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Session 3.

State Immunity from

Atty. Vincent Pepito F. Yambao, Jr.
When is a suit against the State?
Consent to be sued
Express consent
Implied Consent
Suit against Municipal Corporations
Suit against Foreign States
Suit against International Agencies
Suit against Public Officers
Consent to Execution
State Immunity from Suit
Textual Basis

1987 Const., Art. XVI, Sec. 3. The State may not

be sued without its consent

Executive Order No. 292, Chapter 3, Section 10.

Non-suability of the State.No suit shall lie
against the State except with its consent as
provided by law.
Theoretical Basis

The immunity from suit is based on the

political truism that the State, as a
sovereign, can do no wrong

Air Transportation Office v. Spouses David,

G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011
In a republican state, like the Philippines, government
immunity from suit without its consent is derived from the
will of the people themselves in freely creating a
government of the people, by the people, and for the
people a representative government through which they
have agreed to exercise the powers and discharge the duties
of their sovereignty for the common good and general
welfare. In so agreeing, the citizens have solemnly
undertaken to surrender some of their private rights and
interest which were calculated to conflict with the higher
rights and larger interests of the people as a whole,
represented by the government thus established by them
all. One of those higher rights, based upon those larger
interests is that government immunity. The members of the
respondent Labor Union themselves are part of the people
who have freely formed that government and participated in
that solemn undertaking. In this sense and a very real one
it is they are in effect attempting to sue themselves along
with the rest of the people represented by their common
government an anomalous and absurd situation indeed.
Metran v. Paredes, G.R. No. L-1232 January 12, 1948
Practical Basis

Practical considerations dictate the

establishment of an immunity from suit in
favor of the State. Otherwise, and the
State is suable at the instance of every
other individual, government service may
be severely obstructed and public safety
endangered because of the number of
suits that the State has to defend against.
Air Transportation Office v. Spouses David, G.R. No.
159402, February 23, 2011
[A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-
suability is not to be deplored for as against the
inconvenience that may be caused private parties,
the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle
to the performance of its multifarious functions are
far greater if such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy
were not thus restricted. With the well-known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court,
at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy
required to defend against law suits, in the absence
of such a basic principle that constitutes such an
effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.

Providence Washington Insurance Co. v.

Republic (29 SCRA 598)
Four-Tiered Analysis

1 Is it a suit against the State?

2 Has the State given its


3 Is the State Liable?

Can public funds be

When the suit is against the

Suit is
is against
against an
State is
is Named
Named as
as a
a unincorporated
Party government
government entity

Suit is
is against
against an
an Suit
Suit is
is against
against a a public
incorporated officer
officer and
and the
the ultimate
government entity
entity liability
liability will
will fall
fall on
on the
performing state
governmental function
Republic vs. Feliciano
The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing
the State to court just like any private person who is
claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for
the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but
an action in personam. It is an action directed against
a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein
binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed
by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed
against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Land Authority, a governmental agency created
by Republic Act No. 3844.
Sayson v. Singson

The suit disguised as one for mandamus to

compel the Auditors to approve the
vouchers for payment, is a suit against the
State, which cannot prosper or be
entertained by the Court except with the
consent of the State.
Farolan v. CTA
Since the petitioner demands that the Commissioner of
Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for
which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is
obvious that this case has been converted technically into a
suit against the state.

On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may not be
sued without its consent," categorically applies. As an
unincorporated government agency without any separate
juridical personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys
immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely,
taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the
governmental function of collecting revenues which is definitely
not a proprietary function. Thus, private respondent's claim for
damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fail.
Shauf v. CA
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and
may not be invoked where the public official is being
sued in his private and personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the
officers and agents of the government is removed the
moment they are sued in their individual capacity.
This situation usually arises where the public official
acts without authority or in excess of the powers
vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that
a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused
by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction
Express Consent to be Sued
Act No. 327
as amended
by PD 1445

General EO 292

Express Civil Code

Provision of
Charter of
Special Law
Implied consent to be sued

When the State engages in proprietary functions

When it files a suit in which case the adverse party may

file a counter-claim

When the doctrine would in effect be used to perpetuate

an injustice
Republic v. Feliciano
Private respondent contends that the consent of petitioner
may be read from the Proclamation itself, when it
established the reservation " subject to private rights, if
any there be. " The Court does not agree. No such consent
can be drawn from the language of the Proclamation. The
exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation
established by Proclamation No. 90 cannot be construed as
a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will
not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi
juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act.
The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from
statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be
made by an act of the legislative body.
Sayson v. Singson
Consent to be sued for money claims is
contained in Act No. 327.
Republic v. Purisima
The consent, to be effective though, must come
from the State acting through a duly enacted statute
as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus,
whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn
Administration agreed to had no binding force on the
government. That was clearly beyond the scope of
his authority. At any rate, Justice Sanchez, in Ramos
v. Court of Industrial Relations, was quite categorical
as to its "not [being] possessed of a separate and
distinct corporate existence. On the contrary, by the
law of its creation, it is an office directly 'under the
Office of the President of the Philippines."
There should be no question on this score considering that the SSS is a
juridical entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers
separate and distinct from the Government. SSS' own organic act
specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court. These words
"sue and be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action.
So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity
from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of
the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government
must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS,
although it does not thereby concede its liability. That statutoy law has
given to the private-citizen a remedy for the enforcement and
protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit
to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any
lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs governmental or proprietary
functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a
private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as,
in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from contract
and even for tort.
Rayo v. CFI of Bulacan
It is not necessary to write an extended dissertation on
whether or not the NPC performs a governmental function
with respect to the management and operation of the
Angat Dam. It is sufficient to say that the government has
organized a private corporation, put money in it and has
snowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter.
(R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3[d]). As a government owned and
controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the Government. (See
National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L-17874,
August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 78 1). Moreover, the charter
provision that the NPC can 'sue and be sued in any court' is
without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly
it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
Intervention is not an independent action,
but is ancillary and supplemental to an
existing litigation. Hence, the private
respondents' action for intervention in Civil
Case No. 0025, not being an independent
action, is merely incidental to, or related to,
the said civil case.
Froilan v. Pan Oriental
The immunity of the state from suits does
not deprive it of the right to sue private
parties in its own courts. The state as
plaintiff may avail itself of the different
forms of actions open to private litigants. In
short, by taking the initiative in an action
against a private party, the state
surrenders its privileged position and
comes down to the level of the defendant.
The latter automatically acquires, within
certain limits, the right to set up whatever
claims and other defenses he might have
against the state.
Lim v. Bowell
The claim for damages for the use of the property against
the intervenor defendant Republic of the Philippines to
which is was transferred, likewise, cannot be maintained
because of the immunity of the state from suit. The claim
obviously constitutes a charge against, or financial liability
to, the Government and consequently cannot be
entertained by the courts except with the consent of said
Plaintiff argues that by its intervention, the Republic of the
Philippines, in effect, waived its right of non-suability, but it
will be remembered that the Republic intervened in the
case merely to unite with the defendant Attorney General
of the United States in resisting plaintiff's claims, and for
that reason asked no affirmative relief against any party in
the answer in intervention it filed.
Malong v. PNR
We hold that in the instant case the State divested itself of
its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is
no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad
Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did
not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to
1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers.
The correct rule is that "not all government entities,
whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from
suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of
the objects for which the entity was organized." (Nat.
Airports Corp. vs. Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil.
203, 206; Santos vs, Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 285; Harry Lyons,
Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil. 593.)
Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in
which they have assumed to act in a private or non-
governmental capacity are not suits against the State (81
C.J.S. 1319).
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in
which they have assumed to act in a private or non-
governmental capacity, and various suits against
certain corporations created by the State for public
purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of
the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of
a governmental or political character, are not regarded
as suits against the State.
The latter is true, although the State may own the
stock or property of such a corporation, for by engaging
in business operations through a corporation the State
divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by
implicating consents to suits against the corporation.
(81 C.J. S. 1319.)
Amigable v. Cuenca
If the constitutional mandate that the owner be
compensated for property taken for public use were to
be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character
should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.
Had the government followed the procedure indicated
by the governing law at the time, a complaint would
have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the
compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to
the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed,
may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so
condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use
defined in the judgment."
Suit Against Public Officers
Lansang v. CA
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints
filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of
their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one
against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the
public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a
positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to
pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his
official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the
rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal
capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.
Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being
sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity,
although the acts complained of may have been committed
while he occupied a public position.
Acts of Officers/Agents

ted Entity

Administrative Code of 1987

SECTION 11. The States Responsibility for Acts of Agents.

(1) The State shall be legally bound and responsible
only through the acts performed in accordance with the
Constitution and the laws by its duly authorized
(2) The State shall not be bound by the mistakes
or errors of its officers or agents in the exercise of their
Civil Code of the Philippines

Art. 24
Art. 34
Art. 2189
Art. 2176
Art. 2180, par 5.
Meritt v. Government
The state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because
neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the
part of the state in the organization of branches of public
service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary,
we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part
in order that each branch of service serves the general weal
an that of private persons interested in its operation. Between
these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private
nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case
where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain,
January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
That the responsibility of the state is limited by
article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a
special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in
which these words are employed, is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if
he is a special official) so that in representation
of the state and being bound to act as an agent
thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
This concept does not apply to any executive agent who
is an employee of the acting administration and who on
his own responsibility performs the functions which are
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which
are regulated by law and the regulations."
Suit against Local
Local Government Code

Local Government Code, Section 24.

Liability for Damages.- Local government
units and their officials are not exempt from
liability for death or injury to persons or
damage to property.
Torio v. Fontanilla
Under Philippine laws municipalities are political bodies corporate
and as such are endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations
to be exercised by and through their respective municipal
governments in conformity with law, and in their proper corporate
name, they may inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be
contracted with.

The powers of a municipality are twofold in character public,

governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private, or
proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised
by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and
promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial
public, and political Municipal powers on the other hand are
exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community
and include those which are ministerial private and corporate.
If the injury is caused in the course of
the performance of a governmental
function or duty no recovery, as a rule,
can be had from the municipality
unless there is an existing statute on
the matter, 10 nor from its officers, so
long as they performed their duties
honestly and in good faith or that they
did not act wantonly and maliciously
Suit Against Foreign
Holy See v. Rosario
There are two conflicting concepts of
sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the
classical or absolute theory, a sovereign
cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state,
but not with regard to private acts or acts
jure gestionis
Sovereign Immunity

Acts done by State in its

Jure Imperii
Imperii sovereign capacity

Acts done by State in its private

Jure Gestionis
Gestionis capacity
Jure Imperii
lease by a foreign government of apartment
buildings for use of its military officers
(Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]);

conduct of public bidding for the repair of a

wharf at a United States Naval Station
(United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.);

change of employment status of base
employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA
88 [1988]).
Jure Gestionis
the hiring of a cook in the recreation center,
consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria,
a bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry
shop at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio
City, to cater to American servicemen and
the general public (United States of
America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]);
the bidding for the operation of barber
shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City
(United States of America v. Guinto, 182
SCRA 644 [1990]).
Operation of the restaurants and other
facilities open to the general public (US v.
US v. Ruiz
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State
may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given
its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates
to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case
the projects are an integral part of the naval base which
is devoted to the defense of both the United States and
the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized
for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
Rep. of Indonesia v. Vinzon
There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic
mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State does not
merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that;
the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its
maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into
contracts with private entities to maintain the premises,
furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living
quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that
petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a
sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with
respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air
conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water
heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian
Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian
Acts of Foreign Agent

A foreign agent, operating within a

territory, can be cloaked with immunity
from suit but only as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending state. The
consent of the host state is an
indispensable requirement of basic
courtesy between the two sovereigns.
Minucher v. CA
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government
of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the
participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the buy-bust
operation conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may
be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give
enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if
not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has
tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after
having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be
expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher,
later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo
hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent
of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine
government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on
the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.
US v. Guinto
It is clear from a study of the records of G.R. No. 80018
that the individually-named petitioners therein were
acting in the exercise of their official functions when they
conducted the buy-bust operation against the
complainant and thereafter testified against him at his
trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected with the
Air Force Office of Special Investigators and were charged
precisely with the function of preventing the distribution,
possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting
those guilty of such acts. It cannot for a moment be
imagined that they were acting in their private or
unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later
testified against the complainant. It follows that for
discharging their duties as agents of the United States,
they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to
their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
USA v. Reyes
Since it is apparent from the complaint that
Bradford was sued in her private or
personal capacity for acts allegedly done
beyond the scope and even beyond her
place of official functions, said complaint is
not then vulnerable to a motion to dismiss
based on the grounds relied upon by the
petitioners because as a consequence of
the hypothetical admission of the truth of
the allegations therein, the case falls within
the exception to the doctrine of state
Suit against International
WHO v. Aquino
The executive branch of the Philippine Government has
expressly recognized that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host
Agreement. The Department of Foreign Affairs formally advised
respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official
position that accordingly "Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the subject of
a Philippine court summons without violating an obligation in
international law of the Philippine Government" and asked for
the quashal of the search warrant, since his personal effects
and baggages after having been allowed free entry from all
customs duties and taxes, may not be baselessly claimed to
have been "unlawfully imported" in violation of the tariff and
customs code as claimed by respondents COSAC officers. The
Solicitor-General, as principal law officer of the Government, 7
likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic
immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our
system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is
essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts
to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by
the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in
this case, or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in
adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise
their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to
embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting
foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the
judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the
political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an
antagonistic jurisdiction.
One of the basic immunities of an international
organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e.,
that it is immune from the legal writs and processes
issued by the tribunals of the country where it is
found. (See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44). The obvious reason
for this is that the subjection of such an organization to
the authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government
may interfere in their operations or even influence or
control its policies and decisions of the organization;
besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would
impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-
Garnishment of Public Funds
If the State is adjudged liable, can public funds be
garnished or public property seized to satisfy the
Suability vs. Consent to liability

The phrase that waiver of immunity by the

State does not mean a concession of
liability means that by consenting to be
sued, the State does not necessarily admit
it is liable. The State is merely giving the
plaintiff a chance to prove that the State is
liable but the State retains the right to raise
all lawful defenses (Philippine Rock
Industries, Inc. v. Board of Liquidators, 180
SCRA 171 [1989]).
A. General Rule
Even though the rule as to immunity of a state
from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends
when the judgment is rendered. Although the
liability of the state has been judicially
ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine
for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and
execution cannot issue on a judgment against the
state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of
state property to satisfy judgments recovered,
and only convey an implication that the
legislature will recognize such judgment as final
and make provision for the satisfaction thereof.
Sayson v. Singson
Once consent is secured, an action may be
filed. There is nothing to prevent the State,
however, in such statutory grant, to require
that certain administrative proceedings be
had and be exhausted. Also, the proper
forum in the judicial hierarchy can be
specified if thereafter an appeal would be
taken by the party aggrieved.
CA 327
In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims,
other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General
shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of
Sundays and holidays, after their presentation.
If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons,
office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid
shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a
proper decision is received by him."
The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General
in the settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days
from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the
President of the United States, pending the final and complete
withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the
President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the
Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity."
City of Makati v. CA

Where a municipality fails or refuses,

without justifiable reason, to effect
payment of a final money judgment
rendered against it, the claimant may avail
of the remedy of mandamus in order to
compel the enactment and approval of the
necessary appropriation ordinance, and the
corresponding disbursement of municipal
funds therefor
Nessia v. Fermin
while it is true that Fermin may not be compelled by
mandamus to approve vouchers because they
exceeded the budgetary appropriations, he may,
nevertheless, be held liable for damages under Art. 27
for malicious inaction because he did not act on the
vouchers. This provision against official inaction finds
its ally in Sec. 3, par. (f), of R.A. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act," which criminalizes "[n]eglecting or
refusing, after due demand or request, without
sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time
on any matter pending before him for the purpose of .
. . discriminating against any interested party."
B. Exceptions: PNB v. Pabalan
funds of public corporations which can sue
and be sued were not exempt from
garnishment. As respondent Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration is likewise a
public corporation possessed of the same
attributes, a similar outcome is
Caloocan City v. Allarde

the rule on the immunity of public funds

from seizure or garnishment does not apply
where the funds sought to be levied under
execution are already allocated by law
specifically for the satisfaction of the
money judgment against the government.
In such a case, the monetary judgment
may be legally enforced by judicial