Robert R.

Wadholm

W.V. Quines Natural Kinds: The Dubiousness of Similarity & Kind and the Induction of Grue Non-Ravens
Robert R. Wadholm, Missouri University September 11, 2012
Is the notion of kinds and similarities a dubious concept? Are the natural kinds ultimately reducible and superfluous? Can we inductively arrive at grue non-ravens (and what in the world is a grue or a nonraven)? In this paper, I wish to critique W.V. Quines argument regarding the puzzles about non-black non-ravens and grue emeralds put forth in his essay Natural Kinds.

Non-black non-ravens
Hempels puzzle of non-black non-ravens suggests that each black raven tends to confirm the law that all ravens are black, and further that each green leaf, being a non-black non-raven, should tend to confirm the law that all non-black things are non-ravens, that is, again, that all ravens are black. This is said by Quine to be paradoxical. Quine posits a solution to this puzzle by stating that the complement of a projectible predicate need not be projectible. So a green leaf counts toward All leaves are green, but not toward All non-black things are non-ravens. Quines argument for rejecting the projectibility of complements of a projectible predicate seems to be based on a distaste for the idea that looking at one kind (or non-kind) can help us confirm projections about another kind (because for him, kinds are too messy). However, if we take Hempels puzzle at face value, there is not much of a puzzle, and no paradox, and our notion of kind/similarities does not seem to be put into doubt. If there are one million ravens in the world, and I have examined 800,000 of them, and every one of them has been black, we can use induction to predict that the next raven I examine will be black, and further that it is likely that all ravens are black. When I examine raven number 800,001 and it is black, I get closer to confirming this prediction based on induction. Let us say, for the sake of argument, that there are 1082 other objects in the universe (other than ravens). If I examine a green leaf (which is both a non-

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raven and non-black), I show that one of those many other objects in the universe that is non-black is also a non-raven. While we dont usually do things this way, we can see that it is just a question of statistics. 1 in 1082 is very small, and thus is not much of a confirmation of our hypothesis that all non-black things are non-ravens (and thus that all ravens are black). However, 1 in 1 million is statistically larger, and thus is more of a confirmation of our hypothesis that all ravens are black. As long as there are more things that are non-ravens than there are that are ravens, it is exceedingly more easy (and intuitive) to confirm that all ravens are black on the basis of seeing ravens than on the basis of seeing non-ravens. Thats not a paradox, thats just statistics. And it doesnt seem to be much of a puzzle. There is a puzzle, however, involving induction from kinds related to this: If we only had an idea of a raven, and no one had ever examined a ravens color, could we examine every non-black non-raven in the universe and confirm that ravens are always black (or say anything about what ravens are, based on what other things are not)? Or does the notion of kinds (like black things or ravens) require at least one example (and not merely nonexamples) to uncover the nature of the kind?

Grue emeralds
Quine asks us to picture Goodmans grue emerald puzzle as an example of the dubious scientific standing of a general notion of similarity, or of kind. So what is the puzzle? Goodman creates a universe in which emeralds are being examined to see what color they are. As we examine each emerald, we notice that all the emeralds we have examined thus far are green. So far so good. We would use induction to predict that any emerald we examine tomorrow will likely be green (they have all been green so far, so that would be a good hypothesis about the state of things, unless we know that the emeralds will change color overnight, or we have examined emeralds that are not green, which is not the case). However, Goodman proposes a new idea in the form of a proposition: Call anything grue that is examined today or earlier and found to be green or is not examined before tomorrow and is blue. Lets think a little about Goodmans proposition. He is asking us to create a new naming convention whereby we name emeralds based on color and examined date (green and examined today or earlier, blue and not

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examined before tomorrow). So any emeralds before this specific date in time are green, because they are green, correct? They are also grue, because they are green and were examined today and earlier. So this state of affairs seems to imply that inductively we should hypothesize that an emerald examined tomorrow will have the same likelihood of being green as it does of being grue. Or that induction based on kinds of things is dubious, because the notion of kinds and similarities is dubious. That seems to be the way that Quine deals with the puzzle, but lets take a closer look. I have a daughter named Emily that turned 10 on July 15, 2012. On July 14, I could have said 9 is the age of Emily Wadholm today or 10 is the age of Emily Wadholm tomorrow. But in this case, Emily is in fact 9 today and 10 tomorrow (because it is her birthday tomorrow). Emily was 9 every other day of the year before July 15, so we should predict that she will still be 9 years old on July 15 and after. Unless something happens. Something did happenshe changed from 9 to 10 because July 15 was her birthday. Lets propose, then, to call nen any Emily Wadholm that is 9 on July 14 and earlier or is 10 on July 15 and after. Im okay with that. We can predict on July 14 that Emily will be 9 on July 15 based on her being 9 years old for so many days previously, but wed be wrong (shes going to change ages). If we knew anything about aging and birthdays, we would be able to use inductive reasoning to say that Emily would be 10 on July 15. Good thing we have the number nen. We can instead predict that Emily is nen years old, and well be right! Emily is nen: she is 9 on July 14 and earlier or 10 on July 15 and after. But wait, if were correct, that means that we have misdefined nen; nen should be 9 on July 14 and earlier and 10 on July 15 and after. If our prediction about nen is correct, we are forced to get rid of the or and replace it with an and. If nen is correct, nen needs redefined (as both statements are true, and no disjunctive is needed). If Emily is nen tomorrow, she is 9 today and earlier and 10 tomorrow. Lets look back at grue and imagine, for the sake of testing the argument, that Goodman and Quine are right in suggesting that it seems to be equally plausible (inductively) that an emerald we examine tomorrow will be green and that it will be grue. (For Quine, an intuitive notion of similarity between green emeralds makes them more likely intuitively, though not necessarily inductively). After all, all of the other emeralds were green in the past, leading us to make a prediction that all emeralds are

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green (even the emeralds we have not yet examined). And as we examine more emeralds, we may find ourselves closer to being statistically able to predict that all emeralds are green (as the unexamined emeralds near 0) as we did with ravens earlier. However, we also find that all the previously examined emeralds seem to point to a prediction of a grue emerald tomorrow, despite the fact that a grue emerald is nonsensical and smelling of philosophical trickery. So how do we choose between green and grue? On the basis of the intuitiveness of similarity/kind, as Quine seems to suggest? If we allow ourselves to be drawn into the puzzle, we may have to admit the equal likelihood of either green or grue, or like Quine, to speculate about projectible predicates and question the scientific standing of the idea of similarities and kind. But lets not give up yet. Maybe Emily being nen is a clue to emeralds not being grue. Lets look ahead to tomorrow when our predictions about the color of previously unexamined emeralds will be tested, and see what the results are, then use a time machine and come back to today to make our decision about the color of emeralds that will be examined tomorrow (well be testing the nature, value and validity of a proposition based on its results). Lets take the simple choice first: we say that emeralds examined tomorrow will be green based on inductive reasoning that seems to suggest that as we experience more green-only emeralds we are more likely to experience green-only emeralds in the future. If an emerald we examine tomorrow is green, we were right about our prediction (for the time being). If an emerald we examine tomorrow is red, we were wrong. But we based our hypothesis on past empirical data, so we were right to hypothesize that based on our previous research, all emeralds are green. It is just a matter of an incorrect hypothesis. We merely need to adjust our hypothesis about the future to account for our experiences in the past. Tomorrow we will adjust our hypotheses if need be. Thats how science works. Now lets take the more difficult choice: we say, based on the grue proposal, that emeralds examined tomorrow will be grue (and thus blue). If an emerald we examine tomorrow is green (or red, or purple, etc.) we were wrong. If an emerald we examine tomorrow is grue (and thus blue), we were right. Unfortunately, if we were right, grue is not what we thought it was. Grue was supposed to mean any emerald that is examined today or earlier and found to be green or is not examined before tomorrow and

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is blue. But we find that if an unexamined emerald is blue tomorrow after examination (and thus, grue according to our proposed prediction), then grue actually means any emerald that is examined today or earlier and found to be green and is not examined before tomorrow and is blue. If the prediction about grue is true, grue is not a disjunctive proposition. True grue as it was proposed satisfies both sides of the disjunction, meaning that there is no disjunction (and we may infer no intended disjunction). May we infer from this that the nature of grue is nonsense (and mere philosophical gobble-dee-gook) or that it has been miscommunicated? If it is nonsense (which I think it is), lets get rid of it as a proposition. If it has merely been miscommunicated, then lets be more clear about what grue means (and, not or). So if we will be right about grue tomorrow, then grue is a bad (non-inductive) option. Without the disjunction, grue is a green emerald examined today or earlier and is predictive of a blue emerald tomorrow. But based on inductive reasoning, we have already stated that it is most likely that an emerald examined tomorrow will be greenafter all, all of the earlier examined emeralds were green. We have no good reason to choose grue (there is no evidence for unexamined emeralds to be blue), and subsequently no puzzle over kinds or similarities. Grue is not equal to B or C, it is equal to B & C, and thus not a good choice (unless, like nen, we know beforehand something about the rest of the emeralds or about a change that will take place in the unexamined emeralds overnight, but if that is so, we should have entered that into the proposal concerning grue). Inductively we should hypothesize today that tomorrows examination of emeralds will yield similar results to what we have observed thus far, and they will be green, not blue or grue. Further, if we find that all non-green things are also non-emeralds, and we have at least one example of an emerald and it is green, we could hypothesize that all emeralds are green. Consequently, we could also say that all ravens are non-grue (but could we say that all non-non-grue things are nonravens?). Can we infer from the non-raven and grue puzzles that the notion of similarities or kinds is dubious in its scientific standing? I think the reasoning behind this inference has been dissipated. The kinds seem to have stood their ground. Even if science advances and posits reduction of kinds into superfluity (as Quine asserts at the end of his argument), still humans and animals seem to make use of

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kinds and similarities at every point in their lives, causing recognitions of kinds and similarities to proliferate. They are now richer kinds, but they are nevertheless persistent and useful (and made use of by even the scientists and philosophers who wish to deny them validity). Another question might be Does a study of kinds belong to ontology, or to epistemology? An answer to that, I fear, could be full of unending puzzles, though perhaps not of the grue non-raven variety.