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Aircraft Fuel Tank System Safety

Training

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Course objectives

Inform candidates of the safety issues and
shortcomings that have led to a decline in fuel system
reliability and safety to assist them in establishing
Maintenance and continuing airworthiness
management procedures
Effective Quality and Safety management procedures
Assist candidates to prepare for the
implementation of a wide range of fuel system safety
related requirements
Statisfy Part M& 145 Amendments on fuel system
safety

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Introductions
Course format/methodology
Questions / Participation

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Module 1 - Introduction

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EASA Agency Decisions

2007/001R
2007/002R
2007/003R

All relate to Aircraft Fuel System Safety – why?

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TWA 800 6 .The Agency Decisions are the outcome of the most extensive aviation safety investigation in the history of aviation The accident to B747 operated by US Operator – TWA on 17 July 1996.

TWA Flight 800 crashed at 20.30 on July 17 1996 In flight break up due to explosive failure in fuselage 212 pax 18 crew die Initial investigation focuses on terrorism 6 months pass before terrorism – or external explosion discounted Fuel tank explosion – induced by system failures – 9 months into investigation 7 .

TWA Flight 800crashed at 20.30 on July 1996 8 .

9 .

The Agency Decisions are the outcome of the most extensive aviation safety investigation in the history of aviation 10 .

The EASA decisions relate to Design and Production standards Continuing Airworthiness Management Operating procedures and limitations Part 145 organisations and maintenance of aircraft Licensing standards for aircraft for maintenance engineers 11 .

What have design and certification assumptions got to do with in-serice continuing airworthiness management and maintenance of aircraft ? 12 .The investigations surrounding the accident led to many basic design and certification assumptions about installed fuel tank system safety to be substantially revised.

The purpose of this training is to explain in more detail what effect the design and certification assumptions have on in-service continuing airworthiness Can you identify some of the processes which might be affected for an in-service aircraft if design and certification assumptions are subsequently revised ? 13 .

” Regulation 2042/2003 – Article 2 .All of the continuing airworthiness processes could be affected ! „covers all of the processes ensuring that at any time in their operating life.Definitions 14 . all aircraft comply with the airworthiness requirements in force and are in a condition fit for safe operation.

AD Maintenance Programme Flight Manual Maintenance Standards Modifications Reliability Programme Repairs Certification MMEL MaintenanceRequirements Life Limits Weight & Balance Airworthiness Limitations C of A Records 15 .

these processes are those associated with the operation. As you can see. continuing airworthiness and maintenance of aircraft. In the global fleet of aircraft – all of the processes have been affected 16 .

We all accept that aviation fuel is dangerous when handling the fuel: but it has mostly been safe inside aircraft installations…. 17 .

Or has it been safe? 18 .

Or has it been safe? 19 .

Aircraft Fuel Tank System Safety – Module 1 Or has it been safe? 20 .

Or has it been safe? A global review of in-service fuel tank safety data demonstrated that fuel tank safety does not meet contemporary standards for system safety targets 21 .

8 December 1963 – Pan Am B707 9 May 1976 – Iranian Air Force B747 22 August 1985 – BA Air Tours B737 11 May 1990 – Philippine Air Lines B737 17 July 1996 – TWA 800 B747 3 March 2001 – Thai Airways B737 5 September 2001 – BA B777 20 August 2007 – China Air B737 22 .

7 Hull losses and 1 ground fire that all resulted in fatalities Perhaps it is not quite as safe as we thought? 23 .

Not all of the aircraft losses arose from the same failure causes – but there are characteristics that require further study This is the primary purpose of this course – to study the failure characteristics and learn from the failures 24 .

In order to better understand it was necessary to :- Assess the TWA accident causes Compare with other accident data to seek common cause failure characteristics Review Design assumptions Review development of scheduled maintenance requirements and inspection/maintenance standards 25 .

The assessment led to the discovery of 3 similar failures:- 1990 Philippine airlines B737 1996 TWA 800 And in the midst of the investigation… 2001 Thai Airways B737 26 .

Aviation Fuel System Safety – Module 1 27 .

Aviation Fuel System Safety – Module 1 In order to learn from these accidents – we are going to have to go back to basics! Design and Production standards Airworthiness Management principles Maintenance and Inspection Standars development and principles 28 .

Aviation Fuel System Safety – Module 1 This course is essentially about fuel system safety initiatives :at the same time these initiatives were being developed 2 parallel investigations were underway:- Lightning HIRF Ageing Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee ( ATSRAC) – Airplane wiring 29 .

Fuel System Safety Module 2:- The history of the Rulemaking 30 .

July 1996 – TWA 800 accident August 1996 – White House Commission: „The Ageing Airplane Non-Structural System Programme” The same year – Start of a major industry study into Fuel System Safety 31 .

32 .

approx.NO IGNITION SOURCE IDENTIFIED 33 .Empty CWT explosion during pushback from gate . .1990 – B-737-300 Manila .8 fatalities . Philippine .Jet-A fuel.95 degree F ambiet temp.Air Conditioning Packs running during Ground Operations .CWT pumps operating at time of explosion .Almost new airplane .

B-747. . approx.Empty CWT explosion during climb . JFK -25 year old airplane .• 1996 . 120 degree F tank temp. TWA 800.NO IGNITION SOURCE IDENTIFIED 34 .230 fatalities .Air Conditioning Packs running during Ground Operations .Jet-A fuel.

TWA 800 accident 35 .

2001 – B-737-400 Bangkok Thailand 36 .

approx.1 fatality .2001 – B-737-400 Bangkok Thailand .CWT pumps operating at time of explosion . 97 degree F ambient temp. .10 year old airplane .Jet-A1 fuel.NO IGNITION SOURCE IDENTIFIED 37 .Empty CWT explosion minutes after refueling .Air Conditioning Packs running during Ground Operations .

3 Centre Wing Tank explosions What Coused them? How could it happen? There had not been any indications previously that the tank systems were unsafe Is it an age-related issue? 38 .

Heating of the centre wing tank to temperatures that were higher than anticipated during design were apparent at an early stage Heat transfer from externally mounted Air Conditioning System (ACS) a large contributor to an explosive condition 39 .

A series of trial flights flown to replicate the TWA 800 final hours establishes CWT intenal temperatures as high as 145f. 40 .

Heat transfer into the Centre Wing Tank (CWT) is possible from the ACS – what about the Exposure on all fleets aroud the world? 41 .

Fuel Tank Flammability Exposure Worldwide Fleet Average 42 .

Fuel Tank Flammability Exposure Worldwide Fleet Average Main Tanks 2-4% Tail Tanks 2-5% Heated Center Wing Tank 15-30% Body Tanks Un-heated Center Wing Tanks 2-6% • Pressurized <5% •Un-pressurized>20% 43 .

„Prevent fuel system accidents through ignition source elimination and flammability reduction„ 44 .

fuel and an ignition source The fuel source came from fuel vapour from heated tank ullage Where does the ignition source come from? Tanks were specifically designed to eliminate ignition source – weren´t they? 45 .The explosive condition required oxygen.

Ignition source requirements were developed on the assumption that flammability levels lower than tank heating proceduced under certain critical conditions:- Ignition source requirements were reassessed – permissible energy level limits too high to prevent an unsafe condition occurring 46 .

There is now a probable scenario which expalins the
fuel tank explosions that have been happeninig:
what is the condition of the rest of the world fleet,
are there latent threats out there?

1998 Industry Fuel System Safety programme
implemented which included a programme of survey
of sample aircraft around the world

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Industry Fuel System Safety Programme Survey was not
conclusive but there were finding
Bonding provisions missing
Swarf and contamination in tanks
Damaged components
Evidence of overheated pumps
Wiring problems
Vent systems incorrectly assembled

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Industry were carrying out an Industy Fuel System
Safety Programme – what about Regulatory rules and
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
initiatives?

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NTSB concluded that tank flammability is the main
culprit the ´most likely ´ignition source was a wiring
defect, possibly related to the Fuel Quantity
Indicating System (FQIS)

NTSB recommend reducing flammability as the
priority
Reducing ignition sources as a ´secondary´need

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FAA nad Regulators from JAA – initially – then Canada and Brazil worked towards a common harmonised set of requirements to reduce the likelihood of an unsafe condition arising in fuel tanks Wing tanks assumed to be safe from effects of heating Flammability target level is wing tank level or better 52 .

Flammability at first. the most difficult problem to solve Initial efforts focused on ignition source reduction Flammability not ignored – but difficult 53 .

FAA rulemaking initiatives to be developed in harmony with Europe.Regulatory effort co-ordinated by FAA. Brazil 54 . Canada and Brazil Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committees (ARAC) established – review flammability issues ARAC is USA process for rulemaking ARAC´s included representatives from Europe. Canada.

2 ARAC activities commence in parallel:- ARAC (1) – Study flammability reduction ARAC (2) – Study flammability reduction systems – ground and air Air .nitrogen enriched air (NEA) Ground – ullage washing and fuel scrubbing 55 .

benefits of airborne system not cost effective and unsubstantiated Rulemaking effort requiring future aircraft to be designed without heated tanks 56 .Flammability Reduction ARAC:- Nitrogen Gas inerting – on board and pre-flight Foam – Filled tanks Tank Membranes Nitrogen Gas inerting benefits inconclusive when weighed against cost and operator hazard issues ARAC (1) concludes that with current technology.

Ignition Source Reduction studies uncover failure modes that could lead to ignition sources:- Mechanical failures – pumps – friction Electrical faults in tank systems – electrical arcs Cross-coupling effects on in –tank systems from external faults – including hot surface effects Bonding system faults – internal and external Lightning protection 57 .

Airplane surveys and comparison of previous requirements against TWA 800 scenario leads to need to carry out safety assessment of all designs – TC and STC 58 .

Ignition sources os all types – mechanical and electrical vs Heating effects on tanks 59 .Design safety assessment to address flammability vs ignition sources for fuel tank system In order for the safety assessment to be carried out. requirements have to be developed setting out standards for designs.

981-1B – Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention Guidelines AC 25.Guidance material initially developed in the form of FAA AC by ARAC and Fuel System Safety Team as an Internationally harmonised guidance document AC 25.981-2 – Fuel Tank Flammability Minimization Guidelines JAA issues eqivalent guidance document JAA TGL 47 60 .

FAA AC and TGL 47 (Appendix B) define the process for determining the action required in the design review Apply unsafe condition criteria to design List unsafe conditions Provide proposals to address unsafe condition If no unsafe condition – review ICAW for best practise 61 .

In order to initiate review of in-service airplanes and initiate changes necessary in TC standards for future airplanes – Regulation required:- FAA Special Federal Aviation Rulemaking (SFAR) 88 JAA INT/POL/25/12 62 .

91 .SFAR 88 codified as FAR 21 plus FAR´s 25 .121 & 125 JAA issue INT/POL/25/12 JAA INT/POL/25/12 is purely a policy statement – there is no JAA equivalent to FAA SFAR process 63 .FAA Issued Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) May 2001 – Final Rule issued – SFAR-88 SFAR 88 is „suite of rule amendments.October 1999.

Effective 6 June 2001. Type Certificated after 1 January 1958.e. 6 December 2002) Applicability – All Turbine Powered Aircraft with 30 seats or more. and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements. Ignition Source and Flammability Reduction.September 2002 -”Spot Amendment” issued that changed FAR 21 to allow „Equivalent Safety Provisions for Fuel Tank System Fault Tolerance Evaluations” Transport Airplane Fuel System Design Review.(i. or max payload of 7.500lbs. 64 . Design Review to commence – 18 months to complete.

Design review to be carried out on fuel tank system required of TC and STC Holders Operators required to survey aircraft and advise TC/STC Holders of configuration – in order that review can be conducted 65 .

500lbs.JAA do not issue equivalent safety policy but implement design review Transport Airplane Fuel System Design Review. Type Certificated after 1 January 1958. Ignition Source nad Flammability Reduction. Effective March 2002. 66 . and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements. Design Review to commence – 18 months to complete Applicability – All Turbine Powered Aircraft with 30 seats or more. or max payload of 7.

1309 SAA taking into account the new 25.Part 21 TC and STC Holders to conduct a „design review” – more than a 25. 67 .981(b) changes.

This review task was completed in USA and (probably) in the JAA Member States at the time JAA Member States were required to issue individual requirement for operators to inspect fleet No guarantee what the position is/was for the ´rest of the world´ fleet 68 .

Significant differences between Boeing and Airbus fuel tanks system design features Pump power supplies through tank conduits in Being models – external supplies in Airbus fleet No pump low-level protection in Boeing models 69 .

Occurrence on B737 when pax notices fluid pumping out of wing leading edge after engine start Arc through in conduit allows fuel in wing tank to leak out through hole in conduit Campaign on Boeing fleet to address problem Pump power supplies to be protected inside conduit by teflon wrap 70 .

FAA emphasis now retuirns to flammability reduction concept 71 .FAA Spot Amendment takes into account development of a ‘Flammability Reduction System´(FRS) – or Nitrogen Gas System (NGS) – in USA resulting from research part sponsored by FAA Tech.Centre.

FAA press for harmonised requirement to retospectively fit FRS as well as for new types JAA and then EASA not convinced of cost/safety benefit from retrospective rule-making for FRS systems Regulatory Impact Assessment carried out which confirms cost/safety benefit not justifying retrospective rule-making 72 .

EASA Agency Decisions 2007/01R.March 2007.2007/02R and 2007/03R issued on Fuel system safety Part 145 organisations – component and airplane level Part M airworthiness Management organisations Part 66 Licensing 73 .

g.Regulations awaiting implementation FAA Regulations to implement changes and standars e. MPD Revisions. Design Changes EASA Regulatios to implement MPD Revisions 74 .

145.66 75 .Where are now? TC Holder manuals now include fuel tank system safety provisions ADs issued for same actions Full implementation – including design rule changes – awaiting EASA/FAA EASA implements changes to Parts M.

Part M requires that vertification procedures are put in
place after working in an area.

Take 10 minutes now, to develop a verification
procedure following a zonal inspection in a CWT
which resulted in a minor structural repair and the
replacement of a length of vent pipe
We will review the procedure later in the course

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ARAC
Flammability SFAR 88
Reduction SFAR Assessment
Study NPRM SFAR 88
Manila Bangkok Implementation
New York

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

NTSB Industry Fuel
recommendations Systems NGS
Safety Development
Program
FAA Task to Industry ARAC
based on NTSB Interting
Recommendations Study

Industry and Regulatory consensus: Reducing flammability would provide major
benefit to enhancing fuel tank safety

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In summary:-

Centre Wing tanks and some other tanks (e.g.
auxiliary tanks) are assesed for flammability
Efforts to be made to reduce flammability
All fuel system source installationc (including wing
tanks) to be ignition source suppressed against new
requirements

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Fuel System
Safety
Module 3:-
Developments in
Fuel Tank
System
Design
Requirements

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An overview of fuel tank system safety related
developing design requirements.

Why is it necessary for an Airworthiness Engineer or an
Aircraft Maintenance Engineer to know about design
requirements?

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These processes ensure that the aircraft and product remain in compliance with the airworthiness requirements in force and that the airplane and product remain in a condition fit for safe operation 81 .Design Requirements form the basis for Continuing Airworthiness management processes.

For example. the Failure Modes and Effects analysis required for fuel tank systems provides date which is required for the basis of the development of the MRB as well as the inspection standards required in scheduled maintenance 82 .Design Requirements form the basis for Continuing Airworthiness management processes.

981-1-Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention Guidelines FAA AC 25.Developments in Fuel System Safety Design requirements:- Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88 FAA AC 25.981(b)-2 Fuel Tank Flammability Minimization JAA INT/POL/25/12 JAA TGL 47 Flammability Reduction System requirements 83 .

Changes to Parts 21. 25. 129 Introduces new design/build requirements and implementing rules for operators Design/build requirements initially harmonised with JAA (EASA) Introduces 3 element analysis tool and Monte Carlo analysis methodology to determine flammability Goes further than 25.1309 in system safety assessment 84 . 121.SFAR 88 FAA Rulemaking – enables FAA to enact several rulemakings simultaneously as well as retrospectively. 91.

85 .SFAR 88 Spot Amendment introduces provision for equivalent safety – by flammability reduction system – in flight or on the ground Flammability reduction intended to be retrospective to existing fleet – EASA position still unclear: Regulatory Impact Assessment carried out shows cost/safety benefit to be unproven.

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12-1 JAA ( part) equivalent to SFAR 88 and AC 981-1(b) Cannot be used to implement Note: EASA implementation of complete rulemaking not yet clear – awaiting decision on flammability reduction systems JAA TGL 47 adopted by EASA as the current standars TGL 47 contains Interpretative Material to INT/POL/25/12 3 element design appraisal tool Listing of failure modes to be considered during design 86 .

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 2 Definition of Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation Definition of fuel system Airworthiness Limitation item Flow chart to map fuel tank system safety assessment Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICAW) guidance Development of scheduled maintenance tasks using Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) methodology 87 .

lightning. static Friction sparks – metallic surfaces rubbing – debris in pump impeller or interference between impeller and case Hot surface ignition 88 . HIRF\EMI.JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 3 Ignition sources Electrical arcs and sparks – wiring and component failures.

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued .4 89 .

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 5 Pump problems 90 .

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 6 Pump problems encountered include Debris from mis-functioning pumps and fittings Stator winding and internal wiring failures leading to arcing Dry running/overheating of pumps Thermal protective devices missing after pump build Electrical connections exposed leading to arcing Thermal switches incorrectly set Poor/no bonding across mating surfaces or bond jumpers Power supply connectors corroding leading to leaks and arcing Cooling port tubes missed during ressembly Pump problems for the MRO and Operator 91 .

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 7 Wiring to pumps iside tanks Arcing due to rubbing in conduit protecting the pump electrical supply – Boeing Design feature Poor circuit protection response Operator resetting CB 92 .

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 8 FQIS system 93 .

washers. tools – potential reduced arc path in probes Probe damage – reduced arc path 94 . lock wire.JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 9 FQIS system problems Degradation of wire insulation – inside/outside tank Copper sulphate deposits on connectors – reduced breakdown voltage Routing of FQIS wires with high voltage wires in conduits FOD in tanks – wire wool.

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued .10 Bonding straps 95 .

loose Straps frayed/worn as a result of wing movement Lightning strikes have resulted in the loss of aircraft due to poor bonding! Poor/missing bonds are often caused by maintenance error! You are only 1 fault away from an unsafe condition! 96 .11 Bonding straps in tanks Straps missing.JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued . broken.

12 Foregoing lists of design related failure modes form the basis for Inspection standards Maintenance procedures 97 .JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued .

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 13 Many of the characteristic inspecion items appear to be those of the zonal inspection programme (ZIP): so why do we need to worry? The list was compiled after an extensive survey of aircraft and components world-wide – the zonal inspection standard was not producing the results that it should! 98 .

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 14 Once the TC/STC Holder has reviewed the design and identified potential un-safe conditions. then the conditions must be mitigated Design changes Operational Procedure changes Maintenance Programme changes Airworthiness management procedure changes Training Not all of these are the responsibility ot the TC/STC Holder 99 .

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 15 So that is inspection standards and maintenance procedures – is that all we need to concern ourselves with in TGL 47? 100 .

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 16 No! Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations Fuel System Airworthiness Limitations MSG Analysis Significant Item development These are also covereds by the TGL! 101 .

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 17 Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation (CDCCL): what is that? 102 .

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 18 ritical esign onfiguration ontrol imitation ( ): A fuel system feature the design integrity of which must be maintained to ensure that an unsafe condition does not develop. Features in an aircraft system or componenet. May exist in fuel system but may also be features in systems or assemblies that interact or cross-couple with fuel systems 103 .

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 19 Examples of CDCCL:- Bonding feature attaching to component and tank Separation of fuel gauge wiring from other high – power wiring Fuel pump configuration Wire support for high power wiring near to tank We will later look at some characteristic CDCCL from TC Holders 104 .

Power cables riding on structure can cause damage to the power cables 105 .

fuel pump 106 .g.JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 21 For the identification and management of CDCCL Related tasks highlighted by TCH in AMM/CMM Airworthiness management procedures put in place Ensure features are protected during repair/changes Ensure maintenance organisation is aware Implement traninig programmes Remember. the feature itself may not be directly related to the fuel system and also may be at component level e.

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 22 For the identification and management of CDCCL 107 .

how will the operator control the CDCCL? Pool parts Component suppliers 108 .JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 22 For the identification and management of CDCCL If fuel pump. configuration is to be identified as a CDCCL.

FAA 8130-3 Contracts will need to specify CDCCL managed and complied with during MRO activity – box 13? CAME procedure in place Maintenance procedure for MRO 109 .JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 22 For the identification and management of CDCCL Fuel Pump CDCCL management:- This will be a challenge for the operators EASA Part 145 From 1 .

JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – continued – 23 For the identification and management of CDCCL – WIRING Wire repair and inspection practises training required to Ensure acceptable wiring standard practises splicing. support routing Provide comprehensive knowledge of CDCCL for type 110 .

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TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – cont.– 25
Fuel Tank System Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI)
Fuel System Mandatory Instructions – can include
Design changes
Maintenance
Inspections
Procedures

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TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – cont. – 25
Fuel Tank System Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI)
Those items necessary to ensure that
Unsafe conditions do not arise in the fuel system
throughout the service life of the airplane
ALI to be mandated by AD and included in the
Airworthiness Limitation Section of ICAW

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TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – cont. – 25

Fuel Tank Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI)
ALI contained in:-
Section 9 of MPD
Note: Airbus now cross-refer to Scheduled Maintenance Data
(SMD) document
Maintenance Manual Section 5

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TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – cont. – 25
Could a CDCCL be an ALI?
No, A CDCCL does not fall within the definition
of an ALI
An ALI requires some positive action to be taken
– modify/change, inspect etc.
A CDCCL is a design feature

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TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – cont.– 25
Another form of an ALI could be a
modification/change:-
EASA AD 2006-0191
A330-200, A340-200/300 aircraft
Air Conditioning – prevention against fuel explosion
risks – installation of heat shields in belly faring

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– 25 Fuel Tank System Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI) EASA AD 2006-0204 – July 2006 ATA 28: Fuel – Fuel Tank Safety ALS Part 5 – Fuel Airworthiness Limitations (FAL) 117 .TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 – cont.

AIRBUS Fuel Tank System ALI – Maintenance and Ispection tasks Mandatory accomplishment – no change or deletion Can be escalated in accordance with approved escalation practises – based on data collection and analytical techniques – CAME procedure Aligned with ZIP Dedicated tank entry to be avoided maintenance error 118 .

AIRBUS Fuel Tank System ALI – Maintenance and Ispection tasks – continued Exceptional short term externsions permitted (CAME procedures) 10% or 500FH – FH 5% or 250FC – FC/LDG´s Calendar limits extensions RI <12m 10% or 1 month RI> 12m>3y – 2 months RI>3y – 3 months 119 .

AIRBUS Fuel Tank System ALI – Maintenance and Ispection tasks – continued A 330 Fuel Airworthiness Limitation (FAL) Task Ref: 281800-02-01 – Detailed inspection of vapour seal/drip shield – 6y A330-300 post mod 49520 120 .

AIRBUS Fuel Tank System ALI – CDCCL It is important to remember that these CDCCL are design features that require management in Scheduled maintenance Repair Change/modification They are not scheduled maintenance tasks – to be carried out at specific intervals 121 .

AIRBUS Fuel Tank System ALI – CDCCL Air gap – FQI probe to structure FQI wiring separation from other wiring Direct bonding of equipment items in fuel tank Safety critical features of fuel pumps 122 .

AIRBUS Fuel Tank System ALI – CDCCL Is this everything from Airbus? 123 .

we still have to look at scheduled maintenance and MSG 3 as maintenance procedures – see module 5 124 .AIRBUS Fuel Tank System ALI – CDCCL No.

What about other TC Holders? Boeing for example? 125 .

Most other states appear to be following FAA policy FAA has been issuing a series of NPRM TO mandate certain fuel tank system safety items It would appear that these actions will not be implemented until 2008 126 .

g. FAA NPRM 2006-NM-163-AD – on B767 seeking operatot comment Amend maintenance programme to incorporate ALI Initial inspection of repetitive ALI items to phase in inspections Intended to reduce likelihood of ignition sources 127 .e.

FAA policy appears to require inspections to ensure initial configuration – this is not yet required in Europe EASA Part M will mandate FAA – and other State of TC – fuel tank system safety provisions 128 .

28-AWL-01: Task ALI – detailed inspection of wire bundles over CWT – 12y/3600H AWL No. B767 MPD AWL No.Boeing Airplane MPD already published with ALI/CDDCCL e. 28-AWL-02: CDCCL – External Wires over CWT – maintain existing wire bundle routing and clamping 129 .g.

28-AWL-04: CDCCL – Lightning protection – Hydraulic line fuel tank penetration – bond checks on heat exchanger and lines – to structure and in-line connectors 130 .g.5 milliohms or less AWL No.Boeing Airplane MPD already published with ALI/CDDCCL e. B767 MPD AWL No. 28-AWL-03: CDCCL – Lightning protection – Engine fuel feed line – verify electrical fay surface bond from bulkhead fitting to structure – 0.

28-AWL-06: AC and DC Pump Maintenance – repair and overhaul of fuel pumps must be IAW with CMM 131 .g. B767 MPD AWL No.Boeing Airplane MPD already published with ALI/CDCCL e.

ohm – pump to housing bond 0. 28AWL-07: CDCCL – AC fuel Pump Fault Current bonding path – installation of bonding straps – pump housing to structure bond 0.g.3 m.ohm 132 .Boeing Airplane MPD already published with ALI/CDCCL e. B767 MPD AWL No.2 m.

B767 MPD AWL No. 28-AWL-14: CDCCL – tank access door configuration – verify seal position – apply grease both sides of knitted aluminium mesh gasket 133 .g.Boeing Airplane MPD already published with ALI/CDCCL e.

28-AWL-17: CDCCL – resetting tripped fuel pumb CB – must trouble shoot faul at component level before resetting CB 134 .Boeing Airplane MPD already published with ALI/CDCCL e. B767 MPD AWL No.g.

Boeing Airplane MPD already published with ALI/CDCCL e. B767 MPD AWL No.28-AWL-17: CDCCL – resetting tripped fuel pumb CB – must trouble shoot faul at component level before resetting CB – How will operators manage this? 135 .g.

Boeing Airplane MPD already published with ALI/CDCCL Managing the B767 Fuel Tank System ALI will be more problematical than the Airbus A330 (6 ALI – no measuring) vs B767 (17 ALI – 11 measurement items) What if FAA mandate threshold inspections for these ALI? 136 .

Part 121 – this would not be automatically applicable in Europe. 137 .g.If FAA mandate configuration threshold inspection using the OPS Rule e.

Boeing issue spread sheets of ALI/CDCCL for each type See Course Handouts 138 .

139 . Trickle earth faults sometimes do not trip the airplane CB quickly enough. Failres have occurred when wires arc through to the conduit metal sleeve.Note the requirement for the installation of Ground Fault Interrupters (GFI) 115v AC supplies for many tank mountes pumps on Boeing aircraft are routed through conduits inside the tank from front spar to rear spar. GFI will do this.

We have covered design requirements with regard to ignition source suppression. with the exception of the maintenance requirements – what about flammability reduction? 140 .

For flammability Supperession – see next module – module 4! 141 .

Fuel System Safety Module 4:- Flammability Reduction in fuel tank systems 142 .

Given that fact. 143 .The NTSB recommended that fuel tank flammability was primary causal effect – trying to make tanks ignition proof was (probably) unachievable in the in- service condition. then unless the tanks were flammability reduced then the likelihood was that there will be another incident.

2 ARAC`s were convened to study flammability protection ARAC 1 -1998 .initially finds on-board systems difficult ARAC 2 – 2001 – considers FAA device based on food processing unit to be feasible and develops basic certification proposals 144 .

Various methodologies studied with mixed results Ullage washing Fuel scrubbing Polyurethane foam filled tanks Inner tank membranes On Board Inert Gas System (OBIGS) Remove heat from CWT 145 .

Centre studies with a system that used Hollow Fibe Technology to separate out oxygen seemed promising ARAC hypothesises that Ox reduction to 12% would provide the necessary margin to reduce flammability 146 .FAA Tech.

147 .

depleted in Oxygen 148 .Air Separation Module separates out Oxygen Water Carbon Dioxide Remaining air rich in Nitrogen.

149 . Fuel System Safety – Module 4 Boeing test system on Boeing 747 aircraft Airbus test using A 320 Note: Airbus do not agree with FAA model that shows some variants to have similar flammability as Boeing airplanes.

3d Model of typical installation 150 .

151 .

FAA propose that system is not an MMEL candidate – aircraft can `safely operate` without system available No flight deck effects – no operating condition monitor Maintenance tasks:- Change ASM – Life Limit Zonal Inspection of system installation 152 .

US Military experience with Nitrogen systems very obscure Nitrogen enriched atmosphere will suffocate Difficult to purge tanks Loss of life of mechanics 153 .

FAA policy to require installation of some form of Flammability Reduction (FRS) either fitted to aircraft or through groud based inerting to All existing high flammability aircraft – 10 year compliance time-frame All new designs 154 .

Regulatory Impact Assessment carried out by JAA Fuel System Safety team No proof that retrospective implementation would be cost effective More emphasis on removing heat sources from all new designs Current initiatives to suppress ignition sources would provide a reasonable defence for existing fleet 155 .

EASA now carrying out another RIA Results awaited! 156 .

Fuel System Safety Module 5:- Developments in Fuel Tank System Maintenanace requirements 157 .

g.JAA TGL 47 Appendix B requires that maintenance Steering Group (MSG) methodology takes into account the safety features inherent in Fuel Tank System and components design MSG analysis previously only takes into account the intended airplane system function e. `supply low pressure fuel` 158 .

MSG 3 analysis also provides a Zonal Inspection Programme (ZIP) MSG 2 analysis does not provide a ZIP 159 .

Findings from the fleet survey carried out by the Industry AFSSP and in-service experience reviews (SB. AD. MOR) gave evidence that the ZIP was not providing the necessary preventative maintenance required to ensure continuing airworhiness 160 .

AD.Findings from the fleet survey carried out by the Industry AFSSP and in-service experience reviews (SB. MOR) gave evidence that the ZIP not providing necessary preventative maintenance required to ensure continuing airworthiness and reliability Maintenance procedures were deficient 161 .

then surely they should have led to mandatory AD action? 162 .If these shortcomings led to an unsafe condition .

All unsafe conditions must be subjected to AD action. 163 . Some conditions were not unsafe – according to the various definitions But they are undesirable and cauld lead to unsafe conditions developing under certain failure conditions.

For example. leaving lockwire in a fuel tank is not of itself an unsafe condition but it could lead to one if it Bridged an FQIS probe Lodged in a pump inlet and led to impeller rubbing or pump bearing failure 164 .

TGL 47 requires Fuel Tank System to be reanalysed using new MSG criteria Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedure (EZAP) System installation and component safety features to be addressed when assessing fault conditions 165 .

What does this all mean? EZAP? Safety fault conditions? 166 .

bonding of pipes for safety in a lightning event – are not specifically addressed 167 .g.g.MSG 3 analysis only addresses the fault condition associated with function of the system e. supply low pressure fuel to the engine fuel system The safety features e.

Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedures (EZAP) were developed by the Ageing Transport Systems Regulatory Advisory Committee (ATSRAC) to address wiring fault conditions More of this later! 168 .

we need to go back to MSG analysis and Zonal Inspection Programme development! 169 .At this stage – in order to understand more fully.

A review of MSG 3 methodology for fuel tank system safety 170 .

Refer to MSG handout 171 .

Level 1 – Consequences of Failure Evident or Hidden Function Failure Effects of Failure on Operating Safety and Operating Capability 172 .

Level 2 – Applicable and Effective Maintenance Tasks Failure Effect Category (FEC) FEC 5 FEC 6 FEC 7 FEC 8 FEC 9 Evident Evident Evident Hidden Hidden Safety Operational Economic Safety Non-Safety 173 .

are not likely to be detected during operations. and/ or Could have significant economic impact.Selection begins at the highest manageable level. and/ or Could have significant operational economic impact. Maintenance significant items (MSIs) Systems and assemblies Identified by manufacturer as items whose failure: Could affect safety (on ground or in flight). 174 . and/ or Could be undetectable or.

Provide clear MSI definition IDENTIFY EACH MSI Function Functional Failure LIST Failure Effect Failure Cause Additional Data APPLY LOGIC For each MSI’s functional failure and failure cause DETERMINE IF Applicable and effective task TASK IS NECESSARY SCHEDULED Formed by resultant tasks and intervals MAINTENANCE PROGRAMME 175 .

Logic Diagram Logic Diagram Flow starts at top Answers (Yes or No) dictate analysis flow direction First level determines consequences of failure Each functional failure analysed Identifies one effect category for each functional failure 176 .

Each failure cause for each functional failure is driven through second level questions 177 .Evident Safety (FEC 5) Evident Operating capability (FEC 6) Evident Economic – non capability effects (FEC 7) Hidden Safety Effects (FEC 8 ) Hiden Non-Safety (FEC 9) Second level determines if there is an applicable and effective maintenance task.

In safety effects paths (evident or hidden) all subsequent questions must be asked. In absence of adequate infomation default logic dictates „No” answer and subsequent question to be asked. Uses paralleling and default logic. Multiple „Yes” answer allowable. 178 .Second level maintenance task analysis.

Consequences of Failure Evaluation (Level1) IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL FAILURE Significant Item Evaluation EVIDENT TO THE OPERATING CREW DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF NORMAL DUTIE? DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OR DOES THE COMBINATION OF A HIDDEN SECONDARY DAMAGE RESULTING FROM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE &ONE ADDITIONAL THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT FAILURE OF A SYSTEM RELATED OR BACK-UP ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY? FUNCTION HAVE AN ADVERSE EFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY? DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT OPERATING CAPABILITY? 179 .

Question 1 must be asked for each functional failure of the item being analysed. The intent is to segrerate the evident and hidden functional failures.Hidden / Evident Functional Failure (Question No 1) IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL FAILURE EVIDENT TO THE OPERATING CREW DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF NORMAL DUTIES? This question asks if the operating crew will be aware of loss (failure) of the function during performance of their normal operating duties. 180 .

Hidden / Evident Functional Failure (Question No 1) IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL FAILURE EVIDENT TO THE OPERATING CREW DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF NORMAL DUTIES? Function does not include safety 181 .

Function does not include safety Function of airframe fuel tank system is to provide low pressure fuel to engine High pressure system. 182 .

Function does not include safety Function of airframe fuel tank system is to safely provide fuel……… 183 .

A „ Yes” answer indicates the functional failure is evident: proceed to Question 2 A” No” answer indicates the functional failure is hidden : proceed to Question 3. 184 .

185 .Direct Adverse Effect on Safety (Question No 2) DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OR SECONDARY DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY? For a" Yes„ answer the functional failure must have a directive adverse effect on operating safety.

A „Yes” answer indicates that this functional failure is safety related and task(s) must be developed in safety effects. Category 5. 186 . A „No” answer indicates the effect is either operational or economic and Question 4 must be asked.

Operational Effect – (Question No 4) DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATIONG CAPABILITY? If the answer to this question is "Yes„. A”No” answer indicates that there is an economic effect and should be handled economic effects. 187 . and task selecion will be handled in operational effects. Category 7. Category 6. the effect of the functional failure has an adverse effect on operating capability.

188 .Hidden Functional Failure Safety Effect (Question No 3) DOES THE COMBINATION OF A HIDDEN FUNCTIONAL FAILURE AND ONE ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF A SYSTEM RELATED OR BACK-UP FUNCTION HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY? This question is asked of each hidden functional failure which has been identified in Question 1.

A”No” answer indicates that there is a non-safety effect and will be handled in non-safety effects. 189 . Category 8. If a „Yes” answer is determined. Category 9.For protective safety / emergency system or equipment . there is a safety effect and task development must proceed in hidden safety effects. the additional failure is the event for which the system or equipment is designed.

Effect Analysis (Level 2) Effect Categories and Maintenance Tasks Failure Effect Categories – FEC – (from first level questions) FEC 5 – Evident Safety FEC 6 – Evident Operating capability FEC 7 – Evident Economic – non-capability FEC 8 – Hidden Safety effects FEC 9 – Hidden Non-Safety 190 .

Maintenance Tasks for each effect category Lubrication / Servicing Operational / Visual Check (for Hidden Categories only) Inspection / Functional Check Restoration Discard Combination (for Safety Categories only) 191 .

Is a Lubrication or Servicing Task Lubrication/Servicing applicable & effective? Is an Inspection or Functional Check to Inspection / Functional detect degradation of function Check applicable&effective? Is a Restoration Task to reduce failure rate Restoration applicable & effective? Is a Discard Task to avoid failures or to Discard reduce the failure rate applicable and effective? Is there a Task or Combination of Tasks applicable & effective? 192 .

Lubrication/ Servicing Is a Lubrication or Servicing Task applicable & effective? Is a Check to vertify operation applicable & Operational/ Visual Check effective Is an Inspection or Functional Check to detect Inspection / Functional Check degradation of function applicable& effective? Is a Restoration Task to reduce failure rate Restoration applicable&effective? Is a Discard Task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective? Discard Is a Discard Task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective? 193 .

The analysis will result in the development of large numbers of General Visual inspections especially in relation to systems instalations General Visual Inspections may be precluded by the Zonal Inspection Programme What does this mean? 194 .

We need to look at the zonal programme development prescribed in MSG 3 195 .

MSG 3 analysis of an SSI or MSI may result in a task described as ‘General Visual Inspection’ – or General Surveillance Inspection EMSG analysis produces structural Zonal Inspection Programme General Visual ( or surveillance) Inspection (GVI) tasks become candidates for the Zonal Inspection Programme 196 .

” Zones defined by ATA Zoning criteria – 100-200 etc Zones further defined by subzone 197 ..General Visual (GV) Inspection items within zone All items given equal treatment – no „pay particular attencion to….

may be required to gain proximity.MSG3 Definition: General Visual Inspection:- A visual examination that will detect obvious unsatisfactory conditions/ disrepancies. etc. Workstands. access panels / doors. fairings. ladders etc. This type of inspection may require removal of fillets. 198 .

engine electrics. etc) MSI/ SSI Analysis may result in general visual inspection ( GVI) tasks GVI tasks are candidates for zonal inspection programme Zonal candidate tasks are transferred from ATA working groups to zonal WG using transfer sheets 199 .No characteristic items ( such as airframe.

Z10-010) 200 .g. Zonal WG assesses suitability of candidate tasks Packaged tasks become „precluded” by zonal programme Precluded MSI / SSI tasks lose individual identity Zonal task has an allocated MRB Reference (e.

Remember – this zonal task may include a number of precluded MSI/SSI items Precluded tasks listed in Appendix to MRB Zonal Programme validated – access rules sampled 201 .

assign preliminary zonal inspection by packaging precluded tasks 202 . discuss service experience.Manufacturer provides A/C zoning diagrams / access panel diagrams and door diagrams Manufacturer provides worksheets for each zone Working group meeting to review data.

Summarise proposed zonal inspections in appropriate packages based on access requirements Validate zonal inspections on aircraft Present to ISC 203 .

1. The density of the zone(closely packed with systems / structural items) 204 . System components and structure contained in the zone 5. 4. Structural inspection requirements in the area 3. „Normal” airline maintenance operatios within the zone. Systems maintenance activity and frequency in the zone 2.

high temperature. Environoment of the zone (exposed. Importance of systems/ components within the zone 7. Failures have operational or safety related effects or impact other components in close proximity 8. etc) 9. pressurised.6. Degree of accessability of the zone 205 .

10. MSI’s & SSI’s contained in the zone 11. Operators service experience / type of abnormalities 12. Content / format of past A/P programmes 206 .

Composite area – what type of composite – how is damage evidenced Inspect ability of structures items Insulation removal required Surface preparation / cleaning required Corrosion task applied to the area 207 .

Surface to be inspection may be identified as ‘internal’ or ‘external’ Logic used to determine internal / external is not always self evident e.g. outside (external) surface of stab box is inside (internal rear fuselage Logic may vary from type yo type 208 .

Extent depth of the inspection usually set by access requirement Remove Trim Remove Panel(s) Remove Soundproofing Remove Surface Preparation etc Access requirement is circumscribed within maintenance manual reference For full intet of task to be met – task cards require accurate transcription 209 .

g.Fuselage) Zonal programme threshold inspections are often linked to SSI Initial Inspection Interval Lack of findings in thershold inspections should not provide basis for escalation of programme 210 .Care must be exercised when collating zonal findings sine defects / failures may be recorded by ATA Chapter (e. ATA 28. ATA 53.Airframe Fuel. ATA 29 – Hydraulic Power.

Planners and inspectors require zonal programme training Development of ZIP Access Rules Inspection Surface Rules Inspection Standards Data Processing Rules 211 .

We now are re-familiarised with MSG 3 methodology and Zonal Inspection Programme development What next? 212 .

The Fuel System Safety Programme and the in-service experience reviews all indicate that the Zonal Inspection Programmes are not achieving the results expected 213 .

The MSG methodology does not cover the system plumbing very well Inspectors are frequently not trained adequately on the principles of the inspection nor familiar enough with the technology of the systems instsallations 214 .

The ZIP requires GVI to be applied to a zonal volume Let us look at some wiring instalation problems 215 .

riding on hydraulic lines.Wires improperly tied. contaminated with caustic fluid 216 .

Bundle riding on structure 217 .

Heat Discoloration 218 .

Overheated wire at the splice 219 .

Bend radii problem – Less than 3 times the diameter 220 .

221 .

O.K – so there are problems with some of the wiring inspection standards – but some of the examples were installation standards problems – nothing to do with scheduled maintenance 222 .

Organisations approved in accordance with Part 145 are approved to carry out repairs and changes/ modifications Installation inspection standards are then an issue 223 .

pipe connections – contribute to flammability by enhancing vapour propagation. bulkheads.Fuel spraying and sloshing resulting from incorrectly restored internal tank components – dams. These factors need to be taken into account as well 224 .

We are probably now in a better position to review the verification procedure which we developed at the beginning of the course! Part M 402(f) requires that the aircraft/component is checked for Clear of tools and equipment Clear of extraneous material Panels correctly refitted 225 .

We need help from the TC Holder ! 226 .So. Part M requirements alone do not meet this neeed.

We have dealt with scheduled maintenance development and considered some related problems in changes/modifications/repairs – is that all? 227 .

No. we have to consider airworthiness management and maintenance procedures Task card development Maintenance Procedures including verification tasks – tank closure Repairs/changes Maintenance Programme development ARC issue MEL management Occurrence reporting standards 228 .

Task Card development – Part M or Part 145 Task card development must take into account Sufficient information with regard to inspection standard Highlight CDCCL Ensure verification checks/tank closure procedures followed Include cleaning stage 229 .

Maintenance Procedures – Verification Procedures – Part M 402(f) CDCCL Damage to components Connections correctly re-assembled – fuel and wiring Bonding checks carried out – as necessary Panels refitted Tools and other extraneous material Function checks – as necessary Leaks Attachment of components/system Independent Inspection? – best practise 230 .

Maintenance Procedures – General Pump dry-running is to be avoided Most Boeing pumps do not have auto-shut off Airbus pumps with auto-shut-off must be switched to the auto position when maintenance task is completed CDDDL must be managed during maintenance and change/repair – advise MRO organisation – especially in case of nonstandard STC 231 .

Repair and changes/modifications CDCCL must be managed Refer to Boeing documentation for authorisation of tank repairs Avoid contamination of wiring systems Observe wiring standard practises – wire clipping. routing. splices etc. 232 .

Maintenance Programme development:- Escalation of tasks associated with ZIP nad ATA 28 and in some cases – associated systems (CDCCL related) Reliability programme NRC tracking MPD revisions 233 .

compliance Modification/changes.ARC issue:- CDCCL. ALI. Repair standards Airplane survey Part M and Part 145 compliance – fuel system safety 234 .

MEL Management Fault Isolation CB reset procedures ALI and TC Holder recommendations in OPS Manual 235 .

236 . Included because of on NTSB recommendation out of the Learjet 35(Payne Stewart) accident. Fuel System Safety – Module 6 ATSRAC Meeting – 23/24 January 2002 decided to add new tasking: T10WG to review far 135/FAR 25 aircraft to ascertain applicability with ATSRAC proposed rulemaking.

1309) 237 .1705 (inline with 25.H (1700 series) addressing „Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems (EWIS)” Plus identify: EWIS Definition Design mitigatios for ageing wiring Specific „Wiring System” Safety Assessments 25. Proposed Outputs of ATSRAC New/dedicated Section on FAR/CS-25 .

1529 Appendix H Standard Wire Practices data. Fuel System Safety – Module 6 CS/FAR 25. as improved under ATSRAC TASK 7 Wire Separation Design Guidelines Special Identification Requirements Electrical Load Analysis Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedure (EZAP) 238 .

Fuel System Safety – Module 6 MSG 3 Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedures Refer to handout 239 .

Fuel System Safety – Module 6 Proposed rulemakig – cont.500lbs payload (cargo) TC nad STC’s to be reviewed and included in the application of EZAP. Retroactive application of the „Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedure” (EZAP) to all turbine powered aircraft TC after 1 January 1958 with 30 seats or more. 240 . as appropriate. or greater than 7.

Fuel System Safety – Module 6 Proposed rulemaking – cont. 241 . FAR 145 to be amended to require maintenance providers to introduce similar training programmes. As well as Ops Rule changes requiring Operators to introduce specific EWIS Training.

129.125.25. Fuel System Safety – Module 6 Proposed rulemaking cont. FAA rules to be amended: FAR’s 21. possibly 135 plus SFAR (codified as part 21) for the retroactive review of TC/STC standard and application od EZAP 242 .91.121.

145.66 AD for relevant changes to scheduled maintenance 243 . Fuel System Safety – Module 6 Proposed rulemaking cont. EASA rules to be amended: Most probable outcome will be to follow the SFAR 88 model Amendments to Parts M.

Fuel System Safety – Module 6 Rulemaking time frames All task group reports have to be presented to ATSRAC by January 2003 FAA plan to have NPRM published in the Federal Register 3rd quarter 2003 Final Rule (subject to comments ) .awaited 244 .

Fuel System Safety – Module 6 Rulemaking time frames EASA timeline to be similar to the planned by FAA EASA development could affect this timeframe 245 .

Fuel System Safety – Module 6 The End!! We hope that the course delivered all of the objectives for you. 246 .

Fuel System Safety – Module 5 Occurence Reporting standards Strip reports for CDCCL ITEMS CDCCL and ALI events require reporting to TC Holder 247 .

Aircraft Wire Interconnect Systems 248 . Fuel System Safety – Module 5 Ageing Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee – ATSRAC.

Fuel System Safety – Module 6 TWA 800 accident 1996 White House Commission: „The Ageing Airplane Non- Structural Systems Programme” 1998 Ageing Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ATSRAC) is formed. 249 .

First two year commission of ATSRAC produced five reports. Fuel System Safety – Module 6 Fuel Tank Ignition AND Flammability Reduction initiative (SFAR-88) ran in parallel with a ATSRAC. ATSRAC commissioned for a further two years to turn reports into rulemaking. 250 .

Fuel System Safety – Module 6 FAA Ageing Transport Non Structural Systems Plan ATSRAC Task 1 Task 2 Task 4 Task 3 Task Fleet Standard Sample Fleet Service Maintenance Training History Review Practices Inspection 251 .

Fuel System Safety – Module 6 Four sub working groups set up to undertake this tasking. T6WG – to address certification rules and guidance T7WG – to address Wiring Standard Practices Manual 252 .

Fuel System Safety – Module 6 T8WG – to address Training rulemaking and guidance T9WG – to address continued airworthiness and maintenance rules and guidance 253 .

1309 Standard Content Programme SEDLP Recurrent Training compliance requirements Maitenance ICAW EZAP Ops Rule & AC Ops./Maint EZAP SFAR Part 25 Rule ATA Specification Rule EZAP AC Part 25 AC ICAW Appendix Ops/Maint AC H 254 . Fuel System Safety – Module 6 ATSRAC Task 7 Task 8 Task 9 Task 6 SWPM Training Maintenance Wire Systems HWG Standarisation HWG HWG WG Reorganise existing Rules Wire System Determine new Wire Systems Training Standard Format Maintenanace Programme SWPM Requirements Identify.