FAILURE ANALYSIS OF ICE (INTER CITY EXPRESS) , GERMANY - 1998

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ABSTRACT

Complete failure analysis of ICE

In June of 1998, one of the Germany’s Inter City Express (ICE)884 train slammed into an overpass killing 101 people & injuring over 200 severely. This paper gives an overview that how this catastrophe would have been avoided if proper care had taken in the preliminary stage itself & how playing with FOS perhaps can cause fatal errors.

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INTRODUCTION

ICE project started in the 1980s & the first ICE was the inter-city experimental, which gained a speed record over 400km/h. Top speed on high track Top speed on conventional line Speed record Best average speed 280km/h

200km/h

408km/h

200km/h
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BACKGROUND

 In 1971 IC rail system was introduced in Germany connecting towns & cities.  Up gradation of IC was implemented in 1980’s to provide high speed rail system across Germany.  During 1990’s tremendous growth of ICE was noticed (30% boost) & it was expanded to connect neighboring countries like Switzerland, Austria, Belgium & Netherland.  In 1994 two German states railroads were merged into the Deutshe Bahn AG & privatized.

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BACKGROUND CONT
 ICE are the modern hotels which include the amenities like       Dining car Telephone services In-seat video BACKGROUND CONT Audio attachment Smoking area Internet access

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TYPES OF ICE
GRADE CLASS YEAR SPEED Km\h ICE V ICE 1 ICE 2 410 810 1985 1991 1997 200 280 280

401 801 802 803 402 805 806 807 808

ICE 3 ICE 4 ICE 5

403 406 TILTING ICE TRANSRAPID MAGLEV VEHICLE

2000 2002 2002

330 300 400

ICE VT

DEISEL ELECTRIC TRAINS

2001

200

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SEQUENCE OF FAILURE
• • • • • The rim of a wheel on the third axle of the first car broke, peeled away from the wheel, and punctured the floor of the car, where it remained embedded. The embedded wheel rim slammed against the guide rail of the switch, pulling it from the railway ties. Steering rail also penetrated the floor of the car and lifting the axle carriage off the rails. Derailed wheels struck the points lever of the second switch & changes its setting. The rear axles of car No 3 were switched onto a parallel track, and the entire car was thereby thrown into the piers supporting a 300-tonne roadway overpass.

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SEQUENCE OF FAILURE CONT
• • • • Car No 4, likewise derailed by the violent deviation of car No 3, passed intact under the bridge and rolled onto the embankment immediately behind. As the second half of car No 5 passed under the bridge, the bridge collapsed and fell on the car, flattening it completely. Remaining cars jackknifed into the rubble in a zigzag pattern as the collapsed bridge had completely obstructed the track. Cars 6 and 7, the service car, the restaurant car, the three first class cars numbered 10 to 12, and the rear control car all derailed and slammed into the pile.

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WHAT ARE THE CAUSES?

Technical Causes
Use of a rubber damping ring between a metal wheel rim and the wheel body.

 Wheel design

 Bridge design
Bridge supported on two thin piers. 

Management Causes
Poor response by the train crew. Reducing the factor of safety by Duetshe Bahn. Pressure resistance windows & rigid aluminum frames hobbled the intervention of the rescue workers.


 

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UNDERLYING ISSUES
 Operation Maintenance decision
concerns vis-à-vis possible metal wheel failure.  Permissible error in Wheel diameter is 0.6mm but error noticed in failed wheel is 1.1mm.  Insufficient failure detection system.

 The Fraunhofer Institute had told the DB management as early as 1992 about its

Design verification flaws

The rubber cushioned wheels, which has been used successfully on street cars were not suitable for heavier loads of ICE train operating at much higher speeds.

FOS
Worn out wheel diameter suggested by Fraunhofer Institute was 88cm but DB kept this value to 85.4cm. So a only of difference of 2.6cm is also one of the causes of this failure.
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NEGLIGENCE TOWARD NDT TESTING

It was committed to use ultrasonic testing every 250,000km operation, in fact no appropriate testing method was developed for in service inspection. Wheel in question was first put into operation in 1994 and ran 1.8 Million km until the accident in June 1998. It is significant that during its 4 years of operation through testing of the wheels have not done.

No fracture mechanic testing of the wheel was carried out after implementing.

The limited testing that was done did not account for dynamic, repetitive force that result from extended wear.

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CONSEQUENCES

 2. 3.

LEGAL In august 2002, 2 DB officials & one engineer were charged & fined. The remarkable growth of ICE of about 30% per annum was hindered by this incident.

4. People in Germany started traveling in car after this accident after few month.  Technical

6. All wheels of similar design were replaced by monoblock wheel. 7. All 59 ICE1 train were recalled for ultrasound examination of the wheel.

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CONCLUSION
• • • • • When such a train is involved in accident , the energy released is high & damage done is much higher than for lower speed train. Purely material defect has caused this accident. Poor reaction by the manager after noticing the violent vibration had quintuple the after of this accident. The passenger traveling in such a train should be given some basic preliminary coaching. Train manager refused to stop the train until he recovered the problem himself claiming this is against the company policy, such policy need to be noticed carefully. • A difference of 2.6cm can cause such an unforgettable catastrophe.

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STATISTICS

           

Length : 358m Weight : 850 tons Max seating capacity : 651 Total no of passenger traveling : 287 Dead : 101 Severely injured : 88 Unharmed : 106 Hazard (0-1000) : 292 Range (km square) : 1 Fear factor (0-10) : 2.2 Media effect (0-100) : 70 An example of Price: Brussels to Frankfurt(313km) 1st class : 125 euros(7875 INR) 2nd class : 84 euros(5292 INR)

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THANKS

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