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PERSIAN GULF WAR 1991

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War should never be

thought of as

something autonomous but always as

an instrument of policy…. This way of
looking at it will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and the situations which give rise to them Clausewitz
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INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION
 The Gulf War (2 August 1990 – 28 February 1991), codenamed Operation Desert Storm (17 January 1991 – 28 February 1991) was a war waged by a U.N authorized Coalition force from 34 nations led by the United States, against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait.  The war is also known under other names, such as the Persian Gulf War, First Gulf War, Gulf War I, or the First Iraq War before the term "Iraq War" became identified instead with the 2003 Iraq War (also referred to in the U.S. as "Operation Iraqi Freedom").

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INTRODUCTION
 Kuwait's invasion by Iraqi troops which began on 2 August 1990 was met with international condemnation, and brought immediate economic sanctions against Iraq by members of the U.N Security Council  U.S. President George H. W. Bush deployed U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia, and urged other countries to send their own forces to the scene. An array of nations joined the Coalition. The great majority of the Coalition's military forces were from the U.S., with Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and Egypt as leading contributors  The war however cannot be attributed as a classical example of military or operational strategy as no semblance of parity existed between belligerent forces, however it will have a profound impact on future of warfare and holds some important lessons for us

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INTRODUCTION
August 2, 1990-Iraq invades Kuwait

August 7, 1990-President George Bush launches "Operation Desert Shield", sending American troops to try to stop an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. First U.S. Fighter plains arrive in Saudi Arabia
January 16-17, 1991-The air war begins. Bombers and cruise missiles strike at power plants and other important targets. Iraq attacks Israel with scud missiles .This air war last 42 days
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INTRODUCTION
February 24, 1991-Allied ground assault begins. Iraqis leave Kuwait igniting an estimated 700 oil wells in Kuwait February 28, 1991-Conclusion of war declared after 100 hours

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AIM
Analyse the Gulf War 1991 with special
reference to the Allied air campaign and the

100 hours Ground War focusing on its aims,
objectives and plans. Also highlight the

lessons that can be drawn with relevance to
the Indo – Pak war perspective.
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SEQUENCE
     Area of Warzone and Pol Background to War Aims/Objs and Strategies of the Belligerents Air Campaign The Ground Offensive Analysis and lessons learnt with ref to Indo Pak Perspective

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BACKGROUND

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AREA OF WARZONE

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AREA OF WARZONE
RUMAYLA

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POL BACKGROUND TO WAR

Iraq had a number of reasons for attacking Kuwait. Iraq had never really accepted the state of Kuwait and considered it to be part the land between Euphrates and Tigris rivers that had historically belonged to Iraq (before fall of Ottoman Empire)  Iraq thought the underground oil along the border with Kuwait at the Rumayla oil fields was being stolen through slant drilling from inside Iraqi territory  Iraq claimed before the war, Kuwait was responsible for the reducing world oil prices.

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POL BACKGROUND TO WAR

Saddam Hussein claimed that Kuwait owed his country money for Iraq’s economic losses. Kuwait's leaders refused all of Saddam's demands and increased its oil production by 40 percent.

 US diplomatic stance to Kuwait-Iraq Situation before Iraqi invasion was indifferent and Iraq misperceived that US will not be drawn into the conflict

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POL BACKGROUND TO WAR
On the 25th July 1990 , Saddam met with April Glaspie, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, in Baghdad. According to an Iraqi transcript of that meeting, Glaspie told the Iraqi delegation, "We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts

 According to Glaspie's own account, she stated so in reference to the precise border between Kuwait and Iraq and she believed that war was not imminent

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MIL AIMS / OBJS AND STRATEGIES OF BELLIGERENTS

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POLITICAL AIMS /OBJS
• Iraq needed to speedily replenish her

coffers depleted by the protracted war
with Iran • Saddam Hussein penchant desire to become the pivotal figure in the Arab world to ensure his political survival
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Expand seaward access in Persian Gulf for trade and oil
WARBAH BUBIYAN

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MIL AIM /OBJ
Occupy and ensure def of Kuwaiti territory
against aggression from Saudi Arabia and

Allied Gulf Countries and guarding against
reaction from Allied Forces

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xx xx

RG
xx

RG
III

CDO

III

CDO

INVASION OF
KUWAIT AUG 1990
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US POLITICO - MIL AIMS /OBJS

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POLITICAL AIMS /OBJS
• Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait • Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government • Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and • Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad
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IMPLICIT AIMS/ OBJS
• Establishing and regulating control over Middle East • Minimising threat to Israel a close ally other than deterring future enemies • Asserting global and regional hegemony by use/demonstration of politico – military and technological prowess
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WORLD RESPONSE AND FORMATION OF COALITION

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$ 54 Billion

50 Countries Participated

200,000 Tps

COALITION CONTRIBUTIONS
1200 Tks 60 Warships 750 Aircraft

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US EXTERIOR MNVR
• Isolate Iraq diplomatically

• Secure Security Council Resolutions
• Strangulate Iraq’s resources through blockade • Defame media Saddam through aggressive

• Seeker of Justice and defender of weak • Ensure cooperation of the big five in UN27

IRAQ’S EXTERIOR MNVR
• Link Israel with Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait • Break the coalition by drawing Israel into conflict • Exploit Islamic card, portraying it as Islamic Jihad against Western Infidels
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OP DESERT SHIELD

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MIL OBJS OP DESERT SHIELD
• Dev a defensive cap in the Gulf Region • Defend Saudi Arabia • Build a mil effective coalition and

integrate Coalition forces
• UNSC Resolution 661 and 665
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BELLIGERENT STRATEGIES

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IRAQ

Attrition oriented strategy focused
on def of Kuwait

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COALITION
Strategy of Annihilation aimed at undermining the Iraq’s offn capability

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OP DESERT STORM
“We are going to cut off the Iraqi
Army in Kuwait, and then we are going to kill them” Colin Powel

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OP DESERT STORM

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MIL OBJS – OP DESERT STORM
• Attk Iraqi political – Mil ldrship and Comd and Comm

centers
• Gain air supremacy • Sever Iraqi supply lines • Destroy NBC Production, storage and delivery capabilities

• Destroy Republican Guard in the KTO
• Liberate Kuwait City
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AIR CAMPAIGN

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AIR CAMPAIGN OBJS
• To neutralise Iraqi Command, Control
and Communication infrastructure

• To gain and maintain air supremacy
• To destroy Iraqi NBC capability

• To weaken Iraqi ground forces in KTO
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COMPARISON OF AIR FORCES

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COALITION AIR ORDER OF BATTLE
COUNTRY USA NO OF AC DEPL 1376

SAUDI ARABIA UK UAE FRANCE BAHRAIN CANADA OMAN KUWAIT QATAR ITALY TOTAL

175 69 50 42 24 24 20 18 12 10 1820

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IRAQI AIR ORDER OF BATTLE
TYPE OF AC FIGHTER BOMBERS RECCE TOTAL NO OF AC DEPL 582 16 32 630

IRAQI AIR DEFENCE WEAPONS
SAMS AAA 17000 1000
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COMPARISON OF AIR FORCES
Coalition Hi –Tech Med / Low Tech Strat Bombers 1100 675 45 Iraq 630 42

COALITION AIR POWER STRATEGY
• Aimed to cause paralysis through extensive use of Air Power
– Command, Con and Comm – War making industry – Armed Forces – Transportation
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IRAQI AIR FORCE STRATEGY
Learning from 8 years Iran Iraq war, Iraqi leadership believed that air power cannot perform a major role in any large scale war. Saddam Hussein thought that coalition could not sustain its air effort beyond 4 – 5 days and thereafter the Iraqis would impose a ground battle on them. Based on this strategy Iraqi Air Force was developed to perform mostly the Air Defence Role based on Soviet philosophy.

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CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

H hour 0300 hours 17 January 1991

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CONDUCT OF OP
• Phase I – 2000 sorties per day – Air superiority achieved within one week

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CONDUCT OF OP
• Phase II – Destroying 36 Bridges – Reduced the Iraqi Logistics to 10% • Phase III
– Provided int, fire power and air cover to gr forces
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SUMMARY OF OPS
• Coalition flew over 100,000 sorties
• Dropped 88,500 tones of bombs

• 6500 tons were precision weapons

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SUMMARY OF LOSSES
• Coalition shot down

– 17 Iraqi Aircraft in aerial engagements
– 18 while fleeing to Iran

– 127 on ground
• 148 Iraqi Aircraft fled to Iran

• Coalition lost 60 aircraft
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ANALYSIS OF AIR OPs

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COMMAND AND CONTROL
• UNIFIED COMD • AWACS • SATELLITES • UAV & JSTARS

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ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY
• PRECISION MUNITIONS
• DAY AND NI OPS

• AIR TO AIR REFUELLING
• EW

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

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LEAFLET DROP

Surrender now and you might live to see your family again”

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USE OF MEDIA

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FLAWED IRAQI AIR STRATEGY
Saddam Hussein’s misconception about the capabilities of air power, led him to under utilise the capabilities of his large air fleet. Saddam not only faltered in his strategy but also failed to utilise the true merit of the air machines he had. Decision to flee planes to Iran once they were most needed in the war proved very costly as they were not subsequently utilized Iraqi pilots lacked int abt en due to lack of surv means and sat images

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THE GROUND OFFENSIVE 100 HOURS BATTLE

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PREVALENT OP ENVMT
• Iraq stood politically and military

isolated through an exterior manoeuvre • Air Campaign had seriously impinged upon Command and Con system of Iraq • Base of Op of Iraqi forces in KTO stood op vuln to Coalition Air Campaign
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PREVALENT OP ENVMT
• Prolonged blockade had degraded Iraqi war potential besides psychological effects

• By the time the land offn began, Iraqi cbt effectiveness had significantly reduced
• Technologically Iraqi’s were at clear disadvantage 59

OPPOSING FORCES

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TALIL
AS-SALMAN

JALIBAH
AL-BUSAYYA

BASRA

450000 Tps

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IRAQI DEPL IN KTO

IRAQ
Local Res

Strat Res 8 Divs

Op Res 10 Divs

6 x divisions

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COALITION LAND FORCES
18 Army Contingents comprising 800,000 tps

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US LAND FORCES
• 2x Corps HQs (VII and XVIII)

• 3x Armd Divs (1, 3 and 1st Cav)
• One Airborne Div (82nd AB) • One Air Assault Div (101) • 2x Mech Inf Divs (1 and 24) • 2x Marine Inf Divs (1 and 2)
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COALITION LAND FORCES
• Britian. One Armd Div (1st)

• France. One Armd Div (6th)
• Egypt. One Armd and One Mech Div

• Syria. One Armd Div
• KSA
– Two Armd Bdes – Two Mech Bdes
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OPPOSING STRATEGIES

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IRAQI FORCES
• Iraqi Army was poised to defend Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) • Hardened layers defences

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IRAQ

SADDAM LINE

Trenches
KUWAIT

Barbed Wires
SAUDI ARABIA

Anti Tank ditches
MINES
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IRAQI FORCES
• Iraqi Army was poised to defend Kuwait
Theater of Operations (KTO) • Hardened layers defences • Attrition oriented strategy to inflict heavy causalities

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COALITION STRATEGY FOR OP DESERT STORM

Strategy inclined towards

of

annihilation

maneuver
warfare
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CONDUCT OF OP GROUND OFFN

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OP STRAT PERSPECTIVE GROUND OFFN

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IRAQ’S STRATEGIC ERRORS
• Annexation of Kuwait
• Missed Strategic Opportunity of

Sealing Ports / Securing KSA Oilfields
• Strategic Bal

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NOTION OF BALANCE

IRAQ
Local Res

Strat Res 8 Divs

Op Res 10 Divs

6 x divisions

IRAQ DEPL 43 DIVS OUT OF 53 IN KTO
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IRAQ’S STRATEGIC ERRORS
• Annexation of Kuwait • Missed Strategic Opportunity of

Sealing Ports / Securing KSA Oilfields
• Strategic Bal

• Strategic Posture
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COALITION STRAT ERROR WAR TERMINATION FAILURE TO CLOSE THE RING

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LESSONS IN INDO-PAK SCENRIO

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LESSONS IN INDO PAK SCENARIO
• High tech, lethal, short and swift wars
• Technology dominated warfare

• Qualitative than quantitative apch
• Information superiority

• Air and Space Con / Use of Imagery
• Precision Engagements
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LESSONS IN INDO PAK SCENARIO
• Enhanced Integration and joint planning
• Effective use EW • Regional Wars – need for alliances • Focused Logistics / War Stamina • Leadership the ultimate factor
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LESSONS IN INDO PAK SCENARIO
• Strong air arm with technological edge
over adversary

• Exterior manoeuvre vital to attain objs
• Management of Info and Media Warfare • Indigenous R&D Base / HRD
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LESSONS IN INDO PAK SCENARIO
• Acquisition of Air to air refuelling and EW as
force multipliers

• Favourable air sit – a must for success
• Information Superiority a prerequisite to

achieve decision superiority
• Leadership excellence and dynamism
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RECOMMENDATIONS
• Realistic Force Goals/ Bal Dev Strat • Human Resource Dev HRD / R&D

• Exterior Mnvr / Media War
• Multi Dimensional Response

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CONCLUSION

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QUESTION & ANSWERS

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