CHALLENGER

DISASTER : CASE
STUDY
Samiul A. Chowdhury [2021298272]
mac151830@utdallas.edu
EMSE-6361 Fall-2015 Dr. Lawrence Chung
Term paper – Interim
http://www.utdallas.edu/~mac151830/emse6361
Overview
 Space Shuttle Challenger was
second reusable orbiter of NASA's
space shuttle program

 Disaster occurred on January 28, 1986

 Challenger Broke apart 73 seconds

into its flight and exploded in midair

 Which led the deaths of its all seven

crew members
Space Shuttle
The Space Shuttle orbiter was the
reusable spaceplane component of the
Space Shuttle

Orbiter is attached to the large External

Tank—the middle cylinder with the sharp-
pointed end shown in the figure; the
external Tank contains 143,000 gallons of
liquid oxygen and 383,000 gallons of liquid
hydrogen for the Orbiter's engines.

The two smaller cylinders on the sides of

the External Tank are the Solid Rocket
Boosters (SRBs).
Space Shuttle Challenger
Country: United States
Named after: HMS Challenger
(1858) steam-assisted Royal Navy warship
First flight: April 4–9, 1983
Status: Destroyed January
28, 1986
Number of missions: 10
Time spent in space 62 days 07:56:22
Number of orbits: 995
Satellites deployed: 10
Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs).
 SRB was almost 150 feet, it
was too large to ship as a
single unit by rail from Utah to
the Kennedy Space Center
launch site in Florida.

 For this reason it was

manufactured from individual
cylindrical segments.

 SRBs fire for about two minutes

after liftoff, and then, their fuel
exhausted, are separated from
external tank.
O-Ring Seals

 Field joint was sealed with two rubber O-rings

 O-rings designed to be seated in a groove and compressed during assembly between two
or more parts, creating a seal at the interface.

 Prevents pressurized hot gases and flame to leak

Organizations Involved

Marshall Space Flight Center was in charge

of booster rocket development

Morton Thiokol - Contracted by NASA

to build the Solid Rocket Booster

The shuttle was built by Rockwell

International's Space Transportation
Systems Division
Key People Involved

Roger Boisjoly The engineer who knew challenger has a

problem and tried to stop the launch

Larry Mulloy Marshall’s manager for SRB project.

Challenged the engineers decision not to launch

Alan McDonald Director of the SRB project at Morton Thiokol

The astronauts: seven crew members, which included five NASA astronauts and
two Payload Specialists. One of the Payload Specialist Christa McAuliffe, who
would have been the first schoolteacher in space.
What Happened?
 Disintegration of the vehicle began after an O-ring seal
in its right SRB failed at liftoff.

 The O-ring failure caused a breach in the SRB joint it

sealed, allowing pressurized burning gas from within
the solid rocket motor to reach the outside external fuel
tank.

 This led to the separation of the right-hand SRB's aft

field joint attachment and the structural failure of the
external tank.
Cont.
 Tank exploded and aerodynamic
forces broke up the orbiter.

 Loss of 7 astronauts (entire crew)

 Loss of Challenger

Where?
 Over the Atlantic Ocean, off the
coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida
What Failed?
 O-rings were designated as "Criticality 1"—
meaning that their failure would result in the
destruction of the Orbiter

 Joint rotation phenomenon: O-ring joints were

supposed to close more tightly due to forces
generated at ignition, but due to the effects of
booster combustion, the metal parts bent away
from each other, opening a gap through which
Simplified cross section of the joints
gases leaked
between SRB segments.
Legend:
A - steel wall 0.5 inches (12.7 mm) thick
 First and Second(safety backup) O-ring seals both
B - base O-ring gasket, failed to prevent the leak
C - backup O-ring gasket,
D - Strengthening-Cover band,
E - insulation,
F - insulation,
G - carpeting,
H - sealing paste,
I - fixed propellant
Why Did it Happened?
 SRB temperatures below their redline of 40 °F (4 °C).

 The temperature on the day of the launch was far

lower than had been the case with previous
launches: below freezing at 28 to 29 °F (−2.2 to
−1.7 °C)

 O-rings were not tested at temperatures below 50 °F

(10 °C).

 Causing the O-rings to harden

 Opening a gap through which hot gases—above

5,000 °F (2,760 °C)—leaked

 Right SRB producing a propulsive force that rammed

the hydrogen tank into the liquid oxygen tank
Key Dates

Jan 27, Jan 28,

1974 1976 1977 1981 1985
1986 1986

Morton NASA- Morton- O-ring NASA Level I Teleconferen Challenger

Thiokol accepts Thiokol erosion management ce to discuss explodes 73
awarded Morton- discovers discovered briefed on effects of cold seconds after
contract to Thiokol's joint rotation after second booster temperature liftoff.
build SRBs booster problem. shuttle flight. problem. on booster
design. performance.
Root Cause
Direct cause of the explosion was technical –
faulty design of the SRB, insufficient low
temperature testing of the O-ring material that
the O-ring sealed

Indirect cause:

The Rogers Commission* found NASA's

decision-making processes and lack of
communication between different levels of NASA
management had been key contributing factors
to the accident.

The unrealistically optimistic launch schedule

also possible contributing cause to the accident

*Rogers Commission, a special commission appointed by

United States President Ronald Reagan to investigate the
accident.
Problem - Organizational Communication and Ethics
 Engineers at Morthon-Thiokol vigorously opposed the
launching of Challenger(even before night before
launch) , but their warning had not Been heeded by
management

 Same O-rings engineers had been concerned about

for more than eight years

 Even O-rings designated "Criticality 1” - no one at

Marshall suggested that the shuttles be grounded until
the flaw could be fixed.

 Top NASA decision makers(at levels I and II) told the

commission that they had no knowledge that these
had been the subject of intense controversy between
Thiokol and Marshall Space Flight Center(level IV and
III in the decision-making chain)
Cont.
 Although O-ring failure was the immediate cause, a flawed decision-making process
was an equal, if not more important factor

 More than 30 people were in at least 25 communication situations during 1977 –

1982 discussing the O-ring problem, yet none reached Level I or II

 While NASA worked on solving the problem, it continued to fly and it defined the
Criticality-1 feature as “acceptable” and “unavoidable”.

 Mulloy said, “My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch – next april?’

 Boisjoly recalled that when the shuttle was destroyed a few seconds later, "we all
knew exactly what happened.“

 NASA officials said they would not have given the final approval to launch if they
had heard the views of Thiokol engineers
Aftermath
 In the first minutes after the accident,
recovery efforts were begun Search and
rescue aircraft were also dispatched

 It took 3 months to recover bodies of crew

members

 After the Challenger accident, further shuttle

flights were suspended, pending the results
of the Rogers Commission investigation.

 Two-and-a-half year grounding of the shuttle

fleet; flights resumed in 1988
References
Engineering Ethics:
The Challenger Disaster
[https://www.cedengineering.com/userfiles/ethics_cha
llenger_disaster_2283.pdf]

http://ethics.tamu.edu/Portals/3/Case%20Studies/Shu
ttle.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Challeng
er
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Challeng
er_disaster
http://pirate.shu.edu/~mckenndo/pdfs/The%20Space
%20Shuttle%20Challenger%20Disaster.pdf
http://softwarephysics.blogspot.com/2014/07/new-
introduction-to-softwarephysics.html
Thank You