3 views

Uploaded by balrajjadon

save

- Estimation Theory
- 1040.pdf
- Engdahl 1998.pdf
- d 3652 - d 3652m - 93 r99 ntjnlvjfra
- Lecture
- ICP-OES
- An_Introduction_to_the_Bootstrap.pdf
- Jackknife Method
- An Illuminating Counter Example
- the uses of the erotic
- C50C50M-13
- Model pemikiran Geometri Van Hiele
- Bootstrapping a Universal Pivot When Nuisance Parameters Are Estimated
- Thoughts on the Secularization of Easter
- Heteroscedasticity3 150218115247 Conversion Gate01
- 7. Sampling and Sampling Distributionsnew.doc
- A Reasoning Teaser
- Transitions Words
- Part4-PanelDataBinaryChoiceModels
- 000465.pdf
- On the Dialogue Form
- Paradoxes
- Elon Musk: Tesla, SpaceX, and the Quest for a Fantastic Future
- Dispatches from Pluto: Lost and Found in the Mississippi Delta
- The Innovators: How a Group of Hackers, Geniuses, and Geeks Created the Digital Revolution
- Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind
- Yes Please
- The Unwinding: An Inner History of the New America
- This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate
- Grand Pursuit: The Story of Economic Genius
- A Heartbreaking Work Of Staggering Genius: A Memoir Based on a True Story
- The Emperor of All Maladies: A Biography of Cancer
- The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power
- John Adams
- Devil in the Grove: Thurgood Marshall, the Groveland Boys, and the Dawn of a New America
- The World Is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century
- Rise of ISIS: A Threat We Can't Ignore
- The Hard Thing About Hard Things: Building a Business When There Are No Easy Answers
- Smart People Should Build Things: How to Restore Our Culture of Achievement, Build a Path for Entrepreneurs, and Create New Jobs in America
- Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln
- The New Confessions of an Economic Hit Man
- How To Win Friends and Influence People
- Steve Jobs
- Angela's Ashes: A Memoir
- Bad Feminist: Essays
- You Too Can Have a Body Like Mine: A Novel
- The Incarnations: A Novel
- The Light Between Oceans: A Novel
- Leaving Berlin: A Novel
- The Silver Linings Playbook: A Novel
- The Sympathizer: A Novel (Pulitzer Prize for Fiction)
- Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close: A Novel
- A Man Called Ove: A Novel
- The Master
- Bel Canto
- We Are Not Ourselves: A Novel
- The First Bad Man: A Novel
- The Rosie Project: A Novel
- The Blazing World: A Novel
- The Flamethrowers: A Novel
- Brooklyn: A Novel
- Life of Pi
- The Love Affairs of Nathaniel P.: A Novel
- The Bonfire of the Vanities: A Novel
- Lovers at the Chameleon Club, Paris 1932: A Novel
- The Perks of Being a Wallflower
- My Sister's Keeper: A Novel
- A Prayer for Owen Meany: A Novel
- The Cider House Rules
- Wolf Hall: A Novel
- The Art of Racing in the Rain: A Novel
- The Wallcreeper
- Interpreter of Maladies
- The Kitchen House: A Novel
- Beautiful Ruins: A Novel

You are on page 1of 43

Robin Hanson

Associate Professor of Economics

George Mason University

We Disagree, Knowingly

• Stylized Facts:

– Argue in science/politics, bets on stocks/sports

– Especially regarding ability, when hard to check

• Less on “There’s another tree”

– Dismiss dumber, but not defer to smarter

– Disagree not embarrass, its absence can

– Given any free pair, find many disagree topics

• Even people who think rationals should not disagree

• Precise: we can publicly predict direction of

other’s next opinion, relative to what we say

We Can’t Agree to Disagree

Nobel Prize 2005 his most cited paper by x2

Agent 1 Info Set

Aumann 1976 assumed:

• Any information

• Of possible worlds

• Common knowledge

• Of exact E1[x], E2[x]

• Would say next

• For Bayesians

• With common priors

• If seek truth, not lie, josh,

or misunderstand

Common Knowledge Set Agent 2 Info Set

John estimates car age E1[x]

**“It wasn’t “I’ve never
**

shiny” been wrong

before”

“I can still

“It picture it”

sounded “I had a good

old” viewing angle”

“Fred said so”

**age 7 here “Mary is blind”
**

age 2 here

Mary estimates

car age E2[x]

age 7 here

age 2 here

Agree If Averages Same

E1[x] =

E2[x]

Aumann (1976)

Annals Stat. 4(6):1236-9.

We Can’t Agree to Disagree

Aumann in 1976: Since generalized to:

• Any information

• Of possible worlds Impossible worlds

• Common knowledge Common Belief

• Of exact E1[x], E2[x] A f(•, •), or who max

• Would say next Last ±(E1[x] - E1[E2[x]])

• For Bayesians At core, or Wannabe

• With common priors Symmetric prior origins

• If seek truth, not lie or

misunderstand

We Can’t Agree to Disagree

Aumann in 1976: Since generalized to:

• Any information

• Of possible worlds Impossible worlds

• Common knowledge Common Belief

• Of exact E1[x], E2[x] A f(•, •), or who max

• Would say next Last ±(E1[x] - E1[E2[x]])

• For Bayesians At core, or Wannabe

• With common priors Symmetric prior origins

• If seek truth, not lie or

misunderstand

Disagreement Is Unpredictable

I (ω ) knows X ω = v if I(ω) ⊆ {ω : X ω = v}

meet IΛ J (ω ) is common knowledge (c.k.)

Vω = E µ [ X ω | I (ω )], Yω = E µ [ X ω | J (ω )]

Z ω = E µ [ Yω | I (ω )], Pω = 1[ Z ω − Vω > 0]

Note : E µ [ Z ω − Vω | IΛ J (ω )] = 0

If c.k. that J knows P, then c.k. that Z ω = Vω !

Hanson (2002) Econ. Lett. 77:365–369.

Experiment Shows Disagree

E.g.: What % of U.S. say dogs better pets than cats?

time Example

• A gets clue on X • B gets clue on X

• A1 = A’s guess of X

30%

• B told A1

70% • B1 = B’s guess of X

40% • B2 = B’s guess of A2

**• A told Sign(B2-B1) “low”
**

• A2 = A’s guess of X 40%

• Loss (A1-X)2+(A2-X)2 • Loss (B1-X)2+(B2-A2)2

A neglects clue from B B reliably predicts neglect

Sample Percent Questions

• What percent of people in the U.S. agree with this

opinion? “God created humans in basically their present

form in the last 10,000 years.” (Gallup,1999)

• What percent of people in the U.S. agree with this

opinion? “The U.S. government is hiding that it knows of

the existence of aliens.” (CNN 1994)

• By weight, what percent of cheddar cheese is protein?

(U.S. Department of agriculture)

• What percent of the population of India is literate?

(Nation of India)

Experiment Features

• All answers integers in [0,100], either real % or

XA + XB, each from 6s dice: [0,10,20,30,40,50]

• All by hand, subjects roll dice first, for credibility

• Subjects told all after each round, to help

learning

• Zipper design, to minimize strategic interactions

• Lottery payoff, to reduce risk aversion

• Double dice, for easy squared-error penalty

• Only tell B-sign, to reduce signaling ability

Complexity of Agreement

**Can exchange 100 bits, get agree to within 10% (fails 10%).
**

Can exchange 106 bits, get agree to within 1% (fails 1%).

**“We first show that, for two agents with a common
**

prior to agree within ε about the expectation of a

[0,1] variable with high probability over their prior, it

suffices for them to exchange order 1/ε2 bits. This

bound is completely independent of the number of

bits n of relevant knowledge that the agents have.

… we give a protocol ... that can be simulated by

agents with limited computational resources.”

Aaronson (2005) Proc. ACM STOC, 634-643.

We Can’t Agree to Disagree

Aumann in 1976: Since generalized to:

• Any information

• Of possible worlds Impossible worlds

• Common knowledge Common Belief

• Of exact E1[x], E2[x] A f(•, •), or who max

• Would say next Last ±(E1[x] - E1[E2[x]])

• For Bayesians At core, or Wannabe

• With common priors Symmetric prior origins

• If seek truth, not lie or

misunderstand

Generalized Beyond Bayesians

• Possibility-set agents: if balanced

(Geanakoplos ‘89), or “Know that they

know” (Samet ‘90), …

• Turing machines: if can prove all

computable in finite time (Medgiddo ‘89,

Shin & Williamson ‘95)

• Ambiguity Averse (maxact minp in S Ep[Uact])

• Many specific heuristics …

• Bayesian Wannabes

Consider Bayesian Wannabes

~

X i (ω ) = E [ X (ω ) | I i (ω )] + eiω [ X ]

µi

Pure Agree

Disagree Sources to Disagree? A.D. X(ω ) ⇒

A.D. E[Y(ω ) | Ω]

Prior µ1 (ω ) ≠ µ2 (ω ) Yes Either combo

Info I1 (ω ) ≠ I 2 (ω ) No implies pure

version!

Errors e1ω ≠ e2ω Yes

A.D. X(ω ) ⇒

Ex: E 3.14,

E 2 2/7 A.D. Y(ω ) = Y

Notation

State ω ∈ Ω (finite)

Random variable X (ω ) ∈ [ X , X + ∆X ]

Information I i (ω ) ∈ I i (a partition)

Bayesian estimateX i (ω ) ≡ E µi [ X (ω ) | I i (ω )]

~ ~

Wannabe estimate X i (ω ) = Eiω [ X ] = X i (ω ) + eiω [ X ]

**Assume : eiω = eiω ′ ∀ω ′ ∈ I i (ω )
**

More Notation

Bias ei [ X | S ] ≡ E µ [eiω [ X ] | S ]

~

Expect unbiased E iω [ei [ X | S ]] = 0

**Calibrated error eiω [ X ] = miω [ X ] + ci [ X ]
**

Choose ci at Di (ω ) ∈ Di coarsens I i

**Lemma 1 The ci which mins
**

~

E[( X i − X ) 2 | Di (ω)] sets ei [ X | Di (ω)] = 0.

Still More Notation

~q ~

Estimation set Bi (E ) ≡ {ω | E iω [ µ i ( E | I i (ω ))] ≥ q}

~

N q-agree that E in C E C ⊂ i∈N Biq (C E )

~ ~

i,j ε-disagree about X {ω | X i (ω ) ≥ X j (ω ) + ε } ≡ Fε [ X ]

~ ~

i,j α , β -disagree about X {ω | X i (ω ) ≥ α > β ≥ X j (ω )}

**i, j q-agree to ε-disagree {i, j} q-agree that i, j ε-disagree
**

Let 1,2 Agree to Disagree Re X

~q

A = C F Fε [ X ], Bi = Bi (A) (coarsens Di )

~ ~

ei = ei [ X | Bi ], pi = µ ( A|Bi ) p2 ≡ E 2ω [ p0 ]

p0 ≡ min( p1 , p2 ), εˆ( p ) ≡ pε − 2(1 − p ) ∆X

**Lemma 4 : ε ≥ 0 and e2 = 0 imply e1 ≥ εˆ( p0 )
**

~ ~

E 2ω [e1 ] ≥ ε ( p2 )

ˆ (3)

~

E1ω [e1 ] = 0 (4)

Theorems

Re agents 1,2 q-agreeing to ε-disagree about X ,

IF at some ω equations 3 and 4 are satisfied,

1

THEN at ω agents 2,1 q-agree to

εˆ( ~

p2 ),0-disagree about e1

IF agents 1,2 q-agree to ε-disagree (within C ) that

they ε-disagree about X and satisfy eqns 3 and 4,

2 THEN ( within C ) agents 2,1 q-agree to

εˆ ( ~p2 ),0-disagree about e1

Theorem in English

**• If two Bayesian wannabes
**

– nearly agree to disagree about any X,

– nearly agree each thinks himself nearly unbiased,

– nearly agree that one agent’s estimate of other’s bias

is consistent with a certain simple algebraic relation

• Then they nearly agree to disagree about Y,

one agent’s average error regarding X.

(Y is state-independent, so info is irrelevant).

Hanson (2003) Theory & Decision 54(2):105-123.

Wannabe Summary

• Bayesian wannabes are a general model of

computationally-constrained agents.

• Add minimal assumptions that maintain some

easy-to-compute belief relations.

• For such Bayesian wannabes, A.D. (agreeing to

disagree) regarding X( ) implies A.D. re Y( )=Y.

• Since info is irrelevant to estimating Y, any A.D.

implies a pure error-based A.D.

• So if pure error A.D. irrational, all are.

We Can’t Agree to Disagree

Aumann in 1976: Since generalized to:

• Any information

• Of possible worlds Impossible worlds

• Common knowledge Common Belief

• Of exact E1[x], E2[x] A f(•, •), or who max

• Would say next Last ±(E1[x] - E1[E2[x]])

• For Bayesians At core, or Wannabe

• With common priors Symmetric prior origins

• If seek truth, not lie or

misunderstand

Which Priors Are Rational?

Prior = counterfactual belief if same min info

• Extremes: all priors rational, vs. only one is

– Can claim rational unique even if can’t construct (yet)

• Common to say these should have same prior:

– Different mental modules in your mind now

– You today and you yesterday (update via Bayes’ rule)

• Common to criticize self-favoring priors in others

– E.g., coach favors his kid, manager favors himself

– “I (Joe) beat Meg, but if I were Meg, Meg beats Joe”

• Prior origins not special => priors same

Origins of Priors

• Seems irrational to accept some prior origins

– Imagine random brain changes for weird priors

• In standard science, your prior origin not special

– Species-common DNA

• Selected to predict ancestral environment

– Individual DNA variations (e.g. personality)

• Random by Mendel’s rules of inheritance

• Sibling differences independent of everything else!

– Culture: random + adapted to local society

• Turns out you must think differing prior is special!

• Can’t express these ideas in standard models

Standard Bayesian Model

**Agent 1 Info Set
**

A Prior

Agent 2 Info Set

Common Kn. Set

An Extended Model

Multiple Standard

Models With

Different Priors

Standard Bayesian Model

State ω ∈ Ω (finite) Agent i ∈ {1,2 ,...,N }

Prior pi (ω ) , p ≡ ( p1,p2 ,...,pN )

Info Π it (ω ), Π t ≡ ( Π1t ,Π t2 ,...,Π tN ), Π ≡ ( Π t )t∈T

Belief pitω ( E ) = pi ( E | Π it (ω )), E⊂Ω

**In Model (Ω, p, Π ), p is common knowledge
**

Extending the State Space

Possible priors pi ∈ P, p ∈ PN

~ ~

Pre - state ω ≡ (ω , p ) ∈ Ω ≡ Ω × PN

~ As event

E ≡ {(ω, p ) : ω ∈ E}, p ≡ { (ω, p′) : p′ = p}

~ ~

pi ( E | p ) ≡ pi ( E ) (1)

~t

′ ′ ′ ′

Π i ((ω, p )) ≡ {(ω , p ) : p = p, ω ∈ Π i (ω )}

t

An Extended Model

Pre - info Γit (ω ), Γ t = ( Γ1t , Γ2t ,..., ΓNt ), Γ = ( Γt )t∈S

~ ~t ~

Γ (ω ) = Π i (ω ), ∀t ∈ T ∩ S

i

t

~ ), q = ( q ,q ,...,q ), allow q ≠ q

Pre - prior qi (ω 1 2 N i j

~ ~ ~

qi ( E | p ) = pi ( E | p ) (2)

**In Model (Ω, P, Π, q, Γ), p is common knowledge
**

~t

relative to Π , t ∈ T , but not necessarily Γ , t ∈ S .

t

My Differing Prior Was Made Special

My prior and any ordinary event E are informative about

each other. Given my prior, no other prior is informative

about any E, nor is E informative about any other prior.

~ ~

(1) & (2) ⇒ qi ( E | p1 , p2 ,..., pi ,..., pN , B ) = pi ( E | B )

**In P, A is independent of B given C if P(A|BC) = P(A|C).
**

~

Theorem 1 In qi , any E is independent of any p j ≠i , given pi .

~ ~

Theorem 2 In qi , any E depends on pi via qi ( E | pi ) = pi ( E ).

Corollaries

~ ~

Corollary 1 If qi ( E | pi = P ) = qi ( E | pi = P′), then P ( E ) = P′( E ).

**My prior only changes if events are more or less likely.
**

~ ~

Corollary 2 If qi ( E | pi = P, p j = P ) = qi ( E | pi = P′, p j = P ),

′

then P( E ) = P′( E ).

If an event is just as likely in situations where my prior is

switched with someone else, then those two priors

assign the same chance to that event.

Only common priors satisfy these and symmetric prior origins.

A Tale of Two Astronomers

• Disagree if universe open/closed

• To justify via priors, must believe:

“Nature could not have been just as

likely to have switched priors, both if

open and if closed”

“If I had different prior, would be in

situation of different chances”

“Given my prior, fact that he has a

particular prior says nothing useful”

All false for brothers’ genetic priors!

We Can’t Agree to Disagree

Aumann in 1976: Since generalized to:

• Any information

• Of possible worlds Impossible worlds

• Common knowledge Common Belief

• Of exact E1[x], E2[x] A f(•, •), or who max

• Would say next Last ±(E1[x] - E1[E2[x]])

• For Bayesians At core, or Wannabe

• With common priors Symmetric prior origins

• If seek truth, not lie or

misunderstand

Why Do We Disagree?

• Theory or data wrong? • They seem robust

• Few know theory? • Big change coming?

• Infeasible to apply? • Need just a few adds

• We lie?

• Exploring issues? • We usually think not,

• Misunderstandings? and effect is linear

• We not seek truth?

• Each has prior: • But we complain of

“I reason better” ? this in others

Our Answer: We Self-Deceive

• We biased to think better driver, lover, …

“I less biased, better data & analysis”

• Evolutionary origin: helps us to deceive

– Mind “leaks” beliefs via face, tone of voice, …

– Leak less if conscious mind really believes

• Beliefs like clothes

– Function in harsh weather, fashion in mild

• When made to see self-deception, still disagree

– So at some level we accept that we not seek truth

How Few Meta-Rationals (MR)?

Meta-Rational = Seek truth, not lie, not self-

favoring-prior, know disagree theory basics

• Rational beliefs linear in chance other is MR

• MR who meet, talk long, should see are MR?

– Joint opinion path becomes random walk

• We see no virtually such pairs, so few MR!

– N each talk 2T others, makes ~N*T*(%MR)2 pairs

– 2 billion ea. talk to 100, if 1/10,000 MR, get 1000 pairs

• None even among accept disagree irrational

When Justified In Disagree?

When others disagree, so must you

• Key: relative MR/self-deception before IQ/info

• Psychology literature self-deception clues:

– Less in skin response, harder re own overt behaviors, older kids

hide better, self-deceivers have more self-esteem, less

psychopathology/depression

• Clues?: IQ/idiocy, self-interest, emotional arousal,

formality, unwilling to analyze/consider

– Self-deceptive selection of clues use

• Need: data on who tends to be right if disagree!

– Tetlock shows “hedgehogs” wrong on foreign events

– One media analysis favors: longer articles, in news vs editorial

style, by men, non-book on web or air, in topical publication with

more readers and awards

We Can’t Agree to Disagree

Aumann in 1976: Since generalized to:

• Any information

• Of possible worlds Impossible worlds

• Common knowledge Common Belief

• Of exact E1[x], E2[x] A f(•, •), or who max

• Would say next Last ±(E1[x] - E1[E2[x]])

• For Bayesians At core, or Wannabe

• With common priors Symmetric prior origins

• If seek truth, not lie or

misunderstand

Implications

• Self-Deception is Ubiquitious!

• Facts may not resolve political/social disputes

– Even if we share basic values

• Let models of academics have non-truth-seekers

• New info institution goal: reduce self-deception

– Speculative markets do well; use more?

• Self-doubt for supposed truth-seekers

– “First cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then

shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy

brother's eye.” Matthew 7:5

Common Concerns

• I’m smarter, understand my reasons better

• My prior is more informed

• Different models/assumptions/styles

• Lies, ambiguities, misunderstandings

• Logical omniscience, act non-linearities

• Disagree explores issue, motivates effort

• We disagree on disagreement

• Bayesian “reductio ad absurdum”

Counter Example

• P(y) = exp(-by) π ( y ) ∝ exp(− βy )

• Asodpf

s = y +ε

E[ε 2 ] =

U ( s′, b) = bs′ + ln( P ( y* | s′))

ε ≈ N (0, σ 2 ),η ≈ N (0,θ 2 )

P ( s′ | s, b) ∝ exp( E[U ( s′, b) | s, b] / r )

P ( y | s ) = N ( s − βσ 2 , σ 2 )

- Estimation TheoryUploaded byArmando Cajahuaringa
- 1040.pdfUploaded bypollux23
- Engdahl 1998.pdfUploaded bymanuelflorez1102
- d 3652 - d 3652m - 93 r99 ntjnlvjfraUploaded byPatricio Alejandro Salazar Rojas
- LectureUploaded byHuongQuynh
- ICP-OESUploaded bysabir21
- An_Introduction_to_the_Bootstrap.pdfUploaded byCyprian Omari
- Jackknife MethodUploaded byLe Hoang Van
- An Illuminating Counter ExampleUploaded byf.cordella5397
- the uses of the eroticUploaded byapi-243335303
- C50C50M-13Uploaded byLorena Jimenez
- Model pemikiran Geometri Van HieleUploaded byNurul Ain
- Bootstrapping a Universal Pivot When Nuisance Parameters Are EstimatedUploaded byIsmael Neu
- Thoughts on the Secularization of EasterUploaded byChris Antenucci
- Heteroscedasticity3 150218115247 Conversion Gate01Uploaded byLWANGA FRANCIS
- 7. Sampling and Sampling Distributionsnew.docUploaded byWinnie Ip
- A Reasoning TeaserUploaded byCastle Here Tear
- Transitions WordsUploaded byJulian Galvis
- Part4-PanelDataBinaryChoiceModelsUploaded byJesús M. Villero
- 000465.pdfUploaded byKurdi
- On the Dialogue FormUploaded byBart Mazzetti
- ParadoxesUploaded bymcdropkicker