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ARREST taking of a person into custody in order that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
*An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be
arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.
1. By virtue of a warrant of arrest (Gen. Rule); and
2.Warrantless arrest (Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure) (Exceptions)
* When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the
officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the
cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has
been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or
forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to
so inform him, or when the giving of such
information will imperil the arrest. The officer need
not have the warrant in his possession at the time
of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person
arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to
him as soon as practicable.
An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue
of the warrant, or without a warrant as provided in
section 5, may break into any building or enclosure
where the person to be arrested is or reasonably
believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto,
after announcing his authority and purpose.
WARRANTLESS ARREST: A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense (in flagrante delicto
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it (hot pursuit
when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
1. The person to be arrested must execute an
overt/physical act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and
2. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
In both instances of warrantless arrests, the
officers personal knowledge of the fact of the
commission of an offense is absolutely required.
Under par. (a), the officer himself witnesses the
crime while under par. (b), he knows for a fact that a
crime has just been committed.
*Rebellion vs. People, G.R. No. 175700, July 5,
2010: FACTS: The arresting police officers were on
routine patrol when they saw the accused handing
a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance to another and holding with his other
hand three
strips of aluminum foil; the police officers approached
them, introduced themselves and inquired about
what accused was holding; suspecting that the
sachet contains shabu, the accused was arrested
and charged; the accused questions the legality of
the arrest claiming that he was not committing or
attempting to commit an offense when arrested and
that the warrantless search upon his person was
also unlawful thereby rendering the seized articles
inadmissible in evidence.
* The Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless arrest
of petitioner was effected under Section 5(a), or the
arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto or while accused
was in the act of handing to Clarito Yanson a plastic
sachet of shabu. Upon seeing the exchange, PO3
Sotomayor and PO3 Garcia approached accused and
Yanson and introduced themselves as members of the
MAC. PO3 Sotomayor confiscated from accused the
plastic sachet of shabu while PO3 Garcia confiscated
the aluminum foil strips which accused was also
holding in his other hand. Under this circumstances, we
entertain no doubt that petitioner was arrested in
flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime,
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the
view of the arresting team.
Jurisprudence is settles that the arresting officer in
a legitimate warrantless arrest has the authority to
search on the belongings of the offender and
confiscate those that may be used to prove the
commission of the offense.
*PP vs. Aruta, April 3, 1998: FACTS: A police officer
was tipped off by his informant that a certain Aling
Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the
following day with a large volume of marijuana.
Acting on the said tip, a team of policemen
deployed themselves near the PNB building. Then,
Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB
building where two females and a man got off; the
informant then pointed to the team members the
woman, Aling Rosa, who was then carrying a
traveling bag; policemen approached her,
introduced themselves as such and asked about
the contents of her bag, she handed it to them and
upon inspection it yielded dried marijuana leaves.
*PP vs. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752 (2003): FACTS: In July
and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City,
received a report from a civilian asset that the
neighbors of accused were complaining that the latter
was responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in
the area. The intelligence section conducted a
surveillance for five days and learned that accused
was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the
civilian asset informed the police that accused went to
Cotabato and would be back later that day with a new
stock of marijuana. At 4 pm that same day, a team of
policemen posted
themselves to await accuseds arrival. At 8 pm, two
men disembarked from a bus and helped each
other carry a carton. The policemen approached the
accuseds and asked if they could see the contents
of the box which yielded marijuana leaves.
*PP vs. Nuevas, Feb. 22, 2007: FACTS: The police
officers received information that a certain male
person, more or less 54 in height, 25 to 30 years
old, with tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and
usually wearing sando and maong pants, would
make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While conducting
stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug
trafficking, they saw the accused who fit the
description, carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted
the accused and informed him that they were police
officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by
the accused, it contained marijuana dried leaves and
bricks wrapped in a blue cloth.
*PP vs. Aminnudin, July 6, 1988: FACTS: The police
received an information that accused would be arriving
in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. While the accused was
descending from the gangplank of
MN Wilcon 9, he was pointed to by the informant as
the carrier of the marijuana; the policemen then
approached him, introduced themselves as such, and
inspected the bag he carried which yielded marijuana.
* Malacat vs. CA, __________:FACTS: The accused
were seen by the policemen at about 6:30 pm
standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon
Boulevard with eyes moving very fast and looking at
every person that came near them; the policemen
approached them, introduced themselves as such and
were able to confiscate a
grenade from accused.
** PP vs. Montilla, Jan. 30, 1998: FACTS: The
arresting police officers received a tip off
information from a civilian informant that accused
would be delivering marijuana concealed inside his
travellingbag and carton box. The informant pointed
the accused to the policemen after he has alighted
from the passenger jeepney; the policemen
approached him, introduced themselves as such;
and requested him to open and show them the
contents of the traveling bag , which accused
which accused voluntarily and readily did. Upon
cursory inspection, the bag yielded the prohibited
*PP vs. Maspil, Jr., August 20, 1909:FACTS: A
checkpoint was set up to check on vehicles
proceeding to Baguio City because they had been
earlier tipped off by some confidential informers that
accused Maspil and Basking would be transporting
a large volume of marijuana to Baguio City. At about
2:00 o'clock in the early morning of November 1,
the operatives intercepted a Sarao type jeep driven by
Maspil with Bagking as his companion. Upon inspection,
the jeep was found loaded with two several sacks and
round tin cans which when opened contained suspected
dried marijuana leaves.
*PP vs. Balingan, Feb. 13, 1995: FACTS: The police officers
received a telephone call from an unnamed male informant
that accused was gong to Manila with a bag filled with
marijuana. They saw accused boarded a Dangwa bus
bound for Manila carrying with her a gray luggage. When
the said bus passed by a checkpoint set by them, a police
officer boarded it, introduce himself to accused and asked
her permission to check her luggage but she did not
respond; the inspection yielded suspected marijuana
flowering tops .
*PP vs. Macarios, June 16, 2010: FACTS: PO2 Pallayoc
was informed by secret agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network that a baggage, with marking
O.K., of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger
jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. PO2
Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned
himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion,
he found the black backpack with an "O.K." marking
and peeked
inside its contents and found bricks of marijuana wrapped
in newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on
top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one
knew. When the jeepney reached the
poblacion, the bag was carried by
accused; he then introduce himself as a
police officer and arrested her, brought
her, together with the bag, at the police
station and when the bags were opened it
contained (3) bricks of marijuana, (2)
round bundles of marijuana, and (2) bricks
of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a
*PP vs. Lising, July 27, 1997: FACTS: NBI agents
arrested one Raul Lacson by virtue of a warrant of
arrest and in the course thereof, saw a substantial
amount of shabu and assorted drug paraphernalia on
top of a table inside his room. When asked about the
source of the shabu, he informed the agents that
accused would be delivering to him a substantial
amount of shabu at around 12 noon using a BMW car
with Plate No. TJH-300. A team was formed to stop
and inspect accused at the parking area upon his
arrival. When accused got off from his car carrying a
red pouch. The NBI agents
approached, identified themselves and requested
that the red pouch be inspected. Upon inspection, it
was discovered that the pouch contained five (5)
big plastic packets of white crystalline granules
suspected to be shabu.
Ruling: PP vs. Aruta, Tudtud, Nuevas, Aminnudin, and
*As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled
that reliable information alone, absent any
overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable
cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
* PP vs. Aruta, the SC ruled Accused-appellant Aruta
cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither
was she about to commit one nor had she just
committed a crime. Accused was merely crossing
the street and was not acting in any manner that
would engender a reasonable ground for the
NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that
she was committing a crime. It was only when the
informant pointed to accused and identified her
to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was
singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents
would not have apprehended accused
were it not for the furtive finger of the
informant because, as clearly illustrated
by the evidence on record, there was no
reason whatsoever for them to suspect
that accused was committing a crime,
except for the pointing finger of the
*In PP vs. Nuevas, et. al., the SC held that accused were not
committing a crime in the presence of police officers.
Reliable information alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under
Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act
that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
*PP vs. Aminnudin: Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused was not caught in
flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or
had just been committed to justify the warrantless
arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
In the case at bar, the accused was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just
done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him
as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It
was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
Identification by the informer was the probable
cause as determined by the officers (and not a
judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
*PP vs. Malacat: Here, there could have been no
valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal
knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or
an overt act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that
a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed.
RULING in PP vs. Montilla, Maspil, Jr., Balingan,
Macarios, and Lising.
*PP vs. Montilla: Here, there were sufficient facts
antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point
prior to the search, were already constitutive of
probable cause, and which by themselves could
properly create in the minds of the officers as well
grounded and reasonable belief that accused was in
the act of violating the law. The search yielded
affirmance both of that probable cause and the
actuality that accused was then actually committing a
crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs.
With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that accused
was caught in flagrante delicto, hence, his arrest and
the search of his belonging without the requisite warrant
were both justified. (There was consented search)
*PP vs. Maspil, Jr.: The appellants were caught in
flagrante delicto since they were transporting the
prohibited drugs at the time of their arrest. A crime was
actually being committed. (This case involves a search
of moving vehicle).
*PP vs. Balingan: The search and seizure in the case at
bench happened in a moving, public vehicle. In the
recent case of People vs. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA
122 (1991), this Court gave its approval to a warrantless
search done on a taxicab which yielded the illegal drug
commonly known as shabu.
Unquestionably, the warrantless search in the case at bench
is not bereft of a probable cause. The Baguio INP Narcotics
Intelligence Division received an information that appellant
was going to transport marijuana in a bag to Manila. Their
surveillance operations revealed that appellant, whose
movements had been previously monitored by the Narcotics
Division boarded a Dangwa bus bound for Manila carrying a
suspicious looking gray luggage bag. When the moving,
public bus was stopped, her bag, upon inspection yielded
marijuana. Under
those circumstances, the warrantless search of
appellant's bag was not illegal.(Search of moving
*PP vs. Macarios: It is well to remember that on Oct.
26, 2005, the night before appellants arrest, the
police received information that marijuana was to
be transported from Barangay Balbalayang, and
had set up a checkpoint around the area to
intercept the suspects. At dawn of Oct. 27, 2005,
PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the
Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him
that a baggage of
marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to
leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2
Pallayoc had probable cause to search the packages
allegedly containing illegal drugs.
Be that as it may, we have held that a search
substantially contemporaneous with the arrest can
precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search. Given that
the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that
search is also valid. (Search of moving vehicle)
*PP vs. Lising: Verily, the NBI agents had reasonable
grounds to believe that accused
was in possession of shabu, having been so
informed by Lacson, who was himself caught in
possession of shabu and this reasonable belief was
indelibly confirmed by the subsequent discovery
and seizure of the shabu contained in the pouch
which was surrendered without objection by
accused to the NBI agents for the inspection.
(Consented search).
1. An offense has just been committed- There must
be a large measure of immediacy between the
between the time the offense was committed and the
time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable
lapse of time between the arrest and the commission
of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
* An arrest a day after or three (3) days after or four (4)
days after or eighteen (18) hours after the
commission of the crime violates the first requisite.
*In PP vs. Gerente, March 10, 1993, the SC upheld the
arrest of the accused, who was pointed to by his
neighbor, an eye witness to the commission of
the offense, to the arresting officer as the
perpetrator thereof, three hours after its commission
to be a valid hot pursuit arrest.
2. The person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
*Personal knowledge an actual belief or reasonable
ground of suspicion. The ground of suspicion is
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of
the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested.
*In PP vs. Alvario, July 16, 1997, the SC ruled that the
personal knowledge of the arresting officers in the
case at bar was culled from the information
supplied by the victim herself who pointed to
Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his
* In PP vs. Manlulu, April 22, 1994 the SC held that
while Pat. Perez may have personally gathered the
information which led to the arrest of Manlulu, that
is not enough. The law requires personal
knowledge. Obviously, personal gathering of
information is different from personal knowledge.
*In PP vs. Cendana, Oct. 17, 1990, the SC invalidated
the arrest of the accused which was done a day
after the killing of the victim and only on the basis of
information obtained by the police officers from
unnamed sources.
* In PP vs. Abrenica, July 1, 2001, the accused was
arrested shortly after the victim was killed but declared it
unlawful because the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts that he has committed the crime.
The SC ruled that their knowledge of the circumstance
from which they allegedly inferred that accused was
probably guilty was based entirely on what they had
been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the
PNP station an reported that a man had been killed; by
an alleged witness who saw accused and the victim
coming out of the Sting Caf; by Danet Garcellano,
the waitress of Sting Caf, who said that the man
last seen with the victim was lean, dark
complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a
pair of brown short pants; by a tricycle driver named
Armando Plata who told them that the physical
description given by Garcellano fitted the accused
and who said he knew where he lived and
accompanied them to his house. Thus, PO3 Rosal
and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information
given to them by other (none of whom is an eye
witness) .
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized
Gen. Rule: Searches and seizures must be effected
by virtue of a search warrant.
Exception: In cases of permissible warrantless
1. Search incidental to a lawful arrest (Section 13,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view;
3. Search of moving vehicle;
4. Consented search;
5. Customs searches;
6. Stop and frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances; and
8. Inspection of building in accordance with fire and
sanitary laws
*The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest
before a search can be made the process
cannot be reversed.
WHAT CAN BE SEIZED: dangerous weapons or
proofs or implements used in the commission of the
crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be
used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee
with the means of escaping or committing violence.
SCOPE OF THE SEARCH: The person of the arrestee
and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made
(PP vs. Castiller, 188 SCRA 376).
PLAIN VIEW SEARCHES usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently/accidentally
comes across an incriminating object.
1. A prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they are;
3. The evidence must be immediately apparent; and
4. The plain view justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search.
*Revaldo v. People, April 16, 2009: There is no
question that the police officers went to the house of
petitioner because of the information relayed by
Sunit that petitioner had in his possession illegally
cut lumber. When the police arrived at the house of
petitioner, the lumber were lying around the vicinity
of his house. The lumber were in plain view. When
asked whether he had the necessary permit to
possess the lumber, petitioner failed to produce
*PP vs. Doria, Jan. 22, 1999: It is clear that an object
is in plain view if the object itself if plainly exposed
to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is
inside a closed container. Where the object seized
was inside a closed package, the object itself is not
in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without
a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and
may be seized. In other words, is the package is
such that an experienced observer could infer from
its appearance that it contains the prohibited article,
then the article is deemed in plain view.
BASIS: Practicality- this has been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of
locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant
may be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct warrrantless searched
of automobiles in the absence of probable cause.
*In carrying out warrantless searches of moving
vehicles, police officers are limited to routine
checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really
searched nor their occupants subjected to physical
or bodily searches, the examination of the vehicles
being limited to visual inspection. (PP vs. Saycon,
Sept. 5, 1994). Where, for example, the officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these
do not constitute unreasonable search.
*When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search
would be constitutionally permissible only if the
officer conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe, before the search, that
either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents
or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of
some criminal offense. (PP vs. Bagista)
* The SC has in the past found probable cause to
conduct without judicial warrant an extensive
search of moving vehicles in situations where (1)
there had emanated from a package a distinctive
smell of marijuana (PP vs. Claudio); (2) agents of
Narcotics Command of the PNP had received a
confidential report from informers that sizeable
volume of marijuana would be transported along the
route where the search was conducted (PP vs.
Maspil); (3) Narcom agents were informed or
tipped off by an undercover deep penetration
agent that prohibited drugs would be brought into
the country on a particular airline flight on a given
date (PP vs. Lo Ho Wing); (4) Narcom agents had
received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession
prohibited drugs and when the Narco agents
confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a
conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to
present his passport and other identification papers
when requested to do so (PP vs. Malmstedt; (5)
Narcom agents had received confidential
information that a woman having the same physical
appearance as that of the accused would be
transporting marijuana (PP vs. Bagista); (6) where
an informer positively identified the accused who
was observed to be acting suspiciously; and (7)
where the appearance of the accused and the color of
the bag he was carrying fitted the description given by
a civilian asset.
CONSENTED SEARCH the constitutional immunity
against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waiver, either expressly or
impliedly. However, the consent to the search must be
voluntarily, unequivocally, specifically, and intelligently
given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
* The following shall be considered in determining
whether the consent was voluntarily given or not:
(1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in
a public or secluded location; (3) whether he
objected to the search or passively looked on; (4)
the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5)
the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the
defendants belief that no incriminating evidence will
be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took
place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective
state of the person consenting. (PP vs. Nuevas)
1. The right exists;
2. The person involved had knowledge either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and
3. The said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right.
*In cases where the SC upheld the validity of consented
search, the police authorities expressly asked, in no
uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be
searched. And the consent of the accused was
established by clear and positive proof, either because
he spontaneously performed affirmative act of volition
by himself opening the bag
without being forced or intimidated to do so, or he
expressly gave his consent.
*Silence should not be construed as an implied
acquiescence to the warrantless search.
STOP AND FRISK SEARCH the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him
for weapon(s).
* The SC held in Malacat vs. CA that where a police
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him.
While probable cause is not required to conduct a
stop and frisk, however, mere suspicion or a
haunch will not validate it. A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him.
* Posadas vs. CA, members of the Integrated National
Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was
carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously and
attempted to flee. They found inside petitioners bag
one 38 cal. Revolver with two rounds of live
ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22 cal gun and
a tear as grenade. The SC upheld the legality of the
search as a instance of stop and frisk.
*Manalili vs. CA, Oct. 9, 1997: Patrolman Espiritu and his
companions observed during their surveillance that
appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk
along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to
police information was a popular hangout of drug
addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-
Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such
suspicious behavior was
characteristic of drug addicts who were high. The
policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop
petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on
drugs. During such investigation, they found
marijuana in petitioners possession.
*PP vs. Solayao, Sep. 20, 1996: He and his
companions drunken actuations aroused the
suspicion of SPO3 Ninos group, as well as the fact
that he himself was attired in a camouflage uniform
or a jungle suit and that upon espying the peace
officers, his companions fled. It should be noted
the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence
mission to verify reports that armed persons were
roaming around the barangays of C
There was justifiable cause to stop and frisk
accused when his companions fled upon seeing the
government agents.
the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by
the police who carry out a process of interrogation
that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.
*It includes the practice of issuing an invitation to a
person who is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed.
TO REMAIN SILENT enshrined in Sec. 17, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution which reads: No person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
- It secures to a person the right to refuse to answer
any particular incriminatory question, e.i., one the
answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for
some crime.
SCOPE In Teodosio vs. CA, the SC ruled that the
constitutional right of an accused against self-
incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the
accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are
not included in the prohibition as the accused does not
thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and
guiding hand of a
counsel is not required. Hence, it has been held
that a woman charged with adultery may be
compelled to submit to physical examination to
determine her pregnancy (Villamor vs. Summers);
and accused may be compelled to submit to
physical examination and to have a substance
taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which
was contracted by his victim (U.S. vs. Tan Teng); to
expel morphine from his mouth (U.S. vs. Ong Sui
Hong); to have the outline of his foot traced to
determine its
identity with bloody footprints (U.S. vs. Sales); to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or
shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to
enable the foregoing things to be done (People vs.
Otadora, et. al.,); requiring him to take part in a
police line up; subjecting him to ultra violet powder
test or paraffin test.
*Forced re-enactments are covered by the right
against self-incrimination the accused is not
merely required to exhibit some physical
characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit
criminal responsibility against his will. It is a police
procedure just as condemnable as an uncounseld
*The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to
ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the accused. (PP vs.Bandula, May 27,
* The presnce of a lawyer is not intended to stop an
accused from saying anything which might
incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our
Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would
lead the accused to admit something false. The
counsel, however, should never prevent an accused fro
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. (Teodosio vs. CA)
* Independent counsel he cannot be a special
counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the
police, or the municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused.
- Contemplate the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
RULE : It would not be sufficient for a police officer
just to repeat to the person under investigation the
provisions of Sec. 17, Art. III of the Constitution. He
is not only duty bound to tell the person the rights to
which the latter is entitled: he must also explain
their effects in practical terms, e.i., what the person
under interrogation may or may not do, and in a
language the subject fairly understands. Short of this,
there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said
that the person has been informed of his rights.
*Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides: A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized which may be anywhere in the
- A search warrant must conform strictly to the
requirements of the constitutional and statutory
provisions under which it was issued. Otherwise, it is
1. One specific offense
* Scatter-shot warrant search warrant issued for more
than one offense.
*The failure of the search warrant to mention the
particular provision of PD No. 1866 that wa violated is
not of such gravity as to call for its invalidation on this
2. Probable cause based on personal knowledge of
the complainant and his witnesses
*Prudente vs. Dayrit, Dec. 14, 1989: the deposition that
the police authorities had conducted continuous
surveillance for several days of the suspected premises
and, as a result thereof, they gathered information from
verified sources that the holders of the subject firearms
and explosives are not
licensed to possess them do not satisfy the
requirement of personal knowledge.
* The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit
to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether
it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for
damage caused. The oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge
of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of
the existence of probable cause.
3. Particular description of the place to be
* A description of the place to be searched is sufficient
if the officer serving the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. A designation or description that points
out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of
*The SC has the occasion to rule in PP vs. CA that the
police had no authority to search the apartment behind
the store, which was the place indicted in the warrant,
even if they intended it to be the subject of their
application. Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be
changed, enlarged or amplified by the police.
4. Particular description of the things to be seized
- Meant to enable law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1)
readily identify the properties to be seized and thus
prevent them from seizing the wrong
items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no
discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus
prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.
* In PP vs. Simbahon, April 9, 2003, the Court ruled that
finally, the seized marijuana was not mentioned in the
search warrant issued for the search of appellants
house. The seizure by the police officers conducting the
search of articles not described in the search warrant
was beyond the parameters of their authority under the
search warrant. Art. III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution requires that a search warrant should
describe the things to be seized. The evidence
purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the
things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant, to
leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize, to the
end that unreasonable searches and seizures may
not be made and that abuses may not be