FUEL TANK SAFETY

FUEL TANK SAFETY

(Level 2 Training)
Fuel Tank Safety
Overview

TWA 800 accident

Airworthiness Directives (ADs) and a Special Federal

Aviation Regulation (known as SFAR 88)

probable
cause: ignition of flammable fuel/air mixture in
centre wing fuel tank (CWT)
changed way fuel tanks are designed, operated and maintained
pursuit
now for elimination of ignition sources and
reduction
of flammability of tank

eliminate ignition sources

FAA prototype onboard inerting system (May 2002)

FAA
airworthiness regulations 14 CFR Part
25 (Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category

require ignition sources not be present or develop in the fuel tanks

Airplanes)
of transport airplanes

Amendment 25-102

renamed 25.981 as Fuel Tank Ignition Prevention

new requirements

address causes of ignition sources within fuel tanks

minimization
development of flammable fuel tanks
or
mitigation ofvapours
the effects ofinan ignition of vapours in the tanks

Airframe manufacturers and Supplemental Type

Certificate (STC) holders

conduct safety review of all fuel system components

determine design meets requirements of FAR 25.901 and
25.981(a) and (b)
prepare special maintenance inspections to determine
continued safety and airworthiness of fuel system on aircraft

Design changes required to address unsafe condition will

be mandated by AD

DGAC
requested SFAR 88 to be added to PART
145, PART M and PART 147

reinforce the application of these regulations

JAA issued interim policy on fuel tank safety

INT/POL/25/12 (Oct 2000)

EASA later issued NPA_10_2004

introduce into JAR-25 the equivalent of FAR 25 Amendment 102

JAA Temporary Guidance Leaflet TGL 47

guidelines on interpretation and implementation for JAA

Member States
common approach for continued airworthiness of fuel
harmonised approach within the JAA community and FAA

Long Term Design Modifications

airplane design modification

nitrogen-inerting systems
addition of insulation between heat-generating equipment and fuel
tanks
appropriate modifications should apply to newly certificated airplanes
and, where feasible, to existing airplanes

Near Term Operational

pending implementation of design modifications

modifications in operational procedures

consideration given to refueling CWT before flight whenever possible
from cooler ground fuel tanks, proper monitoring and management of
CWT fuel temperature, and maintaining an appropriate minimum fuel
quantity in CWT (B747)

Fuel tank ullage

volume within tank not occupied by liquid fuel

Explosive conditions

when specific proportions of evaporated fuel, oxygen,

pressure and temperature are present

can be made up of fuel vapour

even if the ullage is flammable, explosion will not occur unless an

ignition source of sufficient energy exists

Explosion can only occur if 3 conditions are present:

Fuel vapours
Air (oxygen)
Ignition (e.g. electrical short)

Different
fuels are approved for use in turbinepowered airplanes

most widely used fuel types: JET-A/JET-A1 and JET-B (JP-4)

approved fuel types for a given airplane type listed in Airplane Flight
Manual (AFM)

Each fuel type has its own properties

differences can occur in a given fuel type because of variations

in the properties of source crude oil and refining process
used to produce it

Flash Point

lowest temperature at which the liquid supplies enough vapours

mixed with ambient air, to make a gas that will ignite with the
contact of a thermal source

at this temperature the combustion will not be self sufficient,

because you need to reach the ignition point

Ignition Point

temperature at which the combustion is started and can

continue

Auto-Ignition

temperature at which a gas or vapour ignites spontaneously in

the absence of a thermal source (e.g. Jet A: 450F,sea level)
it is a practice that max allowable surface temperature is at least

FUEL TANK SAFETY

(Level 2 Training)

Ignition Source
Prevention

Regulatory authorities and aviation industry have always

presumed that a flammable fuel/air mixture exists in the
fuel tanks at all times

adopted philosophy that the best way to ensure airplane fuel

tank safety is to preclude ignition sources within fuel tanks

based on application of fail-safe design requirements to the

airplane fuel tank system to preclude ignition sources from
being present in fuel tanks when component failures,
malfunctions, or lightning encounters occur

Possible ignition sources include:

electrical arcs

friction sparks

mechanical contact between rotating components in fuel tank

hot surface ignition or auto-ignition

lightning
electrostatic charging
electromagnetic interference
failures in airplane systems or wiring

failure of components within fuel tank, or external components or systems

that cause components or tank surfaces to reach a high enough
temperature to ignite the fuel vapours in the fuel tank

Conditions required to ignite fuel vapours from these ignition sources

vary with pressures and temperatures within the fuel tank and can
be affected by sloshing or spraying of fuel in the tank

Identify and address potential sources of ignition within fuel tanks

and by possible external influences, which may not previously have
been considered to be unsafe features

Each operator should review aircraft service records, flight logs,

inspection records, and component supplier service records to assist
in establishing any unforeseen failures, wear or other conditions that
could result in an ignition source within the fuel system

Review of changes to components from original type design

changes to components, and the use of Parts Manufacturer Approval

(PMA) parts following certification may have been done without
consideration of possible effects of the changes to the requirements to
preclude ignition sources
whilst aircraft manufacturer will be responsible for integrity of fuel system
designed by them, they are not responsible for any effects that may be
caused by installation of additional fuel tanks fitted by STC or other

List of some discrepancies found:

Pumps

Pump inducer failures resulting in ingestion of inducer into pump

impeller and generation of debris into fuel tank
Pump inlet check valves failures resulting in rubbing on
pump impeller
Stator windings have failed during operation of fuel pump

subsequent failure of a second phase of pump caused arcing through

pump housing

Thermal protective features deactivated by inappropriate wrapping

of pumps windings

Pump
s Cooling port tubes omitted during pump overhaul

Extended dry running of fuel pumps in empty fuel tanks, causing

failures
Use of steel impellers that might produce sparks if debris
enters the pump
Debris found lodged inside pumps
Pump power supply connectors corroded, allowing fuel leakage
and electrical arcing
Electrical connections within pump housing exposed and
designed with inadequate clearance to pump cover, resulting in
arcing
Re-settable thermal switches resetting at higher trip
temperature

Pump
s Flame arrestors falling out of their respective mounting

Internal wires coming in contact with pump rotating group,

energising rotor and arcing at impeller/adapter interface
Poor bonding across component interfaces
Insufficient ground fault current capability
Poor bonding of components to structure
Premature failure of fuel pumps thrust bearings, allowing
steel rotating parts to contact the steel pump side plate

Wiring to Pumps located in metallic conduits or

adjacent to fuel tank walls

Wear of Teflon sleeving and wiring insulation, allowing arcing to

conduit causing an ignition source in tank, or arcing to the tank

Fuel Pump Connectors

Electrical arcing at connections within electrical connectors due to
bent pins or corrosion

Fuel Quantity Indication System (FQIS) Wiring

Degradation of wire insulation (cracking)

Corrosion (copper sulphate deposits) at electrical connectors
Unshielded FQIS wires routed in wire bundles with high voltage
wires
Corroded and loose terminations
Excessive strain on the wiring

Fuel Quantity Indication System

Probes
Corrosion and copper sulphide deposits reduced

breakdown voltage in FQIS wiring

FQIS wiring clamping features at electrical connections on fuel
probes damaged wiring and reduced breakdown voltage
Contamination in fuel tanks and mechanical impact damage,
caused reduced arc path between FQIS probe walls

Failed or aged seals

Seal deterioration may result in leaks internal or external to

fuel system, as well as fuel spraying

Bonding

Straps
Corrosion, inappropriately attached connections (loose

or improperly grounded attachment points)

Static bonds on fuel system plumbing connections inside fuel tank
found worn due to mechanical wear of plumbing from wing
movement and corrosion
Bonding points improperly sealed after access
Worn and frayed bonding jumpers
Incorrect bonding jumpers (manufactured from incorrect material)

Cleanliness

Removal of any loose material, rivets, swarf, hardware, excess sealant, etc

Inspection of:

All plumbing for damage, security, possible sources of abrasion and chaffing
Quick disconnect fittings are secure and in good condition
Plumbing is not distorted by clamps
Wiring for any signs of degradation or overheating
Wire routing is appropriate and properly secured
Connectors are properly torqued and if appropriate lock wired
Where a connector has been disturbed, inspect both male and female
connections for damage
Insulation material deterioration
Cable support for adequacy or potting for deterioration
Contacts for damage and corrosion cleaned prior to reassembling
Bonding jumpers and bonding points for damage, correct sealing, corrosion,
correct material and terminals
Fuel Pumps are correctly mounted and secure
Fuel system vents and vent heating elements, check condition and security
including any flame trap that may be installed and that vent is unobstructed

Effects of electrical transients from lightning, EMI, or HIRF on

anything conductive (e.g. fuel tank plumbing, structure, fuel,
equipment and wiring) within the fuel tanks, particularly for the
fuel quantity indicating system wiring and probes

Impact from Pneumatic System Failures

Leakage of air from ducting located near fuel tanks due to duct failure
resulting in undetected heating of tank surfaces above the auto-ignition
temperature

Impact from Electrostatic Charge Buildup

Use of non-conductive reticulated polyurethane foam that holds

electrostatic charge build up
Spraying of fuel into fuel tanks through inappropriately designed refueling
nozzles
Spraying of fuel into fuel tanks from fuel pump motor cooling flow return
ports that spray fuel into the tank

Minimise number of components and systems inside fuel tanks

whose failure could result in an ignition source. Examples:

Wiring entering tank for such purposes as temperature monitoring and

fuel quantity indication should be minimized
If practical, fuel pumps located such that electrical power for pumps is
routed outside tanks in such a manner that failures in power supply
cannot create hot spot inside tank or arc into tank
Separation of tank wires from higher energy carrying wires and shielding
of tank wires; or installation of transient suppression devices, to preclude
unwanted electrical energy from entering tank
Locating fuel pumps such that inlet remains covered with fuel throughout
airplane operating envelope

Installation of baffles in tank structure and use of collector tanks that are
continually filled with fuel using ejector pumps

FUEL TANK SAFETY

(Level 2 Training)

Flammability
Reduction

Centre-Wing-Tank (CWT) explosions

17th July 1996, B747-131, Registration N93119 - Flt No TWA 800

1990, B737-300, Philippine Air Lines
2001, B737-400, Thai Airways

Common Factors

Aircraft parked on ramp for some considerable time with

high ambient temperature (+900F)
Centre Wing Tank empty
Air-conditioning Packs running for some time

FAA believes added safety net of reducing flammability of

the tank is also necessary

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) require aircraft operators

to reduce flammability levels of fuel tank vapours to remove
likelihood of potential explosion from ignition source (Nov 2005)

Amendment 25-102 added a new paragraph 25.981(c)

minimization of the formation of flammable

vapours in fuel
tanks, or mitigation of any hazards if ignition does occur
intended to promote design practices that reduce exposure
to operation with flammable vapours in transport airplane fuel
tanks to lowest practical level, equivalent to that of unheated wing
tank

Factors influencing formation of flammable vapours include fuel type,

fuel temperature, and any design feature that increases the potential
for fuel mists to be created

Vapours from Jet A fuel at temperatures below approximately 100F

are too lean to be flammable at sea level

at higher altitudes, the fuel vapours become flammable at temperatures

above approximately 45F (at 40,000 feet altitude)

Flammability Limits

Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) defines the temperature at a specific

altitude, below which the fuel vapour/air mixture is too lean to ignite
Upper Flammability Limit (UFL) defines the temperature at a specific
altitude, above which the fuel vapour/air mixture is too rich to ignite

Flammability Envelope
vs. Ignition Energy, Flash Point and O 2 Level

50
LFL

Altitude 1000's ft.

40
UFL

30
20

Heated CWT
Profile

10

Unheated Wing
Tank Profile

0
-50

50

100

Temperature Deg F

150

200

80o F Airport OAT

90 minute ground pack operation
(~36oF CWT temperature increase,
~18oF for 30min)
20.9% Oxygen content
120 oF Flash point
fuel

Flammability Envelope
vs. Ignition Energy, Flash Point and O 2 Level

50
LFL

Altitude 1000's ft.

40
UFL

30
20

Heated CWT
Profile

10

Unheated Wing
Tank Profile

0
-50

50

100

Temperature Deg F

150

200

40o F Airport OAT

90 minute ground pack operation
(~45oF CWT temperature increase,
~22oF for 30min)
20.9% Oxygen content
120 oF Flash point
fuel

Tail Tanks 2 -5%

Main Tanks 2 -4%

Body Tanks
Pressurized <5%
Heated Center Wing Tank 15-30%
Un-heated Center Wing Tanks 2-6%

Un-pressurized >20%

All airplanes designed with a Center Wing Tank are

susceptible to flammability risk

including Airbus and Boeing models

CWT of following models considered high flammability:

Boeing -707, -737, -747, -757, -767, -777, for their centre wing

tanks

Airbus A300/310, A320 family, A330/340, for their centre wing tanks

auxiliary tanks on Boeing DC-10 and DC-9/MD-80, and STCs

introducing unpressurised auxiliary tanks in cargo compartment

Transferring heat from fuel tank (via use of ventilation or

cooling air)

if heat sources were placed in or near tanks that significantly

increased formation of flammable fuel vapours in the tank
if tank is located in area of airplane where little or no cooling

Selective use of inerting

on ground or in-flight
particularly if fuel tank flammability is significantly higher in
one particular fuel tank or phase of flight

Misting and sloshing

flammability of fuel vapours greatly influenced by agitation,

sloshing, or misting of fuel, which results in higher
concentration of fuel molecules in ullage

install sufficient baffling in tanks to reduce sloshing

returning any fuel used to cool fuel pumps to bottom of tank
introducing fuel during refueling at bottom of tank through low velocity
nozzles

Fuel Types

Use of any low flash point fuels must be analyzed if they

are proposed for use as an approved fuel

may significantly increase operational exposure to flammable

vapours
other minimization means, such as inerting, may be required to

Fuel Tank Temperature

auxiliary fuel tanks located in cargo compartment or pressurized

areas, tanks located in center wing box, and horizontal stabilizer
tanks may have less ability to reject heat to ambient air
may be subject to heat sources from equipment located nearby
in fuselage, such as air conditioning packs

use of thermal insulation blankets

providing ventilation or dedicated cooling to remove excess heat from
areas adjacent to tank

installing an air gap in spaces adjacent to fuel tanks and using a

fan during ground operation

using ram air inlets for in-flight operation to transfer heat from
tank

bleeding cool air from ECS packs into the air gap

Fuel Tank Ullage Sweeping

positive ventilation system to sweep ullage of flammable

fuel vapour/air mixtures at rate that keeps ullage lean in spite
of higher-than-desirable fuel temperature
should address any negative effects, such as sweeping unburned
hydrocarbons into the atmosphere

Alternative is to mitigate effects of an ignition of fuel

vapours within fuel tanks such that no damage caused by
an ignition will prevent continued safe flight and landing

recognizes that applicant may choose to accept high flammability

exposure in a given tank and to provide additional protection to
extinguish or suppress an explosion in tank if ignition occurs

foam system

multiple small blocks of highly porous material that completely fill tank
interior, with negligible voids
prevents gross over-pressure or explosion within a tank by limiting
extent of any vapour/air ignition to a small local detonation,
preventing it propagating throughout the tank

Preference for fuel tank inerting in meeting new

standards outlined in FAAs proposed rule

Inert gas introduced into ullage so that oxygen content

reduced to point where ignition and subsequent
combustion is precluded

For the purpose of AC25.981-1B, tank is considered inert

when oxygen content is less than 10% (inert gas: nitrogen)

Inerting may be achieved by supplying inert gas from:

Nitrogen is currently the inert gas of choice

on-board storage bottles holding either gas or liquid inerting

agent
on board inert gas generation systems
a ground storage system if tank is inerted only on the ground

inexpensive
minimal undesirable effects on fuel system and engines

Nitrogen Generation System (NGS)

gas separation technology separate air into two exit streams

Nitrogen-Enriched-Air (NEA)

FAA onboard inerting prototype (May 2002)

installed on a B747SP
weighed about 200 pounds
takes up very little space

FAA research also demonstrated that a higher level of oxygen (12%)

could be used

Boeing proposed NGS on new production airplanes, and to make

a similar system available for retrofit to in-service aircraft (2003)

NGS components located in air conditioning equipment bay on right side

of airplane

EASA and FAA are in discussion on the harmonisation on this issue

N2

O2, CO2 , H2 O

N2
O2
CO2
H2 O

Air

If you breathe air that does not have sufficient oxygen, health
problems can occur.

Physiological effects of a low oxygen content environment (listed in

decreasing oxygen level environment):

decrease in night vision, increase in breathing volume, increase in

heartbeat rate (pulse)
increase in breathing and pulse rates, decrease in muscular
coordination
emotional upset, unusual fatigue, trouble breathing
nausea, vomiting, unable to do tasks, loss of consciousness
intermittent breathing, unable to move, convulsions, death in
minutes

A person that breathes air with a low oxygen content cannot

sense that the oxygen level is too low

Maintenance actions that require entry into a fuel tank that

contains inert gas may be hazardous if appropriate safety
precautions are not followed

Fuel tank should be ventilated and an appropriate air

source provided

Appropriate warning information should be included in the

Maintenance Manuals, and placards should be placed at
fuel tank entry points to warn maintenance personnel of
any hazards associated with maintenance actions or tank
entry

NEA generated is routed safely to the center wing tank

usual operation of NGS outside of fuel tanks is free from
concentrations of NEA

However, a duct leak, or component failure can cause

NEA to go into areas outside of the fuel tanks

NEA leak can cause condition where oxygen content of air is

decreased
Caution stencils and placards: installed on access doors
adjacent to areas where potential NEA leakage can occur

FUEL TANK SAFETY

(Level 2 Training)

Continued
Airworthiness

Amendment 25-102 also require that critical design

configuration control limitations, inspections, or other
procedures be established, as necessary, to prevent
development of ignition sources within the fuel tank
system

included in the Airworthiness Limitations section of

the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA)
requirement similar to that for airplane structure
requirement to provide any mandatory fuel tank system
inspections or maintenance actions in the limitations section of
the ICA

Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations

(CDCCL)

include any information necessary to maintain those design features that

have been determined by analysis of the fuel tank system as needed to
preclude development of ignition sources
may include any maintenance procedure that could result in a failure,
malfunction, or defect endangering the safe operation of the airplane, if
not performed properly or if improper parts or materials are used
information is essential to ensure that maintenance, repairs, or alterations
do not unintentionally violate the integrity of the original type design of the
fuel tank system

Definition of CDCCL does not include all the features inherent in

a design

includes only information necessary to ensure safety of fuel tank

systems

Any fuel tank system components that are determined to require

periodic maintenance, inspection, or overhaul to maintain the integrity
of the system or maintain protective features incorporated to preclude
a catastrophic fuel tank ignition event must be defined and included
in the Limitations section of ICA

Examples of such items include:

Aging fuel line couplings seals/O-rings

materials used in fuel line couplings may lose flexibility and harden
with age
may allow air to enter the fuel line or leak, allowing spraying of fuel in
the tanks or other areas of the airplane where spraying fuel could
create a fire hazard

Wear of pump bushings, bearings, and seals

may significantly affect performance of fuel pumps and degradation of

features necessary to maintain explosive proof qualification

Fuel pump protective features

Transient suppression/energy limiting devices

Component grounds and wires, wire shield grounding

Fuel tank access panel/door seals

Fuel pump connectors, corrosion, wear

Fuel pump electrical supply conduit structural, sealing integrity

Visible means must be placed in areas of the airplane where

maintenance, repairs, or alterations may violate the critical design
configuration limitations

This essential information will be communicated by statements in

appropriate manuals and be evident to those that may perform
and approve such repairs and alterations

Acceptable means of providing visible means would include colour

coding of the wiring or, for retrofit, placement of identification tabs at
specific intervals along the wiring

Example:
maintaining wire separation between FQIS wiring and other high power
electrical circuits where separation of the wiring was determined to be a critical
design configuration control limitation

CDCCL should be identified in the airworthiness limitation

section of ICA as an Airworthiness Limitation Item (ALI)

However, CDCCL are not inspections or life-limited items, as are

most existing ALIs

CDCCL are features usually controlled by operators (or, where

necessary, holders of type certificates or supplemental type
certificates) through the development of appropriate
procedures

As applied to fuel tank systems, ALI means fuel system mandatory

instructions that can include design changes, maintenance,
inspections, or procedures considered necessary to ensure that
unsafe conditions do not arise in the fuel system throughout the
operational life of the airplane

For each item identified as an ALI, the holder of a type certificate or a

supplemental type certificate needs to develop instructions for design
change, inspection and maintenance or procedural change

All changes to a CDCCL or ALI or a procedure involving a CDCCL

or ALI must be approved by the appropriate regulatory office

SFAR 88 design review resulted in several changes to the

design, operation, and maintenance of Boeing aircraft for
example

SFAR 88 analysis also identified maintenance issues not

directly related to safety that are involved with ignition
prevention

Incorporation of the required SBs and maintenance

program changes has resulted in modification of several
documents

B777 Example: AMM, IPC, SRM, MPD, SSM/WDM, FRM/FIM,

CMR, SWPM, CMM, Task Cards, Airworthiness Limitations, etc

FUEL TANK SAFETY

(Level 2 Training)

Fuel Tank Safety

Precautions

Fuel tanks have two

hazards:
fire and toxic fumes

fuel vapour has an intoxicating effect

Fire precautions specified in

governmental/local regulations should
always be strictly observed

Make sure that you have the correct fire

fighting equipment available

When you have to work on fuel system wiring,

you must use test equipment that is approved

Make sure that lighting (explosion-proof lighting

sources) in work area is sufficient to work safely

unapproved equipment could cause fire or an explosion

for work in areas where heavy fumes are present as

inside fuel tanks, flameproof torches must be used

Wear protective goggles or face mask, clothes

(100% cotton) and gloves and avoid wearing
metallic clothing (e.g. footwear or a belt with a
metal buckle) which can cause sparks

In the work area you must not:

smoke,
use flames which do not have protection,
operate electrical equipment which is not
necessary for the task,
pull or move metal objects along the ground,
use hearing-aids or battery-operated
equipment which will cause sparks,
perform hot work,
operate mobile phone or 2-way communication
within 15 metres of any open fuel tank

Put safety barriers in position and put up the

required warning notices like not to operate the
fuel system, not to refuel the aircraft, etc.

Defuel the applicable tank

fuel tank valves closed

drain remaining fuel
purge tanks of fuel vapour before any inspection or
repair

Open and safety tag the required circuit breakers

for the fuel system and others

Fuel tank is a confined space and has these

hazards:

Risk of fire/explosions due to presence of flammable

gases and vapours or due to an oxygen-enriched
atmosphere

Risk of exposure to toxic fumes or substances

Risk of inadequate supply of oxygen

Poor natural ventilation

Poor natural lighting

Oxygen deficiency

Oxygen enrichment (potential fire

hazard)

Presence of flammable
gases/vapours

NOTE: Some of these precautions are the

minimum safety standard for work in a fuel tank.
Local regulations can make other safety
precautions necessary
Before you can enter a confined space, you are
required by to have a Confined Space Entry
Permit.
Safety Assessor

responsible for testing and monitoring atmosphere of

confined space regularly and filling information in
Confined Space Entry Permit (must be certified)

Authorised Person

check to ensure that readings in entry permit

Before you enter confined space, you need to

have an entry permit that is approved by the
authorised person

You are required to sign in and sign out on

the entry permit when you enter or leave the
confined space

A copy of the entry permit is to be

conspicuously displayed near the confined
space

When you are working in a confined space, always

If you are the authorised entrant, it is your

duty to ensure that you:

Know what hazards may be present

Have received proper briefing
Wear necessary P.P.E. correctly
Use only approved sparks-proof tools and approved
clothing
Remove all sources of potential ignition
Communicate with attendant
Exit immediately when order is given by attendant
To sign in and sign out on entry permit

If you are the attendant, it is your duty to

ensure that you:

Know what hazards may be present

Have received proper training
Do not leave your appointed place
Do not perform other duties
Continuously maintain accurate count of authorised
entrants
Maintain constant communication with entrants
Summon rescue and other emergency services, in
case of emergency
Evacuate the entrants if the ventilation system
fails

NOTE:
You must
complete a PreEntry Checklist
before you do
work in a fuel
tank

Finally, get
access to the
applicable work
area

WARNING
:

Do not touch or push against the magnetic level

indicators when you are in the fuel tank
Do not touch or push against the FQI probes when you
are in the fuel tank
Do not cause damage to the internal structure, sealant,
electrical cables, or conduits during maintenance
Do not use metallic wire wool in fuel tanks

NOTE: You may have to remove parts of the

structure (and equipment) to get access to
parts of the tank

Use protective mats on the floor of fuel tank to

prevent:
damage to fuel tank structure

injury to persons

Safety all components before you place them

inside the fuel tank

All wire locking must be installed/adjusted outside

the fuel tank

Use only red tie wraps in the fuel tanks

Use only approved cleaning materials.

Make sure that all signs of solvents and cleaning

agents are removed from the
equipment/components before they are installed.

Put blanking caps on all disconnected pipes and

openings in components and tanks.

Do not connect electrical equipment to a power

source less than 30 meters away, unless the
power source has spark-proof connectors.

You must obey the fuel safety procedures when

you do work in a fuel tank. When differences
occur, you must use the approved precautions
of this procedure.

After completion of work in a fuel tank,

personnel must make sure that:

Work area is clear of tools,

Work area is clean,
No electrical equipment has been damaged and
disconnected,
All the fuel system components have a correct
electrical bonding,
All access panels are back in their original position (e.g.

Qn 1
Fuel that can be used for a particular airplane
type :
(A)
Is any type meant for the type of engines it has.

(B)
Can be any type as long as it satisfy the required
temperature characteristics.

(C)
Are those approved types listed in the Airplane Flight

Qn 2
Use of low flash point fuels :
(A)
Is restricted to tail tanks.

(B)
May significantly increase operational exposure to
flammable vapours.

(C)
Mandates inerting to mitigate the associated
hazards.

Qn 3
Auto-Ignition point is :
(A)
Temperature at which the combustion is started and can
continue.

(B)
Temperature the combustion will not be self sufficient.

(C)
Temperature at which a gas or vapour ignites
spontaneously in the absence of a thermal source.

Qn 4
Factors influencing formation of flammable
vapours include :
(A)
Fuel type and fuel temperature only.

(B)
Fuel temperature and any design feature that
increases the potential for fuel mists to be created.

(C)
Fuel type, fuel temperature, and any design feature that

Qn 5
Flammability exposure of the Center Fuel
Tank is deemed to be :
(A)
More than the main tank or tail tanks.

(B)
More than the tail tank but less than main tank.

(C)
More than the main tank but less than tail tank.

Qn 6
Fuel Tank Ullage Sweeping can be used
to :
(A)
Cool fuel tanks that are exposed to external heat
sources.

(B)
Lower the Flash Point of the fuel tanks.

(C)
Keep ullage lean with regard to flammable fuel

Qn 7
Fuel Tank Inerting :
(A)
Means that the fuel tank design satisfies the
requirements introduced by the new regulations.

(B)
Uses an inert gas to reduce the oxygen content to the
point where ignition and subsequent combustion is
precluded.

(C)
Refers to fuel tanks that are below a specified

Qn 8
Critical Design Configuration Control
Limitations (CDCCL) are :
(A)
Inspection items.

(B)
Found only in the Maintenance Planning Data
document.

(C)
For maintaining those fuel tank design features needed to

Qn 9
Changes to a CDCCL or ALI or a procedure
involving a CDCCL or ALI :
(A)
Must be approved by the appropriate regulatory office.

(B)
CDCCL changes must be approved by the appropriate
regulatory office but not for ALI.

(C)
ALI changes must be approved by the appropriate

Qn 10
For Fuel Tank Entry, the Safety Assessor :
(A)
Is responsible for testing and monitoring atmosphere of
the confined space regularly and filling information in
Confined Space Entry Permit.

(B)
Check to ensure that readings in entry permit
are within permissible levels.

(C)
Continuously maintain accurate count of