Emergency Relief

Gary Van Sciver

September 16, 2008
1
 Gary Van Sciver

Process Engineer
8 years
Risk Analyst 22
years
ETC 2 years

2
Presentation Overview

3
Terminology (ERS)

Emergency
Relief
System

4
1. Normal Vent

5
What is the difference between
the normal vent & the
emergency vent?

6
What are the differences?
(between the normal & emergency vents)

No blocking devices in ERS

No flame arresters in ERS
ERS usually bigger
Normal vent also handles vacuum
Pollution abatement for normal vent
Normal vent opens first
Manifolding for normal vent .

7
VPRV (conservation vent)

8
 VPRV
(vacuum pressure relief valve)

9
 Manifolds
One pollution abatement device will normally
handle the discharge of multiple vessels

10
 VPRV
(vacuum pressure relief valve)

11
Storage Tank Under Vacuum

12
Plastic Bag Over Vent

13
2. Design Basis

14
Upset Scenario ...

Series of events leading

to high vessel pressure

15
What do we want the ERS to
protect against?...

16
 Concept Sciences
1999 Allentown, PA 5 fatalities hydroxylamine

17
 Concept Sciences

The plant was designed to concentrate

hydroxylamine (HA) up to 50%
HA is known to be explosive above 70%
concentration
Due to startup problems, the actual
concentration was 86% HA .
18
Concept Sciences

19
Flammable Discharge

20
 BP - 2005

Texas City, Texas 15 fatalities

Vapor cloud explosion of hexane/heptane (44C)
7700 gallons released < 2 minutes from 35 m height
21
 BP - 2005
Tower 170 feet tall Blowdown drum 115 feet tall

22
 BP - 2005
Truck parked,
but idling about
25 feet from
blowdown drum

Eyewitness saw
engine over-
revving and
backfiring sparks

23
BP - 2005

24
Toxic Discharge

25
 Bhopal - 1984

>2000 off-site fatalities due to

toxic relief valve discharge
26
Bhopal

27
 Bhopal
1984
Relief valve on an MIC storage tank lifted in the middle of
the night releasing 80,000 lbs
>2,000 people died within a short period
~30,000 people were permanently or totally disabled
MIC reacted with water, source of contamination uncertain
Incident had long-term ramifications for Union Carbide and
the chemical industry as a whole .
28
Bhopal - 1984

29
 Design Basis
Procedure
1. Identification
2. Sizing
3. Selection
30
How do we identify
upsets?

31
2 important upsets

32
Fire Exposure

33
Runaway reaction

34
Some other non-
reactive upsets

35
Excessive heating
(steam valve failures, coil leaks)

36
Pressurized liquid addition

37
Pressurized gas addition
(line blowing, pressure transfers, pads or purges)

38
Some reactive
upsets

39
Inadequate cooling

40
Inadequate heat sink

41
Excessive reactant

42
Poor reactivity

43
 Design Basis
Procedure
1. Identification
2. Sizing

44
 Sizing vents is
straightforward but
we do need kinetics
data for reactive
scenarios
45
Types of runaway
reaction
Vapor Pressure
Gas Generating .

46
 Vapor Pressure
Runaway Reaction
Pressure related to temperature
Control temperature by
evaporative cooling .

47
 Emulsion
Runaway

1995, one-shot emulsion process

Water charging system failed
New operator being trained, batch not stopped
2,000-gallon, 120-psig reactor
Broke 35-psig, 18-inch rupture disk
~1200 lbs ethyl acrylate released.
48
Emulsion Runaway

49
Emulsion
Runaway

Odor complaints
13 miles away in
Karlsruhe,
Germany

50
 Gas Generating
Runaway Reaction
Pressure related to amount of gas
Cant control temperature by
venting
Only control is depletion of reactants
.

51
 MAA July 1988 (R&H)
Deer Park, Texas
Rail Car

52
 VSP
(Vent Sizing Package)

53
VSP

54
Temperature vs time

55
P vs T

56
 Design Basis
Procedure
1. Identification
2. Sizing
3. Selection
57
 List the
scenarios in
order of
increasing relief
device size
requirement
58
 Example Scenario
List
2 1.Liquid filling
3 2.Fire case
12 3.Half charge runaway
18 4.Full charge runaway
24 5.Full charge runaway, no
water heel .

59
Selection Approaches

1. Codes
2. Tradition
3. Risk .

60
 Codes
NFPA 30 requires ERS
protection against fire for
aboveground storage tanks
of flammables &
combustibles

61
Fire Case Requirement

62
Tradition

63
Take advantage of
our previous
experience
64
For example: batch
reactor ERS sized
for a full-charge
runaway
65
Risk
66
Risk Management
Services
(RMS)

67
 Rohm and Haas
Risk Criteria

Community 1 in 100,000 per year

Employees 1 in 40,000 per year

68
3. Mechanical

69
Vessel Failure

70
 Vessel Failure
With increasing pressure, flat surfaces become rounded,
vessel resembles a sphere.

71
Bottom Seam Failure

72
Hold Down Lug - Older

73
Hold Down Lug - Newer

74
Hold Down Lug - Newer

75
Failure Pressure

76
Relief Devices

77
Rupture Disk

78
Tension-loaded RD

79
 Tension-loaded RD

Vacuum support
goes under the RD

80
 Compression-loaded RD
(Reverse Buckling)
Knife blade (if necessary)
goes on top of the RD

81
Relief Valves

82
Weak Seam Roof
(part of API 650)

83
Weak Seam Roof
Weak seam roof should prevent this

84
 Weak Seam Roof

Install with relief device to protect the roof

85
Design Temperature

86
Thrust forces

87
Thrust forces

88
Thrust forces

For 24 RD, Area = 452 sq in

Pmax = 165 psi
Thrust = 2 Pmax A = 150,000 lbs

89
Piping Thrust forces
(initial & established)

90
4. Discharge

91
Dispersion Zones
1. High momentum
2. Less momentum
3. Gravity
4. Atmospheric
turbulence

92
2-phase Flow

93
2-phase Flow

94
PHAST Emulsion Reactor RD

95
Gooseneck

96
 Toll Incident
Wisconsin - 2002
Leaky steam valve heated a completed
batch from 40C to 150C in 3 hours
Resulting decomposition (>200 psig)
MSDS: This material is considered
stable
No fatalities or injuries .

97
Toll Incident
2002
runaway

98
Toll Incident
2002
runaway

99
Toll Incident
2002 runaway

100
 TNP
(Thrust Neutralization Plate)

101
 TNP
Thrust Neutralization Plate

102
TNP or Gooseneck

103
 Catch Tank
Gravity Separator
Vapors still
escape from
a separator,
but at a
lower
velocity.

104
 Catch Tank

From reactor Cyclone

separator

105
Catch Tank Incident

106
 Catch Tank Incident
Illinois 2001
Runaway reaction
broke 135 psi RD
Blew off catch tank
top & damaged
piping
No injuries or
fatalities .

107
Catch Tank Incident
Catch tank roof
failed
Low-pressure
vessel with
insufficient vent

108
Catch Tank Incident

109
Quench Tank

110
Straight up

111
Rain Protection - Cover

112
5. MOC

113
 Why document?

Required by OSHA PSM (Process Safety Mgmt)

Required by EHS 536 (Process Safety Mgmt)
For future Management of Change (MOCs)
For future HAZOPs
Avoid reconstructing the design
Information can be used on other systems .

114
 Vent System
Analysis
Follow the ERS procedure for every
vessel & every relief device

Store the results in a safe place

115
Questions?

116