Drums

of Reconciliation, Drums of War Efforts Between 1966 and 1967 to Persuade the South-Eastern Nigerian Leadership Not to Precipitate War Oluwatoyin Vincent Adepoju Compcros Comparative Cognitive Processes and Systems Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge One myth that has arisen around the Nigerian Civil War, particularly among those who venerate the secessionist state of Biafra, is that the secession was inevitable after the pogroms relating to the counter coup of 1966. The recent inflammatory summation of the place of Igbos in Nigeria in the pre-war, war and post-war history of Nigeria by Chinua Achebe in his 2012 Guardian UK essay on the war "The Genocidal Biafran War Still Haunts Nigeria"( the article has been removed from the Guardian site) led me to argue that Achebe is a bad leader for the Igbos he claims to represent and those who follow him uncritically, as has been the current trend, do so at their peril. I will present, another time, in a wider platform, my rationale for making that assertion. My central understanding is that he is out of touch with the history and current situation of Ndigbo in Nigeria. He massages Igbo pride but speaks only from a platform that has not moved beyond the tensions 1968, the heart of the civil war. His current views are little different from those he expressed in his 1968 interview with Rajat Neogy in the journal Transition,reprinted in Transition 75/76. I earlier summed up my critique in stating that a person who, like Achebe, in the Information Age represented by 2012, focuses, without any accompanying critical context, on importation of stock fish to Aba in the immediate post war years of 1971 and shortly after, has lost the plot. Ndigbo in Nigeria, and Nigeria as a whole, is in desperate need of direction in terms of the harnessing of human power and natural resources For Ndigbo, specifically, this need for vision and its actualisation involves the South-East and the dispersion of Ndigbo across Nigeria. I dont get the impression that the Igbo marginalisation mantra based on a 1968 template as invoked by Achebe is particularly helpful as the answer to this challenge in a country where so many units are fighting for a share of proceeds from the centre. 1

I think that if one insists on being an ethnic champion, focusing on the interests of your ethnic group rather than those of the nation as a whole, such a broader vision being the kind that would have been expected of an Achebe who had assumed the moral stature of a Nigerian and African elder statesman, one needs a strategic vision that takes an up to date account of the distinctive strengths of the group and its location within the national space. Is it possible to divorce the challenges and possibilities of Ndigbo from those of Nigeria? Is a national strategy not superior to an ethnically centred strategy? How do we untangle the ethnic challenge from the complex web of national interrelations? In contrasting ethnic and national vision, it could be helpful to revisit Biafra and the various roads taken and not taken in relation to its history. The Biafran effort was most admirable on various fronts and represents a beacon of value in African history. These achievement includes Biafran ingenuity and unity of purpose in creating technologies from the ground up in adverse conditions, technologies unreplicated in other African nations and even by the Biafrans themselves after the war, such as cost efficient and portable methods of refining oil, the famous explosive ogbunigwe and refabricating armoured vehicles, some of which can be seen at the National War Museum at Umuahia. However, Biafran achievement needs to be put in context If the fantastic energies represented by Biafra were centred in regional development instead of a war that Biafra was posed to lose from the very beginning on account of limitations in equipment, human power and territory in which to manoeuvre, what would have been the outcome opposed to the horrible story of death in massive numbers through starvation and combat? True, the Biafran leader may have had cause for fear about the modification of the Aburi Accord which presented the possibility of a state of emergency being declared in any of the states of the nation by the federal government, thereby overriding the regional power from the centre and perhaps putting his already traumatised population at risk. Do the military and strategic limitations of Biafra not suggest, however, that a wiser strategy would have been to continue negotiations within a framework that did not include secession which would take away the oil fields which have eventually become central to the Nigerian economy, a situation made more problematic by the fact that these oil fields are located in lands whose populations were divided over alliance with the secessionist state? 2

Anyway, the story has come and gone. At this time, it is useful to look over the broken bottles that cut ones feet on the journey into the future represented by ones past and ask how could those bottles have been avoided? Was the scope of loss worth the struggle? Was what was gained not better achieved through a method that did not require such a level of sacrifice? What if Adolf Hitler had turned the massive creative powers he was able to inspire from Germany to national development instead of to Jewish extermination and imperialist expansion? The world would be a different place today because the global war that ensued from Hitlers ambitions created and enabled fundamental changes to the world, laying foundations for the modern world. I use that example, not because I correlate Ojukwu and Hitler in leadership vision and style, but as leaders steering two strategic initiatives at the cusp of national history and with Hitler, global history, at differing scales of influence. With hindsight these efforts represent the harnessing of colossal national forces in directions that may best be described as misguided. In this summation below, I present the sequence of efforts to peacefully persuade Biafra to desist from secession and the challenge of war that would ensue. One may ask-if they wanted to go-why not let them go? The counter argument is not something I will pretend I fully understand since there were various interests at stake and various motivations involved, within Nigeria, Biafra and the international community. The notion of preventing the secession in the name of national and continental integrity looks problematic to me. The rationale that looks most meaningful to me is that of the contradictions between the efforts of Biafra to claim a multi-ethnic status involving the entire South-East and the problematic place of non-Igbo minorities in that alliance, as evoked by Ogoni leader Ken Saro-Wiwas claim that the Biafran initiative was an Igbo land grab to control the Niger-Delta oil fields and the controversial Midwest invasion which would have opened further aces to such resources talk less the fears of Igbo domination in the strategic port city of Port Harcourt and the later Rivers State. This collusion between economics and conflictual ethnicity was not helpful to the Biafran initiative since it provided justifications for opposing it and weakened its internal cohesion even before war began. Now, to the timeline of conciliatory efforts towards the South-East leadership before the declaration of Biafra in 1967 and the commencement of fighting at the Ogota front that year.

Reconciliation Efforts to Persuade South-Eastern Leadership to Avoid War : Timeline Between January 15,1966 Coup Anti-Yoruba and Anti-Northern Massacres, the Anti-Igbo Massacres and Pogroms of the 29 July 1966 Counter Coup and the Commencement of Fighting in 1967. 1. Ntieyong Udo Akpan, Chief Secretary to the Military Government, Head of the Civil Service and Member and Secretary to the Cabinet of Eastern Nigeria and holding these posts in secessionist Biafra till the end of the civil war in January 1970. I appealed to [ Ojukwu ] in the name of God and humanity to throw away all idea of secession, which was bound to bring up war. I expressed my views and feelings of the dreadful consequences of civil war. I heard nothing further [about my proposal]. Source : Source-The Struggle For Secession, 1966-1970: A Personal Account Of The Nigerian Civil War by Ntieyong Udo Akpan.Page 80. [This section of the book can be read free on Google books]. 2. Nigerian government telegram of May 1966 to the South Eastern governor and later Biafran leader, Odumegwu Ojukwu. I highlight the pleading by the government, most likely coming directly from Yakubu Gowon, the head of the Federal government. extract- 'the constitution can provide all safeguards necessary for state governments. Also programme envisages immediate appointment of a revenue allocation commission to find new formula on basis of principle of derivation and need to provide adequate funds for essential government functions. Programme will ensure justice and fair play for all the country. Therefore I earnestly appeal to you to cooperate to arrest further drift into disintegration. On the basis of the foregoing, representatives of all governments can meet without further delay to plan for smooth implementation of the political and administrative programme adopted by your colleagues of the Supreme Military Council. Most immediate. Source-The Struggle For Secession, 1966-1970: A Personal Account Of The Nigerian Civil War.p.82, by Ntieyong Udo Akpan, Chief Secretary to the Military Government, Head of the Civil Service and Member and Secretary to the Cabinet of Eastern Nigeria till the end of the civil war [This section of the book can be read free on Google books]. 4

 3. Efforts of James Cumes, Australian High Commissioner in Lagos to Broker Reconciliation I was Australian High Commissioner in Lagos from August 1965 when I presented my credentials to Azikwe, until August 1967 when I took leave of Gowon in Dodan Barracks and went to the UN General Assembly then about to meet in mid- September in New York. In October 1966, I travelled by road from Lagos to Enugu to talk to Ojukwu in an attempt to help towards a peaceful settlement, end the massacres of the Ibos and keep Nigeria intact. (You will see many newspaper and other media accounts of my talks with Ojukwu at this time.) I undertook these talks with Gowons knowledge and consent. After my talks, the atmosphere between Lagos and Enugu seemed to improve for a time and was one factor which led to the Aburi Agreement in January 1967. That Agreement then fell apart, largely I think because of problems Gowon had with it or more accurately perhaps, problems that those who kept him in power had with it. As Ojukwu told me, the great problem in reaching a peaceful settlement was, from the Ibo side, the problem of dealing with the North after the appalling massacres of so many Ibos on and after 29 July 1966. Could the Ibos ever really regard their fellow Nigerians of the North as brothers after those terrible events? Source-http://maxsiollun.wordpress.com/2009/04/17/igbo-soldiers-plotted-coup- from-independence-day-ejoor/ 4. The Federal Government Delegation led by Obafemi Awolowo to Ojukwu on Saturday, May 4, 196G A. Nowa Omoigui summary: "Nonetheless on May 4th the National reconciliation committee sent a delegation led by Chief Awolowo to Enugu to find ways to defuse the situation. Among terms given to the committee (by Ojukwu) for the participation of the East in peace talks were that there should be 'an agreed agenda', 'an acceptable venue', a defined 'time limit', as well as the termination of economic sanctions against the east and withdrawal of northern troops from Lagos. When Chief Awolowo asked Ojukwu about the attitude of Eastern Leaders to the North and the question of secession, Ojukwu's response was "on the specific question of whether there is a possibility of contact with the North, the answer is at the battlefield." Source ; "May 30, 1967 " at the Igbo culture site Kwenu.com.

B. Confirmation from Ralph Uwechue, Biafran Ambassador to France and later head of Ohaneze Ndigo, the pan-Igbo organization: When on 7th May 1967 the Yoruba leader came to Enugu at the head of a reconciliation committee, Ojukwu had a handsome opportunity to play his card. He missed. Dr. Michael Okpara who still enjoyed popular support in Eastern Nigeria and whose friendship with Chief Awolowo had sustained the UPGA alliance was not even invited to meet Chief Awolowo. After a hurried reception, Chief Awolowos delegation left Eastern Nigeria. Ojukwu saw fit to describe the mission as an ill- conceived child. Source: Why Biafra failed Being excerpts from the book: Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War Facing the Future, written, by Chief Raph Uwechue, president- general, Ohanaeze, the pan- Igbo socio-cultural organization By Onouha Ukeh UKEH Sun publications, Saturday, October 24, 2009. Reprinted at https://lists.mayfirst.org/pipermail/friends/2009-October/006186.html. C. Mobolaji Aluko elaboration: "....eminent persons sent by Gowon (delegation led by Chief Awolowo) to persuade Ojukwu not to lead Biafra to secede, at which point Ojukwu disclosed that the momentum to secede was too far to stop the effort, that in fact his life would be in danger if he broached a retreat, but that he believed that the secession would be short-lived, and he would do everything in his power to make it so. Of course, history proved him wrong, but these are some truths (if you will permit me to be so blunt) that never come out in conversations..........." Quotes from Aluko's presentation of the transcripts of the talks. I highlight the pleading from Awo. Aluko introduction to the transcript: "Here is the true account of what took place as taken from scriptsof the discussion between Papa and Chief Ojukwu (the Ikemba). The discussion was taped by the Ikemba and the recorder was captured after Enugu fell. On Saturday, May 6, 1967, at 5.15 pm, a meeting began to take place, at the State House, Enugu, between the then Excellency, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu (theIkemba) and a delegation of the National Conciliation Committee (Committee) led by the most Honorable Chief Obafemi Awolowo. The Committee was represented by Professor Samuel Aluko, Chief Mariere, Chief J.I. Onyia, while the Eastern Region was represented by Lt. Col Imo, Lt. Col Effiong, Lt. Col. Kurubo, Mr. C.O Mojekwu, Mr. N.U. Akpan, Professor Eni Njoku, Dr. Nwakanma Okoro, Dr. P.N.C. Okigbo, Mr. C.A. Onyegbale and Mr. Ndem with the Ikemba presiding over the meeting. 6

 Awo: The main concern of these delegates is to ensure that Nigeria does not disintegrate, and I would like to see Nigeria bound together by any bond because it is better than breaking the whole place up because each unit will be the loser for it. The economy of the country is so integrated that it is too late in the day to try and sever them without risking the death of one or both of them. So we have come, therefore, to appeal to you to let Eastern representatives attend the meeting of the Committee (ON-GOING NATIONAL CONCILIATION MEETING) . I do not want to put myself in a position where I will be treated as an advocate of the Eastern cause. Let the Eastern delegates go there, make their case and then as a member of the Committee I will get up and say I support this entirely. If at the meeting the East and West present what they want for a new Nigeria whether temporarily or permanently, and the North says "no, we are not going to have it", I will go out and address a World Press Conference and send our case to that body and say this is what we have done and the North has turned it down. I will then take any step that is necessary to bring into effect what we want. The North needed to be in a position of being presented with the United front of the South. ..... The issue at hand is not enough for us to say that we do not like the North. That is a negative approach. I think a positive approach will be for us to meet. Unity will last only if it is based on common understanding among us and the basis will start at this meeting. As I said before, I want you to give me a chance of meeting your people regularly. Let us resolve our differences and get what we want and quickly too. ...... Awo: You have talked about Easterners and Northerners trying to go to the same meeting and bringing about reconciliation because they are the two warring parties. I do not think the fight is between the East and the North alone. It affects all other parts of the country save that there is no quarrel between the East and the West and Mid-West. The fight involves all of us. The West at this moment, has its own complaints against the North. The fact that we went there particularly so soon after my withdrawal from the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee, which I observed was set up by the Federal Government to wage war against the East instead of trying to put things in check, must assure you that we are resolved to find a solution to this. Aluko comments by quoting Saro-Wiwa's On A Darkling Plain, Wiwa, being an actor in the events of the time: 7

... Page 78 of Saro-Wiwa: "It cannot be believed that the [AWOLOWO'S ENUGU] delegation was expected to achieve much. They probably obtained certain promiese from Ojukwu, for they returned to Lagos with proposals which were said to have been agreed by Ojukwu. The Federal Government was to lift the economic blockade placed on the Eastern Region in some respects, a gesture which Ojukwu would reciprocate by abrogating some of the laws he had passed confiscating certain properties and assets of the Federal Government. Gowon, acting in good faith, immediately accepted the proposals and began to implement them. But Ojukwu had no intention of accepting any proposals whatsoever, except that which was by now uppermost in his mind: secession. Source : MADIEBO PART 5: The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War posted in in Aluko Archives. Sat May 26, 2001 4:20. Link : http://groups.yahoo.com/group/AlukoArchives/message/23 D. Omoigui summation "A few days later on May 20, Gowon accepted the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Committee. Although Ojukwu said he did not recognize the group as constituted, members passed along his demands to the federal government. After consultations, therefore, Gowon announced on May 25, that the SMC had agreed to withdraw non-Yoruba troops from Abeokuta and Ibadan and establish a crash training program to increase the Yoruba representation in the Army. This had always been a key demand of Ojukwu but was also later echoed by Yoruba leaders. To ease the process and avoid apprehension among the mostly northern soldiery, Lt. Col Hassan Katsina (Northern governor), Lt. Col Joe Akahan (Chief of Staff, Army) along with the Battalion Commander, Major Sotomi addressed the troops at Ibadan. The plan was that they would mostly have departed Ibadan and Abeokuta by May 31, some to Apapa and Ikeja in the Lagos area, while others were to be transferred to the Jebba and Ilorin garrisons by train. The SMC, citing the status of the city as the federal capital, had rejected the suggestion that northern soldiers be removed from Lagos as well. However, events quickly spiraled out of control and none of this came to pass." Source: "May 30, 1967 " at the Igbo culture site Kwenu.com. 8

 5. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe at a crucial meeting on secession, perhaps the fateful Consultative Council in Enugu of May 26, 1967 where some describe the creation of Biafra as being decisively agreed upon by delegates. Furthermore, Dr. Azikiwe had a long standing-enmity with Ojukwu which had not healed and, as a long time champion of One Nigeria, he refused to associate himself with the initial declaration of independence, speaking against it in the Consultative Council in Enugu and being shouted down by the younger elements for his pains. Source : Martin Dent , Nigeria: The Task of Conflict Resolution, The World Today, Vol. 24, No. 7 (Jul., 1968), pp. 269-280. Obi N. Ebbe in Broken Back Axle: Unspeakable Events In Biafra Xlibris (November 17, 2010) chapter four, page 30, accessible free on Google books, confirms this account of Azikiwes experience at the council. 6. Dissent from Igbo intellectuals and members of minority groups Criticism, though necessarily muted has come from certain intellectuals who continue to define themselves as Nigerians and see Ojukwu as a mere Machiavellian working to establish an isolated pocket of power and control without any real vision. Their argument is that such a new State would be essentially no different than the previous Nigeria. Contrary to the idea of the first coup, they argue Ojukwu has enacted no real plan for a thorough transformation of the society and that all present appearances suggest that the new State will again exist primarily for the satisfaction of the political leadership, the Civil Service and academic classes. In general this group sides with the minorities and only sees a situation of real development coming out of association with the rest of the Federation. However because of the present mode of government much of this criticism has had to remain underground. .... What is probably most clear, in all of this, if Biafra does survive the present military fighting is that it will be an unhappy place. The Ibo leadership will never be able to quell the suspicions of the minority groups. The Calibar, Ogoja, and Rivers peoples will continue to feel they are no more than a tool of Ibo survival, and that Biafra is at the expense of greater possibilities for self-development within a State-Federal framework. At the same time Enugu will have to spend most of its energies suppressing rebellious internal interests and being prepared to defeat new

external threats. Under these conditions the police state character of the present society will continue for a longtime. Source : Stephen Vincent, Should Biafra Survive? Transition, No. 32 (Aug. - Sep., 1967), pp. 53-57. 56 and 57. Also posted at Rethinking Biafra blog Facebook Toyin Adepoju page Facebook Compcros page Scribd (PDF) Academia. edu (PDF)

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