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LINE BREAK

ZAKIR HUSSAIN
TRAINING AGENDA
THIS PROCEDURE DEALS WITH
-PLANNING & EXECUTION OF ALL LINE BREAKS
- LINE BREAK AT DESIGN STAGE
What is line break?
Line break—
Opening of cleared or unclear lines or equipment by actions that may
include, but are not limited to, the following:
 Breaking flanges
 Removing one or more bolts from flanges
 Opening valves to the atmosphere
 Removing valve bonnets and non-return (i.e.,check) valves
 Turning spectacle plates (i.e., blanks/blinds)
 Breaking pipe joints
What is line break?
Line break—
Opening of cleared or unclear lines or equipment by actions that may
include, but are not limited to, the following(Continued):
 Removing slip plates (i.e., blanks/blinds), blind flanges, plugs, and caps
 Disconnecting tubing
 Disconnecting loading and unloading process hoses
 Penetrating a line by mechanical or other means
 Opening inspection ports
 Making subtle adjustments (e.g., replacing packing on a valve)
What is line break?
Line break—
All systems prepared for line breaks shall be properly isolated according
to Company HSE procedure on Lockout/Tag out & as per HSEF Manual
Executing Line Break-Job Plan
The job plan shall include the following which will be done by Permit
Issuer & Engineer In Charge:
 Specific identification of the hazards (Risk assessment).
 Isolation, clearing, and flushing plans, (SOP with Isolation Diagram is
necessary) which may include isometric drawings.
 Identification of valve to close, location to drain, and the lockout.
 A description of the PPE to be used, when to wear it, and when to remove
it.
 The specifications for and duties of a standby person, where appropriate.
 Contingency plans if a single isolation device is used or if unprotected
personnel and/or the environment are potentially exposed.
 Control of entry to the area affected by the line break.
Executing Line Break-Job Plan
The Completed Job Plan is a part of Line break work Permit.

Another alternative is an approved job procedure, which can be used for


routine jobs, including preparing the system for the initial line break. If
a procedure is used, a process shall be in place to do the following:
- Periodically review the procedure for inclusion of all mandatory
elements of this procedure.
- Document the line break training and periodic retraining of the
people performing the routine line break jobs .
Executing Line Break-Job Plan

When any part of the body crosses the natural


plane of an opening created by a line break,
Note Company HSE Procedure on Confined Space Entry
may govern the entry.
Executing Line Break-System Preparation

All lines and equipment associated with a system are verified by


procedure practices to have been isolated and, where appropriate,
drained, flushed, and/or purged of Hazardous material and the
following criteria are met-
 The system’s temperature is lower than (60°C) and higher than (-10°C).
 Atmospheric pressure has been attained.
 Hazards associated with toxicity, corrosiveness, flammability of gases,
vapors, or mists, and/or airborne combustible dust are reduced to
acceptable levels
Executing Line Break-System Preparation

Levels of cleanliness shall be established and verified.

Locations that have hazards associated with


toxicity, corrosiveness, or flammability of gases,
Note vapors, mists, and/or airborne combustible dust
should set Plant and Process-specific limits that
reduce these hazards to an acceptable level.
Executing Line Break-System Preparation

 The first break does not always verify that the system or equipment is
free of hazards.
 Company experience has shown that incidents still occur after the first
break is completed.
 These incidents have a variety of causes, including trapped pockets of
pressure or hazardous process material, not isolating all sources of
pressure or hazardous process material, or not draining the low point
and venting the high point.
Executing Line Break-System Preparation

Various means of isolating systems or equipment that contain hazards


can be used. A listing, from the most protective to the least protective,
is as follows:
1. Double blocks and controlled bleed
2. Block valve and blank/blind flange
3. Double block valves
4. Single block valve
5. Engineered process plug (i.e., solidifying the process)
Executing Line Break-System Preparation

All valves within the isolated system must be maintained in the open
position and the line cleared to prevent trapping process material in
the line/equipment.

Hot liquids that cool to solid can create special


CAUTION problems if gases and hot liquids are trapped
between solidified plugs, which can then "blow out."
Executing Line Break-PPEs
For each job task where there is potential exposure to a hazard
-PPE to be specified, available, and used, no matter how thoroughly the
system was prepared for the line break.
Executing Line Break-PPEs
Key elements when selecting & using PPE include the following:
 A cross section of knowledgeable and experienced people, including
those who are to use the PPE, should be involved.
 Before any PPE is adopted, it should be field tested for practicality by
the personnel who are to use it.
 A list of the site-approved PPE, categorized by hazard, shall be readily
available to all personnel.
 Specify when the PPE to be worn & removed.
Line Break at Design Stage
Systems shall be designed and built to enable isolation and clearing of the
hazard.
Key elements for designing a system include the following :
 Isolation and clearing shall be primary considerations during project
front-end loading activity.
 The design shall consider the balance between added potential leak
points (catastrophic and fugitive) vs. the benefit of providing
additional connections for flushing and clearing access to systems and
equipment.
Line Break at Design Stage
Systems shall be designed and built to enable isolation and clearing of the
hazard.
Key elements for designing a system include the following (Continued):
 The design shall include the ability to isolate secondary energy
sources for polymer and melt systems where the material is “frozen”
(i.e., solidified) to eliminate the hazard.
 All systems shall be designed with the ability to isolate secondary
energy sources.
 Examples of secondary energy sources include steam and electric
tracing and jacketed vessels and pipe.
 Experienced field operators and mechanics shall be involved in the
front-end loading efforts. .
Line Break at Design Stage
Systems shall be designed and built to enable isolation and clearing of the
hazard.
Key elements for designing a system include the following (Continued):
 The hierarchy for isolating hazardous processes shall be as follows:
 1. Double block valve and controlled bleed
 2. Block valve and blank/blind flange
 3. Double block valves
 4. Single block valve
 5. Engineered process plug (i.e., solidifying the process)
The design team shall consider this hierarchy, starting with the most
protective level.
Safety Contact - 1

RELEASE OF MIXED XYLENE FROM P01B.

On 8th August 1999 Para-xylene release through pump strainer due to improper
XV isolation procedure and no positive isolation.
Safety Contact - 1
SEQUENCE OF INCIDENTS
On 8/8/1999 19:30 hrs :-
 P01 B was stopped and suction XV was closed by pushing emergency button from
local cabinet B . Discharge valve was also closed . Pump P01A was running at 240
C and 7 barg pressure.
8/8/1999 Night:-
 The strainer element of P01 B was removed with an intention to use it in P01A.
 Strainer flange, strainer drain flange and vent flange were left loosely bolted.
9/8/1999 day :-
 Insulation work was going on pump suction line near XV push button.
Safety Contact - 1
SEQUENCE OF INCIDENTS
9/8/1999 14:35 hrs:-
 SFE noticed insulation workers running away from the site.
 He immediately went to the site and found a major release of xylene .

 He stopped the running pump.

 People were instructed to move away from the site .

 Fire monitor was directed towards the leak.

9/8/1999 15.01 hrs:-


 Fire services alarmed

9/8/1999 1540 hrs :-


 FE pushed the emergency button located too close to pump) wearing SCBA and
closed the pump suction xv.
 After a while the vapor release was under control.
Safety Contact - 1
What went wrong????
 Absence of advanced planning , work procedures and risk perception of carrying
out the job.
 Improper XV isolation procedure .
 No positive isolation.
 Possible hazard was not identified beforehand when people were working near the
emergency push button.
Safety Contact - 1
Key learning:
 Ensure positive isolation by blinding the lines during maintenance jobs. Work permit
should not be issued without positive isolation.
 The critical push buttons should be properly covered so that no one can accidently
activate it.
 Ensure proper isolation of XV and display a “Do not operate “tag on the
emergency push button so as to make people cautious while working near it.
 Strict compliance of work permit procedure and proper risk assessment should be
done before carrying out any job.
 People should be trained to follow the best practices for all the activities.
Safety Contact - 2

Second Degree Burn While Attending FT


On 14th August 2009
At one of the refinery
Safety Contact - 2
DETAILS OF INCIDENT
 While attending FT on HAGO line at auto ignition temperature, HAGO flushed out
from its impulse line drain and caught fire.
 Fire was controlled and extinguished by application of water spray / stopping of
HAGO CR pump and isolation of FT
 Instrument Executive faces second degree burn.
 Two FTs and cables, tubing , canopy in the vicinity were damaged.
 One control valve cable was damaged.
 Plant kept running with lower throughput.
Safety Contact - 2
FINDINGS OF INVESTIGATION
 Original work Permit was issued for FT 123. FT420 was added later on with mutual
consent of operator.
 Detail discussion was done for FT123 and not for FT420, having the same level of
risk.
 In the permit Isolation, Drained and Depressurized was not ticked.
 Root valve Isolation was not ensured before opening the drain plug.
 Risk Assessment was not carried out properly.
 Escape route was not cleared because of scaffoldings.
Safety Contact - 2
ROOT CAUSE
 While attending FT on HAGO line at auto ignition temperature, HAGO flushed out
from its impulse line drain and caught fire.
 Fire was controlled and extinguished by application of water spray / stopping of
HAGO CR pump and isolation of FT
 Instrument Executive faces second degree burn.
 Two FTs and cables, tubing , canopy in the vicinity were damaged.
 One control valve cable was damaged.
 Plant kept running with lower throughput.
Thanks
S.N. Action points Resp. Target date
1 Nominate the PPC (Plant Procedure Champion) for Line break at plant level. HOD
2 Kick Off meeting with PPC
3 Identify group that needs training (Maintenance/Non sup/ contractor/PSR) PPC
4 Impart training to the identified group. PPC
5 List out Line break Requirements in the plant. PPC
a) Routine Line break Jobs.
b) Non routine/envisaged Line Break Jobs.
6 List of line break job where positive isolation is not possible & only one isolation PPC/Prod
valve is provided. . Mgr.
7 P&ID or sketch indicating points of isolation, points for clearing, points of lock-out / PPC
tag-out and blind position for Individual Line Break Job.
8 SOP/SMP preparation for individual Line Break Job Plan activities above with detail PPC
sequential Operation for Draining/ Venting/Emptying out, Clearing & Flushing Out;
End point Verification including PPE Selection & instruction for where & when to
put on & remove.
9 Risk Analysis using Kenny & Fine method for all the line break Activities of the PPC
plant
10 Review/audit of the past line break job & Gaps with respect to above all. PPC/Prod
. Mgr.
11 Weekly status report to be prepared and sent to Sponsor . PPC/HOS
12 Send % progress plant wise to Safety for review.
LINE BREAK

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