Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ON IWO JIMA
Classification ch*ng*d to
ED
CINCPAC-GINCPOA
BULLETIN NQ. 136-45
10 JUNE 1945
8 JUN1945
Defense Installations
on
I WO JIMA
flaintly
CINCPAC-CINCPOA
FLEET MARINE FORCE
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
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MARINE CORPS
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5 ComGenTraComFMF Pendleton
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BRITISH
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RAdmComDDs 1
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2 1 1 1 1 1 ea ea ea ea ea Captain EscortForcee
SenOffMinFlot
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Table of Contents
JAPANESE DEFENSIVE PLAN AT IWO JIMA . . . . . ILLUSTRATIONS .. General Terrain Features Beaches ......... Terrain Inland * Obstacles and Mines Mines Trip Wire Anti-Tank Ditches Caves Coast Defense - Artillery 15 cm CD Guns 14 cm CD Guns 12 cm CD Guns 12 cm (Short) Naval Guns 8 cm CD Guns Antiaircraft and Dual Purpose Batteries 12 cm DP Guns 10 cm DP Guns 7 cm AA Guns 25 mm AA MG 13 mm MG Searchlights . . . . . . . . Blockhouses Covered Artillery Emplacements 120 mm Howitzers 75 mm (Type 38) Field Guns 75 mm (Type 90) Field Guns 47 mm Ant i-Tank Guns 37 mm Anti-Tank Guns Open Artillery Emplacements 47 mm Anti-Tank Guns 37 am Anti-Tank Guns Mortars 320 mm Spigot Mortars . 150 mm Mortars 81 mm Mortars Grenade Launchers . Rockets 200 mm Rocket Launcher 250 kg Rocket Launcher 63 kg Rocket Launcher Pillboxes Rifle Pits Tanks Dummies Radar and Radio Station Revetted Vehicles Air Raid Shelters Ammunition Storage Miscellaneous . . . 2-6
7-119
7-16
7-10
, 11-16
17-20
17-18
19
20
21-25
26-39
26-26
29-31
32-33
34-37
38-39
39-64
39-42
43-45
46-48
49-58
59-60
61-64
65-70
71-86
71-74
75-78
78-80
8I-85
86
87-88
87
88
89-95
89
90-92
93-94
95
96-IOO
96-98
99
100
101-103
104-105
106-108
109-111
112
113
. . . . . . . 114-115
' 116-117
. . . . . 118-119
MAP APPENDIX
Enemy Defense Installations as observed from ground study.
Arcs of Fire for Casemated Coastal Defense Guns on Iwo Jima.
Anti-Aircraft Defenses.
Blockhouses with principal directions of fire indicated.
Covered Artillery with principal directions of fire indicated.
The strategic importance of IWO JIMA. need hardly be emphasized. Its value as
an airbase midway between the MARIANAS and the heart of JAPAN has already been
proved. After the occupation of SAIPAN, the Japs must have known that IWO would be
attacked* The only question was VHEH. The story of their haste in constructing
defenses is told in aerial photographs from 15 June 1944 until D-Day, 19 February
1945.
INCREASE OF FORTIFICATIONS
At the time SAIPAN was invaded, only AA defenses, hasty fire trenches, and pre
liminary beach defenses had been prepared at IWO JIMA, By September 1944* positions
had been constructed in depth behind the beaches. Company and platoon positions
were then in evidence, and concrete pillboxes and covered artillery emplacements
were under construction. By December, most beach positions were completed and had
been strengthened by the construction of heavy concrete blockhouses. A cross-island
defense line in depth protecting the northern part of the island was springing up
along the high ground north of Airfield No. 1. Additional AA defenses, increased
numbers of covered artillery and coast defense guns, and more and more concrete
positions and minefields on the beaches were noted on each succeeding photographio
softie. By D-Day, key positions had been connected with pillboxes and were protected
by covering fire from artillery, anti-tank guns, and mortars, previously sighted in.
Intelligence prior to the invasion of IWO indicated a formidable garrison force
with many major caliber weapons and extensive tank and personnel obstacles; however,
aerial photographs and maps gave only a limited picture of one of the enemy*s best
defensive weapons, the terrain. An amphibious assault in force was limited to the
east and west beaches of the narrow southern part of the island. These conditions
gave the Japs an advantage in preparing defensive positions for all-around security.
Only small groups were needed to cover very narrow beaches with steep exits along
the northern coast.
COVER AND DISPERSAL
, Captured documents, confirmed by ground study, indicate the enemy's battle
strength was conserved by countermeasures against shelling and bombing. The terrain
was well suited for cover, and caves were so numerous in some sections of the island
that it was impossible to plot them all on a 1:10,000 map. The coarse, loose, vol
canic ash kept damage from shell fragmentation to a minimum. Ammunition, stores,
and personnel were dispersed in caves and behind protective terrain where naval
gunfire and artillery could not reach them.
CAMOUFLAGE
Camouflage encountered and camouflage discipline during construction, as evalu
ated from aerial photographs, was excellent. Positions were at all times covered
with materials which blended into the surrounding terrain and vegetation. Spoil
from excavations was planted with grass to obliterate traces of military activity.
Natural vegetation was used to a large extent to conceal well-built positions from
aerial attack. While such practices could not always elude photographic interpre
tation, nevertheless many positions were not detected until gun fire had blown away
the concealing vegetation. Maximum use was made of IW0*s sparse growth for con
cealing trenches, rifle pits, machine gun and artillery emplacements. Positions as
large as those housing 120 mm Howitzers were undetected under the protective covering
of trees in their natural state.
COAST DEFENSE
Coast defense artillery ranging from 4.7" (120 mm) to 6M (I55 mm) guns was
initially effective against our ships. All CD guns were casemated in four to six
feet of reinforced concrete. Each emplacement was so positioned in the terrain that
it was normally protected from naval gunfire. A ship taking a CD gun under direct
fire necessarily exposed itself to the gun at which it was firing. Many guns were
so camouflaged that their location was unknown, until they opened fire.
ANTIAIRCRAFT
Antiaircraft batteries were numerous, including 120 mm DP, 100 mm, 75 mm, and
25 mm in triple, twin, and single mounts. The Japs could not satisfactorily conceal
these weapons, but their continued use against aircraft and our personnel ashore
testifies to the sound construction of their emplacements.
EAST BEACH POSITION
The elaborate trench system facing the eastern beaches had been entirely
abandoned. The loose nature of the sand suggests their presence as dummies, al
though they may have been prepared originally as hasty beach defenses before adequate
concrete positions were built. Well-constructed blockhouses encasing 25 mm machine
cannons to 120 mm short naval guns were the first defenses encountered on and near
the beach. Some concrete pillboxes and sandstone revetted rifle pits gave infantry
protection to the heavier weapons. The ground at the base of Airfield No. 1 was
more suitable for dug in positions, and most of the infantry positions protecting
the east beach were here. The positions were not so much the target for naval gun
fire, and excellent observation and good fields of fire were afforded here. The
position of Airfield No. 1 limited the depth of these positions to approximately
500 to 700 yards. Supporting fires were delivered from the flanks using the ob
servation provided by Mt. SUHIBACHI and the high ground over the East Boat Basin
and around Airfield No. 2. The area between the beach and Airfield No. 1 was steep
and impossible for wheeled vehicles* to traverse. Movement of infantrymen and tanks
was impeded by the loose soil with the result that they offered excellent targets
to anti-tank and anti-personnel guns and tactics.
WEST BEACH POSITIONS.
The defenses of the West Beaches were probably more extensive and elaborate
than East Beach defenses.' Airfield No. 1 permitted these defenses to be 700 to 1400
yards deep giving considerably longer fields of fire and permitting a more elaborate
system of dummy positions fronting the actual main positions and designed to draw
our preliminary bombardment. The terrain was much more substantial for caves and
underground shelters, and positions were better protected from our naval gunfire.
SURIBACHI POSITIONS
In the south a cross-island defense line was constructed on the terraced slopes
which guarded the approaches to Mt. SURIBACHI. It consisted of a maze of concrete
pillboxes, bunkers, shelters, and blockhouses which were capable of all-around de
fense and were mutually supporting. In addition to this elaborate surface organ
ization, there was an equally elaborate subsurface organization of shelter, passage
way, living quarters, storage areas, and cave-type firing positions which provided
adequate protection against the heaviest of bombs and shells. The excellent ob
servation from the heights of SURIBACHI and the high ground around Airfield No. 2
were the feey to controlled artillery and mortar fire,
MAIN DEFENSE BELT
Since landings in strength were limited to the east and west beaches near the
southern end of the island, the enemy prepared his main defense in depth in a cross-
island belt. Beginning in the west at the rocky cliffs to the north of the western
beaches, it stretched east across the island to skirt the southern end of Airfield
No. 2, and terminated in the cliffs which form at the northern end of the eastern
beaches. The center of this belt was 2600 yards deep. It gained its strength from
its depth and its concrete and steel structures, positioned so as to obtain long
fields of fire which were carefully calculated and tied into the overall defense
system. Reliance on caves as a shelter and a fighting position was increas'ed here.
Most of the positions showed excellent engineering and terrain appreciation. Com
munications were maintained by trenched wire, radios, and a labyrinth of underground
tunnels connecting all areas. One of these tunnels was explored for 800 yards,
and 14 entrances were found; it housed two battalion command posts and was equipped
with lights and telephones. Artillery, including heavy mortars and rockets in and
behind this defense belt, could cover most of the beach area. Positions were pro
vided with complete preregistration data.
Strong points were established around commanding ground, Conorete-faced caves
and infantry positions in the erosion-made crevices were frequently so close to
gether that an equally strong defensive position existed only a few yards to the
rear or flank. Contact became so close that safety of our own troops prevented use
of artillery, naval gunfire, or air support in reducing these positions. One bluff,
forming something similar to an amphitheatre, contained two terraces and three tiers
of concrete pillboxes and oaves*
FINAL DEFENSIVE AREA '
North of this cross-island defensive sector, the extremely rough terrain from
the coast to 2000 yards inland created a natural defensive area. The number of
caves and terrain characteristics somewhat compensated for the reduced amounts of
concrete and steel. These features, coupled with the masses of men employed, tended
to make this final defensive area equally as strong as the main defensive positions.
In attacking these positions no Japs were to be seen, all being in caves or crevices
in the rocks and so dispersed as to give an all-around interlocking defense to each
small compartment. Attacking troops frequently were subjected to fire from flanks
and rear more than from their front. It was always very difficult and frequently
impossible to locate exactly where defensive fires originated.
In defending IW0 JIMA, the Japs employed one basic tactic which in a sense was
a departure from the Japanese defensive operations hitherto generally encountered.
This tactic was simply to occupy previously determined D-Day positions and maintain
them, without recourse either to costly rtmain effort" counterattacks or organized
withdrawals. This plan was not only simple in conception but in general was skill
fully executed and well adapted to the terrain of IW0 JIMA. There were no organized
attempts made to counterattack our beachhead, no large scale night counterattacks,
no "all-out" banzai charge. Instead, the enemy committed a minimum number of troops
to the southern beach area and defended it by delivering heavy volumes of fire from
both SUHIBACHI and the north so that even when the southern area was finally taken,
the bulk of the enemy's forces remained intact and were well entrenched in the most
heavily fortified part of the island. The enemy, by continuing to follow his simple
but basic defensive tactic of occupying a position and refusing to yield until dug
out and killed without counterattacking and without withdrawing, was able to main
tain organized resistance for over twenty days. There were no tactical withdrawals,
no retrograde or delaying actions in the military sense, though in some instances
isolated withdrawals were made to preserve units and individuals threatened with
inevitable destruction. It is now known that this defense of holding to the end
without counterattack or withdrawal was the express plan conceived by the Commanding
General. It was this simple tactic, coupled with the incredible rocky terrain and
the maximum use the enemy had made of this terrain in constructing fortified posi
tions which made the capture of IW0 JIMA so difficult*
ANTI-TANK TACTICS
Captured battle plans indicate the enemy's fear of our tanks. Mine fields,
magnetic mines, and explosives carried by hand were employed at the beach where the
loose sand seriously impeded the movement of even full-tracked vehicles. Anti-tank
guns, mainly the high velocity 75 mm and 47 mm, were the principal weapons employed
inland. Many anti-tank guns had one or more supplementary or alternate positions*
These weapons were sited in terrain affording fields of fire covering possible tank
routes from the beach; however, considerable emphasis appears to have been placed on
locating an emplacement where it was protected by an abutting bluff or terrace, which
shielded it from frontal flat trajectory fire.
Three types of rockets were used as artillery weapons. Several positions were
sighted for firing at ships approaching close to shore. The V-trough launcher was
used for 63 kg and 250 kg aerial bombs with rocket motors providing the propelling
force. A 200 mm rocket was used from a mobile-type launcher and a launcher which is
mounted on a mortar-type bipod. Rockets were dispersed in deep draws over the north
ern portion of the island and the launchers could be moved to the site of the am
munition.
* * * * * * * * *
It is evident that little was left undone by the Japs in constructing as for
midable ground defenses as possible on an island with the size and particular terrain
of IWO JIMA. A study of Japanese defense installations encountered in the field is
presented with photographs and drawings on the following pages.
4I
1 1|
T "
Y --' U ^ V
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W X Y
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WHIRAIWA BA\ A B C
v rw
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W \d^$S.
B C
TACHIIWA PT.
AST^BOAT BASIN
IWO
JIMA
THE SPECIAL GRID SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN PURPLE COLOR. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE USED FOR PIN POINT DESIGNATIONS. THE ARBITRARY TARGET SQUARE SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN SALMON WITH BLUE LETTERS AND NUMBERS. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE USED FOR AREA DESIGNATIONS. THE NUMBERING OF THE IOOO-YARD TARGET AREAS AND LETTERING OF THE EOO-YARD TARGET SQUARES HAS NO RELATION TO THE NUMBERING USED IN THE GRID SYSTEM.
COAST DEFENSE A A HEAVY A A AUTOMATIC MACHINE GUN (6.5-7.7 mm) A A TWIN MOUNT A A TRIPLE MOUNT A A DUAL PURPOSE FIELD ARTILLERY-HEAVY FIELD ARTILLERY- LIGHT COVERED ARTILLERY ANTI TANK -MEDIUM ANTI TANK -LIGHT MORTAR ROCKET PROJECTOR, SINGLE VEHICLE, ARMORED
CASEMATE OR BLOCKHOUSE EMPLACEMENT, UNOCCUPIED FIRE CONTROL CENTER FIRE CONTROL VISUAL OBSERVATION POST OBSERVATION TOWER PILLBOX PERSONNEL SHELTERS-BELOW GROUND DIRECTION FINDER SEARCHLIGHT SIGNAL TOWER AMMUNITION COMMAND POST BURIED BUILDING AIRCRAFT REVETMENT
R
W
S
X I
T
Y
THOUSANDS OF CAVES USED FOR DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, PERSONNEL , AND STORAGE HAVE NOT BEEN PLOTTED.
'20,000
SCALE IN YARDS
JICPOA L-50608-54
- A I B
C : D
E + A
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TACHIIWA PT
P : Q LJ V
R W
J - F
ST^-BOAT BASIN
IWO
JIMA
THE SPECIAL GRID SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN PURPLE COLOR. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE USED FOR PIN POINT DESIGNATIONS. THE ARBITRARY TARGET SQUARE SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN SALMON WITH BLUE LETTERS AND NUMBERS. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE USED FOR AREA DESIGNATIONS. THE NUMBERING OF THE 1000-YARD TARGET AREAS AND LETTERING OF THE EOO-YARO TARGET SQUARES HAS NO RELATION TO THE NUMBERING USED IN THE GRID SYSTEM. PIN-POINT DESIGNATION OF R J I 0 6 IS BC 7 5 0 - 7 0 9 R J I 0 6 IS IN TARGET SQUARE 132 A
BLOCKHOUSES
P Y U Q ; R V ! W! X Y W ! X
I I l WITH PRINCIPAL DIRECTIONS OF FIRE INDICATED
=20,000
Y U V
SCALE I I 1 IH I 1 I IN YARDS
JICPOA L-50608-54
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TACHIIWA PT
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ASTs-BOAT BASIN
WO
JIMA
THE SPECIAL GRID SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN PURPLE COLOR. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE USED FOR PIN POINT DESIGNATIONS. THE ARBITRARY TARGET SQUARE SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN SALMON WITH BLUE LETTERS AND NUMBERS. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE
S : T
THE NUMBERING OF THE IOOO-YARD TARGET AREAS AND LETTERING OF THE 200-YARO TARGET SQUARES HAS NO RELATION TO THE NUMBERING USED IN THE GRID SYSTEM. PIN-POINT DESIGNATION OF RJIO6 IS BC 7 5 0 - 7 0 9 R J I 0 6 IS IN TARGET SQUARE 132 A
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES
OBIISHI PT
'20,000
Wl
Y -
SCALE
IN
YARDS
JICPOA L-50608-54
ItIIIIII
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ROCK
X; Y
X Y A !, M C
V W
RAIWA BAY
R W
S T X Y
G H
WO
JIMA
THE SPECIAL GRID SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN PURPLE COLOR. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE USED FOR PIN POINT DESIGNATIONS. THE ARBITRARY TARGET SQUARE SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN SALMON WITH BLUE LETTERS AND NUMBERS THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE USED FOR AREA DESIGNATIONS. THE NUMBERING OF THE IOOO-YARD TARGET AREAS AND LETTERING OF THE 200-YARD TARGET SQUARES HAS NO RELATION TO THE NUMBERING USED IN THE GRID SYSTEM.
U ! V
B C D
W ;X C D
COVERED ARTILLERY
WITH PRINCIPAL DIRECTIONS OF FIRE INDICATED
R S
LEGEND
V
E A B
W
C D
W X
ALTERNATE HT
POSITION POSITION
SUPPLEMENTARY
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iii
- * "
R :S
20,000
SCALE IN YARDS
X
I JICPOA L-50608-54
17'
'T IS1
I4I2O'
21'
CONFIDENTIAL
MAP APPENDIX CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN NO 136-45
IWO JIMA
PLOTTED FROM GROUND STUDY AND CAPTURED MAP
24 48'
-47'
47'
46'
195
45'
45'
17'
18'
19'
141 20"
21'
JICPOA L-50608-5 5
Cleared of mines, . t theshoulders of road is still mined Extent of field flints are. 3"*"'tf6 ' s//Us iv/ vc/sficM r)
nown 6 mines
removed
252
253
mortar grenod (-5!Magnetic mints (H Cosi of flares. d caps / ammo (3) Toot-measure
(qpproK 100 yds square w onrained 6 Herr, icol mines. 27-45 See In&drt
1 nest Tieiqs conrained a i and (21) Taoe- Measure ape-neat vre See Insert '/f- B~- C area (-9B) bombs
.^r
ry of mined area
(4! BOA /nines remove c i3>Shape charge (I) STjck qrenade tz) s' Duds, (i) &UA mines // were removed
HIRAIWA BUY
id 0 on each side
uop bomb disper \al area (65 to 70) 250 Kg dispersei 1 in groups of S. groups IS ft. opa
easur&4 ydstich. mines 250 kg bombs iv ydstick mines rows removed. ? This field consisted of 4 ro or mines running approxu s parallel to the beach for i distance of over 1000 yar nd The mines were 63 kg < 250 kg bombs with no 1 d 'ardsrick mines were lashi length-wise TO the bombs ur/ed near the surface . The aerial; bombs were place an overage of 35' Qgarf There were approximately j^7rd^m9a'5 mines in the field. This area i See Insert 0' ed ines 6 J (i7j Conical <f AntiInsert F mines Scotterec Pattern of Anti- Tank This oreo conrained 57 Co/, Trench and 19 Hemispherical mines 2"Terrace wen si I raws ... to the beach on Terrace. The rows ZSaparT, Double and si horned mines were fovn Some irunm Mfrnp-Hind son contdbieci scrfetf-pi Tbe\ Conicalmin?S-w 3 rowi(f'f&rrace) onk ro (2 terracer),' stoy$t*4di it rt beach and 25'apart ' Hoi were present for additionc mines One Depth charge found- (See insert f'J.3/ This area contained in series of 2 with connecfing. a//
(I) ROW 2 /7( rn mines !3) Rows / Hi rn /nrnes /orf. her we en rows 411 removed.
ynK
field located approt red pattern not Removedjs) loolb Sombs
I- imr
>e measure mines mines e)Tonh mines Magnetic 2) $o kg bomb a charoe arena cm Horn rninee, ydst cM mines, Tape measure mines \yAnfi-p sonnet, a.
Removed (eto box mine. 5 /tasty mine fie 4 yds tic A f 3 removed. 3 3 JLXtll), oito mines horn mines i row ac'ft off , a/so rape-measure,
do/ mines I claare This area contain charge p/aced / road with 2 yd either side This area has be&n found dps
60) Kg be nbs remoireo' 3-i-fS C) Incendi ary re. voved. 3-3-45 ttap naz ard pattern of Tape -measvre mines le rot* of horn turned upside, down base as stick mines used.
25 Depth Charge Mine field c/eared z no data on pattern or (19)Smqle horn mines Ci)2 horn oeoch mine (( US A'oyy gun firs (6OJ US mcrfor duds IS) VS. Novy rocket- </</, <2) USAircraft duds also srr?o//er duc/s stored am me
16 MARCH 45 D plus 25
MINE
SITUATION
of
MAP
Mined area has bee neutra/jze d of f/'/ct/on qrenodes, a// are Scoftcrev md/scrim natelyt
IWO JIMA
Compiled by Corps Engineer Section from information received from 3 d , 4 t h , 5 t h 2d Sep. Engr. Bn. and Marine Divisions,
f fi / / " on beech
L1
500
wmmmm1
1000
2000 yds
JICPOA L- 50608-56
Beaches
Beaches
Beaches
1 0
Terrain Inland
Clumps of vegetation in
the central areas con
cealed trenches, rifle
pits and MG positions.
Terrain Inland
1 2
Terrain Inland
1 3
Terrain Inland
1 4
Terrain Inland
15
Terrain Inland
- *
1 6
17
Mines
(TA-165 0)
1 8
Trip Wire
Anti-Tank Ditches
View of AT trench,
(TA-198H)
View of AT trench,
(TA-198H)
20
CAVES
2 1
Caves
Typical entrance to ex
tensive cave network,
extending from under
neath the quarry near
the East Boat Basin
with tunnels leading as
far bs 800 yds. to
Minami Village.
(TA-183W)
Entrance to cave
(TA-198X)
22
Caves
Entrance to cave.
(TA-216D)
23
Coves
Caves
(TA-199UJ
(TA-132C)
(TA-199U)
25
26
1 cm CD GUNS
5
27
15 cm CD GUNS
28
14 cm CD GUNS
29
14 cm CD GUNS
30
14 cm CD GUNS
ENTRANCE
TO
ADJOINING ROOM
3 1
12 cm CD GUNS
pm
-)
r
*
Close-up of 120 mm (12 cm) CD gun showing destruction of Installation by naval gun fire and construction of casemate. (TA-183W)
?) \/
1
i^^ftV.
;:&,"
.*
'
'
^"HBL
^'
* ^ * ^
V
I \
32
12 cm CD GUNS
33
34
36
12 cm
Naval Guns
120 m (12 cm) short naval m gun emplaced as a coast defense gun.
' >0 0 0. ?
.'. 0 . 0 ^ _
rt
O O o n ^ ^ O
o;o"o?,v
GUN ROOM
AMMO. ROOM
LIVING
SPACE
0,
| FIRE-PORT
oSo.oo
h4'- tf1
9"- 0"
-6'- 6"
r- 9"
6'-0"
-O'U 3'-0"
,00 0
n
O O T>
o. o o
O
CP
o0o
Plan view of casemate for 120 mm (12 cm) short naval gun. (TA-146Y)
37
8 cm CD GUNS
38
8 cm CD GUNS
>'( - " % ,
'
1
'* " * ' '
p. *:
5-0
'^:\^v-f
C
cl
^ -1
Four-meter rangefinder used in conjunction with 120 m (1 cm) dual pur m pose b a t t e r y . (TA-202X)
39
12 cm DP GUNS
; ; , ; . / ; .
:
. .
. ;
"lli:;:
40
12cm DP GUNS
4 1
12 cm DP GUNS
42
10 cm DP GUNS
43
10 cm DP GUNS
44
10 cm DP GUNS
Plan view showing size of 100 mm (10 cm) DP gun revetment. This
revetment was dug Into the ground approximately 8 ft. to 12 ft.
with rock piled around the sides. (TA-217G)
45
7 cm AA GUNS
--:
75 mm (7 cm) type 88 AA
gun showing poorly con
structed revetment which
easily crumpled from the
effects of our artillery
Note the camouflage
painted on the barrel of
the gun. (TA-235V)
& '
46
7 cm AA GUNS
Hastily emplaced 75 mm
(7 cm) type 88 mobile
AA gun. The beginning
of a revetment is noted
(TA-218C)
75 mm (7 cm) type 88 AA
gun. (TA-235V)
47
7 cm AA GUNS
48
Triple-mount 25 mm AA MG
in lava rock emplacement.
Several of these mounts,
believed to have been
taken from wrecked LSMs,
were found. (TA-166C)
Triple-mount 25 mm AA MG
emplaced with a battery
of twin-mount 25 mm AA
MGs. (TA-217L)
25 mm AA MG
25 mm twin-mount auto
matic AA MG showing gun
in emplacement which
was constructed of lava
rock, blocks. Note
ammunition storage box
es lying around sides
of revetment. There
was a passageway lead
ing from revetment to
underground shelter.
(TA-148P)
"it
"***'
50
25 mm AA MG
25 mm twin-mount auto
matic AA gun in lava
rock emplacement.
(TA-182Q)
51
25 mm AA MG
25 mm twin-mount auto
matic AA position con
nected to earth-covered
living quarters and
ammunition storage over
looking airfield No. 1.
(TA-164E)
25 mm AA MG placed in
revetment using sand-
filled oil drums as
retaining walls, re
inforced with blocks
of lava rock. Note
mount for two gunners,
one to elevate, the
other to traverse.
(TA-147T)
52
25 mm AA MG
25 mm AA MG emplacement.
This is a new type mount
modeled after the 25 mm
twin-mount MG. (TA-147T)
25 mm automatic AA in
small revetment measur
ing ten feet In diameter.
Like many AA weapons on
Iwo Jlma, this gun Is
sited also for use
against ground forces..
Considerable armor-
piercing ammunition was
found In various AA
positions. (TA-219F)
25 mm AA MG
Entrance to earth-
covered partially
underground living
quarters at 25 mm
twin-mount auto
matic AA position.
(TA-164E)
54
25 mm AA MG
55
25 mm AA MG
25 mm AA single-mount MO
emplaced In revetment
using sand-filled oil
drums as retaining walls.
Ammunition was stored
around the sides of the
revetment as shown In
picture. (TA-147T)
AEMPTY
AMMO. BOXES
USED
FOR
WALLS
SLEEPING
SPACE
GUN BASE BOLTED TO WOODEN TIES 6" SQUARE SIDE VIEW OF BASE
25 mm AA MG
57
25 mm AA MG
ViV
2 5 mm AA g u n .
Triple-mount 25 mm AA gun.
58
1 mm MG
3
13 mm MG revetment show
ing how natural vegetation
proved to be effective
camouflage. (TA-132H)
13 mm single-mount MG
emplaced on top of Mt.
Suribachl in very
hastily constructed
revetment. Nine of
these weapons were
found around the top
of Mt.. Suribachl.
(TA-132P)
59
1 mm MG
3
13 mm twin-mount with
single seat attached to
mount in rear of gun.
Previously encountered
twin-mount 13 mm MGs
have been equipped with
seats on each side of
the gun. (TA-183X)
# #
13 mm single-mount MG
emplacement carved out
of lava rock. Note
ammunition storage
cave at left of gun.
(TA-183C)
60
Seorchlights
6 1
Searchlights
Revetment containing
truck with generator
for mobile search
light. (TA-217Q)
62
Searchlights
150 cm searchlight In
fixed position. A
revetment of loose rock,
has been partially blown
away. Attempts to
camouflage such posi
tions with vegetation
were not effective.
(TA-218V)
\ 4
" '
63
Searchlights
ELECTRIC CONTROL BOX BUILT IN WALL
64
BLOCKHOUSES
: i
Embrasure of blockhouse
housing a 47 mm AT gun
showing tube and carriage .
(TA-165J)
65
Blockhouses
66
Blockhouses
67
Blockhouses
68
Blockhouses
69
Blockhouses
SANDBAGS
1 4 WAY OBSERVATION TOWER |2'-O" HIGH PROTRUDING 3'"0" ABOVE'TOP OF BLOCKHOUSE WITH 3 L 0 " X ZLd' HIGH (INSIDE) OPENING AT BOTTOM
70
120 mm Howitzers
7 1
120 mm Howitzers
**f%$
72
120 mm Howitzers
Close-up of 120 mm
(12 cm) Howitzer posi
tion. Note screen used
to camouflage opening.
(TA-201S)
73
120 mm Howitzers
74
Interior view of 75 mm
(type 38) fl-eld gun em
placement snowing extent
of damage. (TA-132R)
75
Inside view of 75 mm
(type 38) field gun
position destroyed.
(TA-201V)
76
75 mm (Type 38)
Field Gun
Ruins of casemated 75 mm
(type 38) field gun.
(TA-201V)
77
78
79
Interior view of 75 mm
(type 90) field gun.
(TA-217H)
Front view of 75 mm
(type 90) field gun
showing construction
of emplacement and
how well the terrain
was utilized for
camouflage. (TA-217H)
80
Interior view of 47 mm AT
emplacement showing damage
done to gun. (TA-132C)
It. V *,
8 1
47 mm Anti-Tank Guns
Artillery emplacement fo
47 mm AT gun built of lav
blocks with a log roof,
earth covered. The fire
port Is at the right. A
connecting MG position
built of lava blocks may
be seen at center.
(TA-182W)
82
4 7 mm Anti-Tank Guns
Front view of 47 mm AT
gun shelter showing
where gun was kept when
not In position.
(TA-132B)
47 mm AT gun emplacement
made of materials at hand
including logs and lava
rock. (TA-183N)
47 mm Anti-Tank Guns
Typical 47 mm AT gun
T:
shelter. At the far
end of this shelter
was an.entrance to a
cave and tunnel sys
tem which was more
than 800 yds. long
and had 14 entrances.
It housed two Bn CPs.
(TA-183Q)
84
47 m m Anti-Tank Guns
DRUMS FILLED
WITH SAND
o
< o
oq oo
AMMO. STORAGE
TRENCH TO
AMMO- DUMP
(TA-147I)
85
3 7 mm Anti-Tank Guns
Front view of 37 mm AT
emplacement showing
destruction caused by
artillery fire.
(TA-98D)
86
OPEN ARTILLERY
47 mm AT gun covering
road at TA-201W.
87
37 mm AT gun In open
emplacement showing
how terrain aided In
protecting the posi
tion. (TA-217G)
37 mm AT gun In open
emplacement. (TA-217G)
88
89
150 mm Mortars
90
150 mm Mortars
9 1
150mm Mortars
CAVE IN
BLAST WALL OF l"0" SANDSTONE BRICK 4 L 2" HIGH PROTECTED WITH EARTH
(TA-198X)
92
81 m m Mortars
Close-up of 81 mm mortar
in position at TA-182U.
Some antiaircraft 81 mm
mortar projectiles were
found on the island.
93
81 m m Mortars
View of 81 mm mortar
emplacement. Note
how foliage and ter
rain were used for
concealment.
(TA-181D)
81 mm mortar position
made of rice bags.
The mortar Is con
cealefl partially by
brush covering part
of the emplacement.
(TA-182M)
94
Grenade Launchers
95
200 mm (20 cm) rocket projectiles in shelter adjoining launching site. (TA-183M)
96
200 mm (20 cm) mobile rocket launcher In camouflaged emplace ment. (TA-183M)
View of 200 mm (20 cm) rocket launcher from shelter for ammunition. (TA-183M)
97
Close-up of 200 mm
(20 cm) mobile rocket
launcher. (TA-201I)
98
99
63 kg Rocket Launcher
100
PILLBOXES
11 0
Pillboxes
Entrance to pillbox
(TA-147M)
102
Pillboxes
Front view of pillbox showing fire port. This position can be seen only from the front because of nat ural concealment. (TA-198R)
Pillbox having a roof of concrete two feet thick covered with rock and earth. The natural camouflage makes detection difficult. (TA-182R)
103
RIFLE PITS
104
Rifle Pits
,, ,.
,
Tank turret mounted in field, near beach used as rifle pit. (TA-165E)
105
TANKS
106
Tanks
g tank, mounting a
37 mm gun, in tank ser
vicing area. (TA-EOOY)
107
Tanks
Revetted and camouflaged medium tank mounting 47 mm gun, model 97. (TA-201G)
Rear view of Jap medium tank model 97 revetted In foot of slope of Hill 382. (TA-200Y)
108
DUMMIES
109
Dummies
10 1
Dummies
Ill
12 1
REVETTED VEHICLES
13 1
14 1
15 1
AMMUNITION STORAGE
Underground ammunition
storage. (TA-234H)
16 1
Ammunition Storage
17 1
MISCELLANEOUS
18 1
Miscellaneous
Interior of communications
room In earth-covered con
crete structure at air
field No. 1. This posi
tion was knocked out by
flamethrowers. (TA-164J)
19 1