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Computer-aided Hazard

Identification
Paul Chung
(p.w.h.chung@lboro.ac.uk)
Department of Computer Science

Hazards and Operability


(HAZOP) Studies
Established and widely used
technique in the process industry
for hazard identification
Time consuming, labour intensive
process:
Tedious
Expensive

Computer-aided HAZOP
Different levels of support:
Electronic report form
Electronic data (on plant, on fluids,
etc.)
Automated Hazard Identification
Continuous operation
Batch operation

Automated Hazard
Identification
Continuous operation
From basic research to commercial product
HAZID
Basic technology
Signed directed graph (SDG) representation
Fault propagation

Go through a list of deviations systematically


and identify the faults that cause the
deviations and the consequences that result
from the faults and deviations

HAZID Overview
Automated extraction of plant design
from a CAD system, e.g. Intergraph
SmartPlant P&ID
Convenient forms for adding any
missing process specific information
Tick boxes for selecting analysis options:
Deviations, e.g. more flow, less flow, etc.
Items to HAZOP, etc.

HAZID Overview
HAZOP style output in different output formats
XML, with HTML web page view.
Excel spreadsheet.

Query facility for viewing analysis results


e.g. viewing faults and consequences relating to a
particular plant item
e.g. viewing the propagation path between a
particular fault and consequence

Compare facility for viewing the difference


between two HAZID runs
Useful for after making a change to the design

Hazid Operation
Select SP P+ID
From SmartPlant

Run Hazid data wizard,


Extract plant data from
SP database:
*Plant Items
*Piping, valves, fittings
*Controls
*Fluids information:
Temperature
Pressure
Fluid name

Hazid maps SP icons


to Hazop Process
models

Converts P+I diagram


to Analysis model

Hazid analyses plant and


generates Hazop Report

Hazid Operation
Select SP P+ID
From SmartPlant

Run Hazid data wizard,


Extract plant data from
SP database:
*Plant Items
*Piping, valves, fittings
*Controls
*Fluids information:
Temperature
Pressure
Fluid name

Hazid maps SP icons


to Hazop Process
models

Converts P+I diagram


to Analysis model

Hazid analyses plant and


generates Hazop Report

Hazid Operation
Select SP P+ID
From SmartPlant

Run Hazid data wizard,


Extract plant data from
SP database:
*Plant Items
*Piping, valves, fittings
*Controls
*Fluids information:
Temperature
Pressure
Fluid name

Hazid maps SP icons


to Hazop Process
models

Converts P+I diagram


to Analysis model

Hazid analyses plant and


generates Hazop Report

Hazid Operation
Select SP P+ID
From SmartPlant

Run Hazid data wizard,


Extract plant data from
SP database:
*Plant Items
*Piping, valves, fittings
*Controls
*Fluids information:
Temperature
Pressure
Fluid name

Hazid maps SP icons


to Hazop Process
models

Converts P+I diagram


to Analysis model

Hazid analyses plant and


generates Hazop Report

Mapping SmartPlant to Hazid models


SmartPlant
Database
References

Mapping created by user


for all company,
then mapping is >95%
automatic
Automatic mapping by Hazid:

Hazid Model
Types

=
=

Centrifugal Pump

?????
Mixer
Stripper
Absorber
Reactor

Valve

User makes choice

**This User mapping is required only once for the whole Project**

9
Checking Automatic Nozzle Mapping
Hazid model is process function:

But P+ID is piping:


N4

Vapour Out
Port
Vapour/Liquid
In Port

Vapour

N1
N3

Liquid
Liquid Out
Port

N5

N2

User confirms nozzle functions:


N1 is vapour/liquid in port,
N2 and N3 are liquid out ports,
N4 is a vapour out port
N5 is Cleanout liquid in port.

Hazid Operation
Select SP P+ID
From SmartPlant

Run Hazid data wizard,


Extract plant data from
SP database:
*Plant Items
*Piping, valves, fittings
*Controls
*Fluids information:
Temperature
Pressure
Fluid name

Hazid maps SP icons


to Hazop Process
models

Converts P+I diagram


to Analysis model

Hazid analyses plant and


generates Hazop Report

Equipment Knowledge Base


Knowledge about behaviour of equipment
Interaction between Faults, Deviations and Consequences
Consequence

Fault

These links are called


arcs in Hazid

Deviation

Fault
- can cause Consequence
Fault
- can cause Deviation to process variable
Deviation can cause another Deviation
Deviation can cause Consequence

Equipment Knowledge Base


Knowledge about Faults and Consequences
This is mainly engineering knowledge and experience
Out
In

Fault Bearing failure

Consequences
Casing damage
Seal damage and leakage
Loss of discharge pressure
Flow disturbance
Pump stops

Hazid Operation
Select SP P+ID
From SmartPlant

Run Hazid data wizard,


Extract plant data from
SP database:
*Plant Items
*Piping, valves, fittings
*Controls
*Fluids information:
Temperature
Pressure
Fluid name

Hazid maps SP icons


to Hazop Process
models

Converts P+I diagram


to Analysis model

Hazid analyses plant and


generates Hazop Report

HAZOP Style Output from


HAZID

HAZID Viewer Queries


Standard format questions:
What causes could there be for a
selected hazard?
What consequences are there for a
given failure mode?
How is a given hazard realised?
Show a path of deviations for propagation

Display all hazards with a given


severity rank or higher

Filtered Output showing


Fault Paths for a given
Hazard

Automated Batch Plant


Hazard Identification
Batch operation
Early research prototype (CHECKOP)
Basic technology
Action representation
State-based simulation

Go through a set of operation instructions


systematically and identify potential
ambiguities, operating problems and hazards
Applying guidewords such as before, after,
no action, etc.

CHECKOP System
Overview

Simple Batch Reactor


Example

CHECKOP Plant
Description
instance(tank101 isa tank, [content info
[reactantA], outports info [out is [pump101,in]]]).
instance(pump101 isa pump, [status is offline,
outports info [out is [valve101,in]]]).
instance(valve101 isa valve, [status is closed,
outports info [out is [reactor101, in2]]]).
instance(reactor101 isa stirred_tank_reactor, [
outports info [out1 is [valve103,in], out2 is
[valve106,in]],
heatSink info [hout is [jacket101,hin]],
reaction info [reaction_ab_p]

]).

Operating instruction
format
Natural language
Easy for user
Requires natural language processing
Could be ambiguous

Structured template
Easy for computer to process
Limited expressive power

Operating instruction
format
Object Action
valve101 open

Object Action until Condition


mixer on until elapsed-time 20 minute

Object1 Action Object2 Filler-word


Fluid until Condition
reactor101 fill-from tank101 with
reactantA until volume 30 percent

CHECKOP Operating
Procedure Input
charge reactor101 with reactantA: {
(1) valve101 open
(2) pump101 start
(3)
reactor101 fill_from tank101 with
reactantA until volume 30 percent
(4) pump101 stop
(5) valve101 close
}
etc

Deviation Generation
Combine each single action in the
procedure with guide words, from:
No action Simple omission.
Early/Late action Sequence of procedure
changed (how many steps feasible?).
Early/Late action termination until condition
of action varied.

Then, simulate the effect of executing the


new procedure on the plant, detect
hazards.

Batch HAZOP Output


Operation

Keyword

Consequences

(3)
reactor101
fill from
tank101
with
reactantA
until
volume 30
percent

No action

(6) agitator running while vessel


empty
(17) cannot empty [reactantA,
productP] from reactor101 to tank103
because content of reactor is
[reactantB].

Early
reactor101 cannot be filled from
action (-2) tank101 because there is no flow
path.
Late
action
(+3)

reactor101 cannot be filled from


tank101 because there is no flow
path.

Batch HAZOP Output


Operation

Keyword

(3)
reactor101
fill from
tank101
with
reactantA
until
volume 30
percent

Early
no consequence.
terminatio
n (to only
10
percent)
Late
terminatio
n (to 50
percent)

Consequences

(17) cannot empty [reactantA,


productP] from reactor101 to tank103
because content of reactor is
[reactantA, productP].
(17) contamination in tank103.

Future Work on CHECKOP


A formal structured language for operating
instructions
More guide words
Other Action change other variables of the
Action model

Rules for reasonable deviations

What are the most likely mistakes in operation?

Integrate with HAZID

HAZID is strong on process hazards, CHECKOP


better for operating errors, etc.
HAZOP of start-up, shutdown, maintenance, etc.

Conclusions
Automated hazard identification
continuous operation
commercial tool that can reduce the time of HAZOP

batch operation
promising area of research and development for
identifying problems associated with human errors
and operating procedures

Benefits:
Doing HAZOP earlier, and on modifications.
Consistent, repeatable, complete hazard
identification method.

Acknowledgements
The work described in this
presentation is being funded by
HAZID Technologies Ltd
Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council, UK

Thanks are also due to my


colleagues
Dr Steve McCoy
Mr Dingfeng Zhou