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HAZOP STUDY

HAZard and OPerability




An introduction
Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 2
Content
History
Purpose
Hazards
Deviations
Parameters
Guidewords
Consequences
Safeguards
Application
HAZOP in Dow
HAZOP Process
Nodes
Starting the Study

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Origins of HAZOP
Concept dreamed up by Bert Lawley at
I.C.I. in the late 1960s
Result of a desire to have structured
check on P. & I.D.s
Spread through I.C.I. in early 1970s
Endorsed by the Health and Safety
Directorate of the U.K. government
Dow started to use in mid 1970s
NL, Belgian and U.K. government
adopted HAZOP
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HAZOP in the 1980s
U.K. HSE and the Dutch
Arbeidsinspectie began to mandate
HAZOP as part of Safety Report for
Seveso Directive
I.C.I. by this time were doing HAZOP
on everything
Dow incorporated in its Risk
Management process based on its own
criteria (focusing on highest risk)
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Purpose of HAZOP

To identify credible causes, consequences
and safeguards before INCIDENTS occur
To define recommendations to minimize the
HAZARD by eliminating or controlling the
cause or providing lines of defence
Provide compatible information for
subsequent Process Safety efforts (i.e.
LOPA scenarios)
Comply with regulatory Process Safety
requirements
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Scope of HAZOP
Review is limited to the piping,
instrumentation and equipment shown on
the P&IDs (do not re-design)
Review is limited to deviations from normal
operations
Impact of process unit on the utility systems
or other process units will be noted as
requiring further study
Primary intent is to identify hazards and
define action items for additional safeguards
if appropriate
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HAZARDS
Fire and Explosion
Reactive Chemicals Incidents
Toxic Exposure
Corrosion
Radiation
Vibration
Mechanical Hazards
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Deviations
Hazards are caused by DEVIATIONS
from the DESIGN INTENTION
HAZOP is a method for generating
these DEVIATIONS using GUIDE
WORDS
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Study is based on
PARAMETERS
Flow
Temperature
Pressure
Level
Composition
Agitation
Anything it is important to control
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In combination with GUIDE
WORDS
No
Less
More
Reverse
Instead of or Other than (e.g.
something else or wrong composition)
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Combinations of parameters and
guide words are DEVIATIONS
No flow
Less flow
More flow
Reverse flow
Flow of something not planned
More temperature
Less temperature
And so on...
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Deviations are logical
combinations like...
More temperature
Less pressure
Ignore illogical combinations like.
X Reverse temperature
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Determining the causes for a
deviation
Consider only the causes that originate within the node
(consequences may be outside of the node)
Deviations could be caused by:
Equipment or process control failure
Human error
Loss of utilities
External events such as fire
Long term processes, e.g. erosion, corrosion, coking
If process instrumentation crosses a node boundary, control
malfunction is considered a cause in both nodes
Deviations that require the simultaneous occurrence of two or
more unrelated causes are not considered
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Consequences
Describe all consequences, even those that propagate outside
the node.
Consequences may include:
Personnel injury
Environmental damage
Equipment damage
Property loss
Extended downtime
Operability/Quality problems
Consequences are described assuming there are no
safeguards
Describe consequences as a chronological sequence of
events
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Safeguards
Safeguards may include:
Equipment design
Instrumentation (control, alarm and shutdown)
Pressure relief devices
Administrative procedures
Only list those instrument systems that have at least
an alarm as a safeguard
Control instrumentation must automatically correct
or mitigate a process deviation
Operator training and administrative procedures
should be listed provided they are part of ODMS
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what can HAZOP be applied
to?
Continuous processes
Batch procsses
Operating procedures (similar concept
to Job Safety Analysis)
Maintenance procedures
Any operation where the Design
Intention is defined and deviations are
possible
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Recommendations
Recommendations are made to:
Eliminate a cause
Prevent or mitigate the consequence
Reduce the likelyhood that the hazard will occur
Examples of recommendations include:
Equipment/instrumentation changes/additions
Further study needed
Inspection and maintenance
Training
Administrative systems to manage hazards
Verification of design assumptions


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Risk Review in DOW today
(Process Risk Management Standard 2001)
Level 1 Risk Review: (Process Hazard
Analysis (RC-PHA, Fire and Explosion
Index, Chemical Exposure Index,
LOPA target factors)
Level 2: LOPA, Cause Consequence
Pairs, Occupied Building Overpressure
analysis
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Risk review in DOW today
LEVEL 1
Fire and Explosion Index < 128
Chemical Exposure Index < 200
CEI Hazard Distance (3) outside of the
fence

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What makes HAZOP
mandatory?
TECHNOLOGY IS NEW TO DOW
New processes
New chemistry
New Unit Operations
These are the ONLY criteria for
Mandatory HAZOP
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HAZOP method
Generic for Chemical Industry
Dow guideline setting down our special
needs (\\USN17\ehsaps)
Based on P.& I.D. or flowsheet study
with Operating Instructions/Design
Intention
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Normal scope of a Dow
HAZOP
Based on the operating unit(s)
generating the highest risk
Basic Criteria described All steps
from start up, through normal running
to shut down
Application to Most Effective
Technology (M.E.T.)
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HAZOP Process
Team maximum 6 persons from (example):
run plant engineer
programmer
process control
process chemist
shift operations team member
study leader/facilitator
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Nodes
P&IDs for the process are broken into manageable
sections called nodes
Nodes generally consists of unit operations and
associated piping and connect to upstream and
downstream units
Nodes are defined by the HAZOP team and can be
redefined as needed
A Global issues node can be included to capture
hazardous events that can impact the entire process
unit. For example:
Loss of containment
Sampling
Utility failure


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Typical nodes
E 201
R 201
P 201
NODE 1
NODE 2
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Nodes
There is no right way to define nodes
Usually start with a small node
As experience builds, move to a larger node
Follow the leaders intuition
If the team gets bored, the node is probably
too small
If the team gets confused, the node is
probably too big
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Starting the study:
The most knowledgeable person
describes the INTENTION of the node
Composition (which chemicals are in
the equipment)
Flow, temperature, pressure, phase,
quantity, agitation etc
. Anything important to the process
Leader records for study team
reference
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Start with Deviation No Flow
Team gives all the causes for no flow in the
lines and equipment inside the node
Leader prompts their thinking
Team can add but not delete
These causes are recorded in software
package
The library in the software can be consulted
for possible additional causes
When the ideas dry up move on to
CONSEQUENCES
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Team decision on ACTION
column
Team may decide if any new action is
needed
Can record any protective devices or
alarms which become active e.g. PSVs
Can refer decision outside the team
Can refer serious consequences for
consequence analysis
MUST NOT REDESIGN THE PLANT in
the Hazop study session!!
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After no flow
Repeat exercise for less flow
(ususally similar to no flow
Repeat exercise for more flow
Repeat exercise for reverse flow
Repeat exercise for composition
(other than expected material
composition)
UNTIL FLOW is completely studied
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After flow
List causes for more temperature
proceed to consequences for more
temperature
repeat all steps as for flow
when temperature is studied, go to
pressure
after pressure, consider other
parameters, e.g. agitation (use design
intention as a guide)
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When parameters are all done
for node 1
Repeat whole process for node 2
And all the other nodes defined in the
study scope
List actions and responsibility for follow
up