ISS Rendezvous, Proximity Operations,

Docking & Berthing Considerations

April 25, 2005

Presented and edited by Al DuPont

NASA/JSC/Aeroscience & Flight Mechanics Division

Data & Information content provided

by David Strack and Brian Rishikof
Odyssey Space Research
JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division
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 Topics

• Background
• Introductory Charts – Regions Around ISS, Sample Trajectory, Safe Free Drift
Examples, Safe Free Drift – Drag Effects
• ISS Safety Considerations
• Trajectory Considerations
• Navigation Considerations
• Control Considerations
• Docking/Capture Considerations
• Monitoring and Commanding
• Crewed Vehicle
• Demonstration Flight Considerations

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Background

• This presentation was assembled by people working to support the

integration of vehicles into the ISS (ATV, HTV, and SLI, OSP…)
• Areas not included are launch, far rendezvous, berthing, deorbit…
although some aspects of monitoring are included, the broader aspects of
ground and flight operations is not covered
• It was put together to provide a guide to basic constraints and
considerations as opposed to a comprehensive set of requirements
• The presentation does not capture all requirements and considerations
• Despite the distinct groupings in this presentation, the requirements and
considerations are often interrelated
• The bottom line…design for safety of the ISS…and be able to prove it.

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Regions Around ISS*

Approach
Ellipsoid Keep-out Sphere
4km (200m radius)
V-Bar
2km

3 Sigma Dispersion R-Bar 3 km radius spherical

comm coverage

Out of plane minor axis of AE is 2km

*Chart taken from a presentation prepared by Paul Lane/USA in support of Mission Operations
Directorate and modified.

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Sample Trajectory

Spherical Space-to-Space
Comm Range (~3km)

Directional Space-to-Space
KOS Comm Range (~30km)
AE

V-Bar

KOS

R-Bar

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 ISS Safety Considerations

• The ISS Safety Requirements Document (SSP 50021) provides safety

requirements that can effect a vehicle’s design. A few are paraphrased
below:
– Two Fault Tolerance for ISS Catastrophic Hazard
– Single Fault Tolerance for Critical Hazard
– Design for minimum risk where fault tolerance is not practical
– Two inhibits on functions whose inadvertent operation may cause a hazard
– Three inhibits on functions whose inadvertent operation could result in a
catastrophic hazard. Two of the three inhibits shall be monitored.
– Monitor and control any function whose loss could result in a critical hazard
– Reporting of hazard, loss of function, change of inhibit status and change of
monitoring status in time to control the hazard or compensate for the change
• SSP 50021 was not designed for free-flight phase so additional
requirements may also apply

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 ISS Safety Considerations (2)

• The most likely hazard for free flying vehicles is collision. To mitigate
this hazard the vehicle designers could:
– Meet the Fault tolerance requirement for all systems (or design to
minimum risk where appropriate)
– Pair being less than two fault tolerant with the ability to safely abort
the operation and leave the vicinity of the ISS
– Show that collision does not create a catastrophic failure on the ISS
• The vehicle’s designers must receive concurrence on all safety related
issues from ISSP and appropriate review panels

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 ISS Safety Considerations (3)

• There are still other Safety related requirements that have been imposed on
vehicles flying near the ISS
– Requirements implemented through Segment Specification Documents &
Interface Requirements Documents as opposed to standard SSP documents
– Fail Safe: The system must be automatically (for uncrewed vehicles) fail safe
or initiate a collision avoidance maneuver while in free flight
– Safe Trajectory: Targeting and Trajectories must be designed such that the
safety of the ISS is preserved
• No ISSP fail safe requirements exist for vehicles
• Baseline rules exist and may become requirements in the incoming
vehicle’s Segment Specification or Interface Requirements Document
– The vehicle shall not complete rendezvous to the vicinity of the ISS
if the vehicle is zero fault tolerant to catastrophic hazard
– The system shall automatically initiate a Collision Avoidance
Maneuver (CAM) if a failure occurs that leaves the vehicle zero fault
tolerant while in the vicinity of the ISS
– Design must consider how to handle failure cases that lead to a zero
fault tolerant vehicle while in the docking/capture process

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 ISS Safety Considerations (4)

• Computer Based Control Safety Systems Requirements (SSP 50038) will

likely have a strong influence on vehicle design. A few are paraphrased
below:
• Overrides shall require at least two independent actions by the
operator
• Need two independent commands to deactivate critical
capabilities
• Separate control path for each inhibit used as a control
• Alternate functional paths shall be separated for critical functions
• A processor shall not independently control multiple inhibits to a
hazard
• Safety requirements may also have a strong impact in other systems
– Payload handling
– Laser safety
– Battery safety
– Etc.

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Trajectory Considerations

• Trajectories must be designed such that ISS safety is preserved

– There are no ISSP requirements documents that dictate trajectory requirements,
however there are concept documents and precedence
– Refers to all potential trajectories a vehicle may take when all dispersions (typically up
to 3 sigma) are taken into account (including GNC, environment, failures, etc.)
• Cases for failure to dock or to be captured by the SSRMS may have complex trajectory
issues due to interaction with the ISS…may need special systems to ensure a safe trajectory
• Safe trajectories must be defined for each region near the ISS
– Baselined regions defined in concept documents:
• Approach Ellipsoid (AE): 4x2x2 km (SSP 50011)
• Keep out Sphere (KOS): 200 m radius (SSP 50011)
• Omni directional communications disk: 3x1½ km (SSP 50235)
– Safe free drift trajectories should be employed when ever possible.
• 24 hour safe free drift trajectories prior to the maneuver that takes the vehicle inside the AE
• 24 hour safe free drift trajectories prior to entering the KOS when practical – attempt to
maximize safe free drift region
• Maximize safe free drift trajectory when practical inside KOS

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Safe Free Drift Examples

Far Field Approach OUT OF PLANE

(Looking down)

Flies around ISS Closest altitude

IN PLANE ISS is out-of-plane

ISS

Passes by before Altitude variation does

crossing ISS altitude not cross ISS orbit

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Safe Free Drift - Drag Effects

With Aero Drag

No Drag

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 Trajectory Considerations (3)

• Other baseline goals and considerations related to safe trajectory:

• In the vicinity of the ISS, the vehicle must follow a predefined
trajectory with predefined collision avoidance maneuvers planned
for any point on the trajectory
• The vehicle must not be targeted through the ISS except for final
approach
• Trajectories within Keep Out Sphere (200m) of the ISS must stay
within defined corridors (a survey flight may have exceptions)
• The vehicle shall not get closer than 6 ft to any ISS structure -
specific requirements for capture mechanisms and attachment
points may have exceptions

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Trajectory Considerations (4)

• A vehicle must be able to execute a Collision Avoidance Maneuver

(CAM) at all times for all mission phases
– Where applicable, a safe free drift trajectory may be used
– An active CAM (thrust to maneuver the vehicle away from the ISS)
must be used when free drift would be unsafe, too lengthy, or
difficult to monitor
• A CAM must put the vehicle on a 24 hour safe free drift trajectory
• Planned post CAM actions must keep the vehicle on a permanently safe
trajectory
• CAM must take the vehicle outside the AE within 90 minutes and must
remain outside the AE
• During a CAM the vehicle must stop closing and establish an opening
rate within half the distance from the ISS
• CAM in close to the ISS must begin with an opening rate

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Trajectory Considerations (5)

• Vehicle Sensors
– Trajectory can be effected by sensor range and field of view
– GPS blockage/multipath may impact vehicle trajectory
– Blockage of vehicle attitude sensors may impact trajectory
– Loss of lock/re-acquire capabilities may affect vehicle’s
accelerations
• Structural Clearance
– Clearance may impact trajectory and will partially define approach
corridor
• Plume Contamination and Thermal Restrictions
– Plume impingement (from vehicle or ISS) may impact trajectory
• ISS antenna blockage
– Trajectory must not block ISS antennas
• Lighting
– Lighting for adequate visual monitoring and sensor conditions may
restrict the trajectory profile, the timing for trajectories, and even the
time of year that maneuvers take place
– The goal may be for lighting to not limit activities
JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division
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 Trajectory Considerations (6)

• Communication Requirements
– May require timing maneuvers to take place over ground stations or
within range of a communications satellite
– “no fly” regions due to vehicle-to-vehicle communication blockages

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Navigation Considerations

• There are no ISSP requirements documents that dictate vehicle

navigation requirements – only concept documents
• The navigation requirements may go in the Segment Spec.
– The vehicle should not rely on ISS for determining, maintaining, and
monitoring the vehicle’s absolute state (except perhaps while attached)
(minimize impact to ISS)
– Crewed vehicles should not rely on the ISS for determining the vehicle’s state
prior to departure
• Crewed vehicles may need to separate from dead, uncontrolled ISS and therefore
should not rely on the ISS for navigation
– For safety, the vehicle should always know its navigation state and should
monitor it with respect to defined limits
– Assess protection from ‘common mode failure’
• Non-identical systems provides most reliable solution
– Assess the impact of using sensors not originally designed for use
near a large structures - Earth Sensors, Star Trackers, Sun Sensors, GPS

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Navigation Considerations (2)
Using ISS Resources
• Using ISS resources for relative navigation presents certain challenges
– ISS inertial navigation not specified for high performance
– Large structure introduces rotational errors between navigation base
and capture point for relative attitude determination
– US GPS systems on the ISS have visibility and pointing issues
– Use of Russian segment ISS GPS system and KURS based
range/range rate capability will require coordination with Russians
– JAXA’s ISS GPS system and their RF communication based
range/range rate capability are not yet available and use of these
system will require coordination with JAXA
– Russia’s KURS system has performance and location limitations
– Navigation systems that require RF communication with the ISS
needs to be assessed (US, Japan, Europe, and Russia all have space-
to-space communication systems)
– Existing laser reflectors can effect new laser systems
– Existing laser reflectors may not match required locations or design
for new systems
JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division
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 Control Considerations

• There are no ISSP requirements documents that dictate vehicle control

requirements however ISS constraints may drive control specification
• Vehicle control performance requirements can depend on several factors:
– ISS control characteristics
• ISS attitude hold mode a major factor (e.g., ISS at LVLH TEA)
• Different ISS attitude control modes and options result in different ISS
control motion characteristics
– Russian control system vs US system with Russian RCS
– TEA hold vs fixed attitude hold
• Design for degraded ISS can strongly impact control constraints
• Moment arms between c.g. and capture point can drive vehicle design
– ISS loads constraints for allowable contact conditions

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Control Considerations (2)

• Examples of vehicle control system functional requirements

– Must de-activate upon docking contact and/or capture
– Ability to inhibit jet firing (following safety inhibit requirements)
– Ability to re-activate in time to ensure safe trajectory after separation
(docking and berthing)
– Ability to re-activate in time to safe vehicle after failed capture
• The control performance requirements may define several vehicle items
– Type of controller, size, placement and number of jets, control cycle
frequency, guidance and navigational capabilities
• The control functional requirements may define several vehicle items
– Avionics architecture, communication design, C&DH architecture,
command and control design, etc.

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Docking/Capture Considerations

• Vehicles must design their GNC to meet pre-specified docking or capture

conditions (ISS specific)
– Docking mechanism capture performance may limit:
• Lateral and rotational misalignment, Lateral and rotational rates,
Minimum closing velocity
– ISS structural docking load allowance may limit:
• Maximum closing velocity, Lateral and rotational rates
– Capture mechanism may limit:
• Relative position, Relative rates
– ISS flex motion can play an important role in both capture
performance and loads
• Motion during post-capture/pre-berthed phase may impact structure,
avionics, and sensors (ISS specific)

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Docking/Capture Considerations (2)

• Vehicle must be able to recognize a failed capture and be able to recover

(complete, back-out/retry, abort)
– To recover without abort the vehicle may need to understand its inertial and
relative state and status of the ISS
• Vehicle must be able to recognize a capture with failed completion and be able to
recover (complete, back-out/retry, abort)
– ISS may be in free drift for a significant time under this scenario
– ISS/vehicle relative attitude may have significant offset
• Vehicle should limit requirements on ISS to support separation from a
docked/captured condition
– ISS attitude, control modes, Array orientation
– De-docking mechanism preparation
– Monitoring and commanding systems, Navigation system, communication
systems
• If separation mechanism fails, vehicle must have an alternate method of separating
that meets nominal separation requirements

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Monitoring and Commanding

• There are no ISSP requirements documents that dictate ISS crew

monitoring or control requirements, except…
– There are some CBCS requirements (SSP 50038) that are related to
this – especially related to placing, removing, and monitoring inhibits
– There are Human Rating requirements that are applicable to an
uncrewed vehicle flying to the ISS
• There are concept documents and precedents for monitoring and control
considerations
• Many of the monitoring and control requirements may be placed on the
vehicle’s crew instead of the ISS’s crew for a crewed vehicle
• When in the vicinity of the ISS, the vehicle will be monitored by the ISS
crew and by the ground personnel when possible

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Monitoring and Commanding (2)

• Visual Monitoring (onboard crew)

– May limit the regions and durations that the vehicle can fly
– May require specific trajectories
– Likely to impact approach/departure corridor definition
– Examples of Visual monitoring considerations
• Identify vehicle at 1 km (be able to see it)
• Determine approximate attitude at 500 m
• Evaluate trajectory inside 200 m
• Evaluate docking/capture conditions prior to docking/capture
• Visual monitoring requirements must be met for any lighting conditions
– May affect launch dates, rendezvous timing, target positions, etc.
• Vehicle data must be provided to the ISS during all nominal proximity
operations and any time the vehicle is within 3 km of the ISS
– This information is used to monitor vehicle health, status and
trajectory

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Monitoring and Commanding (3)

• The vehicle may need to have ISS-to-vehicle commanding capabilities

– For uncrewed vehicles, the Station crew must have independent
command capability to abort, inhibit thrust and enable thrust (SSP
50011)
– For SSRMS capture this must also include a command to inhibit
vehicle jets and a command to activate an alternate separation
mechanism
– Vehicle/mission specific design may cause addition of other required
commands
• For operational flexibility this may include such things as:
Hold/resume, Retreat to hold point/continue, go to Free drift,
reconfigure, separate, remote piloting, etc.
• Time critical, safety critical ISS-to-vehicle commands must be through
hardware command (as opposed to ISS laptop)

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Crewed Vehicle

• Crewed vehicles have a few additional considerations (based on

experience with Shuttle, Soyuz, CRV)
– Ability to escape from a dead station
– Ability to escape within a given time limit
– Ability to allow for safe multiple vehicle separation
• Monitoring role may be done on the vehicle instead of the ISS
• Space-to-space voice communication is likely a requirement

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Demonstration Flight Considerations

• Demonstration is required prior to flight to ISS

– Precedents and concept document (SSP 50235)
• Demonstration flight can be to ISS under certain conditions
– Failure of any demonstration will not lead to hazard
– Functions/capabilities are proven in demonstration prior to being
relied upon for safety
– Demonstrations must have pass/fail criteria that clearly demonstrates
the function/capability
– There must be a reliable method to measure the pass/fail criteria
• ISS may require on-orbit test for key functions as part of verification

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 Back-up Charts

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 ISS Resources

• Attachment Mechanisms
– APAS Docking Mechanisms (used by the Shuttle)
– Probe and Drogue Docking Mechanisms (used by Russian vehicles
and the European ATV)
– Common Berthing Mechanism (CBM) – variety of utilities
– Payload Attachment Systems for unpressurized attachment
– Canadian Mobile Services System (MSS) used for capture, for
manipulating payloads, for attachment at CBMs
– Japanese JEM Robotic Manipulator System for payload manipulation
• Navigation Support Equipment
– Laser Reflectors (Shuttle, ATV and HTV)
– Video Targets (SSRMS, ATV)
– Visual Targets (US, Russian)
– Range/range rate capability on JAXA communication system
– Kurs Radar system for Russian vehicles and ATV
– GPS Receivers/antennas (US, Russian, Japanese)
JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division
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 ISS Resources (2)

• Communication Systems:
– US space-to-ground (including TDRSS) for data, voice, and video
– Russian space-to-ground for data, voice and video
– US space-to-space for data and voice
– Russian space-to-space for data, voice, video (Russian AR&C)
– Japanese space-to-space for data (HTV AR&C)
– European space-to-space for data (ATV AR&C)
• ISS command and data handling equipment (US and Russian)
• Voice communication equipment
• Monitoring equipment (cameras, lights, targets, windows, monitors,
laptops, displays on hardware command panels)
• Command support equipment (laptops, hardware command panels, hand
controllers)

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 ISS Resources (3)

• ISS attitude control system

• ISS navigation system
– Rotational and Translational state information
– Raw GPS data for relative GPS navigation
• Crew members for ISS preparation, vehicle monitoring and commanding
• Links to ground control for ISS preparation, vehicle monitoring and
commanding
• ISS command and monitor capability for ISS preparation and
contingency trouble-shooting
• Utilities for attached phase support

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 ISS Environment
Orbit
• Orbit ranges
– 278 – 460 km
– 51.3 to 51.9 degree inclination
– < 0.01 degree eccentricity (expect < 0.003)
• Orbit knowledge
– Spec from SSP 41000
• Position: 3000 feet (RSS)
• Velocity: Undefined
– Actual knowledge: TBD (much better than 3000 feet)
• Change in Orbit due to drag
– < 1e-5 m/s2 (TBC) orbit average for non-emergency conditions
– < 2.2e-5 m/s2 (TBC) instantaneous for non-emergency conditions

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 ISS Environment
Attitude Control*
• Different Attitude Control Modes are available:
– TEA momentum management - low angular rates but non-fixed
attitude and slow response to disturbance
• Assembly complete design range (SSP 41000, SSP 50261)
• Range without Orbiter attached: 15 Yaw, -20 to 15 Pitch, 15 Roll
• Range with Orbiter attached: 15 Yaw, 0 to 25 Pitch, 15 Roll
• Less than 3.5 variation per orbit (SSP 41000)
– LVLH hold - fixed attitude, faster response, higher angular rates
  5 undisturbed, <2 peak to peak for shuttle docking (SSP 41000)
• <0.02/s undisturbed, <0.04/s with Shuttle plume (SSP 41000)
• Controls to defined attitude such as 0,0,0; average TEA; DTEA (average
TEA pitch with no out-of-plane component along the approach axis)
– Adjustable response to CMG saturation levels (set at low momentum
levels for quick response and minimized rate changes for
desaturation, set at high momentum levels for maximized time
between jet firings)
* Simplified description - many caveats and details not included
JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division
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 ISS Environment
Pointing
• ISS specifications from SSP 41000
• Angular Alignment of US docking port: 3.4/axis
• Angular alignment of SM aft port: 3.4/axis
• Any non-articulatable point on ISS: 5/axis (under LVLH attitude hold)
• Angular alignment of Alpha Joint: 4
• Angular alignment of Beta Joint: 6
• Attitude knowledge: 3/axis
• Attitude rate knowledge: 0.01/s/axis
• Camera pointing accuracy (TBD)
• SSRMS pointing accuracy (TBD)

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 ISS Environment
Blockage/Clearance
• Clearance and keep out zones
– ISS structural clearance (safety clearance envelopes, robotic
arm/MSS pathways, articulating/deployable elements)
– Other vehicle approach/separation corridors
– Antenna visibility/radiation
– ISS crew and equipment viewing constraints
– Sun blockage/shadowing and thermal constraints
• ISS Solar and Thermal radiator orientation
– Should design to not impact ISS power/thermal
– May need to limit solar arrays motion to reduce RF signal multipath
and/or blockage, plume impingement, sun reflection/blockage, etc.
– Can not stop motion of thermal radiators

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 ISS Environment
Configuration
• Mass properties are not fixed or guaranteed by ISS
– Can design to range of properties for example:

Fwd Aft Port Stbd Zenith Nadir

C.G. X 0.62 -8.35
C.G. Y -3.27 0.33
C.G. Z 2.83 5.35

• Aerodynamic properties are not fixed or guaranteed by ISS

– Can use range of ISS configurations
– Aero properties change during the orbit
• Surface characteristics are not fixed or guaranteed by ISS
• Expect the ISS configuration to change during its life

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 ISS Environment
Additional Environment Considerations
• GPS Environment
– US antenna placements have significant blockage (array orientation
has significant effect) and do not point zenith
– Japanese and Russian antennas have some blockage
– All have multi-path potential
• RF Environment
– Vehicle RF must not interfere with ISS RF or radiate sensitive ISS
systems
– Vehicle must consider ISS RF for interference, and radiation of the
vehicle
• ISS plume impingement on the vehicle & vehicle plume impingement on
ISS
– Contamination, thermal heating, structural loads, and torques
• Vehicle design should accommodate all lighting conditions
• Thermal and ESD constraints at attachment points
• Solar Beta impacts lighting and thermal conditions

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 SSRMS Free Flyer Capture*

• Vehicles being captured by SSRMS are required to enter a Capture Box, station-
keep for 5 minutes during which ISS prepares for capture and then, on command
from the ISS crew, inhibit jet firing
• The size and shape of the Capture Box is defined by several factors:
– SSRMS reach and stopping distance (partly a function of the vehicle mass)
– Relative state sensor position, orientation and field of view
– Residual relative velocity at free drift
– Attitudes and attitude rates of ISS and vehicle at free drift
– Position and orientation of grapple fixture
– Location of the center of mass with respect to capture point
– The structural envelope of both the vehicle and the ISS
– Attachment point of the SSRMS
– Crew direct field of view
• The vehicle and the SSRMS will likely have different electromagnetic charges so
precautions must be taken to ensure proper electro-static discharge
• As a precaution against problems with the arm after capture but before berthing the
vehicle it is recommended to plan for 24 hour contingency operations on the arm

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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 SSRMS Capture Failure Recovery*

• Vehicles must be able to recover from a failed SSRMS capture

– There are a number of different failures
• Vehicle drifts out of reach
• Vehicle bumped by the SSRMS Latching End Effector (LEE)
• Vehicle is hit by LEE snares during capture attempt, but no capture
• SSRMS goes to safe mode and cannot capture the vehicle
– Accommodations will need to be made for each scenario
• Vehicle can only be re-activated by ISS Crew command
• SSRMS may still be in the vicinity
• Both the ISS and the vehicle may be out of attitude
• Vehicles must be able to recover from a capture with failed rigidization
– This situation causes a series of problems because the vehicle can still rotate
• The grapple fixture will eventually contact the inside of the LEE and may damage
the LEE
• The vehicle can rotate such that it can contact with the SSRMS booms and
potentially set up a catastrophic hazard
• This can put both the ISS and vehicle out of attitude for separation
– The vehicle will need an alternate separation method that can be commanded
by the ISS crew

JSC - Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division

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