Frege~sLectures

on Logic
Carnap's Student Notes
1910- 1914
Publications o/tlze Arclzive C!/Sdelllijic PlztlMOpl,y
Ht/ill/all Library, UmiJer.Jity (!fPit&Jburglz

VOLUME I.
Frege's Leaures on Logic: Carnap's Student Notes, /9/ a-/9/4, Translated and edited, with introductory essay, by
edited by Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey
VOLUME 2.
Carnap Brought Home: The View (rom Jena, Based on the German text, edited,
edited by Steve Awodey and Carsten Klein with introduction and annotations, by
Gottfried Gabriel ", ,.
.. "', \

At
Opell Court
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 Publications ofdie Archilie ofScientific Philosophy
Iltllman Library; Univer,sity rifPituburgh

Steve Awodey, Editor

EDITORIAL BOARD
James Lennox
University of Pittsburgh

Richard Creath John Earman

Arizona State University University of Pittsburgh

Michael Friedman Gottfried Gabriel

Stanford University University ofJena

Dana Scott Wilfried Sieg

Carnegie Mellon University Carnegie Mellon University

Mark Wilson Gereon Wolters

University of Pittsburgh University of Constance

,
 t

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Frege, Gottloh, 1848-1925.

(Lectures. English. selections)
Frege's lectures on Logic: Carnap's student notes, 1910-1914 I
[J"anslatt'd and edited, with introductory essay hy Erich H. Rcck
and Steve Awodey; ba.sed on the German text, edited, with
introduction and annotations by Gottfried Gabriel.
p. cm. -Wull circle)
Incilldf"s bihliographical references and index.
ISBN (~812f1-95~6_1 - ISBN 0-8126-9553-4 lpbk. : a(k. paper)
I. L'gw, symbniJc lind 1113them,ltical. I. Catnap, Rudolf,
1~91~197l).IL Reek, Erich H., 1959- III. Awodey, Steve, l%lJ-
1\. Gabrwl. Goufrieri. 194:l- V. Title. VI. Series.
B324.'1. F22F.52 2004
160......dc22
 Contents

Preface Xlll

Introduction: Frege's Lectures on Begrifftschrift

Gottfried Gabriel 1

Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence

Erieh H. Reek and Steve Awodey 17

Carnap's StndentNotes: 45

Begriffsschrift 1(1910-1911) 49

Appendix A:
The Ontological Proof of the Existence of God 79
Appendix B:
Numerical Statements abollt Concepts 83

Begriffsschrift II (1913) 87

Logic in Mathematics (1914) 135

Literature Cited 167

,
ix
Frege's Lectures on Logic

Carnap's Student Notes, 1910- 1914

Preface

Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) is generally acknowledged to be one of the founders

of modern logic, arguably even its main source. Frege presented his pioneering
logical system for the first time in Begrifj<schrift (1879), Later an expanded and
modified version appeared in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Vols. I (1893) and IT
(1903), Together with his second book, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884),
a~.d a series ofimportant anicles, including '<'Funktion und Bcgriff' (J891) and
""Ubcr Sinn und Bedeutung" (1892a), these texts are all well known today, and
are of continuing influence in philosophy, logic, and related areas. They have.
indeed, hecome classics of analytic philosophy, and ofnineteenth~ and twenti~
eth-eentury thought mor<.~ generally (d. Beaney 1997).
Until rel'cntly, very huh; was known ahoul Fregt~'S post-1903 views on
lObric. induding any rnodifieations or his logical system in real'tion to Russe1l's
antinomy., ofwhidl ht' was informc·d in 1902 when (;rllndW'St>lze, Vol. II., was in
press. Even l(~ss was known ahout tht.' dasses Frege reguhlrly taught on logic at
the University of Jena. It is true tha.t Rudolf CCirnap., in his "Intellectual
Autobiography" (1963)., had mentioned auending several ofthese classes dur-
ing his student years in Jena, 1910-1914, and bad described them generally. But
it took the rediscovery and reconstruction of Carnap's lecture notes, in the early
19905, for more specific and complete information to become available.
German transcriptions of parts ofthcse notes, edited hy Gottfried Gabriel., were
snbsequently pnblished as (Frege 1996),
In the present volume we make available., in English, the full set of notes
taken hy Carnap in Fregc's IflhrlC classes, supplemented hy a translation of
Gabriel's introduction and annotations it>f the German version. CaTnap"s Ice-
lUre notes are from three classes: ·"Begrill...<;chrift {" (1910-11) (with two
appeudices), "Begriffssebrifl II" (1913), and "Logik in der Mathematik"
(1914). In OUr own introductory essay we provide additional information about

xiii

.
 xiv Frege's Lectures on Logic
Frege's
.' workb as a lecturer' qu 0 t'109 extensIVely
. not only from Carnap's later rcc-
oIIeriod'
ecUons, ut also . from tho se 0 f ot h er students of Frege's during the same
P , we summanze and analyze th fC '
special focus on t h e ' e cont~nt 0 arnap s lecture notes, with
we discuss the infl preCIShe nlature of the lOgIcal system contained in them; and
uence t e ectures had on C II'
history oflogic more generally. arnap, as we as theu place in the
A large part ofthc credit for makin C '
available in the present' . d g arnap s notes from Frege's lectures
lorm IS ue to Gottf . d G b . I .
When they prepared the German ve' ne a ne .and hIS co-workers. Introduction: Frege's Lectures on Begriffsschrift
especially of two kind' . rSlon they faced consIderable difficulties,
5. typesettmg Frege's u al <Ii .
and transcribing Carnap' . d nusu, two- menslOnal notation;
~ 5 annquate sho th d .
aspects. see Gabriel's imrod . ) 'tV7 r an notanon (for more on both Gottfried Gabriel
r ucnon . we are much bI' d Pr
lor allowing us to make use of th I . 0 1ge to ofessor Gabriel
.h e resu ts of hIS effo t . I <Ii . .
W)t electronic versions ofth ryp r s, me u ng provIding us
'h' . e eset texts. We are al fut· .
lor IS editorial assistance to G R ' so grate to Richard Rles
. ' eorge eisch for hi h i '
[fOnw files, to Myra Awodey £ h s e p prepanng the elec-
Call1!;, for his help with the tor PI o.tographs o.f Carnap's notes, and to Andre
'l'l' rans aUons and hIS h' . In the present volume, three lecture series ofFrege's are published in English
,w IJroJeet was SUpported financiall h NEH ent USIaS:lC support overall.
KZ-20n'i-OI. y Y CollaboratIve Research Grant for the first time: two on "Concept Script [Begriffsschrift]" from the winter
semester 1910/11 and the summer semester 1913 and one on '''Logic in
Mathematics" from the summer semester 1914. The hasis of the present edi-
tion arc lectnre notes takcn hy Rudolf Carnap when he was a student in Jena.
The originals are in Car nap's papers in the Archive of Scientific Philosophy at
the Hillman Library, University of Pittshnrgh.' The German originals of the
two lecture series on BegrijjsJ'chriftwere published in the journal Ifistoryand
Philosophy of Logic in 1996, edited by myself with the assistance of
Christopher von BUlow and Brihritte Uhlemann. 2 The lecture series on '''Logic
in Mathematics" has never been pnhlislwd. and appears here for the first time
in any I:mguage. It follows Fn.·ge's own nott~S for this course (Jllite closely, as
published under the same titk in his PostlwmOlls Writings (Frcge 19H3. pp.
219-70~ Frege 1979, pp. 203-50k\ Its puhlit~atiol1 thus has a plHticular docu-
mentary value in connection with ongoing investigations abont Frcge's influ-

,
ence on Carnap, In preparing the German original of this text, Christopher

1. The signatures at the Archive of Scientific Philosophy (ASP) are ASP/RC 111-10-01.
ASP/RC 111-10-02, and ASP/RC 111-1(}.()3 respectively. The present publication, like that
of the German originals. is by permission ofthe ASP, which reserves all rights. Apart from
Carnap's notes there also exist some notes about the lecture course "Begriffsschrift I" by
Carnap's friend Wilhelm Flitner (see the introduction by Reck andAwodeyhelow).
2. Additional details on the text of the German original and its transcription from
Carnap's shorthand. as wdl as other editorial matters. are to bj~ found in the original
place ofpuhlication of the first. rwo lecture cuur:<;cs in German (Fr~ge 1996). The pTf'S~nt
introduction omits som(~ editorial details, but is otherwis~ a slightly amended and aug·
mented translation of my introduction to that puhli(~ation Iibid., pp. -iii-xvi).
3. Note that the translations from Frege's writings here do not always follow the published
English translations for which page references are given.
 2
Gottfried Gabriel Introduction: Frege's Lectures on Begriffsschrift: J
von BUlow and Brimtte Uhl ' "
0-
Kicnz1er also took part. emann were onCe agam of aSsIstance and Wolfgang course was not always held, however. The only inlcrruption occurred in the
•
winter semester 1902/03, following Russell'5 communication of the antinomy. I,
'U i"
The lecture Courses on B ebrl;/JJschTlif'tare 0 f special
' value because they
d acument Frege's pr - f£ This might have represented Fregc's desire to give himself a break while he
antinomy A t f esenhtatton 0 ormallogic after Russell's discovery ot'the assessed his logicist program. The continuation series, "'Bcgriffsschrift II," was
Fre '
. par rOm t esc lectures 0 r
.
ly 'd '
' U on evI coee on thIS consists of only offered once, in the summer semester of 1913, i.e. the time Carnap heard
ma17:~ ~:arks. ~thout any direct clues ahout the construction of the for- it. From the summer semester of 1913 Frege offered '''BegriffsschrifC' every
cal con~ePt:.S;~;ol~~r:he for ~helc~ncept 0.£ number and of other mathcmati- semester to the end of his teaching career (summer semester 1918). It was some-
least hints for the int at, t . e e~tures. gtve supplementary insights, or at times canceled due to illness, however. Although Frege was on leave. according
principle ~f composi~i:;::l~atl~i:~hclasslcal themes in th~ study of Frege: the to the lecture list. in the summer semester of 1914, Carnap went to his lecture
teoees to the whole sentenc; . e Context of the relanon of parts of sen- "'Logic in Mathematics" in this semcster. 7
(p. 87).4 concepts (and ) applied at the.lev el of sense but not of reference The construction of the logical system in the two lecture courses on
• not concept-extensIOn) h '
expressions (p 74)' th '. _ s as t e reierence of concept ""BegrifIsschrifC corresponds to that in the Basic Laws of Arithmetic (Frege
. , e omISSIon of any dis . f' di
the reference of expressions of the form HthCeUSSlOn 0 lll" rect sense (p. ~4); 1893/1903). Thc rules of inference introduced agree right down to the notation
evaluation will be left to furth' "eoneept F (p, 66), A detalled employed (cf. Basic Laws I, §§ 14ff. and the ovcrviewin §48),ln the Basic Laws
IlaS heen taken by Reck and A er lllvestIgauons (A fi '"
d' .' lfst step 10 thIS dIrection Frege introduced additional inference rules beyond modusponens, used in the
· . wo ey In then HF ' L '
Bcg~ff~8chrift, so as to shorten the proofs (d. the explanation in Bar;ic Laws I.
t h I'U Intlut·n(·c ") In the f II . rege s ectures on Lomc and
, " , 0 owmg, the 10m I d h ' O'
hf' In tht' fi:m:ground. o-ca an mat emaucal aspect will § 14). Also taken over from the Basic Laws, in the lecture course, is the corre-
, 'I'ht·!t'ctUrt'S llrt~ also ofinterest because th d sponding reduction in the number of basic laws. The individual basic laws and
I,rt'g'l"!'> illl'a!'> WI'ft' I.lhsnrlH'd hy on" f th . ey .emonstrate how thoroughly the ""theorems directly following from them" (cf. the table in Basic Laws 1,
'I _ " 0 e pre-emment -
p III o!'>ophy of scinH'I' This t 'III representattves of ule Appendix I) arc even given the same "'code numbers [Ahzeichen)" (d. Basic
• ., 00. WI )e touched 0 h Th
WlTl' !'>Il ckc'i.'iiv(' for the eurly Carnap-th' . n ere. e lena years that Laws I, §§ 14 and 18) in "BegrifI<sehrift II" by which thcy are then adduced in
('OIHt'xt or III'o-K a ntianisJtI L b . h" e ten~l()ll bernreen lOgic and life in the proofs. Of special importanec is the fact that Frege completely omits the valu(.,'-
, :; '. . , (' f'nsp lto,mphle. and the C
1II11l{ -wIll of eour.'il' only hI' I'ull ' I d yerman youth move- range function as well as, accordingly, the description function. Basic laws V
h' - . . y reVl'a e to us whe C' '"
t Is pt:'flOd and other doeu1llents h' I ' n arnap s diancs from and VI are thus eliminated. In fact only basic laws I-Ill appear in the lectures.
,I I . ave leen I)roperly , 'd ' There is no obvious reason why basic law IV should have been left out. It is used
a rear y eVldellt thm onel' aga,',) th'" scrutInize . But It is
1 '1 -- e eOlltlnental" f'
p 11 osopher art' coming to light. roots 0 an "analytie" ill Rasic Laws "'to prove the equality of truth-values" as e.g. in the case oflaw
(IVb) of double negation (Basic Laws I. §51). Basic law IV makes particular use
of equality as a relation b<-,tween truth~values as o,?/ect.r. But .~ince truth-values
an' treated throughout the leetures as object~ and admitted as arguments of the
identity relation (Pl'. 7:i. 87. and 96). the omission of basic law IV could well be
I. The Lectures On "Be r'lf '" ' a merely organizational matter. Otherwise it would have to be suspected that
Development of Frege~ ~~sChnftd hJn the, Context of the Frege was already heginning to have douhts about lhe objectification of truth-
glc an IS Philosophy of Mathematics values at this date. (This line ofthought is pursued by Reck and Awodey in their
In the44ye ' ""Frege's Lectures on Logic and their Influence.") There is evidence ofachange
ars, 10 toral. of his tcachin ..
semester 1874 to summer jg career at the University of lena (summer
h semester 918) F
OUr (per week) lecture course 'th h '. re~e rcg~_Ilarly announced a onc- 6. This was in a letter to Frege of 16 June 1902 (Frege 1976, pp. 211£.; Frege 1980. pp.
~eme.';~~~ from that of 1883/84 ~. t e n.de Begnffsschrift" every winter
BOL). Frege's suggestion for a way out in the afterword to Basic Laws II is dated
"'October 1902," 'TIlis volume appeared before the end of 1902~ on 28 December 1902
.Begnlfsscnrift" in the wintf' . dore thiS, Frege had already lechlred on Frege wrote Russell. ""You will have received the second volume of my Basic Laws" (Frege
!J("ni 1'1 . r semester 1879/80 - . 1976, p. 237; Frege 1980, p. 154) .
• on 0 lIs Rf'griffssc!Jniji (Freg' 1°791 .10 conjunction with the pub- 7. Tht~s('; data were gleaned from Krei..,er (2001), pp. 280-84. In Scholz's Indl~x to the sci-
t () . DUl'tolak f '.
4 'l'f . ," C () partIcipants the entific Nachlass of Goulob Frege there are, among otht~r indieation~ ahout th~ d(';velop-
. h' JU,;tlflcation for th" . rnent of the "'Lecture on Begriffssehrift," outlines from the Yl~ar IlJ07. Cf. Vemart ( IlJ76),
1'o.,t!lUflWII.,· flrilillg.1 (Fr l~~ l~ dlSt:usscd in "Notes for L d .
.r;. This nHllhina"·,, fefge ~. p. 275; Frege 1979 p 255) U Wig Darmstaedter" in
p- 95. Also mentioned there is the "proof that then~ is no mhre than one limit to 11 func¥
'h"! no actors! C , ". lion whose argument increases to positive infinity'" in ""Begriffsschrifl II" (p. lOJff.l.
.... l~' ht't"ll thl:' sub 'ect f. . n arnap s early develo me . .
J. U <I separate paper (GahrieI200~). ,nl In hts lena years has rnean- The date briven there - 5 July 1913 - would make it appear that thiS proof was workedout
specifically tor the lecture course "Begriffsschrift II."

4
4 Gottfried Gabriel Introduction: Frege's Lectures on Begriffsschrift 5

of view along these lines in the last published writings. Thus in defining the Novemher 1918; Frege 1976, p, 45; Frege 1980, p, 30). What parts ofthe formal
conditions under which two thoughts have the "same truth-value," the cate- logic, lhe Begriff.~schrift, count toward this "'harvest"? The substantive IObric is
gory of object is not applied to truth-values. It is especially noteworthy that devoled to the philosophical analysis of the "basic" logical categories, Thus
Frege's formulation at this point (on the basis of his new theory of compound another of the posthumous writings on suhstantive logic (from the ~ear. 19~5)
thoughts) corresponds to basic law IV: ·'1 now want to say that two thoughts bears the characteristic title ""My basic logical Insights." Frege begms II WIth
have the same truth-value if they arc either both true or both false. I maintain the words, "The following may be useful to some as a key to the understanding
therefore. that the thought expressed hy "A' has the same truth-value as that of my results," but oue should not conclude from this that there are no .... results"
expressed by "8' if either 'A and B' or else '(not-A) and (not-8)' expresses a true in the realm of formal logic. I think we can rightly claim that the text.
thought." (Frege 1923, p. 51; Frege 1984, p, 406), Frege thus carries out in the "Begriffsschrift I," supplemented by certain parts of "BegriffsschriftU;' rep-
lectures what he emphasized to P.E.B. Jourdain regarding Russell's antinomy resents an inventory of what Frege regarded, after the faIlure of the 10gtCIst pro-
a~d the resulting «diffic~~": "In my fashion of regarding concepts as func- gram, as the result of his work in the field of formal logic. This is in accordance
tIOns, we c~n treat the prInCIpal parts of Logic without speaking of classes, as I with his statement that his logic is "'in the main" independent of the problems
have done 10 my Begriffsschrift, and that difficulty does not then come into con. in set theory (Frege 1983, p, 191; Frege 1979, p. 176), since for him, as he
sideration" (Frege 1976, p. 121; Frege 1980, p, 191), already puts it in '''What may I regard as the Result. of my Work?;' "'the exten-
. T~IS 15 nm,the only respect in whi~h the late FTege occasionally appears to sion of a concept or class is not the primary thing for me." .
reconsuler th~ advantages of the Begrifftschriftover the B~ic Laws. Thus in a This conjecture is also confirmed by Frege '05 form of presentatIon. In con-
lett,:r to H, Dmgler of 4 July 1917 (Frege 1976, p. 41; Frege 1980, p, 28), he tra'it to the otherwise highly reflective style of Frege's considerations about
Im~lt'r!" ttw ~t>!!,ri.!j~'schrift presentation of the concept of following in a Russell's paradox, culminating in self-criticism for the careless acce~t~nce of
!"t·(I~h·n~·t'. W~1('h (lispt~nses with value~ranges, to that in the Basic Law.,>. At the concept-extensions (dasses), 10 the presentation in the posthumous wrltIngs on
~Jt'l!lnnln/!01," Ht'I:~rirrsschrift In he even returns to his earlier terminolo call- substantive logic is characterized by what one might call a "dogmatic" pr~ce­
. tht· "hOrizontal"
Inl! . th~ "eontent
. strok.e". In substance , thoug, gy,
h t h e concep- dure. This i!:i even more thc case in these lectures, which avoid any themattza-
tum
f or
. fht' Ha,w'
,~ {.o1Os dommates' , the horizontal,'s und t d
eIS 00 as a specla . I tion or critique of past errors - the antinomy is not mentioned - and instead are
"t11ll'tlOl1 of IIrst level, whosc value for the argument "th e ue IS t e true an d
IT '" h concerned to exhibit wbat can be regarded as unquestionably !:iccure. l1 It seems
lor a~l, othN ohJects as arguments the false (d. ""Begriffsschrift I," . 73). that Frege even expressed this attitude in his lccturing style. He trumped the
I he coot.en: of "B~gri~,fsschriftI" corresponds to what Frege~isted under user-unfriendliness ofthe traditional style of dogmatic exposition at the lectern
the characteristIc headIng What may 1 regard as the Result of m Work? n as hy actually turning his back on his students. Car nap describes the lecture
F Y
farhackasl9061
, . . regc1983 " p,200'Frege1979 , p. . Noneth e \ess there
184) " ,IS course "'Begriffsschrift [" as follows:
a notlceable dIfference between "Begriffsscbrift I" and th f h'
mous writi ,( "I d . ose 0 IS posthu- He [Fn~gcl seldom looked at the audience. Ordlnarily we saw only his
ngs ntro ucllon to Logic" and "A brief Sluvey f \' I
D ''') . h' 0 my ogle a hack. while he drew the strange diagrams of his symhohsm on the
woctnnes 10 ~ .l c h Frcge goes about actually spelling Out the "results" of his
o~k. These wrltI~gs belong not to formal logic but to /informal) su h!:itantivf> hlackboard and explained them. Never did a student ask a question or
10gIe (what would 10 German be called "inhaltliche L('gt'k"j" A full t ( " make a remark, whether during the lecture or afterwards. The possi-
hi' ' . r~a mellt 0
bility of a discussion seemed to be out of the question. (CaTnap 1963,
~ e at~er ~ Interrupted by his death - Frege embarked on only with the I ulrical
Inz'estlgatlOns ("'Thought· " .... N . "'" ~ . . I'J p,5)
. . , . s. eganon, Compound Thoughts"). Their
philosophical
.- . onentatIon
.... toward a transcendfntal
. PI, t ' h
a omsm rever erates In ' an We can only speculate whether Frege would have embarked on a ne~ exposition
ap bOrisUe remark III Begnffsschrl'f't I"·. '"Lomc . IS
, not on Iy trans ' of the formal part of his logic once he had completed the substantIve part. But
even trans-human." g o· -aIlan, b ut
if he had done this, we can now say how it would have looked. It would have con-
.. Freg~ glo!'sed his elaboration of his substantive logic later with th d tained the following fragIOent of the Basic Laws: 11) the basic laws 1-1II (and
I arn trYlOg [(l hrinrr in tht' harvest of my J'f' " (I II' e wor s, perhaps IV); (2) all tbc inference rules witb the exception of those that drop out
t" • Ie etter to ". Dmgler of 17
" .. This distin('tioll is hPrf' to Iw undf''-s(oo~ I ' h 10, Apart from the rele.... ant po~thum()llswritings after 1906, se~ especially the letter to R.
,.
IIl'of' 0 II Ilrrnalism. Fr~lJ"t'·s f I I,.' ..h.on y In t. f'- sense
.. th'a t "ClormaI" l ' k
OITlC ma es
. •• " '=' . IIrma ogw-t e "Beonff h 't'" . '='- Honigswald of26 April to4 Mny 1925. ,
tuI or"sllh.~tantivf' .. lo.,.;cl'· .(., '=' sse fl t -IS of course a "content-
r:>- .f'. I IS Interpreted not (' 11. Carnap confirms this in his autobiography; "I do not rememher, that he I F~egf'l cve,r
(·tT',u.al cOlltt:'nt" (sefHit' and re-fert'nce) ofth~ . ' . a ~ere ormal calculus), as a "con-
II. nus remark is also of interest in th . t · slgnfFs Is a~sum~~ throughout. discussed in his lectures the problem of this antinomy and the questlon of pOSSIble mudi-
e con ext 0 rege s pohtlcal diary (Frege 1994). fications of his system in order to eliminate it" (Carnap 1963, pp, 4f.).
 6
Gotdried Gabriel Introduction: Frege's Lectures on Begriffsschrift 7
because of the elimin.t'lOTIO f vaIue-ranges (specIfIcally
' , t' BG;lC
rul e II,,c, " La
I §48) d(3) II ' WI 199~, pp, 137-39), He also does not seem to have regarded the question
,, ; an a the laws derived from basic laws I-lll ( d h IV) b
usmg these rules. an per aps y whether geometry is included or not as Olle of any importance. it may thus have
seemed natural 14 tor him to project both these views onto his teacher as well.
cept Consid~ring thde fact that Frege systematically avoids any mention of con- In any case Carnap later repeated the claim that Frege never gave up his
-extenslOns an value-range i h' I ' ,
anal f' 5 n 15 ectures, It IS astonishing that in the logicism, even when he was specifically asked about this. I;; Meanwhile this
ogous case 0 expressIons of the form "'the conce t F" h '
in t ti h P e seems to persIst claim has heen refuted by the publication of the Posthumous Writings. But
un;~~' ng t ese as n~mes (""Begriffsschrift I," p. 66). Thus he regards "'falls Carnap's Obstinacy is easier to understand when we look at the lectures trans-
as an expressIon of a first 1 1 1a' .
whose value ('or ob)'e t - ev~ Ie t1on~ I.e. as a two-place function lated here. Apparently Frege's silence ahout the antinomy, in the lectures, led
.' C 5 as arguments) IS al hal'
backwards from the insi ht . ,,~ays a trut -v' ,ue. TIus seems a step Carnap to the premature conclusion that it presented no problem for him. 16 In
g
language is heregw'lty f " appare~t, m Ube, Schoenflies" from 1906, that fact, though, Frege had already quietly drawn the consequences and eliminated
o a counteneit" by", . . . . b'
IFregeI98~,p,I92;Fre 1979 I 12 commg ano ]ectfromaconccpt value-ranges. On the other hand, the lectures confirm a conjecture that was
cis-ion o£linguistic expregessl' ,,' Pak' 7!). Frege emphaSIzes that this "impre- already suggested hy some passages in the Posthumous Writings -that Frege did
. on m es It appear "th h i ' , indeed withdraw value-ranges, but continued to regard attributions of number
Uon is a third e l e m e n t . at t e re aUon of subsump-
1983, p, 193, Frege I;~~er~e~;:nt;pon the object and the concept" (Frege as statements about concepts. And this deserves our attention, particularly with
del~eptive way of talking wh' p h )h', ut Frege himself gives credence to this respect [Q the newly awakened interest in f'rege's philosophy of mathematics
I ,Ingu1sucully
.,
in categorl'al di
en e t mks he ea e .
n xpress somethmg uscd meta- (as manifested, e.g., in the recent writings of C. Wright, M. Dummett, G.
'. seourse. such as "th la' ,
ulldl~r t he (~onccpt F" in th h' ere tlOn of an object a falling Boolos, and R,C, Heck),
, , eo lect language f' I I '
nbjl'ct (I and thl~ 1)~el1d()-oh)' .. h as a lfSt- eve relation between the At the end of "Begriffsschrift I" Frege returns, in the section "numerical
> . eet t e coneeptp"
Wh~t ('an Wt~ say On the hasis of the 1 t . , statements about a concept," to an analysis he had tentatively put forward but
('OI1('('ptHlIl of the relatio b tw I e~ ures published here about Frege's then rejected as a definition of cardinal numhers in Foundations ofArithmetic
Ill'tWI'I'n logie and arithmet"n , C e een ogle and h .
, mat emaucs. paTticuIarlvJ (Frege 1884, §§55ff,) - representing attributions of number of the form "the
. c. arnap s statement th F
(,'I~t program even after Rus 'ell' d' at rege retained thc 10lTi- number II uelongs to the conceptF" as second level concepts. Carnap seems on
k . . s s Iscovery of th . b~
S epucal sluprise fn,m the start Car a d f' . e antmomy was greeted with the uasis ofthe lecture to have taken this conception as the core of Frege's logi-
h i ' . n p e lllItely " ,
t f' el'turc course "Begriffssehrl'ft I" h mamtams. WIth relation to cism (Carnap 1930a, p. 21). He even takes over this idea himself in his presen-
.. ' d' , t at at the e d f h
In Icatedthatthenewlomc towh' hh h d' n o t e semester Frege tation of lObricism. and repeats it even as late as 1964 in evident agreement
. t\'. , Ie e a Introd d
nmstructlOIl of the whole of mathem' f "(C uce us, could serve for the (Carnap lYY3, pp, 1~7f.),
re'll, ,I ' h a ICs aroap 196~ 5) B ' Fr~ge's original ohjection to the analysis from the Foundations of
a ) (. allne~ e could construct the wholp. of m . , p. : u.t If Frege
geometrY-Wlth the help oflol71c th' Id I athemancs_l.e. mcludiTw Arithmf'lti.: picked up again here amounts, as is well known, to the fact that the
, M t\'-' IS cou on y m ' h "
In athematics" (p. 135), that in arithme '. can, In t e sense of"Logk
arc logical. 1:\ This says nothing yet aboutt~~andgeometrythe methodsofproot' 14, Especially given his unreliahle nH~rnory; in the uriginal. unpublished version of
Car nap's "lntellt~ctu81Autobiography." ht> notes that this was a reason for giving up stud-
this is a mat[er ofthe nature ofth ' e nature of the two disciplines ll~
. e (Uwms Carna 1m F ' , , ies in less systemntie s6ences: "I would soon give up studies in these other fields, partly
109 about this as he sub I ... p ew rege s way of think- because of II love of systematization, connection, and general explanations, and also
, "sequent y ",te d d h 1
Mathematics" himself' wh F .n e t e eeture course "'Lome in because of the fact that my memory is quite unusually bad. (Once a psychologist told me
, ere rege exph·tl 'h ty that I should take this fact as a blessing in disguise, because a too great familiarity with
on the represemability of mathe.n t: I' del y'. ng t at the outset, casts doubt old ways of thinking is for many an obstacle to finding new ways, andmy sometimes total
I ,. . a lca 10 uenon th ,,,. f
, HI purely lomcal terms "Ber
.~' ' . nou II"1 In d et ' "' . e In erence from n to n + forgetting of old ways might free me from this obstacle.)" I am grateful to A.W. Cl!TUS for
('a I law. Wi[h that, Frege had fri u IOn IS t.reated here as a nonlo m- providing this quotation. The manuscript is in the Carnap Papers (Manuscript
"
gr,lIll.
1n matht'maticc ar'th~-venupacoreeomp '
fh'
onent 0 IS own IOJncist
,"-
pro-
Collection 1029) at the Special Collections Department of the Young Research Library.
, _ ' ". I mt"tl(.' as well ' 0· University of California at Los Angeles.
Insofar as inlt'rt'llCt>S OlTur in h th C· as geometry, there is logic only 15. ASPIRC 086-13-05 (letter to'T.W. Bynum of 4 April 19671. quoted by C. Parsons (1976.
Russdl',!oi til rnl of log!i('i~1Il Ii, 0,,, ~rnap. on the other hand, adopted p. 274. note 27). See also Bynum (1976, p. 284).
'AT' , . ' .l. (lilt t lat Included . . 1&. This is thp vit>wtakt>n by T.W. Bynum (1972, p. 48), relying on Carnap, wbowrites, "k,
Illll~!i (to.g. Carnal) 1(22) and .' . , geometry) from his earliest late Hs 191;l-14 he was presenting lind defenlling bis hlgistic [!'oie! programml' in OHlrSt~!,i
mamtalllcd It to h's }, at Jerm University, '" Also on p. SO, "Tht~re is it widespread myth that Russell's Paradox had
I:.! S .\.. .. I ast years (e.g. Carnap
•• ~~ ,} ,",0 Introdl!{'tion to L . " left him a disappointed and broken man~ hut actually, at least until lC)14, he helieved his
n, S"t" also Frt>ge's 0 ogtc, Frt"gc 1983, p. 210' Fre!e 19
logistic programme had ht*"n carried out successfully," This interpretation was already
PI ),20'lt') . wn notes for this lecture Co IF' g 79, p. 193.
. . . . urse rege 1983 21 f questioned by Parsons (1976. pp. 274f.). The present puhlication eS6entially cc)rrohorates
,pp. 9.~ Frege 1979,
Parsons's conjectures.
 8 Gottfried Gabriel
numbers understood this way can't be regarded as independent objects. For this
reason Frege finally ends up introducing the cardinal numbers as concept-
extensions and thus as logical objects (Foundations, §68). Once this ronte was
m~de impassible by the antinomy, the question remained uppermost in his
~lOd wheth~r the numbers could he understood as objects at all. Fregc puts his
hnger on thIS problem most precisely in the "Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter":
Since a statement of number based on counting contains an assertion
about a concept, in a logically perfect language a sentence used to
make such a statement must contain two parts, first a sign for the
concept about which the statement is made, and secondly a sign for a
second level concepl. These second level concepts form a series and
t~ere is a rule in a~cordance wilh which, if one of these concepts is
gIVen, we can speCIfy the next. But still we do not have in them the
numhers of arithmetic; we do not have ohjects, but concepts. How
tan we get from these concepts [0 the numbers of arithmetic iu a way
that tan not be faulted? Or are there no numbers whatever in arith-
lUetic? Could it he that the numerals are dependent parts of signs for
th"s" s""und I"vel concepts? (Frege 1983. p. 277; Frege 1979 pp.
25h[)D • with, can lead to the following contrary positions:
Th~ idea of introducing numhers as ohjects corresponding, as it were, to con-
,
(:(:~ltS of s~~ond level i~ one t~at is, revived in a different form by Frege, despite
hl~ skept~clsm about it at thIS POint (1919), in his very late attempt to justif
anthmeuc on the basis of the ....geometrical source of knowledg "H
h' b . . . c. ere c
h~
repeats ,.IS, aSlc VIew; ....A statement of number contains a.n assertion about a
('o~e~pt (fre~~ lQ8:~, p: 2QB; Frege ~Q79, p. 278), He points out, furthermore,
~l~~t3a nU~lh~r appears In mathemaut·s as an ohjett, e.g. the numlwr :r' ~Freg('
. ' p. 90,. Frege 1979, p. 271). And he concedes that it "seems" tharth(' IU IT _
Ical source of knowled " ' . .
r
I:'
ge on Its own (:annot yield us any ohjeers" (Fregv 19B:~
299; Frege 1979, p. 279). What emerges from this is that ahhough }H~ 11<;
~nErr attempts to re~a.rd the numbers as logical objects. ht: still regards them
as 0h~ect~·. ~ ~h~ empIrIcal source of knowledge is explicitlyelimiuated, "since
n~~ lOgl; mIte III the full sense of the word can now from this source" only the
~i~~~~~in~ege~:ltriea1.SOurce of knOWledge remain, i.e. those of ~ure inru~
· . b Pro ~ on Its own the logical source of knOWledge cannot vie1d
nUIll b t'rs en er we wIll appeal t t h · J.
Even thou h ' .0 e geornetncal source ofknowledge" (ibid.).
~ l'(' . g these new re~ecnons are couched in an attitude of 0 Pen-ended
~ u,la~.on. as we can see from expressions like ....attempt" "seems .,", roba~
i ...
) y. It 1.'; dear that the main preoccupation is still the qu'estion ho~· t:e idea
17. Cf. nlso tIll:' lndt~x to the scientific N hI
A(~('ordi~g to it: a lost docu;"'ent in the ~~Ch~:s of Gott1~~ Frege (V?,raart 1976, p. lOl).
tamed diSCUSSion of "second 1. I ss (dated after 1918 by H Scholz) con-
IAnzahlen]:' As Scholz uses qu:::ti~~~~~:that corn'~pond to the car~nal numbers
own. • 'W€ must VIew these expressIOns as Frege's
Introduction: Frege's Lectures on Begriffsschrift 9
that a statement of numher contains an assertion about a concept can he made
compatible with the idea t.hat numbers arc ohjects. Frege's answer is that we
must overcome the "kindergarten-numbers [Kleinkinder-Zahlenl," which
derive from what is countahle and thus, as we would now say, from concept for-
mation on the pattern of sortals. This understanding of numbers was funda~
mental for Frege from the time of the Foundations (§54): "Only a concept that
precisely delimits what falls under it and permits no arhitrary subdivision can he
a unit with respect to a finite numher." This point of departure is now ahan-
doned, ali "no hridge" leads from the "'kindergarten-numbers" to the other
kinds of numher: "1 myself at one time held it to be possible to conquer lhe
entire number domain, continuing along a purely logical path from the kinder-
garten-numhers~1 have seen the mistake in this" (Frege 1983, p. 296; Frege
1979, p. 276).
For this reason Frege now takes the opposite route and, starting from the
complex numbers, tries to get to the other nnmbers by specification. An
appraisal of this new approach, especially an analysis of its deeper motivations
in the face ot'the alternatives, has never been undcrtaken.
The denial of the propOSition that numhers are logical ohjects, to begin
(1) Numbers are not logual objects, but objects of another kind;
(2) Numbers can be ohtained 10gicaBy, but nOl as logical o!?jeets;
(3) Numhers can neither he obtained logically, nor are they objects.
The third position, which seems to have been Wittgenstein'5, Frcge never held.
In his last writings he takes the first position. What ahout the second position?
We know from Frege himselfthat even before the discovery ofthe antinomy he
harhored "slight doubts" about the introduction of (~oncept-extension,<;(Frege
lQ76, p. 87~ Frege 1980, p. 55). Even after the puhlication ofthe Foundations
oj Arillllneti(' he considered the possibility of a logical constructioIl of arith-
meti(: without conn~pl-t~Ktensi()ns.ll\Understandably he returned to this strat-
eb'1' after the discovery of the antinomy. The direction he took at lhis point
agrees with that indicated in "Begriffsschrift 1" and the "Notes for Ludwig
Darmstaedter" in that both refrain from introducing cardinal numbers as inde-
pendent objects. In "'Begriffsschrift 1" Frege Teplaces his definition from Basic
Laws by a value·range-free presentation, without even mentioning his failed
attempt (assuming that Carnap's notcs cover all the essentials). Thus Frege
seems to have been considering a construction of arithmetic at this point in
which arrrihutions of number are expressed hy means of second-level concepts,
avoiding concept-extensions. The result would have been a logicism without
W, Cf. the ahstract for the Nachlass item N 47 in t.he Ind.-x to the scil'ntifi(: Nachhl5s
(Veraart 1976, p. 95). The deei.'iion in favor of concept-(~xtensionsWilS taken with Frege's
introduction of value ranges, 1889 at latest. Cf. in the abstract for item N 90 (ibid., PI"
10M.) the considerations on "A short I'!xposition of thl'! Begriffs.,;chrift at its current ( 10
November 1889) standpoint."
 II
Introduction: Frege's lectures on Begriffsschrift
10 Gottfried Gabriel
ture courses "Analytical Mechanics [" (winter semester 1912/13) and
vllhw-.rall~t~5, if we follow Fregc in assuming the reduction of the concept of "Analytical Mechanics II" (summer semester 1913),2'1
('(){~rdtnutlon to that of relation to be unproblematic. which would guarantee the Carnap did not just go to the lectures, hut studied Frege's writings as well.
lo~Y)cal character ofthc c~ncept of coordination (Basic Laws I, §§38 and 66). In Carnap's papers there is a shorthand draft of a playful communication of20
The .reaso~ Frege dId not pursue this strategy further would seem to be March 1913 from Carnap to Kurt Frankenhcrger. annotated with the remark.
that he dId not. In the end see any way of getting by without the conception of "To Frankenberger, when he showed up neither at Kanter's nor at my place (for
numbc~s as obJcc:s. Thu~ despite the use of quantifiers in '~BegriffsschriftI" working on Frege ), and I was about to leave for tvvo months." 25 The note is writ-
he persists t?e~,c 10 t~eaung the numbers as arguments of first-level functions ten in Frege's logical symbolism~ in its form it asks for the conclusion from one
I~. 851. and 10 Begnffsschrift II" (p. 124) they arc explicitly said to belong to definition and two premises that, translated into ordinary languag~, amount to:
t. e ca~cgory of obJ:cts: "Numbers are, after all, objects." 19 Frege's tergiversa-
The definition is a stipulation that a certain sign means presence ofa
~,I~~S ~n th~s questIon are well encapsulated in a story told by Wittgenstein:
person A atplace b at time z.
h
~ ast tIme I saw Frege, as we were waiting at the station for my train I said
to . 1m,t?''Don't
H yo u ever rIII d any di'fficulty
. . your theory that numbers
III ' are The first premise asserls: Places where RudolfCarnap is at time z are
o I)Jec
't"s e. r e PrIe,
"2U d '"'"5 omctlmes
. I seem to see a difficulty-but then again I neither places where Kurt Frankenberger is on 18 March at 10 a,m.,
f.I on se~ It. nor places where Kurt Fran.kenberger is on /9 March at 3 p.m.
The second premise asserts: AUp/aces where RudolfCarnap is dUT'
ing Ihe timefrom 21 March to 22 April are differentfrom jena.
The symbolic represcntation, which is not in accordance with Frcgc's rules,
II. Carnap as a Student of Frege lellves it to the addressee [0 draw the correct conclusion (indicated by a question
mark after Frege's judgment stroke), perhaps in the sense of a reminder to pay
':"h~lt Carnal' tells us ahout his reiatiollshi to Fre e i " . , 21 .
lllllltt'd mainly to a dl..~slTiption of Frege's l~ctur gWitn hl~ ~utoblOgraphy, IS
Car nap a visit before his imminent departure. Usc is made, in this note, of
Frege's way of representing lhe elementhood relation (cf. Basic Laws I, §34)
from a note in Camap's pap . h' 'h es. y thiS IS so we can gather
, ers In w Ie he responds [() b 'bl and thus of the value-range function. As the latter makes no appearance what-
lurthernmtacts with Frcge' ""I 0 n I l' d' J a query a out POSSI e
that year in Buchenbach n~ar F Yb lve ThIn ena umilJuly 1919; after August of ever in the lectures. Car nap must have acquainted himself with it by reading
. rei ueg. ere I wrote D R I Basic Laws afArithmetic on his own. 2h A more thorough study ofthe text, he
slOnally came back to Jena for a few da s. Wh di er aum. only occa-
shy~.
he was after all very wtthd
rawn.
YWh Y d I nm seek Frege out? I was [00
en I thawed 0 tit . h .
says. he undertook only after the First World War ICamap 1963, p. 6).
In Car nap's papers (ASPIRe 081-28-01) there are also shorthand notes on
Clfcle, it was too late ."22 IC arnap wou ld anyw h u [. a er III t e Vienna
even ifhe had tried as the laue h d d ay nm ave ound Frege in Jt~lla Frcge's two pllpers on "The Foundations of Geometry" (Frege 1903). which
Th '. r a move to Bad Kleinen in 1919 ) Carnap took down while he was working on his dissertation at the University of
e notes puhlIshed here were robabl h b . .
about the content ofthe lecture' l' h P
..
h~ t e aSls for what Carnap says
s n IS auto lOgraph l t d '
Jena.27 This book. contains many references to Fregean considerations and
at that later. time" Carnap annotated tl tern Wit . h dates y.headi"
n: u ylllg them 2"-1 Th
again
.
rence ot these notes has hee 1m f . .' ngs, etc.' e eXlS~ 24. That Carnap went to these lectures is confirmed by his diary, No notes have been
" .., n own 0 SIllCC the edito . fF '
denee mqUlred about the p . 'b'l' h . . rs 0 rege 5 correspon- found, to date. As these courses are not mentioned in the (published) autobiography, it is
. OS51 11ty t at Car nap m' h h' I .. to be assumed that whatever notes Carnap had ever had were no longer availablp. to him.
possession (d. FrcD"c 1976 16·1 A ' 19 t ave etters III hiS
~ , p. . ccordmg to a ha d ' l' Nothing has shown up 50 far in the Carnap papers in Pittsburgh (ASP) and Los Angeles.
courses attended durilw his stud' .. ' j ' , . n VoITltten 1St of lecture 25. Fritz Kanter was a student friend of Carnap's at Jena. It appears from other indica-
~
t h e t Ilrt't' ("ourses f()r which th
ItS In ena and Frelburg C'
.,. ' arnap too not only
k cion~ in this same note and from Carnap's diaries that he was in fact only away for a
t" nOlt: s are translated hert' , but also . Frege ' s Icc- month; the summer semester began on 21 April 1913.
26. This is especially plausihle given the timing of the note, i.e. at the.end ofth~ sem~ster
19. Cf. in thi.... l'olllu·l'tinn also ttw It'l
,~II!W. PI" lih-iHI.
t' , " hd()r'~ he re~umed with "Bpgriffss{~hrift II" after It tWO-Y"ar llltf'rrllptlOn since
I r to K. ZSlgmonrly l Frt-'ge 197flo, pp. 269-71' Frege "Begriff~~chriftI'"; the purJlo~('ofthf~ meeting I ""for working on Frl'g~") wa~ f~vid"lltlyto
:-0. Shll l tl'd from P.T. (~"ll.('h (l'Jhll. I. 12B. ' rt-'vit-'w tilt-' (~ontent... flf the previous courst" in preparlltion for thf~ f~orJtinuation; Tf·ft-'rfmce
21. Lllrnllp (lIltd.I'II. 4-h)'.\1 ,. tit.
I, thrt-'t'''artlcll'
I . , to Frege's publisht'd huoks would have been an obvious mea'Hln' un sueh !HI "celt~if)l1, (I
, rp {(l h t-' .ldt'nllt"'d
l
...
. n owmg .arnap's d~s . .
f II . (. t " " ' an t-'
s In
"8 e,,"ntrs~chrift
.. II " h
t e other tw"o
~n2,IAS'hpe/"R"(~in'd Riehar:~~:t1~~hS,as the ""friend" Kurt Frankenh'erger
0'" •
am grateful to A.W. Carus for pointing this out.) .
major of the army" 27. This dissertation, suhmitted in 1921. was puhlished unchanged the followmg year
. • H8R-flO_OI ,e m.
23. St'l:' below. s('{'tion '111. (Climap 1922).
 12
" . Gottfried Gabriel Introduction: Frege's lectures on Begriffsschrift 13
dIstInctIons, Later notes (from th 1 ,.
with some comments ofh' e year 943) on Sense and Reference," along 2) Two pages headed "'Numerical statements ahout concepts" (in
. book of IS own, aTC part of his w k " ' and NecessUl'.
,
I n thIS C or on ".J.eamng shorthand, underlined).
, course. arnap en d h :J
took the reference of co courage [e (erroneous) idea that Frege
3) Tbe one-page draft of a note to Knrt Frankenberger described
have found in his own no~ecer~ e.~~res~~~ns to ,be extensions (classes). He could
above.
cepts themselves aTC the r Sc c. egfrI sschnftI," p. 74)thatfor Frege the con·
h Clcrence 0 concept w d F F On the first page of this additional material Carnap notes (in shorthand)
tewell-known table th t h h . or s. or rege reproduces here
May 1891 (Frege 1976 a e ad already IOclud d ' I "Perhaps this belongs with part II [i,e, of 'Bcgriffsschrift']," The fact that the
96' F e 10 a etter to Hnsser! of 24
te nees In',..Indirect speech"
' p, I ,rege
. 1980 ",p 63) addi ng the co I umn on sen- content of pages 3 and 4 of this manuscript can be fit seamlessly after the notes
'
now I CIt empty, In partI' uI ' t IS noteworthy that th
h" e space Ior
' "mducct sense IS, on "Begriffsschrift 1" argues against CaTnap's guess, which apparently, given
c ar, t IS calls Into . C
§3 0) that Frege's theory f questIon arnap's objection (1956, the numbering, refers to the entire manuscript. The refutation of the ontologi-
h . 0 sense and reference ("
cal proof of the existence of God helongs into the same context, the disdnction
as It there) "leads to . fi . sense and nominatum" as he
an In mIte number of entities." , uetween first- and second-level concepts. That these items belong together is
reinforced by the very similar presentation in The Foundations ofArithmetic
(§§52f,), For these reasons itcms (1) and (2) above were placed at the end of
"'Begriffsschrift I" as Appendices A and B respectively. Item (3) is substantially
III, The Text
reproduced in this introduction (section 2 ahove).
If we could be sure Carnap was not mistaken in placing page 5 with the
The manuscripts translated b ' other parts, there would be an argument against our procedure. For the date of
I I' ere are wrltte . h
lu lItliully I1s~d hy Carnap Tb . n In t e Stolze-Schrey shorthand
IIlilt (l "" HegritI'ischrift II"' 53 emanuscnptof"B pagc 5 (20 March 1913) might then casl doubt on it, According lO Carnap, he
' . egrl'f"Jsschrift I" has 29 pages attended the lecture course '''Begriffsschrift I" in the winter semester 1910/11.
"I " pages (mcludingtw ' '
,II!,"]£, In Mathenlatics" ha 32 o gaps In the text), and that of
an' I s pages, The page 'th' all But a placement ofthese fragments in ''"Begriffsschrift II" would still be rather
' I1IHn )en.~d consecutiVely in th h d ., s W] In three manuscripts unlikely. as the summer semester of 1913, in which CaTnap wok this course,
shaky lines differ noticeably from the fan writIng of Carnap's old age whose
only began on 21 ApriL In any case, the fragments bear no obvious relation LO
The manuscriptof"B 'ff e urn hand of the notes '
writing) "R C egn sschrift I" bears the I b 1'(' t.he content of "Begriffsschrift II." Doubts about Carnap's guess arc further
. . .arnap. Univ. Jena. W.S. 1910- a e In ordinary hand- strengthened by the fact that page 5 is a loose sheet whose format is quite dif-
Apart from tbe word "B 'ff h' 11, FREGE BegrifIss h '/'t I"
(i I . egn ssc nft" these len , . ferent from that of the others.
nc ~lng Lhe "I") in Carnap's later hand were all SUbsequent additions In his lel.:turc notes Carnap frequently ignores Frege's painstaking distinc-
writin e ,"~anuscript ~f '''Begriffsschrift Ii .. bears th . . tion between ohject-Ianguage use and metalinguistie mention. In some cases he
, C g) Frege, Begnffsschrift II S -S 1913 R e lahel (m ordmary hand- uses colons in place of Iluotatioll marks; in many more, though. all indication is
In arnap's I t b . " " Carnap " Add '
. " aer and.arethewords"PartII[n- ,,' edto thIS tith-. omitted. We have only interpolated quotation marks in (:ases where it seemed to
manuscnpt contains minor comments etl.l~} . .Beyond that, the entire
hand; for specifics see the notes Th and clanfIcatlOns in Car nap 's lutf"f us indispcns<lble for the avoidance of misunderstanding; see the notes for
;bl Ydo n?t ~ntedate Carnap's st~d ~~·~rsa~e numbers and other addition~ prob-
details.
I;SOs) of h~s autobiography. Puuli~hed in 1~~; f~r .the c0'!lposition (in the mid-
The distinction. important to Frege, hetween the notation for actual proofs
(as transitions from premises recognized as true to a conclusion recognized as
. rer. as vanous nores and Ietters In '. hIS pa . t IS possIble that th ey are even
true) and the uotation for valid deductive schemata (by enclosing the latter in
s~oned by queries arising, in 1963 f ~ers su~ge~t they may have been oeca-
papers and letters ' rom t e pubheatIon ofFrcge' h single quotation marks; cf. Basic Laws I, §§14-17) is consistently omiued by
"B' . s post umous Carnap. In the Basic Laws this same means is employed lO distinguish the
egrlffsschrift I"
,. I
(l{' I.' that aho' 'I d was sllElpIen lente d"uy material f I ''"analysis'' of the ideas motivating the proofs from the synthetic "construction"
I' . In( II es the Ie-crure- J ...., '. rom t le manuscript fas- of the proofs themselves. This distinction is also omitted in the notes. We have
P
I {rIlt'nt consist" f' f'·
..., t) IVt' pag· lOtes
f
lor Lome
b"
In Math emaucs' "Tl '
1'1fI4l). and ('oBtains the I'(lll ~s, su lsequently numbered (in Ca·' , l~ls11P- made no attemptlo reconstruct these distinctions in the text prt:sented here.
OWlng: rnap sater Every effort has heen made to present the notes on the page in an order and
I) Two pagt's headed ""B 'f ' configuration that reflects the original notes, as this conveys important infor-
h ' egn fsschnft" d "
t e eXIstence of Goo" (in ordinar an !~e ontological proof of mation about the intended interrelation of the proofs. A,;; a rule Carnap put the
y handwTlung, underlined). main line ofargumenton the left side ofthe page and, across from it on the right
 14 Introduction: Frege's Lectures on Begriffsschrift 15
Gottfried Gabriel
side, the corresponding parenthetical remarks, substitutions, and variants. The original transcriptions, both in content and in their presentation. For the
substitutions indicated ~r~ not complete~ presumably Car nap only WTote down extremely lahor-intensivc task of establishing this corrected text, t.he assistance
t~e on~s that Freg: specIfIcally wrote on the board, and not those he only men- of Dr. Brigitte Uhlemann at the Philosophisches Archiv in the University of
tIOned In explanauon. Reconstructions of the steps omitted in Carnap's lecture Constance. whose knowledge of Carnap's shorthand is unsurpassed. was
not.es. where possible, are supplied in the editorial notes. The separation of the utterly indispensable. The original German text of Carnap's notcs was made
~atn argume~t fro,m t~e commentary, which in the notes is sometimes empha- intu a usable computer file by Christopher von BUlow, who abo helped in the
Sized by a vertIcal h~e. IS reproduced in the text here by leaving sufficient space reconstruction of formulas left incomplete by Carnap.
to mak~ the separation ObVIOUS. Insofar as these lines also serve the purpose of I am grateful to Richard Nollan and Gerald Heverly at the Archive for
h,racketmg or highlighting parallels or comparisons between formulas expres- Scientific Philosophy for their support, as well as to Professor Jiirgen
SIOns .' ,etc. , they appear a~ /"l,nes In t h e text. We also reproduce other ' graphic MittelstraB and Professor Cereon Wolters, who gave me access to the copies of
deVices, ~,g. arrows for pOinting to particular things mentioned. Where this was the Carnap papers at the Zentrum flir Philosophic und Wissenschaftstheorie at
not pos.sl~l~ fo~ tech~ical reas.ons or because the page would have become too the University ofConstanec, Professor Peter Schroeder-Heister participated in
me~sy,.lt 1.5 m?icated m the editorial notes. Horizontal lines in Carnap's manu- a first reading of the original transcriptions. Professor Friedrich Kamhartel
~cnpt.mdlcaungwhere a line of thought come to an end are represented here by also supported this work, as part of our collaboration in bringing out Frege's
IIlsertmg extra space between the texts so separated. posthumous papers. Finally I want to thank Professor Marco Ruffino for the
In the Stolze-Schrey shorthand ""not" is Wfl'tten" " As th b I very stimulating discussions that greatly benefited the final draft of this intro-
,I -. e same sym °
WI.U~ ~lS.(~ liS,"cd b,y Russ:1l a~ the negation sign, its application to schematic let~ duction, and Andre Carus for his help in translating it into English as well as
us. , IS u rcae y <jU8SI-logl
. c'al an d east'1y read able. The transcription undoes making valuable suggestions for the revision of the text for the English edition,
t Ilis so Wt' hHv(' ,.'st." 'I 't I ' , of a byphen ("not-A") F
, ," CI I 'y Inse'tlOn 'h' . If
"'llr('ss' II
, . {,Ii
't
liS eonl1e(~U()n )etween the negation and the
." regc11 Imscb
Plitt it r •• A" ( . h propOSItIOna etter y
'rl ·gl ,~llot wit out a hyphen) into parentheses (cf "Compound
IOUg Us . '

In editing and presenting the text we ado ted the .

m:Jterial.s are to be regard d " 1 . .p. standpolilt that these
ondaril 'C e prImarl y as an editIOn of a Frege text, and only sec-
or lect~:s a ~rnap. :ext. But we made no effort to alter their character as a set

, tcnt Oh . no~es •. wh1(,h °fne would not expect to be entirely uniform or consis~
. VIous mist'akes 0 Caruap'
as well as t h '
. 0
notes to the ori' Ie"
II
. s were genera y corrected without mention
er minor textual tnt r 1 f b'
~ p(~ a IOns. w ose rationale is ~rjven in the
either indicated~::he7:~:~~;:bhc~tlO~.All other e~loitorial interwntions arc'
within square brackets. mes or, III the case of Interpolations, l'llt'lost.d
.

Acknowledgment

, Tht' starting point or this edition were tran "

Nollan of the Archive of'S·
.
'Ions IWrt· arp has"I'

2R: F
t"<,

o .". a ('7{'rnl<lJl
.
.f'

It'xt th t d
.
. sCnptlOns ohhe lectures by Richard
Clentl Ie Phtlos h . P'
dWl'kt'd ~lT1d proofread alr'lins' til .. I 'hOP Y m Ittsburgh. These were
e ongHUl s orthand ' ,,'
'manuscnpt. The transla-
o a eparts quite SUbstantially from the

. r~ge ordinarily lIses capitol Gret"k. I tt ." 0 •

e ~rs lor prOpOSitions.

Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence

Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey

In Gottfried Gahriel's introduction to this book, essential background infor-

mation for Frege's lectures has he en provided and a philosophical discussion
of their content, significance, and influence initiated. In the following second
introduction, we will supplement this groundwork in three respects: by pro-
viding a fuller impression of Frege as a lecturer, based on several student
reports (Section I)~ by summarizing and analyzing further the logical content
of Fregc's lectures (Section II); and by directing attention to some especially
significant aspects of their influence on CaTnap and, through him, on the
later development of logic (Section III). In the interest of independent
readability, a small amount of overlap between the two introductions has heen
allowed.

I. Reports on Frege's Lectures

1. Teaching at the University ofJena

Gottlob Frege's teaching career at the University oflena began in 1874. He was
26 years old at the time. He continued to teach at lena until his retirement in
1918, at the age of 70. I From [he list of classes offered by Frege over the years,
it is apparent that he lectured on a wide range of topics in mathematics. at hoth
introductory and advanced levels: from the Differential and Integral Cakulus.
Differential Equations, Fourier Series, and Complex Analysis. through Analytic

1. For a concise chronologyofFrege's life and works, sec (Beaney 1997); forthe first hook-
length biography ofFrege, see (Kreiser 2001),

17
 18
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awoder Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence 19
aod Synthetic Geometry AI b
Mathern u· Th h ' ge fa, and Number Theory, to the Foundations of tures of Frege on the borderlands between those fields, namely, sym-
a es. e tree classes h f£ d
Mechanics I and II d e 0 e~e most often, however, were Analytic bolic logic and the foundations of mathematics.
classes were at the c'oao °fohe ulsually enntled '"Begriffsschrift." The former tv.'o Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) was ar that time, although past 60,
reo IS eeture h" . 1 . I . only Professor Extraordinarius (Associate Professor) of mathematics
ofcourse closelyreIat d h" S Ipmc asSIca mechamcs; thelatterw'ds.
, e to IS research i 1 . O · . in lena. His work was practically unknown in Germany; neither
class '''Begriffsschrift'' al h d n ogle. ccaslOnally, the mtroductol)'
teaching Career. Z so a a more advanced sequel, at least late in Frege's mathematiciaus nor philosophers paid any attention to it. It was
obvious that Frege was deeply disappointed and sometimes hitter
Until recently, very little was k ahout this dead silence. No puhlishing house was willing to bring out
COntent of his classes, includin DOwn ahOll.t Frege as a lecturer, or about th€
maties. The rn . . g those on lOgIC and the foundations of mathe· his main work, the two volumes of Grundgesecze der Arithmetik; he
am source of mformatio r. h h had it printed at his own expense. In addition, there was the
Autohiography" (Carna 1963 -w . 0 or ot wa~ Carnap's "Intellectual
clear from this source thPt F ) e wIll quote extensIvely from it below, It is disappointment over Russell's discovery of the famous antinomy
' presentation and stylare~~nmthe
hIs .' d . mos t ·
engagmgteacher, in terms 0r whieh occurs both in Frege's system and in Cantor's set theory. I do
e not remember that he ever discussed in his lectures the prohlem of
At the same time ·th , meed. he was rather introverted. remote and dn.
,WI respect to th . ' ,
extremely stimulating and h h elf ~ontent Caruap found his classes this antinomy and the question of possible modifications of his sys-
Su I)sequent work Both. a wat elearnedmth em d eepIy·mfluenced his 0\0,'11 tem in order to eliminate it. But from the Appendix of the second vol-
. spects are con f d "f ume it is clear that he was confident that a satisfactory way for
tions to three other repo t b F Irrne 1 we compare Carnap's recollec·
r s a Out rege con ' h overcoming the difficulty could be found. He did not share the pes-
ot hcr reports_ hy Wilh 1 Fl' eernmg t e same period. As these
, " em ltner, Gersho S h i · . simism with respect to the "foundation crisis" of mathematics some-
stcill-ure less widely k . m e 0 em, and LUdWIg Wlttge.·
nown. we WIll quot th I times expressed by other authors.
tngt~ther with Cur nap's th . e ere evant parts of them as well:
· , ey constItute all t h ' , In the fall of 1910, I attended Frege's course "Begriffsschrift"
[ hIS connection First h e eyeWItness reports we have In
. ., owevcr, to Carnap. (conceptual notation, ideography), out of curiosity, not knowing any-
thing either ofthe man or the subject except for a friend's remark
~. ~arnap's report on Frege's lectures that somebody had found it interesting. {But the very idea of a sym-
~ art I, § 1, of his "Intellectual Autobio ra h" .
bolic notation for concepts seemed attractive to us. Thus we went,
Carnap recalls his relation h' F g P y, entitled "My Student Years,"
s Ip to rege as a student as follows:3 and} We found a very small number of other students there. Frege
From 1910 to 19141 studied at the U· .. looked old beyoud his years. He was of small stature, rather shy,
Freiburg/LB First I mversitles of Jena and l~xtremely introverted. He seldom looked at the audience. Ordinarily
. concentrated on philo h
later, physics and philosoph . sop y lind mathematics' we saw only his hack, while he drew the strange diagrams of his sym-
o f·1ecture COurses I'll dyweremymaJorr
10 owe only my 0 .
Ie Id s. I n t h e selectioo' bolism on th~: blackhoard and explained them. Never did a student
about examinations or a prol· . I wn mterests without thinking ask a qUt.~stion or make a remark, whether during the lecture or after-
Iecture course I dropped ,·t eSSlOna career Wh I· .
d d' . en dId not hke a wards. The possibility of a discussion seemed to be out ofthe ques-
. h " an stu led the b'" I .
III t e field Instead [ JIg I' su Ject }y rcadmg books
. '" reat yenJo d th d tion. {And I never heard that a student ever went to Frcge's office in
In COntrast [0 the endless c ' ye e stu y of mathernatif·s
h·f ontroversles a h "., order to talk to him. But my friend and I became very much inter-
P 1 osophy, the results in math . mong t e vanous schools of ested and had our private discussions on this new form oflogic, We
h' ematIcs could b
t cre was no further comrov B . e proveu exactly and were fascinated to learn how the connections between sentences
rec' d fr ersy. ut the most f . C 1·
eIVe om universitv lect' ."d· rUUm Inspiration I were reducible to two simple ones (negation and conditional) and
of h'l 'J Ires w not corn f·
P I osophy proper or math' e rom those in the field represented by simple configurations oflines. We amused ourselves
emaHcs proper, but rath fr
, cr om the lec- by sometimes using or misusing the notation for profane purposes.}
2. Sp,., (Krt,jsf'r 2001) 1 '
Fff'gt' lit th{' {/nivt".,,~! Pr' 280-R4. for a mnn' cll'taile..l,-> I . Towards the end of the semester Frege indicated that tbe new
"" "J (l It'na . _ \I, ,.omp ~te II -t f
"IS rt't~OIlstfl1et~d from u ' COUTses offer~d bv
.'"\'
, . i' art'nal ins\'..". j .
•. , . I In
II
)f1W'}·,' -
,
IlIVersHy'..I_s 0 - . logic to which he had introduced us, could serve for tbe construction
llh']I"I'tual A .l." R IS rOJn the or,· . . I . ft,COT~.
utll"logrnph ... h ~H},l , unpubl h d of the whole of mathematics. This remark aroused our curiosity. In
S Pt"('ill! Collt'l'tions Of" y. In ( f' Carnap Pap/'rs (M. _ ~s e version of Carnap'5
at Lt)S Angl:"lt's Tho n, Pt lIr.t n,lf'nt of the Young Res~"',h "LnohlsCnpt Colleetion 1029) at the the summer semester of 1913, my frit'nd and I decided to attend
~h ' '·aertaq dh" .... , IfaryU' ..
y t e pl'rmission of th C. uote, ere IS In Box 2. fold CM' m~erslty of Californill Frege's course "Begriffsschrift n." This time the entire class con-
e arllap heirs. er 2. section B, and is quoted
sisted of the two of us and a retired major of the army who studied
 20
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodq Frege's lectures on logic and Their Influence 21
so~e of the new ideas in mathematics as a hobby. It was from the tem of logic {and admired his great ingenuity in constructing it},
major that I fi~st heard about Cantor's set theory, which no professor I was not aware at that time of its great philosophical significance,
had ever mentIoned. {The fact that the audience was so small was Only much later, after the first world war, when I read Fregc's and
partl~ also due to the time: the lectures were at seven o'clock in the Russelrs books with greater attention, did I recognize t.he value of
mo.rmng.} In this small group Frege felt more at ease and thawed out Frege's work not only for the foundations of mathematics, but for
a bit more TIl ·11 . .
w . e~e w~re Sil no questIons or discussions. {But Frege philosophy in generaL {Even after the war, Frege remained unknown
ould not .restnct hImself to explaining the advanced parts of his sys- among the German mathematicians and philosophers. Heinrich
tem of lOgIc only, bu~ also occasionally made polemical remarks Scholz became later the only one in Germany who worked for the dis-
about other conceptIons. Especially he criticized the formalists semination of Frege's ideas. In other couutries, a few logicians made
those who declared that numbers were mere symbols among th'em his name known, but not many read his works. Russell and
Prof J TIl h· ,
.: omae, IS colleague at Jena, with whom he had had a Whitehead called their readers' attention to him. On the occasion of
polemIcal ~xchange in the Jahresbericht der deutschen the foundation of the Association for Symbolic Logic in 1936,
Mathemaukerverein;nung(1906_0B)
~ , When h e rnad e suc h·d
51 e Whitehead called Frege the greatest logician of the 19th century.
remarks, he would sometimes turn his head a bit away from the Polish logicians were influenced by the study of Frege's works, and
?lac~boa~d, so that we saw him at least in profile and then with an recognized their importance.}
tromc smIle he would make some sarcastic comment on th'e oppo- In the summer semester of 1914 I attended Frege's course,
~ems.} [.,.J Alt.hough his main works do not show much of his witty Logik in der Mathematik. Here he examined critically some of the
~O~!i. there eXlsts.a delightful little satire Ueber die Zahlen des Herrn customary conceptions and formulations in mathematics. He
lUbert
S '( (t . In thIS pamphlet he ridicules the definitions which H deplored the fact that mathematicians did not even seem to aim at
.c lu}~rt had given in an article in the first volume ofthe first ew-' the construction of a unified, well-founded system of mathematics,
Uon of the large Enzvklo lid' d .
(Sl'hub ' . ' F ~ Ie er mathematl.Schen Wi.ssenschaftefl. and therefore showed a lack of interest in foundations. He pointed
, ert s artlcl~ for~unately was replaced in the second edition by out a certain looseness in the customary formulation of axioms, defi-
an excellent contrIbUtion by Hermes and Schol ) F .
that Schubert discovered a new " ,z. rege pomts out nitions, and proofs, even in works of the more prominent mathemati-
call th '. 1 pnnclple. whIch Frege proposed to cians. As an example he quoted Weyerstrass's definition: "A number
e pnnclp e of the non-distinction ofthe distinct' d h
is a series of things ofthe same kind" ("'" ... eine Reihe gleichartiger
:;~l;;:r~~;::::~~~~hmisosPtrinci~l: could be ~sed in a m~~;frui~fUI way
amazmg conclUSIOns
Dinge"). {On this he commented with all impish smile: '"'According
to this definition, a railroad train is also a number; this number may
ous aI;p~7:a:~v:s~~~~~gu:~:~nS~~;~bSl'~hh'ifl,
bI' .
Frege eX~lain~d
' c are not con tamed In h'
vari- then travel from Bt'r1in, pass through jena, and go on to Munich,"}
He l~ritieized in part icular the lack of "lttention It) certain fundamen-
pu ~ca.tlons, e.g" a definition of the continUity of a fu t' ~s
the Iinnt ofa function, the distinction between nf TIC lon, an of tal distinetions, e.g.• tilt' distinction Iwtween tht.~ symhol and the sym-
and uniform conver 1 0 mary convergence bolized. that bt·twt't'n a logieul concept and a mental image or act.
the help of the quan~~::~~h~h~se cone~pts.were expressihle with and that between a function and the value or the function.
first rime. {The last~menu·' dedi a~pe~ III hIS system oflogic for the Unfortunately. his admonitions go mostly unheeded even today.
one stmctIon and h
shown to be based on the difr . some Ot el' ones were (Carnap 1963, pp. 4_6)'
terence In the ord . h' h

,
fiers appear, which is of course II 1m er 10 w IC the quanti-
demonStratlon. of the '10"'; al . ,wek'
owntoday)H' e gave a Iso a 3. Other reports: Flitner, Mholem, and Wittgenstein ..
. l:>~c mlsta e In th 0 t I .
eXiStence of God. e n 0 o@cal proof for the Carnap is not the only student of Frege's who later descrihed attending hIS le~­
.Alt~Ollgh Frege gave quite a number of ex . tures, in particular his lectures on ""Begriffsschrift." Another such student IS
apphcatlOns of his s\tmhor,' I . amples ofmtcresting Wilhelm Flitner, a good friend of Carnap's from their student years, and suhse-
I Ism III mat lemaucs h II.
('IISS general Tlhilosoph· .. I II . . . . e usua y dId not dis- (luentlya professor and leading scholar in education. In Flitner's autobiography,
t Ita pro) ems It IS .. d I· .
Iw saw (he great phil . h· I' ' l;VI ent rom hiS works that
. osop lea Importa . f h .
which he had created h t h d.d nce 0 t e new Instrument
h · , u e J not COn v I . 4. Car nap's unpublished recollection concludes: {Besides logic there was only one fic1~:'
lO IS students. Thus, although I . eya c. ear Impression ofthis mathematics in which I attended a lecture course by Frege. It was rather remote fr
was mtensely Interested in his sys- lOgic, a year's course in Analytical Mechanics.}
 22
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awode- Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence 23
Erinnerungen /889-/945 (FJi 1986) ,
In th £ h h t n e r . he, too, reflects on his time in Jena }e'wish scholar, most famous for his studies ohhe Cabala and Jewish mysticism;
e OUrt c apter, entitled "Student Years 1909-1912" h "t b t and the friend is Walter Benjamin, equally weB known as a philosopher, liter-
Frege and Carnap: • e WTl es a on
ary theorist, and cultural critic. In the second chapter of his book Walter
[Carnap's] interest in loo-ical Benjamin: Die Geschichte einer Freundschaft (Scholem 1975), entitled
. o· problems Ie d h'1m to the lectures of an
alssocIate professor [AuBerordentlicher Professor] who ~as then "Growing Friendship (1916-1917)," Scholcm writes about his time as a stu-
amend
mostdcompletely u n1mown.'GottI0 b Frege. Ernst Abbe had recorn- dcnt at the University of lena (while Benjamin was a student at the University
F
o .e rege to ~he faculty [to become associate professor] in 1883 of Munich), He gives tbe following evaluation of his classes and teachers,
pomnng to Frege s excellen 1 . al' " ' including Frege: 6
Siegfried Cza ski h d t OgI~ lOveStIganons; Abbe's successor
as the m t' p a re~arded hIm - as we knew from his children- [Benjamin and Il didn't really have teachers, in the good sense, at the
OS Important thmker at the University of lena university; we educated ourselves, each in a very different way. I don't
Nevenheless Frege stru I d .
•"TT f:" gg e to even have his lectures take place remember one of us ever talking with enthusiasm about an academic
es acmor collegium" was then th ul . . leacher later, and if we had some praise, it was for eccentrics and out-
iog as a th' d F e r e, With the lecturer connt-
had to he ;:n~e~~:~~ dO~ several semesters the lecture would have siders, such as the linguist Ernst Levy, on Benjamin's side, and
he enlisted me and la tt adrnadPhnot found a second hearer. Therefore Gottlob Frege, on my side, (Scholem 1975, p, 32, our translation)
, a en e t e extrao di 'I f ' " ,
lecture course on "Begriffsschrift'" r nan y .ascmatmg lOgIcal Several pages later Scholem comes back to the same topic, now in more
Julius Frankenherger's broth h' and the followmg semester detail, and particularly in connection witb his teachers in philosophy:
physics, played the role of thee~h:d majored in mat~ematics and
0

tun~s became the foundat' rh' IPerson, For Carnap, these lec- Philosophy Rt lena annoyed me considerably. I despised Eucken, who
, IOn 0 IS ater philos h' h '
achleVt~mt'nts as the t. op y, e saw Frege s looked unreal-pompous, and talked the same way. After one hour of
- mos Important de I ',. lecture by him I didn't return. Bruno Bauch, however, was a must
Aristotle and Leih - I ] ve opments In lOgiC SInce
TIlZ ....
and, as far as Kant was concerned, also interesting for me. For I read
During his time as a student Ca
Fregc; likewise, I only exchan ed a f:n~p ~ev~~ spoke a word with a lot of Kant during that six-month period. Bauch's big monograph
at his door when I had t d Jig wmslgmflcant words with him, on him had just appeared, in which his break with Cohen, soon to
. • 0 ever some thin 0 'd take on such hitter forms, was prefigured, [...] Over the course of the
Sity one didn't dare to add F g. Ut51 e of the univcr-
ress rege In ·t f h semester, I also he came acquainted with the polemic in Kant-
our neighbor on the For tw ,Spl e 0 t e fact that he was
ne
except when he walked :ve:gth' °F r~rely sa,: the not very tall man, Studien, started by a lady, against Cohen, which announced a nation-
e orstweg bndg 1 k.i d
an d a h and on his back, and then disa . ,e, ~o ng ownwards alistic ilnd slight. hut still recognizable anti-semitic shift ofa part of
lectures he rarely glanced t b' d ppearmg 10 hIS house. In his th{~ Neo-Kuntians.
a lsstu ents'hew I' In contrast. I was nttractt..d (0 two very opposite teachers. Tbe
cerned with the symbol h • as exc USIVely con-
, S e wrote on the board d l' , one was Paul F. Linke, an unorthodox Husserlian, who induced me to
totally Introverted manner th h 11 an exp Blned In a
"l . , us w 0 y focused on th b' study large parts ofHussel'l's Logicallnve,ltigation,}', which Benjamin
o f oglc," (Flitner 1986 pp 126 27 ' e su Jeet matt",
Oh . ' , - , our translatIOn) only knew vaguely from his time in Munich. The other was Gottlob
Vlously ~litner's report confirms the ima e Frege. whose Foundations ofArithmetic I then read, besides related
an~ unchansmatic teacher. It also 'vesa g of Frege as a shy, introverred
writings by Bachman and Louis Couturat (The Philosophical
fillIng his logic classes. In a more:beat :~od.sense ohhe diffiCulties he hadin

, :em ,Flitne~ and his friends, especfally

nanly faSCInating lomeaI lecture.
. 'I'
' d ~'.
A t h Ir report about F
C;m,)(
rege as a lectur
,'lI\O ~~s again two people who hecame
.
f
~on.veys ~he intellectual excite-
,,?ap, enved trom Frege's '"'extraof'
course ,1

er,. ~um roughly the same period,

dud Fl!tller. Tht' amhor of that rel)( t ~O(~d frtends as students, like Carnap
)r 1S .l"ershom Sc h 0 Iem, the weB-known
Principles ofMathematics). I attended Frege's one-hour lecture
Course on "Begriffsschrift." Mathematical logic was of great interest
to me then, since discovering Schroeder's Lectures on the Algebra of
Logic in a used bookstore in Berlin. These and similar attempts to
arrive at a pure language of thought inspired me greatly. In Bauch's
seminar we read the logic of Lotze , which left me cold. My final
paper for the seminar was a defense of mathematical logic against
5. For marl:" on the lack of
Carnap's NUhla· . ~eTsollal Contact be [Ween
ss qUoted In Gabriel's introduction F~eg.e a~d Carnap, see the note frorll

,
• egtnnmgofsection 3 (p.lO). 6. Compare (Scholem 1994), pp. 110-11, for a closely related report.

r
 24 Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence
2S
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awode)
h I f 't went to visit Frege I had a
Lotze and Bauch, whose ouly response to it was silence. The philoso- Wittgcnst~in: I.remem~er that w :n hel~ould look like. I rang the
phy of language aspec' of a concep' scrip' wholly purged of mysti- very clear Idea 10 my mmd as to w at ,•
cism, as well as its limits, seemed clear to me. I reported on it to I ld h'm I had come to sec
hell and a man opened the ~oor; to,., , .d To which I
Benjamin. who asked me to send him the seminar paper. At that lime Professor Frege. "I am Professor Frege, the ma~ sal.,
I oscillated between the poles of a mathematical and a mystical sym- Id I ly "impossible!" A, ,his first meeungwlth Frege my
cou ou y re P , bi . e the floor wah me.
holism,!",1 own ideas were so unclear that he was a e to Wlp
What I liked about Frege, who was almost as old as Eucken and, (Drury 1984, p, 110) , ' ,
like him, wore a white heard, was his entirely unpompous manner, P Ceaeh conveys Wlttgenstem s
In a related, perhaps hetter known repon, eter . -
which contrasted very favorably with Eucken's. But in Jena almost
later recollections as follows:
nobody 'oak Frege scriously. (Ibid,. pp, 65-66)
. d bjections to his theories,
Rudolf Euckcn, the person compared so unfavorably to Frege, was then a well- I wrote to Frege, putting torwar some 0 1 re Frege wrote
• C I ~o
and waited aIlXlously lor a rep y. .I' my great p easu ,
cstahlished professor of philosophy at the University ofJena. 7 Beyond that com-
parison, what Scholem's report reveals is that not only Carnap, but also other and asked me to come and see him. I ' d heard the
' fh ys'schoo caps an
pt-rccptive students-with very different interests and backgrounds-were fas- When I arnved I saw a row 0 0 . 1 d 1 t had had a
' , ' h ' d n Frege, I earne a er,
l'ina{t~d hy Frcgc's lectures, in spite oftheir off-putting style. Note, moreover. nOIse ofhoys playmg m t e gar e .. d then his wife; he
sad married life - his children had died young, a~, d d good
thut Scholl'Tn does not group Frege with Bruno Bauch and other Neo-Kantiam . he was. a.l'..ln an
had an adopted son, to whom I h e \leve
whll hq!;ulI 10 display Overt anti-Semitie tendencies at the time.8
t'h II 'h
As St'holt'lIl's remarks ahout Frege occur in a chapter eovering the year at er, a small neat man Wit
1<) Ih -17, it IIppl'iUS that he attt~ll(h.:d Fregt.~'s •• Begriffssehrift" during that year. I was shown into Frege's study. Frege was h 'h talked He
d d the room w en e .,
thlls a It'w yl'nrs lIftl'r Carnal' and FlitnN.'J No notes taken hy Scholem in thaI a pointed heard, who bounc~ aroun I felt very depressed; but at
uhsolu'ely wiped 'he floor wlth me, and h d []
f'\ass n;ist, as far as we know, nor do we know of any other notes by students in . "so I c eere up ....
FH'g~''s ('lasses from this general period. III On the olher hand, it is possiule to the end he said "You must com~ aga~n, f h t Fregc would never
l'ompan' especially Carnap's and Flitner's reports concerning the year~ I had several discussions WIth hIm a ter.t ~'f' I st3rted on some
' h I ' " ld mathematics, 1 .
1<)10-14 with information from another well-known philosopher: Ludwig talk about anythmg ut oglc al , I" d then plunge back
Id - nethmg po Ite an
Wittgenstein. Wiugenstein did not llttend any of Fregc's classes, but he visited other suuject, hc wnu say SOl d n ohituary on a col-
, l' d h matics He once showe me a .
him several limes between 1911 and 1913. The relevant information can hI: Into 0b'1C an mat e . d ',hout knowing what It
' ' d " rusedawor WI
found in repons by two ofWittgenstein's students. whom he later told ahout hi~ league who, It was sal , neve hould be praised for
meetings with Frege. meant; he expressed astulllS. h mLn
, t that a man s

The fIrst such repon is by M.O,C. Drury, who recounts Wittgenstcin.~ this.[ ... ) "I'ng at the station lor
, I F r . as we were wal h
description of his fIrst visit with Frege in Jena, in 1911, as follows: The last time saw rege, tOO d difficulty in your t e-
, 'd h' "0 't you ever III any
my tram. I sal to lin . on ")" re lied "Sometimes I j'eem to see
ory tha, numbers are obJccts. H~ P,,, (Geach 1961, pp, 129-30)

,
7. S~ (~athe 1995) f~T mOTe on Eucken, including his relationship to Frege.
e. This IS noteworthy In connection with the infamous anti-Semitic remarks Contained in a difficulty - but then agaIll I don t see It. d f
Frege:s 11It~r.di~, from the years 1924-25 (Frege 1994), For 8 general discussion of . . d Frege referred to at the err 0
Fre~ s ~ohtlcal V1e~'s. see the editors' i~rrodu~tion to (Frege 1994) and Chapter 6 of The final meeting between Wlugenstem an ,
I Krels~r 2001 I. F~r further hackgmund, mcluding the political leanings of Bauch and Geach's report, most likely took place in 1913,17' 'dl'mpression of Frege as a
orhe.r (~erman philosophers at the time, compare (Sluga 19931. . h more nuance h
~, "'I' sh~Hlld add that t.hNe is rellson for douht about the accuracy of some aspects of
~('h,ol~1ll ,.. Tt'pon (as pOlTlted out to us hy Gottfried (;ilhrif'lj. For example, other record5
Fromthesefourreports.anc er,. I 'h'lscarecr.ln1910-ll,w en
teacher emerges, alleast 0 f F rege r elatIvely ate m
llIdll'llh' that ht' o;tl.lrtt'd to tllk,' dasst's at Jr-nA only in I(H7/18 (when FTt~ge was ill or 01"1
1",llH" '~"I' "dow). !l11l alTt'lidy in 19Ifl/17; nlsa, in Schoh'll1's diary from the pf'riod.
II.Thi~llIIrtofWittgen~h~tn~rf'p()rt,o
- '. ftl'n
. Iluntl'd
'" (;llsn in KI'I'k 20021, ac.fU'
. thlll FTI·J.!;I'·~ wlk
.. M<<IT~' -IIIlwd
i:--dHI!"ln20Illtl, Fr,'~l' I~ I1llt tlWlIllOnt'llllt all. On ttl!' other hllnd, the latter hook dof'~
, . . llncritll.tJly '.lfO'tl'
<Illy rontuin~ some mISinformation, It .I~ trUl FTI'g" Illtt>r <I' lnptf
. i I two 1'1'1'f I
l'nUtllll\ 111'< 'itlllh'1l1 pllpl>r (Ill [n~il' for Haut'h"s st~mil1ar; Sf't' IScholem 20001
. . 'Whllt'_ ' rl'n.
'
109-11,
I . f'nr I nnn' tli,tal ~,M'I
10.r~lt' ver~r;fr~t seme~
onl?-: OIhN Ilnh's f,tlllt1 Frt'gt"S It'ClUTf'," kno\\-"Tl til us come from his
young ti1l' two did nut have any c ' ul their OWIl.
hildrf'n . his hou~l'hoII
t.. ·r tit (('lIdl~n~ at th,' LJlllvt>rsity of ll'na, 1874/75, thus II llIueh earlier period. These urt'
AJfl'f'd 'anrt Toni Fuchs, the first of which grew up I n · · ' .

:~a~m~';lt~ :I~s~
m
.Iro u (~ol1letry,
on Analyti(' recorded hy the sturtcnt R. Schropfer, See
rt'gl lJ1\J I. pp, ,J44 -64; compare also (Kreiser 2001), p. 276.
(Krf'iser 2001), pp. 497-50. 4
12. Wittgenstein kept correspondmg WIt
, . h F ,ge until 1920; for more on their contact,
re
' 'WI'

I Reck 2002).
 26 27
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awode, Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence
Carnap, Flitner, and Wittgenstein were in contact with him, he was already 6~ by a diagram ofthe form:
years old. Apparently his age showed in the classes Carnap and Flitner attende~.
although Frege was still able to "'bounce around the room" when WittgensteJn
visited him, as well as to "wipe the fioor with him" intellectually, In 1916-17
TQ
when Scholem was in his class, Frege was 68 years old, with his health growing P r resenting the "dependence " 0 fQ on
increasingly fragile. In fact, Scholem may have been in the very last class Frege The vertical line may be thought of ~s ep ". ., of the formulas to their
P, the horizontal lines as representmg the content
taught at Jena, in the winter semester 1916/17. His classes during the summer right. Thus the complex formula:
semester 1917 were cancelled due to bad health; in the winter semester 1917/1B
he was granted a leave, perhaps also for health reasons; and his classes in the P-HQ --> R)
summer semester 1918 were again cancelled because he was too ill to teach. At
that point he retired. 13
is 'Written:
So far we have reviewed several repoTts on Frege and his lectures at the

-r=~P
University of Jena, in particular his lectures on "Begriffsschrift." In the nel1
section we will turn to the Content of these lectures. To assist the reader unfa.
miliar with Frege's technical work, we will begin Section II with a brief expla'
nation of his unusual notation; after that, we will summarize and analyze the .
The negation ----, P of a formula P is indicated . .. I dash attached to the
by a vernca
logical system contained in Carnap's notes, along the way comparing it to the
horizontal content line:
systems in Frege's earlier Begriffssthrift (1879) and Grundgesetze del
Arithmetik (1893/1903),
.,--P
.. , ' a compI'ex formula , with dif-
Wlthm
This negation can occur at any pOSItlOn . . F'nally the universal
'
ferent meanings resultmg f rom d'f£
I e rent pOSIuons. 1 ,

II. The Logic in Frege's Lectures quantification:

I. How to read Frege's conceptual notation '<I:np

The two-dimensional notation employed by Frege has some virtues, but also
of.a formula <p (posslhly
.. . , t he variahle .r) is written:
('ontaHung
many drawbacks. It leads to a diagrammatic representation of the logical struc'
ture of propositions, which makes certain basic inferences quite perspicuous.
At the same time, the emphasis on the display of relatively trivial information -&'1'

, (c~mbined with Frege's aversion to defined s}TI1bols for logical operatioml

qu~ck.ly leads to rather baroque diagrams that are anything but perspicuous.
TbiS fact clearl.y prevented Frege's system of notation from catching on even
among those, lIke Carnap, who took the trouble to learn it. The disadvantages
~f Frege's ,notation s~rely also contributed to the poor reception his works ini-
ually receIved, despIte the many important logical advances concealed just
beneath the elaborate formalism.
-&
..
. . . .IS, t~Vt.J., Ytl 111' Ig to tht~ right of
The scope of. the quantlftl~r

. ' the usual sense.

which is a variable-bmding operatlon III ' . bl to express all of the other
Combining these basic clements, F~ege ~s a die.. ction and existential
. ". ., h s conJunctIon, sJun.
famihar lOgIcal operatIons sue a .'
Q) ,
. P & Q' written as -,( P ---4' -, In
ment,The basic idea behind Frege's notation is to represent a conditional state- quantification. For examp Ie, t h e conJunctlon IS

the form:
ifl~ then Q
~Q
~;~~~mpll.re again (Kreiser 2001), pp. 280-84. for some of the details in the last para- P . . d' ted by several dl'I'feren t forms of
The application of rules of inference IS III . lca. I I I d with the names of the
horizontal lines between formu Ias, someumes a)e e
 28
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodq Frege's lectures on logic and Their Influence
other formulas being invoked F . . . 29
rule (see below): . ormstance, an apphcatIon ofthe transposition
Universal generalization is indicated by a "sagging" line:

Finally, a vertical line (the "judgment stroke"):

I-
is indicated by writing a "flattened X" . is added to the left-most end of a formula to indicate that its content is asserted
In place of the horizontal line:

--
as true, for instance when it has been derived from the axioms. Frege applies his
inference rules only to such derived formulas; there are no conditional deriva-
tious involving formulas without the judgment stroke.
P .... ~R .... ~Q
2. SwnmaryofFrcge's logical system
When convenient as in the £ - The system of logic presented in the lectures is a hybrid fragment of the systems
di ' , ' oregOIng w hall
tIonal SIgn -7 associates to th e . h' e S use the convention that the con- presented in Frege's published work; like Crundgesetze der Arithmetik it uses
g
ten more simply as P .... Q Rfl t , so the formula P .... (Q .... R) ean be writ- several ditIercnt rules of inference and fewer axioms, but like Begriffsschrift it
remi '. - 7 . T h e rule of Detach ' ,
.P ses, IS wrItten with a sin Ie h ' . ment, WhICh reqmres two makes no use of the theory of extensions of concepts or the description opera-
IIl oked. Thus if we have alrea~ la::l~~~tall1ne. labeled by the formula being
v tor. Thus it is essentially what we would now call a system of higher-order, pred-
icate logic, similar in many respects to the system of Whitehead and Russell's
(II - I ' Principia Mathematica (1910/1913), bmwith "simple" rather than "ramified"
types.
W,' "un int,'r Q from p .... Q b D We begin by summarizing (in modern notation) the system presented in
Y etachment, by writing: the lectures, before relating it more precisely to Fregc's other logical systems, 14
TQ The logical language is much like the usual one of predicate logic; it con-
sists of the following kinds ofsymbols:
(I):: _ _P_

-Q Propositional letters: P, Q. ...

If We have already labeled. ludividllalletters: a, b, ...
Predieate letters: f~ G, .
(2) TQ High(~r-ord('J' pn'dieafe letters: a.
FUllctionleuers:'/: K· .
p....
P
Variahlt~s: .f·, y, ...• X, Y. ... ,
then the inference from P to Qf
rather than a double colon-
.
rom (2) by Detachment is writt~n
.
with a ' I
SInge We shall follow Frege's custom of using speciallencrs .'T, y, X; Y, etc. for vari-
-P ables involved in quantification. Atomic formulas are the following:
(2):
-Q I' for a propositional letter P
a=h for individual letters a, h
Applications of the other n I F(a, .. , h) for Fa predicate letter and a, ... , h individual letters
li1Ilo....'jngstvlt>s t',· It'S (Sf'l' bf'low) are ff'('orde.rl, I a (F. _.. ,G) for a a higher predicate letter and F, ...• G predicate
. . " () JrWs; II ana ogously, using the
letters
(Cut)
- - - -- -- (Negation) 14. In doing so, we disregard some specific features of Frege's system, particul?-~Iy as
relating to the use of distinct letters in quantification and the theory of propositIOnal
equality.
 ----------------------1" 3I
30 Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence

For our purposes. it is sufficient to use different sorts of letters in this way to .
SpeCI'f'IC, us'ually arl'thmetical , [unctlons an d relanons
' ·1·k
1 e l+a'anda<3are

indicate different syntactic types. A more elaborate system of notation, say, also often used in atomic formulas. _ f th t given in the
involving numerical subscripts as in Alonzo Church's "A Formulation of the The system of deduction is essentially a fragment 0 ~ 11 : tbree
I f ' f enee and the.o owmg
Simple Theory ofTypes" (1940), would be required for a more rigorous presen- Grundgesctze. It consists of severa. ~u e~ 0 10 e~ . duality respectively.
1
tation. Frege's own convention was lOuse different styles ofletters, labeled with axioms for propositional and quanuf1canonallogtc an eq ,
appropriate styles ofvariables indicating their argument types. No types higher
than those indicated here OCcur in the notes, but the further extension is obvi- Axiom I: P-4P
ously intended. Note that the equality sign = occurs only between individual let-
lers. Function symbols with appropriate arguments are permitted in place of
individuals as arguments, as in/(a) ~ band F(g(a), b).
Occasionally, functions of propositions are also considered, as iuf(a::::: b). Axiom II: ';Ix F(.r) -4 F(a)
A special case ofthis is the "horizontaf' function:
';IX a(X) -4 a(E)
-'I'
Axiom III: gla" b) -4 g(';IX(X(a) -4 X(b)))
sometimes called the ·'content stroke," which represents a function that can be
applied to any arb7llment cp to yield the value true if and only if the argument is Aspecial case of (III) is the more familiar:
true, andjalse otherwise. Thus, e.g., the expression:
a~b --> ';IX(X(a) -4 X(b))
-(/=(1

and another case is:

,
elt'nottOs true, and the expression:
~a~b --> ~';IX(X(a) -4 X(b»

d . f 'ndiscernibles." The func-

Thus (Ill) yields Leibniz's Law of t~e. 1 enn,ly ~ I ,'thin auycontext.
W

denotesfalse. . . . I' It' Its applIcatIon w .

tlOnal formulation lOVO Vlllgg perm s . kinds: those involving a
Formulas are built from the atomic formulas by means of (the horizonti.ll The rules of inference arc broken down lOto n;o mulas to draw a couclu-
and) the propositional operations: ' .formula as premise,
smgle . amI those " that use. , twO lor
!jion. The rult~s of the first sort lire liS follows:
negation
conditional
(Exchange)
and the (universal) quantifiers:
Q-->P-4R
';I.r 'I' (x) for an individual variable x . 0 f any nu mberofconditions P, Q, .-..
';IX'1'(Xj
and similarly for any reordenng
for a predicate variable X

In principle: higher predicate letters could also be quantified, but this does (Transposition)
nm happt'n In tht'. notes. In addition to this primitive notation, Frege often P-4~-4~Q
t~st's rh.(' ('om pit-x ~Ylllb()ls corresponding to the other familiar logical opera-
tions. hkt,:
· . .. . g one could instead inrN tbe
an d SimIlarly for any at h er con dit,'onal posloon, e, .
conclusion:
'1'&", conjunction
3xq>I.1') existential quantification
 32 Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence 33
Erich H. Reck and Ste'o'e Awodey

Th.is rule is also taken to allow sirnullaneous cancellation of double negatl'ons P-4 Q
as In e.g.: . (Cut) ~--~-~

Thus a more general instance might look like this:

P-4Q-4R
and similarly for negated Q, etc.

(Collapsing) Fiually, there is the following rule:

P-4 Q-4 R P-4~Q-4R

and similarly in the presence of additio n al con d.inons
. .III any pOSIuons.
,. (Negation) -~~~~~~~~~~~

q>(a)
(;t'nt~raliza[ioll) _ This rule, like the others, can also be applied in the case where there are several
V.I 'I' (:t.) other conditions P present.
This completes the description of the logical system presented in the
wltt'n'.1" lUay 1101 <lln'ady OlTUf in (a)"" '. '.
Ins. t'.~.: qJ , simIlarly for functIOn and predicate let- notes. We now briefly analyze it, comparing it mth Frege's published systems.
The system of the notes, consisting of three (groups of) axioms and seven rules

,
of inference (together with rules of substitution and change of bound variables)
q>(F) can be shown to be a complete system of deduction for this fragment of predi:
:a~e logic, which is of course sufficient for all of predicate logic by suitahle def-
VXq>(X)
InItions. It differs from the system of Bt·griffsschrift by the addition of several
new rules of inference (beyond Det<lchment), in place of a number of the
where X m<lY not already oeCUT in cp (F) Th" . axioms. The currerH axioms [a, IIa, and lib also occur in BrgrilJ}'schrift (lb is
generalization: the side cond,'t',( typ" I IfS IS the customary rule of uniVer!illl
.
reqUired htTC. ms lea 0 natu T<l' I d e d uctlOn
. systems an~ not derivable). a.I) do two axioms whidl an' const'qtH'IH~(>S ofaxi0111 III. hut the
rClJlilining fiv(~ axioms of Ht,fJ,r{!I.\·...("!Jr[/i can now he (krjVt~d. ,.
There arc also three "forms of inference" involving t wo prcmlst:"s:
. Tbt, system is esS('ntially tlw "logic.,I'· fragment of the sysu~TT1 ~rJvell 111
~rund~t',\'f'f::;t" Spe(;ifinllly. it omits from that system the three axioms gc~ve,rn~
P P-4 Q mg propositional etluality (IV). extensions of COIH'epts (V). and the descnpuon
(Detachment) _
operator (VI), which we now briefly describe.
Q
<lnd similarly in the presence of additi ill ..
on COndItIOns, e.g.:
This says thatPis either Q or -,Q, and is used in the Grundgesetze (§51) to prove
Q P-4Q-4R
"propositional extensionality":
P--.:. R
(PH Q) -4 P= Q
A ft'l:lt.t'd rule is tht> f{)lIowin . w~ . " , . The famous theory of extensions provides a term {.r: qJ} of individual type ,for
t'OndHlons: g Hch tan also be apphed in the case of several
every formula qJ. Since the term {x : qJ} is supposed to represent the extenswn
 34 Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey Frege's lectures on logic and Their Influence 35

of the concept represented by q>. these terms are plausibly governed by the lion disjunction. and exclusion ("neither-nor") in .the nowh-fambliliar way. The
axiom: , , qwte
, SImIlar
..
exposition IS to a mo d ern t re atment usmg trut ta es. t _
--
The rules of exchange, tranSpOSItIon, d etac h m ent
. ' and cut are nex as
cons-
Axiom V: {x: I'} = {x: 'If} .... 'Ix (I' .... 'If) sidered in turn, These arc justified by their preservatlon .of truth, under y.
tematlc - . 0 f th e trut h -vaIues of the formulas
. conSIderatIon , mvolved_
The well-known contradiction of Russell arises quite directly from this axiom. Next, general inferences having a common form, like:
Finally, in Grundgesetze Frege also employed a description operator lX.f/',
which was supposed to denote the unique individual satisfying the condition 1>2--> 12 >2
expressed by ({'. if there is one, thus formalizing the definite artide, as it occurs 2>2-->22 >2
in "the x such that cp." This operator is governed by the axiom: 3> 2 --> 3' > 2
Axiom VI: a = (IX_x = a) .
are considered. These are used to motIvate h ' d ea of a concept
tel . as a function.
b- d on
. - -
The Fregean doctnne of objects, functlons, ~~nc~, pts relatIons,
d U etc. asequan-
,'versal
By omitting these three axioms and the corresponding machinery of proposi- the notions of saturated an d unsatura t e d e n tIues IS presente, n t Thus
tional equality, extensions ofconcepts, and definite descriptions. the logic pre~ - negauon . of a general statemen
tifieation is introduced as a way to permIt b - Iy by. using
scnted hy Frege in the lectures may be characterized as the inferential part of his . one can adequately express t h e gener
whtle . al inference a oye SImp
mature system; i.e, it is that part involved in drawing logical inferences, without variables to express generality.
tht· constitutive or constructive part, involved in building up logical objects.
Lik... modern systems of logic, it can he applied [Q reasoning about various dif- I>2~X2>2
ti.'n'nt domains, hut it has no domain of ""logical objects" of its own to reason
ahouL One might say, tentatively, that Frege has cut his system back to a tool for - that statement expresses t h e gen eralized negation:
negatIng
logical inference about other domains, rather than a self-sufficient theory of a
domain of independent logical objects.

,
for all x, it's not the case that I > 2 ~ I 2 >2
3. Outline orthe lectures
rather than the intended:
We now briefly outline the contents of the two logical lectures Begriffsscllrift I
and II, to he called Parts [ and II respectively. The third lecture Logic in
it's not the case that for all.r,.r > 2 ~ .r 2 > 2
Mathematics is related to the Nachgelassene Schriften item by the same natTle
(Frege 1983, pp. 219-70), and should he compared to it.
.
The U1llwrsal . .. pt~rnHts
qUllntJlwr 'h t (,-I,atter t (I he t~xprcsst~d as:
Pan I contains an exposition of the conceptual notation. motivated hy
informal considerations and linguistic intuitions. It makes no mention of
---."iX" (.l' > 2 ~ ;1. 2 > 2)
axioms or formal deduction, hut instead focuses on expressing mathematical
and other statements in the conceptual notation, A few rules of iuference arc . , b comhined with the other logical
given, and some simple arguments are formalized, but the systematic treatment Frege then shows how the quantlfler can e h ther classical forms of
of d.e~uction is given only in Part II, Part I also inclndes a number of topics operations to express not only existence, ~ut ~!allso,~ e dO .. one"), and particu-
. d . Y·· d egauve ( an n .
familIar from Frege's writings, including the doctrine of sense and reference, JU gment: umversal af umatIve an n . . ") He arranges these 1Oto
I aff- - - (" "and some not .
and the classification of entities into objects, functions, concepts, relarions, ar IrTIlaUve and negatIve some . B if)r~sschrlifit § 12. He t h en
., " . done 10 egn '.1'-
second-level functions. etc, the classical "Square of OppOSItIOn as IS <Ii _ - hed role assigned to
l h the stmgnlS
Tht:' first few pages of Part I give tbe basic concepts of COmenr and judg- remarks that these forms do not re al y ave,. I distinc[ion between subject
them in traditional logic, and that the [Tadiuo~a ..
srrokes. ,and the notation for rht> ('onditional and negation as operations
IOt'Itt
011 sentt'IIn's. f1wse are explained in terms of the possible truth values ofthe
and predicate "'does violence to the nature ofthFlll gs ., ow-classic pbilosophi-
m o ' . , . f me of rege s n C'
c.o p l1t'1lt sentences, i.e, negalion ---.P swaps true and false, and the condi- ThIS leads lOtO an expOSItIOn 0 so" H d' usses sense and reter·
I d . - - I f- . es of Part L e direct and m trec.;-td'
tional P ~ Q ~xcilides the case wbere P is true and Q is false, It is then sho\'\o'J1 ca octrme~ In the flOa Ive pag ISC .
-
cnce, concept and object, unction f · . and concept.
h f- t rule of inference 0 f
how lhese ran be combined to express the truth-functional operations conjunc-
reference. Interestingly, he a Iso argue s for t c us
 36 37
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodl!f Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence

Grundgesetze ("Absorption"), which states that the horizontal function - ({I is . the note b 00 k '
There follow five hlank pages 10 At.this point the lectures
d
idempotent: may have included the two examples of the °hnto~olgllcal ahrog~:v:~t t~:y
numerical concepts (see a b ove,) Ju d gt.ng from .
w .at wows,
f '
'tion of
-(-'1')=-'1' . I ' I d d the hegmmngs 0 an exposl
must In any case have a so mc u e . . III f llowed hy
deduction. For the notes resum~Vlit~ the sta~~ml~~lti~~:~I::rks:h:tentirely
He concludes the lectures with a discussion of the hierarchy of objects, con- formal deductions of the sort ?lve~ ill Frege s ~ axioms I and II are invoked
cepts, relations, and second-level concepts. The universal quantifier is cited as absent from the notes up to thiS pOlnt. M?reove,' marks like '"earlier we
an example of a second-level concept, as is the property of heing satisfied by in the course of the suhsequent deductlons with re
exactly one object, which is expressed in conceptual notation.
had. , .." , . . from axiom III (notably,
Between Parts I and II, two notcs have heen included which, from their After deriving some propertIes of Identity Ii ' of
- . ) F e turns to twO app cations
content, seem to belong ronghly there. The first of these notes labeled (by us) Leibniz's Law, re~exIVlty, and. symmetry, re~ The first is a detailed proof of
Appendix A is an analysis ofthe ontological argument for the existence of God. "how one can denve proofs usmg our symbol~" h ' ter than the other
It uses conceptual notation to clearly make the point that existence is not a ' , that two num h ers are
the proposltlOn . equal If eac IS grea
characteristic of the concept "'God." but rather a feature of it- to u.se Frcge's when increased hy an arbitrarily small amount:
terminology. By analogy, a house may be made of stones and mortar (its charac-
teristics), but not of spaciousness and comfort (its features). (Vx>O (b+x>a & a+x>b)) -> a =b
The second note is also of considerable interest. as it deals Vlith numbers.
It hrieny indicates how the number ofa concept is a feature ofit, and thus a seC- from the premises:
(mel-level concept. Fregc considers the example "'two tall towers" in which the
towers are both t.all, hut are not hoth two. He also considers some other types of (a- b)+b=a
second-level concepts. ,(a> a)
Pan II is occupied with several different topics, including some further a>h--....7a-b>O
l~x.amples of the ex.pression of mathematical concepts in conceptual notation; ,(b> a ) & ~(a > b) -> a = b
th(,~ development of a system of formal deduction; and several extended ex.am- 1>0
pies of it.s use, There is also an extended discussion of rigor in mathematical
arguments and definitions, the use of variahles, and the nature of functions.
This occupies five pages. ' d ' I 'h()ws that limits are
There are two gaps in Part II of the notes. one of five pages and one off(H1r. The Th~ second example, whlc , h (.0 II ows. lTl10le late y. s
contents of these gaps is, however, not difficult to infer. .
uUlclue. . .. (,...
Spt~ufll'aUy. a proo IS glvell 0
I'the formula:
Part II hegins with a brief summary of the "'semantics" of the coneepw al
notation. tht~ rdt~rt~nccs and senses of sentences and their parts, i.e. names and V,'>U3d>OVa>d(- ,'<;1-f(a)<,,)
functional expressions. The bask language of horizontal, negation, condi- & V" > U 3 d> 0 Va> d (-,' < lJ -f(a) <,,)
ti~nal, identi,ty, and quantification is recalled, Two examples ofthe expression ->;1-8
01 mathematIcal concepts are then given: continuity of an analytic function at a
point, and the limit of a function for positive arguments increasing to infinity, , , f occu ies nineteen pages in the note-
from eleven listed premIses. The proo .' - ~ h 'ddJe of it. It is clear that
notatIOn as:
':r
~he statement is continuous at the point x" is expressed in conceptual i'
hook, with the second gap 0 f lour pages. fight.10
, t e mt
several intermediate steps of the proof are ml~Smg. e remarks ahout rigor in
'1e>O 3d>0 '1a (x- d < a <.r+ d -> - e <f(a)-f(x) < e)
These detailed examples are followed
mathematics and the importance of co~eeptua no a
rsOtmtion for achieving it.
f functions in mathe-
di Ion of the nature 0 I
The statemt'nt "A is tht'limit of/Tor positiv.. argum"nr' . . . I" . " There follows an cxten de d scuss . h ' . 's no m()rt~ ahout symho s
.IS {'xpn~ssed as; . '-..... s Inereaslng to In may , h ' that ant melle I. . h h
mattcs. Frege concludes y saYlOg h mselvcs conclude Wit t c
. .
t han hotany is about mlcroscope .
's The lectures
, t h' he d to YOlilor
I recommen '
' , questions, w Ie
words, .... I have now suggcste d vartous .
'1e>O 3d>0 '1'1 >d (-e < A -f(a) < e)
further reflection,"

I:0.. .
.. >
1 1.
' . _
--_.,... :"'1
 39
38 Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodf!1 Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence

ciated until much later. Indeed, many of his contributions seem to have been
rediscovered "independently," and to have entered the discipline through other
III. The Influence of Frege's Lectures
sources, snch as Russell, only to be recognized much later as having also been
I. Frege's logical innovations contained in Frege. Afurther important aspect of these lectures is that we know
AE, our summary in Section II shows, a number of the most central features of through them that Carnap, in particular. was already acquainted with many of
modern logic are already treated at some length in Frege's lectures. We find not these topics directly through Frege.
o~~y a systematic treatment of propositional logic, including the interdefina-
One specific case of Frege's indirect influence on modern logic through
hlhty of the propositional connectives and their truth-functional specification, Carnap appears to be the general adoption of higher-order logic with s~m~le
but a~so a comple.te a~cour~t o~what we now call first-order logic, including the types, as opposed to ramified types, in the late 1920s and early 30s. As thIS ~m­
fu~ct1onal analysIs of predicatIon, the theory of relations, and the basic ideas of eage ofthe theory has not heen generally acknowledged (even by Carnap hIm-
unIversal. and exi~tential quantification. Equality is treated as a hasic, fir5t- self), we take this opportunity to briefly make the case. IS .
or~er .1~gtcal r~latlOn. and it."i relation to higher-order quantification through The first thing to note in this connection is that Carnap's textbook Abrts.~
~elbm.z s L,aw IS presented. Also on the higher-order side, we have a system der Logistik, pnblished in 1929, hut completed and circulated as early ~s
lOvol~Ing sll~ple types, prcsented as a natural hierarchy of different kinds of 1927, seems to have heen the first systematic treatment ofhigher-orde~lo~c
rl~II~;tlOnS, ~th types ~ete~mined inductively hy the typcs of their arguments. with simple types. If! The other frequently cited sources, Leon ChWlstek,s
Fmally, lo~~al d~dUCl1on IS treated by means of a formal system, with axioms "The Theory of Constructive Types I" (1924) and Frank Ramsey s
and rult's ol1l1rcrente that are deductively complete for the first-ordcr prcdicate "Foundations of Mathematics" (1925), actually contain much less detaIl tha~
was already in Frege; and Hilbert and Ackermann's Grundzilge de~ lheoretl-
•. " and
calculus: . the rigor orinformallolTica! ' 1 prools
and rna th ematlca £'
JS re1ate d to
schen Logik (1928), occasionally also mentioned in this conn~cuon, used
0"
I ht, st ru tly fo~rnnl ehara,cter or such deductions, which can be used to represent
.hun. Most of llws(" tOllles ramified types until the second edition of 1938. Perhaps more Importantly,
,' . : are' treatt'd
. in a qUI'te. mode rn way, Just ' as t h ey mIg'ht
hl ItIUIl ~lHrodllc~ory logw course today. Carnap's Abriss and related works were familiar to Godcl (see below), whose
" R(~s~dt~s reOllnding ~I!; how n~ll~h of modern logic was already in Frege, the "Uber formal unentscheidbare Siitze dec Principia Mathematica und ver-
~t cture~ al~o s~rve as cV1de~lce Of, hIS continued serious engagement with logic wandter Systeme I" (1931) is generally reCob'llized as one ofIhc m~in sources
after ht. learm.d of Russell s antInomy and duriug a p ' d ' h' h h b of the modern theory, Finally, given his familiarity with Fn~ge's hIerarchy of
lished nothin on h .> , , ' ' CrIO In W lC e pu - objects, concepts, higher-level concepts, etc., especially m the form, con-
, ." . g t e suhJt.<.t. Particularly noteworthy in that respect is the
tained in the 1910-1914 lectures it is reasonable to assume that Carnap s use
r,cvI~cd lOgIcal system [)f(.:'sented in the Icdures, in which, as pointed out in
S eellon . 1I' the apparatus
. fI °h11" I'" , ,
<.a III ercnc(' IS retamed hut the ('onstructive
of simple types; in Abriss, A lybau, and elsewhcr~. was derive~ from that
Sourr.e,17 Not~ also that, un(ler Frt'gl-~'S influl-~nce. simply-typed hIgher-ord~r
0
mac h mery
, - resp hI" h h
on~1 e or t e t cory oflobric:al objeNs has • ht'ell disnlrt.ll"d, The
resu Ihug system, hke,modern 't . r I I ' ,
s y s ems 0 (t'( lwtIVC logiC, has no domain of its lngit' was neVl'r just a dt'vic'(' lor avoiding contradi<'tion for Cllrnap. hut was III
own, b ut can he' apphed to reasoni ng"1 a )out ot Iler (Omalns,
I ' As Carll a}) himself.' t~e very mIltm: oflogic, It-ndillg it 1111 inht,rt'nt plmlsihility that other eom~ep-
h aps recallIng Frege's lectu £
per
later: res. ormu <lted thIS POlllt of, view some y(~ars
I " lions la('k(~d.
" . .
-
tl 'I Frcgt>'s lectures are hiS
Anot h er rangt: OllSSUCS ot'eurrtng prOlllll1Cn y n . .
The ' , , semantic doctrines of sense and reference; intension and extenSIOn: names
e
proposulOns oflogIc and mathematics [ ] are l'
cance for science since the .d' h ""
" T
.0 great slgm I-
and objects; individuals and descriptions~ concepts and extensions; et~. Thes
Y31 10 t e transformanon of [scientific I , • 'fl t'a! book Meanmg and
TO ., '. lSSues also form the backbone of Carnap s m uen 1
~ po.slUofns,.[.,,] LOgIC and mathematics are not sciences with a
omam 0 ohJects of thei
"·d al" b'
[1 Th e assumptIon
rown. ...
' of·'formal" or ecent very different
15 , Compare (Kamareddine. Laan. and Nederpelt 200 21 f or a r ,
l e o Jeets, as opposed to the .... r al" b' f
t:'nces. is dropped (Carna l e o Jecrs 0 the empirical sci- aCCOUnt. , . ik com are (Reck 2004),
P
. p 932. p, 433. ollrtranslation) Hi, For more on the relevant history and role ofAbnss der Logtst, th modern sources
~7. To be sure. in the Abriss Carnap cites only Russell and ~~':l~?:.~it7ngs that, despite
2. Frf."gt"s innuencf" on Carnap f .type theory, relegating Frege's works to the catei?ory 0 , 1 ble insights for the
hlJlng superceded by more recent logical theory. snll conta~~ va u; be explained by the
It. might rt:>asonably be asked wh at, I'f any mfluence
' F 'd . presem" (Carnap 1929. p, 107, our translation)., Howe~~r~::e~~reg~'ssystem of type
('Ially the later ont:>s c()uld h h'd' rege s octrmes. espe~ fact that one's own parents always seem old-fashlOned. '. menu (The
, , a v e a on the subs' I· t d type-theore nc argu
e( uen eve opment of'I oglc.
l t d I ' n . .
t-.11V l'n then l-'Vt'n his earlier . otaUon did not lend itself well to more c~mp lca. e r; h positional calculus.)
WrItten works were not well~known or widely appre- same can be said, mutatis mutandis, about hiS notanOn or t e pro

___4111
 41
40 Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey Frege's lectures on logic and Their Influence

Nf·(,f'.~·silY
(1947), in which he "developed a semantic method int1uenced by
Fregc''i distinction between the nominatum ("Bedeutung," i.e., the named
entity) and the sense ("Sinn") of an expression" (Carnap 1963, p, 63), Here,
however, we probably have less a case of the specific influence of Frege's lec-
tures than of his more general influence on Car nap, since these topics were also
discus~ed pr~minently in Frege's published writings.
. Fmally, ,It seem.s that Frege's influence on Carnap extended beyond tech-
nwal and phIlosophical logic to also include what may be called the ""scientific
temperament" that he passed on to analytic philosophy:
From Freg: I le.ar~ed caref~lncss and clarity in the analysis of con-
cept~ and h~gulstlc expresslOn.[".] Furthermore, the following con-
ecptJOn, which derives essentially from Frege, seemed to me of
paramount importance: It is the task of logic and of mathematics
~thin the total ~ystem of knowledge to supply thc forms of concepts.
statt:ments, and Inferences, forms which are then applicahle every-
In l.,.] recent investigations into general properties ofaxiom~tic~~s-
terns such as completeness. monomorphy (categorieity), decldabl~Ity.
consistencj', etc,. [.,.] it has become increasingly clear that the mam
difficulty [...] lies in the insufficient precision of the concepts used.
The mostimportaut requirement [.,,) is, on the one hand. to estab-
lish explicitly the logical basis to be used in each case, [, .. 1; and on the
other hand, to giveprecise definitionsfor the concepts used on .that
basis, In what follows, my aim will be to satisfy those two re~Ulre- ,
rnems and to [, .. 1derive a number oftheorems ofgeneral axlOmall CS .
(Carnap 2000, p, 59. our translation, original emphases)
At the time, Carnap was one of a few logicians engaged in research of this sort,
and he discussed his results wi th Fraenkel, Godcl and Tarski, among others.
Despite some interaction, however, Carnap's basic viewpoint was decidedly
Fregean, compared to that of those influenced by the Hilbcrt schooL TI?,us" fO,r
instance, no distinction was made hetween what we would now call the obJe~~

, wlwr,c, he~ee also to non-logical knowledge. It follows from these

('onsHlerations that the nature oflogic and mathematics can be
~'Jt.arly UIH~t'rst~,)()donly if close altention is given to their application
Ifilloll-iogwal hdds, especially in empirical science, (Ibid" p. 12)
language" of the axiomatic systems heing investigated and the '"mctalangu~g~
bemg' used to conduct the investlgatlons;
, ' '
mstea
Olle "universal" language. Yet again. Carnap wauted to r~co~cl~e such an
d , I'k
I e re,

approach with tbe use of the axiomatic method, rather than dismlssl~g the lat-
teras "theft." as Russell had done. Here one can perhaps discern the mnuen~e
F ge he worked . ' W1thm

3. From Frt'gc to (;(j,dd, via Carnap orthe later Frege ofthe lectures, who emphaSIze t c mlere
' d h " ntial role oflogl c ,
. ,
WI' {'onclude this.essay "f h d b t - wilh HIlbert (as pre- "
, . , ' hy callI' ng ,a t entlOn
t" to a particularly noteworthy case ot' Carnap also adopted Fregc's posluon rom t e e a e .
Frege S InnuCnCt' which Ie-Ids trl K
, • ., M h ' ' ' ) that an axIOm system
. .., , , . un 0 e I an d some of the most imj)ortallt
C"d sented III the lecture notes for" LOgiC 111 at ematlCS ,
early results In modt:r I . IH A ' d h'
deterrnllles . I .cal research project
-I. .', . n ogIe: s recent scholarship has established, during a highcr.ordcr concept. lndee , IS enure °6r:L
t IIe ate 19205.Car nap was, aettv e Iyengage
, d'In IogIcal
' research on axiomatie sys- can he seen as an altcmpt to reconcile the two sides of that dehate. 'd
, I' ' . matic systems cons! -
[ems adndl9v2a8rulUs 1,lotlOns of complctt·I1eSs. Ht~ finished a hook manllscript

,
ThE~ s.pecific logit'al nntions and properties 0 aXlO , . .
aroun , which, ht, . I" ,. lomcal consequence.
All . A' " circulated un( Ier t h e tit'I e Untasudwll/-ff'n zur ered by Carnap indud(' sueh modern-sotHH mg topH.S as r;-
, '<1 1'1' d 10,rH~al cOInplettness.
. '
gkememen xwmallk, hut never published. 1'1 A.... Wt~ will nnw indh"lt(' (his satlsfa(~tion, ('onSi,'ilt>IHj', catq.{oridty. deel n II Ity, an, t"' ~ , h' ,
wor apparently had some inn >, h ' • Amon~ tht. "tlwon'ms of W'IH·r:.,llIXHHIJUW'S . , . ' h h t wei to l)roVI' an 1 ,It uny
'a1 .
>
uenCe on t t: young Kurt C{.del. WhO.. . I~ subs(>' t at t' r . ' II '
t Ioglt" results In turn contrihlll 'd ,.' . I I ' 1 syswm IS IOhr:LCU Y cOnl-
quen, t.
(' • , , '
to .,aenap s dt'('ISlOtI to ahandon hIS (:fHISlstt'nt aXiom ~ystt~m IHIS II mudd. lUll t tat UlIllXIO n . h
project around 1930. . .. _' '... . ' I' "fn I)oint ofvlt~w, owcver.
p1etc Just lilt IS calq!;Ol"lt'al. As IS dt'ur rom u mo( I . , II
Much of the background for C ' ' " .' I k d rt'ventcd him from rea Y
th 'd ' . arnap s A,nomatik consists of Fregean t he mathemaucal tl"anH.~work JIl whH~h \e wor e P . .. h' If
emes an assumptIOns HIS goal h " ' h 'dequately. Carnap Imse
approach to th r d.' • owever, was to combine a Fregean logicist prOVing these conjectures, or even staung t em a "with
e loun anons of mathe . . h H' . heCame aware of the deficienCies . .' h through diSCUSSIOns
In hIS approac
developing a "theo o f ' , manes WIt a dberuan formalist one by
303) in which ry laxlOmauc systems of arhitrary form" (Carnap 1930. p, Tarski in 1930 and , somewhat earlier, with Godel.1 dent at the U' mvers!'ty of
, variOUS ogIcal and m a l ' al ' d In the late 1920s. Kurt Code! was a doctora stu f h Vienna Circle.
systematically As he "h' et oglc questIons could be addresse V ' B h e memhers 0 t e
. . put It In t e Introduction to the Axiomalik: lenna. where Carnap was teachlllg, ot w rc d' of mathematics.
' I' d foun allons
an d they often met privately to dISCUSS oglc an '"M talooik .. and
W.lnthiss{'ctinnwt"drawheavily (A ' Moreover, Codel attended Carnap •s 1928 I'ect u~e course on e
I d h ~ manuscripl of his
t:I • •

(R\'~'k 2004)' ('ompa" al' l thO~ wdodeyandCarus 2001), (Awodl"Vand Reck2002),

he was one of the few people to whom Carn~p ClfCU ~le d ~ ~o important tht,-
and
.' . at elntro U't' Ie .,
19, Carn'lp did puhlish 1 C IOn to arnap 2000),
" some re ated . t' l ' ,
l Jnt>lgt>nt!lcht> BegrifffO" (1927' "B . ar .~c es, In partIcular "Eigentliche und A,riomatik. Cbdcl's work in logic from that time r~~uhlte . III laled to Carnap's
,
Ax IOnl/ltl "er
'k" ( 19'.,\Ob), and "Vb E t c h . . uber U n I ersuc h ungen zur allgemelnen
' I re ogulla e as re
'
IJOO k mllnuscnptwBsonlyrecentl er xuemalaxt " Ie ' orems. the contents of which are c Icar y c, '<Ii tation from 1929).
redis orne. arnap and Bachmann 1936). }iIS '
AXlOmatik: the completeness 0 lIst-ord e r lomc
f fi
b·
(hIS sser
Y covered. edued, and publisheda6 (Carnap 2000).

___all
42 Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey

and the incompleteness of axiomatic systems of arithmetic (Gode1 ]931). In

addition to the well known and less direct influence of the Hilbert school on
G6del's work, Carnap's very direct influence thus seems unmistakable. And
indeed, Codel himself refers to Carnap explicitly in the former work, and
irnplicitlyin the early public statements ofthe results from the latter.:w Finally,
in later years, he identifies "Carnap's lectures on Metalogic" alongside Hilhert-
Ackermann as his two main early inOuences. 21
Thus we have found a clear historical and conceptual path from the texts
presented in this book to the celebrated logical results of Godel-who 3.':1 a
student in Vienna attended the logic lectures of Carnap. who in turn took down
these lectures on logic by Frege in lena.

20. See fGi.idel 1986) p 62 f 3.

2(03). •. • n ..• compare also (Awodey and Caru5 2001) and (Goldfarb
21. See (Awodt'y and Cams 2001).

____.......\MIIi
~~----------

Carnap's Student Notes

What follows are notes, taken by Rudolf Carnap, in Frege's 1910-1914 courses
~n lo~c and the foundations of mathematics at the University of lena, trans-
"ated .mto English by the editors. The notes consist of three parts:
Begnffsschrift I," "Begriffsschrift II," and "Logic in Mathematics." Their
~ont~nt ~eriv~s from transcriptions, supervised and edited by Gottfried
abnel, from material contained in Carnap 's Nachlass. The first two parts are
~upplementedby editorial tootnotes from Gabriel'5 German version, also trans~
ted into English. Apart from our treatment of footnotes, we have adhered to
the typog
. rap h ""
Ie conventIons ()f the German verSIOn;.see " the Ultro d uctlon
" by
Gabne~ (above) for details. However, we follow CaTnap's original page breaks.
~he tturd part, "U)bric in Mathematics," is published here for the first time,
either in ('...erman or III
" E-,nghsh
" (although a related text. ' " 0 f Frege ' s
conSISting
OWn lecture notes, was published in his Nllrhp,t'/assenen Srhriften). We adopt
the same tv<) h" " " h" I" h I" "
.J t ograp Ie conVl~nllol1s tor t IS text as or t e orcgOlng ones.
"

45

-_.
,
R.Carnap

University ofJena
 Winter Semester 1910-1911
Frege
Begriffsschrift I

10 2+J~'
( ~ cont;nt ~trokc Only th~ thought. 1.
judgment stroke not yet as a fact.

-,3>5 negation

~ 3<5 the same as - 3 < 5.

condition stroke

L3~>2

}
] >2 This may at first seem counter-intuitive. since
we know the individual sentences, or their
L2~>2 falsehood. But as far as logic is concerned.
2>2
II
it dot:sn't mallcr whether we can survey the
sentences.
IV

r:.~.lhis makes mote scnsc:

~~s~::e~: ~~"Begriffsschrift I" and "Begriffsschrift II," editorial footnotes will be

margins.' ~:n the te~t by. brie! descriptio~5, as well as Teferenc~ numbe.rs in th.e outsi~e
e
flotation "11 coununghnes 10 the deSCrIptions, each formula m Freg 5 Begriffsschrift
Nates. W~ be counted as one line. eN will be used as an abbreviation for Carnap 's
GottfTiedlGa~~e exception of footno'te 99, all notes are from the German version by
neL
l.Topoftbepa~
Underst d. l:>~' rig
° h t 51°d e. 10mes 2-3: "Only the thought, not yet as a f act, "ThoJS IS
° to b e
o~
thus 0. f In the ,sense "not yet asserted as a fact"; since 2+3 -= 5 is 0. true thought and
pende a~t-accord.ing to Der Gedanke (1916) p. 74: "A fact is a thought that is true"-inde-
nt y of whether it has been recognized as true and asserted by us,

49

~ 't16
50
Winter Semester /910-1911 Frege's Lectures on Logic 51

T ~ not {A false, B true}

4 cases are possible:

III: A false, B true.
I) A is true, B is true. not-A and B
II) A is true, B is false.
III) A is false, B is true.
IV) A is false, B is false.
1: A true, B true «
Case III cannot OCCur. A andB

} Thus, only means that case III is ruled OUl; doesn't say
anything about the truth of individual sentences.
IV: A false and B false
neither A nor B

II: A true and B false

«

A andnot-B
III
not lA false, B true}
A ornot-B «
I
L not: A false, B true; --c;:::: .,; 2.

not (A lmc, B truel

not-A ill" nol-11'

IV
not ! A f<llsc. H raise) ~ and; ~ neith.:r-nor.
.1 "r !lIme <",-
('h~' 1I<1I1-l"u:llISJV~' "ul'"')

no! "
lA true, B lalscl
not-A or IJ

2 3
~------~~
d s "or"and "and"
.are-doubly
2,Bott~mofthepage,lasttwoltnes:
. I n eN,n)
otonlythewor
underhned (here represented by boldface.
but also the correspondmg .
SIgns'In
lJegriffsschrift notation.

.-
 52 S3
Winter Semes[er 19/0-1911 Frt!ge's Lectures on logic

, Let us replace Mby:

not (not-Maud r)

not ( not-A and B)

Ican also regard

since:
L A
S
as upper tenn to rand cJ. or
--rcA
L ~ as upper tenn to .1 ,

not ( not~A and 8 and T) ,~

B and rare interchangeable. L LJ not (not-N and .1)

Wewrire:

We call A the "upper term"; Band rthe lower terms. not-N ( oot-A and Band T)

»The lower terms arc interchangeable. «

not ( not-A and B and rand,1)

TeAl
L:: r not (not-Maud rand,j)
"

Let us replace M by L ~ For not-M Wl' get: not-A and B. is the upper term; rand ,1 are the lower
!trolS. I can', rc~ard B as a lower term

--,-,-.'1 not-A and B

nnl (nol-A ,md n anu rimd .1): H, I: ,I 1lIIl'n:h;1l1~l'ahle lll' r - LH
L: r,I Ilol ( not-I) lind ["ami, 1 )

nut \ nul (not-A lind H)und "und .11·

lower Icrm[ s I
) mllY not he br\lkcn up.

4 5
 54 Winter Semester 1910-1911 55
Frege's Leewres on Logic

lS ~ not ( not-A "'d not-B and not-F) I AorBorT

nol (not-A and nol-8 and not-n

3. A or B or r (non-exclusive "or")
I
nltlrht'r A 1Ior B nor r
LandT
I
Instead of I, [put ---r-c= BA not-B or A
I

A andB and r I
shall mean: ··'05ults by transposition."

A andBand r
. h kind of transition. 4.
In ordinary language we simp Iy say "thus" without specifymg t c
Here we arc more preClse.

(-) and ,1
In~t('ad of (~). let us pill
'E;; 5.
I '-r- ,1r
I-r- For.l Tht'!W\l .1ft' i",cn-JlllfI~t,llhlc:
we CUll wnte:
S{'

><:
L(~n.,
Rho Iranl'pll",Uinn

1-.-.1
, L, /"

6 7

no~auon
. for "'uans--
3. Top of the page, second line: In eN, above the word "or" in shorthand . (inUlTI"
the etze I, p. 27)two
Frege's Slgn endieu-
phrase "Ilon-€xclusive 'or"') the same word occurs again in ordinary n01:aUon, pres 4. Second half of the page; Elsewhere (c f · Grundges
is smaller., and the lines are perp
.. .. I the fiattene d X , d
ably to highlight this case and make it easier to recognize. POSlnon" (contrapOSH.lOn , . the premise aD
1ar to each other. We follow CN. missing both 1D
. dgment ar~.
5. Bottom of the page: In CN, the JU f suokes
"transpmiloo n.
..
in the conclusion of the second example 0 a

... fIIIIIi
 56 57
Wimer Semester 1910-1911 Frege's Lectures on logic

Can of COUrse <llso be applied backwards:

lIere, 100. we use the flattened X:

The main point is: »In a transposition the upper term negated takes The intemlcdiate ~tcp
the place urthe lower ham, and the lower

~r
A
term negated, the place of the upper [enn. « ,J
is simply lett out. "

Another application of transposition (according lu the same principle)'

><

t J. form into the upper

Rille: We can :'Ilw'ays tum anyone of. the lower
. . !cnllSlower
in nega e the rest' 0f the lower
teml:
The case or severallo,.'er tenns: . neg ated tom) tOlo a
term and the upper term In
terms remain unchanged. E.g.:
We know thai the lower terms
are interchangeable. therefore:

1n:::~
1rc:::~
C r
"
~; 1
Ct "
><
. ,
E -
"
t
A
II ~~: A

8 9
6. Bottom of the page last Ii 'C'''h of
th e Iower terms . ' formula
In the ne.furthest
H as, to the right. ".1" instead of"r" in the lowest
erroneously,
58
Winter Semester 1910 191! 59
Frege's Leewres on Logic

We can regard 2 terms together as the upper term: Besides transposition there are also less simple inferences.

(I-c~ (H
not ( not-A and B ) B is true
case 1[1 is ruled out. II and IV arc ruled out.

From these two propositions it obviously follows: (I-A

A is true
case I

We write (the propositions arc labeled for later use):

If we only Want 10 h.ave one lower Ie
nn, we proceed as follows:
(a I-B (fJ I-r Ir

Or we write:
I-cAB 1-8
(fJ)::-- (a):---

I-A I-A

Now we ICllhc I I I \"

. (p mes be Inc upper Il~rm: 1'=~r Or we write briefly'
Irl : --- m-~
Thus we nOw hI11/C onl I-c~ L r
Y WIt' 1uwer tefm: II amll't1",1 ,'1.
IIi( :- - - (fJ.r):-
I-A I-A

~----- ~/O~i '--.-'_' ----------~

60 61
W'Inter Semester 1910-1911 Frege's lectures on Logic

More Intricate Farms oj -Inference:

(0
\\!lIat can be In
. t'erred from th"
" IY (0

Possible cases: A true B true < 7,

At B false M,

(A f Bt)
> Af Bf

Bt rt <
Bt rr
(B f rt)
> Bf rr
If r t: Bt: At.
If A l Br rr
Ruled out: AC n.

Thus it follows:

!
Fusion of iJcl1ticallowcr tcnns:
f-r:; ;,t.,
/
II
We-write
f-r:AH .\
II
(PI'
(a):
f-r:A
r

/2 /3

oomb;ned
7.To pofthe i page, ,econdhne, . left ,ide, The b.-cke" indicate rbat rhree term' have been
terms "r" nto one upper term (in relation to the remaining lower term "T·'). The lower
fl, S and".d"h ave been exchanged without comment.
. arne line asI i n 7" nght
C'undge",ze . .
"de, .
(E) ,e,ult' f,om (0) hy applymg '.
tran,po""on, '.
","c, ("f,
, p. 28.1ert column, bottom halO.
62 63
Winter Semester 1910-1911 Frege's Lectures on Logic

Instead of alilhat we write briefly:

» if we have two premises

~~
[with the same upper term]

~f
or: such that a lower term of one
occurs negated in the other,
~ then we draw the inference:
(0)' (y),--------- leave the upper term alone and
take as lower terms the lower

~j ~i
tenus of the premises except
for that term which occurs
both affmncd and denied. «
z z
We write:

Yel a third fonn of' f

1Tc ~r m",nc, - 2~p"m;"r; with the ""m, upper term
L.2=
.1 (¢ E ('7
What follows
from this'?
~~ d
9.
>< (a),
(~)o-- -.-- -

(a

14
9 80 resents the inference indica~ed
b' " ttom urthe page, last line but one: Frege usually rep . ~ eriod at the beginOlng
y -, _ . _ . _ . _ . _" typographically in such a way that there 1~D'~ eN.
and at the end (cf. Grundgesetze I, p. 30. right column). We fa
 65
Winter Semester 1910-1911 frege's lectures on logic

Inferences Involring "e

v nera /.uy.

( 21" 4
(-I) 4
always true:
0 4
4
~ 1 >- 2
2

1>2
'1::: 2>2
2' > 2 h- 3' > 2
• L J>2 . 2 4.
. 10.
'---
Both terms fals'"
. ". the lower term fal,c, both true. One c?mponent ehangcs, namely the nne referred to by the tencr of generality. It is 11.
-y------_./ an object. The other componcnt refers to a concept: square root of 4. This conccpt
n
alv.ays need~ "saturatIOn" by an object. The COI/('CP' is il/Ilced ol"complelio
The form is always true
sin 1

a" >- 2anda > 2 arc notrcall .. sin 2

y a proper name (e.g., I or 2 or ~) . e~me
we replace the letter b ' Y prOpOSitions; rather the be .
propositions." propositions when sin J
\\ e call them "quasi-
sin 4

Here we have a conslant component as welt and one that varies: an ohjeet. Here, too,
In ordinary language we sa y ..something"
. instead of a. the constant component "sin" is unsaturated. incomplete. Thefimctio n is in need 01"
completion.
if something squared IS
. 4, then its 4 111
power .
IS 16. sill 2 is an irrational numbcr~ we call it the "valuc" of the function for the argument 2.

I' 'varying objcct~ cnnstant function: ( ):.

"
In Contrast we have: ;s the vallie nf our function for the :ugumcnt 2.
2 4 4
'----------------.,..-~ ,
---"
L 2: Ih
2' - 4
in 2" - 4 . ,
(i _4 " cI complele lhought. " 0 <I
IS 1101 a COIll I t h 4
'----y---.-1 thus",' peet ou~hl 4 II> !(,
. f/lla.l/"propfI.\'itilJr/" .
! t"ouxht.\·.'

nl\ls 111\· hUl\'linli IS 1.:11IHpkted by II\\' ""r~1I1l1\'nL" , . .

(()n~ shullld 1101 "011//1.\'" till" vlllm' Ill' Ill\' hllKti(lll with the fUll\'Il\lll ltse!t,)
E very square '
onl a ' Toot ot 4 is the 4 th TOil '
Y combmatlt)n of 2 . t 01 In, su
(oncept\'., n0 t 0 1'2 lholl~hIS.
16 17

he""een "'m'
lOT on
.. op of the page, line' 6-6, Acco,ding to f,ege', di,rincri m caDng
! ndeutendenl" and" f . [b . h ll d n}"leuers itshouldnotsayherethatagen-
erallet "" . re erTl~g ezetc ?e e •• . ' ..
leT a m the expreSSiOn "0 2 ", 4' (above) refers.
11. Tup of the page line 7' In eN the object name "~4"
is used instead of the ~o~cept
name "square root 4 ~f "~hich c~ntradicts
Frege's conception- For more on thlS lss~e.
;" Na'hgdamne Sch;'!,en (f«ge 1963, p, 2551; compa« abo the cone>pondi,;g
emarks on the eoncept "square root of 1" in the present text (p. 19 belOW)'fP.-hesu,mabf Y
lunap' bh . ... t f 4" by means a t e Slgn or
Cth a tevlated Frege's spoken expreSSion square rou 0 .

e square root.
 66 67
Winter Semester 1910~1911 Frege's Lectures on Logic

Instead of "Wlsaturated"' or "in need of completion" we can also say: "of predicative 13.
character."

If we say: "All square roots of 4 arc 4th roots of 16," then "square root of 4" seems not to
It suggests itself. then, to regard a concept as a function as well.
he prcdicative; but it only seems that way, since we really have the following:
th
;'If something is a square root of 4, then it is a 4 root of 16."
Scheme: I-c w(n)
'I'(n) Consequently we should not link logic too closely to everyday language; logic is not only
trans-arian, but even trans-human.

<P(a) .takes the place of' does. n0 t "1Ild'!Cate" aq . '

tums mto a real proposition if
'..
' . uasl-prOposltlOn In which Q occurs; it 2
,= 8 can be decomposed in different ways into a saturated and an unsaturated
, we replace a With an object. Likewise for 'P(a). part:
2' ;' = 8.
Contrast: (-2) is a square rool of 4 3; 2;'::: 8.

~ 8; 2' = p
"
something unsaturated

i= I is obviously false; it would say: Everything is a square root of I.

12, But: (-2JfaJls
: under~the concept"::;quare rool of 4 ..
, ~--) would not be true either: Nothing is square root of 1.
'~-
• ' I something y
self-sufficient
ThIs bnngs about
the connection. Thus in order to negate generality, let us make use of German leners:

) falls under ( is false: Everything is square root of I.

'-,---J
even requires a is true: Not cverything when squured is I.
douhlc completion
~. is flllsl,:: Nolhin~ whcn sqUlIrcd is 1
Thus I need 1(1 IIC~IIIC it:

h-tr-r- a. - 1: It is false, that nothing is a square rool of 1,

/9 or existt:ntiul propo.\'ition: Th~re is a square root of l.
/8
~2. ~~ddJ.e of the page: In eN t .
the. WIthin the bracket • he thLrd. cUdy bracket d •.
means of additional und i-
tJ:te expressIOn "square
er lnmg,
oesn t Include the definite article
root of 4" is highlighted further by
13. Top of the page, first two lines: In eN, the quotation marks are missing.
 69
68 Winter Semester 1910-1911 Frege's Lectures on logic

Earlier \\If;: had: is not true, thus:

We can also write:

n .4 == 1 "At least one square root

f 1 is a}'<1 root of I."
,? "
(= at least one)
""Ta'~ 1 (particular affirmative) some

Ilcrc the judgment stroke IS . not neccssat)'; we can also leave It. as a mere t h DUg hi , which
is not possihle with letters of generality.
is false, thus:

Vi is an (J~it'c/ (not a concept), is not in need of completion.

hy contrast. is unsaturated.
. 3Td root of 1,"
"At least one square roo t of 1 IS"not a
is a nonsensical notation. .
(particular negative ) "some not

\h' havc allowl'd ourselves III he misled hy ordinary usc of language:

If SOlTll'lhing j"" square Toot of 1, it is + I or 1:
-&,- <1>1.\
L'I'la\
all ----==:::::::::~:::=-------3-~c~o~ntrary
~<I>I') n"
'I'lal -.... \
contrad(leWry J opposite

If something is a square rool of I. it is not a 3"1 mol ur 2

~<I>(al
'f'jn\
,\'f/nlt'
~t"d21 ~trary
Or: No :>quare rool of I is a )'d rool of 2. ~<I>lal
(univer,\"ul negaril'{' judgment) . - L 'f'(d)

20 21

14. Top of the page, lines 1-5~ By "letters of generality [Allgemeinbuchstaben 1." what is
meant are Roman letters. The "earlier" refers to p.16, middle of the page, where it says.
however;
L 'I~ 10

" •
In p,j~ni('tlillr, th,· ju(lg1nt'nt stroke is missing, contrary to Frege's (only emphasi-,.edl rule
t~llil It mU.'5t hf' the-.re wht'n ft'~f'r81ityis expressed hy means ofa Roman l~tter. Compare
(ynuul/l.l"w·(U I. p. 31. on thiS lSSllt'. especially note 1.
70 71
Winter Semester 1910-1911 Frege's lectUres on Logic

all contrary no

~contradictory
~
some _
~ contmry~
_ _ some not
-r&.-n-r- <P(o)
. . '-'- 'f'(o)
says therefore: There is at least one object,
that is both tP and If'.

Some:
~<1l(0) .' t the general
'1'(0) So the particular affirmative judgment contains an existentIal Judgmen ,
affirmative does not.
we can also write:

~<P(O) [taot for us We give their

'1'(0) The 4 judgments: all, some, no, mme not are oot that IrnpO ~e basic elements.
. But we have even rno
ronn to make a connection with ordinary IOgIC.
~ 'C'::: <P(o)
'f'(o)
16.
~X(O) There is at Jeast one X. tufe of things.
· d es violence to the oa
The distinction between subject and predIcate 0

Instead of X( ~) we have: E,g" the four concepts in ~ E~~:~

x(o)
flhH
. t/Jand If'and Xand il.
are aII .Interchangeable· The'e
, ,·s "' least one object thai IS

e.g.: '1:': <P(A) says: A is a 'P and A is n m.

'f'(A)

22 23
15. Top of the page, first line; In eN thewo"

reasons. q
.
of the two diagonals in the logical 5 • uare;..d contradictory" takes (as usual) the pla~e
- e present form was chosen for typographIC
:6. Se~ond half of the page. third line {r.o m
Pl'edicate"; but in the text we are dealing f
:th . "object" instead of
e bottom: In eN, 1£ says sub'eet_predicate
the replacement of the
rion strUcture.
J

st~ctureof the sentences by their argument- unc

__ !,,~

.~.M.·· . . __
 73
72 Winter Semester 1910-1911 Frege's Lecwres on Logic

There is a ditlerence between 3:> 2 and 1001--998> 2; in spite of the fact that 3 ,md

(1001-998) have the same value, they have different senses. It is only by an
As tbe rnt:aning of a st:ntence we mus't t akc the truth value:
investigation that we find out they arc identical. The two sentences:
word sense meaning
thought - . is true
"The Morning Star is not luminous"

and b something
property of a thought. ut
Truth is not. as. everyday language suggests. u
aclditiona1.
'The Evening Star is not luminous"
\ . ". since what is
" spondence a t' an I.dea with rca lty "
Trutb cannot be defme d as carre
.1
have different senses. The thought .' h cannot be dcfincu,
. h h
objective cannol be compared Wit W a .t is suhJectlVe. Trut

analyzed, reduced. It is something simple, basic.

'The Morning Star is the Evening Star"

is the result of a special insight; in contrast, the sentence:

. , . h ~ Howing fundion: .
Our bonlOntallmc stands lor teo function is the frue.
th '0 the value of the " the False.
"The Evening Slar is the Evening Star" ,; If I talo: as its argument the True, e" ",," " "

is true in and of itsclC The tliftcrcllcc between the names thus cI1rrcsponds to a
""
~th.c,
"~ .>
F~~~~cr true IWr lalse,
or somethIng that IS nCl

difference between the senses. S{) 11 naml,: docs nol ,iust express the thin~ denoled. We ('unscqucntly: -,,.
uistinguish, consequently, between the "mc.tning" lind the ..scn.. . t.' .. Ill".1 pnllK'r n.\lllL'.

24 25
 75
74 Winter Semester 1910-1911 f~'s Lectures on logic

nsaturated part:
sign: proper name We can divide the sentence 4 > 3 into a saturated an d an u
17. sentence concept word sentence in indirect speech
sense: s. of the n. thought s. of the c.
meaning: object truth value 4 ,; > 3
concept thought
proper name; concept word.
~··t·
We can divide thi:; agatn
to o.
3 ~ > C
proper name; relation.
18. The sign expresses a sense. The proper name expresses the sense of the etc.
name.
The sign n:f(:rs to a meaning. The proper name refers tu the object.

5-1> 3
~
5-t ';>3
"A believes that the Morning Star is a planet."
~
function
r s
_ ~
l ., -'"
In this case we couldn't just substitute in "Evening Star"'; inuccu. fhe thought here IS
(not a concept)
precisely lIot the sense, but the meaning.

26 27

17. 'Top of the page, lines 1-3: In eN, the horizontal lines ofthc table are not drawn.
18. Middle
used of t~e page. lines 4-5 from top: In
for abbreVIatIOn. eN. quotation marks" 'I" are sometirn e5
 77
76
Winter Semester 1910 1911 freze's Lectures on Logic

r A... afEngland _
I1Je capifal

England; the capital of ?

(analogous to 5~.g)
I-( level function: argument object

1II II
2r>J level functiun: 2'''J len:l C\lnco:pt
-.-v-r a'•
a
I' ~ I

~n>O (-I)' ~ I 2~
Ifwe want to ex.press that at most Otlt' ohJl:ct falb under a concept, we \loTit..::
~n3>O
2' - I 3'

e.g .. positive square root of 1:

!hese 3 have something .;" -= 1, has the value: ;2 has th~ value: 1, 4. 9
III common: the Trut:, the True
the False. '
(~ I
~~(all ';>0
another example:

~ ,,-+
b d.=ott
1 -- 2
.;' > 0
II + 1 2
0=-

2'''' len'!lim("l;fln:
argument: Iimctinn I" lew/limclioll:

1
argulllent: ohwrt
.wlfi,l/i,'/f ('Ofll""f!f.\
I i.I'1f /" /1'\'1'1 ('olln'f"

(I and 11:'11 Imd,'rlhi... nllll,:cpl)

'-- ~2~8J 29 -------------'

,..
" .'
~ '
xx &#'*111\ _
I AppendixA
1...:.:......=:...:......------------
 81
80 frege's Lect.um on LOglc
Wincer Semester 1910-1911

Thl! Ontologficul/ PrrJ/!/ot!ht' E.u~t,'nn· of (in"

20.

"(jlxl" is somelimes a l.:oncept name. somcllme~ a prllr n name C\\slcncc lh.tr,t":·

h J fCJlurl..' ICT\,II~-'

19. "exists" is either a 1" I~yel concept .; Ii\CS

n
or a 2 <l lc\'cl concept There is a ~
alUl cOnnCCll.':J wIth a propcr narnl.':l

Om: first ddines the concept ··Goo. ' but includes existence as a charactenstll .
"[Ht'rkmal]
I Ih' l.jUL'~ll,)n
What
~ II 1
in the detinition. Therefore in the onr<!loglull p,"""t \l..e LlrL'. rJ.thl..'r. JNhng l.. •
21
features doe~ the e,)neerl ··ti,'>d" h,n ("
A concept is composed of characteristics:

eg. '1'::"'=1
~ '"' 0 I •
1 I 'M.juarc root uf I
"'tel
2) ro~itiv(' Ilumhcr

F
I
-'1'1 ... )
- \(~ I
--- l( ~l
r1l1QCIU.:e Ullmot he ITlrhrde([ ,1\ ;I l'hmal'll'fl"tll
t"lllllTpt

AI
~2 .
. s thc (conjunct1Ve.~
19. Top of the page, lines 3-5: What is probably meant is that the expression .. ex.ists"~; ·concept.
-t curved bracket indtcatt; nee is a feature
Th us The no te ""elUSte
against its logical nature, combined with a proper name here, not with a concept ~.ahut
20. Top of the page, first tOTmu.
, lao The f us .
'"41(;)." .For Fr,~ge.
t.his i~ noto~ ··li.n~sticallyimproper (spra~hlich.un~~attha.[~ho.rle­ combination of the characteristics ,of the on the left. 1 ce of the questton
also IOgJ.c~ly.,~on~enslC~ (unsmntg). See the examples "Africa eXlsts and e also belongs nlore under the sign for eXIstence eriod takes the p a
magne eXists 10 Uber dte Grundlagen der Geometrie II (1903). p. 373~ compar. 21. Five lines from the bottom of the pag e·lnCN.ap
.
'-Uber Begriff und GegensLand" (1892b), p. 200. 1T1ark.
 I
I
I

I
I
I
I Appendix B

.••~ ...
't-...~
 84 85
Winter Semester 1910-1911 f¥'s lecrures on Logic

Numerical Statements about a Concept:

:3>2: i>2; Pc;'; qJ(S'.';). . is
. '- = fthis functIOn
The number ofuNeus fallinR under the concept is 0, . . if for 2 argumen Is the value 0
This function expresses a relatIon, I tion to each other.
the True, we say: the two arguments s t a od in that re a
22.
If2 things fall under the cuncept.
then they are identical.
There is at least one ubject that falls, . t nly one s t ...'>ods in
under the concept. for each obJed." 0g relation.
the correspon In

The number ofobjects falling under the concept is J.

H~re we have relations as argumenls.

The numerical statement concerns the kind of satisfaction; it is a 2"d level concept 23.
indicating the features of a concept.
Above we had concepts as arguments.

In everyday language we take "two" and "tall"III ~

' . 'two ta II towers ",0 be adiectives of Thus there are 2 kind~' OJ,,]"d Ie vel (:oncepts.
equal Slatus.
24.
_ ,,(2).
But: each tower is tall . fact • a concept):
level function (In
1here IS y(t another kmd of2nd
not: each lower is Iwo,
bcr 2 as ar~ument,
rt of the num
rhe value of the lundlun IS the 1 rue If I ttlke a prope Y
Plato already realized thai the attrihute "one" docs not apply In the o~icci.
nut fhe
concept; for example: the conccp' "chairs in the auditorium" ha,~ the feature (11"
e.g., ~> I
uniqueness.

BI 82

ofunique~e" (d. p.
w points from the statement

~hould
22. Top o:the page, line 3, Ifwe follow F,ege', u'ua! rep,e,entation
29; also Grundgesetze I. §22). the upper part of the formula look like thHi:
~i~.
L-..:iI'(')
/1'(-)

Thi, <one, pond, al,o to the ,ep«oentation of the one-'<>-one ,elation on p. 82 belo~
(eompart> also. Grundlff'snu I. p. 40~.
We are probably dealing with a mistake in Ca.rnap ~
hott'S. hpn'. sln(~t' thiS representation ?Ccurs nOWhere else in Frege. It is. however.
logieally <o"ee' a?d ean be "an'fo,medtn,o Frel!"', '-'p'e'en'atio , ,inee "6";, a bound
variahll" in Frt'ge GrufJdl!oest'tr."I.
s syntbohsm snd n
can, for syntactic reasons alone. not occur free In
"fP(;;)"" (compare § 17),
 Summer Semester 1913
Frege
Begriffsschrift II

The meanings of the parts of a sentence are not parts of the meaning of the sentence.

However: The sense of a part of the sentence is part of the sense ofthe sentence.

The meaning of a sentence is its truth-value.

lfa sentence has no meaning, but only sense, then we arc not in the realm of science, but

of fiction.

A sign expresses its sense, refers to its meaning.

(E.g., the meaning of a proper name is the object it names,)

I)
. Sorne signs
. . n('('d o!I'omplcfioll (e.g.
arc m 0= ).

lfsunnJ. . . . f" . ' 't"I'/lin the case of two

, .... ~mcllta'lllfI YH~lds a ~cntcncc. then the Slit{l n.~ crs to a (on<

arguments, a rt'!,jfjO/r).

More generally: .Iimctivn.

2 J Th . f I entation are called proper

. osc parts of a sentence that arc not 10 need 0 supp em

name.~; they refer to objects.

~---------------'

87
 I
88
Summer Semester 1913 I frqe'$lectures on logic

COlh.:ept of the true: I

l=:,
; == ;,.
concepl ofth...

identity rdation
non~(rue:

} 1;1 [eve-! function

(the arguments are objects)

2r.J lewl function

I
I
I,
"
lthc argumcnts an: 1-, le....el functionsl

We wan( to express the cool'inuit} of an analytic funl:tion al a particular point.

for every t' there eXIsts <l rxlSIII~C.J SlIl.:
.h thatlhl" fclatwll hold:,-
y'

ThlL~: In the interval from x - d fo x -t- dlhe differ-

ence berween the ....alue of the function and
the value at x can be made arbitrarily small.

." ,
,
~~ ·.,, ,
L__~_~ ·, d'\_1
if'{l\I)

"
(/'(\)
(/'1'1' ,
fonllnll\l)'.

I'his is supposed to hilid ti,r SUllie I' II.

TIT
• ·0
·0
\
2
90 91
Summer Semester 1913 ""', Lectures on Logic

Example. The function ~2 is continuous at 1:

Let the number A be the limit of a function <P(;) for positive arguments jnG'1'essing

toWHn!s infurity (A ~ lim <P(~)).

';=' 00
•

I'T' A - <P(a) < e FOI" every a > dthe difference A - fj)(a) must be < e in absolute
L..= A- iP(a»-e v!ilue; and for every positive e there has to be such a number d.
a>d

~A-<P(.)<'
A -a>(.) > - e
.,b
b>O
pO

4 5
92
I 93
Summer Semester 1913 I Frege's lectures on logic
I
I
I A is identical to B if c¥erything that holds. for A also holds for B: and conversely.

--!rc'lM)a) is. the same as u =' h; the tv.'o are identical. i.e., whateVcr holds of
the one also holds of Ihe other:

I-r- g (-&c Ira»)

L g(a = b) fIb)
(III

Ipp. 6-10 in CNaT'("cmp~'J

This contains e....erything that can be said about identity.

E.g., as g we can take -';:

25.
Earlier we had:
[H ~'(a)
L---.::: a=b
~ b) I ifM,(f(fJ))
~M,('(fJ)) (n.
(H,);- - - - - - - - - - - - -- » Everything that's tnle for all 1·lle....el functions
In- fla) is true for anyone of them. «
L:::: fIb)h
(17 (ltta We now apply this in the form
26.

,
~
I(a)
I(b)
,(,,)
~bl

11

~:.Six lin., from the bottom of the page. right column' Thee5 e "e.'Iier'~;:;" :: :J:i: ::-::rc
I gpages lsee above), In terms of content, compare Crundg t!tz I, § . e
IIWhas the label "lIb."
26. Last line, right column: In Nc' the judgment suok.e in this formula is rnissing.
 I

!-----------~
94 . Frege's lectlJres on Lolric
• 95
Summer Semester 1913
I
I

II
I
I
I
IlIa I-n-r- Ila)
L::= fib)
l1=:O

><
I-rr fib)
L fla ) 27.

>< u~b
(lIIe la
-0--
1Sf(~t 'Laa
fib) (lIId I-r: flu)
f(a)
usually

Now we usc lhe introduction of German letters; we can

'----' ~Iways do so jfwc let the cavity immediately follow the
Judgment stroke .

In III. instead of _ .,t= for g we can take

~fI")
(11)" ---,!~('::') Imtc:ld of h I Cllliid also have written a everYWhere
{ in III and a .
I- l/ -- {/ (Ilk

12 /3

. led line fro mth e topofthepQue' On the use of the Slgn

27reekl
Tl,
." -~- "and 0
f 0_·"
"".1lJ,J.
G a els). cOlnpaTe Grundgeset:;e
ettel"s( as Ih --,:l" 1. p. 66f.
 97
Summer Semester 1913 , lnjo'l1.e<tures on Logo<
!

I'
,

I
In IIIc we replace I'I.¢. ) by .; '" a:
I lfil- - - - - - - - - - -
I
,
"'1-111 ( --r- <J l ( 1I1~

I
I --0--
-0- I
~ "g'""
III
I Want to replace a by - 11. and b by -.- U"
t'Xlh}l
28
I J.:(u) gtl'tl

~Lal~(-.-al
Ilk

29 (lg), --- - - - - - - - - _
><
We had Ig
~;-a)=(--.-a) ~g(iJl-g(/,'l
t ft g(<J11
hglhll
~(:- a) = (--.- a)
1ft
-0- I
Irl
~ ,l.!(i1I-'!l(hl

~"
ilia a <l /' tlllh

(- Ill"" t-r- a)

14 I /5
'----
28. SeVen lines. from the top of the page: WIth
. respect to the subsutuuons
.. per formed
.'_;: in
,"
(IIIe), the funcrionletter "f" has, in additioll, been replaced by the fUDcnon name rr~k.e
The horizontals
in (IIIe) have been fused (cr. Crundgesetze I, p. 67). In eN. the judgment Ii
i .. missing.

29. Eight lines from the top of the page: In the ttansition u!>iog (Ig) the formula

L~
is considered to be a lower te~m in fIg) that coineideswith the upper term in (IIle). The
pr~sent derivation of (lUg) dIffers from the onf: in Grundsest!tze 1 fp.
67) .

••••••'..v
 99
:i"I~e~"~le:cta:",,~o:n~L:o~gi:C
98 Summer Semester 1913 ! _

We now give some applicatiuns: show how one can cunduct fJroof~ with our notation.

30. E.g., we want to prove the propusition

~
a~b
t r+b>a
r+a>b
t> 0 oj lIa: h-:;--!(a)
h-- u>a
~r(·)
. L(a_b)+~~_~ _
(Ib)" -------------

~
We had IIIe !(b)

~
¢+b>(1
I(a) 1(0 C.a>b
Here we want to make use a=b
C>O
of the proposition:
(a-b) H~a
I-- (A
Instead of a" a (~b~ b) + b:> a

~
(a-b)+a>b

~
We use it here by replacing a>a
(lIIc),,---_ _ a-b>O
j(¢) by ¢> a a-b>O
a by (a-b)+h e t+h>a
r t+b>o
~ a>a t+o>b
(a-b)+b>a b by a r: t- a> b
31. (a 0>0 t:> 0 (lla
lIIe then assumes the form (n

~
a>a

~
a>a a>b We also use:
(0 b)+h>a r tl-b>Q .... a>O (H
(a-b)+b=a r+a>b
0>0 l-r--a-b>O (T
• La>b
We had Ib:

~
a>b
a>a
• H 1,>0
(j.> b
t -I
r" 0

We now write il in th~ fonn:

~
(a h)+h>a
(a -- h) + h ~ a
(0 b)t-a>b

16 17

~o. ":o~ of the page, second line: In eN, the jUdgment sO'oke in the sentence to be proved
IS mISSing.

31. Middl: o~·the page: In eN, the brackets in the expression "(a _ b) + b > a" in (IIId ao. d
(a) aTe nllSSIn.g~ compare. however, the form in which (a) is used. In eN, the label (IX) IS
duuhly underhned.
 100 I 101
Summer Semester 191] I ~'s LecOJres on Logic

I
I
I
And we use: I

~
32.
~;~ I
(Ll): --- _ b>a

~~n, I

~
a~b (.1
, t+h>a
t+a>h This is supposed to mean (~at I
'>0 a and h arc real numbers, smce
b>a
c>a
it is only for them that> is I
supposed to be defined.
d>b (P
-.- (8):: b>a
31.
a)

~ ----------
h-b>b
• L(b-a)+a>b '+b>a
t+u>h
33.
(Id):: <>0
-----------------------
~
b>b IP) ------
(h -a) + h > a
(h - a) + u::. h
(IIa)::

~
h>h
h u>O
t r+h>u
r~u>h
roO

/8 /9
t but-o ne forIl1u .. In
I C'1I.1
J~. this
32. Top of the page, first formula in the right column: In eN, the judgment stroke 15
. nu"ssing· d
ts nokein the las "d" by"! + a
34 Bottom of the page' I:r"t. C:!i;as been replac~ xi
f h ( ) theJudgmen b "1 + b" an
33. Bottom 0 t e page: a Is " Invoked
. by replacing ""a" by "b" and "'b" by "a. "Theinfer- Also, when Invokmg (In erections in the e .
cnce involving
apparently (ld) in
deduced comes
the foabout as~:
fOllows: In the missing part (see above)., (Idl was replacement is effected by eor
em

a
This corresponds
(ld) is .the
to In
then invoked the Conn ~
representation of lId) below , as well as in Grundgesetu I, § 49.
(b'-a) +" > b
(b- a )+ b > a
(b-a)+a>b
thuHeplacing
sentence "b" by
deduced by" (Id).+ b) a." In eN, the jUdgment '''oke i. mi..ing in the
-rIb-a)
invoking
 102 103
Summer Semester 1913 I frege's Lectures on logic

I
I
I
,

, • b
TI-:?,>a-f(b)
f-r-I+b>a r + a::> f(b)
35. ~I+b>a b>.
l+a>h (Ib 0>0
t>0
f-r-I+a>b
~I+b>a
l+a>b (Id
This is the expression for the hmll
. ' ofaIIJnction as the argument goes to infinity.

tg f
l+b.>a
l+a>b
I> 0
r+h>a
r+a>h
'>0 (IIa
'li-;--,-------- a" b
t>o -feb)
,+a>f(b)
b>.
36.

L_-;-~===== .,>
{ Here we also have to
assume as known"
I-- I > 0 (E .
b r >

~----b>O
___
>0

b>b
_ _ _ _ '>0
b- feb)
,+ b > fIb)
37.

(I

Thboth
If I . u and h arc r,m,t,
'. a' th, ",gument go", to po"t;vc
. ;nHnHy. then 0 and b cn;nc;de.
q.e.d. Thw;wc only nceded the sim a IS I;.'hal W(/'" I(J 1'/'0I '('
. rk scntcnL·C.~ ,I H. w('

21
35. Top of the 20
!e~dap,
Ih, poge m \the
36. Botto f pag" In CN. the jUdgmen"troke i, mi"ing in the<eeond fo,mula
it on
tom"" becan" Ftege only 'ketehed the p,oofh ete withon' ,pelling e out. The
whete
lodgment 0 then have th"tatn' ofan "analy,i,." E\5e • hnwevet, Fteg u""he

fo,m'~nd8"'tzeI,
IUk, in G moke m ,uch ca"'"' well (fo> ""ntenc",")- N> no exception i' at i>Vue hete
n
ood p. 94), the judgmen,,(toke ha' hee added. Likewi" fm the "C·
u a on the next page.

otmul~"
of the page again, In CN, the tepte"ntarion of the lowe" loWe< letm in the
"'ond f
37. Bottom
n) th, i only hinted at. Catnap ptovide> (with "fetenee to the lOWe< te<m ahoveon
.
I"dd,d' nstructlo
.. . n, ,. th 'm,tead of a , b." In h"
e ..me. . 1atet h andwnung.
. enth
. t he 'm,(tueU.
tie tefe' and on,tead nfo, D." Again in hi' latet handwtiring lin par "'" with deie-
m"n ,enee tn hoth diteerion,). thi. temark folloW", "Note the diff"enee!" What he
5 IS the difference between free and bound variables: cf. the next note.
 104 105
Summer Semester 1913 Irejo\ lectures on logic

Earlier we already used:

Here we need the proposition: t--(a-b)+b-u

(A

--.--
38.
IL ..
I L....!-. e+b>a
e+a>b
A
(1I1e):
l- (a m) j m (l

We also "",ant 10 use:

39.

• ~ el2 >a-l(~)
e/2 + a >/(111)
J-c i.' • (e
e+(e+h»(a
+ h) )- LJ
m)+m 40.

~
.>m (:+d>m+n

• d>m
~ ~ el2 > b-l(~)
e/2 + b >l(.)
(Z) .----------------------
t-rT- e+(e+. b»a
c>m
J:--n (Z

bn L e>(a-m)
d>n (e+b»m 41.
(lib): - - ---- - - - -- -- -- - - -- - --

~
(e+e)+b>a
e>a-m
We also need an intermediate proposition: e+ b>m
(1"+1')+ h=e+(e+b)

(H)::------- l- (p+ q)+ r=p+ (q+ r) (H

t-rT-(ete)+h>a
1§(e+el+b>a L('>a-m 42.
(e+e)+u>h (' t ".~", (r
e -"a m
(Ic): _
t' ~ h "m
(' .> h m (Ie

t: :::~ : ~ ,~~
~
(' Ie II -'"

f' '" m
~--I'I" 'm
___.__ (0" I d I If . ,.

22 23
~8. Top of ~e page: In eN, the followin r e . . . . ked by a line of dashes
In Carnap 5 later handwriting: "Dis . g ~arklsadded to the rust formula on thIS page. 39. Top ofthe page' In CN the inference involving gIlC)d;e:::e I. § 14. The formula
been used for the fraction or~ divided~h d and " .. For graphic reasons. "eI2" has (inste~ of a conti~uouslinel; CQ~poo:e. h.owev~:.+(;:nb»~. a; (a - ml + m, and b: a.
(HIe lIS used after making the 6ubsUt.Uoons.jl ~ ). . . ns C • ~ d' e + b.
aki the subsotuOO •••
40. Top of the page, next line: (Z) is used after m ng
i'IJ: a - m. and 11 : m. . ked by a continuous
. . (IlIa) 15 mar u1 (III I
~1. Middle of the page: In CN. the inference Invot;1D~setz.:e I. p. 26f. The fo:m a a
~ne (instead of a line of dashes); but compare Cru ~e + e) + b. and b : e + Ie b).
IS Used after making the substitutions jI,~ ): ~ > a. a. endy deduced i~ the
. th :-ht column was ap~ h substitUtions:
4.2
.' ~ottom: The third formula (Ie) in e
1Jl.1SS mg pan; cr.
Gru.fldg~setz.:e I. § 49. (
used after making t ei:(i5
61:(e+r.) 1" b>a. P: (e+e) +a> b.

_ _..
t ....··•. . .
 106 Frege's Lectures on Logic 107
Summer Semester 1913

43. (yle:

1§
~:::l:~;~
e>a m
e! b>m
e> b- m
e-+a>m (15'

---0- lIa:
~d2>(I-f,(.g)
46.
47.

~
e+h>"
I- el2 +el2 = e e+a>h L - ,,12+0>((;)
I- e12+e12 =-- e (fJ ;>m
44. ---0--- ,,;2 >a-f(d)
ei2 + a >f'(t/)
~~b
~
n~:~~b
e2+h>l(d) "i2>u-/ld)
e/2 > h-/(t/) el2 + a >j(d)
~(eI2 + e12) + b > a ---0---
(Ib
(Ib, Id)e: ================ d>m
13.
_____ (ei2 + el2) + a.> h
0.0 ••••• 0.
» el2 > {/-f, (D)

~~u
el2 .j 0 > (I)

~
45. (o} e+h>"
('+o>h D>m
(Id

1§
d b>U f'-'2 > a-f(d) .. v
e+a>b ---0--- ('/2 + a >,/.,(<1)
e:2 n f'(d)
J

eI2>a-/( .> We suppose Ila to bc in

el2 + b >f(~ We ~uppose Ib to have the Conn:
('/2 + h> I(dl this fonn (and similarly
t-/2 > h -f(d) I-r-- el2 > u - fed) again with hand n).
<'12 + a >/(d) ~ e/2,'>a-f(J)
el2 .- a >((d)
---0---
We suppose hill) ha ....e Ih<: llmn"

l'il I (/ , ((d)
/'/2 . ,/ ((iI)
1,;2 j /I - I(d)

24 25

43. Top of the p a ge. fust

. line' (y). .
44. Middleo f t h epage: (HIe). . IS Invoked afte rrep I '
aClng"b"by"a" and "a" by '"b."
46
romWh
r· the
olefact d~' I t"he 'form of. (ld) invoked here, the additional negation stroke comes
page' r.:
f(¢"I: ~ ¢tb>a IS used after makin gthesubstltunonsa:el2+el2,b:
.. e, 8 I1 d 47 T at b has heen replaced hy" --r- el2 > a - I(d)."
i~ .replaced b· thge.. I n the fIrst
oPofthepa . transition involving (Ib) and (ld), the highest lower term
';+a >b h
terrn or lId) e lower term of (Ih) and the lowest lower term is replaced by the low~r
45. Bottom of th - 4ft B . e [wo new lower terms are identical and are, thus, "fused."
~'b~'
epage: (oj is invoked a f ter the sub· .
stltutlons e: e/2 and m:f(d). "pieced b f h e page' In the ,econd tran'ition involving lIb) and (1d), "u" i, H," to be
. Ottorn
""If, 'he I:we 'clat"e to the p,evioU> fMm of (Ib) 'nd lId). By mean' of ,he ,,'mition
"" "pl"ed I" lowerte,m i, ,<,placed hy 'he lowe, teem of (1bl and the lowe' teem ahove
thus, "t'used:/y the lower term of (Id). The twO new lower terms are identical and are,

~'."".'.,. .
~
,..
 108 109
Summer Semester 1913 Frege's Lectures on Logic

49. (II., II.):: ========================== We use the sentence:

b> m
e+h>a b>n h-m+l>m (l
~-Tr e+h>a : Lm>O
e+a>b
d>m
eI2>a-f(b)
el2 +a > fib)
e+a>b
el2 > a -feD)
el2 + a >f(D}
r-
I have lo addth a.'t since
m can b e somethmg ot er
h
b> m than a number.
b>m e/2 > h -feb)
d>n
el2 > b- feb)
el2 I b >/('o)
b>n
We also use: l-n- ~ ~ ~
el2 + b >f(b)
(£ L: b>c (K
b>n ---.---
~
m+I>1I
in the form: m + 1 .> m

_.- m>n

d>m
d>n
e+b>a
e+a>b
b el2 > a -fib) (l.) m>n:
50.
el2 + a >f(b)
b> m
/) f-c m+ 1 >m
m>O
b el2 > b-j"(b) K):
el2 + h >j(bl
~
11>11
b>n ::. 0
m n

26 27
49 Top orthe page; The form of (lIa) invoked here results from
lila): Io---flu)
~f(.)
by r~placing "/( ~)" by the function (listed in the right column)
~ ell ." (/-.fl~)
L...= t.':'2 t <l ;. If; 1
;: > In.

The second time (llal is invoked, "a" is replaced by "b" and "m" by "n,"
50. Bottom of the page: In eN, the two generalized lower terms of the last formu Isbondr.theto
.
page are not gIven ." 1nstea.d, arrows and the words "same as a b OV~.
exp I·1C1uy. "refer f a tthe
the corresponding lower terms in the previolls formula (top of the page). SImilarly 0
two genera.li..zed lower terms of the rUst formula on p_ 27.

____7 "'~
 110
Summer Semester 1913 III
Frege's lectures on Logic

----------------

~
m.• I>m
m+l>n
Ie:

~
m .... ! ·>m a 54.
51. 111>0 b
m"'>n a
(I): ---------- _ h
in (he form:

~
m'l>m

~
m+ [>n mTI>m
m>n m + 1 >n
m>O m+ I >m (II
><:
tn-rl>n
---.---
-.---
~ ::;>m That takes care 0 f Ihccase m>n
m + I >n
52.

~
m'>O I1a: m+l>m
(Ira) . _ m+ J >n .. ()
By transposition c oecomc5:
.tt b>m

5;1. 8 b
m>"
b>m
b>n
m>O
------------------ d)
-.---
11>/1
e+b>a
e+a>b
b>m
55.

~
a'b
a>h II >- n )
m= n el2 > a -f(b
I lIL~ b'm
- Lb."
h>a
(' " 0
('/2 +0 >(t1)
b>m ...)
----m·(J d-Il el2 > h-'J(~
l-:::===~= m in the li'flll: ('/2I-h>f(b)
'mII

_.-
II b>/t
-:. m I J • 11/
n I I . 1/

-.---
28
29 .... befo," the
51. Top of the page, right column: In eN, the two lower terms of the form 0 "has been r eplaced by n
"
hm a<e only hinted at. f (Ie) invoked
c
. .
54. Top of the page' In mvokiog (I) twice here, m d g,"phicolly f<om t he rest
52. Middle,a:right
stitutions; m + column:
1 and The form of (lIa) invoked here results from the followm
. g sUlr second time. r ula here is separa~eat comes bpfore.
.'is. Bottom of the page: In eN, thenstitute
last lorman a dd e ndum to w
~';;:.m ofthe proof, thus appearing to co
1.-.-;>/1

~
53. Bottom. nght
. column, In the 'entence dedueed by mean, of Icli. 'he I owe r ternl m
,.
was m >twice
used n" still appears. The transition is thus meant in the sense that this lower tet
in (.1).

rt
 112
Summer Semester 1913 II J
! rrege's Lectures on Logic

(2.) n >m

f-rrn+l>m
L f1 >m

~
n>O Ie: n+l>m
56. Ie): _
n-r-l>n
n + 1 >m

~
~::~:
n+l>n

n>m
n::>O ---0--- 57.
I) . n + 1:> n_
[PI'. 31-31 in CVareempryl

~
n+l>m
n -t 1 :> 11
n>m
n>O

Ila) : -
~ ~~i>m
a
n+I>11
n>O _

30 31
56. Top of the J?age. right column: In eN . cd . hoW to reconsttuct the cont~:-
here are only hmted at. • the two Imver terms in the form af(Ie) mvok Ior t he case m > n abo .
57. ~oncerning the empty pages: For gul.d a nee concerning
sODding .
deductlon
llaUon of the deduction, compare the cor,re ~ Iso missing.
The initial part of the subsequent deductIon 15 a
Frege's Lectures on Logic
115

• el2 > a-((iI)

el2 + a >/(1I)
1I.:-o.
0.>0
e+b:> a
e+a:> b
• ei2:> b -fib)
,/2 f b >(b)
8>n
11>0

el2 > b -f(b)

el2 I- h >f(lI)
1l>11
n>O
e+b>a
e+a>b
e/2 > a -f(D)
el2 + a >((ll)
8>0.
0.>0

35
 116 117
Summer Semester 1913 Frege's Lectures on Logic

58.
T1a: I-r-:----./(a)
~f(·)

• • e+b>a

~
• b ~>a-f.(b) e-la>b
(IIa) ,------- _ ~+a>flbJ ..,.,c.rT1~",rrr e/2 > b . f(b)
b>. e/2 + b >I(b)
0>0 b>.
ell> b -fIb) .>0
e/2 + b>f('b) ¢> 0
ell> 0
b>n
n>O
a el2
• • rrrr, e > a - !(It)
e+a>f(b)
el-h>a lIa: 10-",· e!2>a-f(b) b>.
e+a>b
L__-====== pO
e/2 + a >j(b)
e12::. 0
b>d
Pa-flb)
t + a >f(lt)
b>.
L _---'====.0
e/2> >0
t>a- f(ib)
h-r-------,nro
€I> ()
([Ia): - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - -- - - - - -- - -- ---

e+ b>a
6C

0>0
pO
t +o>/(b)
b
'----0>0
>. , •
e+a>h
el2 > ()
pb-f(b) b is limit for function
'------'>0 .+h>/(b) [with ar~~e~t]
'T-Tr~·h"~TT'-- el2> b - fib) b>. going to mhnlty.
el2 -to b >/(It) L Q>O
b>n L----=_ _• t >0

St).
Q>D
e+b>a • o e>a-~b)
e+o>'[(b) 6.
e + I.J:::' h This" has nothing b> (I . aislimit
'-- 11>0
• • e/2 ;.. () to do with that R.

:;:; ,j\:\} ~
) e>O

L__ .::===== b>o

a- 0
t- ()
already lillishcl!

36 37
58. Top of the page, first line' Th ·ouS page, right column), "a"
h ere on, more and more J'ust sk·erepreset' , conceptual Dotanon
. .In eN " [m . "'
6. O. Middle of the page: "When lllVO......ng (lIa) here (c [ . preYl
h n aOon In IS, ro
· ..
men t strok e IS mIssIng in the fi
etc ed and conta"
fi . . . h ' dg-
Ins some mIstakes. In addinon, t e JU
lI'st lye formulas ( [th d -. I lsrcplaced by "b." .. _ I" 't" concerning the lowest lower
59 Bon f h o e eductIOn In the left column. . Th emark a 15 Iml . . f the remark (';on-
' . omo t epage.rightside:There 11." . .. fiI. Bottom of the page, right Side: e ~ Ie men ted along the hnes \) .
cerntng the last formula means th rnar TIns Dhas nothing to do ......i th that 0 co n- term of the second formula has to be s pp
from the scope of the "0" in th I at the scope of the "0" in the upper term is different f:l;rning the lower term above it.
e Ower term Ie[ G .. "
. rundgesetzeI, p.13); similarly for 6.
IIa 119
Summer Semester 1913 frege's lectures on Logic

IA)" ------------- ----------------- I-r- e/2 > 0

. L e.>O (A
'Tr-------,-,n-- e + h > a
e I- a> b
e>O
11), --- --- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -- - --
./Torr- t> b -fib)
'+
b > fIb)
b>11 IL, • ~b ~
G==h
t> b -fib)
I' L ,+ b >f(b)
L_-=--.:::=~===
d .
C
'"'IT'--'T,,:rrTT-r , > a -fib)
>0
>0 \ I.- b>1l
.>0
r>O
r+£1>/(b) tab t>o-J(II)
11>0
'""' ~. \ I' L
L__~===== 1£>0
> 0 . L--
,+a>IIO)
b>Q
.>0
<>0

, r+b>a
t+a>h This is the proposition we wanted to prove.
, • r>o
t> b -fib)
t+ h:>l(b)
b>. 'ntcnce that occurs in it alway~ contains
, •
0>0
r>O
The deuuction is so complicateu because every sc
., ., ' . • assumptions in mmd,
'Th" .' impOrlant for
IS IS
t>a -((b) all of Its condltlOns; one does not Just keep ,
We proved carlkr'
r ta 'Itb)
II .' II the rigor of proof.
Q.> () I)~"b
It It ! II ,((
t ' () It I (f > II
r ·0

38 39
120 121
Summer Semester 1913 Frege's Lectures on Logic

Mathcm<uics is a deductive science. Not all propositions arc proved, however; there <Ire
some basic propositions in mathematics. I f one wants to find out what these axiums are,
proofs have to be without gaps. Every proposition used in a proof has to be recognizilble
as such. That is very hard to do in everyday language; since everyday language is not
logically perfect enough for that purpose. In particular, the forms of inference used are
not exhibited clearly; we just say "thus" or "therefore." the corresponding rule of . s are always mix.ed together:
In a mathematical lecture two thing
inference is not indicated. Consequently it is easy to use "therefore" in cases where we
are not dealing wilh a gap-free proof. For ex.ample, in geometry we somelimes rely on
I) the pure inferences
intuition; One is then only aware of the fact that the result is evident. says "therefore," but
does not know the reason for the evidence.
2) the commentary on them.
Our conceptual notatiun avoids this logical deficiency of langu<lge. It also avoids the
verbosity of everyday language
mathematical rigor. In conceptual
.a1 to negatively influence
This mixture has the potentt upcrfluo .
We make several modes of inference explicit: s us
( ) f" ordsare
. a completc understanding 0 It, W
notation. assummg
(),,----

( i
( I"
( 1
Imnsposillon:
introduction of a (icnnan Ictlcr:

40 41

J ",.I,~
 /22
Summer Semester 1913 123
frege's lectures on LogiC

In our proof we used the assumptions:

J-a-h+b==a (4
(E

I-r-a>a
(E

~
C-+-d-.m.j.-f1
'T=a-b>O
a>h l' 'nl
d .n (2

~f;~
E~~b}\1 (/1
1-(11 1 In t r " 1 (q + r)
(II

62.
These lower terms don't seem to be necessary; note. however, that in conceptual l-r- e: 1 = e d")
~'; () :.j could have adde
'"l I'
•( L
notation the [etters do nor juS! refer to numbers. but to objects in generaL these lower
terms are supposed to replace the assumption that we are dealing with numbers. For the
function'; > (can only take the value True if both [arguments] are numbers. Our l-r-m+l::>m
. Lm>O (I
conceptual notation is thus different from arithmetic and analysis insofar as it does not
just deal with numbers. 11 is ne~'er determined exaer(l" (in mathematics) where the limit
fiesh,. What u numher ,.ea/~v is, what can be indicated by a letter (the realm ofnurnbers
is constantly cxtendclI: negative, rationaL complex). One does not know how far the (K
realm of numbers may he further cXlcnllcd, As a cllllscquenl:c the Sl,.'flSe of all
propositions is inllcterminatc. l'tIT as soon as the realm Ofll1l11lhers i.'< oh:nded. the
Propositions that Were already proved nel'" no Illn,Lter hold. This is Sll nlT;lIlSC I ha .... e 1'11- 0

provelltltc .I('1He, not Ihe form. Anll thcI('1/sl' has 10 he proved anl'\~ III onln III
I' ,·0

preserve thc validity IIfp rnp nsiIiIlIlS.l1\)uplt. havl'rlm.. held 1I11llllin' :J1lI1 lllnrl'tHI!ll'il
!'wm. lakinll: it to he whm i.. essl'Iltiul

42 43
62. Bottom
thetical of the page: In eN, the whole paUg?aph inserted here is marked as a paren-
remark.

d
 124
125
Summer Semester 19 t] Frege's lectures on Logic

Here functions are essentially the same as in analysis. but with an extension: not only
numbers, but any object at all can be argument and value of a function; especially truth. We can add thcse rwo numbers: (I + I') + (2·1)
values (concept and relation). "In general it is not wcll understood what a function is
similarly: (l + 2') + (z.ll
really SUpposed (0 be." This shows itself in various things people say. They talk, for
ex.ample, about the SUm of two functions (f(x)"!"- g(x). But really we cannot talk about . the sym bol for a function from the
. now distingUish
sums of functions. Only in the case of numbers is it defined what the sum of the numbers But in this composite symbol we can . n in the two cases and what
is, and numbers are, after all, objects. In the"!"- sign we have the sign for a function ofm'o symbol for its argument. W e can distinguish whalls comma
arguments. It is, in fact, a function we can call a 1'I level function of two arguments. is different.
That is to say: in each ofthc argument places only names for objects can be put, not
functions; indeed, functions are fundamentally different from objects, including numbers. I+ .;2 + 2';
Common:
Thus it is impossible to have the argument place for a proper name occupied by a
function name.
Different: 1, 2, ... .
h . rwo functIOns..
Let's look at a special case, say: '. we have built this function out oft o~e .. t
2
We can, in a certam sense, say that ..' d We can conSIder dlfferen
1+ X lx. . the way Just mdlcate . . flhe
But that is only to be understood m d tennine the values 0
. two functions. We can e n
We combine them to: values for the samc argument In the . h 0 different cases, we ca
Th by companng t e rw . n
2 functions and add them together. en, t which is in need of samratlO ,
I +x +2x.
f . his common componen , . ' .
identi " a common component. r th n >ay: This functIOn IS
'J r one can e
. . I abbreviated lorm .
63. we caB the new function. n . two functIOns.
How should we understand this'! We cannot add timctions. W~' alwHys h:IVC tn compuscd, by the operation. of addition, out of those

distinguish the function from ils value for a cer1ain argument Fur instancc, Iherc is thL'
value of the function for the argument I. , function of 2 arguments. E.g..
. addition. but for any
The !i:lmc holds nol only tor

44 45
63. Three lines from the bottom of t:h. I ues-
tion mark. e page: 11 eN, a period takes the place of the q

_ _1 ,. J .#! .,.j. . _
 126 127
Summer Semester 1913 Fr!ge's Lectures on Logic

thus, e.g.

F(]~2'::. :;.::,

FfI-·J 2 ,2·J} We have thus obtained a new function. but it isn 'f the function I~( of the funclion 2,';'

since the first tllnction is a 1-, level function.

lien: I can again think 01. this as composcJ f
case!i and one that \arit;:s I, 2. 3 . II a componl,.'n! that is the same in all three

Then again. it is possible to have a function of a function:

\\'hat Slays the same'

We can say that I is the limit of the function ~ as the argumto=nts go to infinity.
2-1- 4'
F(l--~2. 2'';1

Strictly speaki ng H. is ....TO as the arguments go to oc.

fun Similarly, I is the limit of the function
ction of a function - ng to say: the sum or th e produci of functions. Also wrong: a

E.g., our functions: 3( - s+1 as the arguments go to 00.

Similarly, I is limit of the function
3s~ + 5

Here we have a common unsaturated component. \Vhat varies, however, is lhe fw:Jction .
As an argument for the
argument " first function w e can take . e.g.. t he value of the 2 nd for the It is a de·
CllClency of en'l:rJay lanRl/lIge that we have to tal k as I·1· the fiunctIOn
. were an

object.

Or the valu!;: of the 2nd ~

unction for lh c argument ~
Wl'. havl'. thus. II 2'~1 levd lilOdion who!'lc llrguml"nts arc 1'I1evc1 functions. III such a

I j 12'2)' case Wl' ran talk ahl1ut a lilll\;ti(lll of 1I function.

Or Ihl" vlIllle Ol'lhl' .,n,1 f

... 1Ifidiun lilt th (' lu",Ulllclll
lhl' nWitakl' is illwl1YS lil l'lll1rU~l" the Vllille of the fUlll'liol1 with the functiun itSl'lf.
I I (2.])'

Thl"cum mun component is:

46 47

..__.....
 128 129
Summer Semester 1913 Frege's lectures on Logic

to the value of a
, . b ut functions. Genera lIy one re Iers .
This is all connected to what I Said a 0 . . ,ha'y is a functlOo,
. 1 d'
. then mls e 10 to thUlkmg
One speaks, for instance, of variable quantities, variables. What is that? With the function of .. with}": }' =1(x), and one IS a variable number; a
. . all neither a constant nor . ,
symbol I we refer to a dctenninate or, as One says, ··constant" number. Likewise for Lhe Th~ letter v docs not refer to anythlOg at , . in itself. Rather, It IS
64.
'. , ,= I + ..2 does not refer to anythmg x
sign 2. But how do We refer to H variable number? For that we have letters; but do letters combination of S1gnS such as. J '0 which the leners
with a sense 1
refer in the same way to variable numbers as these symbols do to Constant numhers? Do to be understood as part of a b'I g er g
Mit·
, a sentence I .thmeticallanguage mucb
We have ditferent variable numbers x, y, z, just as we have different constant numbers 1, he whole. In our usua an . us
65. andy arc used to confer generality to t ryday language, th .
2,3? No, we don't know how they are different; we cannot say anything about that Much is left to eve
is not expressed that really Sb ou Id be exprcssed. . d all by itself, some thought
AbDUl the COnstant numbers [we] can say: There arc integers, real numbers, prime . . own as though It express e , eraHty
lhe fonnula y 1 T Y! 150 wnnen d
7"C The letterS of gen
numbers. etc., classes which have certain properties in common. Do we have for variable . I ' componellt.
In itself it does, however, not d a that . It IS on y a only confcr genera lily on the
Ones something like, e,g., the di~tinetion between prime numbers and non-pnme
, hin in themselves, they used to
occurring in it do not refer to anyt g _ b + ac the letters are
nUlnbers? No, we don', really have that. We don't know how they are dirrerent. We (b+c)-a , 66.
know what the sum of two eoo~lant numbers is; but not what the sum of two variables whole. For example, if we have the sentence a
Id have to a .
dd' if a h, c are numbers.)
,
make thc sentence general. (A e tually one wou e can see what t he whole
x I- y is. Nowhere is illaid down how we arc supposed 10 add 2 variable numbers.
t his case w
But c g nalone doesn't express . an y thing. In . 'e, we have
h Ie thing; for Instant,;
' . " do not have the w 0
s~ntenec b. Ordinarily, however, we

conditinns that arc only cxp rcsscd

, in words.

48 49
f the f'nd of the
h page: In •
eN an arTOW POints rom
64. Top of the page, line three: In CN, a period takes the plaee of the Question mark. bottom of t e .. above.
lin.~
66. Four hnes from .the "a(b + c)" ab + oc
65, .Sixth page: In CN, a question mark takes the place of the brack.et to the equatlon
penod from
after !lay an.yth~n.g
the. topabout
of the
that."
 130 131
Summer Semester 1913
Frege's Lectures on Logic

Letters also have this task of expressing genemlity in analysis. But that is not always . "ariablc"
. the cxpresslOn aUoget her. We have here the
As I said, it is better to aVOId v
easily recognizable.
imegral

lncidcntally, it also happens that letters arc used to exprcss what we did by "there exists":

h· h we can write as follows:

as a particular example of the general case, w IC
For example, it happens that in an algehraic proposition aile wants to express existencc.
Yet no clear distinction is made hetween these two ways of using letters. It is only
through our conceptual notation that we are made aware how completcly different the
If (a)da.

Iwo usages arc. b 2 Thus we (lre dealing

. functions· above, e.g., Y a .
We can then replacef(a) by v a n o u s , W have to
nd . , 1'1 level function as argument. e
The point where things are usually unclear is that one doesn't distinguish between the with a 2 level function, WhICh takes a . t variable to fill
besides usmg an apparen
.. W d 't know w h a I' 0 do
expression "function" and "value ofa function." Similarly. one writcs/instead ofl{.t). indIcate thiS clearly. e on . bl One also writes
. . uld not be reCOb'1l1Za c.
From a logical point of view that is to be rejected. What is unsaturated appears then to be the argument place; withOut 1·t the function wo
complete.
dx'
-~2x.
And then there is a usage of letters in Analysis that Pcano h<ls called "aprm rcnt variahle." dx
For example. in nly differentiate functions, not
. . h a function, since one ean 0 .
r' ,
J:)a~da.
Here, too. we arc dealmg WIt
. ·nvolved
..
IS we use
the letter.t, ObVIOusly
what the function I
67, numhers And tn make clear . For here we can infer a
This refers to a completely dctennined numher, namdy li.~ Wh1..'lhl'f I writc down 1/.1 . ,. " ,·\·lettcrthanlll(d
. t- h",· '" de I- (1(.
this IS a dJifercnt us\,: () t Ie I_ •. ith numbers.
or that expressiun tnakci'i on difference. This (J Ls thus a pSClJdU.V'lfi,thk lacing the etters w
particu1<lr sentcm;c from Ihc' gencrnl one by rep

50 51
67. Two lines from the bottom ofth , h pre--
vious integral. epage; In eN, an arrow points from "This' to t e

.i
JI.. _
 132 133
Summer Semester 1913 rrege's Lectures on Logic

Above , how c\er,

. we cannot write:

dl'
dl ~21

68. because we are d eatmg

. wilh a 2nd I . I "
. . .
e"e ,unctIOn. The I,\ level function has to be
mdlcated cl ear Iy, which
. it isn't in this case. We are confronted wilh peculiar questions. The solution will always consist in leaming

to distinguish between the/unction itselfand its value; as well as in always distinguishing

These are , th en, a couple of cases I wante .
Roman letters. d to mentIOn. in connection with the US<lge of
between the symbols and what is referred to by the symbols. Some people think that the

v . symbols are what arithmetic is about. But that doesn't work in the end. One contradicts
anous other things in Arithme .
always cianI'" 1 tIc depend on this issue as welL Indeed, O[]e should
oneself continually. Instead, the symbols are just tools for inquiry, not what the inquiry is
':J, a ways ask the foIl .
symbol 0 . . OWing question anew: Is what I am confronted with a
69.
, r IS It lhe meaning of the s y m b o l ' . about just as the microscope is a tool for botanical inquiry, not what that inquiry is about.
fonned by llsin " e.g., an Integral: Is the mtegml a symbol,
g the stroke J. or IS it the meani .
power series. ng of a combmation of symbols? Is the
a groups of symhols. or is it Iha .
Regardless of wh' h t to whIch such a group of symbols rcfers'! I have now suggested various questions, which I recommend to you for further reflection.
IC alternative one <lece ts ." .
Usually thO '. p .• peculiar dIfficultIes <In:: encountered
IS IS swept und h .
er t e carpet Or I' k d
determinant or i . . a e elcrrnin<lnts: b this symholl·· I the
• S It a symbol for who t' "
determinant r .. a IS called the detcnnilwnf! In a sncciili case the
Clers to a nu b . o·
mer, Just like

52 53
68, Fourth line f
"d12/dl = 2'1 " rom the top: In eN an
. ' arrow points fro <.<.' • •
69. Lines 3 6 • d 7 rn In thIS case" to "[he expressIon
•• n fromth b
question mark. e ottorn: In eN• a penod
. tak . each case, the plac.e ofthe
es. In

____t J
 Summer Semester 1914
Frege
Logic in Mathematics

b Logir
. does not play th ' ,arne
' role ..0 olher sci,nces "' it doC' in mathemarics. At

cst In law (definiti ons ), but very differcnt subject matter.

matlcs purely logical? Or are therc specifically
Are the infcrences in mathe· .
in£
mathematical inferences tb at are not govemed by the general laws of logic" (F..g., the
00serence from n to n + I.) B ut here, too, there"
- a general law on wh"h
. Ihe.
mferenec
."
as a ccrtam property tp and ,f It holds genendly tor this
ed: "If the number one h . . ..
, POSitive whole number [n] has it, its successor (n-\-I) also has it, then
propcny ({J that _if a ...

h I number has the property rp."

each [positive) woe
70.
E.:w.mple.
a _ (b + m) is to be proved by Bernoulli's induction. We conceive of the
(a+ b) +m ~ --l-

ProPOsition as. a p ro pert)' of the number m, llssuming a and h to be given.

We have to prove that

(0 I M -'" n ~'(I + th I n) hoh.!s,
also holds;
(tl + h) • (n ~ I) iJ + (I' + (n 1- 1)) acc\lrding 10 the proposition:

\'~ ",,",",,"
c t (1II-1ll (c I 11I).1:
We apply the proposition:
"h, any C~lllle?\t onc can repln ec a nurnher
by \Jnc identical with iI"·

(0 I (h ! n)) t I~

:~~~~~~~ ~he
of
ve
ut
pag" The following example (Ihe "a"oeiati law"l i' "p.,ated
m
by

~~g~~"humo~,
'''pondi e" 'Om the mam text in eN, As it i' mentioned, but no"pelledo in thce -
explain
of "te
text, F"ge probahlydevelOped it freelyTC
in hi' lecture, Thi' would
y e followmg outline of a proofi"omewhat oh,cu in the note'· It con'"''
of ,u,tJ:t"e tramfmmation of"(a' bl .(n' 1)" ioto "a' (b·(n· I) )." Fo' a "iriei,m
p compare L, Wittgeo"ein, Ph;lo,"phi,al R,"wck>, 119751, p, 194[.
11 .' a proof,"
"ght ar.. : ,om t h e h ottom, ught
.. Flvelinesfr .. "d" In eN, the pa"nthe'" .
00 the .xpr""on
. on t h e
~
',,, b);' m,mng, The propo,ition "c • 1m' 11 ' I' • m) • 1" i' u"rl loy replacing "c" hy
I" re' 1m <t, Th"horter arco i' ,uppo"rl to indicat. tho' the exp"",i"n "I In • hi • n I
w
su tsfrom "(a'" b) + (n + 1)"

:'::'~
""Thee, Ii "
""'1'1' n" from the bottom, ngh",d" , In" (n • b) • n) d .rhe. , ,1n,
expee,,'on • b)" • n
" • Ih the expee"ion "n • (b • n I" in a"oroanee with the a"umpt'on "I n • b 1 • n "

;~;,t;:t
ad
line, left,id" In eN, the ",oond parenth"i' behind "n" i' ,"i"ing and. in,te .
Car '. an addinonal parenm"i, behind "1." The longe' arrnw on the left, wh"h ide on
""pnap' nnt" abo begin. at me level of the lower line, i' ,uppo"d to indicate thar the
of ,;,""wn:'( a • (b • n I) • I" ",ul" by ,uh,riturion (cf. note 721 from theright hand.
e pteV10us line.
 137
136 Summer Semester 1914 ~~ lectures on Logic

a+«b+n)+ 1) (a+(h+fl»+]; We get . . ore and more, endlessly. But we can

The manifold of mathemattcal truths gro..... s m JI d it
(a+h)+(n+l) al«b+n)+1); again applying the proposition: ber of truths gets smaller and sma eT an
74. also trace the inferences back; then the Dum . . We will
h+{n+l)=(b+n)+l; h ps also definltlons.
(a+ b) I (n+ I) = a+(b+(n + 1)); finally has to come to an end. Axioms and postulates; per a

Thus what holds for n also holds for n + 1. This is the first premise. The second look at that in more delilillater. . . I es those
. ths in a chalO of tn erenc ,
premise is the general law above. "Theorems" we only caU the most Importanl tN 76.

We conclude: If the numher 1 has this property, then every positive [whole] number that arc used as premises in several directions:

has the property. From this proposition and the proposition that the nomber 1 has the
property (as above: (a + b) + 1 = Q + (b + i) it follows that every positive whole number
75. has this property.
o
Thus every mathematical inference is analyzed into a general mathematical theorem
t 'onvince (in the
or axiom and a purely logical inference. in Euclid) less the purpose 0 c .
Sometimes a proof has (also already , . but to establish a logical
We distinguish: inferences frum 2 premises and inferences from] premise. , ld beheve anyway).
case of simple propositions whtch wc WOll . 't ro of truths

From 2 p"mis," a new truth followse A .

. .
connection, Euclid envu>loned as the Idea
' 1 of mathcmatlcs a sys C

. , The aspiratIOn IS to m
mterconnected hy logical mferences.
"

.' . to find the kernel out 0

ake the number of bastc.
fwhich all ofrnathematlcS
,

~
. '
unprovable truths as small as pOSSible, I urety logical mferences.
. . necessary to draW on y P
From Ih" and a 3'" a new one follow, ag"n can be developed. For that purpose It IS th logical laws, on the one
Iy between e
-) separute Sh arp

We ean al", d<aw a ""'elu,ion from ,u'l une ""mi'", I One must (sec the example K hOVI,;
. . " d theorel11s used, on teo
hand, lind the m.lthenmtleal aXlOl11S an
h ther
r
'
If ' i1l10 procricl? lia.~
n t 1I"/1i<'h ht' did 1I0t 1'11/, /I .l
TillS ,dcill, III \\'hiC"JI ":lIdid fl.Win'd II
c.g., if II rrupositilltl holds for C'very positive whuk numher (Ull! we SlIY tlwl it 1111.S alst) .. ldfllt'tlli//it'st
he,'lIlllmo.I'/ .'/lIil'dl' /0.1'/ ill "WI'(' rt/t ("t "
holds for the number 2.

2 3
SSI'ble fork originating in
. diagram illuscrates a PO
. .
76. SlXhnes . The followmg
74. Second line, right side- In eN an srrow . f h . n "c + from the top. 'nts
(m + 1) '" (c + m) + 1" abo~e.' pOInts rom ere back to the equauo the theorem to which the arrow pOl '

" ( c f . note 7 0).

75. Ten lines from the top: End of the examplo
.
138 139
Summer Semester 1914
frege's lectures on Logic

Every mathematician works in his own area without attending to how to integrate it ~ d "'J" "derived sentence
"'Axiom," "theorem," not: "basic sentence [(mm saL, . .
into the whole system. Thus the disorder. b tht: sensually perceptible sign
[Lehrsatzl" Since we want to understand a sentence to e .
f I Th ught is not meant 1tI a
It is not just a matter of extending the chains of inference further and further and whose sense is a thought. Only this thought is tlUt: or a se. 0 .
is independent
increasing the manifold of Imths more and more. but <'Ilso of going backwards and psychological scnse h..:re! Th "... sense of the Pythagorean Theorem, e.g.,
discovering the basic truths so as to develop out of them the system o/marhematic!i, from the various subjective thoughts. .
... . antee that an object with ccrtam
[n mathematics we do not, like in the other sciences. just have to make claims Postulates are really also aXIOms, they guar
. Is· not meant as !I.
convillcing, but their logical interconneUion is also import<'lnt How one thing follows properties exists. (E.g., in Euehu:, a I,· ne through any two pom . ,
from another. Today too much weight is put on showing that a claim is evident; nol construction. )
enough on which web of inferences that supports it. .. f si s can he replaced by a simple sign.
Definitions are supulatlOnS that a group 0 go
Thcf(ml1da(irms consist of axioms, postulates. and perhaps definitions.
Thus we distinguish:
Axioms are truths that do not need proof and that within the system, ure also not
I) tht: "defining group of signs"
proved. (But that is not enough: sinee Euclid already proved various things that did not 2) the ·'defined sign" which is new.
seem to need prooL, . the parts orthe
hI· to the particular sIgns.
(To the sentence corresponds a thoug , -l
Thus: Id have to adu In
hI) Tht:rcforc we wou
scntcm:e, correspond parts 0 r th e thoug .
I) trulhs; an untrue system is a contradiction in it~c1f. _ .' . . . . , . as the roup of signs has a sense.
conncction with dclltlltlOns. wsof"r g b h nCW simple
2) belonging to a CI'I"'(/i/l.\T.~/em: it is possihlc for there to he scvcf:ll systems of . • .. I re lace thc group of signs Y t e .
It". in accmdann.' With the delltlltlon, p . tly a definition
lIlathl'matics. E.g., A H ('/)HF; possibly A could he proved from Hand ( ... F. or 'Inn l'S nnl the thought- (tltlsequcn
sign, thcn it is only the sentence thaI c , g., _ I ,,~]. only for
alsll IJ from A and ( ... f·; then We have lhl' choin' or whdher In lakl' ,.j as an ,1.l(lOltI . . [I ,·k Jes b,stmmll'rl Uln.,.,.
. 1 1 " f clmncctlons -(l~ r
is mIl rl'<.,l1y necessary lor I lC ll~pe \J
nnd IJ as a Iheorem Of "ict' \.I'I".\"(f.

lhc case Ill" c'Iprcssioll

4 5
. . . n" is underlined three time5.
'l" the word "deClnl
DO
77. Nine lines from the (Op: In C~~,

_ _ _.1~
140 141
Summer Semester 1914 frege's Lectures on Logic

A definition is introduced by means 0 I a sentence th t' h .

identisch ist] I th a lS t en Identical lderdunn
. n c subsequent Construction f til .
as a premise for' fi 0 e system that sentence is used fonnally
III ercnces, although not contentu Ii . Objection: How can it really be doubtful whether the sense of a complex sign
the whole . , a y. from the sentence that contains
group of sIgns the fonnally sImp Ier sentence can b d . d b coincides with the sense of a sign that has already been in use for a while and whose
law of identity. c enve y means of the
,ensc has long been fixed. Well, suppose it is the case, but we only "sec it as if through a
Frequently something is smuggled into a . fog"!
recognized h mathematical definition that should he
as a I corem or axiom first. Some definitions in mathematical textbooks are never cited or used later on, not even
Definitions are logically superfluous, implicitly; they arc pure ornament ("ornamental definitions"). Already in Euclid: e.g., u

but psychologically valuable. line is length without breadth, etc.

Dejinitions don',·Just. he1p to construct but als . Given the way in which mathematical texts are written today one can never see
order to reduce th , 0 to ana~vze what IS complex, e.g., in
e number of axioms. Such an an I . whether a defmition is (implicitly) used or not. Each proposition should really carryall
only feci that on ' h,," a YS1S cannot be proved right; one can
M .
c as hit the naIl on the head .
,and It can prove itself fruitful its premises explicitly with it.
ore preCIsely'. we construct
' the system again b . . Sometimes things are called "definitions" which really aren't. If in algebra the 3
Occasion"lly hI' Y USlOg the result of the analvsis
.. walsfi d' . numbers x, .1', z occur in 3 equations, thcy are not always detennine(] completely thereby:
use fbr a h'l
xc In a definition is. the .se nse 0 Ia 'sign that has already been in
. W Ie . Oncc'annut . prove that, thou h· j h· . ' .', . It is possible that several such systems of) numbers satisfy the equations
Stlpulation bu,' . g , t as to be eVident; It lsn t an arbitrary
, an aXIOm. Thus: If the expressions "point," "line." "plane" occur in several sentences. their

. LctAbcthcoldsi . gn,'1'et s assume that a c '. . sense is not necessarily detennined u"ique~r. It is not clear whether se\-'cral solutions are
with A, If we don't k ertam complex sign coincides in sense
nuw that fur SUre w possible, or none at all. That is. then. no definition.
that B is t h . , e proceed as follows: We stipulate arbitrarily
o ave the 'sense . u l'lh c complex si If' , When an "empty sign" in a sentence has no sense, the whole sentence also has no
~nse; it docs not express a thought, only a task: to find a sense for the empty sign in such
sense of A h ' gn. the I' definition was correct then the
as to coinCide with that olB . WcavOld ' th .
system by using B If e sign A and rcconstmet the whole
, . that reeo t '
ns ruetlOn succeeds . . . . . a way that the whole sentence acquires a sense and becomes troe.
IOtroduee the sign If " " we can. tor pragmatic reasons, also
agam; we Just have to re '. . .
had 1Io sense before th d ., gard II as newly IOtrnduced. as if it hadn't
e efimtlon.

i
7 J
6

______1 ,,1-. ,ill

142 143
Summer Semester 1914
frege'!i lectures on Logic

If a concept is given to us, we don't know yet ifan object falls under it. It is
possible that an object falls under the concept, but also that no object f~lls under it. It is ,
• ,. 1/5 [WorrdefinitlOnen,
]"eg ." some
, b " mi1Jaj de/ml tlU . . ly
One talks reprovmgly a out no . , . expreSSIon can on
false that a proper name is a concept [word] with only one object falling under it. In the . . But thIS reprovmg
. . h F gean definitions. sense
sentence: All humans are mortal, its sense does not include; Cato is mortal; for that a people in connectIOn WIt re but must also have a ..
I consist of words.
further premiM: and some inferences are necessary. More precisely, the sentence would
mean: What gets defined must not on y . d 't give proofs for groups
' .. Since we on
. ltd in mathem aUt.: s . of that
fead: Ifsomething is human, then it is mortal. lfwe move from the general to the This however is oftcn v\o a e 'bl to get a clear grasp
." . and it must be POSSI e . ell
of signs but for the sensc thcy have, . t giving definitlOnS as w .
particular, we get: IfCato is human. he is mortal. To this we add a 2 nd premise: Calo is • . . more careful attention a
sense. MathematiCians should pay b' gs
human. Only from both of them we get: Cato is mortal. As this is not directly contained f similar t m .
Weierstra~'s:
A number is a group 0
in the sentence: All humans are mortal, the concept docs not denote [hezeichnet nichtj the , ,"3"
2"d (Thomae?): A number is the stgn. . . ed by the senses; I
object falling under it . that cannot be perceIv
3'd Wrege?): A number is somethmg . 3 in them is not
We have to distinguish: Whether we replace an old group of signs with a new SIgn or . S' so what IS
can. e.g., , aIk about 3 axtOm ,
whether We assen something about something.
pcrceivable by the sen!ies. ry different system!i of
An example for the r J
kind ufdefinition: We give 2 sentences
.. , nee tions. From them three ve
X i!i a prime number. } Thus three very dItferent (,,:0 p . not present so far.
Hereby an object. namely 2. arise s temsIS, thus,
y ber noW
Increased by 2, x is l1ivisible by 4. is determined. arithmetic would havc t o · nile ' I d be a num be r, too'. this num
railroad tram wo u 78,
According to Weierstrass a
Here we have a l:oncepl with two characteristics; thereby I have not uclcnnillcl1 an
.
cnmcs radng along !rom Herlin.". ,
'. 'usl one onthnte tic', as if the differences
object. but a concept; evcn if in this casc only 1 tlhject fulls under it. .. h whole there \S J •
One always ads as 1\ 01\ t c
An object falling under a concept is. lIncr all. nol the mcaning of the sign f(H lhi,~ '11l;ant
concept. resided only in insl~lIl • l1etails.

8 9
Carnap adds as a
. thIS sentence. I .,
. I connection WlthlHeiterknt Jm Zelltrum '
he bottom. n the center
78. Three lines from t ' . "laughter 10
comment in the left marg:tn.

d
 145
144 ~'s lectures on logic
Summer Semester 191-4

Mathematicians are not concerned about that in any further way, The formulations
of propositions in the different systems of arithmetic <lgree; it is then left to the d d as a unit and
" de can itselfbe regar e
. copt ofmag m U f
philosopher to analyzlo: their sense. A self-respecting mathematician will nol bother to do Further it says: "Now the can '.h ] the concept a
j ' to (bcelc ne
·bbbb'" Let b r e e r " · h neept
that. "At most he will occasionally, in an unguarded moment, drop a definition in be posited repeatedly: t = . g . , . . h r the sign: h b b b, t e co
79, . t repeatedly. or rat e .]
passing, or at least something that looks like a definition." magnitude Ifl now posit thlS concep .50 instt=ad, to [posit a
. . ew results. probably one I , . that
At bonom then: is the realization, I assume, that the content of the thought is doesn't change at all, and nothmg n ., d h to stand for the express tram,
80, , d But even It I regar the
the main thing. But perhaps the different conceptions ofnwnber do, implicitly, coincide determinate single magmtu e Or erhapS, contrary to
ositing it repeatedly. p led into the
at bottom? While everyone misses the mark slightly in his or her definition. Then, [rain does not get changed by P . ' t In that case we are
.' . of the train that IS mean. different
however, the proper sense has to become manifest in proofs. Yet in them no use is made formulation above, It IS my Idea . . ent people would have
, d b'ective; then dlfter . bout the
of the definitions when inft=rring corresponding laws. It is for that reason, too, that the realm of the psychologICal an su j tly not be talking a
. . ·d s and they wou ld , const=quen ,
numbers, smce different I ea.,
different definitions do not stand in conflict with each other; Lhey lay heside each other.
81. same thing.
like the animals in paradise [sie liegen neheneinander wie die Tiere im Paradiese].
. ration? 02,
E.g., according to Weierstrass: A row of books in a bookcase has to be a number, How do we get to mulllp IC, b" HoW do we know that? Is it an
S
d that contam all these . the roW that
the express train at 5: 14 as welt. If I now multiply those numbers with each other. I have ' There IS now a magmtu e thuS obtalOlllg
P resident Wilson, ] (hiS
to get another number. But how, then, do I find it a:uom? Ex-ample W, POSit repeatedly d appeUatiVUm lApp elatlvum ), m
S Wilson (concept wor , h we mean the sum
From Weier.\'trass's lectures: "According to our definition a numerical magnitude conlams all the presuient peatedly "By a )( t ng
• name) appears re . b an a_times POSl I
[Zuhlengrr)jJe] results from thl': repeated positing of similar clements." Thc definition row president Wilson (proper .' merical magnItude y .
.. "We obta lO thiS nu b b_limes • if h Islhe
says Ihis: "We can form the idea OLI row of similar things, Things arc to be counted as consisling of , 1 terms of h. .. " But whal is meant y .. suddenly
, " sltmg ofa . eHexerE-'I].
similar if they cuincidt= in a certain wmplclI. of characteristics. Such a row is, theil, what of fl, <IS well as hy a h_tlml:s po. ,[Ge~,hwmdlgkeIl15t k em
, 'ie' I1l JWltt s '·a_tlmes
we mean by a numerical magnitude." Does the sentence above rt'ally Itlliow from Ihis railnmd lrain'? There S flO m(/~ . everyday usage, II say
t 'arowilnd,as m
the number has ceased ttl )C
definition? Accurding to the delinitioll it is nolthe idea 1lt"t11i: row, but the row itscJfthat
is the numerical ma~nilude. Su, c.g., a railroad lrain is supposed Itl resull from lhe
repeated positing of a railroad car?

79. Five lines from the top; Here Carnap adds in the left ' . '"I hter on the left
10
" tis "'b"·

[Heiterkeit /inks]." margm. aug

80. Seven lines from the top: What is meant is "the din d d i . f the cOll-
f:t:"ptofnumher." e.rentun erstan ngsa .

81. TWdve.lines from the. top; H~re Carnap adds the marginal com ent: '"The old mall
waxes poetic! [DerAlte ll.!lrdpoetuchfJ" m

___djh
) '~,
 , 147

1-46 Summer Semester 1914 hIp.'s lectUres on logic

I . Plv~h~
to this questlOn, "
thin" of va \ue
I . , t ibuted some '" h difficult
.
Weicrstrass would ha\e l:on r
'allv thought about \ .
't~~1
d.dn't even sec t e
This sleight of hand is cleverer than the usual: the performer doesn't just deceivc the
I intelleclual powers. had he rc -
I ~ .d 'a1 of mathcmatll,;S
, " as a system.
.dent ica1,
1
audience, but also himself -the pinnacle of art. In other scicnces such sleights of hand roblem in it. He was lal,;king t 11.: I C t things that afe non-
P . conncc 5
\ f -quality a1so
0=
83. arc not popular at all; hut in mathematics they are, so to speak, presentable. Wcierstrass thinks the sign 0 e
. \ ,. I + h '" h + lJ. therthey arc
Occasionally Weierstrass also talks about <'I "set," as well as about the "value" of <'I and h~ gives as hiS ex-amp \;. , . .ome respect, ra
. t similar III S would
numerical magnitude. Here hc probably means what is usually meant by number. "A But: l 3 .., =:- 'i hoth sides arc not JUs . . ( .. ee for that task we
n -r - - ' tas\<. of addlllg sm . the
numerical magnitude is determined if it is declared which clements it contains and of , .. we don't mean the 1 f oIl1 completlllg
identical: since by ·'3 -j .. er that reSll Is r
. + ') l- 4)_ but the numb . res ect to a new
each of them how oRen they are included." If one knows what ';how often" means, then not have to add a number. (3 ~ fi dO\ltlater\lllth p
. S Just as we may, e.g·. III Iready kneW
the number has indeed been defincd. task and that is the same as - . . . .d ntical With one we a
d n10untatn that it IS I C
Before that the concept of number is extended in order to make division always mmet or a newly dlseo\,ere
different
possible. Now a number is no longer, as before, supposed to consist of similar, but of before and called something else. \It the sentences have
"') is the same, b has cognlll\ e
dissimilar clements. The definition, however, was: "Each ofthc repeating clements of S nd'iO=]-+-- d entence
The meaning of 5 a
0= - - - Thc secon S
. haitI different senses heliocentriC VieW of
the row are called the unit ofthc numerical quantity." Out ··the unit" is a proper name: so \
thought ('Im/ntt [Gt'Jdllkt'l/In ' ., d .·thc founder of the h I say:
"Copernicus ail . ren ee between w en
it can't mean each one of them. I content [Erkcnntnisillhtl/ ]. t .. till a dirte
,.' 1e man: but thcre: IS S ..... steml" and
Thus the actual number is, contrary 10 the initial definition, brought in through the I h 1
tcsnarsystcm "mcan tht.: s.Ul
,·.vicwo lrIC
t·the solar
~
s,
. • 11' the hc!llll,;Cn . 'cS.
back door as a "sct," "value," or as a "how often." I "C\lpcrnicu:- is thc hmndcr {I
Tho:-": scntences '
. h'wc different "ens

I ·'Copernicus is l 'npcrllJl,;IIS.

12 /3

~3. Three lines ~rom the top: In connection with this whole paragraph Carnap comments
In the left rnargm: "laughter in the whole house {Heiterkeit im gan.zen. Hause]."
 148
Summer Semester 1914 Frege's Lectures on Logic 149

If we consider this to be one sentence, I ean negate it as a whole; then there arc the

following possibilities: the I<l part is false or the 2nd is false or both arc false. l"llUS Ihis is

different from the case where I ha"Ve both sentences separately.

Then we can define: The expression "0 is a positive 3,,1 root" is to mean the same as
A proper name has
"0 is a positive number and 0 is a 3,d root." We see: If we want to define a concept, we
1) a meaning: the thing abollt which something is said; have to indicate in general the place for the object (e.g., by means of a), since the concept
2) a sense that is part of the thought.
(predicate) is supposed to have general validity.
The name Scylla has no mean', I "
lng, on y a sense. Mount Aetna is higher than Ifboth concepts have sharp boundaries, i.e., for each object it is determined whether
Vesuvius." Here it is not the m .. . .
oUntam Itself, with all Its masses ofmck that is part of it falls under the concept or not, then the composite concept also has sharp boundaries.
the thought; rather somethin invi "bl '
g 51 e has to be part of the invisible thought: the sense of Another example: Suppose "(I is a prime number" is the expression to be defined:
the name Aetna. Similarly 5 and 3 + 2
have the same meaning, but ditferent senses. "There is no whole number> I and < 0 such that a is a multiple of it." But, e.g., the

number 3/2 also falls under this concept; thus we have to add: "0 is a positi'o'c whole H5.
We define concepts r I t'
, e a IOns, and (what is most difficult) ohjects. A concept is in number"; "a is > I." Thus we have 3 sentences; thus 3 suh-concepts that can be regarded
~ecd of supplementation al . .
E.g. ' ways has predlcallvc character. as characteristics of the concept prime number. (It does not matter that u is not in

64. ~~
The two pan
I
subject position in the 1sl sentence.)
S can a so occur in other s
art . entences; they have a sense in themselves. The I >I Analogously for the definition (~la relation; the only difference is that we ne-ed 2
P IS something saturated the 2""
, IS unsaturated letters [Buchstahen]. A relation is contained in a sentence in which 2 proper names
We can say several things about .
" . one and the same object, also put together in one uccur, e.g., J > 2. A relation name is doubly in need of supplementation
sentence: S IS a .,"
, POSItive number and a yd root."
A rC{luin.:rnent for any dcllnition (whether of a concept or a relation): It has to hold

in gent'ral withollt qualilil:atinns; or if qualified, then 2 definitions ha\'c to hold; the tid
. the case .
for
. the staled
III wtllch
I'· . . ', .. ,.. r. d Otherwise it can happen thaI
qU<l Iheilhon Isn sa ISlie .

lhe sense of a group of signs is indctcmlinate, E"Vcry sentence, i.e., every complex of
P.6.
signs (according to their rules), hilS to be either true or false.

/4 /5
84 , Four ij nes from the b
understandin f ottorn: This remark' "." ositive" is containpd in "'0 i.~
they still d g 0 the Conte:x.t princi 1 . If 15 revealing with respect to Frege's (later) 85. Middle of page: The emphasis is on "whole num b er • p . '
o so as a Contribution to thP e, the parts have senses "in themselves," then ). 1," thus superfluous.
e senSes ofwhole sentences. . f h in tf'xt hy flngl/' Ilrack,-to;,.
66. Last line: In eN, this paragraph IS separated rom t f> rna -

?
,
Summer Semester 1914 frege's Lectures on Logic 151
150

E.g., if we apply the general definition

b) Isaa~~ltIPleof7 )
Arithmetic signs, too, have to be defined in such a way that, no matter which object a is congruent to h modulo 7
a IS a whole number
(not only numbers) we put in the place that needs to bl: supp!cmentt:d, we get a detioitt: and
b IS a ...... holc number
meanmg.
we gd:
Ifwe claim that the sentence "Aetna is higher than Vesuvius" is true, then the two

proper names do not just have a sense (as even names in fiction do), but also a meaning: (16 - 2) ; " multiple 7
and
16 is a whole number
J 16 is congruent to 2 modulo 7
the real, external things that are designated lbezeichnet]. Now tht: whole sentence also
( and
hus a me,ming, besides its sense. This meaning has to remain the same if we replace 2 is a whole number
some parts oflhe sentence with others with the same meaning, even if they have different
But if we write:
senses. E.g.,

)
"\0 - 2 is a multiple of7" (16~3) is a mulliplcof7
and 16 is congruent to 3 modulo 7,
"17 - J is a multiple of7." 16 is a whole numht=r
The 'nllll vul/le remains unchanged. It is, therefur~, to be recognized as Ihe mt=aning of ( and
3 is a whole numher
the sentcm::c.
In ordinary usage: 'The sentence (or thought) is Irue," it seems as ira property is then the whole thing is still right the sense of the individual sentence is independent of

ascrihed to the sentence. We du nut seem 10 be dealing wilh a relation bdween the whether it is true or hllse. We can, in addition, give a sentence assertoric force or not

sentence and its meaning (a thingl, hut with a relation hctwl'l'll an Oh.il'l"t 111\d this (c.g .. in tidion). We nUl grasp a thought without asserting it as tn/C, without judging.

property. However: n\llhing is added to lhe senSl' \.r"'i . r' hy sayil1~ 111<11 it is trill'.
('he scnll'nn' "(II 2) is a lIlullipk ofT' is in ill'ed nrslIpplc\llentation: it fomts a
" "\",,,.. ",' I (,', if Ilto so, I subs.um..: 16 under this.
,I,
I
P\ISSlllL- nSSl'ftillll wlnrh .. :Ill, l'.~'" ...

('111/('1'/)'

16
17

87: Two lines from the bottom: The object would here be the sentence seen 8S a WTitten or
pnnted sentential sign,
 Frege's Lectures on Logic 153
152 Summer Semester 1914

, Analogously to how (3 -- 2) is the value of the function (a - 2) for the argument 3,

we can say that

and
"(16 - 2) is a multiple ofT'
The equality sign = does not stand for [hedeurt:t nich/] the copula, but for identity

Consequently

apparently says that

2 is a square root of 4;

"(17 - 2) is a multiple ofT' (-2)'(-2) - 4

arc values of the function says that

"(a - 2) is a multiple of 7'"

-2 is a square root of 4;

for the arguments 16 amI 17. bot

docs not say that

What ajimclion is cannot be defined, it cannot be reduced logically to something
2 is a square root of 4,
more simple; one c<Jn only hint at it. elucidate it.
bot
What lor us is an argument is called "subject" in [traditionalJ logic, our concept is
2 is a positivc square rool of 4
l'allcd "predicate."
The signs indicating generaliry are used to confer generality to the sentence. They
III\. rhe usc of limdillll in mathcmatil,:s is quite obscure. One talks ubout variables as if
have to be rcplaee<lble by proper names; and in doing so one makes the step from the
there were nlllsl..lTll numbers (1,2. ck.l amI variable number".
general to the particular.
If! replace x 2 by
Therefore a letter call not stand for [hcJclIleII] a "variable number·'; since there isn't
2
4 2 anything at all the lettcr is supposed to stand fnr---thcre arc no variable numbers. In pure
5 2. arithmcti..: time doc~ nol play ,1 rnle. lim, conscquenlly. docs variation. One talks about

it is not as. ifol1c thin"ev<Jrics

. ' " Sm" -..my Vllflallon
u 111 -. t hc thing that ....arics would Iwvl'to vari.1hk "qll<lIItilil',<·; l'. j.;. , tilt' 111;1!!lIitndl' of a l'Od ilf il'On that chal1ge~ over time i~ a
H9. r~mal1l the saine: (like a monarch Whll <lges; in cuntrast to him and his succe~sor). /illl l .t;O/1 whl'!"e f indil·all's till' (l1'!l:lll11l'nt pllsilill11, BUI now we havc moved over to the

uPlilinl/ioli ot"llrithllll·tic Till· v:lriatioll dlll·S nllt bl.'hl1lg hl anlhll11.'lic proper.

Dnt: ntkn confusl's tht: valuc l)f the fUlll-tilll1 with the I"undion itself; the value is an

object and it isn't in lIceJ ofSUpp!clllcntatioll any more, There is a diHiculty here: The
18
expressions ';conccpf' and "function" arc logically objectionable. Since one c;'ln say ·"the

function," which is then a proper name and has to stand for an object_ The value of the
88.
expression 'fu~ction'."
Eight lines fTOm the botton·
1,
Wh at F rege means, more precisely, is "the use of the
function is. indeed, an object, which is thus easily confused with the function itself.
89. Lastp.line:
(19fl3j, 236.Comparc the corresponding passage
_. < in F rege ' 5 Nachgclassene Sr.hriften
19
 155
154 Summer Semester 1914 Frege's lectures on Logic

t f h c function 1 + 2'(. N ow, it looks as if this func!,·on

x is the argume not w'-'~ the A function of2 arguments, e.g., .; - S. can be transformed into a function of one
argument in (l + . 2,/' .'
, so In the functIOn .g-. "'., argument in two ditTerent ways: either by a saturation (.; - 2) or by identifying the two
But (I -I 2tl isn't th c fu nctlOn
a particular argument" e g (I 2
. of a function R h
. at er, it is the value of a function for
argument positions (~_ ';). Functions of two arguments that always have a truth value as

If I designate th
, .., + '3) can be th
..
.
c argument jm the function ¢'c (I 2·3)'. ~ value are relations. Therefore we can transform the relation';:> ; into a concept, e.g., .;
e posItIon of the argument by J; the I h
that is the v<lluc of this fu . ." n ave the function (I + 2·.gl: and
> 0 (the concept of positive number). Or we form the concept .g>'; (thi~ is an empty
90. , nctlOn for the argument 3 Th' .
functions to form . IS IS how one can combine two concept nothing falls under it).
a new one. Functions have to be defined everywhere from the beginning; for instance, the

F. A_,function of 2 argu menls .IS fundamentall d·j·j·

y .
I erent from a Cu r r function.g _ ( also for objects other than numbers, e.g,: If both arguments are not
,.g.• It I saturate one a r g ' .. nc IOn 0 I argument.
ument positIOn in "c; - (" I et a f . numbers. it is to be "the False." If a function is first defined narrowly and later
only a second saturdtion I d ." g unction of one argument, and
ca s to an object. expanded, then this expansion changes the function; and if one still keeps using the same
. One more thing concerning the eonfiuSlon . of object
. and fi .
Its value: The value of th" _ unctIOn, or of a fum:tion and sign. this ambiguity can easily lead to confusion.
1 H e [unci IOn I !.; .,~ r.or a II arguments (at I • In the development of mathematics one does, however, reach certain points where

~cratch again.
. ut on..:: cannot say th I" ' , east lor numbers! is
at IS the funcllOn. Since e ' . one wants to expand the system. But then one has to begin from In any
the point 2. we h'lve to I ' .g.. In order to differentiate say at
(2+4:)) (I +2 2)
, rep ace the argument position wi h
_
-
I 2+k etc., so (I +(2+/i)-
• CO". thm alwuy' hos to he a comptete .,yst,,,, at hand that;' lugicolly unproblematic.
Hut In "["there .IS no argument po 'it"
lt~n
b h E.g., une would h",e to proceed" folluwS' ,slong as the plus sigo + i, u>cd ooly for
y 2 + k. Thus even the f ," s I at could be replacetl
91. . uncllons which arc called "CI .• ..' pusitive whole numhers, \l1lC chooses a diflcrenl sign for it. e.g·. ---.. .
contused with their valu' h'h" msldnl 111 Analysis arc not to he
c. W II.: IS an object.

20 21

90. Six lines from th e top: In

2-:\}:.!," eN. an arrow points from the word "h .. .,
91. Two 1" f t At back to (1 +
. Ines rom the bOt[om' Fo
der Anthmetik. .p. 72 • t'ootnote.- r the expressio n ' .. constant," cf. F rege •
s•Grulldgcsetze

-_.,.,,~.
 156
Summer Semester 1914 157
Frege's Lectures on Logic

A sentence, e.g" 2 + 3 "" 5, has

.
One cannot develop non-Euclidean geometry b y saymg: Let's assume for the
1) a sense, which is its thought content [sein Gedanke]. By combining the words
moment that the parallel axiom is not true, so drop it.
92. which stand for [hezeichnen] parts (lfthe sense one can form a variety of
But is it possible to draw a conclusion from a false sentence?
sentences.
If I have the sentence: If A is true, then B is true,
2) a truth value, which is its meaning. The closed part ufthe sentence, a proper
then by means of the axiom: A is true,
name, stands for (bezeichne/l an object; in science it is necessary that this

proper name docs not just have a sense, but also stands for [bezeichnef] an we can conclude: B is true.
object. The predicative parts of the sentence stand for [bezeichnen] a concept. On the other hand, if A is not true we cannot infer anything.
Object and concept are quite different. If A is true, then B is true,
Then again, suppose I have:

Among the sentences we distinguish between axioms [AxiomeJ and theorems

If B is true, then r is true.

(Lehrsii/ze].
Conclusion: If A is true, then r is true
Axioms are true and unprovable; they have not been derived themselves, instead
Continuing further: If r is true, then .:::1 is true.
everything is derived from them. An aKiom has to be true; and for that it is necessary that
Conclusion: If A is true, then t1 is true.
no part of it is still indeterminate. (EKcept for general signs, which confer generality uf
content to the sentence.) . t in all the sentences. But usually one docs
t
The condition "If A is true" remainS cons an be d
()e/inition.\· arc stipulations that a familiar complex. sign is ID be rerlaced hya simple, '., . sentence, althoug h they have to assume
not write down all the premises 01 a . . . A is tme I can still dra......
new one. This new sign hus thereby acquired a definite me.ming, and tile st'n1cncc . ' . 'fl Jon't prt:suppose the aXiom. '
implicitly <11' conditlOl1s, 1 hus I . , , t ee
. - . If 4 is true, III ewry sen en .
hecome.s tautologieul. This talltological.selltenn' cun then he Ilsed;ls il prt'misc, lOll condusiollS. alhcil alwilYs with the condItIOn. '

22 23
92. Three lines from the top: According to Frege's al . 1 it should say
.. exp re ss [ ausd" ere'Instead 0 f "stand for [ber.eichnen]."
rue k en )" h usu t:ermlno ogy,

t
158
Frege's Lectures on Logic 159
Summer Semester 1914

Ewmpie 93.

We presuppose: If2 sides ofa triangle arc equal, then the opposite angles a.re also
·V·~
equal. [To prove:] In ......... J tn·,ngle the larger angle lies opposite to the larger Side.

Similarly for indirect proofs. E.g., suppose we have to prove that E is true.
~C
A
Assume I have the sentence: If E is not truc, then Z is not true; ifI then know that Z is
Thus: IfAe - BC, then L B -= LA. IV Ifa=b,thennoth>a. 94.
true, I can conclude that E is true, since the sentence abo ....e can be transposed to:
II IfAC<BC, then LA > L B. V If a> h, then not h > a. 95.9
If Z is true, then E is true.
III If a is not:> b, and if a is not = h, then b:> a. 97.
A sentence that is an axiom in one system can he a theorem, thus something to be
proved, in another. To prove: If L B > L A. then AC > BC

A sentence that is supposed to be an axiom has to be true; a false axiom is self- lfnot AC >BC, then AC~BC or BC >AC (a
contradictory. If AC =BC, then LB =LA. I

If BC > AC then LA> L B. II

Ifan axiom is only posited hypothetically, It should really be added as a condition to
each sentence, a1 least implicitly. If we don't do that, the theorems derived from il If LB =LA,thcnnot LB >LA. IV

(ilppcaf to) have more general validity than they really do. If AC - BC then not L H :> L A. <p
---.--- V
If / A > / B, Ihen not L B :> L A,
(y
If BC' ','1(', then rwl L H' / A.
(a

11'11111 .'Ie' . JI(', iflltlt .-/(' IU',thclIl1ol.!B>LA.

(I') If. /I ''/.-f, then 11111 (I(' /Ie.

[I' /1/ ·/A.ifnol AC ·>B(', then nol L B > LA,

24 25

. . of a roof, several arrows are a ddedin eN

93. First line; In the followmg outhne p

-from (a) back to (II II ; he third line after ( (1 I to the lim'! (fj)~
II 'g(a)andfro mt
- from the line immediately fa OWln • after (fJ) to the line (r).
. a f ter ( a ) and from the line and b !Itand for the ang les, L_ A and L R.
- from the second fme
. h' line the letters a L B "
94. Fifth line, right SIde: In t I S , 1 . "If AC> Be, then LA) - . B
95. Sixth line, left side: In C'II.T'tsayswrongy.
J~, 1 db stand for the englesLAendL
. .
. " his line, the letters a an . ents AC and BC.
96. Sixth line, nght Side. In t b and for the line segm
., he letters a and !'it
97, Seventh line: In thIS hne, t

.'>I t
160
Summer Semester 1914 161
Frege's Lect.ures on Logic

[',5' If L B > L. A, then not Be > AC (X

A, J' . not Be ~Ac.,
If L. B > L A and If . ' then AC>BC. (p

Therefore: If not AC :> Be. then not L B > L A 2',4' If L B > L A. then not Be =: AC (F
(5
If L B > L A, then AC> Be. f.l, v If L B ;. L. A. then AC > BC

-.- This is what was to be proved,

(Here we have repeatedly used "transposition": antecedent [Bedingungssalzl and

consequent [FolgesafZ] are interchanged, but both in negated form. (The English
logicians call this contraposition.)
Thus here we have used the false Sentence "not AC
as a condition in a bigger sentence so that nothing has been said about whether this
condition is satisfied or not.
The same proof can also be arranged in such a tonn that it looks like a direct proof.
We make use of the following sentences:
]') I[not LA >/.8, thennol Be >AC'.
2") !fllm LAc-LB, then not Be "-AC.
3') Ifoo! Bc" >AC andifnol 8e -A(', then AC >BC
4') If LIJ >L.A. thcnnol LA LIJ.
:'1') Ir / H ., L A, then not / A ~ / H.
.
The difference between an indirect and a direct proo f'IS therefore not as big as
usually assumed. .
:> He," too; but not in itself, only
. d not draw any conclusions from a false
As we have seen, in an indIrect proof we 0 . as
assumption; sinee we do not actually have the falsehood as a premise, but always only
the condition in a conditional judgment. .
. de cd tn.ed to draw conclUSIOns from
Ncvertheless. in mathematics people have III
false premises. e.g., in non-Euclidean geometry. . ".
. 'ne the other is intersectcd by It, too,
"'If one of 2 parallel lines is Intersected by a Ii , . lIel
. t" I f one does not use thiS para
or ' "'There is only one parallel line through a pOIn .
. . . ~tisn~
. , , cl what can be proved without It. t .
aXIOm for the moment and asks mer y . " It is
i ich ~cntenccs can h c prove 'd without lIS111g I .
nhjeclilmanlc. One learns. Ihen, w 1 ~ , . ' that
if one assuITIC.~ mlOl hcr ;IXIOll
1 Illstead
. , an aXIOm
quile" different Imiller. IHlwevl'r. t
. .. rl' we have tn {lojcct· One can only lakc a me
Clllllradil.:ts it Against Ifllll pltllcdll I w.e it as IhL"
, "rt"ltl,.·c 11IIllufalscl.lI1c"!hulony .
Ihllll!J;hl hI Ill' Ihl' prt'lllisl' ill Ull mIL:. . ' . 11 dc-rivc-d sclllcnces.
Clluditioli llllll:lllilliliull<li "I Ills " {;\'Ildilion
I is thell CIIlTlcd llillll~ III a

26
27

,
.011........'.
162 Frege's Lectures on Logic 16]
Summer Semester 1914

As far as independence is cuntemed it matteN. e.g.. whether

A A
[besides]
,
S the system S
, is also consistent.

LI not..::1

E.g., 'Through a point there is more than one line parallel to a line." If one \vorks out
this geometry more and more , d oes one eventually reach a sentence that contmdicts one In Hilbert's Foundations o(Geometry investigations are pursued that initially make

of the other axioms? In that case it look like the consistency orthe Euclidean axioms is at issue. But with respect to those
. one w ou Id be confronted with the same situation as in
an indirect proof. One Vi ou Id app I" axioms such an invesligation is impossible. Or it is only possible by reinterpreting the
y transposition" and get the parallel axiom as a
word axiom. Hilbert says frequently: certain axioms define this and that concept. Here
conse4 ue nce. However: How many inference's are .
. necessary . at a contradiction?
to arnve
Thus nothing has really been proven. "axiom" is used in a way that is ditferent from our usage, as well as different from
traditional usage. Si!lee an ax.iom is allowed to contain only what is already detenninate
Do we really have to assume the axioms t o be true.<' Everyhody has to figure thai out

for himself. Ifsomeone else doesn't take the parallel axiom to be true, I have to assume [bekanntJ.
Hilbert says: "The points on a line are in a certain relation to each other that is
that he means something different by "point" thiUll , or by "1·me. .,
expressed by the word 'between '." This explanation is supplemented by the axioms:
With respect to the axioms one wants. to ir1vestrgate whether Ihey ilre consistent and
I) Let A, B, C be points on a line: If B lies between A and C. then B lies berween C
whether they are independent Ii
rom each other. Whoever takes the Euclidean axioms 10
anti A.
he tnJC assumes, oftourse, that the Yare'wnslstenl.
.'. But whether they are independent is
2) If A and (' are points on a line, then there exists a point B that lies between A
lIT1portant to determine. sinte nne is su .,
. ,. pposed to make the numher of axioms as small <IS
pOSSIble. and ('.
.ll (liven three (ll'h/trmY puints 011 u line, only olle of them lies hetween the other

IWIl

41
YB.

28 29
o " bl d to take the plaee of the foUowing
:>"8. Bottom ofpage; This pIcture IS presuma Ysuppose. l' d me that a is
axiom; "Assume that A B Care three points that do not lie on a mean assu AB'In a
. ' , C If h I' a meets the segment
ahneintheplaneABCthatdoesnotmeetA,B,
. t e segment
AC = the me S·C"m a pOI·n,"IDavid
.
pumt, then it also meets either the seb'1Tlent or. . h h ,"on~ .. ~,·tjon of thl'
.I . A_' 114 Startlng"'lt t f' Cl. "r."
H 1 bert,. (;Fundlagen
. der Geometrlf~,. n.J\.10m .
I" d under A-ionllI 4 • Fn~g"
the same num her, J'Ul
tex.t thIS axIOm replaces another axIom 15 e . . )
USes the latter axiom in his Nachge/a.Hene Schriften j 1983). p. 246.

. . ' ....... _, t
 165
164 Summer Semester 1914 Frege's Lectures on Logic
.------------_.-

These arc pseudo-axioms; since the expression "between" is nut dctcnninatc yet. It
is analogous to presenting a number of sentences as the definition of a number, as . Id fonnulate the sentence
If par stoud for [hezeichnet] a re 1atmn, we cou .
follo .....s:
"If a parb
il 2 - 4 II is still doubtful here whether a numher has been defined at all: and a par c,
(/ < 6 whether there really is such a number, or perhaps several. then bc. for any a. b, and c."
0:=

. . . her true or false. E.g.. it IS tme if we

etc. lfwe replace par by a relation, thiS sentence IS ell
. . h' '":I"d level concept. namely Ihl::
replace par by .'=." Thus here we are also deahng Wit a ~
Thcsc "axioms" arc, therefore, really definitiuns, and not even uniquely determining.
concept of relations
. h· h e,g., the identity relation falls.
10 W IC ,
This is further nbscun:d by the facllhal for us the word "between" is not new, .. d r" "in:' so as tu
bUI
With respect to 2 nd level concepts we don't want to say un e .
('llIlsCqUClltly it is hettcr to replace it by new words: If 1'1 level
. _ . b t also different from th c casc (
indicate that thiS case IS analogous to, U
IUO
"A li...' s hl'lwccn Hand C"

\Ill.' say ".-I pat U tar ('''; concepts.

h I f between three object\ (In
thus: "lfHrat A lar(",then Bpat ("!lull." In "B pat A tar C· we arc dealing wit a rc a IOn
. . . , . " , a fundion of three arg.unll:nls who..c
I len: we arc dealing. with a 2
nd
lcvcll:onccpL [traditional] logic: "relatIOn With 3 bases ), I.e, .
, lation as thaI stand.. to iI concepl I
value is a truth value. (It thus stands to an ordlOary re
Compare: "If a is a v~

andhisalf', More predscly. Hilbert's 1'1 Axiom says:

then u -,-- h, for any a and h."
. . . the line detennincd h~ A and C. If
. I If 8 IS a pOInt on
"If A is a point. if C is a pom . ..
Here we have the 2nd h:vcl concept "conct=pt of concepts under which only one object tar C. then 8 pat C tar.--l.
e is different from A. and if B pat A
falls,"

30 31
L J a~ a ('onllllt'nt (,n
th ...... urd
99. Eight hnes hom the bottom: In eN. Carnap has WTitten in his lat~r handwriting "this eN this sentenCI' i .. mar ..#'
100. Ten lines from the top: In '
i!> right (.w richti/{I:' rt>pt>atcd rhl" word "pat." and drawn an arrow to an occurr("n~(" nfir
"in" in the previous l'if,:nten~e,
furtht>r dl')WT1.
166 Summer Semester 1914

Literature Cited

And this is su pposed

to b '
e satisfied whatever A, B, and C may be. The whole thing
has a sense only if pat and tar have a sense.
Later Hilbert not only uses
.. lh e word ..hetween" with a d'l~
I teTcnt .
meanmg, he also Awodey, S. and Carus, A. 2001. "Carnap, Completeness, and Categoriciry:
often ' "I'me,."" pane,
. uses "point" I " ... differently
. from Euclid. What is unclear, then, is The Gabelbarkeitssatz ofl928" Erkenntnis 54, pp. 145-72.
, he never says so ex.plicitly and h·c never
this: • • makes clear how else he understands them. Awodey, S. and Reck, E, 2002, "Compleleness and Catcgoricity, Part I:
Nineteenth Century Axiomatics to 'IWentieth Century Metalogic"
Often he lISCS the ex.pressions as indicating indefinitely , J' us'1 as we usc Ietters.
History and Philosophy ofLogic 23, pp, 1-30,
Awodey, S. and Klein, C" eds. 2004, Carnap Brought Home: The Viewfrom
lena, Chicago: Open Court,
Beaney, M., ed, 1997, The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
Bynum, T, W, 1972, "On the Life and Work of Gottloh Frege " in Frege,
Conceptual Notation and related articles. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 1-54.
__, 1976, "The Evolution of Frege's Logicism" in (Schiro. M.. ed, 1976),
pp.279-9 9 ,
Carnap. R. 1922. flu Raam: Ein Beitrag zur Wis.senschaft.slehre, Kant-
Studien. Erganzungsheft 56, Berlin: Reuther & Reichard.
__. 1927, "Eigenlliche und Uneigendiche Begriffe" Sympo"ion 1, pp.
355-74,
__, 1929, Abril'S der Logistik. Vienna: Springer,
__, 1930a, "Die ahe und die neue Logik" Erkenntnis 1, pp- 12-26,
32 _ _. 1930b. "Bericht tiber Untersuchungen ZUT allgemeinen Axiomatik"
Erkenntnis 1, pp, 303-10.
_ _. 1932. "Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprachc dec
Wissenschaft" Erkenntm:., 2. pp. 4:~2-65.
_ _. 1947. MeaniflK (Jfl(i Nt.It's,'lit)'. Chit'IIp:0: tJnivt'rsit)' ofChi','ap;o !J~«.~
.. o
__. 1956. Meaning and Nf'C('8Sity. 2nd ('tl.. Chinlp:o: llnl\if'rsuy 01 ChH'ag

Press. .
__. 1963. '''Intellectual Autobiography" in The P/li/oMJphJ' (!{ Rudo(/
Carnap, p, Schilpp. ed.. La Salle. lL: Open Courl. pp, 3-1\4,

167

______.''*' iii.
 169
168 Frege's Lectures on Logic Literature Cited

1993. "Interview mit RudolfCarnap" in Mein U7eg in die Philosophic, __, 1964. The Basic Laws ofArithmetic. M. Furth, ed, and trans., Berkeley:
W. Hochkcppel, ed., Stuttgart: Reclam, pp. 133-47. University of California Press; partial English uanslation of (Fregc
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