Police Use of Force in Seattle, January 2009 March 2011

Matthew J. Hickman, Ph.D. Seattle University Loren T. Atherley, M.A. Northwest Justice Solutions

December, 2012

Points of view expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not represent or reflect views of Seattle University. Please direct all correspondence to either Matthew J. Hickman (hickmanm@seattleu.edu) or Loren T. Atherley (lorentatherley@gmail.com).

ABSTRACT This study provides a descriptive statistical analysis of Seattle Police Department use of force reports the same reports that were used in a recent Department of Justice investigation concerning the use of excessive force. An additional goal of the study was to attempt to replicate the governments finding that 20% of uses of force by Seattle police are excessive or unconstitutional. All use of force records during the period January 1, 2009, through March 25, 2011, (N = 1,240) were coded for content, including administrative data elements as well as the content of report narratives. Incidents were coded for both officer force level and suspect resistance level, in both static and sequential forms, following Alperts force factor method. Relevant Graham factors were also coded. The incidence of force, incident characteristics, officer characteristics, suspect demographics, and force factors are described and discussed. The data were also geocoded and mapped in order to better understand the spatial distribution of police use of force in Seattle.

INTRODUCTION In December 2011, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, in conjunction with the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington (collectively, DOJ), released a report entitled, Investigation of the Seattle Police Department. In this report, the DOJ described the results of their investigation in Seattle consistent with their role of identifying patterns or practices of conduct by law enforcement agencies that deprive individuals of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (p. 1). In both the report and a televised news conference it was announced that the DOJ found SPD engages in a pattern or practice of using unnecessary or excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14141 (p. 3) and When SPD officers use force, they do so in an unconstitutional manner nearly 20% of the time (p. 4). A finding that 1 out of 5 uses of force are unconstitutional should be taken very seriously, for if true, it suggests a very serious problem. For the two and a quarter year period studied by DOJ, this would amount to approximately 250 use of excessive force incidents. Such a finding demands careful scrutiny to ensure a thorough understanding of the problem so that police reform efforts will be meaningful and long-lasting. Unfortunately, the DOJ report does not contain a description of their methodology that would permit one to directly replicate the analysis. Absent a clear methodology, we sought to replicate this finding using common social science methods. In addition, and perhaps more important, we provide a thorough descriptive analysis of use of force incidents in Seattle. It is our hope that those involved in police reform efforts will use these data to better understand police use of force in Seattle and move forward with reform efforts from a rational basis. Specifically, we provide answers to the following questions: When, where, and how often do the police in Seattle use force? What are the underlying offenses in use of force incidents? What are the characteristics of a typical suspect and what do they do? How many officers are typically involved and what do they do? How are the interactions distributed in terms of both suspect and officer actions? How often might the use of excessive force occur in Seattle? How is police use of force geographically distributed in Seattle?

Regardless of whether one agrees with our methods, analysis, and conclusions, we believe that our creation of a research platform for understanding use of force in Seattle is a substantial step forward. We believe that our data collection provides a useful and important decision tool for understanding the nature and scope of police use of force in Seattle. Our descriptive analysis only scratches the surface of a rich data source, but this is a necessary first step and is only the beginning of an ongoing program of research. We anticipate being able to make these data publically available (subject to SPD approval) so that anyone who is interested may explore the data. We welcome and encourage other researchers to replicate our findings in the interest of science and the pursuit of knowledge.

KEY FINDINGS Recognizing that some individuals may not have the time or interest in reading the entire report, we summarize the key findings here. Readers interested in the details of our methodology and the comprehensive set of findings will want to read the entire report. In sum, we analyzed 1,240 use of force incidents during the period January 1, 2009 through March 25, 2011. When, where, and how often do the police in Seattle use force? Police use of force in Seattle is a statistically rare event. The police in Seattle use force at the rate of about 2.4 incidents for every 100 arrests. Use of force is more frequent on weekends, and during the late evening/early morning hours. The West Precinct has the largest share of use of force incidents, with about one in three uses of force reported in that precinct. (See Table 3 & Figures 1 - 3) What are the underlying offenses in use of force incidents? Officers indicated the type of incident on the use of force reporting forms. This describes the general nature of the dispatch or on-view incident and associated incident characteristics. These characteristics are not mutually exclusive, so several type characteristics may be indicated for a particular incident. Forty percent of the incidents were reported as involving some type of felony matter, and fights or disturbances were indicated in 30% of incidents. About 1 in 5 involved violent crimes and/or were drug related. Eighteen percent were characterized as involving mental/suicidal suspects. Domestic violence was indicated in 15% of use of force incidents. (See Figure 4) What are the characteristics of a typical suspect in use of force incidents, and what do they do? The vast majority of force incidents involved a single subject upon whom force was used. The median age for all suspects was 29 years, they were most frequently male (87%), and most frequently white (45%) or black (40%). The race distribution for suspects in use of force incidents is roughly equivalent to the race distribution for all arrestees during the study period. Half of suspects exhibited signs of intoxication (either drugs or alcohol), and nearly 3 in 10 exhibited signs of mental illness or were suicidal or delusional. Suspects fled from officers in about one quarter of incidents. Maximum suspect resistance levels were typically in the form of defensive resistance (48%) or active resistance (25%). Suspect resistance resulted in WACIC Officer Safety reports being filed in 19% of the incidents. Suspects complained of injury in about half (51%) of incidents. (See Figures 5 - 10) How many officers are typically involved and what do they do? About 8 in 10 use of force incidents involved either one (48%) or two (33%) officers who used force on suspects. Overall, the 1,240 incidents involved 650 officers who used force, one third of whom were involved in a single use of force incident during the study period. Thirty-one officers (about 5% of all officers involved in use of force incidents) were involved in 10 or more incidents during the study period as either first

responding officers or as backing officers, including three officers (about 0.5%) who were involved in 20 or more incidents. The most frequently reported tactics were hands, elbows, and arms (used in 80% of incidents), followed by feet, knees, and legs (28%), and Tasers (23%). Less frequently reported were OC spray (7%), batons (4%), and canines (3%). Maximum officer force levels were typically in the form of defensive force (41%), followed by intermediate weapons (29%), and offensive force (24%). (See Figures 11 - 14) How are the interactions distributed in terms of both suspect and officer actions? Results of static force factor analysis (i.e., the maximum officer force level, minus the maximum suspect resistance level) indicate that resistance and force levels were matched in about 36% of use of force incidents, and officers used one or two levels of force higher than suspect resistance in another 45%. Officers used a lower level of force compared to suspect resistance in about 14% of cases. Officers used three or more levels of force higher than suspect resistance in about 6% of incidents. Results of dynamic force factor analysis indicate that most incidents ended by the fourth dyadic officersuspect interaction. Officers on average operate at a force deficit during the first two iterations, transitioning through balance to a force surplus thereafter. Dynamic force factors are consistent with application of a force continuum. (See Figures 15 18) How often might the use of excessive force occur in Seattle? Filtering all use of force cases by relevant Graham factors and static force factors results in a pool of 43 cases (or 3.5% of all use of force cases during the study period) that were selected as potentially excessive. We strongly caution that further research is needed to determine the overall utility of our approach, and in a broader sense, whether it is possible to identify the use of excessive force from administrative records. In the context of total arrests, this would equate to about 1 potential use of excessive force for every 1,180 arrests in Seattle. Incidents identified as potentially excessive were more balanced between 2nd and 3rd watches (as compared to all force incidents), and were more frequently on-view incidents as opposed to dispatched calls. All but two cases involved a single suspect, and typically involved either one (54%) or two (35%) officers. The race distribution for suspects in potentially excessive cases decreased for whites, and increased for suspects in the Asian and Other categories. Officer tactics (hands, elbows, arms, etc.) were similar in distribution to those for all use of force incidents. Subjects were booked in about 60% of these incidents, and some common charges listed were obstructing, assault, resisting, trespass, and warrants. (See Figures 19 21) How is police use of force geographically distributed in Seattle? Police use of force is distributed across the entire city; however, there are areas of clustering and noticeable spatial patterns within the city. Higher densities of use of force incidents were noted in the general vicinity of the following locations: In the North Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1) NE 125th St & Lake City Way NE; and (2) NE 45th to 50th Sts & University Way NE. In the East Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1) E Pine to E Pike Sts & Broadway to Boylston Aves; and (2) 23rd Ave to MLK Way & E Cherry St to E Yesler Way. In the West Precinct, there are higher

densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1) Belltown; (2) Pioneer Square; and (3) International District. Finally, in the South Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1) Rainier Ave & S Genesee St; (2) Rainier Ave & S Ferdinand St; (3) MLK Way & S Webster to S Othello Sts; and (4) Rainier Ave & S Henderson St. (See Maps 1 2)

METHODS The lead author submitted a Public Data Request to the Seattle Police Department requesting all of the use of force reports that were provided to DOJ with regard to their 20% finding. The SPD responded that a Research Agreement would be a more expedient method for processing the data request, so the lead author requested, and obtained, a Research Agreement for these purposes. Our research is fully independent and is not funded by the SPD. We were provided with a series of PDF files containing scanned images of SPD use of force reporting forms and related documents during the period 1/1/09 through 3/25/11, amounting to 1,240 records in all. Data for this study were coded from the content of these official SPD Use of Force reports. Each report included officer identifier information, suspect demographic information, a categorization of the type of suspect resistance and how force was applied as well as information about location, booking, injuries and evidence of impairment or suspected impairment. The first four pages of these reports (more if supplemental forms are required) are comprised of entries and check boxes which were coded into a computer database using a numeric coding system. The remainder of the report packet varied depending on the presence of supplemental documentation, report narratives, photographs, Washington Crime Information Center (WACIC) reports, Labor and Industry (L&I) claim forms and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) call logs as well as routing information and other administrative documentation. These data fields were entered as they appeared in the record. Force Factors In addition to the variables contained in the form, the authors read the narrative reports and coded officer-suspect interactions. Force and resistance were classified based on complimentary scales drawing from previous research.1 For each record in the dataset, we calculated a static force factor. This compares the maximum force applied by the officer to the maximum level of resistance (i.e., officer force level minus suspect resistance level), and takes on numeric values ranging from -6 to 6 (see Table 1). For example, if the maximum level of suspect resistance was Resistance 4, and that was met with a comparable level of officer force (Force 4), this would result in a static force factor equal to 0, indicating a proportional response. If the officer used a higher level of force, say Force 5, then the corresponding force factor would be +1, indicating the officer used one level of force higher than the degree of suspect resistance. If the officer used a lower level of force, say Force 3, the force factor would be -1.

Alpert, G. & R. Dunham. (2004). Understanding Police Use of Force: Officers, Suspects, and Reciprocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Table 1. Suspect Resistance and Officer Force Levels Level Description Level Resistance 1 No resistance. The Subject is Force 1 offering no resistance or threat. Resistance 2 Verbal resistance to complying Force 2 with lawful orders. Subject may challenge authority or standing and may present as dead weight. Resistance 3 Use of posture and verbal threats Force 3 of physical violence. Subject may attempt to intimidate or otherwise pose a physical threat to officers. Resistance 4 Physical non-compliance including refusal to give up hands for cuffing and attempts to flee. Active physical resistance to compliance. Subject may attempt to strike officers, kick and struggle free from holds and compliance positions. Use of non-lethal weapons to injure or otherwise actively assault officers. Drug paraphernalia, beverage containers and rocks may be employed as cutting and impact weapons. Use of lethal force as presented by whatever means are available: firearms, knives and motor vehicles. Force 4

Resistance 5

Force 5

Description Officer presence in uniform or marked police vehicle. Issuance of lawful orders and light physical contact to include guiding, leading and/or handcuffing. No intentional infliction of pain for the purpose of compliance. Chemical agents for the purpose of crowd dispersal or distraction. Tactic is often reserved for large gatherings, civil disobedience and fight disturbances. Physical control tactics such as pain compliance holds, joint manipulation and open handed strikes. Advanced physical control tactics including closed fisted strikes, knee and elbow strikes to the body and the extremities. Intermediate weapon use, deployment of electronic control weapons and impact weapons for pain compliance and strikes to the body and extremities.

Resistance 6

Force 6

Resistance 7

Force 7

Use of lethal force including carotid artery holds, head strikes, and intentional discharge of firearms.

In addition to the static indicator of maximum force and resistance, we also coded dynamic force factors throughout the force incident. Narratives from all 1,240 cases were read and we coded up to 10 iterations of dyadic action/reaction using the same coding scheme as was used to code the static force factor. This helps to assess how force incidents evolve from the perspective of the officer and provides a dynamic overview of the incident from start to finish. Where multiple officers or suspects are involved, their actions are represented as a composite. Weapon draws are a problematic area in use of force research. Some parties contend that a weapon draw is a use of force, while others contend that it is at most a threat of force, and still others argue either side depending on the level of the draw and the motives of the officer with regard to their safety. From a legal perspective, courts have upheld the right of officers to protect themselves against unknown or potentially threatening situations by drawing and pointing a firearm when it is reasonable to do so. Civil rights organizations such as the ACLU contend that drawing and pointing of a firearm at a subject is an application of force in itself and should be reported whenever it occurs. As there is no definitive guidance on the reporting of firearms as cover or with

the intention to discharge the weapon, agencies across the country employ different standards. During the study period, SPD officers did not report weapon draws consistently. In fact, the lead author of this report was on scene at one of the use of force incidents that occurred during the study period, as a ride-along observer on unrelated field research. In that incident, there was a weapon drawn and pointed at the suspect that went unreported in the subsequent use of force report. Sometimes there are references to other officers providing lethal cover, or references are made to felony stop or high risk stop procedures. Insofar as weapon draws were not consistently reported, we were faced with a substantial measurement problem. Ultimately we decided not to record weapon draws because we could not be confident that we were capturing their true incidence. Lethal force, for the purposes of this study, was only coded when the officer used an impact weapon on an area of the body with potential to cause lethal injury (such as a head strike), used a carotid artery hold/restraint, or discharged a firearm. Use of Excessive Force (UOEF) Since the 1980s the United States has been in a slow overhaul of policing and police powers. The Rehnquist court established an objective reasonableness test on the use of force by law enforcement officers. The case, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 286 (1989), known more commonly as Graham, has come to be the standard for use of force analysis. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that with regard to determining the reasonableness of force, the Fourth Amendment requires that the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment interests must be weighed against the interests of the government. To this end, Graham moved beyond the four criteria previously applied (the need for the application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether the force was applied in good faith), and distilled excessive force in the form of a three-prong test to be weighed with information available to the officer at the time of action, and without the benefit of hindsight: the severity of the underlying offense, the immediate threat posed to officers and/or the public, and fleeing or active resistance to arrest. In assessing the totality of circumstances, relevant issues may include the perception of suspect impairments, psychological threats, outnumbering of officers by suspects, physical size, and other factors. Where Graham factors are absent, it can be inferred so too is justification for the use of force. Our method employs the characteristics of the reported data to identify factors which would indicate whether the force was justified. In reviewing these data the authors identified multiple approaches to identifying UOEF cases. Static force factor analysis, dynamic force factor analysis, force factor modeling and variations of these analyses enhanced by what we refer to as Graham factor filtering represent some of the techniques considered. Identifying UOEF incidents can be a subjective process. Guidance from the Rehnquist decision indicates that there must be a compelling governmental interest to use force in apprehending a suspect and those factors may only be judged based on the knowledge of the officer acting at the time, without the aid of 20/20 hindsight. Over the years, the courts have contributed to the case law on the subject.

The current legal definition of UOEF is rooted in the constitutional protections afforded by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically those provisions regarding search and seizure, cruel and unusual punishment and equal protection. Some researchers have argued to expand the definition to address appropriateness of action. The late sociologist Carl Klockars seemed to favor a force-aslast-resort policy advocating a strict definition that identifies appropriate use of force by the highly-skilled-police-officer standard.2 In this era of modernized, professional policing and intense scrutiny it is assumed that officers and their command are acting in good faith. From this perspective, the identification of UOEF incidents is not one of identifying criminal malfeasance, or overtly abusive, disparate or brutal action on the part of the police. Rather, UOEF incidents are assumed to be the product of culture, inadequate supervision, training, professional oversight and/or a combination of these factors. The organizational origins of UOEF as a product of psychological, sociological and environmental factors has driven the artifacts of UOEF underground. From the most skeptical point-of-view, all cases in which force was used above what was necessary to match the resistance of the offender are viewed as potentially UOEF incidents. Only where Graham factors are present justifying force and no alternative exists, and where the maximum force applied is truly a last resort measure, we presume any highly skilled officer would have acted accordingly necessitating the action by legal and professional standards. UOEF is difficult to identify, and the artifacts of UOEF and empiricism are all that are available to us. The role of academic research is to employ the scientific process in search of the truth, and to apply that truth where possible in order to help make the world a better place in which to live. We are left with the content of official records to provide indicators of UOEF. These data are naturally limited by their representation of the officer applying force. We have to assume these reports reflect a degree of bias toward the officers writing them. As these documents are intended to record justification for the application of force, the authors used these reports to eliminate those incidents where force was justified and focus on the remainder for indicators of UOEF. A hypothetical will demonstrate the problem. While on patrol an officer observes a juvenile male committing an act of vandalism. The officer approaches the subject, identifies himself as a police officer and issues a lawful order to the subject to surrender. The subject flees and the officer gives chase. The suspect is younger, visibly unarmed and considerably smaller than the officer. In apprehending the suspect the officer tackles him and successfully takes him into custody. As a result of the tackle the suspect receives superficial abrasions to his knees and minor bruising, and no medical attention is required. Under Graham this incident could be considered UOEF. The subject was not a danger to the public, he was fleeing but it was a non-violent crime and it is arguable that there existed no compelling governmental interest for his apprehension. Furthermore, the arresting officer was plainly aware of these factors at the time that force was applied. His actions may have derived from the suspects lack of respect for formal social
Klockars, C. (1995). A theory of excessive force and its control. In W. A. Geller & H. Toch (Eds.), And justice for all: Understanding and controlling police abuse of force (pp. 11-29). Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.
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controls. This UOEF incident does not readily appear to be an egregious overreach of police authority and may not be easily identified by examining force and resistance levels. Thus, an analysis of the data focusing on large, positive force factors as potential UOEF would be crude at best. Graham Factor Filtering As demonstrated by the hypothetical, a more detailed analysis is required to confidently identify potential UOEF incidents. Rather than bluntly pointing to the outliers in a distribution of force factors, a systematic identification and elimination of incidents with sufficient justification for the application of force is more appropriate. We operationalized Graham factors from the SPD use of force reports as follows (Table 2):
Table 2. Operationalization of Graham Factors Graham factor Report Section Evidence of threat or Force / Resistance Used intention to inflict harm by Subject (check all that apply) Threat level (from narrative) Force / Resistance Used by Subject (check all that apply)Subject Flight Type of Incident (check all that apply) Variable (code) - Impact Weapon (2) - Knife (4) - Firearm (5) Weapon present or suspected (4) Motor Vehicle (1) Foot (2) Other (3) Felony (1) Violent Crime (4) Fight Disturbance (6) Domestic Violence (8) Mental / Suicidal (10) Poor Balance (2) Rambling / Incoherent Speech (3) Smelled of Alcohol (4) Subject indicated drug / alcohol use (5) Subject indicated not using prescribed medication (6) Slurred Speech (7) Possible mental illness / suicidal / delusional (8) Possible intoxication (alcohol / drugs) (10)

Evidence of intention to flee Evidence of a compelling governmental interest to intervene or interdict

Indicators of an impaired rational ability (no single factor taken as indicator, multiple factors must be present)

Subject Impairments (check all that apply)

If we assume all incidents where an officer uses force against a citizen and is at a force surplus (force factors 1 and above) have the potential to be UOEF incidents, we can begin to eliminate justifiable use of force incidents by applying a logical analysis of the Graham factors. Most of the factors listed in Table 2 are evidence of a compelling interest to seek compliance, where the subject poses a substantial risk to officers and/or public safety. Other factors are counter-indicative of alternatives to force.

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Statistical Significance Before proceeding with the analysis, a few words on the issue of statistical significance are in order. Sample-based statistics are estimates of a true population value (or population parameter) that would have been obtained had one analyzed all of the data rather than a sample of the data. Due to sampling variability, statistical estimates always have a degree of error associated with them. Tests of statistical significance are necessary to determine whether an observed difference in the sampled data is due to a real and true difference, or if it couldve been obtained by chance due to sampling variability. We have analyzed all UOF incidents during the study period and we do not seek to generalize our findings beyond the study period. As such, we treat these as population data. The numbers we report are treated not as sample-based statistical estimates, but rather as population parameters having no sampling variability associated with them. Any observed difference in the data is treated as a real and true difference in the data, and statistical significance is not considered relevant. Therefore, we do not report any tests of statistical significance, and readers should instead consider the substantive significance of any observed differences.

ANALYSIS When, where, and how often do the police in Seattle use force? During the study period (1/1/09 through 3/25/11), there were a total of 1,240 use of force reports. In the aggregate, this amounts to approximately 46 incidents per month, or about 1.5 incidents per day. In order to better understand the incidence of police use of force, we standardized force incidents in terms of arrest activity. Table 3 presents arrest-based rates of use of force during the study period. Overall, police in Seattle use force in about 2.4 out of every 100 arrests. This rate is fairly consistent over the study period, with monthly rates varying from 1.9 per 100 (March, 2009) to 3.1 per 100 (April, 2010).

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Table 3. Arrest-based rates of use of force in Seattle Rate of force per Year Month Arrests Force 100 arrests Overall 2009 50,748 1,240 2.44

January 2,080 48 2.31 February 1,850 48 2.59 March 1,929 37 1.92 April 1,926 47 2.44 May 1,945 45 2.31 June 1,933 45 2.33 July 2,049 52 2.54 August 2,015 51 2.53 September 1,914 40 2.09 October 1,918 47 2.45 November 1,695 45 2.65 December 1,744 45 2.58 2010 January 2,052 48 2.34 February 1,847 39 2.11 March 1,900 49 2.58 April 1,827 56 3.07 May 1,934 55 2.84 June 1,958 51 2.60 July 1,950 53 2.72 August 1,895 44 2.32 September 1,870 47 2.51 October 1,909 47 2.46 November 1,711 36 2.10 December 1,757 43 2.45 2011 January 1,889 44 2.33 February 1,531 46 3.00 March* 1,720 32 1.86 Note: Arrest data were provided by the Seattle Police Department. * Includes all arrests but only force incidents through 3/25/11, thus the actual rate for March, 2011, is probably higher.

It is important to note that these overall figures can mask important variation by day of week and time of day. Use of force in Seattle is more frequent on weekends, with 36% of all incidents during the study period occurring on Saturdays and Sundays (see figure 1). Force is also more frequent during the late evening and early-morning hours, with 60% of all incidents occurring during the hours 2000-0359 (see figure 2).

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Figure 1. Use of Force Incidents, by Day of Week

250 235 Number of incidents 200 150 142 100 50 0 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Day of week Friday Saturday Sunday 175 211 160 161

156

Figure 2. Use of Force Incidents, by Time of Day

800 700 Number of Incidents 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 0400 - 1159 1200 - 1959 Time of Day (Watch) 2000 - 0359 141 360 739

The West Precinct has the largest share (34%) of use of force incidents, followed by the South Precinct (21%). The North and East Precincts each account for about 17% of incidents (see figure 3). The Southwest Precinct had the lowest proportion of use of force incidents (10%). Incidents that occurred outside of Seattle are not included in this figure.

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Figure 3. Use of Force Incidents, by Precinct

450 400 Number of incidents 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 North West East Precinct South Southwest 118 215 212 262 422

What are the underlying offenses in use of force incidents? Officers recorded the type of incident on the use of force reporting forms. This indicates the general nature of the dispatch or on-view incident and associated incident characteristics. These characteristics are not mutually exclusive, so several type characteristics may be indicated for a particular incident. Forty percent of the incidents were reported as involving some type of felony matter, and 38% non-felony matters (see figure 4). Fights or disturbances were indicated in 30% of incidents. About 1 in 5 involved violent crimes and/or were drug related. Eighteen percent were characterized as mental/suicidal. Domestic violence was indicated in 15% of use of force incidents.

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Figure 4. Percent of Use of Force Incidents, by Type of Incident

Civil disorder Warrant service Traffic related Multiple subjects Domestic violence Property crime Mental/suicidal Drug related Violent crime Fight/disturbance Non-felony Felony 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 1.3 5.9 10.7 12.1 15.2 15.5 18.2 20.0 21.8 29.5 37.5 40.3 40.0 45.0

Percent of incidents

What are the characteristics of a typical suspect in use of force incidents, and what do they do? The vast majority of use of force incidents (94%) involved a single suspect upon whom force was used. It is important to note that in some cases, the suspect(s) fled or otherwise left the scene without being enumerated. For example, the use of OC Spray to stop and disperse fighting crowds after bar closings in Belltown or in Pioneer Square may result in no enumerated suspect(s). Another example might be mass demonstrations wherein numerous individuals are involved in an incident but not enumerated. In cases where the number of individual suspects was not identified, we coded these as zeros; there were a total of 22 such cases (1.8%) among the total. Figure 5 shows the distribution of force incidents by the number of suspects upon whom force was used.

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Figure 5. Use of Force Incidents, by Number of Suspects

1400 1200 Number of incidents 1171 1000 800 600 400 200 22 0 0 1 2 3 4 20 Number of suspects 37 7 2 1

A total of 1,252 suspects were identified in the use of force records, representing 1,193 unique suspects. The vast majority (96%) were suspects in a single use of force incident during the study period (see figure 6). There were some repeat suspects upon whom force was used, including 39 individuals who were involved in two incidents, seven individuals who were involved in three incidents, and two individuals who were involved in four incidents during the study period.
Figure 6. Suspects, by Number of Use of Force Incidents
1400 1200 Number of suspects 1000 800 600 400 200 39 0 1 2 Number of incidents 3 4 7 2 1145

At the incident-level (i.e., including repeat suspects), the average age of suspects in use of force incidents was 32 years (SD=12), and the age of suspects ranged from 12 to 78 years. The age distribution exhibits positive skew, so the median age (29 years) is perhaps a better measure of central tendency (see figure 7).

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Race was determined for 1,262 suspects in use of force incidents. Forty-five percent were White; 40% Black; 5% Asian; 3% American Indian; and 6% Other (see figure 8). As shown, these figures are roughly comparable to the race distribution for all arrestees during the study period (arrestee data were provided by SPD). Whites comprised 50% of all arrestees and 45% of those upon whom force was used during the study period. Blacks comprised 38% of all arrestees and 40% of those upon whom force was used during the study period. Asians comprised 6% of all arrestees and 5% of those upon whom force was used during the study period. American Indians comprised 3% of both the arrestee and force populations. Individuals in the Other category represented 3% of the arrestee population and about 6% of those upon whom force was used.

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Figure 8. Race distribution, Suspects in Use of Force Incidents Compared with Arrestees
60 50 40 Percent 30 20 10 0 White Black American Indian Race Asian Other All Arestees Use of Force Suspects

Gender was determined for 1,267 suspects in use of force incidents. (There was additionally a transgender individual for whom a specific sex category could not be determined. It is important to note that there were additional transgender suspects, but a dominant gender was identified in the report for these other cases). Eighty-seven percent of suspects were male, and the remaining 13% female. Suspects may exhibit impairments that affect their judgment and behavioral decision-making. There was no evidence of impairment noted for 26% of suspects in use of force incidents. However, about half of suspects exhibited signs of intoxication (either drugs or alcohol) (Figure 9). In about a third of cases, suspects indicated to the officer(s) that they had been using drugs and/or alcohol (32%), exhibited rambling or incoherent speech (33%), or smelled of alcohol (36%). Slurred speech (24%) and poor balance (17%) were also noted impairments. A possible mental illness, suicidal intentions, or delusional behavior was noted in 28% of incidents.
Figure 9. Percent of Suspects Exhibiting Impairments, by Type of Impairment
Poor balance Slurred speech Possible mental illness/suicidal/delusional Subject indicated drug/alcohol use Rambling/incoherent speech Smelled of alcohol Possible intoxication (alcohol/drugs) 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 17.0 24.2 28.4 31.9 33.1 35.8 49.5 50.0 60.0

Percent of suspects

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In addition to impairments, suspects fled from officers in about a quarter of incidents, by either foot (26.5%) or motor vehicle (3.1%). These figures also include a small subset of cases in which suspects fled by both motor vehicle and foot. As discussed earlier, we measured suspect resistance by reading report narratives and coding suspect resistance levels on a seven-point scale. The scale categories included: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Cooperative/no resistance Verbal noncompliance/passive resistance Psychological threat Defensive resistance Active resistance Aggravated active resistance I Aggravated active resistance II

Figure 10 shows the distribution of incidents along the seven-point continuum described above. In nearly half (48.5%) of all incidents, the highest level of suspect resistance was defensive resistance. Next most frequent was active resistance, with one quarter (25%) of incidents falling in that category.
Figure 10. Percent of Use of Force Incidents, by Maximum Suspect Resistance Level
60.0 Percent of incidents 50.0 48.5 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 1.0 0.0
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on co m

Maximum resistance level

Another way of gauging the seriousness of suspect resistance in use of force incidents is by the presence of Hazard Report & Washington Crime Information Center

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Ag gr av at ed

ac t iv e

re si

(WACIC) Officer Safety Entry reports filed along with the use of force report. These WACIC reports are to be completed by officers if combative resistance or physical aggression that is intended to overpower, disable or injure is directed toward an officer. These forms instruct officers: Do not fill out this report if the suspect only physically pulls away, lies down or acts in other similar non-combative ways. Once entered into WACIC, other officers will then be notified about the potentially combative suspect should they encounter him/her when performing a records check. WACIC reports were filed in 19% of all use of force incidents during the study period. Suspects complained of injury in 51% of incidents (although this refers only to the first suspect reported and is thus conservative), and suspects were reported by officers as visibly injured in 69% of incidents, but the injuries were sometimes a result of something that happened prior to police involvement. Among those suspects complaining of injury, 20% specifically refused treatment. The majority were treated by EMS personnel at the scene or at a police precinct. In 14 cases (or about 1% of all use of force incidents), suspects were treated and admitted to a hospital. How many officers are typically involved and what do they do? Eighty-one percent of all incidents involved force used by a single officer (48%), or by two officers (33%) (see figure 11). Another 12% involved force used by three officers. The remaining seven percent of cases involved force used by four or more officers.
Figure 11. Use of Force Incidents, by Number of Officers Using Force
700

600 596 Number of incidents 500

400

411

300

200 149 58 0 1 2 3 4 5 Number of officers 6 7 10 29 18 4 2 1 1

100

Our analysis yielded 650 unique officers involved either as first responding officers or as backing officers in the 1,240 use of force incidents during the study period. It is important to note that not all officers were accounted for; we recorded up to six

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officers involved, but there were a few incidents that exceeded that range, including one incident that involved 29 officers. About a third (34%) of the officers in the use of force data were involved in a single incident during the study period (Figure 12); about half (53%) in one or two incidents; two-thirds (66%) in one to three incidents; and about three-quarters (76%) in one to four incidents. Ninety-five percent of officers in the use of force data were involved in less than ten incidents during the study period. Thirty-one officers (about 5%) were involved in 10 or more incidents during the study period, and there were three officers (about 0.5%) who were involved in 20 or more use of force incidents during the study period.
Figure 12. Number of Officers Involved in Multiple Incidents, by Number of Force Incidents
250 223 Number of officers 200 150 100 50 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 20 23 24 Number of incidents

119 89 64 39 33 22 22 8 8

Slightly more than half of the use of force incidents (55%) resulted from the dispatch of an officer to a scene, while the remainder (45%) were on-view incidents. As to the specific tactics employed, we recorded all tactics used by officers (as indicated on the use of force reporting form) involved in each incident (Figure 13). As can be seen, hands, elbows, and arms were the most frequently reported (80%), followed by feet, knees, and legs (28%). Tasers were reported as being used in 23% of incidents. Less frequently used were OC spray (7%), batons (4%), canines (3%) and other types (3%).

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Figure 13. Percent of Use of Force Incidents, by Tactics Employed

Other K-9 Baton OC Spray Taser Feet/Knees/Legs Hands/Elbows/Arms 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 2.6 3.1 3.6 7.3 22.8 27.7 79.5 80.0 90.0

Percent of incidents

As discussed earlier, we measured maximum officer force levels by reading report narratives and coding officer force levels on a seven-point scale. The scale categories included: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Police presence, verbal direction Strong verbal order with minimal contact OC spray Defensive force, forcibly subdued suspect with open hands or feet Offensive force, forcibly subdued suspect using closed hands or feet Intermediate weapon Deadly force

Figure 14 shows the distribution of incidents along the seven-point continuum described above. In about 4 out of 10 incidents, the highest level of officer force was defensive physical force. Next most frequent was the use of an intermediate weapon, with almost 3 out of 10 incidents falling in that category. About one quarter (24%) of incidents involved officers using offensive physical force.

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Figure 14. Percent of Use of Force Incidents, by Maximum Officer Force Level
45.0 40.0 41.0

Percent of incidents

35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 4.1 0.3 23.9 28.7

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Maximum force level

Officer injuries were reported in 17% of incidents, although this figure relates only to the first officer reported, and is thus conservative. Officers typically self-treated or were treated by EMS personnel. How are the interactions distributed in terms of both suspect and officer actions? Here we report on the distribution of force factors (i.e., level of officer force minus level of suspect resistance). A value of 0 indicates that police force was proportional to suspect resistance. Positive values indicate officers using a higher level of force compared to suspect resistance, and negative values indicate officers using a lower level of force compared to suspect resistance. In general, officers following a force continuum model will use a higher level of force in order to overcome a given level of suspect resistance, thus +1 events (and to some extent, +2 events, some of which may be an artifact of skipping over OC spray, or going to an intermediate weapon such as the Taser rather than physically fighting an individual) are to be expected. Overall, about 80% of use of force incidents fell in the 0 to 2 range, and about 14% fell in negative categories (Figure 15). The remaining 6% were in the 3 to 5 range.

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Figure 15. Percent of Use of Force Incidents, by Force Factor (Force - Resistance)
40.0 35.6 35.0 30.0

27.1

Percent of incidents

25.0 20.0 15.0 10.9 10.0 5.0 0.4 0.0 -3 -2 -1 0 1 Force Factor 2 3 4 5 3.9 2.3 1.9 0.3

17.7

Since the static force factor only captures the maximum levels of officer force and suspect resistance, an examination of dynamic force factors may help to understand the evolution. As previously mentioned, we coded up to 10 dyadic iterations of officersuspect actions. More than half of all cases end by the fourth iteration (Figure 16). Figure 17 shows the average levels of officer force and suspect resistance at each iteration. Overall, officers on average entered situations at a force deficit, and transitioned into a force surplus by iteration three. This generally reflects initial attempts to reason with noncompliant suspects either with voice commands or limited physical contact.

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Figure 16. Number of Incidents, by Number of ForceResistance Iterations

1400 Number of Incidents 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Iteration Number

Figure 17. Dynamic Force and Resistance Levels

Average Force or Resistance Level 5.00 4.50 4.00 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Iteration Number Officer Suspect

Figure 18 shows the average force factor at each iteration. As can be seen, force factors are generally negative in the first two iterations. Average force factors transition through zero to positive values thereafter, consistent with the notion of a force continuum.

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Figure 18. Dynamic Force Factors

1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 -0.50 -1.00 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Iteration Number

How often might the use of excessive force occur in Seattle? As previously discussed, our approach is to filter out cases based on both Graham factors and static force factors in order to identify a pool of potentially excessive incidents. Selecting use of force incidents having an absence of Graham factors as defined (i.e., threat or intention to inflict harm, fleeing, a compelling governmental interest to intervene, and impaired rational ability), and having a static force factor equal to or greater than 1, yields an initial pool of 59 cases. Fourteen of these cases were OC Spray deployments, generally involving large crowds and alcohol establishments, and resulting in no enumerated suspects. We removed these cases from the pool. In addition, two of these cases involved animals. In one case, the officer fired a Taser at a dog that was injuring another dog; the Taser had the desired effect and the dog ran off. In the other case, the officer fired his sidearm at the dog but missed. Both animal cases were removed from the pool. The remaining 43 cases (3.5% of all cases) are characterized as potentially excessive. In the context of total arrests, this equates to about 1 potential use of excessive force for every 1,180 arrests in Seattle. We strongly caution that further research is needed to determine the overall utility of our approach. In a broader sense, we need socio-legal research to determine whether it is even possible to identify use of excessive force from administrative records. It should also be noted that the filtering method will include cases that, upon further review, are probably not excessive; likewise, it will miss some cases that are. The filtering method relies on the accuracy of administrative data elements, and it is possible that some characteristics may not be correctly identified in use of force reports or that omitted details in the forms could result in erroneous selection. We describe the cases below with these cautions in mind. Similar to all use of force cases, these potentially excessive cases are slightly more frequent on weekends, but whereas all force incidents are heavily loaded (60%) in the 3rd watch (2000 0359), the potentially excessive cases are more balanced between 26

Average Force Factor

2nd (40%) and 3rd (44%) watches (Figure 19). Similar to all use of force cases, the West Precinct accounts for about a third (35%) of the potentially excessive cases, but the East Precinct has a larger share of potentially excessive cases (28%) as compared to that Precincts share of all use of force cases (17%) (Figure 20). One of the potentially excessive incidents occurred outside the City of Seattle.
Figure 19. All Use of Force and Potentially Excessive Incidents, by Time of Day
70.0 Percent of Incidents 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 0400 - 1159 1200 - 1959 Time of Day (Watch) 2000 - 0359 All Use of Force Potential UOEF

Figure 20. All Use of Force and Potentially Excessive Incidents, by Precinct
40.0 35.0 Percent of incidents 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 North West East Precinct South Southwest All Use of Force Potential UOEF

The types of incidents (i.e., the general nature of the dispatch or on-view incident) were characterized for 32 of the potentially UOEF cases. 24 were identified as nonfelony, 8 as drug related, 8 as traffic related, 7 as property crime, 4 involved multiple subjects, 3 involved warrant services, and 1 was identified as a civil disorder. (Note that these are not mutually exclusive categories). Suspects in these cases were typically male (83%), and the age distribution is substantively similar to that for all use of force cases (median 29 years of age). With regard to race, the proportion of cases involving White suspects declines from all 27

arrestees (50%), to those upon whom force is used (45%), to those involving potential UOEF (40%) (Figure 21). There are increases in the proportion of Asian and Other suspects from arrestees to EUOF cases. For example, the other category increases from all arrestees (3%), to those upon whom forced is used (6%), to those involving potential UOEF (12%).
Figure 21. Race distribution, Suspects in All Use of Force and Potentially Excessive Incidents, Compared with Arrestees
60 50 40 Percent 30 20 10 0 White Black American Indian Race Asian Other Arrestees All Use of Force Potential UOEF

Incidents identified as potentially excessive were more frequently on-view incidents (67%), in contrast to all use of force incidents (45%). All but two cases involved a single suspect, and typically involved either one (54%) or two (35%) officers. Officer tactics (hands, elbows, arms; feet, knees, legs; Taser; etc.) were similar in distribution to those for all use of force incidents. Suspects were booked in about 60% of these incidents, and some common charges listed were obstructing, assault, resisting, trespass, and warrants.

How is police use of force geographically distributed in Seattle? As previously noted, the West Precinct has the largest share of use of force incidents, accounting for just over one-third of the incidents during the study period. However, precinct-level aggregations mask important local spatial variation in the use of force. Here, we report on some basic spatial analyses to explore this local variation. Map 1 is a point map of the greater Seattle area where each point indicates a use of force incident. As can be seen, use of force incidents are distributed across the entire city. A cursory visual inspection suggests clustering and other patterning in the distribution of incidents.

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Map 1. Point Map of Use of Force Incidents in Seattle 29

Map 2 displays a kernel density estimation of use of force incidents over the study area. Higher densities are noted on the map in several locations. In the North Precinct, there area higher densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1) NE 125th St & Lake City Way NE; and (2) NE 45th to 50th Sts & University Way NE. In the East Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1) E Pine to E Pike Sts & Broadway to Boylston Aves; and (2) 23rd Ave to MLK Way & E Cherry St to E Yesler Way. In the West Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1) Belltown; (2) Pioneer Square; and (3) International District. Finally, in the South Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1) Rainier Ave & S Genesee St; (2) Rainier Ave & S Ferdinand St; (3) MLK Way & S Webster to S Othello Sts; and (4) Rainier Ave & S Henderson St. It should be emphasized that this is a very macro-level view of use of force incidents and that greater specificity can be achieved, especially in the downtown core and with Precinct-level analyses. We forego such analyses here in order to avoid potential micro-level spatial labeling and privacy concerns.

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Map 2. Kernel Density Estimation of Use of Force Incidents in Seattle 31

CONCLUSION In many ways, this is just the beginning. The descriptive analysis presented in this report is a necessary first step toward understanding the nature and scope of police use of force in Seattle, but it is also the proverbial tip of the iceberg. The key findings are summarized in the front of the report and need not be repeated here. The next step is to move from description toward explanation. The spatial component of police use of force is an important area for continued research. Everything occurs in time and space, and to ignore these aspects of police use of force is to miss a large part of the story. Merging these data with available crime data, Census data regarding community characteristics, as well as data from other researchers engaged in attitudinal studies of Seattle neighborhoods, may prove quite fruitful in explaining the distribution of police use of force, as well as achieving broader social justice goals. Alternative data sources, such as complaints filed with the ACLU or other entities, should also be brought to bear on the question of the incidence of police use of force. A significant limitation of the present research is reliance upon official use of force reports, which contain statements from the officer, witnesses, the investigating supervisor and members of the SPD chain of command involved in reviewing them, but not the subject of the action. Further, these reports are written for the purpose of documenting justification for the application of force. As such they contain an inherent bias toward police. This is not to say these reports are inaccurate; these are official statements given by sworn officers whom we presume are giving the most accurate statement possible. In reviewing use of force reports, we took no license in interpreting the actions of either party. But we were also looking for specific elements of interaction (force and resistance levels) and a more thorough analysis of the report narratives is certainly in order. One of the benefits of the data file we have generated along with our initial descriptive analysis is that we now have an accurate sampling frame from which a statistically valid sample of cases can be drawn for more detailed qualitative analysis. We close by acknowledging that, despite the relatively benign picture that emerges from empirical data, the public outrage and calls for a DOJ investigation cannot be ignored. We entrust our public servants, especially in law enforcement, with tremendous powers of coercion. When a law enforcement officer uses force against a citizen it is disturbing. From a psychological standpoint the impact can be dramatic for bystanders, let alone the subjects of violence themselves. We cannot ignore the reality of violence simply because it occurs rarely. However, we would hope that those engaged in police reform efforts would do their best to ensure that such reforms are rooted in a rational understanding of police use of force, so that their efforts are truly meaningful and long-lasting.

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