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PY1006 (2009-10)

REASONING AND KNOWLEDGE

LECTURE ELEVEN:

Can we define ‘knowledge’?

4/2/2010
(student version)
Dr. Patrick Greenough

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1. Recap.

• Recall that there are two basic


epistemological questions:

The Definitional Question: What is


knowledge?

The Sceptical Question: Do we know


anything?

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2. Overview.

• In these last two epistemology lectures,


we are going to address the first of these
questions.

• In particular, we are going to look at a


the so-called Gettier counterexamples.

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3. What is a definition?

• Two basic types:

(1) Ostensive definitions (To ostend is to


point.)

(2) Verbal definitions. Here we try to


express using words, rather than by
pointing, what a word or phrase means.

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3. What is a definition?

• Two types of verbal definitions:

(a) Definitions by giving examples.

E.g.: We define bachelor by citing


examples of bachelors: ‘John is a
bachelor’, ‘Jim is a bachelor’, …

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3. What is a definition?

(b) Analytic Definitions: These employ an


‘if and only if’.

E.g.: x is bachelor if and only if …

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3. What is a definition?

• Here ‘is a bachelor’ is the definiendum


(the thing to be defined).

(Sometimes this is called the


analysandum.)

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3. What is a definition?

• And the … are to be filled in by the


definiens.

(Sometimes these are called the


analysans.)

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3. What is a definition?

• Good analytic definitions provide an


analysis of some concept.

• The best kind of analytic definitions are


reductive.

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3. What is a definition?

• Reductive analyses provide an analysis


(or definition) of a concept in terms which
are better understood (or more basic)
than the original term.

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3. What is a definition?

• Reductive definitions are never circular:


the defiendum never re-appears in the
definiens or in any further analysis of the
definiens.

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4. Non-reductive definitions.

Example one:

x is a bachelor if and only if x is a bachelor

• This is blatantly circular.

• This definition is highly uninformative!


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4. Non-reductive definitions.

Example Two: x is red if and only if x is


coloured and not-green and not-yellow and
not-blue and ..

• This definition is circular (non-reductive)


because ‘green’ is defined as as follows:

x is green if and only if x is coloured and not-


red and not-yellow and not-blue and …

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4. Non-reductive definitions.

Question: Are all circular definitions bad?

• Suppose I say that belief is that state


which aims at truth and that truth is that
property which all good beliefs have.

• Such analyses may be informative –


despite being circular …

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5. Necessary and sufficient conditions.

• Necessary conditions are conditions


which must obtain in order for some
other condition to obtain.

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5. Necessary and sufficient conditions.

Definition: P is a necessary condition for


Q if and only if:

Necessarily, if Q then P

That is: Necessarily, Q only if P

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5. Necessary and sufficient conditions.

• Sufficient conditions are conditions


whose holding is enough (or sufficient)
for the obtaining of some other condition.

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5. Necessary and sufficient conditions.

Definition: P is a sufficient condition for Q


if and only if:

Necessarily, if P then Q.

That is: Necessarily, P only if Q.

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5. Necessary and sufficient conditions.

• So, P is both necessary and sufficient for


Q when and only when:

Necessarily, P if and only if Q.

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6. Case Study: defining ‘millionaire’.

• See handout …

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7. Case Study: defining ‘bachelor’.

• See handout …

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8. When are analytic definitions bad?

• They are bad when either:

(a) They are uninformative (see above).

(b) Inaccurate, i.e. subject to


counterexample.

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9. Counterexamples to an analytic definition.

• Recall that an analytic definition is of the


form:

x is F if and only if …

E.g.: x is bachelor if and only if …

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9. Counterexamples to an analytic definition.

• Such a definition makes two claims:

(i) If … then x is F (sufficiency claim)

(ii) If x is F then … (necessity claim)

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9. Counterexamples to an analytic definition.

• In other words, such a definition makes


the following two claims:

(i) … is sufficient for x to be F

(ii) … is necessary for x to be F

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9. Counterexamples to an analytic definition.

• So, counterexamples to some definition


can be of two kinds:

(1) Failure of sufficiency.

(2) Failure of necessity.

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9. Counterexamples to an analytic definition.

(1) Failure of sufficiency: This is where


… is not sufficient for x to be F

• That is, the … condition holds, but x fails


to be F.

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9. Counterexamples to an analytic definition.

Example: Take the following definition.

x is a millionaire if and only x has a very


expensive house, a Rolls-Royce, and a
German butler.

Counterexample to sufficiency: …

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9. Counterexamples to an analytic definition.

Example: Take the same definition as


before.

Counterexample to necessity: …

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10. Is knowledge just belief?

Question: is knowledge just belief?

(Here we are interested in so-called


knowledge-that – as opposed to
knowledge-how.)

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10. Is knowledge just belief?

• Put another way: is belief both necessary


and sufficient for knowledge?

• That is, do we have the following?

A subject S knows that p if and only if S


believes that p

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10. Is knowledge just belief?

Question: But is belief necessary for


knowledge?

• YES.

Potential counterexample: …

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10. Is knowledge just belief?

Question: But is belief sufficient for


knowledge?

• Surely knowledge is some kind of special


belief.

• Mere belief, while necessary, is not


sufficient for knowledge.

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11. Is knowledge just true belief?

Question: Is knowledge just true belief?

• That is, do we have the following?

S knows that p if and only if:

(i) S believes that and


(ii) p is true.
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11. Is knowledge just true belief?

Question: Is truth necessary for


knowledge knowledge?

Arguably: Yes – one cannot know a


proposition which is false.

Potential counterexample: …

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11. Is knowledge just true belief?

Question: Is true belief sufficient for


knowledge?

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11. Is knowledge just true belief?

Counterexample to this sufficiency claim:


I believe that the moon contains 3 billion
tonnes of lead. I formed this belief
without any evidence. Nonetheless my
belief turns out to be true – but surely it is
not knowledge!

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11. Is knowledge just true belief?

Basic Underlying thought: a belief needs


to be a bit more special than that in order
to count as knowledge.

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11. Is knowledge just true belief?

Underlying thought One: we don’t want


beliefs that are accidentally true to count
as knowledge.

Underlying thought Two: we don’t want


true beliefs that are not supported by
evidence to count as knowledge.

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12. Is knowledge justified true belief?

Put another way: …

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12. Is knowledge justified true belief?

This is called The Tripartite Analysis of


Knowledge.

Alternative name: The JTB Analysis.

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12. Is knowledge justified true belief?

JTB Analysis: a subject S knows that P if


and only if

(i) S believes that P,

(ii) P is true,

(iii) S is justified in believing that P

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12. Is knowledge justified true belief?

That is, truth, belief and justification are


not only individually necessary for
knowledge—they are jointly sufficient for
knowledge too.

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13. What do we mean by ‘justification’ here?

• The sort of justification in the JTB


analysis is a certain kind of fallibilist
justification: one can have a justified but
false belief.

• (We’ll come back to this.)


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13. What do we mean by ‘justification’ here?

• It's a so-called 'threshold concept'--you


need a certain amount of justification in
order for your true belief to count as
knowledge. A bit of evidence won't do--
you need sufficient evidence.

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14. Is JTB enough for knowledge?

Question: But is a justified true belief


sufficient for knowledge?

In the shortest and perhaps the most


famous article in 20th Century
Philosophy, Edmund Gettier (1963)
famously thought not …

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