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If you want something new, you have to stop doing something old People in any organization are always

attached to the obsolete.


Peter Drucker, Management Challenges for the 21st Century, 1999

Reshaping the Army for Joint Warfighting:


Maneuver inside the 21st Century Joint Force

Douglas Macgregor Colonel (ret) U.S. Army, PhD Executive VP Burke-Macgregor Group LLC +1 703 975 6954 Doug.Macgregor@Burke-Macgregor.com

Outline for Discussion:


I. What you should take away from this presentation. II. What is the new strategy? III. How should the Army organize for Joint Operations? i. Operational Command and Control ii. Tactical Organization for Combat iii. Reduced Overhead iv. Joint Rotational Readiness System IV. How would the new system work? i. Yesterdays System in Retrospect ii. Future Response to Conflict and Crisis V. How does professional development change? VI. What if nothing is done? VII. Summary of Key Points and Recommendations

What you should take away!


To change something, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete.
Richard Buckminster Fuller, 1970

Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (2003) is a book by Michael Lewis that tells the story of how Billy Beane, the general manager of the Oakland Athletics baseball team cast adopted a fundamentally new, analytical, evidencebased, sabermetric approach to assemble a winning baseball team. Beanes new approach brought the A's to the playoffs in 2002 and 2003. Beane had to fight coaches, scouts and industry executives that rejected his game changing concept. Beanes model changed baseball. Any team that fails to use his model today is a dinosaur. Pause now and watch this clip from the Movie, Moneyball:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jjf1O4jMqeM

So, what are the game-changing implications?


The approach outlined in this presentation is the game changer, the Army equivalent of Moneyball! Reorganizing the Army for Joint Warfighting (integrated, all arms/all effects warfare) is a leap ahead in warfare. Its not about new things. Its revolutionary change within an agile framework guided by human understanding. Build a 21st-century Ground Maneuver Force with a scalable, lego-like force design, a design that provides more ready, deployable combat power at lower cost with less overhead. 21st Century Warfare demands forces-in-being organized around maneuver (ground), strike, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and sustainment capabilities for employment under Joint Force Commands (JFCs). Regionally align C2 (JFCs), not Army forces.

Why not leave change in the hands of the generals?


Armies don't innovate; people innovate.
(Robert R. Leonhard, Fighting by Minutes, 1994)

To get ahead in the Army officers must embrace the orthodoxy of how the Army fights.

Army Officers learn early what questions are acceptable to ask, as well as, what answers are acceptable.
Army Officers discover that acceptable technologies, tactics and organizations are those that do not contradict or threaten to disrupt the Army Status quo views on warfare. Without a top-down Redefinition of Warfare that is inherently joint, the Armys organization for combat and modernization parameters will not change.

Then, the nation pays heavily to re-equip the old, shrinking force (The French Army approach between 1920 and 1940).

First, there must be a new Strategy!


Strategic

US National Security Strategy

1. Maintain the military power to ensure no one power or coalition of powers can dominate the Eurasian landmass and restrict the U.S. freedom of maneuver in any area of importance to the U.S. 2. Defend the Western Hemisphere and ensure the security of U.S. borders and coastal waters; 3. As required, conduct punitive military operations to neutralize or destroy unambiguous threats to U.S. national security interests.

US Military Strategy

US Operational Concepts

4. Defend and maintain the lines of communication and bases necessary for the execution of the above tasks. Outcome: Build regionally focused, integrated, Joint Force Commands, (not ad hoc Joint Task Forces), designed to conduct all arms/all effects operations (new operational concept) in dispersed mobile warfare. Outcome: Reorganize the Army to expand the nations range of strategic options; Combat Groups Forces in Being capable of conducting operations on land under Joint C2 against a mix of potential opponents, conventional and unconventional.

Operational

Tactical

Acquisition

New Organization for Combat: Fewer Single Service C2 Echelons, Faster Decision Cycle, Cheaper to Modernize
(Conduct Integrated Operational Maneuver) ARMYJoint HQ Force

Command
Corps HQ Integrated All (Joint Capable) Arms Command

(Conduct Tactical Operations)

Division HQCOMBAT
GROUP (Joint Plugs)

(Conduct Tactical Maneuver) Brigade


Battalion
Task Force

Combat Group is joint capable!


Operational ground forces are wedded to a hierarchical arrangement with its origins in Napoleonic warfare; a pyramid with a commander at each echelon requiring the next higher headquarters to integrate into the joint fight.

Company
Company-Team

The Fighters!

The Joint Force Command Structure


Joint Force Commander

These are modular HQTRS. More C-2 modules can be added as required.

Deputy CDR for Maneuver

Deputy CDR for Strike

Deputy CDR for ISR

Deputy CDR for Sustainment

Army, Navy, AF, Marine capabilities for employment plug in under one star or below.
Modern warfare, conventional or unconventional, demands Joint C2 structures that accelerate decision cycles and integrate the functions of maneuver, strike, intelligence, information, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and sustainment across service lines. Flag officers are drawn from all services. Stand up initial 3 star Joint Force Headquarters at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. Develop template for JFCs across regional unified commands.

Flatter, Faster C2: How does it work?


One Star Force Packages Exist Now! Post-Industrial Age Industrial Age
Combatant CDR Combatant CDR

Joint TF CDR
Corps/AF/Fleet Corps/AF/Fleet Corps/AF/Fleet /MEF CDR /MEF CDR /MEF CDR

Joint Force CDR

Army

Air Air Force

TBD

Division Division CDR Division CDR CDR

Navy

Marines

There wont be time for a pick-up game in a future crisis or conflict. By the time the U.S. gets its operational construct and C2 act in order, China (or any other future great power or coalition of powers) will defeat U.S. forces and achieve its own strategic aims.

Single Service C2 inside the Regional Unified Commands: Example PACOM


Single Service Operational Commands in USPACOM Additional Unified Commands in USPACOM

US Force Japan

Failure in war is most often the absence of one directing mind and commanding will. Sir Winston Churchill

US Force Korea

Alaskan Command

Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC)

Flag Officer Totals: Four Stars: 4 Three Stars: 15 Two Stars: 35 Total: 54 Flag Officers

Integration within a relatively flat, joint command structure is a vital step in the direction of combining ground maneuver forces with Strike, ISR and sustainment capabilities from all the Services.

More teeth, at the expense of Unneeded overhead and tail!


After Conversion: Four Star: 1 Three Stars: 6 Two Stars: 29 Flag Officer Total: 36
Note 1: SOF JTF retained; Note 2: One Stars are excluded from this total
IISR SUST

JFC

5x

Deputy Commander

MNVR

STRIKE

+
MNVR

Deputy Commander

STRIKE

IISR

SUST

JFC Deputy Commanders

More Efficient, Effective and Agile C2 at Lower Cost!

Five regionally focused Joint Force Commands (JFCs); Services provide one-star commanded mission focused ISR, Strike, Maneuver or Sustainment capability-based force packages to JFCs on rotational basis; Deputy CDRs for ISR, Strike, Maneuver and Sustainment assist JFC CDR to employ mission focused capability force packages; Reduced multi-Star headquarters improves tooth to tail ratio.

$ Savings will be substantial!

Notional Areas of JFC Responsibility inside PACOM:

JFC

JFC

JFC

JFC

JFC

Building Joint Force Commands requires a reduction in Army overhead.


Army Materiel Command Training and Doctrine Command
AMC Modernization & Doctrine

TRADOC
Readiness & Training

Forces Command

FORSCOM

Cyril Northcote Parkinsons (1909-1993) Law Applies: Work expands to fill the time available for its completion, "and that a sufficiently large bureaucracy will generate enough internal work to keep itself 'busy' and so justify its continued existence without commensurate output.

The Combat Group: Key Feature of the Lego-like Force Design


Combat Groups offer more capability with less overhead at lower cost; Combat Groups expand the nations range of strategic options; Combat Groups are self-contained, survivable, mobile combat formations of 5-6,000 troops under Brigadier Generals. Combat Groups punch above their weight, mobilizing fighting power disproportionate to its size (High lethality, Low density ); Combat Groups enable the Army to shed unneeded equipment, rationalize modernization and offer the modular continuum of response the nation needs Combat Groups are faster to deploy and cheaper to modernize than divisions.

Mission focused force packages organized around maneuver (ground), Strike, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and sustainment capabilities for employment under Joint C2.

Example: Current BCT Compared with Combat Group


Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) 3,739 Troops Combat Maneuver Groups (CMG) 5,500 Troops

RECON M A N E U V E R M A N E U V E R

58 M1 Tanks 82 M2/3 BFVs 36 LRAS HMMWVs 10 120mm Mortars 16 155mm SP Guns Target Acquistion
Battery

ARMORED RECON SQDN


M A N E U V E R M A N E U V E R M A N E U V E R

114 M1 Tanks 131 M2/3 BFVs 12-16 Armed


Helicopters +2 UH60s LRAS

VS.

UAVs and UCAVs

Fires Battalion

Strike Battalion C4I Battalion Support Battalion

27 120mm Mortars 24 155mm SP Guns 6-8 MLRS (Rocket) Target Acquistion


Battery + Radars and UCAVs

Support Battalion
(CSA plans to restore the third maneuver battalion to Armored and Infantry BCTs increasing their strength to roughly 4,500 men.)

Joint C4ISR/MI C2/MPs/SHORAD

New equipment must be tied to a new force design with a Joint purpose!
Brigadier General commands 5,150 troops

ARMED RECON

CMD (C4ISR) & CONTROL

STRIKE

SUSTAINMENT

The Light Reconnaissance Strike Group has a joint mission focus:


Provides a credible land component with the mobility, firepower, protection and organic sustainment to operate autonomously under Joint C2 in dispersed/distributed mobile warfare;
Magnifies the striking power of aerospace and naval forces; Signals escalation dominance to the enemy; Bypasses or punches through enemy resistance for operational maneuver to encircle and destroy nation-state forces or sub-national groups ; Shifts rapidly as needed between close combat and peace enforcement; Integrates all arms/all effects.

The Light Reconnaissance-Strike Group (LRSG)


ARMED RECON
923 Troops

HHC

293 Troops

RECON TRP
129 Troops

The LRSG is the place for new Puma variants!

RECON TRP
129 Troops

RECON TRP
129 Troops

AGS

ARMORED GUN CO
43 Troops

Estimated cost of fielding four LRSG all arms battle groups equipped with 1,010 Puma variants in 5 to 7 years = $7.2 billion; Versus 1,748 Bradley Replacements (GCVs) for $28.8 billion in 8 years. PUMA variants are non-developmental, speeding delivery. (Pumas can be built in U.S.).

COMBAT ENGINEER CO
104 Troops

MTR BTRY
96 Troops

Notional Reorganized Army Expeditionary Forces:


(250,100 inside 420,000 man AC) Maneuver Echelon: (4) LRSG: Light Reconnaissance Strike Group 5,150 (12) CMG: Combat Maneuver Group (Armor) 5,500 (6) ICG: Infantry Combat Group (Motorized) 5,000 (4) AAG: Airborne-Air Assault Group (Light) 5,000 Strike Echelon: (Aviation/UCAV/MLRS), TMD (4) ACG: Aviation Combat Groups 3500 (2) STG: Strike Groups (UCAV/MLRS) 3,000 (4) TMD: Theater Missile Defense Groups 4,000 ISR Echelon: (C4I plus SR/manned/unmanned) (4) C4I Groups 5,000 Sustainment Echelon: (See engineer consolidation) (8) CSG: Combat Support Groups 6,000 (2) ENG: Engineer Groups (construction) 4,000 (1) CBG: Chem-Bio Warfare Group 3,000 Manpower Total 136,600

Manpower Total 36,000

Manpower Total 20,000


Manpower Total 57,500

At the height of the Korean conflict, 8th Army (in Korea) contained 201,000 U.S. Soldiers.

Army Joint Rotational Readiness


Pre-deployment Phase (6-9 months) Deployment Phase (6-9 months) Reconstitution Phase (6-9 months) Modernization TNG/ED Phase (6-9 months)

1. Army can provide 35,000 to 50,000 ready, deployable troops at all times; The National Command Authorities (NCA) always know what forces/capabilities can deploy; 2. Funding for O&M is managed more efficiently. Preserves depth in the Army Force; 3. Army Force Packages are precisely aligned with strategic air and sea lift; 4. No more last minute, hasty assembly of units and equipment for crisis or conflict; 5. Deployments become predictable improving the quality of life for soldiers and families;

Emergency Crisis or Conflict Imminent:


Deployment Phase (6-9 months)

Forces selected from the deployment phase for immediate deployment.

CMG CMG CMG ICG AAG C4I TMD STG


ACG

Crisis or Conflict requires the deployment of forces to Joint Force Commands inside regional unified command.
Combat Groups within the Deployment Phase are notified by Army readiness and training command for immediate deployment in 96 hours or less.

CSG CSG

Affordable readiness can best be achieved by adopting some form of rotational deployment scheme for the entire U.S. Army both at home and overseas.
MG (ret) Robert H. Scales Jr., USA, Yellow Smoke:
The Future of Land Warfare for Americas Military, 2003

Follow on deployment

Readiness & Training


AAG AAG

CMG CMG CMG

CMG CMG CMG

CMG CMG CMG

CMG CMG CMG

AAG

Army Readiness & Training Command begins notifying follow-on forces in training phase for potential deployment as air and sea lift become available.

ICG ICG

ICG ICG

ICG ICG

C4I

C4I

C4I

C4I

TMD

TMD

TMD

STG

STG

ACG

ACG

ACG

ACG

Victory required a single commander with absolute authority to harness the power of ground, air and naval forces in a way that brought the strengths of each to maximum effectiveness. No duplication of effort, no untapped resources, no inter-Service rivalry.
General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower, 1947

ENG

ENG

CSG CSG

CSG CSG

CSG CSG

CSG CSG

JFCs receive command and control of arriving Army tactical forces.


JFC
CMG CMG CMG CMG CMG CMG CMG CMG CMG

ICG ICG

C4I

C4I

JFC

TMD

STG

STG

ACG

ACG

ENG

CSG CSG

CSG CSG

Change demands a New Professional Development Paradigm!


The more elastic a mans mind is the more it is able to receive and digest new impressions and experiences Youth, in every way, is not only more elastic, but less cautious and far more energetic.
J.F.C. Fuller, Major General, British Army 1936
Combat Group Command Desirable, But Not Required for Promotion

GROUP CMD

Fewer Required Command Gates Create Flexibility in Professional and Intellectual Development.

GROUP CHIEF OF STAFF BATTALION CMD/STAFF


Battalion Command Gate Required for Future Command

Eliminating unneeded echelons offers the opportunity to promote younger officers faster to flag rank. (Scraps Colonel level of command)

STAFF OFFICER COMPANY CMD/STAFF


Company Command Gate Required for Future Command Platoon Command Gate Required for Future Command

PLATOON LEADER/STAFF

New Human Capital Strategy values talent more than longevity! (C2I = Character, Competence, Intelligence).

This is the path to more agile and effective organizations and more empowered junior leaders.

What if nothing is done?


The primary purpose of an army - to be ready to fight effectively at all times seemed to have been forgotten. The leadership I found in many instances was sadly lacking
General Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, page 88.

Without reform and reorganization, the nation ends up with a smaller, less capable, Hollow Army than the one we have today.
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Armys generals fought for the Armys historic budget share and end-strength. New ideas and new organizations were treated as disruptive. Officers with ideas vanished. General Marshall spent 6 years (1939-1945) replacing the Armys club of generals and recovering Army Forces from 20 years of neglect. After 1945, Army Four Stars testified no war for decades and created the hollow constabulary army on wheels that failed in 1950 Korea. After 1991, the Army generals set out to preserve the Army status quo with a failed technological make-over (Force XXI, Future Combat System). Result: Lots of Generals, fewer soldiers, less capability.

You cannot win this war by sitting still!


Sir Winston Churchill, 1915

Bold, new initiatives can succeed. Incremental changes court failure in defense reform and produce few, if any, $ savings.
Organize for a different future, the unexpected, Strategic Surprise; a Korean-like Emergency in 1950 or a Sarajevo-like event in 1914, not counterinsurgency and nation building; Modernize, but dont build a better carburetor. Go for fuel injection with a new, inherently joint force design! With a new force design (Combat Group), $ Savings emerge; unneeded programs and equipment are identified and shed; Reduce and eliminate command overhead the Army no longer needs: Reduce redundant overhead, adopt joint rotational readiness;

Build Joint Force Commands! Single Service Warfare is obsolete.

Recommendation 1:
From March 1942 to April 1945 when there were 11 million men in the Army and Army Air Corps the US had only 4 four star generals to command them. How many four stars do we have to direct today's Active Army and Air Force? Answer: 21 Four Stars for 879,000 soldiers and airmen. From 7 December to 31 December 1946 when there were 4,183,466 million men in the Navy and 480,000 in the Marines the US had 4 four star admirals to command them: How many four stars do we have to direct todays Active Navy and Marine Corps?

Answer: 10 Four Star Admirals and 5 Four Star Marine Generals for a combined force of 490,000.

What is to be done?
1. Freeze all flag rank promotions pending DoD wide Flag Officer review, identify Flag rank Billets for downgrade 1 or more stars and those billets for elimination; 2. Direct Unified Command Plan to consolidate COCOMs into five RCCs Pacific, Atlantic (formerly EUCOM and AFRICOM), Central, Northern, Southern and Central Commands; 3. Establish initial 3 star Joint Force Headquarters at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. Develop template for JFCs across regional unified commands.

Recommendation 2:
End the state of war/national emergency. Urge the President to reverse President Bushs Executive Order 13223 that suspended Flag and General Officer End Strength Limits after 9/11. Current USA 4 Star 10 3 Star 51 USAF 11 44 USN 10 38 USMC 5 17 Total 36 150

Title 10 USC End Strength Limits 4 Star 7 9 6 3 Star 38 34 26

2 13

24 111

Review and Reevaluate 12 Four Star and 51 Three Star Billets.

Bureaucratic Bloat Increases Costs and Obstructs Effective and Efficient Operational and Administrative Command
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/rg1302.pdf http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/10C32.txt

Recommendation 3:

SECDEF should exercise his authority, direction, and control,* to increase value while reducing cost.
Change is a marathon, not a sprint. Direct the following actions: 1. Document current baseline capability inside Army; 2. Model the forces described in this briefing in simulation.
NOTE: Israeli Defense Force and U.S. Army modeled BTP/TUF forces in simulation. Results dramatically favored the new force design. (Points of Contact Available on Request)

3. Identify existing gaps/overlaps/seams. Overlaps help identify current and future systems and/or investments that are not needed inside the Joint Force. 4. Develop an Army Reorganization Roadmap for execution to include milestones and requirements. 5. Direct the CSA to stand up, exercise and validate the formations outlined in the reorganization proposal and report to the Secretary of Defense on the execution of the roadmap. Reorganize the Force! * 10 USC 113 (b)