Hub or Backwater?

North Korea Between Alternative Conceptions of Northeast Asian Regional Economic Cooperation 1
Balzs Szalontai
2

This article seeks to investigate how the various recent conceptions of Northeast Asian regional cooperation have been perceived by the North Korean leadership, how compatible they are with Pyongyangs non-economic objectives, and how they might influence North Korean actions toward South Korea. Placing the present situation into a historical context, it argues that for the North Korean leaders, regional economic cooperation is less an end in itself than an issue seen through the prism of security policy. That is, such forms of Northeast Asian cooperation that bypass the DPRK or potentially reduce its room for maneuver are likely to elicit unfavorable reactions from Pyongyang. In contrast, the leadership is prone to welcome those conceptions of regional cooperation which imply not only the inclusion of the DPRK but also the full or partial exclu sion of its current opponents.

Keywords: North Korea, Northeast Asia, regional economic cooperation, inter-Korean relations
The research project on which this article is based was supported by a Chinese PostDoctoral Research Grant and the Kwngwoon University IndustryAcademic Collaboration Foundation. In the process of writing this article, the author also accumulated a number of debts to his colleagues, including Bradley Martin, Richard Mason, Chen Bo, Liang Zhi, and Shen Zhihua, for their kind support. 2 Balzs Szalontai is an assistant professor at Kwangwoon University in Seoul as well as associate fellow and visiting scholar of the Institute of Occidental Studies, National University of Malaysia. After receiving a Ph.D. in Soviet and Korean history, he has done archival research on North Korea, Southeast Asia, Mongolia, India, and the USSR. His publications include Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964 (Stanford University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005) as well as articles and book chapters on North Korean and Southeast Asian history. His current research projects are focused on North Koreas involvement in the Vietnam War, DPRKMiddle East relations, and nuclear proliferation.
1

84 Korea Review, Vol. II, No. 2

November 2012

North Koreas Reactions to the SinoJapanese Peace Treaty The Tumen River Area Development Program DPRKROKRussian Trilateralism SinoJapaneseSouth Korean Trilateralism SinoRussianNorth Korean Trilateralism Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War, multilateral economic cooperation between the Northeast Asian countries (China, Japan, the two Koreas, Mongolia, and Russia) has made impressive progress, both in the sphere of trade and investment and in the creation of an institutional framework for regional integration. At the same time, tendencies of divergence also appeared, not least because the economic goals of the participating states were strongly influenced by power politics. As a consequence, the Northeast Asian governments, despite their common commitment to the general idea of regional cooperation, were often in disagreement when they attempted to define which specific form of regional integration would be the most advantageous. To mention but one example, the Chinese leadership, wary as it was about Japans intentions, initially opposed Tokyos proposal to enlarge the East Asian Summit (EAS) to include such non-Asian democracies as Australia and New Zealand (Zhao, 2011, pp. 5960). As did the other Northeast Asian states, North Korea wanted to participate in the process of regional economic cooperation but drew a distinction between those forms of regional integration that appeared to be compatible with their specific interests and those that were not. Figuratively speaking, North Korea faced two alternatives: On the one hand, its leaders aspired to transform their country into a transportation hub linking China and Russia with South Korea and the East Sea; on the other hand, they feared the possibility that the DPRK might become an economic backwater, excluded from and left behind by the rapid progress of regional integration. This article seeks to investigate how the various recent conceptions of Northeast Asian regional cooperation have been perceived by the North

Hub or Backwater? 85

Korean leadership, how compatible they have been with Pyongyangs noneconomic objectives, and how they might influence North Korean actions toward South Korea. Placing the present situation into a historical context, it argues that for the North Korean leaders, regional economic cooperation is not an end in itself but an issue to be address in the context of its security policy.

North Koreas Reactions to the SinoJapanese Peace Treaty

To assess the impact that one or another form of Northeast Asian regional cooperation might make on the course of North Korean foreign policy, it is worth recalling how the DPRK reacted to the conclusion of the SinoJapanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship (August 12, 1978) and its subsequent ratification (October 18, 1978). Fully aware of the significance of SinoJapanese reconciliation, the leaders of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) at first made substantial efforts to take advantage of the process, but as soon as they realized that the expected benefits would not materialize, they abruptly switched to an increasingly critical attitude. From Pyongyangs perspective, the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations seems not to have been either inherently advantageous or disadvantageous. Instead, it had both positive and negative potential. Notably, in 1972 the North Korean leaders, in a sharp contrast with those of the USSR, welcomed the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC, not least because this event greatly facilitated the growth of JapanDPRK trade, gave Pyongyang unprecedented access to Japanese technology, and hence created considerable friction in JapanSouth Korea relations (Cha, 1999, pp. 115122). Under such circumstances, the KWP leadership had good reason to regard SinoJapanese rapprochement as a doubly advantageous process that enhanced their position vis--vis South Korea. In 1978, however, the situation was far more ambivalent. In the summer and early fall of the yearthat is, during the final SinoJapanese talks that resulted in the conclusion of the peace treatyNorth Korean propaganda paid far more attention to the PRC than to the USSR, and even

86 Korea Review, Vol. II, No. 2

November 2012

republished certain anti-Soviet materials from the Chinese press. On the occasion of CCP Chairman Hua Guofengs visit in the DPRK (May 510), both sides lashed out at South Korea but carefully refrained from making any comment critical of Japan.3 In early September, Kim Il Sung made a public speech in which he sharply criticized the practice of dominationism (chibaejuui), a word conspicuously similar to the term hegemonism that China sought successfully to insert into the Sino-Japanese treaty. Since the Soviet leadership regarded the conclusion of the treaty, and specifically Japans acceptance of the anti-hegemony clause, as a step inimical to its interests, North Koreas initial standpoint indirectly supported Chinas efforts to reach an agreement with Tokyo at Moscows expense. To be sure, the KWP cadres had certain misgivings about the Sino Japanese talks, and thus in August and September they usually gave evasive replies if Soviet bloc diplomats inquired about this issue. Still, some of them expressed the view that our good friend, China, will surely use the treaty to the advantage of Korea.4 As the vice-chairman of the North Korean Association of Journalists would later put it, Pyongyang welcomed the treaty, because it increased Japans dependency on imports from China, and thus enabled Beijing to exert influence on Tokyo on behalf of North Korea.5 Thus the pro-Chinese policies Pyongyang pursued in this period seem to have been motivated by the expectation that China would reciprocate these gestures by representing the DPRKs interests during its negotiations with Japan. In the last three months of 1978, Pyongyangs attitude underwent an abrupt change. In the second half of October, Sino-DPRK relations took a turn for the worse. Simultaneously, the North Korean authorities, having cold-shouldered the Soviets in the previous months, suddenly displayed

Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK [henceforth HE-DPRK], 15 May 1978, Hungarian National Archives (MOL), XIX-J-1-j (Top Secret Documents) China [henceforth CTS], 1978, 77. doboz, 78-1, 002378/5/1978; Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 23 May 1978, CTS, 1978, 77. doboz, 78-1, 002378/7/1978. 4 Hungarian Embassy to the PRC [henceforth HE-PRC], August, 23 1978, CTS, 1978, 77. doboz, 78-1, 002646/3/1978; HE-DPRK, 8 September 1978, CTS, 1978, 77. doboz, 78-1, 002646/9/1978. 5 HE-DPRK, October 17, 1978, CTS, 1978, 77. doboz, 78-1, 002646/21/1978.

Hub or Backwater? 87

great interest in broadening their cultural and economic relations with the USSR. The press started to publish more articles about the Soviet Union than about China, and the KWP leaders ceased using the term dominationism in their public speeches. Significantly, the first signs of this volteface appeared right after the ratification of the Sino-Japanese treaty, indicating North Koreas dissatisfaction with the fact that the treaty failed to bring about a favorable change in Japanese policies toward Pyongyang. The KWP cadres lamented that China simply did not attribute as much importance to the DPRK as to adopt a critical stance vis--vis Japan for the sake of Korea.6 In mid-October, Deputy Defense Minister Pak Chung Guk complained to the Czechoslovak ambassador as follows:
The peace treaty is bad and harmful to the DPRK. JapanDPRK relations will deteriorate. Now Japan already completely ignores the DPRK, because it has settled everything with China. Japan will criticize and attack the DPRK more boldly than before, for it knows that China will not take a stand against Japan, whereas South Korea will receive more attention and support from Japan. Japan will no longer be afraid of China, [since] China will no longer criticize Japan for its attacks against the DPRK and for its support to South Korea.7

Actually, the CCP leadership seems to have tried to maintain a certain balance between its North Korean allies and its new Japanese partners, but since the latter were as unresponsive to Beijings suggestions about how to solve the problems of the Korean Peninsula as the Chinese leaders were to Tokyos proposals, the net result was a stalemate.8 This is probably why the North Korea media studiously ignored the conclusion of the treaty as well as Deng Xiaopings trip to Tokyo in October 1978 and Japanese Premier Masayoshi Ohiras visit in China in December 1979.9
6

HE-DPRK, October 31, 1978, XIX-J-1-j (Top Secret Documents) Korea [henceforth KTS], 1978, 80. doboz, 81-1, 002084/3/1978; HE-DPRK, October 31, 1978, KTS, 1978, 80. doboz, 81-1, 002084/4/1978; HE-DPRK, December 14, 1978, CTS, 1978, 78. doboz, 78-1, 005753/4/1978. 7 HE-DPRK, October 17, 1978, CTS, 1978, 77. doboz, 78-1, 002646/21/1978. 8 HE-PRC, December 19, 1979, SKTS, 1979, 81. doboz, 82-3, 005512/18/1979. 9 HE-DPRK, December13, 1979, CTS, 1979, 77. doboz, 78-1, 003385/8/1979.

88 Korea Review, Vol. II, No. 2

November 2012

North Koreas different reactions to the establishment of Sino Japanese diplomatic relations and the conclusion of the SinoJapanese treaty suggest that such forms of Northeast Asian regional cooperation that bypass the DPRK in one way or another, even if they are not specifically directed against Pyongyang, are likely to elicit negative reactions from the North Korean leaders. In contrast, Pyongyang is prone to welcome those conceptions of regional cooperation which imply not only the inclusion of the DPRK but also the full or partial exclusion of its current opponents (South Korea and/or Japan). To investigate whether this hypothesis is applicable to the present conditions, this article analyzes various alternative conceptions of Northeast Asian regional economic cooperation from the perspective of Pyongyangs economic and noneconomic objectives. Due to space limitations, only four major alternatives can be covered here: (1) the Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP; currently known as the Greater Tumen Initiative, GTI); (2) DPRKROKRussian trilateralism, with special respect to the planned construction of a Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) and a trans-Korean gas pipeline; (3) SinoJapaneseSouth Korean trilateralism, with the prospect of a ChinaJapanKorea Free Trade Agreement; and (4) SinoRussianNorth Korean trilateralism, with particular respect to the KhasanRajin railway line and Chinas ChangJiTu Plan.

The Tumen River Area Development Program

During the Cold War, attempts to stimulate economic cooperation among the Northeast Asian countries were limited both in scope and duration. The largest regional scheme, composed as it was of the USSR, China, North Korea, and Mongolia, disintegrated in the early 1960s due to the SinoSoviet split; the parallel growth of SinoJapanese and JapanROK trade did not converge yet into trilateral cooperation; the gradual development of JapanDPRK economic cooperation could not overcome the political barriers between Tokyo and Pyongyang; and direct

Hub or Backwater? 89

trade between South Korea and the Communist states made little or no headway until the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, however, the normalization of SinoSoviet, Sino ROK, and RussianROK relations, combined as it was with a partial inter-Korean rapprochement, created unprecentedly favorable conditions for multilateral economic cooperation in Northeast Asia. Under the aegis of the United Nations Development Program in 1992, the governments of China, Russia, Mongolia, and the two Koreas launched the Tumen River Area Development Program. The programs core area, located at the point of convergence of the Chinese, North Korean, and Russian borders and known as the Tumen River Economic Zone (TREZ), was a triangle composed of Rajin (DPRK), Hunchun (China), and Posyet (Russia). Having set up such institutions as the Tumen Secretariat, the Coordination Committee and the Consultation Commission (1995), the participating governments extended in 2005 the geographical scope of the program which they renamed from TRADP to the Greater Tumen Initiativeto Chinas entire northeastern region, Inner Mongolia, Chongjin, Russias Maritime Province, and South Kore a s eastern seacoast (Bae & Fedorovsky, 2010, pp. 176181; Blanchard, 2000, pp. 274278; Chung, Lee, & Yoo, 2011, pp. 49). In the first decade of the program, the North Korean leaders, having established a Special Economic Zone in the RajinSonbong (Rason) area as early as 1991, expressed considerable willingness to participate in TRADP (Chung, Lee, & Yoo, 2011, p. 8; Hughes, 2000, pp. 2122). In 1998, the state-run Korean Central News Agency made the following enthusiastic statements about the programs aims and prospects:
The [RajinSonbong] zone is connected with all countries and regions of northeast Asia by sea and land... The DPRK government is putting efforts into building the zone into an international transit transport base so that it can effectively help toward the development of economic cooperation and exchange among northeast Asian nations. At present, projects to modernize Rajin port and lift container tranport between Rajin and China and railway freight transport between Rajin and Russia onto a new higher stage are progressing apace...The DPRK government will actively strive to open new sea routes linking Rajin with

90 Korea Review, Vol. II, No. 2

November 2012

cities on the west coast of Japan, including Niigata, as cooperation and exchange are being expanded and developed among northeast Asian nations.10

Still, TRADP turned out to be considerably less successful than expected. Various factors, including SinoJapanese competition and the opposition of local Russian authorities to the increase of Chinese influence in the Maritime Province, greatly hindered regional economic cooperation. During the 1990s, TREZ failed to evolve into a dynamic growth triangle, not least because the economies of northeast China, North Korea, and the Russian Far East, rich as they were in natural resources but short of foreign direct investment, were not necessarily mutually complementary. On the contrary, they often competed with each other for South Korean and Japanese investments, and in this rivalry, the DPRK, due to its slow and mismanaged economic reforms, lacked a competitive edge (Abrahamian, 2012; Blanchard, 2000; Hughes, 2000; Kim, 1992; W. J. Kim, 2008; Meyer, 1999). The rapid inflow of South Korean investments, directed as it was toward Hunchun and other cities of the Yanbian Kore a n Autonomous Prefecture, largely bypassed Rajin and the adjacent North Korean areas. Unable to attract sufficient quantities of foreign investment for the much-desired purpose of industrial development, the RajinSonbong zone could benefit from the growth of regional cooperation mostly in the form of tranportation services. Due to the transit role that Rajin could (and did) play between Hunchun and the South Korean port of Busan, the DPRK had good reason to oppose those Chinese plans that called for free navigation on the Tumen River and the construction of an internal sea port at Hunchun (Cotton, 1996, p. 1101; Freeman & Thompson, 2011, pp. 2931; Kim, 1992, p. 39; Wright, 2000, pp. 1316). Similarly, Rajin faced potential competition from Zarubino and other Russian ports, which both China and Japan wanted to use for transshipment (Meyer, 1999, p. 218). In the light of Pyongyangs initial interest in TRADP, it might appear paradoxical that on November 5, 2009by which time the program finally started to show a stronger growth potentialNorth Korea
10

KCNA, July 9, 1998.

Hub or Backwater? 91

announced its withdrawal from the organization (Yacheistova, 2010, p. 4). Apart from the international disputes caused by the DPRKs second nuclear test, this step was probably influenced by the fact that shortly before, in October 2009, China informed Pyongyang of its decision to launch the so-called ChangJiTu Plan (which is described in the last section of this article) in close cooperation with North Korea. After all, North Koreas initial involvement in TRADP seems to have been motivated partly by the desire to avoid isolation and partly by the calculation that TRADP provided a useful channel for the DPRK to manage its relations with China (the main driving force behind TRADP) and South Korea (with which Pyongyang could interact under the umbrella of TRADP even if their bilateral relations were temporarily strained). Due to the nearsimultaneous creation of free economic zones in Nakhodka, Rajin and Hunchun in 199092, North Korean non-participation in TRADP would have further weakened Pyongyangs chances vis--vis its competitors (Blanchard, 2000, pp. 278287; Hughes, 2000, pp. 1819). By 2009, however, the situation had undergone a profound change. Once the Chinese government made a definite commitment to the DPRK, the risk of being bypassed was no longer as serious as before. At the same time, the post-2008 deterioration of inter-Korean relations reduced the likelihood of North-South cooperation within GTI, while Japan, an observer in GTI, had suspended its trade relations with Pyongyang as early as 2006. Under such circumstances, the North Korean leaders probably concluded that the possible benefits of their continued participation in GTI would not significantly exceed the benefits of trilateral SinoRussianDPRK cooperation, whereas the constraints of multilateral cooperation would not be compatible with their confrontational position vis--vis Seoul.

DPRKROKRussian Trilateralism
Following the disintegration of the USSR, in the 1990s the Russian government focused its efforts on broadening its economic relations with South Korea while simultaneously reducing its cooperation with the DPRK (Joo, 2003, p. 147). Since this policy shift partly coincided with a

92 Korea Review, Vol. II, No. 2

November 2012

period of renewed inter-Korean friction, RussianDPRK relations underwent a serious deterioration.11 Under such circumstances, the likelihood of trilateral DPRKROKRussian cooperation seemed slight at best, though the idea of building a gas pipeline from Yakutia to South Korea via North Korean territory was discussed by Moscow and Seoul as early as 199495 (Ahn & Jones, 2008, pp. 114115). In 200002, however, the new Russian administration of Vladimir Putin, determined as it was to restore Russias international status as a great power, achieved a reconciliation in Russian-DPRK relations. The dramatic inter-Korean rapprochement that occurred in this period created a favorable environment for trilateral DPRKROKRussian cooperation, not least because in April 2002, the leaders of the two Koreas expressed their commitment to reconnecting the northern and southern railway networks. Furthermore, certain unresolved issues of SinoRussian economic cooperationincluding disputes over a planned gas pipeline to the ROK via Chinese territorymade Moscow increasingly interested in using the DPRK, rather than China, as a transit country to South Korea (Ahn & Jones, 2008, pp. 117122; Joo, 2003, pp. 148150; Paik, 2005, pp. 912). One form of trilateral economic cooperation that the Russian government proposed in 200002 was a plan to link the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) to the would-be Trans-Korean Railway (and thus ultimately to the transshipment hub of Busan), with the aim of facilitating transport not only between Russia and South Korea but also between Europe and the Far East in general (Hisako, 2004; Yoon & Lee, 2005, pp. 189196). Another Russian proposal was the construction of a gas pipeline to the ROK via North Korea, either from Yakutia or from Sakhalin. Since South Korean imports of liquefied natural gas from non-Russian sources seemed insufficient to meet the countrys projected demand, and a trans-Chinese pipeline would have to cope with the difficulties of supplying both China and the ROK, this conception of trilateral economic cooperation appeared attractive to Seoul as well (Ball, et al., 2003, pp. 2223, 6970). Pyongyang also showed considerable interest in these forms of regional
11

On North Korean criticism of Russias South Korea policy, see KCNA, January 14, 1998; and KCNA, January 19, 1998.

Hub or Backwater? 93

economic cooperation during its negotiations with Moscow and Seoul (Joo, 2003, p. 151). In October 2002, the northern Ministry of Railways hailed the planned TSR-TKR project as follows: This railway project is an important work as it is greatly helpful to drastically expanding economic links and cooperation not only between the Korean and Russian peoples but also between countries in Northeast Asia and Europe and, furthermore, achieving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region.12 Concerning the trans-Korean gas pipeline, the North Korean leaders, anxious not to jeopardize the nuclear deals they expected from the U.S.DPRK Agreed Framework of 1994, adopted a more reserved attitude. Still, they did demand occasionally a commitment from the South that the pipeline would pass through North Korean territory, which indicated their wariness about the alternative plans aimed at bypassing the DPRK (Paik, 2005, pp. 2627). Despite the interest that all three parties concerned expressed in the aforesaid projects, so far none of these plans has reached the stage of comprehensive implementation. While the northern and southern railways were reconnected as early as June 2003, no test run took place until May 2007 (when Pyongyang temporarily showed readiness to dismantle its nuclear facilities), after which the process stalled again. This lack of progress clearly demonstrated the adverse impact the nuclear crisis made on DPRKROKRussian cooperation (Lankov, 2010, pp. 98100). Since no major trilateral project could be carried out unless the nuclear problem was permanently settled, Pyongyangs nuclear intransigence turned out to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it deprived the DPRK of the possible economic benefits of a trilateral cooperation; on the other hand, it gave the North Korean leadership leverage over South Korea and Russia (whose ambitions were also thwarted, and who therefore had a stake in gaining Pyongyangs cooperation). Since the alternative projects aimed at bypassing the DPRKe.g., the construction of a undersea pipeline and a ROK-managed port facility near Vladivostokwere potentially feasible but not yet in operation, so far the net result has been largely a stalemate (Bauer, 2009, pp. 5658).
12

KCNA, October 18, 2002.

94 Korea Review, Vol. II, No. 2

November 2012

The interrelatedness of the nuclear crisis and trilateral cooperation also manifested itself in the so-called gas for peace plan that proposed to fulfill Pyongyangs energy needs by building a pipeline from Russia through the DPRK on condition that the North Korean nuclear weapons program be verifiably dismantled for good (Ajemian, 2007). And even if the two issues were not formally linked, the North Korean leaders must have been strongly aware that they could not expect a decisive breakthrough in the aforesaid trilateral projects unless they adopted a cooperative stance on the nuclear question for a prolonged period. In other words, the interdependence created by North Koreas participation in the project would give Pyongyang leverage over its partners, but at the same time it would also impose long-term constraints on its behavior. The leaderships reluctance to accept such constraints probably played a major role in that despite the prospective economic benefits of DPRKROKRussian cooperation, Pyongyang seems to have pursued this option less energetically than the alternative path of SinoRussianNorth Korean trilateralism (which, as described in another section, has already entered the stage of practical implementation).13 But even if North Koreas interest was genuine, DPRKROKRussian cooperation would remain highly vulnerable to any sudden and unforeseen crisis that might occur in inter-Korean relations.

Sino-Japanese-South Korean Trilateralism

If the KWP leaders regarded the SinoJapanese treaty as inimical to their interests, this was doubly true for their attitude toward the JapanROK Treaty on Basic Relations (1965) and the gradual establishment of official contacts between China and South Korea in 198992. In the light of their disapproval of these bilateral agreements, they must have perceived the recent emergence of a trilateral SinoJapaneseROK partnership, particularly if it occurred in a period of hostile inter-Korean rela-

For instance, in May 2006 the DPRK cancelled a planned trial train operation on the reconnected railway due to disagreements over such unrelated issues as the nuclear crisis and the maritime boundary between the two Koreas. KCNA, May 26, 2006.

13

Hub or Backwater? 95

tions, as a similarly unfavorable development. For a substantial time, SinoJapaneseSouth Korean trilateral cooperation, overshadowed as it was by overlapping but broader visions of regional integration (e.g., ASEAN Plus Three) and weakened by SinoJapanese rivalry and JapaneseROK disputes, progressed more slowly than the conclusion of FTAs between the aforesaid three states and ASEAN. Since 2008, however, trilateral summits have been held on an annual basis. On the basis of a Trilateral Joint Research Project conducted in 200309, the three countries set up in 2010 a Joint Study Committee for a ChinaJapanKorea FTA. In September 2011, the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat was established in Seoul, and in May 2012, the three governments signed an Agreement for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment (for a brief overview, see Byun, 2011, pp. 12; and Dent, 2009). At a sub-national level, the center of trilateral economic integration has been the region known as the Yellow Sea Rim Economic Zone that encompasses the coastal provinces of Northern China, the western coast of South Korea (with Incheon as a transport hub), and Kyushu in Japan (W. B. Kim, 2008, pp. 516517). In geographical terms, this form of economic integration could have provided substantial opportunities for North Korean participation. As early as the 1990s, a pronounced shift occurred in North Korean maritime traffic from the east coast ports to Nampo, the DPRKs main gateway to the Yellow Sea (Ducruet, Roussin, & Jo, 2009, pp. 362365). Post-2003 South Korean and Chinese investments in the North Korean manufacturing sector were concentrated in such western areas as the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the NampoPyongyang corridor (Roussin and Ducruet, 2007, pp. 1315). North Korean interest in creating linkages between inter-Korean and SinoDPRK economic cooperation also manifested itself in Pyongyangs decisions to reconnect the ShinuijuSeoul railway and establish the Shinuiju Special Administrative Region (Ahn, 2002, pp. 107114). In fact, South Korea was also strongly in favor of reconnecting the Seoul-Shinuiju line, and thus making it the Busannortheast China link in the would-be Great Silk Road (Bae & Fedorovskiy, 2010, p. 156). Nevertheless, the dynamic growth of trans-Yellow Sea maritime and air

96 Korea Review, Vol. II, No. 2

November 2012

cargo traffic among China, South Korea, and Japan (Lee & Rodrigue, 2006, pp. 604616) implied that for these three countries, North Koreas logistical involvement was not a sine qua non of regional integration. That is, in this trilateral structure the absence of trans-Korean land traffic did not hinder the progress of regional economic cooperation to the same extent that it would have in DPRKROKRussian trilateralism. In other words, Pyongyang could participate in this integration process only if its relations with both Seoul and Beijing were cordial; and if they were not, the other powers could easily bypass it. And bypass they did, for during the post-2008 trilateral talks, the DPRK has been only an object of, but not a participant in, the negotiations. As See-Won Byun put it, Since ChinaSouth KoreaJapan cooperation is primarily functional and does not place North Korea at the center of its agenda, this form of cooperation may continue despite the stalemate surrounding North Korea. (Byun, 2011, p. 2). The fact that inter-Korean relations underwent a progressive deterioration in the very same period that Seoul gradually institutionalized its ties with China and Japan must have aggravated Pyongyangs fears of isolation. Due to the existence of a well-functioning alternative logistics network, the disruptive effect that inter-Korean and/or SinoDPRK tension could (and did) produce on the chances of North Korean participation did not give Pyongyang any leverage over the integration process; rather, it weakened its bargaining position. North Koreas awareness of that risk found expression in those KCNA statements made in OctoberNovember 2002 (i.e., during the second nuclear crisis) which accused the United States and South Koreas Grand National Party of hampering the reconnection of the SeoulShinuiju railway.14 Similarly, Chinas disapproval of the creation of a Shinuiju special autonomous region forced the DPRK to shelve the project (W. J. Kim, 2008, p. 225). Bypassed by the process of SinoJapaneseROK cooperation and lacking leverage over it, the North Korean leadership seems to have welcomed any development that could potentially disrupt it. Notably, KCNA has been prone to publish material on problems that created tension in
14 KCNA, October

30, 2002; KCNA, November 16, 2002.

Hub or Backwater? 97

SinoJapanese and JapaneseSouth Korean relations, including territorial disputes (particularly the issue of Dokdo) and Japanese military preparations. Statements of this kind were regularly made at the time of the successive trilateral summits, too. Among other comments, KCNA repeatedly emphasized that Japans ambitions posed a threat not only to the DPRK but also to China: The U.S.Japan joint use of the [Tinian] base in the Asia-Pacific region is aimed to contain China. Therefore there is a call for Chinas vigilance.15 KCNA also paid considerable attention to Sino Japanese disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, drawing the conclusion that The ulterior aim sought by Japan in noisily peddling the nonexistent issues of territories of its neighboring countries is to expand its territory by grabbing territories of other countries.16 Under such circumstances, the further progress of trilateral Sino JapaneseROK cooperation is likely to increase the threat perceptions of the North Korean leaders, and thus it might induce them to continue pursuing a confrontational policy toward South Korea. From this perspective, the friction that the U.S.South Korean responses to the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong crises caused in SinoROK relations (Thompson, 2010, pp. 14) was probably seen as advantageous to Pyongyangs interests.

SinoRussianNorth Korean Trilateralism

In the last phase of the Cold War, the KWP leaders harbored ambivalent feelings about the process of SinoSoviet reconciliation. While they welcomed this step, they also feared that the two powers might reach agreements not only with each other but also with South Korea, which would result in North Koreas diplomatic marginalization.17 That is, a SinoSoviet rapprochement would serve their interests only if at least one of the two powers (and preferably both) remained committed to provide support to the DPRK against the United States and/or the ROK.

15 KCNA, May 10, 2012. 16 17

KCNA, November 24, 2010. HE-DPRK, May 23, 1989, CTS, 1989, 49. doboz, 78-13, 002625/1989.

98 Korea Review, Vol. II, No. 2

November 2012

Instead of achieving the aforesaid aim, in the early 1990s North Korea faced a worst-case scenario, as both the USSR and China, having accomplished reconciliation, established diplomatic relations with South Korea. In the following decades, both China and Russia laid strong emphasis on developing economic cooperation with Seoul, which effectively precluded the possibility of SinoRussianDPRK trilateral cooperation against the ROK. In 200809, however, certain changes started to appear in Russian DPRK and Sino-DPRK relations that gradually reinforced Pyongyangs bargaining position vis--vis Seoul. Overriding alternative logistics plans that were focused on the ports of Posyet and Zarubino, Russia signed an agreement with Pyongyang in April 2008 on the reconstruction of the railway line between North Koreas Rajin Port and Russias Khasan station, and the building of a container terminal in Rajin (Bae & Fedorovskiy, 2010, p. 167, pp. 190191). By October 2011, reconstruction reached such a stage that a trial train was launched. These developments evidently pleased and emboldened the North Korean leaders. At the ceremony of the trial train service, Deputy Minister of Railways Ju Jae Dok declared, The RajinKhasan freight transport will make contributions to the economic exchange not only between the DPRK and Russia but also [between] Northeast Asia and Europe.18 In 201011, KCNA frequently emphasized the strength of RussianDPRK friendship (which, it hinted, South Korea, Japan, and the United States sought to disrupt), and took Moscows side in the recurrent RussianJapanese disputes over the Kuril Islands.19 To be sure, Russias 2008 decision to start the KhasanRajin project was hardly, if at all, motivated by a desire to create some sort of trilateral SinoRussianNorth Korean cooperation against South Korea. On the contrary, it represented an attempt to implement DPRKROKRussian trilateralism, for it was made in a period when Pyongyang showed readiness to make the long-demanded nuclear concessions, and thus the chances of inter-Korean cooperation appeared favorable. Still, the subse18

19 KCNA, November

KCNA, October 13, 2011. 24 2010; KCNA, March 1 2011; KCNA, October 12, 2011.

Hub or Backwater? 99

quent breakdown of NorthSouth relations did not put an end to the project, not least because Moscow opposed the sanctions-oriented policies of the Lee Myung-bak administration (Bae & Fedorovskiy, 2010, p. 167, pp. 108111). Due to Russias interest in taking advantage of the ice-free port of Rajin, this limited project, unlike the grand plan of a Trans-Korean Railway, appeared viable and profitable even if inter-Korean cooperation failed to materialize. The RajinKhasan project probably influenced the CCP leaderships decision to create a transportation corridor from Northeast China to the East Sea through North Korea, rather than the Russian Far East. The socalled ChangJiTu Plan, named after the ChangchunJilinTumenjiang region and officially announced by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during his visit in the DPRK in October 2009, envisioned the construction of a ChangchunHunchunRajin highway and the joint development of Rajin Port. Jilin Province obtained rights to use Rajin Port for ten years, and in December 2010, China undertook to invest as much as US$2 billion in the Rason Special Economic Zone (Abrahamian, 2012, pp. 34; Park, 2011, p. 2). In essence, the DPRK benefited from the fact that Moscow and Beijing had failed to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on the creation of a transportation corridor via Russian territory (Bae & Fedorovskiy, 2010, p. 190). Still, the ChangJiTu Plan laid considerable stress on SinoRussian economic cooperation, and in 200912, both countries were in favor of solving the North Korean nuclear problem by means of engagement rather than coercive measures (Weitz, 2012, pp. 9093). Under such circumstances, the DPRK could take advantage of both Russian and Chinese policies of regional cooperation, though the three states did not coordinate their actions in the same way as occurred in SinoJapaneseSouth Korean trilateralism. The North Korean leaders were clearly aware of the economic and political implications of these developments. In July 2011, Rodong Sinmun summarized the bright prospects of regional economic cooperation as follows:
The Rason Economic and Trade Zone is situated in such [a] favorable geographical position that it can link with [the] three provinces in [the] northeast of

100 Korea Review, Vol. II, No. 2 November 2012

China, the Far East[ern] region of Russia, Mongolia and other areas which have appeared promising economic and trade regions in Northeast Asia... That is why the Rason area can be a favorable transport hub.20

Apart from the direct benefits that the DPRK could draw from the aforesaid projects, this form of regional cooperation was also advantageous to Pyongyang in a strategic sense. That is, these projects, confined as they were to North Korean, Chinese and Russian territory, could be successfully implemented even if the inter-Korean stalemate continued to persist. In other words, the North Korean leadership was no longer compelled to bring about a long-term normalization of inter-Korean relations if it wanted to avoid exclusion (or rather self-exclusion) from the process of regional cooperation. On the contrary, now it was South Koreas turn to feel bypassed. As Kim Young-yun pointed out, A North Korean project under Chinas initiative that excludes the participation of the South would be contrary to the development of inter-Korean economic integration. (Kim, 2010, p. 10). Since this situation reinforced Pyongyangs position at Seouls expense and provided the North greater room to maneuver in the nuclear sphere than a structure based on DPRKROKRussian cooperation, the North Korean leaders have a strong stake in maintaining it.

Conclusion
The findings of this article seem to confirm the initial hypothesis about North Koreas fears of being either bypassed or constrained by the process of regional cooperation. They are also in accordance with what Samuel S. Kim called the greatest irony of the [Northeast Asian] region. As he put it, North Korea, the weakest of the six main actors, seems positioned to be a primary driver of NEAs regional geopolitics. (Kim, 2006, p. 167). Indeed, the DPRK has at least partly succeeded in engaging in regional economic cooperation on its own terms, rather than on the terms of its opponents. Having evaded such forms of multilateral cooperation which
20 KCNA, July 20,

2011.

Hub or Backwater? 101

might have imposed constraints on its foreign policy (i.e., the Greater Tumen Initiative and DPRKROKRussian trilateralism), Pyongyang finally managed to implement a major trilateral scheme that brought about considerable economic benefits and a relatively strong Sino-Russian commitment without directly hindering the North Korean leadership in its confrontational policy vis--vis South Korea. Figuratively speaking, the DPRK proved able to achieve the proverbial feat of having its cake and eating it too. To be sure, the recent emergence of SinoRussianDPRK trilateralism reflected at least as much the concrete interests and veiled rivalries of the two major powers as Pyongyangs diplomatic skills. The limits of North Koreas leverage also became apparent during the ongoing process of SinoJapaneseSouth Korean cooperation, which the DPRK seems to have disapproved but could not seriously disrupt. Paradoxically, the complex Chinese strategy of simultaneously engaging both Koreas may have led to the unintended consequence of aggravating inter-Korean relations by partly reinforcing and partly weakening Pyongyangs bargaining position. On the one hand, Chinas growing economic commitment to the DPRK, which implied the potential exclusion of South Korea, must have emboldened the North Korean leaders, who possibly concluded that the risks and negative economic consequences of a confrontational policy were no longer as great as before. On the other hand, the trilateral cooperation among Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul probably heightened Pyongyangs perceptions of a threat and induced the leadership to adopt a harder stance toward the ROK. In this light, it appears likely that the post-2008 deterioration of inter-Korean relations was at least partly caused by the competing visions of regional cooperation; for this reason, it might continue unless Northeast Asian regionalism undergoes yet another major policy shift. Having been unable to reach a consensus on inter-Korean economic integration, ultimately both the DPRK and the ROK opted for such schemes of regional economic cooperation that were implicitly based on the exclusion of the other Korea. In this sense, the lessons of the Cold War still appear valid on the Korean Peninsula.

102 Korea Review, Vol. II, No. 2

November 2012

References Abrahamian, A. (2012). A Convergence of Interests: Prospects for Rason Special Economic Zone. Korea Economic Institute Academic Paper Series , February 24, 16. Ahn, B.-M. (2002). Restoration of the SeoulShinuiju Line: Review and Outlook. East Asian Review, 14(1), 107119. Ahn, S. H, & Jones, M. T. (2008). Northeast Asias Kovykta Conundrum: A Decade of Promise and Peril. Asia Policy, 5, 105140. Ajemian, C. (2007). Energy for Security: A Natural Gas Pipeline Solution to the North Korean Security Threat. The Nonproliferation Review, 14(2): 329349. Bae, J.-H., & Fedorovskiy, A. (Eds.), (2010). Russian National Strategy and ROKRussian Strategic Partnership in the 21 st Century. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification. Ball, A., et al. (2003). LNG in Korea: Opportunities for Growth . ABARE Research Report 03.4. Canberra: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics & Korea Energy Economics Institute. Bauer, J. W. (2009). Unlocking Russian Interests on the Korean Peninsula. Parameters, 39, 5262. Blanchard, J.-M. F. (2000). The Heyday of Beijings Participation in the Tumen River Area Development Programme, 199095: a political explanation. Journal of Contemporary China, 9(24), 271290. Byun, S.-W. (2011). The ChinaSouth KoreaJapan Triangle: The Shape of Things to Come? Asia-Pacific Bulletin, 115. Washington, DC: EastWest Center. Cha, V. D. (1999). Alignment Despite Antagonism. The United StatesKorea JapanSecurity Triangle. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Chung, M. K., Lee, H.-H., & Yoo, D. (2011). Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation: Assessment and Prospects of the Greater Tumen Initiative . Chuncheon, Korea: AsiaPacific Cooperation Academy, Kangwon National University. Cotton, J. (1996). China and Tumen River Cooperation: Jilins Coastal Development Strategy. Asian Survey, 36(11), 10861101. Dent, C. M. (2009). Japan, China and East Asian regionalism: implications for the European Union. Asia-Europe Journal, 7, 161178. Ducruet, C., Roussin, S., & Jo, J.-C. (2009). Going West? Spatial polarization of the North Korean port system. Journal of Transport Geography, 17, 357 368. Freeman, C., & Thompson, D. (2011). China on the Edge. Chinas Border

Hub or Backwater? 103

Provinces and Chinese Security Policy. Washington, DC: The Center for the National Interest & SAIS, Johns Hopkins University. Hisako, T. (2004). Perspectives on Linking the Trans-Siberian and Trans-Korean Railways. ERINA Report #56. Hughes, C. W. (2000). Tumen River Area Development Programme: Frustrated Micro-Regionalism as a Microcosm of Political Rivalries. Coventry, UK: University of Warwick, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation Working Paper #57/00. Joo, S.-H. (2003). Russia and the Korean Peace Process. In T.-H. Kwak & S.-H. Joo (Eds.), The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers . Aldershot, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing. Kim, E. (1992). Political Economy of the Tumen River Basin Development: Problems and Prospects. Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 11(2): 3548. Kim, S. S. (2006). Inter-Korean Relations in Northeast Asian Geopolitics. In C. K.Armstrong; G. Rozman; S. S. Kim; & S. Kotkin (Eds.), Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia. Armonk & London: M. E. Sharpe. Kim, W. B. (2008). Transborder regional development and inter-city networking in Northeast Asia. Informationen fr Raumentwicklung, 8, 515521. Kim, W. J. (2008). Cooperation and Conflict among Provinces: The Three Northeastern Provinces of China, the Russian Far East, and Shinuiju, North Korea. Issues & Studies, 44(3), 205227. Kim, Y.-y. (2010). North Korean port is slipping away. JoongAng Daily, March 19, 10. Lankov, A. (2010). Russias Korean Peninsula Policy. Presented at Deterrence and Dialoguethe Korean Peninsula after the Cheonan Incident. International Symposium on SecurityAffairs, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo. Lee, J.-Y., & Rodrigue, J.-P. (2006). Trade Reorientation and its Effects on Regional PortSystems: The KoreaChina Link along the Yellow Sea Rim. Growth and Change, 37(4), 597619. Meyer, P. F. (1999). The Russian Far Easts Economic Integration with Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects. Pacific Affairs, 72(2), 209224. Paik, K.-W. (2005). Pipeline Gas Introduction to the Korean Peninsula . Report Submitted to the Korea Foundation. London: Chatham House. Park, H. J. (2011). Expanding DPRKChina Economic Cooperation and the Future of the DPRK Regime: A Rentier-State Analysis. Korea Institute for National Unification Online Series 11-19, 18. Roussin, S., & Ducruet, C. (2007). The Nampo-Pyongyang corridor: A strategic area for European investment in DPRK. In Recent Changes in North Korea

104 Korea Review, Vol. II, No. 2

November 2012

and the Role of the European Union. Seoul: Institute of Unification Studies & Hans Seidel Foundation, Seoul National University. Thompson, D. (2010). Chinas Perspective of Post-Cheonan Regional Security. Presented at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies Symposium on Post-Cheonan Regional Security, Center for U.S.Korea Policy & the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Seoul. Weitz, R. (2012). Russia and China Respond to North Korean Succession. Korea Review, 2(1), 8198. Wright, G. (2000). Trade and Investment Synergies in the Tumen Region. Presented at TREDA Advocacy Workshop 2000: Stimulating Trade, Investment and Growth In and Around the Tumen Region. TRADP Secretariat. Yacheistova, N. (2010). Greater Tumen Initiative: A regional programme of cooperation in Northeast Asia. Presented at the 4th Annual Conference of the Northeast Asia Professors Association, Chuncheon, Korea. Yoon, E., & Lee, D. H. (2005). Vladimir Putins Korean Opportunity: Russian Interests in the North Korean Nuclear Crises. Comparative Strategy, 24(2), 185201. Zhao, S. (2011). Chinas Approaches toward Regional Cooperation in East Asia: motivations and calculations. Journal of Contemporary China, 20(68), 5367.