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Internet Key


IPSec – Reminder






IPSec – Reminder
• Security Association Database (SAD) holds
• Security Associations (SA) is a one way,
cryptographically protected connection
between a sender and a receiver that affords
security services to traffic

Alice spi SA’s 1 1 2 2 … 13 … 21 spi Bob SA’s Bob to Alice Alice’s spi: 21 … Alice to Bob Bob’s spi: 17 … Bob to Alice Bob’s spi: 2 17 Alice to Bob Alice’s spi: 13 .

IPSec – Reminder SA SA contains the fields: • protocol identifier (ESP or AH) • mode (tunnel or transport) • algorithms for encryption/ decryption/ authentication and their respective keys • lifetime • SPI’s • sequence number .

IPSec – Reminder ?Where does IKE fit in SA’s building and managing is either: • Static (manual) – keys and other attributes of SA are manually configured by system administrator. Handled by IKE protocol . Practical for small. relatively static environments. • Dynamic (automated) – On-demand creation of keys.

• IKE is the only standard protocol for building IPSec SA’s (Standard IPSec implementation must also implement IKE) • IKE (like IPSec) is carried out either between a pair of hosts.IKE • IKE is a protocol that builds and manages IPSec SA’s between two computers that implement IPSec. a pair of security gateways or a host and a security gateway .

IKE • IKE is a protocol that builds and manages IPSec SA’s between two computers that implement IPSec. • IKE is the only standard protocol for building IPSec SA’s (Standard IPSec implementation must also implement IKE) • IKE (like IPSec) is carried out either between a pair of hosts. a pair of security gateways or a host and a security gateway .

Endpoint to Endpoint Transport • Both endpoints of the IP connection implement IPsec • Used with no inner IP header • One of the protected points can be behind a NAT node Protected Endpoint IPsec Tunnel Protected Endpoint .

Gateway to Gateway Tunnel • Neither point of the IP connection implements IPsec. but network nodes between them protect traffic for part of the way • Protection is transparent to the endpoints • The inner IP header contains the IP addresses of the actual endpoints Protected Subnet gateway IPsec Tunnel gateway Protected Subnet .

Endpoint to Gateway Transport • A protected endpoint (typically a portable roaming computer) connects back to its corporate network through an IPsec protected tunnel • The protected endpoint will want an IP address associated with the gateway so that packets returned to it will go to the gateway and be tunneled back • The protected endpoint may be behind a NAT Protected Protected Endpoint Subnet IPsec Tunnel gateway and/or Internet .

expectations from IKE • • • • • • • • • Secrecy and authenticity Protection against replay attacks Scalability (being suitable for big networks) Privacy and anonymity (protecting identity of players in the protocol) Protection against DOS Efficiency (both computational and minimal in the number of messages) Independence of cryptographic algorithms Minimize protocol complexity Reliability .

Key Exchange Protocols • Key exchange protocols goal is to agree on a shared key for the two participant • Should implement .secrecy .authenticity .

• There are two types of long term keys: 1. • The keys negotiated in the protocol are called short term keys. Public/private keys .Long and Short Term Keys • To support authenticity parties should know a mutual secret key. Pre-shared secret 2. This key is called long term key.

Long and Short Term Keys Why the need for short term keys? • It is not advisable to encrypt a lot of data with the same key • It is advisable to separate between encryption keys and authentication keys Why not sending the new key encrypted using the long term key? • PFS .

PFS Perfect Forward Secrecy • Exposure of long term keys will not entail exposure of short term keys that are created in the current execution of the protocol • PFS is optionally provided in IKE (detailed later) .

.IKE version 1 • IKE version 1 is a hybrid of three protocols (actually a framework and two protocols) • Version 1 grew out of ISAKMP framework and OAKLEY and SKEME protocols that work within that framework.

• This framework decides on the SA’s attributes the parties will use.ISAKMP (IKE version 1) • Stands for “Internet Security Association and Key Management” Protocol • Created by NSA (National Security Agency) • Framework (not really a protocol) for authentication and key exchange. .

ISAKMP (IKE version 1) • Designed to be key exchange independent (supports many different key exchanges) • In IKE version 1 ISAKMP uses part of OAKLEY and part of SKEME. .

SKEME (IKE version 1) • Describes a versatile key exchange technique Provides: • anonymity • repudiability • quick key refreshment .

OAKLEY (IKE version 1) • Describes a series of key exchanges and details the services provided by each • Based on Diffie-Hellman algorithm but providing added security • Generic in that it does not dictate specific formats .

OAKLEY (IKE version 1) Characterized by five important features: 1. Authentication of DH to prevent man-inthe-middle attacks . Exchange of public key values 5. Negotiation of a group (specifying global parameters of DH) 3. Use of nonces to ensure against replay attacks 4. Cookies to prevent clogging attacks 2.

• Each group includes the definition of 2 global parameters and the identity of the algorithm • Three of these groups are classic DH algorithm using modular exponentiation .Diffie-Hellman Groups • A group for the DH key exchange specifies the global parameters of DH.

5 All these three groups (id=1.2^704 – 1 + 2^64 * { [2^638 pi] + 149686} For group id=2: • Prime = 2^1024 .2.2^1472 – 1 + 2^64 * { [2^1406 pi] + 741804} .5) have: • Generator = 2 For group id=1: • Prime = 2^768 .Diffie-Hellman – groups id=1.2.2^960 – 1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093} For group id=5: • Prime = 2^1536 .

4 • Over galois fields using elliptic curves.Diffie-Hellman – groups id=3. .

IKE Version 2 From this point on we focus on IKE version 2 • IKE version 2 is a single protocol rather than three that cross reference one another and is described in a single self-contained document .

Version 2 greatly simplified IKE by replacing the 8 possible phase 1 exchanges with a single exchange.Main benefits of IKE Version 2 over Version 1 IKEv2 preserves most of the features of IKEv1. The idea behind IKEv2 was to make it as easy as possible for IKEv1 implementations to be modified for IKEv2. • Later we will see that IKE is a two-phase protocol. • This single exchange provides identity hiding in 2 round trips rather than 3 in version 1 .

Main benefits of IKE Version 2 over Version 1 • Version 2 decreased latency by allowing setup of SA to be piggybacked on the initial exchange • Version 2 increased security by allowing responder to be stateless until initiator can receive at claimed IP address .

SIT) • possible error states reduced .Side benefits of IKE Version 2 over Version 1 • cryptographic syntax replaced with one simplified syntax • a few fields were removed (ex: DOI.

Details and variations • IKE normally listens on UDP port 500. though may also be received on port 4500 with a slightly different format .

therefore must remember each request until it receives the corresponding response • Responder retransmits a response only when it receives retransmission .Reliability IKE is a reliable protocol. therefore must remember each response until it receives a request with a larger sequence number plus window size • On failure all states associated with SA are discarded . • Initiator responsible for retransmission in the event of timeout.

Reliability • IKE definition includes recovery from transmission error: packet loss. packet replay. packet forgery .

IKE fails cleanly as though the network was broken .Functionality • IKE is designed to function so long as: 1. channel not full of forged or replayed packets (exhausting network or CPU) • Even if these two minimum requirements are absent. at least one of a series of retransmitted packets reaches its destination before timing out 2.

• protocols which include IP addresses of endpoint within the payload (like IPSec) necessitate that NAT understands the protocol and modify the internal references and those in the headers • In transport mode changing IP address will cause checksums to fail. . In tunnel mode there are routing problems.NAT Traversal • IPsec through a NAT introduces problems.

NAT Traversal • For that reason. When working through a NAT it is better to pass IKE packets over port 4500 which runs the NAT-friendly protocol. . IKE supports UDP encoding that is easier for NATs to process • It is less efficient but is easier for NAT to process • This is where port 4500 comes in.

To Sum Up Overview We talked about: • IPSec SAs • what roles IKE play • Design issues • Key exchange protocols: long/short terms keys. pfs • version 1: structure and features • version 2 • Reliability • Terms of functionality • NAT friendly protocol .