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Cloud Computing

Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Steven R. Hunt
ARC IT Governance Manager Ames Research Center

Matt Linton
IT Security Specialist Ames Research Center

Matt Chew Spence


IT Security Compliance Consultant Dell Services Federal Government Ames Research Center August 17, 2010

Agenda
 Introductions
Steve Hunt

 What is cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How is NASA implementing cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 How does NASA secure cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 Q&A
Presentation Team

Extended Presentation
 FISMA & Clouds
Matt Chew Spence Steve Hunt

 Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP


Steve Hunt

Agenda
 Introductions
Steve Hunt

OBJECTIVE: Overview of cloud computing and share vocabulary

 What is cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How is NASA implementing cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 How does NASA secure cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 Q&A
Presentation Team

Extended Presentation
 FISMA & Clouds
Matt Chew Spence Steve Hunt

 Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP


Steve Hunt

What is Cloud Computing?

Cloud Computing NIST Definition: A model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction

What is Cloud Computing?

Conventional Computing
vs.

Cloud Computing
Conventional
Manually Provisioned Dedicated Hardware Fixed Capacity Pay for Capacity Capital & Operational Expenses  Managed via Sysadmins     

Cloud
      Self-provisioned Shared Hardware Elastic Capacity Pay for Use Operational Expenses Managed via APIs

What is Cloud Computing?

Five Key Cloud Attributes:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Shared / pooled resources Broad network access On-demand self-service Scalable and elastic Metered by use

What is Cloud Computing?

Shared / Pooled Resources:


 Resources are drawn from a common pool  Common resources build economies of scale  Common infrastructure runs at high efficiency

What is Cloud Computing?

Broad Network Access:


 Open standards and APIs  Almost always IP, HTTP, and REST  Available from anywhere with an internet connection

What is Cloud Computing?

On-Demand Self-Service:
 Completely automated  Users abstracted from the implementation  Near real-time delivery (seconds or minutes)  Services accessed through a self-serve web interface

What is Cloud Computing?

Scalable and Elastic:


 Resources dynamically-allocated between users  Additional resources dynamically-released when needed  Fully automated

What is Cloud Computing?

Metered by Use:
 Services are metered, like a utility  Users pay only for services used  Services can be cancelled at any time

What is Cloud Computing?

Three Service Delivery Models


IaaS: Infrastructure as a Service
Consumer can provision computing resources within provider's infrastructure upon which they can deploy and run arbitrary software, including OS and applications

PaaS: Platform as Service


Consumer can create custom applications using programming tools supported by the provider and deploy them onto the provider's cloud infrastructure

SaaS: Software as Service


Consumer uses providers applications running on provider's cloud infrastructure
Virtual Machines Virtual Networks Auto Elastic Continuous Integration Built for Cloud Uses PaaS

IaaS

PaaS

SaaS

What is Cloud Computing?

Service Delivery Model Examples


Amazon Google Microsoft Salesforce

SaaS

PaaS

IaaS

Products and companies shown for illustrative purposes only and should not be construed as an endorsement

What is Cloud Computing?

Cloud efficiencies and improvements


 Cost efficiencies  Time efficiencies  Power efficiencies  Improved process control  Improved security  Unlimited capacity
Proces s Proce ss Process

Burst capacity (overprovisioning) Short-duration projects Cancelled or failed missions

Procurement Network connectivity

Standardized, updated base images Centrally auditable log servers Centralized authentication systems Improved forensics (w/ drive image)

Agenda
 Introductions
Steve Hunt

OBJECTIVE: Discuss requirements, use cases, and ROI

 What is cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How is NASA implementing cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 How does NASA secure cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 Q&A
Presentation Team

Extended Presentation
 FISMA & Clouds
Matt Chew Spence Steve Hunt

 Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP


Steve Hunt

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

Current IT options for Scientists


Requirements* Current Options*
BUILD IT Build my own IT infrastructure that may/may not comply with Federal/Agency IT security standards.

Science-scale application development

Very large data set processing

Missions Timely sharing of results with collaborators and the public

BUY IT Go through a lengthy procurement and provisioning process for basic IT services

Compute intensive processing

DO NOTHING The current basic IT services model is cost prohibitive and I cannot afford to process my data and share with collaborators and the public at large.

* Requirements and Options documented in over 30+ interviews with Ames scientists as part 2009 NASA Workstation project.

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

Scientists direct access to Nebula cloud computing


Mission Objectives

Explore, Understand, and Share MISSION

Aeronautics

Exploration

Science

Space Ops

Mission Support

USE CASES

Process Large Data Sets

Run Compute Intensive Workloads

Scale-out for one-time events

Require infrastructure on-demand

Store mission & science data

Share information with the public

OCIO INNOVATION

High Compute

Vast Storage

High Speed Networking

Shared Resource

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

Offer scientists services to address the gap


Desktop

Super Computer

Excellent example of how OCIOsponsored innovation can be rapidly transformed into services that address Agency mission needs

Server-based compute resources

TARGET COMPUTE PLATFORM

High-end Compute

Vast Storage

High Speed Networking

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

ROI and ARC Case Study

POWER: Computers typically require 70% of their total power requirements to run at just 15% utilization.

*15% utilization based on two reports from Gartner Group, Cost of Traditional Data Centers (2009), and Data Center Efficiency (2010).

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

ROI and ARC Case Study


 Operational Enhancements:
Strict standardization of hardware and infrastructure software components Small numbers of system administrators due to the cookie-cutter design of cloud components and support processes Failure of any single component within the Nebula cloud will not become reason for alarm Application operations will realize similar efficiencies once application developers learn how to properly deploy applications so that they are not reliant on any particular cloud component.

Agenda
 Introductions
Steve Hunt

OBJECTIVE: Overview of how NASA is implementing cloud computing

 What is cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How is NASA implementing cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 How does NASA secure cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 Q&A
Presentation Team

Extended Presentation
 FISMA & Clouds
Matt Chew Spence Steve Hunt

 Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP


Steve Hunt

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Nebula Principles
 Open and Public APIs, everywhere  Open-source platform, apps, and data  Full transparency Open source code and documentation releases  Reference platform Cloud model for Federal Government

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Nebula User Experience Nebula IaaS user will have an experience similar to Amazon EC2:
 Dedicated private VLAN for instances  Dedicated VPN for access to private VLAN  Public IPs to assign to instances  Launch VM instances  Dashboard for instance control and API access  Able to import/export bundled instances to AWS and other clouds
Products and companies named for illustrative purposes only and should not be construed as an endorsement

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Architecture Drivers
 Reliability  Availability  Cost  IT Security

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Shared Nothing
 Messaging Queue  State Discovery  Standard Protocols

Automated
IPMI PXEBoot Puppet

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Nebula Infrastructure Components


 Cloud Node  Network Node  Compute Node  Volume Node  Object Node  Monitoring / Metering / Logging / Scanning

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Cloud Node

LDAP Data Store Nova Cloud Node

Redis KVS Puppet RabbitMQ PXE Ubuntu OS

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Compute Node

Project VLAN Running Instance LibVirt Puppet KVM PXE


802.1(q)

Brctl

Nova Compute Node

Ubuntu OS

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Volume Node

Exported Volume AoE Puppet LVM PXE Ubuntu OS Nova Volume Node

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Object Node

Nginx Puppet PXE Ubuntu OS

Nova Object Node

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Network Node

Project VLAN
Brctl

Public Internet
IPTables

Nova Network Node

Puppet
802.1(q)

PXE

Ubuntu OS

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Pilot Lessons Learned


- Automate Everything  No SysAdmin is perfect  99% is not good enough  NEVER make direct system changes  When in doubt - PXEBoot

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Pilot Lessons Learned


- Test Everything  KVM + Jumbo Frames  Grinder  Unit Tests / Cyclometric Complexity  TransactionID Insertion (Universal Proxy)

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Pilot Lessons Learned


- Monitor Everything  Ganglia  Munin  Syslog-NG + PHPSyslog-NG  Nagios  Custom Log Parsing (Instance-centric)

Agenda
 Introductions
Steve Hunt

OBJECTIVE: Overview of technical security mechanisms built into Nebula

 What is cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How is NASA implementing cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 How does NASA secure cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 Q&A
Presentation Team

Extended Presentation
 FISMA & Clouds
Matt Chew Spence Steve Hunt

 Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP


Steve Hunt

OBJECTIVE: Overview of technical security mechanisms built into Nebula

Technical Security Overview


Issues with Commercial Cloud Providers Overview of Current Security Mechanisms Innovations

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Commercial Cloud Provider Security Concerns


IT Security not brought into decision of how & when NASA orgs use clouds IT Security may not know NASA orgs are using clouds until an incident has occurred Without insight into monitoring/IDS/logs, NASA may not find out that an incident has occurred No assurances of sufficient cloud infrastructure access to perform proper forensics/investigations These issues are less likely with a private cloud like Nebula

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

IT Security is built into Nebula


 User Isolation from Nebula Infrastructure  Users only have access to APIs and Dashboards No user direct access to Nebula infrastructure  Project-based separation A project is a set of compute resources accessible by one or more users Each project has separate: VLAN for project instances VPN for project users to launch, terminate, and access instances Image library of instances

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Networking
 RFC1918 address space internal to Nebula NAT is used for those hosts within Nebula needing visibility outside a cluster  Three core types of networks within Nebula: Customer Customer VLANs are isolated from each other DMZ Services available to all Nebula such as NTP, DNS, etc Administrative

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Security Groups
 Combination of VLANs and Subnetting  Can be extended to use physical network/node separation as well (future)

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Project A Public IP Space (10.1.1/24)


DMZ Services

RFC1918 Space (LAN_X)


Operations Console (custom) Security Scanners (Nessus, Hydra, etc) Log Aggregation, SOC Tap Event Correlation Engine

External Scanner I N T E R N E T C L O U D A P I S

B R I D G E

S M R

Project B (10.1.2/24)

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Firewalls
 Multiple levels of firewalling Hardware firewall at site border Firewall on cluster network head-ends Host-based firewalls on key hosts Project based rule sets based on Amazon security groups

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Remote User Access


 Remote access is only through VPN (openVPN)  Separate administrative VPN and user VPNs  Each project has own VPN server

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Intrusion Detection
 OSSEC on key infrastructure hosts Open source Host-based Intrusion Detection  Mirror port to NASA SOC tap  Building 10Gb/sec IDS/IPS/Forensics device with vendor partners

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Configuration Management
 Puppet used to automatically push out configuration changes to infrastructure  Automatic reversion of unauthorized changes to system

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Vulnerability Scanning
 Nebula uses both internal and external vulnerability scanners  Correlate findings between internal and external scans

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Incident Response
 Procedures for isolating individual VMs, compute nodes, and clusters, including: Taking snapshot of suspect VMs, including memory dump Quarantining a VM within a compute node Disabling VM images so new instances cant be launched Quarantining a compute node within a cluster Quarantining a cluster

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Role Based Access Control


 Multiple defined roles within a project  Role determines which API calls can be invoked Only network admin can request non-1918 addresses Only system admin can bundle new images etc

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Innovation - Security Gates


 API calls can be intercepted and security gates can be imposed on function being called  When an instance is launched, it can be scanned automatically for vulnerabilities  Long term vision is to have a pass/fail launch gate based on scan/monitoring results

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Vision - Security as a Service


 Goal - Automate compliance through security services provided by cloud provider  Security APIs/tools mapped to specific controls Customers could subscribe to tools/services to meet compliance requirements  When setting up new project in cloud Customers assert nature of data they will use Cloud responds with list of APIs/tools for customers to use  Currently gathering requirements but funding needed to realize vision

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Vision - Security Service Bus


 Goal - FISMA compliance through continuous real-time monitoring and situational awareness Security service bus with event driven messaging engine Correlate events across provider and multiple customers Dashboard view for security providers and customers Allows customers to make risk-based security decisions based on events experienced by other customers  Funding Needed to Realize Vision

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Nebula Open Source Progress  Significant progress in embracing the value of


open source software release
Agreements with SourceForge and Github Open source identified as an essential component of NASAs open government plan

 Elements of Nebula in open source release pipeline


Started Feb 2010. Hope for release in June. Working toward continual incremental releases. Exploring avenues to contribute code to external projects and to accept external contributions to the Nebula code base.

Agenda
 Introductions
Steve Hunt

 What is cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How is NASA implementing cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 How does NASA secure cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 Q&A
Presentation Team

Extended Presentation
 FISMA & Clouds
Matt Chew Spence Steve Hunt

 Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP


Steve Hunt

Q&A

Extended Presentation

Agenda
 Introductions
Steve Hunt

OBJECTIVE: Overview of Nebula C&A with Lessons Learned

 What is cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How is NASA implementing cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 How does NASA secure cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 Q&A
Presentation Team

Extended Presentation
 FISMA & Clouds
Matt Chew Spence Steve Hunt

 Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP


Steve Hunt

FISMA & Clouds

FISMA Overview
 Federal Information Security Management Act
Requires all Govt computers to be under a security plan
Mandates following NIST security guidance Required controls depend on FIPS-199 sensitivity level Requires periodic assessments of security controls Extremely documentation heavy Assumes one organization has responsibility for majority of identified security controls

 FISMA is burdensome to cloud customers


Customers want to outsource IT Security to cloud provider

FISMA & Clouds

FISMA Responsibilities in Clouds


 Clouds are a Highly Dynamic Shared Management Environment
Customers retain FISMA responsibilities for aspects of a cloud under their control Responsibilities vary depending on level of control maintained by customer Customer control varies relative to service delivery model (SaaS, PaaS, or IaaS)

 Need to define & document responsibilities


We parsed 800-53 Rev3 controls per service delivery model

 Nebula currently only offers IaaS


We parsed all three service models for future planning

FISMA & Clouds

Customer FISMA Responsibilities for Cloud


Customer FISMA responsibilities Increase as Customers have more control over security measures

IaaS
OS Config Mgmt Anti-Malware SW Install Controls OS specific Controls etc Cloud Customer Security Responsibility

PaaS

SaaS

Software Licenses Developer Testing App Configuration Management Software Development Lifecycle Identifying data types Ensuring data appropriate to system User/Account Management Personnel Controls

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FISMA & Clouds

IaaS Customer Security Plan Coverage Options


 At inception little guidance existed on cloud computing control responsibilities & security plan coverage  FedRAMP primarily addresses cloud provider responsibilities
Other than control parsing definitions Customers are given little guidance on implementing and managing FISMA requirements in a highly dynamic shared management environment

 We have developed the following options:


Option Customer Owned Description Customer responsible for own security plan with no assistance from provider Customer responsible for own security plan using NASA template Agency or Center level Group security plans associated with Cloud providers serve as aggregation point for customer. Issues None to Providers Burdensome to customers May still be burdensome to customers. Not scalable unless automated. May be burdensome to Agency or Center. Requires technology to automate input and aggregation of customer data.

Facilitated

Agency Owned

FISMA & Clouds

Current NASA Requirements/Tools may Impede Cloud Implementation


data as Moderate Independent assessment required for every major change Currently requires 3rd party document-centric audit Not scalable to cloud environments
 Default security categorization of Scientific and Space Science

 e-Authentication/AD integration required for all NASA Apps NASA implementations dont currently support LDAP/SAMLbased federated identity management  Function-specific stove-piped compliance tools STRAW/PIA tool/A&A Repository/NASA electronic forms Cant easily automate compliance process for new apps

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FISMA & Clouds

Emerging Developments in FISMA & Clouds


 Interagency Cloud Computing Security Working Group is developing additional baseline security requirements for cloud computing providers  NIST Cloud Computing guidance forthcoming?  Move towards automated risk models and security management tools over documentation  On the bleeding edge - changing guidance & requirements are a key risk factor (and opportunity)

65

FISMA & Clouds

Nebula is Contributing to Cloud Standards  Federal Cloud Standards Working Group  Fed Cloud Computing Security Working Group Federal Risk & Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP)  Cloud Audit project Automated Audit Assertion Assessment & Assurance API  Providing Feedback to NIST and GAO  GSA Cloud PMO

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Agenda
 Introductions
Steve Hunt

OBJECTIVE: Overview of how Nebula concepts may integrate with FedRAMP

 What is cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?


Matt Chew Spence

 How is NASA implementing cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 How does NASA secure cloud computing?


Matt Linton

 Q&A
Presentation Team

Extended Presentation
 FISMA & Clouds
Matt Chew Spence Steve Hunt

 Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP


Steve Hunt

FedRAMP

Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program

 A Federal Government-Wide program to provide Joint Authorizations and Continuous Monitoring Unified Government-Wide risk management Authorizations can be leveraged throughout Federal Government  This is to be an optional service provided to Agencies that does not supplant existing Agency authority

FedRAMP

Independent Agency Risk Management of Cloud Services

Federal Agencies

: Duplicative risk management efforts

: Incompatible agency policies : Acquisition slowed by lengthy compliance processes

Cloud Service Providers (CSP)

: Potential for inconsistent application of Federal security requirements

FedRAMP

Federated Risk Management of Cloud Systems


Federal Agencies

Risk Management Authorization Continuous Monitoring Federal Security Requirements : Risk management cost savings and increased effectiveness

FedRAMP

: Interagency vetted approach

: Rapid acquisition through consolidated risk management

Cloud Service Providers (CSP)


: Consistent application of Federal security requirements

FedRAMP

FedRAMP Authorization process


Agency X has a need for a new cloud based IT system Agency X gets security requirements for the new IT system from FedRAMP and adds requirements if necessary

Agency X releases RFP for new IT system and awards contract to cloud service provider (CSP)

Agency X submits request to FedRAMP office for CSP To be FedRAMP authorized to operate

CSP is put into FedRAMP priority queue (prioritization occurs based on factors such as multi-agency use, number of expected users, etc.)

FedRAMP

FedRAMP Authorization process (cont)


CSP and agency sponsor begin authorization process with FedRAMP office CSP, agency sponsor and FedRAMP office review security requirements and any alternative implementations FedRAMP office coordinates with CSP for creation of system security plan (SSP)

CSP has independent assessment of security controls and develops appropriate reports for submission to FedRAMP office

FedRAMP office reviews and assembles the final authorization package for the JAB

JAB reviews final certification package and authorizes CSP to operate

FedRAMP office adds CSP to authorized system inventory to be reviewed and leveraged by all Federal agencies

FedRAMP provides continuous monitoring of CSP

FedRAMP

Issues & Concerns


 FedRAMP doesnt provide much guidance for customer side e.g. Agency users of cloud services  Current NIST guidance oriented primarily towards Static Single System Owner environments  Lack of NIST guidance for Highly Dynamic Shared Owner environments e.g. Virtualized Data Centers & Clouds SSP generation & maintenance Application of SP 800-53 (security controls) Application of SP 800-37 (assessment & ATO) Continuous Monitoring  Guidance may be forthcoming but NIST is resource constrained

FedRAMP

Potential Solution
 Agency/Center level Aggregated SSPs: Plan per CSP e.g. Nebula, Amazon, Google, Microsoft etc. Plan covers all customers of a specific CSP Technology integration may be needed with SSP repository to dynamically update SSP content via Web Registration site. Or SSP may be able to point to dynamic content entered and housed on Web Registration site ... maintained in Wiki type doc.
Presentation Title 74 March 5, 2010

Q&A

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