Chapter 5: “The Peace Process

in Colombia and U.S. Policy”

Chapter written by Cynthia J. Arnson

Powerpoint by Zach Nixon

 The Peace Process During the
Pastrana Years: An Overview
• 1998 Election: Andres
Pastrana vows to negotiate
an end to the guerrilla-
paramilitary violence in
Colombia. Pastrana meets
with FARC founder and
leader Manuel Marulanda,
and, once elected president,
and agrees to meet with
guerrillas in Colombia.
• January 1999: Pastrana
travels to the despeje to
meet with Marulanda, only to
be stood up by the leader.
Consequently, paramilitary
groups carry out a brutal
wave of violence. Formal
peace talks stall until
The Peace Process During the
Pastrana Years: An Overview
• February 2000: Focusing on Colombia’s
socioeconomic structure, FARC
commanders travel to European capitals to
see European social democracy; leaders
also experience criticisms of their human
rights and drug trafficking records
• March 2000: Members of Colombia’s
private sector travel to the despeje to meet
with FARC and discuss agrarian and social
policies.
• In response, FARC promotes “Law 002,”
which requires affluent Colombians to pay
a peace tax or face kidnapping.
 The Peace Process During the
Pastrana Years: An Overview
• September 2000: A
rebel prisoner escapes
from jail, hijacks a
plane and lands it in
the despeje.
• February 2001:
Pastrana and
Marulanda sign an
agreement to
accelerate peace talks.
• UN and many
European and Latin
American countries
send representatives
to the despeje to meet
with FARC—United
 The Peace Process During the
Pastrana Years: An Overview
March 2001-February
2002: Peace talks
continue in the
shadow of
paramilitary and
guerrilla violence.
Pastrana continues
to reauthorize the
despeje.
September 2001:
FARC kills Consuelo
Araujo Noguera;
Colombians call for
The Peace Process During the
Pastrana Years: An Overview
January 2002: Pastrana gives FARC 48
hours to abandon the despeje; UN, foreign
ambassadors, and Catholic Church help to
negotiate a cease fire with a deadline of
April 2002.
February 20, 2002: FARC guerrillas hijack
an airliner and take Senator Jorge Eduardo
Gechem Turbay hostage.
Possible Reasons for the
February 20th Hijacking
• The hijacking was an effort to sabotage
negotiations set for April 20th.

• “FARC was simply conducting business

as usual…as if they had no bearing on
the peace process” (140).

• Consequence: Pastrana chastises

Marulanda for his “arrogance and lies,
and ends the peace process by sending
armed forces to take over the despeje.
US Initiatives in Support of
Peace
 Policy makers dealing with Colombia choose to
model their policies after their experience with
war and peace in El Salvador.
 Strategy: Because a military defeat of
guerrillas look impossible, approach
negotiations by politically engaging insurgents.
 However, the US still pushed for
modernization and professionalization of the
military to catalyze the peace process. Why?
US Initiatives for Peace
i. Fostering dialogue among Colombians
over strategies for peace and policy
reform (The “Houston Process”).
ii. Opening of direct contact with the FARC
in December 1998
iii. Financing projects to give instant relief to
civilians throughout conflict zones (OTI,
AID)
The “Houston Process”
“What do the gringos really want?”
 “The answer—although few may believe it…is
that they are trying to help Colombians find
their own solution to their problems using
their own resources” (143).
US Relations with the FARC
 December 1998: FARC and US State
Department Members meet secretly in Costa
Rica.
 February 1998: Three U.S. activists are
kidnapped and executed; FARC claims at least
partial responsibility.
 This ends American contact with the FARC.

“I don’t know if the political climate in

Washington will ever change, absent changes
in Colombia.”
-A U.S. official in Bogotá, when asked
whether US policy regarding contact with the
AID’s Office of Transition
Initiatives
OTI, answering requests from the
Colombian government, addressed the
needs of local areas of high conflict.
 OTI served to establish “confidence that there are
institutions willing to work with people to help re-build
their lives, and restoring their faith that the peace
process can yield positive and tangible results.” (146)
Washington withdraws OTI from
participation in a small project in the
despeje, showing the political limits to
the peace process.
US Concerns With and Approaches
to the Colombian Peace Policy
 Cancellation of OTI project in the despeje showed U.S.
was afraid of being “perceived as tacitly accepting
guerrilla participation in US-funded initiatives” (147).
 U.S. was unwilling to offer incentives for negotiations to
the guerrillas.
 U.S. wanted to increase pressure on FARC to negotiate
via military pressure
 “Tactical defeats suffered by the government security
forces at the hands of the FARC in recent years has
emboldened the FARC and provided little incentive for
the to engage in meaningful or substantive peace
negotiations with the GOC.”
–General Charles Wilhelm
 US Concerns With and Approaches
to the Colombian Peace Policy
(cont.)
 U.S. policy makers were concerned with economic
gains the FARC was making via connections with
narco-trafficking.
 “If the FARC was earning $200 million a year, what were
the incentives to throw in the towel and become potato
farmers?” (149).

 Two perspectives blended together during the

Clinton administration to form policies in
Colombia: the strengthening of Colombian
security forces, as well as an emphasis on
counternarcotics to weaken the guerrillas and
paramilitaries.
 These perspectives came together in Plan Colombia.
Plan Colombia
“The focus of this chapter could leave the
impression that the Clinton administration
policy toward Colombia had as its central
organizing principle the peace process.
Nothing could be farther from the
truth…the only issue in Colombia that was
portrayed as directly affecting vital U.S.
interests was drugs” (149).
Plan Colombia
During the first four years of his
administration, Clinton resisted pressures
from war hawks to provide Colombia with
more sophisticated equipment.
As coca cultivation expanded by 50%
between 1996 and 1998, however,
pressures for modernization of Colombian
armed forces grew.
Key Points Regarding Clinton’s
Plan Colombia
U.S. administration officials called for a
strategies addressing Colombia’s multiple
crises, not just drugs. This idea helped
policies gain leverage in Congress and
Colombia.
U.S. involvement was not simply limited to
a Latin American Marshall Plan.
Despite this, however, Plan Colombia was
defined by it’s spending on military
assistance.
Key Points Regarding Clinton’s
Plan Colombia (cont.)
Reactions to Plan Colombia
Pastrana to the Washington Post: “the aid
package the United States [proposes] is not
a military package; it’s an anti-narcotics
package” (151).
Other nations took offense to the U.S.
bilateral plan; Non-U.S. contributions to
Plan Colombia were a third of what was
expected.
In response, European governments
increased diplomatic involvement in the
peace process.
Bush Administration’s Plan Colombia
Policy
 “Until the terrorist attacks of September 11
changed the tone and focus of U.S. policy in
Colombia, the Bush administration largely
stayed the course set by President Clinton”
(153).
 Bush redressed the gap between economic
and military aid to Colombia, but by less than
2%.
(In Millions) 2000 2002
Military/Police 765.49 401.93
Economic/Socia 214.31 120.30
l Military
Percentage 78.12% 76.96%

Source: http://www.ciponline.org/facts/0512eras.pdf
Bush Administration Policy
Following September 11, 2001
 “[FARC ] is the most dangerous international
terrorist group based in this hemisphere”
-State Department for Counterterrorism
Francis X. Taylor

 “We’re not going to engage in counter-

insurgency in Colombia because there is no
insurgency in Colombia…What you have is
three terrorist groups that operate as
organized crime families…these are not
insurgents. These are criminals. These are
terrorists.”
-Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich
 Whither the Peace Process
 2002: Álvaro Uribe takes
office in Colombia.
 U.S. Intelligence
concludes that, while
“Marulanda [was] telling
the truth,” Pastrana
allowed paramilitary
forces to double in size,
giving them political
power throughout
Colombia (155).
 U.S. must focus on all
non-state armed
actors, left and right,
not just the battle
The Fate of Colombia
A future, comprehensive peace process will
only function if:
The Colombia government combats violent
actors on both the left and right.
The United States:
 combats paramilitarism
 pursues economic policies to expand the economy
beyond alternative development
 is willing to engage FARC politically and
diplomatically
 Supporting agrarian and tax reform, not just drug
reform