Issue 1 March 2013

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
About LSE SU Think Tank Presidents Note Editors Note ECONOMICS AND FINANCE Myanmars New Foreign Investment Law May Derail the Countrys Stated Developmental Goals -Marie Plishka Islamic Finance: Alternative Banking and Potential Solution to Global Financial Crisis Azril Ikram Rating Agencies: The untouchables of the 21st Century Alessandro Panerai WELFARE POLICY Rethinking the Social Welfare System Designed for Migrant Workers in China --Yang Shen HEALTHCARE The Narrative Paradoxes in Indias HIV/AIDS Policy--Sudheesh Ramapurath Chemmencheri DEVELOPMENT Afghanistan, Aid and Counter Narcotic Policy--Becca Cockayne CONFLICT RESOLUTION Will Turks and Kurds Finally Make a Deal on the Kurdish Question? --Sinem Hun NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION Nationalist Revolts in Europe: The Quest for Catalan Independence--Elena Magri GLOBAL DEMOCRACY Converging Election Campaign Practices: How do Americanisation and Modernization help us better Understand this Process?--Siddharth Bannerjee Class Conflict in the Modern Chinese Politics: The Rise of Labour Movement as a Sign of Democracy?- Ruo Wang Sovereignty in Question: Setting the Limits --K. Ipek Miscioglu EU INSITUTIONS The Subsidiarity Principle: Finding a Space for National Parliaments within the EU DecisionMaking processes--Lim Tse Wei

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Issue 1 March 2013 About LSE SU Think Tank LSE SU Think Tank was founded in November 2011 by intellectually curious and like-minded students that would like to engage in lively, informal and often heated discussions on ideas and challenges of the globalized 21st century world. The scope and range of the discussion topics is deliberately vague and broad to attract participants from cross-disciplinary backgrounds CATALYST EDITING TEAM

Elena Magri

Vikram Mathur

Dan Calder

Ruo Wang

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Presidents Note
Dear readers, LSE SU Think Tank has achieved a lot since the inception of the society in late 2011. As one of the founders, I can proudly say that in just one academic year we have evolved from a small society with just a handful of enthusiastic members to a society with over 150 registered members. The founding vision and principle of the society has remained intact, and in the process, we have created a great society that attracts, connects and excites like-minded students capitalizing the diversity in nationalities and disciplines that we have on campus. This journal is yet another major step forward for us as an organisation. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to everyone involved in the making of this journal especially to the committee members that have worked tirelessly to complete the journal to the standard that we aspire. I would also like to thank all the writers that have submitted their articles, even those that were not accepted by the editorial board to be in the journal. We were really impressed by the level of complexity and sophistication of articles submitted. We highly encourage you to try again in the next issue. Moving forward, I hope that committee members for the year 2013/2014 will continue to improve Catalyst further. I believe we have the capabilities to be the primary platform for students to express their policy recommendation ideas on campus. For readers, I hope that you will find this collection of articles both informative and relevant, and that it will lead you to debate about the issues discussed. Thank you for taking your time to read the collection of articles in this journal that we have prepared for you.

Sincerely, Azril Amiruddin President of LSE SU Think Tank

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Editors Note
It started, as do most endeavours, with a thought. The relatively new LSE SU Think Tank Society was in the midst of hosting speaker-led discussions and simulations when it stumbled upon a new project; a journal. This journal was intended to serve as a forum for students to voice their own policy analyses and recommendations. I enthusiastically jumped on board knowing that this new project of ours was going to be challenging and hopefully, rewarding. There was no prior groundwork or layout for the journal, and so I must thank all of the writers who contributed their work for inspiring the shape and direction that this journal would eventually take. I must also thank the committee members of the LSE SU Think Tank Society for tirelessly helping me to cultivate this new idea and channel this inspiration into a concrete forum. I came to the LSE believing that politics is personal. What is more personal than the thoughts and ideas that we develop, nurture and struggle with? I remember the anxiety that I felt when I first met with my dissertation supervisor. I had so many ideas, and a fear that I had nothing new to contribute to the existing global politics dialogue. In time I realized that there is no need to feel insecure about ones thoughts. I realized that this is the place where new ideas are created, where important dialogues and debates flourish. I commend our authors for leaping into this project, and for expressing their thoughts with clarity, depth and passion. The articles in this first volume come from a wide array of disciplines and contribute to the questioning of established norms. Against the backdrop of that ever-present concept of globalization arises an awareness that the world is changing, and that the ways that we conceptualize the problems we face must evolve as well. While some of our authors push for possible alternatives to traditional banking systems and instruments, there also appears to be a realization that development policies must address social issues as well. Analyses of the welfare policy in China, HIV/AIDs in India, the counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan, the endurance of conflicts and the quest for self-determination feature in this volume. Im only here for a year, but I hope that what we have initiated will continue to grow and thrive as new challenges, and new ways of thinking about older challenges emerge. I thank you for reading these policy recommendations, and I hope that you too will be inspired to think different.

Natasha Basu LSE SU Think Tank Editor in Chief 2012-2013

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Economics and Finance

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Myanmars New Foreign Investment Law May Derail the Countrys Stated Developmental Goals p.7-11
Marie Plishka

Myanmar government officials have stated on several occasions that their top economic priorities for the country are jobs and inclusive and sustainable growth. Thus, it is surprising to see that after almost a year of debate, the new Foreign Investment Law that was signed by President Thein Sein in November 2012 could actually make it even harder for the country to achieve its stated developmental goals. This paper puts forward a set of policy recommendations that will not only allow the country to continue to reap the benefits of its natural resource endowments, but will also provide more funds to meet Myanmars social development goals. An examination of the issues concerning the Foreign Investment Law will be followed by an analysis of the possible effects that the law will have on inclusive economic growth in Myanmar. Finally, a set of policy recommendations will be presented that could not only satisfy foreign investors but also promise a better future for Myanmars citizens.
New Foreign Investment Law Myanmar started a process of political and economic reform in 2011: free and open elections were held, media censorship was relaxed, political prisoners were set free, and the country signalled that it was ready to open its borders to international trade and commerce1. A country of nearly 55 million people, it is the poorest country in Southeast Asia with a GDP per capita estimated at just $1,400 in 20122. President Thein Sein stated that the economy was his central focus in all of these reform efforts, promising to deliver monumental growth by triplicating per capita GDP in just 4 years.3 Aung San Suu Kyi called for more jobs for the restless youth population, and the President of the Mandalay Region Chamber of Commerce and Industry stated that the country was resource-rich, but what they needed was skills and technology4.

1 2

Thuzar, Moe (2012) Myanmar: No Turning Back. Southeast Asian Affairs. 203-219

Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook: Burma. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/index.html (accessed 23 February 2013.)
3The

Economist, 2012, July 23. Investing in Myanmar: Triplicating http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/07/investing-myanmar. (Accessed 23 February 2013.)
4 The

Success.

Guardian, 2012, 1 June. Aung San Suu Kyi: treat Burma reforms with healthy skepticism: Burmese opposition leader calls for caution from international community on her first overseas visit for decades. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/01/aung-san-suu-kyi-burma (accessed 23 February 2013.)

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Then, after nearly a year under debate and after going through several revisions, President Thein Sein signed into law a more business friendly version of the Foreign Investment Law 5 . The law is a revision of the first investment law from 1988, which was considered to be highly protectionist. The new law is reported to be investor -friendly because it allows for a higher percentage of foreign ownership of ventures, extended land leases, exemptions on corporate income taxes for five years, and a guarantee against nationalization during the contract period. It also includes new labour requirements, which necessitate foreign firms to hire an increasing percentage of Myanmar nationals as the firms years in operation accumulate6. The danger with the new Foreign Investment Law is the concessions made to foreign companies that wish to operate in the extractive industries. Myanmar is a resourcerich country. Research firm IHS Global Insight stated that the country is among the worlds top five oil and gas production hot spots7. A large percentage of the foreign capital that will enter the county will go to extractive industries. This could be a blessing or a curse, depending on how the Myanmar government maintains control of the situation 8

Economic Growth, not Development Economic development is a broader concept of overall wellbeing. To quote from Pike et al.: One of the biggest myths is that in order to foster economic development, a community must accept growth. The truth is that growth must be distinguished from development: growth means to get bigger, development means to get better an increase in quality and diversity9 The Myanmar government should be focused on achieving economic development to raise the living standards of the country and to provide the citizens the opportunities to realize their full potential. Several statements by political leaders indicate that they are hopeful that the reforms will bring about economic development. However, the countrys investment policies should be examined more closely to see if development, and not just growth, would result from the reforms.

ERIA (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia), 2012, September 28. Myanmar Accepts Development Through Foreign Direct Investment. http://www.eria.org/press_releases/FY2012/10/myanmar-expects-developmentthrough-foreign-direct-investment.html. (Accessed 23 February 2013.)
5 6Anukoonwattaka,

W., & Mikic, M., (2012) Myanmar: Opening Up to its Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Potential. Trade and Investment Division, Staff Democratic Voice of Burma, 2012, November 20. Investment, discretion and Burmas future economic development.http://www.dvb.no/analysis/investment-discretion-and-burmas-future-economic-development/24904. (Accessed 23 February 2013.)
7 8

Bissinger, Jared (2012) Foreign Investment in Myanmar: A Resource Boom but a Development Bust? Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs. 34 (1) 23-52 9 Pike, Andy, Andres Rodriguez-Pose, and John Tomaney. "What Kind of Local and Regional Development and forWhom?."RegionalStudies.41.9.2007): 1254<http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/consultation/terco/pdf/6_university/7_curds_newcastle.pdf>.

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Impacts of FDI After the US and other western countries imposed sanctions on Myanmar in the early eighties many multi-national companies involved in textiles and apparel were forced to leave the country. Western investors were replaced with Asian ones, and Myanmar received increasingly more foreign investment into its oil and gas sector10. It is here that one should analyse the impact that FDI has on different sectors of the economy. To quickly summarize the research of Alfaro (2003)11, one can expect that FDI into extractive industries will have a negative effect on economic growth and that FDI into manufacturing will have a positive effect on growth. The effect of FDI on economic growth comes from the nature of the industry that is receiving the investment and the contextual factors such as human capital, maturity of the financial system and institutional quality12. As Hirschman put it, The grudge against what has become known as the enclave type of development is due to this ability of primary products from mines, wells, and plantations to slip out of a country without leaving much of a trace in the rest of the economy13. Firms working in the extractive industry create less backwards and forward linkages, do not create a huge number of new jobs, and do not create positive externalities such as knowledge spill overs that can be absorbed by local firms14. Countries can take either one of two paths once natural resources become the dominant industry: they can either harness the enormous amount of money this industry produces and invest that money into the social and economic development of the county, or the country can disintegrate into corruption and rising income inequality. The passage of the new business friendly Foreign Investment Law seems to indicate that Myanmar failed to see that they are really the ones in control. Incentives alone will not bring foreign investors into Myanmar. Indeed, it is just one piece of the picture and the government must also strive to lower corruption, decrease bureaucratic red tape in operating a business, and provide a skilled work force15. Furthermore, being an oil and gas hotspot, foreign investors will come regardless of incentives. By offering incentives to foreign extraction firms, Myanmar forgoes a substantial amount of income from these business activities. Indeed, Myanmar would be able to self-finance a larger portion of their developmental plans and they would be less likely to borrow from the Asia Development Bank and the World Bank, both of whom they recently accepted loans for social development16.

10

Anukoonwattaka, W., & Mikic, M., (2012) Myanmar: Opening Up to its Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Potential. Trade and Investment Division, Staff
11 12

Alfaro, L. (2003) Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: Does the Sector Matter? Allston, MA, Harvard Business School Alfaro, L. (2003) Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: Does the Sector Matter? Allston, MA, Harvard Business School 13 Hirschman, A. (1958) the Strategy of Economic Development. Yale University Press (p.110)
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Alfaro, L. (2003) Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: Does the Sector Matter? Allston, MA, Harvard Business School Moran, T.H., Graham, E.M., Blomstrom, M. (Eds). (2005) Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
16

BBC News, 2013, January 28. Burma gets Asian Development http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21226344 (accessed 23 February 2013.)

Bank

and

World

Bank

Loans.

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A struggle has already developed amongst the elites in Myanmar as to whether the country should grow rapidly and perhaps unevenly, with the help of the private sector and FDI, or if it should pursue a more inclusive, diversified and sustainable development path 17. The passage of the new Foreign Investment Law would seem to suggest that the decision has been made to pursue the former. Recognizing that FDI will be flooding Myanmar, political figures such as Aung Suu have asked the investors to be thoughtful in their investments and to work to benefit the people of Myanmar18. Unfortunately, this request will most likely go unheeded. Myanmar must create a diversified economy with inclusive and sustainable growth as their first priority. Focusing on quick economic growth through FDI in extractive industries will only lead to the deindustrialization of other industries (the feared Dutch disease) and will further widen the gap between the rich and the poor in Myanmar. Inclusive growth can only be achieved if the right incentives, or disincentives, are written into law. Therefore, the policy recommendation for Myanmar would be to erase the incentives for FDI into the extractive sector. Foreign investors are eager to enter the country and exploit this sector, and will likely be undeterred by a less generous tax holiday. The money the government receives from taxes in the extractive sector could then be invested in the social and economic development of the country. A country with more domestically mobilized resources means that they would be less dependent on foreign loans and assistance to accomplish their development goals. Marie Plishka MSc Development Management, 2013 M.Plishka@lse.ac.uk

17

The Economist, 2012, July 23. Investing in Myanmar: Triplicating Success. http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/07/investing-myanmar. (Accessed 23 February 2013.)
18

The Guardian, 2012, 1 June. Aung San Suu Kyi: treat Burma reforms with healthy skepticism: Burmese opposition leader calls for caution from international community on her first overseas visit for decades. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/01/aung-san-suu-kyi-burma (accessed 23 February 2013.)

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References Thuzar, Moe (2012) Myanmar: No Turning Back. Southeast Asian Affairs. 203-219. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook: Burma. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html (accessed 23 February 2013.) The Economist, 2012, July 23. Investing in Myanmar: Triplicating Success. http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/07/investing-myanmar. (Accessed 23 February 2013.) The Guardian, 2012, 1 June. Aung San Suu Kyi: treat Burma reforms with healthy skepticism: Burmese opposition leader calls for caution from international community on her first overseas visit for decades. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/01/aung-san-suu-kyi-burma (accessed 23 February 2013.) ERIA (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia), 2012, September 28. Myanmar Accepts Development Through Foreign Direct Investment. http://www.eria.org/press_releases/FY2012/10/myanmar-expects-developmentthrough-foreign-direct-investment.html. (Accessed 23 February 2013.) Democratic Voice of Burma, 2012, November 20. Investment, discretion and Burmas future economic development. http://www.dvb.no/analysis/investment discretion-and-burmas-future-economic-development/24904. (Accessed 23 February 2013.) Anukoonwattaka, W., & Mikic, M., (2012) Myanmar: Opening Up to its Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Potential. Trade and Investment Division, Staff Alfaro, L. (2003) Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: Does the Sector Matter? Allston, MA, Harvard Business School. Hirschman, A. (1958) the Strategy of Economic Development. Yale University Press Moran, T.H., Graham, E.M., Blomstrom, M. (Eds). (2005) Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. BBC News, 2013, January 28. Burma gets Asian Development Bank and World Bank Loans. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21226344 (accessed 23 February 2013.) Working Paper 01/12. Bangkok, Trade and Investment Division, United Nations Economics and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Bissinger, Jared (2012) Foreign Investment in Myanmar: A Resource Boom but a Development Bust? Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs. 34 (1) 23-52.
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Democratic Voice of Burma, 2013, January 17. Burma Launches Major Oil Tender. http://www.dvb.no/news/burma-launches-major-oil-tender/25823 (accessed 23 February 2013.) Pike, Andy, Andres Rodriguez-Pose, and John Tomaney. "What Kind of Local and Regional Development and for Whom?." Regional Studies. 41.9. (2007): 1253-1269. <http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/consultation/terco/pdf/6_university/7 _curds_newcastle.pdf>.

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Islamic Finance: Alternative banking and potential solution to global financial crisis? p. 13-18
Azril Amiruddin

The current global financial crisis was the effect of the western dominated banking systema system that relies on high risk instruments such as subprime lending, over leveraging, incorrect pricing of risk, shadow banking system, and predatory lending. In the aftermath of the crisis, there have been debates on the need for alternative forms of banking that are safe and ethical. Islamic banking has the potential to be a complementary entity in the global financial ecosystem.
Although the industry has been around for almost 50 years, Islamic finance remains largely misunderstood in the western world and by many, significantly underestimated. When it was initially introduced, sceptics labelled the industry as spurious and argued that it is simply an attempt to rebrand conventional banking products in a deceptive way In a nutshell, Islamic finance is a system of banking that complies with Islamic law known as Sharia law. The fundamental principles that govern Islamic banking are: collective risk and profit sharing between the stakeholders, the assurance of fairness for all parties, and transactions that are based on underlying business activity or real assets. Since the opening of the first modern commercial Islamic bank, Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB) in 1975, Islamic finance has developed from a niche service serving only Sharia-compliant Muslim clients to mass market investing and does business in a mature, sophisticated and fast growing industry with an estimated one trillion dollars in total assets. According to Ernst & Youngs World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2013, the global market share for Islamic finance by the end of 2011 was worth around $1.3 trillion (800bn; 1tn), suggesting an average annual growth of 19% over the past four years (24% in 2011). In other words, it is the fastest growing segment of the modern financial market.

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Islamic banking asset growth (US$b)

Certainly market performance is a major factor behind this recent trend, but it is nave to underestimate the role of socially conscious consumers, businesses and leaders who are expecting more from the corporations (i.e. business that play a role in generating social good to the community) to this discussion. With approximately 1.62 billion Muslims in the world a ready-made or captive customer base for Islamic finance arguable already exists1. At the same time, Islamic Banking presents a clear scope for a broader appeal to non-Muslims who are seeking an alternative form of ethical, transparent and responsible banking practices. This trend supports a projected rise in values-based investing among investors, and since the Muslim population is expected to grow at twice the rate of the non-Muslim population over the next two decades2 to approximately 2.2 billion people, we can expect the growth in Islamic finance will continue to expand further in the future.

The rapid growth of Sukuk One of the major products in Islamic Finance is Sukuk. Sukuk is a financial certificate, similar to a bond in conventional finance but it complies with Sharia law. Global sukuk represents a dynamic part of the Islamic financial system that continues to grow at a remarkable pace.
1

PewResearchCenter, (2012), The Worlds Muslim: Unity and Diversity (http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_Affiliation/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-fullreport.pdf) 2 PewResearchCenter, (2011). The future of the global Muslim population, Forum on Religion and Public Life, US

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After the largest quarterly issuance of sukuk shown in the graph below in 1Q 2012, the global sukuk market has continued its rapid growth trend on both primary and secondary market fronts.

Sukuk Outstanding Trend (US$m)

The growth of sukuk issuances in 2012 can be attributed to a number of reasons, including the declining yield to maturity (YTM) for both corporate and sovereign bond issuances in conventional financial markets, the rarity of high quality yielding fixed income instruments, and the flight of fixed income safety due to broad macroeconomic concerns emerging from US fiscal cliff and European sovereign-debt crisis. The primary sukuk market has been driven by the increasing number of funds raised by corporations, states and central banks around the world to capitalize the excess liquidity and provide for safe short to medium-term investment. Some prominent Western financial institutions that are facing tough conditions in the funding market on which they have long relied, are also turning to sukuk as alternative funding for investment. HSBCs Middle East unit became the first Western bank to issue a sukuk in May 2011 with a $500 million five year sukuk. In addition, the French bank Credit Agricole has said it is contemplating issuing an Islamic bond or creating a wider sukuk program that could lead to several issuances in the future. Moreover, France and South Korea have introduced news laws for issuing sukuk. New Islamic banks have recently opened in US, China, India, Germany and the UK. Citigroup, Standard Chartered and BNP Paribas have all taken steps to seize the growth opportunity in Islamic finance. Other than sukuk, there is also significant demand for other Islamic financial services such as insurance (takaful), joint venture (musharakah), lease (ijarah), safekeeping (wadiah) and wealth management services (amanah). Financial news agencies such as Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg have built deep transaction systems and complex financial data for customers to navigate in real time the emerging Islamic financial landscape. However, Islamic finance remains small compared to conventional finance with its hundreds of trillions dollars of market capitalization. The market in sukuk is believed to total about

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$200 billion in September 2012, roughly 1% of global bond issuance3. It is still a relatively young industry compared to the 600 years existence of the conventional banking.

Challenges moving forward The lack of consensus among Sharia scholars who sit on the board of the standard setting authorities is hampering the growth of the industry. The Islamic Financial Service Board (IFSB) based in Kuala Lumpur and Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), based in Bahrain are the two prominent global standard setting authorities that establish the guiding principles upon which the industry is operating. Both belong to diverging schools of thought, and this becomes problematic for standardization. In order for the product development and innovation process to be more efficient and effective standardization is crucially needed. Without standardization the industry is left exposed to Sharia arbitrage as banks, firms and consumers pick and choose for the standard or fatwa that suits their personal objectives. A lack of standardization is not the only hurdle the sector is facing. There are questions regarding the integrity of the products for an industry that is supposedly built on ethics. The past several years have exposed various weaknesses in Islamic finance. The Dubai debt crisis of 2009 showed that there is a problem with the sukuk market. Nakheel, a property developer raised funds through sukuk issuance was forced to restructure the companys debt worth $3.5 billion when they found themselves unable to repay their debt holders from the onset of the financial crisis4. Moreover, the supply of trained and experience bankers have lagged behind the increasing demand for Islamic banking expertise. This has resulted in many Sharia scholars sitting on multiple boards of approving bodies and financial institutions, thus creating a potential conflict of interest. A major misconception would be to consider this faith-founded method of banking to be idiosyncratic or out of date. Islamic banking is as sophisticated as any form of financing available today with tremendous potential for innovation and evolution of its services.

Potential solution to global financial crisis Intriguingly, Islamic banks, with their unique business models, emerged from the global financial crisis with their statement of financial position comparatively unharmed. Sharia law strictly prohibits businesses from profiting based on interest taking, usury, gambling, prostitution and speculative trading; all of which are contrary to the principles of Islamic practice. The law also propagates a certain level of protection of tangible assets from the general meltdown.
3

HSBC Amanah, (2012), Global sukuk market: The current status and growth potential

Hassan and Kholid (2011), Bankruptcy Resolution and Investor Protection in Sukuk Markets,

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Proponents of Islamic banking and the finance industry have already predicted that the industry may have a remedy and that this fast-growing industry can come forward to solve the current financial crisis affecting the world5. Although the size of the industry is still relatively small, there exists an unprecedented opportunity for the financial world to seek solutions in managing and solving financial crisis. The problem of limited expertise can be solved by establishing more academic programmes in institutions to qualify bankers interested in specializing in Islamic banking. For instance, many universities throughout the UK and elsewhere in Europe such as Aston Business School and Bangor Business School have started MBA programme for students interested in the area. On the other hand, Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) and International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) has introduced chartered professional qualification equivalent to master programme for working professionals that would like to work in the Islamic finance industry. Azril Amiruddin BSC Accounting and Finance a.i.amiruddin@lse.ac.uk

References PewResearchCenter, (2012), The Worlds Muslim: Unity and Diversity (http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_Affiliation/Muslim/theworlds-muslims-full-report.pdf) PewResearchCenter, (2011). The future of the global Muslim population, Forum on Religion and Public Life, US HSBC Amanah, (2012), Global sukuk market: The current status and growth potential Hassan and Kholid (2011), Bankruptcy Resolution and Investor Protection in Sukuk Markets, QFinance (http://www.qfinance.com/contentFiles/QF01/h0im2u72/12/0/bankruptcyresolution-and-investor-protection-in-sukuk-markets.pdf) RoulaKhalaf and Gillian Tett (2007) Backwater sector moves into global mainstream
5

Ernst

and

Young,

(2012),World

Islamic

Banking

Competitiveness

Report

2013,

(http://www.mifc.com/index.php?ch=151&pg=735&ac=818&bb=file)

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Dr Abul Hassan (2009) the global financial crisis and Islamic Banking. The Islamic Foundation, UK Sonam Garg, (2012)Sukuk and its growth across major Islamic financial markets Ernst and Young, (2012),World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2013, (http://www.mifc.com/index.php?ch=151&pg=735&ac=818&bb=file)

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Rating Agencies: The untouchables of the 21st Century p. 19-24

Alessandro Panerai

Discussing rating agencies can be a tricky challenge. This category of complex actors, certainly one of the most influential in the contemporary economic panorama, tends to lurk in the shadows for months, only appearing, ex abrupto, to publish their famous and controversial rating reports1. They have become notorious for their downgrades against southern European countries, which has caused more than a few problems for their governments, and recently for Standard & US Treasury Bonds. A downgrade can lead to burdensome public debt since the interest rate a government has to grant to its investors becomes higher, and governments experience greater difficulty obtaining credit and paying back loans. This leads to entrapment into one of the so-called "death spirals" that can steer governments to bankruptcy. For many countries like Italy, that continue to experience austerity, there is no guarantee that the spread between German bonds and Italian bonds will be resolved. Another downgrade for Italy would mean that the Italian people would be poorer, and the spread would remain unchanged. Rating agencies remain powerful and controversial actors. The aim of this article is to explore why.

First of all, what is a rating agency? A credit rating agency (CRA) is a company that assigns credit ratings for issuers of certain types of debt obligations as well as debt instruments themselves. The rating is expressed with specific parameters, i.e. the letter-system created by rating agencies for their judgments, ranging from the triple A, which indicates an almost complete absence of risk (and so that the debtor is solvent), to D, which indicates Default.

Sinclair, Timothy J., The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies and the Politics of Creditworthiness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005)

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You can find the complete map below: Moody's S&P Fitch Long-term Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term Short-term Aaa AAA AAA Prime Aa1 AA+ AA+ A-1+ F1+ Aa2 AA AA High grade P-1 Aa3 AAAAA1 A+ A+ A-1 F1 A2 A A Upper medium grade A3 AAP-2 A-2 F2 Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ Baa2 BBB BBB Lower medium grade P-3 A-3 F3 Baa3 BBBBBBBa1 BB+ BB+ Non-investment grade Ba2 BB BB speculative Ba3 BBBBB B B1 B+ B+ B2 B B Highly speculative B3 BBCaa1 Not prime CCC+ Substantial risks Caa2 CCC Extremely speculative Caa3 CCCC CCC C In default with little CC prospect for recovery Ca C C DDD D / / In default

In the rating market there are more or less thirty relevant players, and among these, nine companies are considered the most reliable and thus are often preferred to the others. These nine companies are the so-called NRSRO (Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization), and are recognized as more influential by the SEC, the US Securities and Exchange Commission. Among these nine, three are the most famous and powerful: Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch. The three together occupy 94% of market shares (Moody's and Standard & Poor's have 40% each, Fitch has 14%) and are usually cited by newspapers for their judgments3. Another important (and quite new) agency is the Chinese Dagong. Established in 1994, this agency has become famous for its downgrade of US Treasury Bonds, and for not having been recognized by the SEC, "because of the
3

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Credit Rating AgenciesNRSROs". ( U.S. SEC, 2008).

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commission's inability to supervise the Beijing-based agency"4. This by itself reveals the first problem in this industry: the three main agencies form a de facto oligopoly, an oligopoly curiously legitimized by a regulatory organism, the SEC, thanks to the already cited NRSRO rules. This oligopoly also happens to be situated in one of the most liberal countries in the world, and regulates the most liberalized sector: that of financial instruments. This paradox has caused a lot of criticism in the past. Many influential opinion leaders such as the ECB president Mario Draghi, have proposed a removal of the NRSRO rules, since these agencies' reports can be "catastrophically misleading" and have extremely negative impacts on the world economy5. Large corporate CRAs do not downgrade companies promptly enough. The list of their mistakes is sadly long. In November 2001, the continuous losses notwithstanding, Standard & Poor's gave Enron a BBB rating. The third of December of the same year the company went bankrupt. Even worse (because of the impact this decision had on every one of us): the 18th of July 2008 Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch gave Lehman Brothers an A, A2, A+ rating respectively. The following 15th of September the company went bankrupt. It was the beginning of the financial crisis. The CDOs on subprime mortgages themselves were rated AAA before the explosion of the crisis. Simple oversights? Innocent mistakes? Or is there something else? Companies which receive on average $300,000-$500,000 per rating should be a little more careful with their evaluations. Since the top three CRAs often use private information to assess their judgments, the bond between them and private companies is pretty opaque, and leaves space to undue influence or misjudge. One could also argue that since private firms pay high amounts of money to obtain a rating of a debt issuer, this might also give additional money to rating agencies to "buy" a higher rating. In some cases (such as that of the insurance company Hannover Re) the newspapers have openly talked about "blackmailing" tactics from CRAs, asking for more money and threating to downgrade if the company did not pay. Hanover Re is said to have lost $175 million because of this6. A downgrade can easily cause a countrys economy or a company to head towards a downward spiral culminating into bankruptcy when it cannot repay in full its debts when requested. Due to the fact that theoretically no one would gain from a countrys bankruptcy (first and foremost, its citizens), the question spontaneously arises as to why rating agencies should downgrade them? Is it just for "financial honesty" (a term which sounds absurd in itself)? Or is it because this can lead to substantial political submission of a country, a continuous dependence on foreign aid and, as I claim the creation of a "discount" whose products are national companies and their shares? At the very least, rating agencies could use more discretion when making forming their judgments.
4

Society for the advancement of Credit Rating, Dagong, the new Chinese bad guy or a fair player? ,,. Available at: http://www.another-rating.org/2012/03/dagong-new-bad-chinese-or-just.html 5 Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose: Only Mario Draghi's ECB can avert global calamity before the year is out. A vailable at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/9436348/Only-Mario-DraghisECB-can-avert-global-calamity-before-the-year-is-out.html 6 Grigolon. Gloria. "Quando il giudice viene giudicato". Available at: http://www.echeion.it/economia/quandoil-giudice-viene-giudicato/

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The complexities of the rating agencies and their relationship to companies and countries become more fascinating when considering who owns and controls the main CRAs: Moodys, founded in 1909, is present in 26 countries, has more or less 4500 employees, and is based in New York7. Its owners are: Berkshire Hathaway Inc., the investment fund owned by the Omaha oracle Warren Buffet, with the 12, 47% of shares. Capital World Investors: 12,38% Price (T.Rowe) Associates Inc. : 5,95% BlackRock Fund Advisors : 3,68% State Street Global Advisors : 3, 24%

Standard & Poors, created in 1860, is based in New York as well, employs 10000 people and has offices in 23 countries8 .It is 100% owned by McGraw-Hill, a famous American company whose main areas of business are publishing, education and financial services. Who owns McGraw-Hill?9 Capital World Investors: 12,31% State Street Corporation: 4,34% Vanguard Group Inc.: 4,17% Black Rock Fund Advisors: 4,17% Oppenheimer Funds Inc.: 4,04%

All of the actors outlined above in the ownership structures are investment, pension or hedge funds companies Again, the question spontaneously arises: how fair is it that these funds might theoretically (or certainly.) know in advance the behaviour of a certain debt instruments, due to the fact that they own companies that can influence the interest rates (and consequently prices) of these instruments? It is s pretty easy for Mr. Buffet to be an oracle if he can directly influence the plausibility of his predictions. If we continue exploring further the ownership structures of the funds themselves we discover that: the main shareholders of State Street Corporation (present in both the rating agencies analysed above) are: Barclays Plc; Citigroup Inc.; Vanguard Group Inc., i.e. some of the major investment banks and another fund. The same is the case with BlackRock. Here we have: Bank of America Merrill Lynch; P.N.C Financial Services & co. etc. An example of the possible implications of this is the following: an investment bank, lets say Goldman Sachs, goes to Standard & Poors two months before it will publish its periodical report and says: Dear Standard & Poors, why dont we make the following deal: in your next report you will downgrade company x. In the meantime I create derivatives, ex. futures, on
7

White, Lawrence J. (Spring 2010). "The Credit Rating Agencies". Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association) 24 (2): 211226
8

Blumenthal, Richard (May 5, 2009). "Three Credit Rating Agencies Hold Too Much of the Power". Juneau Empire - Alaska's Capital City Online Newspaper. Retrieved August 7, 2011. 9 Standard & Poor's "S&P | About S&P | Americas - Key Statistics".. Retrieved August 7, 2011

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company xs shares, and I sell as many as I can to the market. Knowing that you will downgrade it, I will bet their price to go down and sell as many as I can at a certain price, so as to make profit on each of them. At the very end, I will give you the 10% of my earnings. What do you think?. Easy money, indeed. The situation with Fitch is just a little bit different. It is based in New York like the other two, but it is half French half American 10. Here are the two owners: Fimalac (France): 60% Hearst Corporation: 40%

Fimalacs president is Mr. Marc Ladreit de Lacharriere, one of the wealthiest people in France, ex-member of the board of LOreal, Air France and France Telecom, actual member of the boards of Renault and Casino, and consultant for the Bank of France. For those fans of conspiracy, he is also the President of the French section of the Bilderberg Group. To conclude, I hope I have demonstrated that the rating sector is full of shadows. Rating agencies, at minimum, are a risk to be criticized for collusion. It is not clear how influential their owners are and what these companies are able to do at an unofficial level. Moreover, the US Federal Law currently blocks every amendment of the sectors structure. Here lies the sad truth: rating agencies are the untouchables of 21st century.

Alessandro Panerai MSc Global Politics 2013 paneraialessandro@hotmail.it

10

FIMALAC, Group, Fitch. "2011 Fiscal" (in English).. Retrieved 26 March 2012.

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References: Blumenthal, Richard (May 5, 2009). "Three Credit Rating Agencies Hold Too Much of the Power". Juneau Empire - Alaska's Capital City Online Newspaper. Retrieved August 7, 2011. Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose: Only Mario Draghi's ECB can avert global calamity before the year is out. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/9436348/OnlyMario-Draghis-ECB-can-avert-global-calamity-before-the-year-is-out.html FIMALAC, Group, Fitch. "2011 Fiscal" (in English).. Retrieved 26 March 2012. Grigolon. Gloria. "Quando il giudice viene giudicato". http://www.echeion.it/economia/quando-il-giudice-viene-giudicato/ Available at:

Panerai, Alessandro, Speciale agenzie di rating: che cosa sono. Available at: http://www.echeion.it/economia/speciale-agenzie-di-rating-che-cosa-sono/ Society for the advancement of Credit Rating, Dagong, the new Chinese bad guy or a fair player? ,,. Available at: http://www.another-rating.org/2012/03/dagong-new-bad-chineseor-just.html Sinclair, Timothy J., The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies and the Politics of Creditworthiness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). Standard & Poor's "S&P | About S&P | Americas - Key Statistics".. Retrieved August 7, 2011 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Credit Rating AgenciesNRSROs". ( U.S. SEC, 2008). White, Lawrence J. (Spring 2010). "The Credit Rating Agencies". Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association) 24 (2): 211226

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Welfare Policy

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Rethinking the Social Welfare System Designed for Migrant Workers in China
p.26-32

Yang Shen

China has experienced very strong economic growth in the last three decades, leading to rising prosperity and declining poverty. At the same time, this rapid economic growth has paralleled rising inequality, both socially and geographically. This, in turn, has led to high levels of internal migration as people move from the relatively low-income rural regions to the booming cities and industrial regions.
Statistics show that in 2009 more than 145.33 million migrant workers moved away from their homes in order to make a living in China1. The imbalance in development between the western and eastern parts of the country, as well as between the rural and urban areas, is one of the primary reasons rural residents become migrant workers. These rural migrants become the disadvantaged citizens in cities due to the housing system, the low wages, the unpleasant living conditions, the overtime work and the scarce social welfare. In order to explore the experiences of peasant migrant workers in the service sectors, I have done six months of fieldwork in Shanghai. Based on interviews with government officials, academic experts, employees and restaurant managers, I focus on documenting the implications of the attitudes of different stakeholders towards the changing social policy on the social benefits for migrant workers. In particular, this paper concentrates on reactions to this policy at the local governmental level, institutional level, and employee level. These stakeholders have different concerns on this policy based on their own particular standpoint. I argue that migrant workers cannot fully benefit from the policy without direct advocacy from the government to grassroots migrant groups, and without a more transferrable social welfare system across the nation as a whole. In the following sections, this paper first briefly introduces hukou system as well as the social welfare system for migrant workers; then it addresses how different stakeholders view this policy and how their attitudes are associated with their roles. In the last section, I provide recommendations for the Chinese government.

Hukou system and social welfare system for migrant workers The policy of tightening and relaxing the hukou system (household registration system) reflects the state control of labour in order to meet its own political and economic pursuits. As a consequence, it leads to the fluctuation of migration. Hukou system refers to the household registration system in China that categorizes citizens as either urban or rural, and it requires every Chinese citizen to be recorded with the registration authority at birth. The
1

NBS.

(2010).

Report

on

migrant

workers

in

2009

(in

Chinese).

(http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20100319_402628281.htm)

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Issue 1 March 2013

earliest hukou system was adopted in 19582. The parents hukou rather than the childs birthplace determines an individuals hukou. Pun argues that the system is designed to prevent unplanned urbanization and overcrowding3. Solinger claims that citizenship benefits such as health insurance, pensions and unemployment compensation were tied to one's hukou, which for a long time were exclusively associated with urban citizens 3. However, we must recognize the changing nature of policies and situate the discussion of the hukou system in different time periods. Hukou reform is one crucial aspect that reflects the ever-changing policies in China. More recent policy changes indicate the governments desire to create a more harmonious society while maintaining economic prosperity. According to the new Social Insurance Law published in October 2010 in China, the social benefits, once attached to ones hukou of a fixed area, can now be transferred from one place to another from July, 20114. In the case of Shanghai, migrants social insurances are now integrated in the insurance system in Shanghai. Non-Shanghai urban hukou holders can enjoy pensions, medical insurance, injury insurance, maternity insurance and unemployment insurance as well. After retirement, they can enjoy a Shanghai standard pension by paying a certain proportion of fees for 15 years in Shanghai. However, nonShanghai rural hukou holders are only entitled to the first three insurances that urban hukou holders enjoy5. The social benefits, which were divided into Shanghai and nonShanghai hukou, have now shifted into urban and non-urban hukou. Owing to the recognition of the need for migrant labour, and the calls for changing the system, the hukou system is less rigid than it was in the past but it is still a source of discrimination. Promisingly, according to the municipal government, non-Shanghai rural hukou holders will be entitled to five benefits within four years. The central government set up five years of buffering time for Shanghai, from July 2011 for several reasons. First, it is not possible to implement the policy all at once because by adding two more social benefits, the cost increases rapidly. For instance, in the restaurant I worked in, migrant workers are expected to pay 280 yuan (28 pounds) per month instead of the current 180 yuan (18 pounds) if they enjoy five benefits. To illustrate this, these extra social benefits for workers means that the restaurant chain owner who has 14 branches in Shanghai and employs more than 2000 employees has to spend an additional 1.6 million yuan (160,000 pounds) per month on labour, which is a huge expenditure especially against the backdrop of soaring commodity prices. Whilst profit would decline, the cost of food and labour would rise.
2 3

Li, B. (2004). Urban social exclusion in transitional China. CASEPaper, 82 Pun, N. (2007). Gendering the dormitory labor system: production, reproduction, and migrant labor in South China. Feminist Economics, 13(3-4), p. 256. doi:Doi 10.1080/1354570070143946
3

Solinger, D. J. (1999). Contesting citizenship in urban China: peasant migrants, the state, and the logic of the market. Berkeley: University of California Press.
4

National Peoples Congress. (2010). Social Insurance Law (http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2010-10/28/content_1602435.htm)

of

PRC

(in

Chinese).

Retrieved

from

Shanghai Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau. (2011). Policy Q&A on employees from outside for participation in social insurance in Shanghai (in Chinese).(http://www.12333sh.gov.cn/200912333/2009bmfw/zcjd/201106/t20110628_1131177.shtml)

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Other reasons have to do with the transferability of the social welfare system. Neither the hukou system nor the social welfare system have a nationwide synchronised network, which renders information sharing impossible, enhancing the difficulty in transferring social benefits. Furthermore, different areas have different social benefits packages. For example, it is compulsory to pay the fees for all the social benefits together in Shanghai, whereas in some provinces one can choose which benefits to pay for, which complicates the social welfare system as the different governments have to negotiate the linkage problem.

Perspectives from different stakeholders I have interviewed two government officials, both of whom make the point that the main reason for reforming the social benefits of migrant workers is to reduce the social differentiation. An official of Shanghai Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau reiterates that the purpose for transforming the policy is to ensure the wellbeing of migrant workers, to decrease the gap between urban and rural residents, and to achieve social equality. When I expressed to the officials my concern of some top-down policies that may not effectively reach the bottom, they pointed out that the government has made great efforts to provide information and free services to migrant workers via newspapers, television, and online resources. They argue that migrants should take the initiative to understand policies that closely related to them and make use of these services provided. At the employers level, the restaurant chain owner has been planning to apply some changes to this restaurant, including a) limiting the labour quota, cutting from 68 to 48 for table servers. Ironically, this is easily achieved. Due to the scarcity of labour, it has been impossible to recruit enough people for two years; and b) the restaurant recruits part time table servers more frequently than ever. By recruiting a large number of part time workers from rural areas, the restaurant does not need to pay social benefits for them, which lowers the wage bill. 95% of the restaurant workers are from rural China. At the employees level, for many of my colleagues, they have already registered for New Farmers Insurance in rural areas. The compulsory social benefits tied up with work in Shanghai seem repetitive and unnecessary to them. There are two typical perspectives of my informants. Some of them are unwilling to pay for the social benefits, although they are forced to do so. They care more about whether they can take out the money once they leave Shanghai than whether they can obtain three or five kinds of social benefits. One of the interviewees quit his job in 2011 when the government started to charge fees for the social benefits from both employees and employers on a monthly basis (but he re-joined the restaurant in 2012). For the others, they think that social benefits are good for their future but they are confused about how to transfer the benefits or how to withdraw the money once they quit their job and move away. Many of my informants have no idea about the transferability of the social benefits. Being poorly educated and working 60 hours a week, they simply do not have the ability and time to access to the information provided by the government.
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The social welfare system is not unified or synchronised nationwide. One of the greatest challenges is to build a nationwide welfare system so that the social benefits are more transferrable. According to the officials, the city was intending to create a more inclusive environment for migrant workers. However, the migrant workers I interviewed did not appreciate the government's efforts. How to allow migrant workers to benefit the most from this new policy, and how to make policies that meet their real needs are issues that need to be addressed by the government. I would offer the following advice. First, with regards to the accessibility of the policy to migrant workers, community mobilisation may be a good way. As far as I know, almost every district in Shanghai arranges the social workers dealing with migrant issues. Extending their responsibilities to organise lectures and workshops in migrants residential places may be an effective way to disseminate the relevant social policies. Apart from residential areas, social workers can target industries such as catering and factories that are concentrated with migrant workers. Second, a series of policies should work together to contribute to the wellbeing of migrant workers. For example, access affordable housing and education are two primary concerns of migrant workers. Establishing a more inclusive social welfare system alone cannot significantly improve the living conditions of migrant workers in urban areas. Situated in their particular context, different stakeholders the government, employers and employees - have different concerns. An outcome will be reached through negotiation and conflict. Yang Shen PhD candidate in Gender Studies shenyang0118@gmail.com References NBS. (2010). Report on migrant workers in 2009 (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20100319_402628281.htm) Li, B. (2004). Urban social exclusion in transitional China. CASEPaper, 82. Pun, N. (2007). Gendering the dormitory labor system: production, reproduction, and migrant labor in South China. Feminist Economics, 13(3-4), 239258. doi:Doi 10.1080/13545700701439465 Solinger, D. J. (1999). Contesting citizenship in urban China: peasant migrants, the state, and the logic of the market. Berkeley: University of California Press. National Peoples Congress. (2010). Social Insurance Law of PRC (in Chinese). Retrieved from (http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2010-10/28/content_1602435.htm) Shanghai Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau. (2011). Policy Q&A on employees from outside for participation in social insurance in Shanghai (in Chinese).(http://www.12333sh.gov.cn/200912333/2009bmfw/zcjd/201106/t20110628 _1131177.shtml)
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(in

Chinese).

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Healthcare

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The Narrative Paradoxes in Indias HIV/AIDS Policy p.31-36

Sudheesh Ramapurath Chemmencheri

India has the third largest number of HIV/AIDS infected people, after South Africa and Nigeria. There are 2.39 million carriers in India, of which 39% are women and 3.5% are children. Through the efforts of the National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) and a host of aid-dependent NGOs, the infected population has decreased by 56% 1. These partnerships have resulted in multiple streams of policy transfer coupled with the importation of a rich vocabulary of HIV/AIDS combat. This paper explores the narrative framings of Indias HIV/AIDS policy through the prism of policy transfer and highlights three paradoxes that the discourse poses before the policy-maker. I will conclude by recommending an acknowledgment of these paradoxes and exploration of compensatory measures.
Teaching and Learning: the Politics of Policy Diffusion The policy transfer literature has thoroughly tracked the various transfer processes operating today, especially the diffusion of policy in a global information society2. Such processes could either be voluntary, wherein one country draws lessons from the experiences of another, or coercive, wherein the policy transfer occurs as a result of necessity and under pressure. The high prevalence and need for specialised expertise in an issue like HIV/AIDS increases the chance of a country being coerced to adopt the donors perspective and policies. Such transfers are indirect, as Dolowtiz and Marsh point out, as against cases where there is a direct coercion to adopt policies. Also, the policy transfer process can either act like an independent variable that determines the kind of policies that are adopted, or in other words, the means determine the goals. Or it could act as a dependent variable that is chosen by a country according to its policy-objectives, i.e. the goals determine the means. A quick survey of Indias HIV/AIDS policy reveals that we find a mixture of both scenarios; the Millennium Development Goal 6, which calls for halting the spread of HIV infection by 2015 and providing universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment by 2010, has provided the basic framework for HIV/AIDS combat in India. At the same time, governmental and non-governmental organisations have adopted the vocabulary of the donor agencies. Along the same lines, Jensen3 points out that policy transfers can be characterised as either constructivism or social learning. While the former involves the domination of an external party providing the policy ideas, the second involves drawing lessons and inspiration from the external party. For instance, although the government of India has largely been
1

NACO. (2012). Annual Report 2011-2012. New Delhi: National Aids Control Organisation. (http://www.nacoonline.org/upload/Publication/Annual%20Report/NACO_AR_Eng%202011-12.pdf ) 2 Dolowitz, David and David Marsh. (1996). Who Learns from Whom: a Review of the Policy Transfer Literature. Political Studies XLIV, 343-357
3

Jensen, Jane. (2010). Diffusing Ideas for After Neoliberalism: The Social Investment Perspective in Europe and Latin America. Global Social Policy 10 (59), 59-84

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ambivalent towards the decriminalisation of homosexuality, its constituent, the Ministry of Health, has been a supporter of the demand for decriminalisation citing how criminalisation impedes access of the LGBT community to treatment. Although it is difficult to find causal connections, it is interesting to note that the World Bank, which provided around $180 million to Phase II of the Ministrys AIDS efforts, has advocated decriminalisation as part of its HIV/AIDS combat strategies4, and similar lessons have been proffered by the experience of South Africa. The former could be seen as an instance of constructivism whiles the latter as social learning. Clearly, instances of policy transfer involve carriers in many cases, such as international financial institutions, aid agencies and international NGOs that facilitate the process of policy transfer. For example, the Global Business Coalition, an association of major corporates, many of which have a significant presence in India, runs an HIV/AIDS mission wherein it allows the transfer of prevention lessons from communities in one country location to another5. Avahan, the Indian AIDS control chapter of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which has promised $338 million to the country, expressly seeks to disseminate lessons learnt from one work site to another6.

Narrative Framing and Paradoxes The most conspicuous example of information transfer is reflected in the narrative framing of the HIV/AIDS policy. Three such issues and the paradoxes that they open up are delineated here: Identity The identity of the countrys HIV/AIDS policy has been framed closely following the cognitive frames used by international organisations. Thus, HIV/AIDS Surveillance is a major responsibility identified for governments that involves producing accurate data on the classified groups of Men-Having-Sex-with-Men (MSM), Injecting Drug Users, Female Sex Workers and Bridge Population like single male migrants. This lexicon is visible in the work of the National AIDS Control Organisation and across the agencies like the World Bank, UNDP and UNAIDS (compare, for instance, NACO 2012, World Bank 2011, UNDP 2011, UNAIDS 2012). The surveillance strategy hints at the problems involved in monitoring the spread of HIV/AIDS, particularly among the high-risk-groups listed above whose activity is suspected to be largely underground. The second effort to give the countrys HIV/AIDS policy a defining character is seen in the efforts to mainstream the efforts. This effort was
4

World Bank. (2012). Charting a Programmatic Road-Map for Sexual Minority Groups in India. Report No. 55, South Asia Human Development Sector Discussion Paper Series. (http://ilga.org/ilga/static/uploads/files/2012/8/4/04232441.pdf ) 5 GBC Health. (2011). Who We Are and How We Work. (http://www.gbchealth.org/our-coalition/who-we-arehow-we-work/ )
6

Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. (2009). Avahan (http://www.gatesfoundation.org/avahan/Documents/Avahan_FactSheet.pdf )

Fact

Sheet.

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spearheaded by the UNAIDS owing to its associational character having 8 co-sponsors including the World Bank and UNDP. Noting that HIV/AIDS is not just a health issue, NACO adopted the integrated, inclusive and multi-sectorial approach 7. These processes of idea diffusion open up a paradoxical space where it becomes difficult to explicate whether the policy process has been voluntary or coercive and if coercive, whether direct or indirect. The NGOs and the state have largely adopted the strategy of making use of all available opportunities to procure funds and in the process adopted the donors cognitive frames of surveillance and mainstreaming. Crisis The HIV/AIDS epidemic is treated in most policy documents as a crisis or emergency. The thrust on making treatment available to the largest number of people without taking into account the auxiliary aspects of the infected persons lives has been persistent in the policies. Targeted intervention that centres on a set of identified target groups such as the MSM, intravenous/injected drug users and sex workers, and plans the entire policy based on targets is a defining feature of NACOs policy. Seckinelgin8 notes the problems associated with this vertical policy intervention, pointing out that such a strategy focuses on goalachievement and success, and ignores the actual impact on peoples lives in terms of developing their capabilities including income security. The paradox is exposed when the policy-maker is thrown into a dilemma of choosing between the dominant discourse of vertical intervention and capability approach. While the former brings an extensive stock of tools, methodologies and money to the states disposal, and insinuates a sense of ur gency in the implementation process, the latter could appear time-consuming, although more egalitarian. Identity-Crises The medicalised discourse of HIV/AIDS policy has constructed new workable identity categories that have subsumed a spectrum of vernacular sexual identities. The category of men having sex with men emerged as a generalised identity in the terminology of the Centres for Disease Control, that manages the U.S. Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and rolls out the five-year period funding of $150 million promised to the third phase of NACOs efforts. This categorisation has since become universal in HIV/AIDS prevention efforts. While the vernacular lexicon is replete with words such as hijra, kothi, panthi etc. to refer to the transgender, gay and men seeking male sex workers (the third mostly pejorative) respectively, these have been subsumed under the homogenizing term MSM. The NGOs working on HIV/AIDS, including those who have been at the forefront of demanding gay rights and decriminalisation of homosexuality such as the Humsafar Trust and Naz Foundation, have adopted this terminology. Reddys9 ethnographic work in the city
7

NACO. (2007). Mainstreaming and Partnerships. (http://www.nacoonline.org/NACO/Parterships/ )

Seckinelgin, Hakan. (2012). The Global Governance of Success in HIV/AIDS Policy: Emergency Action, Everyday Lives and Sens Capabilities. Health and Place 18, 453-460 9 Reddy, Gayatri. (2005). Geographies of Contagion: Hijras, Kothis and the Politics of Sexual Marginality in Hyderabad. Anthropology and Medicine 12 (3), 255 -270

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of Hyderabad brings out how power difference operates within the local moral economy of the sexual minorities; the sexual health clinics mostly operate for the gay men with consultations for transgenders once in a while. The transgender community, meanwhile, sees the gay men and men seeking male sex workers as the main perpetrators of the spread of HIV. Reddy draws attention to these pathologies of power and suggests that this could be one possible reason for the marginalisation of hijras within the MSM category and hence the ineffectiveness of the prevention programmes targeted at this community. The paradox before the policy-maker then is whether to go beyond the MSM categories and adopt the vernacular identities or retain the medicalised label of MSM understanding that it has helped circumvent the stigmas associated with transgenders and homosexuals in the mainstream community while rolling out prevention programmes.

Reframe the policy narrative from a constructivist perspective to a social learning perspective: the policy-makers should tap the rich experience already built in HIV/AIDS combat to revise the current policy by learning from its own and other countries lessons and move away from a donor-imposed language, especially with respect to the narrative frames used such as MSM, crisis etc. Translate the international policy discourse to the local context: this involves moving away from a surveillance strategy to a rights framework wherein the HIV/AIDS infected people are not approached as mere target population but as citizens with a right to health. This revision would help remove the stigma attached to the HIV positive people and bring more of them forward to access treatment, thereby boosting the success rate of HIV/AIDS combat. Move from vertical policy intervention towards the capability approach: The existing counselling centres should be strengthened, made more approachable and welcoming and also serve to build a community of people living with HIV/AIDS. In the next step, the feedback given by the HIV/AIDS infected people on the impact of treatment or prevention measures on enhancing capabilities in their lives should be used to rework policy priorities and strategies. Integrate vernacular identities in the policy discourse: this is important to understand the local moral economies of the stakeholder community as demonstrated above. To avoid the risk of loss of aid money, a pilot project could be undertaken to demonstrate this revised policy strategy. The new strategy would include, as an example, sensitizing the treatment and counselling centres to the differential power relations with regard to access to treatment within the target population and creating spaces for the marginalised section such as the hijras. India has presented an exemplary case of HIV/AIDS prevention with partnerships running in multiple levels NGOs, community based organisations, international aid agencies and UN institutions. The need now is to take stock of the policy path pursued so far, introspect and introduce corrective strategies where possible. Research outside the field of medicine, some of them cited here, have brought out grassroots accounts of how policies boil down to the lived experience of people. The path ahead is to incorporate them in the narrative discourse

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by negotiating spaces available within the constraints posed by the dominant policy discourse disseminated by the donors and global policy making bodies. Sudheesh Ramapurath Chemmencheri MSc. Social Policy and Development, 2013 S.Ramapurath-Chemmencheri@lse.ac.uk

References NACO. (2012). Annual Report 2011-2012. New Delhi: National Aids Control Organisation. (http://www.nacoonline.org/upload/Publication/Annual%20Report/NACO_AR_Eng% 202011-12.pdf )

Dolowitz, David and David Marsh. (1996). Who Learns from Whom: a Review of the Policy Transfer Literature. Political Studies XLIV, 343-357

Jensen, Jane. (2010). Diffusing Ideas for After Neoliberalism: The Social Investment Perspective in Europe and Latin America. Global Social Policy 10 (59), 59-84

World Bank. (2012). Charting a Programmatic Road-Map for Sexual Minority Groups in India. Report No. 55, South Asia Human Development Sector Discussion Paper Series. (http://ilga.org/ilga/static/uploads/files/2012/8/4/04232441.pdf )

GBC

Health.

(2011).

Who

We

Are

and

How

We

Work.

(http://www.gbchealth.org/our-coalition/who-we-are-how-we-work/ )

Bill

and

Melinda

Gates

Foundation.

(2009).

Avahan

Fact

Sheet.

(http://www.gatesfoundation.org/avahan/Documents/Avahan_FactSheet.pdf )

World Bank. (2011). The Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic among Men Who Have Sex with Men.

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(https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2308/622610PUB 0glob01476B0extop0ID018726.pdf?sequence )

UNDP.

(2011).

From

the

Frontline

of

Community

Action.

(http://www.undp.org/content/dam/india/docs/from_the_frontline-ofcommunity_actioncompendium_of_six_succ.pdf )

UNADIS.

(2012).

Global

Report

on

the

AIDS

Epidemic.

(http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/epidemiology/ 2012/gr2012/20121120_UNAIDS_Global_Report_2012_with_annexes_en.pdf )

NACO.

(2007).

Mainstreaming

and

Partnerships.

(http://www.nacoonline.org/NACO/Parterships/ )

Seckinelgin, Hakan. (2012). The Global Governance of Success in HIV/AIDS Policy: Emergency Action, Everyday Lives and Sens Capabilities. Health and Place 18, 453460

Reddy, Gayatri. (2005). Geographies of Contagion: Hijras, Kothis and the Politics of Sexual Marginality in Hyderabad. Anthropology and Medicine 12 (3), 255-270

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Development

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Afghanistan, Aid and Counter Narcotic Policy p.38-44 Becca Cockayne

In an ideal world, successful international intervention, established through peace-building structures, would allow for the creation of healthy interdependencies between rulers and peripheral elites. 1Unfortunately, the dynamic relationship between economic development initiatives and political conflict in frontier and transition states are far from clear. Government policy has looked to build Afghanistan into a stable Nation-State on the assumption that effective economic development strategy will lead to peace across the country.19 It has been designed primarily on the assumption that agricultural initiatives can act as a viable alternative to the opium industry2 and be the engine for Afghanistan's economic and social growth.3
A developmentalist approach has largely been propagated by USAID and other foreign investors; one that encourages private sector-led development through attempting to create chances for the poor to act as agents of their own destiny. It is less concerned with the structures that create poverty in the first place. Unfortunately, these strategies have not fulfilled their potential; since peace building initiatives began there has been only marginal development economically and socially.4 Moreover, despite billions of USD dollars of investment, Afghanistan ranked 158 out of 185 in the Human Development Index in 2011.5 Inter-ethnic violence, cultural clashes with international troops and studies highlighting rural Afghanistans high propensity for violence6 suggest current strategies are counter-productive. Moreover, inefficiency of economic policy is exacerbated by the existence of only weak conflict processing mechanisms7 which fail to overcome a substantial industrial roadblock: Opium. This article investigates the fragile relationship between economic development strategies and political conflict by analyzing that which existing Counter Narcotic and Agricultural policy neglects to consider; the short-term benefits of the established by the opium industry
1

Peacebuilding involves complex bargaining processes between rulers and peripheral elites over power and resources and when successful leads to stable interdependencies. See: Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: JONATHAN GOODHAND 19 Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: constructing sovereignty for whose security? BARNETT R RUBIN, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp 175 185, 2006 2 Afghanistan Post 2014: Economic Development Difficulties, Brasseur, 2005
3 4 5 6 7

Policy making in Agriculture and Rural Development in Afghanistan, Pain and Shah, 2009 Afghanistan Post 2014: Economic Development Difficulties, Brasseur, 2005 HDI 2010 index - Human Development Reports http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17123464, Feb 2012

Introduction: Security, Governance and Statebuilding in Afghanistan, Christopher Freeman, international Peacekeeping, Volume 14, 2007

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relative to alternative industrial practices representative of peace economies.8 The illegality of the Opium industry under international law coupled within its significant revenue generation for Afghanistan necessitates further investigation of this. Specifically, current policy doesnt consider: the capacity of peripheral elites; provincial ethnic tensions; and overestimates the states capacity to dislodge Opium cultivation. This article describes the characteristics of these three factors to explain why counter narcotic policy results in political conflict and is counter licit economic development. I conclude that an economic development strategy so narrowly focused fails to recognize that simply stamping out supply does not address all the actors required to eliminate conflict in a transition state and can exacerbate it.

Current Economic Development Policy Since 2006, Afghanistan has taken a hardline stance on destroying the Opium cultivation. 9 It is positioned as a comprehensive approach that includes; government institution, law enforcement capacity, targeted eradication programs and the development of alternative livelihoods.10 Moreover, it is welcomed by international states.20 It declares with certainty that it will remove the cultivation of Opium; as Snyder describes, it uses a no extraction approach.11 Such policy is premised on studies that indicate a strong correlation between provincial production of opium and the number of terrorist attacks. 12 In parallel, agricultural development strategies have rationalized their recommendations by focusing on the decline in cereal production between 1978 and 2004. However, both sets of policy seem to be premised on studies that describe poverty; this does not mean reversing these trends is possible or that they will stimulate the economy.13 Moreover, some studies, focusing on Northern provinces suggest that the opium economy has produced significant increases in rural wages and is an important source of credit for poor rural households. According to the UNODC and the World Bank, 14 the opium economy has had a stabilizing effect on the national currency by having a significant net positively impacting on Afghanistan's balance of payments.15 Such studies suggest that depending on the province, counter narcotic policy can act as a tool for the central government to bargain

8 9

Ibid 1
The Opium Trade and Patterns of Terrorism in the Provinces of Afghanistan: An Empirical Analysis National Development Strategy, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2006 http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/afghanistan/counter-narcotics/ World Bank, The Investment Climate in Afghanistan. Exploiting Opportunities in an Uncertain Environment, 2005. The Opium Trade and Patterns of Terrorism in the Provinces of Afghanistan: An Empirical Analysis Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food, Master Point 5 World Bank, The Investment Climate in Afghanistan. Exploiting Opportunities in an Uncertain Environment, 2005. Barnett Rubin, Saving Afghanistan, Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb., 2007, pp.5778.

10

20
11 12 13 14 15

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with peripheral actors, creating stability.16 Thus, the Opium trade and its development does no necessarily cause conflict under the implementation of counter narcotic policy but might actually provide a stable framework for economic growth. There is, however, an arguable rationale behind a Counter Narcotic policy. As both Snyder and Goodhand note, the Opium trade has previously provided local political elites with something to govern.17 Moreover, Southern Afghanistans political elites are closely associated with Taliban insurgencies. Several studies posit their successful establishment within the South due to funding from the Opium trade. As Goodhand notes, Opium is lucrative, easy to transport and easy to obtain within the south of Afghanistan, all properties characteristic of lootable resource.2118 It thus, provides an easy and substantial hook for power control. Moreover, studies demonstrate a strong positive statistical association between lootable resources and political disorder.19 It is based on this association with political turmoil and violence that a Counter narcotic policy, from a domestic perspective, may seem logical. However, as Goodhand also notes, the Opium trade is not new; many regimes across the globe and history have existed in spite of an Opium trade, thus the mere fact that Opium has properties which allow for provincial power control by groups with opposing political ideologies cannot be the only factor considered in the formation of policy. 20 Moreover, it is potentially the omission of these factors, which have led to the Opium trade becoming seemingly insurmountable through a hardline approach. Arguably then, CN policy and development strategies overestimate state capacity and are unappreciative of specific features of a transnational Opium industry.

International Demand and Value Addition The Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Service (ARDS) assumes that increasing production and productivity through agricultural production systems is the best approach to alleviate poverty.21 It is assumed that developing licit agricultural activity reduces political conflict as by removing income streams from the Taliban and Drug Lords that maintain power over provinces. The ARDS takes a market-driven approach, to which counter-narcotic
16 17

The Opium Trade and Patterns of Terrorism in the Provinces of Afghanistan: An Empirical Analysis

Richard Snyder, Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of Extraction Framework, Working Paper No. 312, July 2004. - Page 12 AND see: Ibid 1 18 Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of Extraction Framework Richard Snyder
21
19

Comparative Political Studies, Volume 39, Number 8, 2006

de Soysa, I. and N. P. Gleditsch (1999) To Cultivate Peace: Agriculture in a World of Conflict. PRIO Report 1/99. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute (PRIO). 20 Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, JONATHAN GOODHAND, 2005 21 Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Service Study, 2006

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Policy has seemingly attempted to align by attempting to wipeout the Opium Market through cutting off supply. However, global demand for Opium is strong and Afghanistan is able to meet its needs. There are 16.5 million opiate abusers globally which Afghanistan could supply through only 53% of its total opium poppy cultivation.22 The industry is growing too; according to a joint project between the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) and UNDOC, cultivation in 2011 has reached 131,000 hectares compared to 123,000 hectares for the year prior. This demand is not likely to be curtailed and this is most certainly something that Afghanistan's central government cannot affect by advocating the supply of more cotton or wheat. The intrinsic properties of Opium derivatives are addictive. While the international community needs to eat wheat, no scientific study has ever demonstrated a psychological or physiological addiction to it. For Opium however, major research and development demonstrate neurological alterations and physiological transformations of an abusers nervous system that propagates addictive behavior and repetitive drug consumption. Counter Narcotic and Agricultural Development policy fails to consider not only the strength of the total Afghan Opium Market, but that demand from its target demographic stems from an intrinsic physiological addiction for Opium over their substitute products. Economic development strategy also does not consider that value-add is generated outside Afghanistan, or if it does, it underestimates its capacity. In 2006, the export value of drugs was US$3.1 billion. Moreover traffickers and heroin refiners operating across Afghan borders received 76 per cent of Opium generated income. This is reflective of the fewer actors and increased regulation (leading to increased risk premiums) up the chain. 23 In this sense then, economic development through Counter Narcotic policy is exacerbating conflict through aggravating not only local power holders, but external international actors that are generating lucrative revenue streams. Moreover, a no extraction policy concentrates on a segment of the value chain involving 80 per cent of the stakeholders but only 20 per cent of the value (only 24 per cent of income from Opium is received by farmers), 24 with no provision for macro-economic support.25 With 80% of stakeholders surviving on this lootable wealth and with limited economic power of their own, the Afghans CN policy seems to be directed in the most inefficient way possible.

22 23 24 25

The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, UNDOC, 2011 Sarah Lister and Adam Pain,Trading in Power, Kabul: AREU, 2004. A War on Drugs or a War on Famrers, Rubin and Zakhilwal, The Wall Street Journal, Jan 2005

Ibid 1

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Peripheral Elites and Defence Resources Actors controlling peripheral opium cultivation in the South have been able to afford the protection of non-state specialists in violence given the source of value-add and demand are outside the Afghan state.26 This is because, during the implementation of a new government in Kabul, rural areas with little connection to the center underwent their own political transition during the US led invasion. Given the limited investment of international military protection in rural areas, provincial groups were able to establish a strategic edge. This has enabled Drug Lords to have expendable capital and methods through which to protect themselves and the local communities. Thus, the benefits gained by rural populations from growing Opium are not only economic but also proactive of their social needs. This is particularly notable in the South where resistant movements, drug lords and the Taliban operate over land spanning both Pakistan and Afghanistan; a stronghold of power that has been maintained through suicide bombing and other forms of asymmetrical warfare.27 Here, Counter Narcotic policy has strengthened the political extremist groups. Growing revenues have been used and enabled the consolidation of power to offer protection from military control of the state. The Governments hardline response is even more ironic, as the exacerbation of violence has lead to an increase in Opium prices due to the creation of a risk premium,28 generating further income and political strength for the Provincial powers. It seems Counter Narcotic policy exacerbates violence, which then increases returns on Opium crops allowing further protection by local elites. Ethnic Tension and inherent Political Sensitivity A weakness in the above argument is that it only considers the strength of drug lords in relation to the material characteristics of their goods and international value chain. It has only briefly touched upon the roles of the farmers in this complex network. However, their allegiance is partly maintained through ideological coercion, which has exploited the characteristics of Pashtun politics and purported tribal allegiance too. 29 Laboured with Opium-dominated debt and without the viable productionist alternatives proposed by the government, local villagers are polarized further against the Central state. Those who voted for Karzai as president may well feel victimized through the criminalization of their livelihood.30 Particularly so in the South where there is considerable political conflict between Central Government and the Pashtun community. This creates an environment of
26

Goodman suggests that if sufficient extension of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul may have reduced this effect.
27 28 29

Ibid 1

Ibid 1

Assessment for Pashtuns in Afghanistan, UNHCR, 2003 - tribal segregation is purported frequently contribute to intracommunal conflict. The Taliban movement stemmed from Pashtun populations.
30

Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, JONATHAN GOODHAND, 2005 And: UNDOC Report 2006

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polarity on which drug lords can capitalize and makes space for a form of coercive power that enables a strengthening of agricultural resistance.

It is readily accepted that politics and economics are intrinsically linked - but does this mean you can build an economy through policy? Economic development via agricultural development on the back of a counter-narcotic stance has, in its current state, done little to resolve political conflict or encourage political stability. The above discussion of economic development and its impact on political conflict, fuelled by the Opium trade, is important considering the international societys overthrow of existing Afghan government infrastructure, and its arguable illegality in the eyes of international law.31 With the removal of US and NATO troops by 2014 and Western budget restrictions, the outcome of international intervention is a topic of much debate. Effective economic development and stable social infrastructure with little violent conflict go hand in hand, yet current counter narcotic policy neglects to consider the key provincially specific factors required for transition from economies of war to economies of peace. Notably, this discussion of development and conflict suggests a top down approach taking a hardline stance to illicit industries isnt the answer. Transnational crime exacerbates state failure and th us centrally issued counter narcotic policy is essentially trying to dig itself out of a hole that Opium and transnational actors are digging even deeper.32 Becca Cockayne MSc Global Politics 13 B.Cockayne@lse.ac.uk

References
Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Jonathan Goodhand, 2005 To Cultivate Peace: Agriculture in a World of Conflict. PRIO Report 1999. de Soysa, I. and N. P. Gleditsch (1999) Oslo: International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, UNDOC, 2011 Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Service Study, 2006 Saving Afghanistan, Barnett Rubin, Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb., 2007, pp.5778 A War on Drugs or a War on Farmers, Rubin and Zakhilwal, The Wall Street Journal, Jan 2005
31

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly [on the report of the Third Committee (A/66/462/Add.2)] 66/171. Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
32

Criminal Organisations, Competitive Advantage and State Failure in Afghanistan; Thompson, Small Wars Journal, 2012

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Borders and Rebordering, C Rumford - Europe and Asia Beyond East and West, 2006 Rethinking the Nation-State from the Frontier, Maroya, A. Millennium: journal of international studies 32 (2) 2003. Criminal Organisations, Competitive Advantage and State Failure in Afghanistan; Thompson, Small Wars Journal, 2012 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly [on the report of the Third Committee (A/66/462/Add.2)] 66/171. Assessment for Pashtuns in Afghanistan, UNHCR, 2003 Trading in Power, Sarah Lister and Adam Pain, Kabul: AREU, 2004 The Opium Trade and Patterns of Terrorism in the Provinces of Afghanistan: An Empirical Analysis The Investment Climate in Afghanistan. Exploiting Opportunities in an Uncertain Environment, World Bank, 2005 Saving Afghanistan, Foreign Affairs, Barnett Rubin, Jan./Feb., 2007, pp.5778 Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of Extraction Framework, Richard Snyder, Working Paper No. 312, July 2004. - Page 12 Comparative Political Studies, Volume 39, Number 8, 2006 Introduction: Security, Governance and Statebuilding in Afghanistan, Christopher Freeman, international Peacekeeping, Volume 14, 2007 National Development Strategy, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2006 http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/afghanistan/counter-narcotics Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Johanthan Goodhand Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: constructing sovereignty for whose security? Barnett R Rubin, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp 175 185, 2006 Policymaking in Agriculture and Rural Development in Afghanistan, Pain and Shah, 2009 Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food, Master Point 5 Afghanistan Post 2014: Economic Development Difficulties, Brasseur, 2005 HDI 2010 index - Human Development Reports http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17123464, Feb 2012

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Conflict and Peace

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Will Turks and Kurds finally make a deal on Kurdish question? p46-48
Sinem Hun

The multidimensional Kurdish question of the relatively young 90 year old Turkish Republic remains one of the fundamental issues preventing Turkey from reaching one of its ultimate constitutional goals of acquiring a sustainable pluralist democracy and effectively implementing international human rights standards within the country. Those who are interested in the history and modality of this problem may go through the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. The labelling of Kurdish citizens as members of the PKK or terrorists by the state and the EU is well documented

However, even during the period of the armed conflict between the Turkish government forces and the PKK both parties had not avoided confidentially negotiating at the top levels, namely between the Turkish Intelligence Service (MIT) and the ruling elites of PKK lobbying in various EU countries, to seek ways to find an amicable solution to stop the armed conflict. Although Turkish public opinion was informed of these mutual meetings years after they occurred, none of these attempts satisfied either side. For instance, Turgut Ozal, former President and one of the most preeminent figures of modern Turkish politics showed his courage when he came to the table with Abdullah Ocalan, leader of PKK who is in prison at the moment. 20 years after, the charismatic leader of Turkey, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan who is supported by 50% of Turkish electorates is now attempting to solve this conflict. In fact, Mr. Erdogans attempt goes beyond 2013; between 2009-2011, Mr. Erdogan preferred to keep the dialogue with the PKKs ruling elite living in Europe confidential and charged the chief officer of MIT, Hakan Fidan to carry out meetings to reach a final settlement in Oslo, Norway. At the outset, everything seemed positive; parties drafted written protocols which would be used moths later by the main opposing party, Republican Peoples Party (CHP) as a trump to attack Mr. Erdogan with a political rhetorical discourse, `betraying the Turkish nation and indivisible integrity of Turkey` since they contained commitments such as a general pardon for Kurdish guerrillas and home confinement for Adullah Ocalan. But the process of dialogue went off permanently when the voice recording of one of the meetings was leaked to the Turkish media. The negotiation process immediately stopped, parties went back to their initial positions and in the aftermath of the 2011 general elections the armed conflict started coming back to the ordinary life of Turkish people-- this time more brutally. The death toll in a year and a half was 800. This number was even higher than during the 90s when the close combat or internal war as defined by many political analysts was at its peak Taking the historical background into account, failures in past and actual parameters, it is obvious that the process itself carries a high risk of interruption and that is why it demands

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the full care of both parties. I think that the responsibility of maximum care should be positioned in three main perspectives: Sui generis nature of the problem: Any analysis on the Kurdish question of Turkey should start first by acknowledging a very important fact: the complexity of the problem and sensitivity of the parties. Actually these two characteristics nurture each other; the sensitivity of parties escalates while the complexity of the problem enhances and/or the complexity of problem increases while sensitivity of parties arises. The historical background of the Kurdish question stems from the feeling of being betrayed by their Turkish brothers who had agreed upon the establishment of an autonomous structure in south-east and east Anatolia. After the proclamation of the republic, the agreements for autonomy were not upheld, and this left an indelible imprint over the collective memory of Kurdish people. Positioned on the opposite side of this Kurdish sensitivity, the Turkish identity formulated its founding discourse over the integrity of the territory and the central governance perceives any political or social attempt at discussing the Kurdish question as an evil act or attack to the fundamental components of its identity. Therefore, parties should outline together how to manage these intertwined identities, especially by giving public speeches or expressing opinions that call for a new discourse and language of peace. The fragmented structure of PKK: After the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya in 1999, the PKKs structure has changed inevitably over the years. Although the majority of Kurds still regard Mr. Ocalan as their political leader, new actors have become prevalent in this conflict; especially the fighting forces located mainly in Iraqs Qandil Mountains. Recently, they have declared very briefly and explicitly that reaching an agreement with Mr. Ocalan would not be sufficient for laying down the arms. On the other hand, the European wing of the PKK, especially ruling elites living in different European countries is keeping silent towards this new dialogue. But the local political branch of PKK, Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) gives its full support to Mr. Ocalan and positions itself for ending this process as smoothly as possible. Another important actor of the problem is the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani. As seen on Turkish media, the Turkish State has very good relations with Mr. Barzani and may convince guerrillas located in the Qandil Mountains to serve for Mr. Barzani, especially in security or military sector if this peace making dialogue flourishes more in the near future The War in Syria: This external dimension is quite crucial, as it has the potential to destabilize the on-going peace dialogue. Historically, it is known that Kurdish armed groups have had good relations with the Al-Assad family and often received material support from the Syrian government. The Syrian government had used the PKK as a trump against Turkey to balance power in the Middle East. In domestic politics, the ruling minority elite, the Arab Alawites, had needed support of other minorities against the majority, the Sunni Arabs. These two factors intertwining with the Kurdish question of Turkey to the future of Syria may dramatically influence the direction of the dialogue. Will a new independent or quasiindependent Kurdish state appear in Syria after a possible defeat of Bashar Al-Assad? Or is there collaboration between the Syrian Kurdish wing of PKK and the Syrian government to destabilize domestic politics of Turkey, but more importantly the current peace making dialogue? The murder of three Kurdish women in Paris who were politically engaged with the Kurdish question happened right after the official declaration of the peace making process by Prime Minister Erdogan.
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Both parties and actors should act with maximum responsibility and care while giving public speeches or remain calm while assessing counterproductive acts provoking both Kurds and Turks to successfully complete the dialogue and convert it into an institutionalized peace making process. This is not only a political attitude but also a historical burden on the shoulder of each actor involved in. Sinem Hun Msc in Human Rights 2013, Human Rights Lawyer sinem.hun@hundanismanlik.com s.hun@lse.ac.uk References Official Journal of the European Union, (2006)

(http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/docs/EUterrorlist-May-06.pdf) Radikal Turkiye (2013),

(http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1115373 &CategoryID=77) Terrorism Watch, (2013), (http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2013/01/the-

transformation-of-ocalan.html) Yeni Safak, (2013) (http://yenisafak.com.tr/gundem-haber/silah-birakan-mahmura01.02.2013-465582 ) F5 Haber, (2013), (http://www.f5haber.com/kthaber/silah-birakan-pkk-lilar-bakinnereye-gidecek-haberi-3646032/ ) Candar Cengiz, (2012) Mezopotamya Ekspresi, Iletisim Publishing, Istanbul Candar Cengiz, (2011) Leaving the Mountain: How may PKK lay down arms?, TESEV Report, Report, Istanbul,

(:http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/1fe2c9c3-fe84-4044-81a1d8a3ab906e5c/12028ENGsilahsizlandirma16_03_12Rev1.pdf) European Court of Human Rights cases can be found at:

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{"documentcollectionid":["C OMMITTEE","DECISIONS","COMMUNICATEDCASES","CLIN","ADVISORYOPINIONS","R EPORTS","RESOLUTIONS"]} Yegen Mesut, (1999) Devlet Soyleminde Kurt Sorunu, Iletisim Publishing, Isanbul Yegen Mesut, (2006) Mustakbel Turkten Sozde Vatandasa , Iletisim Publishing, Isanbul
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National SelfDetermination

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Nationalist Revolts in Europe: The Quest for Catalan Independence p.50-55

Elena Magri

In the current financial crisis, most European member states wish they did not lack the freedom of decision-making with regards to their economic and monetary policies. But there is one thing they have not surrendered to Europe: their national identity. The case of Catalonia exemplifies this notion of nationalism, which has recently resulted in revolts, demonstrations and demands for elections for the democratic right of the people to decide the future of their nation. Since there is no single European identity among the 27 member states, the EU finds itself at a crossroads; it can either push for further integration, or it can take a step back and surrender the power to the nation-states.
This article analyses the complexity of identity fragmentation in Europe, explains the conflict of nationalism in the case of Catalonia, as well as the main arguments supporting and opposing independence from the Spanish state, and finally interprets the consequences of secession in the current context of European integration. I conclude that political unrest and dissatisfaction can certainly not be ignored and that cooperation will play a crucial role in finding solutions to the current political structure of the Spanish state. A potential and feasible solution would be to revise the Spanish constitution of 1978 and adopt a new federal structure that would empower the regions at the expense of the central government. With regards to Europe, I argue that member countries should do their best to cooperate and act in unity, both internally and externally, to confront the difficult challenges the continent is facing today. The Complexities of State and Identity Fragmentation in Europe Amid the financial turmoil across Europe, some European regions such as Scotland, Flanders and Catalonia are desperately seeking to gain greater self-rule, intensifying an identity crisis that has persisted throughout history. In an era of globalization and economic interdependence, nationalism is becoming the dominant form of identity protection, turning it into one of the most profound crises affecting the continent today. National identity is a collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation and of sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations. It is a modern phenomenon of a fluid and dynamic nature. While consciousness of forming a nation may remain constant for long periods of time, the elements upon which such a feeling is based may vary1.

Guibernau, Montserrat, (1996) Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Polity Press.

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However, secession is generally perceived by the states as an unviable solution to the countrys financial and economic problems, especially in a moment in history when politicians, diplomats, economists, and academics worldwide are pushing for greater European integration, globalization and free trade. It is also argued that the thought of potential war or conflict, even at a local level, makes many fear the option of independence, especially since the current European Union was once created in order to avoid future wars in the region a fact that new generations tend to forget. But would these potential new European states actually undermine Europes capacity to act globally? Shouldnt these nations have the right to be heard, according to democratic principles? An Independent Catalan State for the Catalan Nation? The concept of secession in Catalonia has taken many different forms throughout history, but in comparison with the high degree of violence and deeply rooted conflict in the Basque Country there has always been a peaceful movement behind it. Catalonia had achieved greater political autonomy before the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), but after Francos victory and during the establishment of a dictatorial regime, the region as well as other Spanish autonomous communities, which had their own culture and language suffered from cultural repression: Catalan identity, culture and language were prohibited in both the private and public spheres. In 1975, the dictatorship was replaced by a democratic regime, in which Catalonia was able to re-establish its own institutions, language and culture. As argued by Guibernau33 Catalonia, since the creation of the Autonomous Communities System in Spain after Francos dictatorship, benefits from a certain degree of autonomy. It has its own Statute of Autonomy, which regulates its status within the framework of the 1978 Constitution, possesses its own parliament, government and president elected in the regional election, and enjoys the right to decide on a fair number of issues whose competency has been transferred to them from the Spanish central government in Madrid. Democratic Catalan nationalism, which became a social movement at the end of the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, played a key role in the Spanish transition to democracy. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 does not foresee the right to self-determination of any of the regions, but it specifically provides a foundation for the protection of all of the cultures and languages present in Spain, such as Catalan, Basque or Galician. However, the Catalan Autonomous Government has still had to struggle to promote the Catalan language after the risk of disappearing during Francos dictatorship, allocating a significant part of the budget to language planning, to the improvement of the knowledge of Catalan in the school curricula and to the autonomous TV channel. Today, Catalan is widely used at all levels of society. Indeed, language is a way of expressing cultural identity, and Catalan nationalists have consistently focused on the issue of linguistic rights to defend their national identity34. However, identity is a complex matter, because it is hard to measure and it changes and evolves over time. In Catalonia, there are people who identify themselves as Catalan, others who feel they are as Spanish as much as they are Catalan, and others who identify themselves exclusively as Spanish. There is indeed tension and conflict within those who
33

Guibernau, Montserrat, (1996) Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Polity Press.

34

Conversi, Daniele, (1997) The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation, C. Hu rst & Co

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reside in Catalonia, which according to Guibernau35, is due to having a constitution that strives to reconcile unity within the states territory with a fair am ount of political autonomy to the nations it contains. Another relevant argument that supports independence is that Catalonia, in the context of the contemporary global financial crisis and rising unemployment (around 40 per cent among young people), would be better off economically by seceding due to the severe fiscal imbalance it suffers. This is originated because of the high amount of taxes paid into the countrys central treasury which is higher than the amount it gets backand due to the excessive bureaucracy of the system (the Territorial Solidarity Fund establishes financial transfers from the richest regions to the countrys poorest regions). Many studies have been made, but economic arguments are highly contested. Some believe in the economic viability of an independent Catalonia, while others argue that borders are no longer important or desirable in the current globalized world or in the context of greater European integration. Those who see the feasibility of an independent Catalonia argue that it accounts for 20% of Spains GDP and one-third of the total industrial production and exports, quite a high amount considering it only contains about 16 percent of the whole countrys population. While the region contributes to around 25 percent of the total taxes, it has been argued that investment of the Spanish state in Catalonia from 1982 and 1998 represented only about 8.5 per cent of the total, which they consider to be unfair. Additionally, Catalonias average contribution to the Spanish Central Administration and Social Security is said to correspond to 19.40 per cent of the total. In contrast, Catalonia receives 14.03 per cent. After contributing to Spains Solidarity Fund, Catalonia is worse off than those autonomous communities subsidized by the Fund and finds itself below average in per capita spending36. On the other hand, it must also be taken into account that Catalonias debt makes up close to 30% of the total debt of Spains regions. In fact, conservative estimates suggest that exiting from Spain, the euro, and the EU would cause a 20% drop in Catalonias GDP as 68 percent of Catalonias exports go to the EU and 50% of its total output goes to the rest of Spain. Although the principle of solidarity is present and widely supported in both Spain and Europe, it has been argued that in the case of Catalonia the current system is outdated, since it was designed when disparities between Spanish regions were much higher. Furthermore, in the current financial context, this system is said to be compromising the economic welfare of the contributor, which also has one of the highest rates of intraregional income disparity, both territorially and socially. The 2012 budget presented by Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has created further controversies, because it does not state the payment of pending debts to Catalonia, which according to the Statute include 759 million for 2008 and 219 million for 2009, and the Spanish states investment in infrastructure in Catalonia has been reduced to 45 per cent and today stands at 11 per cent of the total, far from the 18.6 per cent that Catalonia should be receiving37. According to professor Sala-i-Martn38, Spanish inter-regional transfer system is neither fair nor
35 36

Guibernau, Montserrat, (1996) Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Polity Press. Guibernau, Montserrat, (2007) The Identity of Nations, Polity Press. 37 Guibernau, Montserrat, (2007) The Identity of Nations, Polity Press. 38 Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, (2012) The Independence of Catalonia: The Economic Viability, Script of the Conference at the Ommium Cultural, (http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/papers/independ%20english.htm) , Accessed on 21-Jan-2013

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beneficial, but creates a welfare dependency that harms entrepreneurship and growth in the poorer regions. Secession in the context of European integration Managing a European Union composed of 27 member states is quite challenging, especially when it has to confront such harsh financial difficulties. However, the problems it is facing in finding a consensual solution that will benefit all member states and will solve both the fiscal imbalances and simultaneously promote growth is reflecting one of its major weaknesses and is eroding political integration. Like the Spanish Constitution, EU law does not address the potential disintegration of any member state, as its whole purpose is to pursue a closer integration among its member states. In fact, the President of the European Commission, Jos Manuel Durao Barroso, has recently stated that the potential secession of a certain territory that is part of a EU member state should be negotiated according to international law, since European citizenship complements, but does not substitute, national citizenship, contrary to what some Catalan nationalist parties have been claiming. Although the European Union is a problematic entity whose cultural and physical boundaries are not clear and the role the nations without a state will be allowed to play is uncertain, national minorities within Europe seek the economic and cultural invigoration of the nation. They link across boundaries, hold international meetings, build co-ordinating bodies such as the Assembly for a Europe of the Regions, and actively lobby European institutions, so that, at least in the EU, one may speak of a transnational ethnic movement39. Today, the EU finds itself at a crossroads with regards to nationalist movements, since there is no single European identity among the 27 member states. A common European national consciousness that provides cohesion on a diversified but economically and politically united entity, based on the principle of solidarity among the different regions, will be necessary in the future to articulate nationalism effectively, although challenging to achieve. The lack of trust and resentment towards the Spanish government and other political parties due to the deepening of the economic crisis, the bad economic management, the open hostility to Catalan demands and rising unemployment have all led to political unrest and dissatisfaction in Catalonia. In 2009, 166 Catalan cities held referendums on Catalonias independence, although they were not legally binding because referendums on independence are illegal under the current Spanish constitution. Those who participated, around 27 per cent, voted in favour of independence. In 2011, support for independence rose to 42.9 per cent and today it is 44.6%40. On the 11th of September 2012, the regions national day, there was a demonstration made up of almost 8% of Catalonias 7.5 million people, a fact that clearly showed that there are still some issues that need to be addressed, both domestically and at the European level. The current frustration of the Catalan society cannot be ignored, but cooperation within the Spanish state will be key in finding solutions to the current political structure. A potential solution would be to revise Spains 1978

39

Guibernau, Montserrat, (1996) Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Polity Press. Guibernau, Montserrat, (1996) Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Polity Press.

40

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Constitution thoroughly and adopt a new federal structure, which would grant more autonomy and empower the regions at the expense of the central government. With regards to Europe, however, member countries should do their best to cooperate and act in unity, both internally and externally, to confront the difficult challenges the continent is facing today. Although the EU is still in the process of achieving a closer economic and political integration, a common European national consciousness that provides a more cohesive European society will be necessary although challenging to articulate nationalism effectively in the future. Elena Magrina MSc Global Politics E.Magrina@lse.ac.uk References
Guibernau, Montserrat, (1996) Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Polity Press. Guibernau, Montserrat, (2007) The Identity of Nations, Polity Press. Conversi, Daniele, (1997) The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation, C. Hurst & Co. Keating, Michael, (1997) Stateless nation-building: Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland in the changing state system, Nations and Nationalism 3 (4), 1997, 689-717, Asen, Guibernau, Montserrat, (2004) Catalan Nationalism: Francoism, transition and democracy, Routledge/Caada Blanch Studies on Contemporary Spain, Moisi, Dominique, (2010) New Wave Nationalism, Paris, Project Syndicate, 2010: (http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/new-wave-nationalism#HhgAqr4VOzDHyhcH.99) , Accessed on 21-Jan-2013 Solana, Javier, (2012) A Europe for the World, Madrid, Project Syndicate, (http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/europe-s-global-leadership-by-javier-solana#SYAVDTovSsPYKhzx.99) , Accessed on 21-Jan-2013 Palacio, Ana, (2013) Europes Narrative Struggle, Madrid, Project Syndicate, (http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/will-the-eu-survive-2013-by-ana-palacio) , Accessed on 21-Jan-2013 Palacio, Ana, (2012) Europes Regional Revolts, Madrid, Project Syndicate, (http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/independence-calls-growing-in-catalonia-and-scotland-by-ana-palacio) , Accessed on 21-Jan-2013 Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, (2012) The Independence of Catalonia: The Economic Viability, Script of the Conference at the Ommium Cultural, (http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/papers/independ%20english.htm) , Accessed on 21Jan-2013 Desquens, Josep, (2003) Europes Stateless Nations in the Era of Globalization: The Case for Catalonias Secession from Spain, The Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs, Johns Hopkins University, (http://www.jhubc.it/bcjournal/articles/desquens.cfm) , Accessed on 21-Jan-2013

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Global Democracy

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Converging Election Campaign Practices: How do Americanisation and Modernization help us better Understand this Process? p.56-61
Siddharth Bannerjee

The degree of convergence of electoral practices should be examined in the broader context of complex socio-political transformations occurring across the industrialized advanced countries since about the time of World War II. The changing nature of political communications in this reckoning is characterized by a growing specialization of the profession within a media and communications policy framework that got increasingly liberalized and commercialized around the world. In this perspective of modernizing change or social flux the homogenizing of electoral processes, strategies and professional practices is to a significant degree towards forms that first evolved in the United States1. These include internationalized forms of consumer capitalism and corporate media practises pioneered in America and spread around the globe. One may notice that when these Americanized forces come in contact with host societies, they meld and give rise to hybridized models of media operations and political organization. The degree of convergence in election campaign practices is therefore contingent on a mix of the domestic socio-political context (specific domestic electoral institutions and norms, as well as the overall media landscape) and technologically driven international expertise and processes - often American in origin.

Background and Context The need for any form of political communications only became apparent with the advent of multi-party electoral choice in newly democratizing Western countries since about the 1850s. Initially, political alliances were determined by either social class or religious affiliation and these were frozen in place with the universalization of adult franchise in the 1920s. Since the cleavages were so clear cut at the time, it made sense that electoral functions were by and large handled in-house by representatives of the party itself. But with the enbourgouisement of society in the decades following the Second World War, coupled with a decline in the church's power and subsequent secularization and depillarization of society and the ensuing rise of post-material values single party identification began

Hallin, D. and P.Mancini (2004) Americanization, Globalization and secularization in F. Esser and B.Pfetsch (2004) eds. Comparing Political Communication, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

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waning across the West2. This broad social transformation, as well as the accompanying technological change (like the advent of commercial television in the US and Europe and professional polling in 1930s California), caused the nature and purpose of political campaigns to undergo a profound makeover. Within the socio-political context outlined above, and with a rapid diffusion of mass media in the West (especially the spread of commercial television stations in the 1960s due to deregulation and/or privatization), a mastery of communication technology and technical political expertize was put centre stage in election campaign practises. Slowly, a mediatized logic began permeating the process and eventually trumped political logic as the privileged narrative. This led to the opening up of the negotiation of newsworthiness to other intermediaries (besides politicians and the media) and consultants, spin doctors and other professional advisers were thus incorporated into the management and control of political communications on behalf of political actors3. This in turn led to enormous changes at the level of the political party, transforming them into electoral professional political parties first and foremost, with the consequence of an entirely different approach to the practise of political communication, political advocacy and political engagement4. The professionalization of electoral campaigning practises had led to considerable organizational change, ranging from a greater centralization of operations to a reassessment of the role of members, and the relationship of the centre to the periphery in a political party setting5. Finally, at the organizational-operational level, political parties have embraced the view that they should operate with a single vision and communicate that throughout especially vis--vis how they interact with their members, the media and others.

Americanization, Modernization and Convergence In general parlance, the term Americanization has a number of connotations, mostly pejorative, and denotes a form of cultural imperialism (typified by the McWorld and CocaColonization theses). In politics broadly, Americanization speaks to the cheapening of the quality of public debate and a focus on the glitz and glamour (rather than substantive issues) most often associated with the American Presidential election cycle. In the contemporary academic political communication literature, Americanization generally refers to the growing personalization of candidates (over their parties), utilization of opinion polling/focus group techniques, hiring of professional political marketing consultants and PR/spin gurus, the exploitation of television-focused advertising campaign strategies and
2

Hallin, D. and P.Mancini (2004) Americanization, Globalization and secularization in F. Esser and B.Pfetsch (2004) eds. Comparing Political Communication, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
3

Negrine, R., and D. Lilleker'Sleaze, Scandals and the Media 2004.Gay, O. and Oliver, D. (Eds) Conduct UnbecomingLondon: Politics
4

Negrine, R., (2008) The Transformation of Political Communication. Basingstoke, Hants: Palgrave Macmillan. (esp. Ch 2). P.160
5

Negrine, R., (2008) The Transformation of Political Communication. Basingstoke, Hants: Palgrave Macmillan. (esp. Ch 2). P.160

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the rise of the operational costs (and lately, donations from corporate and non-profit sectors) that have necessitated a permanent campaign mode6. This combination of factors lead to a highly centralized, tightly controlled framework for the conduct of communication functions - pioneered by American strategists and is now accepted as a near universal tactic and could thus be considered an indicator of the convergence of election campaign practices. But on the other hand, one could also argue that these changes (especially in the European, Israeli, Canadian, and Latin American context) are not distinctly American but actually represent something more commonly defined as internationalisation, globalisation, modernisation or professionalization. Case Studies Two case studies, one on Sweden and the other on the Catalan elections in Spain make the point above that while American campaign practises are converging to the extent that they are emulated to a degree in different country contexts, the ultimate form and function of the utilization is uniquely local and specifically tailored to the electoral and media systems inherent to those countries. These two cases have been chosen particularly because politicians in each instance made explicit (derogatory) mentions of Americanization of campaign processes in the lead up to the general election7. In the case of Sweden, the new Prime Minister, Goran Presson, declared No more American PR consultants! after his victory in 1998 despite the fact that his Social Democrats had won big in the election, in part because their messages dominated both the media and public debate8. The statement was made largely due to heavy internal criticism of his importing three American PR professionals into a Swedish plurality model that is traditionally based on a deeply rooted and ideologically grounded political party environment. The political and media landscape in Sweden is considered a middle way characterized by an emphasis on political party ideology (instead of on personalities) and a monopoly of the airwaves by (impartial and objective) public radio and television stations, as well as a subsidised newspaper circulation9. The encounter between the traditional Swedish middle way and Americanized practises have indeed led to increase d media logic, use of opinion polling and other political marketing techniques, growing professionalization, and a greater focus on politicians personalities. But some quintessentially Swedish practises (such as banning political ads and high political awareness) have remained, keeping it, at heart, issue-centric. Thus the author concludes that, despite the transformation (and to an extent Americanization) of the Swedish elections, this is probably not because of the U.S.
6

Downs, William. M (2011) There Goes the Neighbourhood? The Americanisation of Elections, with Evidence from Scotlands Parliament. Parliamentary Affairs (2012) 65, 758777. Oxford University Press. 7 Nord, L. (2001) Americanization v. the Middle Way: New Trends in Swedish Political Communication, Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 6, 113.
7

Xifra, J (2011) Americanization, Globalization, or Moderniza tion of Electoral Campaigns? Testing the Situation in Spain American Behavioral Scientist 2011 55: 667. Sage Publications.
8

Nord, L. (2001) Americanization v. the Middle Way: New Trends in Swedish Political Communication, Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 6, 113.
9

Nord, L. (2001) Americanization v. the Middle Way: New Trends in Swedish Political Communication, Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 6

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origins of the changes but due to the fact that similar changes in most advanced democracies regarding public opinion, media development, and politics contribute to the harmonization of the effects of this process. 10. Similar to Sweden, Spanish political parties have greater ideological standing and are more socially settled11. But recent elections (since the 2000s) have begun showing symptoms of the Americanization of electoral communication in Spain and, by extension, in Catalonia. 12. The primary evidence of this phenomena in Spain are: the growing personalization of the campaign (creation of a logotype for candidates), the use of non -profit organizations (Yo Rompo or Im Breaking Away akin to MoveOn.org in the USA), the spectacularization of politics (linked to dependence on television), and the utilization of websites and DVDs as a marketing tool to spread the message of each party13. But the author states that these modern mass communication techniques (especially ones linked to technology, like a vibrant blogosphere), were already in place in Catalonia prior to the perceived Americanization of campaign politics. This leads the author to conclude that Americanization is a superficial or surface phenomena and that the term modernization, manages to better capture, at least from the standpoint of interpretation, the meaning and scope of the general changes that lie at the root of the new electoral campaign modalities14. Based on the historical context outlined at the start and further illustrated by the case studies of Sweden and Spain, we are able to conclude that changing electoral undercurrents are the consequence of on-going structural change in politics, society and the media system. So rather than representing any directional convergence or a uni-directional dissemination process, so-called Americanized practises such as excessive personalization, a political star system, mass media impression management and an increasing negativity of campaigns and campaign coverage are the consequence of an endogenous change in different country contexts15. Accordingly, rather than seeing the homogenized or globalized electoral campaigns as uniquely American, one can christen the general process as modernisation, driven by socio-economic and technological development, to which all systems in some way or another are inevitably susceptible16. Further, as Plasser explicit asserts, the indicators of Americanized international election communications best reflect the continuing modernization and professionalization of political communicators but that they do not

10

Nord, L. (2001) Americanization v. the Middle Way: New Trends in Swedish Political Communication, Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 6, 118. 11 Xifra, J (2011) Americanization, Globalization, or Modernization of Electoral Campaigns? Testing the Situation in Spain American Behavioral Scientist 2011 55: 667. Sage Publications.
12

Xifra, J (2011) Americanization, Globalization, or Modernization of Electoral Campaigns? Testing the Situation in Spain American Behavioral Scientist 2011 55: 667. Sage Publications. P.671. 13 Xifra, J (2011) Americanization, Globalization, or Modernization of Electoral Campaigns? Testing the Situation in Spain American Behavioral Scientist 2011 55: 667. Sage Publications. 14 Xifra, J (2011) Americanization, Globalization, or Modernization of Electoral Campaigns? Testing the Situation in Spain American Behavioral Scientist 2011 55: 667. Sage Publications. P.671 15 Plasser, F. (2000) American Campaign Techniques Worldwide, Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 5, 34 Downs, William. M (2011) There Goes the Neighbourhood? The Americanisation of Elections, with Evidence from Scotlands Parliament. Parliamentary Affairs (2012) 65, 758777. Oxford University Press. P763 16 Farrell, D. (1998) Political Consultancy Overseas: The Internationalization of Campaign Consultancy, PS: Political Science & Politics, 31, 172.

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furnish any proof for a directional convergence and diffusion process 17. Thus in conclusion, the new modalities of election campaign practises that fall within the context described above are not, at the root, caused by any single source but by a general modernization of electoral campaigns rather than merely Americanization or globalization. Siddharth Bannerjee MSc in Social Policy and Development, 2013 s.bannerjee@lse.ac.uk

References Bowler, S. & D. Farrell (2001) The Internationalization of Campaign Consultancy in J.Thurber & C.Nelson Campaign Warriors Brookings: Institution Press Downs, William. M (2011) There Goes the Neighbourhood? The Americanisation of Elections, with Evidence from Scotlands Parliament. Parliamentary Affairs (2012) 65, 758777. Oxford University Press. Farrell, D. (1998) Political Consultancy Overseas: The Internationalization of Campaign Consultancy, PS: Political Science & Politics, 31, 172. Farrell, D., Kolodny, R., & Medvic, S. (2001). Parties and campaign professionals in a digital age. Press and Politics, 6(4), 11-30. Hallin, D. and P.Mancini (2004) Americanization, Globalization and secularization in F. Esser and B.Pfetsch (2004) eds. Comparing Political Communication, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Lilleker, Dareen G. and Negrine, Ralph (2002) Professionalization of What? Since When? By Whom?, Press/Politics, 7(4): 98-101. Negrine, R., (2008) The Transformation of Political Communication. Basingstoke, Hants: Palgrave Macmillan. (esp. Ch 2). Nord, L. (2001) Americanization v. the Middle Way: New Trends in Swedish Political Communication, Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 6, 113. Plasser, F. (2000) American Campaign Techniques Worldwide, Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 5, 34.
17

Plasser, F. (2000) American Campaign Techniques Worldwide, Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 5, 34. P33.

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Plasser, F (2002) Global Political Campaigning Westport, Conn: Praeger. Xifra, J (2011) Americanization, Globalization, or Modernization of Electoral Campaigns? Testing the Situation in Spain American Behavioral Scientist 2011 55: 667. Sage Publications.

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Class Conflict in the Modern Chinese Politics: The rise of labour movement as a sign of democracy? p.62-66
Ruo Wang

Since the reform policy in the 1980s, China has experienced remarkable economic growth through exports at an unprecedented pace, which has led to a radical social transformation. A recent rise in the number of labour movements in major Chinese cities is often interpreted as a sign that the country is finally moving towards democracy and towards the emergence of civil society through formation of strong working class. Despite its integration into the global market, Chinese officials are still unwilling to discard its socialist connotations in their political rhetoric.
Chinas ideological and political paradoxes have undermined the legacy of the revolution by peasants and workers during the 1940s and it has gradually downplayed the significance of the class during the reform era in the 1980s. In order to understand the class struggle in the Chinese context, it is important to briefly review the ways in which class struggle was incorporated and re-interpreted by Mao Zhedong during the civil war and the Cultural Revolution. The contradictory nature of class discourse by the state during the reform era illustrates how the emergence of the neoliberal political discourse has marginalised and obscured class inequality and other negative social connotations in order to facilitate the economic growth. It seems that workers uprising in China has not yet been translated into the rise of collective power The concept of class conflict by Marx and Weber Marx argues that class difference is the underlying social structure, which determines an individuals access to wealth and the means of production under a capitalist society 1. While the privileged upper and middle classes own the means of production, the working classes constantly face exploitation and abuse since their labour is a mere asset and is often undervalued. Marx describes that rising class-consciousness leads to successive claims for political empowerment. Similarly Webers approach to class is constructed upon social stratification. While Marx conceptualises each class as a collective unity, Weber highlights the divisions and subdivisions within a class1. In addition, in Weberian terms, class itself does not necessarily cause a social movement. The concept of class struggle presented by Marx and Weber is a useful comparative framework in examining Chinas class movement.
1

Gregory,D. Johnson,R., Pratt,G., Watts,M. and Whatmore, S. et al .(2009). The dictionary of human geography. Oxford: Willey-Blackwell.

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Classless society in Maoist China The language of class and class conflict employed during the revolutionary era (particularly during the Cultural Revolution in 1976) had significant social implications. Firstly class was used to challenge the traditional social hierarchy (landlords) that had prevailed in China throughout its history2. Secondly, class was also employed in order to spot counterrevolutionaries who sought to take a capitalist path within the party. Maos political campaigns ensured class was the central factor of bringing social transformation and therefore ultimately a classless and equal society. Although this meant the emergence of a new class division between officials and workers in the aspect of access to political power, the overall consequence of land reforms and nationalisation of industrialisation contributed to equalization and reduction in income inequality3. Therefore class conflict was a political tool to mobilise the peasants who benefitted from land reform and collectivisation and workers who enjoyed stable jobs in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which provided them with life-long employment and various social welfare services. However this class homogenisation was overthrown by the party under a new leadership in the 1980s as workers became a marginalised actor in the new political discourse.

Class discourse in the reform era During Dengs reform era (when de-collectivisation and privatisation were highly prioritised), the meaning of class started to entail negative connotations such as social turmoil and instability4. This historical and ideological change revealed a paradox in the partys political discourse as the previously mobilised supporters (peasants and workers) were silenced and even antagonised. The emergence of neoliberal ideology has gravitated the priority toward individualism, modernisation and open market at the expense of collectivism. The removal of workers life-long employment as well as the denied right to independent unionisation indicated the deprivation of not only social security but also the rights for organising themselves along the line or class. One of the reasons for diminishing the significance of class was that the party-state under new leadership sought for an olive-like harmonious society which obscured and minimised the existing rural-urban dualism. The states continuous efforts to eliminate the inequality through the demolition of migrants informal settlement in cities demonstrated the desire to obscure class5, even though such dualism was the underlying factor driving Chinas fast growing development. Such a harmonious society was regarded as a key element to attract investment and capital from multinational ventures for its economic growth.
2

Kraus, R. (1977). Class conflict and the vocabulary of social analysis in China. in The China Ngai,P. and Chan, C.K. (2008). The subsumption of class discourse in China. 2.35:2. 75-91 3 Lee,C.K. and Selden,M. (2007). Chinas durable inequality: legacies of revolution and pitfalls of reform. Japan Focus. January (http://faculty.washington.edu/stevehar/Lee%20and%20Selden.pdf) Accessed in 15 November 2012 4 Ngai,P. and Chan, C.K. (2008). The subsumption of class discourse in China. 2.35:2. 75-91. 5 Weinsterin,L. and Ren,X. (2009). The Changing Right to the City: Urban Renewal and Housing Rights in Globalizing Shanghai

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Also by rendering class as unacceptable, the party state managed to downplay the existing social inequality between the rising middle class and the low-skilled workers. Given that such income inequality is the underlying driving force that maintains cheap labours, social disparity was a crucial component of Chinas export-oriented economy. Thus Chinas political discourse excluded class-associated inequality in order to sustain its role as the worlds factory. More importantly, class was often considered as a threat to the sovereignty and legitimacy of the party. The role of class struggle during the Cultural Revolution implies that class could be used as a tool to overthrow the existing social hierarchy as well as the political structure. Since class is often associated with the power of civil society and masses, the party viewed the social cohesion or movement based on class could turn against the government. The governments response to the Tiannmen incident in which workers were treated far more harshly than the students elucidated its perception of mass movement as a political threat and social unrest.

Rural migrant workers as the revival of class society? There is a range of literature on factory workers protests and strikes against exploitative working conditions in Chinas cities. Chan6 exemplifies the struggles and achievements of workers in different factories in Shengzen through the development of relatively organised protests. The claims for decent rights and citizenship signify the collective interest of the new urban working class. And labour movements are generally associated with a form of civil society that could lead to democratisation7. However there are several reasons that explain why we need to be critical in conceptualising the recent movement of social workers as evidence of the revival of class society or the emergence of civil society, since they do not represent a homogenous unity. First of all, most of the strikes that took place in China remained highly fragmented and scattered and trade unions remained under official scrutiny. More importantly the significance of class identity was missing throughout the workers social actions. Most of them identified themselves as peasant workers or part-time workers, and there was a lack of solidarity among them as they often dispersed across regions after successive localised protests8. When protests were likely to become widespread across different regions, the state intervened and suppressed the unrest. As a result of the lack of uniformity among factory workers, and states tight control of trade unions, class was likely to remain silenced.

Chan, C.K. (2010). Class struggle in China: case studies of migrant worker strikes in the Pearl River Delta. th (2011) In China Left Review. (http://chinaleftreview.org/?p=495) accessed in 15 November 2012
7

Valenzuela, J.S. (1988). Labor Movements in Transitions to Democracy: A framework for analysis. Working Paper 104. The Kellogg Institute for International Studies
8

Chan, C.K. (2010). Class struggle in China: case studies of migrant worker strikes in the Pearl River Delta. th (2011) In China Left Review. (http://chinaleftreview.org/?p=495) accessed in 15 November 2012

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Therefore we need to deconstruct the category of workers in China, as they are not from a homogenous social and cultural background. Workers are divided between those who used to work at State-owned enterprises and others who did not possess urban residence permits. The rural migrant workers did not always share the common language and culture or even the same social norm with each other. The heterogeneity within the category of workers and even among rural migrant workers (as argued by Weber) reveals the necessity of taking a multifaceted approach in analysing the working class in China. The intersectionality between different identities such as gender, sexuality, ethnicity and religion needs to be taken into account when thinking about class and social conflict.

An alternative way of labour empowerment The historical contingency in Chinas class discourse demonstrates that class is not a fixed and static concept. Class entails different meanings to different socio-cultural groups of people. However class in present-day China is largely absent and oppressed and made unacceptable as it is often associated with negative connotations such as social turmoil and instability (as seen during the Cultural Revolution), which undermines its economic growth. The governments priority on modernisation and harmonious society renders class difference and social inequality as an obstacle of economic growth. Rather than addressing such social problems, the government attempts to stamp out and marginalise the urban poverty and rural migrants from the mainstream image of society in order to lure more foreign investment and capitals. In more recent terms, the states acknowledgement of rural migrant workers was a marker of a change in Chinas political discourse. However the migrant workers in the Special Economic Zones show the governments continuous attempts to perpetuate th e image of a harmonious society and their reluctance to address social inequality and class difference, given that such dualism are the bottom line of sustaining Chinas global position as worlds factory and therefore its economic growth. Having argued that the working class in China is a highly fragmented entity that undermines their solidarity and mobilisation, the civil society in China seems to have a long way to go. Also, the Chinese government is likely to step in to prevent any form of labour movement to maintain its competitiveness in the global economy. However workers may be able to find an alternative solution from their employers with corporate social responsibility that conforms to the international labour standards. An increasing number of firms that are contracted to multinational corporations have adopted codes of conduct to guarantee a number of basic rights for workers such as safe working environment and decent working hours. The key to encourage firms to develop better codes of conduct lies in the hands of consumers in the Western societies. The civil societies, in the form of international NGOs, can pressure corporations to adopt improved corporate social responsibility in their contracted factories and/or suppliers through lobbying and protests. By doing so, the western consumers can indirectly and implicitly influence the attitude of Chinese government to finally address the diverse interests of workers.

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Ruo Wang MSc Global Politics. year of graduation 2013. wakachai@gmail.com

References Chan, C.K. (2010). Class struggle in China: case studies of migrant worker strikes in The Pearl River Delta. (2011) In China Left Review.(http://chinaleftreview.org/?p=495) accessed in 15th November 2012 Gregory,D. Johnson,R., Pratt,G., Watts,M. and Whatmore, S. et al .(2009). The dictionary of human geography. Oxford: Willey-Blackwell. Kraus, R. (1977). Class conflict and the vocabulary of social analysis in China. in The China Quarterly.69.54-74. Ngai,P. and Chan, C.K. (2008). The subsumption of class discourse in China. 2.35:2. 75-91. Lee,C.K. and Selden,M. (2007). Chinas durable inequality: legacies of revolution and pitfalls of reform. Japan Focus. January (http://faculty.washington.edu/stevehar/Lee%20and%20Selden.pdf) Accessed in 15 November 2012 Weinsterin,L. and Ren,X. (2009). The Changing Right to the City: Urban Renewal and Housing Rights in Globalizing Shanghai Valenzuela, J.S. (1988). LABOR MOVEMENTS IN TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS. Working Paper 104. The Kellogg Institute for International Studies

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Sovereignty in Question: Setting the Limits p. 67-71

K. Ipek Miscioglu

The aim of this piece is to dare to question one of the most established norms of the modern state system: Sovereignty. Underneath the established system of global politics, guided by the principles of sovereignty, simmers the legitimacy deficit. For instance, states are bound by international law and norms, but they themselves are the ultimate authorities as the lawmakers. This renders global politics prone to abuse and manipulation by states. Accordingly, I argue that to have a more legitimate and just global political order, state sovereignty should be limited. A global human rights regime has tremendous potential to be the mechanism to limit and legitimize state sovereignty. In the following parts I will provide a discussion of the current status quo, the consequent problems and the reasons why human rights should be the mechanism to counter the dominance of sovereignty.
Origins of Sovereignty The origins of our contemporary conceptualization of sovereignty can be traced back to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. With the principle of non-intervention and the absence of a higher authority in international relations, sovereignty has given states significant power. It has become the main norm of inter-state relations and international law. This norm has shaped the international arena in certain ways. Firstly, states have turned out to be untouchable: borders are regarded as ultimate, and states posses the means to control the dissemination of information about the affairs in these borders. Minority groups demanding secession are regarded as transgressing some sort of divine law, as if current nation states had not themselves emerged from secessions from empires. What's more, international society has the tendency to remain silent in the face of huge massacres due to the non-interference principle (if they dont remain silent, any sort of intervention brings its own controversies). The fact that journalists are kept away from operations in Mali is a contemporary example of how the outflow of information can be blocked by those in power1. Another implication of sovereignty is that the state emerged as an agent motivated mainly by power that does (most of the time) everything to preserve the tools and sources to posses that power in domestic politics. Information and norm production are exploited to reinforce the authority of the state. All actions of a state are framed as if they are in the best interest of its people, though they might be prioritizing state interests. Similarly, domestic law is introduced as the ultimate rule of order, although law can also be regarded as

Mali journalists despair over 'invisible war, Yasmine Ryan , 27.01.2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/2013127154355125483.html

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codification of no more than contemporary power relations or moral rules2. It helps states to reproduce and reinforce their power in domestic politics. Reign of Power in Global Politics Within the sovereignty paradigm, the absence of authority above states makes states the most powerful agents. The consequence is that there might be an exception for nearly every rule of international relations because states have the power to create exceptions for themselves. If the USA were not very powerful, it would not have been able to talk about pre-emptive war in a world where aggression is illegal3. Whats more, in international law, sovereignty shows itself in the consent mechanism. Of course it has its own logic; it does not make sense to force a state to adopt a treaty, but the problem is that states can also use the consent mechanism to protect their interests. The case of ICC is an excellent example showing the problematic nature of the issue: What is the point in establishing a court if states can decide whether to be judged by it or not? These are the many implications of a world where inter-state relations are organized by the principle of sovereignty. We all know that there are mechanisms or norms that limit state sovereignty like the Responsibility to Protect, but are they efficient enough to provide a more legitimate global politics? In the next parts, I will discuss the details of this problem and suggest human rights as the mechanism to achieve state legitimacy. Global Legitimacy Deficit The implications of sovereignty are accompanied by many factors that lead to a global legitimacy deficit. If we understand the reasons and consequences of this deficit sufficiently, then it will be easier to come up with solutions. There are three points to mention in this respect. To begin with, the sanctity of members and borders of states raises a moral problem. States are assumed to act only in the best interest of their citizens4. Consequently the notion of associative obligation, which means the state is obliged to provide justice only to its members, emerges5. This member/non-member differentiation leads from time to time to inaction against massive human rights violations taking place in other states. The perception that only a particular state is responsible for dealing with problems of its nation facilitates the endurance of global poverty or mass atrocities. Abuse of power in domestic politics is another factor. Due to the assurance that no one is going to interfere, policy makers have overconfidence. While domestic laws secure state authority, sovereignty is not particularly sensitive to political legitimacy or democracy6. We can never know the extremes to which a state can aspire. Of course with the help of history and the dynamics of globalization states are not as free as they were before say the

Durkheim, Durkheims Early Works, Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim, and Max Weber, Cambridge University Press 1971, p.74 3 UN Charter article 2(4) , www.un.org 4 A. Buchanan, International Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999), pp.71-87, p.73 5 T. Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33:2 (2005), pp.113-147, p.121 6 D. Luban, Just War and Human Rights, Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980), p.166,

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establishment of the UN or emergence of a human rights regime or the ICC. However, the danger still persists. Powerful states can shape the norms and rules of international relations or circumvent them. This lessens the credibility of many initiatives that may be helpful otherwise. Take the selective approach to humanitarian interventions (why Libya 2011, why not Darfur 20032009?) and how the ways that they are conducted produce suspicions about the real reasons behind those incidents (oil? geostrategic power? supporting allies?). States are both the lawmakers and the subjects of it. Hence, international law is state-centric, and the codification of the rules is in compliance with states perception of legitimacy and effective action7. States have priority over individuals, societies or any other non-state actor in the realm of international law. Turkeys geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the rights of refugees and asylum seekers is a relevant instance. Accordingly, Turkey grants refugee status to only European asylum seekers in order to avoid huge flows from other geographies, which can be seen as a form of discrimination. Global Human Rights as an alternative Based on these three points showing the disadvantages of uncontrolled or inefficiently controlled state sovereignty, it is time to talk about how to change this disadvantageous situation. I argue that human rights have a potential to have transcultural recognition and moral legitimacy to be used to check state sovereignty. If human rights' influence on global politics increases, it can challenge mechanisms of power politics such as humanitarian intervention. However, the current institutionalization of universal human rights is a slow one still in the process of evolving. I suggest taking up the deliberate task of integrating human rights as a tool to recognize a state or dissolve s states sovereignty. Of course, the questions of how to do it and how to define an intercivilisational conception of basic human rights are essential questions waiting to be answered. For now, what is to be done is to prove why human rights are suggested for this task in the first place. In the next part, I will explain my reasons for suggesting human rights as a tool to limit and control state sovereignty. First of all, I agree with John Rawls that a minimalist list of human rights have the potential of cross-cultural acceptance8. However, this list should be formulated on an intercivilisational basis to avoid imposing ones values over another9. The second is that I agree with the argument that a political institution is meaningful only when its members give their consent, and their well-being in that institution is achieved. Since basic human rights are the rights that are essential for people to have other rights 10, their efficiency is vital for a healthy political life. For example, without freedom of speech, people cannot voice their political will. As a final reason I suggest the normative value of human rights. Parallel to the traditional human rights approach, the claim is that human rights should protect all humans from abuse at a universal level. Human rights inclusive approach and normative moral content (recognizing every person as a moral agent regardless of
7 8

J. Tasioulas, Are Human Rights Triggers for Intervention? , Philosophy Compass 4:6 (2009), pp.938-950, p.947 J. Tasioulas, Are Human Rights Triggers for Intervention? , Philosophy Compass 4:6 (2009), pp.938-950, p.941 9 Onuma Yasuaki, Toward a More Inclusive Human Rights Regime, The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. J.R. Bauer & D. A. Bell, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1999, p.123 10 D. Luban, Just War and Human Rights, Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980), p.174

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culture/membership etc.) has the potential to be a concrete tool for people to use against state power and to set a general paradigm to organize the political system and statesociety/individual relations. Based on these reasons, I think human rights have high potential to define and even grant state sovereignty. In that case, both domestic and global political systems will be more legitimate and just. Thereby, the role power plays in politics will decrease, the suspicions of whether the state x is really humanitarian or pursuing a hidden interest will hopefully weaken. States will become more sensitive to peoples needs and interests rather than focusing solely on their own. Otherwise, as it is well said, sovereignty can turn into a bloody license to kill41. Kadriye pek Misciolu Human Rights, 2013 K.I.Miscioglu@lse.ac.uk

41

A. ubuku, The Responsibility to Protect: Libya and the Problem of Transnational Solidarity, Journal of Human Rights, 12:1 (2013), pp:40-58, p.47

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References A. Buchanan, International Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999), pp.71-87 A. ubuku, The Responsibility to Protect: Libya and the Problem of Transnational Solidarity, Journal of Human Rights, 12:1 (2013), pp:40-58 D. Luban, Just War and Human Rights, Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980) Durkheim, Durkheims Early Works, Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim, and Max Weber, Cambridge University Press 1971 J. Tasioulas, Are Human Rights Triggers for Intervention? , Philosophy Compass 4:6 (2009), pp.938-950 J. Cohen, Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and Sovereignty in the age of Globalization, Political Theory 36 (2008), pp.578-606 T. Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33:2 (2005), pp.113-147 O. Yasuaki, Toward a More Inclusive Human Rights Regime, The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. J.R. Bauer & D. A. Bell, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1999

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EU Institutions

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The Subsidiarity Principle: Finding a Space for National Parliaments within the EU Decision Making Processes. P. 73-78
Lim Tse Wei

Vaguely defined, the subsidiarity principle was envisaged as a judicial and political tool1 aimed at limiting the intrusion of European Union (EU) legislative powers into Member States apropos the post-Maastricht expansion of EU competence2. The Lisbon regime contains mechanisms that safeguard subsidiarity by inviting national parliamentarian input, but the effectiveness of these mechanisms is doubtful given the empirical reality of the EU legislative process, which side-lines national parliamentarian agendas. Thus, subsidiarity is seen as a series of attempts to fit national parliaments (Parliaments) within the EU legislative process. This article offers a middle ground by arguing that subsidiarity, in its entirety, reduces Parliaments to advisory roles in the EU lawmaking process while it is also capable of achieving a minimum standard of EU involvement. This article will trace the development of the Lisbon regime of subsidiarity and its institutional criticisms while offering several forms that the subsidiarity principle can take. This is followed by an analysis of the weaknesses of the subsidiarity principle as an ex ante review tool of EU decisions before reaching its concluding remarks.

Development of the subsidiarity principle At present, the subsidiarity principle is found in Article 53 of the Treaty of the European Union, which presumes legislative deference to Member States except in those areas in which the EU has an exclusive competence. However, the EU is allowed to intervene where legislative aims cannot be adequately realised by Member States due to the scale or effects of the legislative issues. As a devolutionary tool, the subsidiarity principle combines the principle of conferral with self-determination to bring the EU decisions-making process as close to the polity as possible4.

This essay uses judicial tool to mean subsidiarity as a ground for ex post review of EU legislative power in relation to EU Member States via the European Court of Justice. P. Kiiver, The early-warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: the national parliament as a Conseil d'Etat for Europe (2011) European Law Review 98 2 Chalmers et. al, European Union Law: Text and Materials (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 3 Chalmers et. al, European Union Law: Text and Materials (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at p.23 4 The commitment to self-determination is evident from the wording of Article 1 TEU that marked a new stage in the processin which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.

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Subsidiarity emerged to alleviate fears of excessive centralisation as new competences were assigned to the EU in the Maastricht Treaty5. Firstly, the new legislative procedures in the Maastricht Treaty caused an exponential growth of intrusive EU legislation that lacked democratic legitimacy. Fligstein observes that the number of binding acts passed rose from 400 acts in 1984 (pre-Maastricht) to 2500 acts in 1992 (year of entry)6. Secondly, the postMaastricht competences of the EU were vague and were diversely interpreted by various institutional actors fuelling questions on competence creeps7 and the democratic legitimacy of EU decisions. Thirdly, it became apparent that the EU had a social agenda and was no longer limited to the single market after the Maastricht conference. The EUs new political project fuelled public fears of excessive federalism8. Consequently, the EU added Article 5 in the Treaty of the European Union as a political response. Current safeguards of subsidiarity Early warning mechanism The Lisbon regime institutionalised (i.e. judicially enforced) an ex ante subsidiarity review in the EU ordinary legislative process via the early warning mechanism (EWM) (Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality). The Protocol requires that the EU Commission (Commission) relay draft EU legislative proposals (proposals) to Parliaments to be reviewed for compliance with the subsidiarity principle. The latter can express findings of non-compliance through reasoned opinions to the Commission. Concurrently, each Parliament with 2 votes each will vote on the proposals compliance with subsidiarity. Under the yellow card procedure, if the negative votes represent a third of the total tally, the Commission is required to review the proposal but has complete discretion on the follow-up process9. Under the orange card procedure, where the negative votes amount to a simple majority of all allocated votes, the Commission has to review the proposal but must seek the approval of the Council and European Parliament should it wish to maintain the proposal. This scheme appears to empower Parliaments to limit the EUs legislative powers in two ways10. First, Parliaments can use their input to limit EU legislative agenda via their
5

Craig, P., Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis (2012) Journal of Common Market Studies, 50: 7287 at p.73 6 Chalmers et. al, European Union Law: Text and Materials (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at p.363 7 nd Craig, European Union Administrative Law (2 ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 8 Burca, The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union , Modern Law Review Volume 59, Issue 3, pp 349 376, May 1996
9

Ibid, Article 7(2) Ibid, article 7(3) 11 Jancic observes that the problem of privity existed in Portugal prior to the Barosso Initiative which essentially endeavours the same aims as the early warning mechanism. See Davor Jancic, The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy boost? Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 8, Issue 1, pp. 78-91 12 P. Kiiver, The early-warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: the national parliament as a Conseil d'Etat for Europe (2011) European Law Review 98 at p99. Similar views were forwarded by in Chalmers et. al, European Union Law: Text and Materials (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at p.130 13 Ibid
10

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reasoned opinions. Secondly, Parliaments can exert their influence via government representatives in the Council who will be held to account for deviations to the national position on EU matters. These processes are aided by the enhanced transparency granted by the EWM through the relay of proposals and explanatory memoranda to Parliaments for their deliberation. Consequently, the EU legislative agenda is no longer privy to governments anymore, thus, enhancing ministerial accountability11. Importantly, the input of Parliaments injects democratic legitimacy into the EU decision-making process. Problematically, the EWM was too impractical to safeguard subsidiarity. First, the one-third voting threshold is impractically high12. The threshold allows EU measures to be adopted despite it receiving from most Parliaments and a half of the Council members. This absurd outcome implies the primacy of the EU. However, this formalistic argument is untenable as it ignores the political reality of EU law-making in which such a large political opposition cannot be ignored by the Commission13. This, however, does not address the collective action problem in the EWM in which all Parliaments act in their own interest and ignore localised politically sensitive issues of other Parliaments. Thus, the negative vote of the affected Parliament is drowned in the positive majority exemplified by the opposition of other Member States to certain subsidiarity judicial challenges submitted by its affected counterparts14. These observations weaken the idea of subsidiarity as a limit of the EUs competences. The Barroso Initiative Parliaments may alternatively look at the Barroso Initiative (BI) to exert their influence in the EU legislative process. The BI, predating the EWM, runs alongside Article 5 of the Treaty of the EU. The BI is an informal consequently, not judicially enforceable political dialogue between Parliaments and the Commission on all aspects of the EU legislative agenda. Like the EWM, the BI emerged as a response to the Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty due to the democratic deficit of EU institutions. As a remedy, the Commission underwent a cultural change15 and invited the input of Parliaments in draft proposals to strengthen cooperation in monitoring subsidiarity16. Unlike the EWM, the BI dialogues may even include political desirability of EU legislations rather than a focus on subsidiarity an alternative ground of limiting the EUs actions.

14

Craig, European Union Administrative Law (2 ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) Jancic observes that the Parliaments faced strong negative attitude from the Commission in EU law-making. See Davor Jancic, The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy boost? Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 8, Issue 1, pp. 78-91 at p.86 16 European Commission, A Ctitizens Agenda: Delivering Results for Europe, COM (2006) 211, p.9. 17 Davor Jancic, The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy boost? Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 8, Issue 1, pp. 78-91 18 Jancic observes starkly varying degrees of voluntarism in the BI process. Davor Jancic, The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy boost? Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 8, Issue 1, pp. 78-91 at p.8691
15

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However, the weaknesses of the BI are apparent. It is not judicially enforceable and merely the result of the Commissions willingness for dialogue. As a corollary, a change in the Commission leadership with a recalcitrant President will diminish the efficacy of the BI. This scenario is unlikely given that the Commission Presidents are proposed by the European Council and that the Commission is driven by policy analysis17. Furthermore, legality does not underlie the BIs efficacy, it is instead a tool to express political desirability. The BI can potentially produce active subsidiarity watchdogs18 if Parliaments reciprocate the Commissions voluntarism19. However, this political dialogue still fails to overcome the collective action problem discussed earlier, thus, remaining an unconvincing tool to limit EU legislative power. Other problems with subsidiarity Apart from the discussed institutional weaknesses of subsidiarity, the principle is weak in other areas of ex ante legislative review. First, it causes regulatory failure20. As an instrumental principle, subsidiarity favours the use of Directives, rather than Regulations, which grant Parliaments discretion in regulating prescribed policy areas. Craig observes that national discretion leads to regulatory failure due to inconsistent and inadequate rules requiring frequent remedial review of primary legislation21. Second, subsidiarity discriminates against the view of private actors - especially entrepreneurs - who incur the cost of inconsistent legislations. Inconsistent regulations increase the number of entry barriers into the market and results in higher prices to offset regulatory risks which are later transmitted to consumers. These are anathema to the single market project.

The third weakness is its non-justifiability. The ECJ is reluctant to declare EU institutions wrong on subsidiarity22 as exemplified by the Netherlands case (Case C-377/98, 2001) in which the ECJ declared a Directive as subsidiarity-compliant despite the EUs exiguous
19 20

Craig, European Union Administrative Law (2 ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at p.394 Craig, P., Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis (2012) Journal of Common Market Studies, 50: 7287 21 According to Craig, the The De Larosire report on failures in the regulatory regime concerning financial supervision provides merely one high-profile example of this.
22

nd

See Craig, P., Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis (2012) Journal of Common Market Studies, 50: 72 nd 87 at p.80; Craig, European Union Administrative Law (2 ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Chalmers et. al, European Union Law: Text and Materials (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at p.364 23 There have only been 20 challenges so far which includes several duplicate challenges. However, the paucity in precedents may not offer a proper sample size for legal analysis. See Craig, P., Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis (2012) Journal of Common Market Studies, 50: 7287 at p.80 24 P. Kiiver, The early-warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: the national parliament as a Conseil d'Etat for Europe (2011) European Law Review 98 at p98 25 Kiiver shares this insight on a minimum standard for EU involvement.

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reasoning for it to be regulated at the EU level. This judicial reluctance stems from the recognition of the majoritarian support and legitimacy of the EU legislative process and its multi-party numerous consultations. Furthermore, findings of incompatibility are unconvincing as the ECJ works with little evidence of regulatory efficacy at both the national and regional levels since the EU legislation was enacted instead of the national legislation. Thus, there have been few successful subsidiarity challenges which confirm its inefficacy as a judicial tool23. The weaknesses of subsidiarity make it an untenable limit on EU legislative competence. Thus, the Lisbon regime merely accommodates Parliaments as advisors on subsidiarity. While the national parliamentarians may dislike being reduced to an advisory capacity, their limited political influence is still better than being side-lined24. Parliaments should embrace their limited role and become active watchdogs to maximise the potential of voluntary driven BI as many Member States are still trying to define their proper roles in EU decisionmaking process. This new definition of national roles could potentially lead to a minimum standard for EU involvement25. Lim Tse Wei LLB in Laws, 2013 t.w.lim@lse.ac.uk

References This essay uses judicial tool to mean subsidiarity as a ground for ex post review of EU legislative power in relation to EU Member States via the European Court of Justice. P. Kiiver, The early-warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: the national parliament as a Conseil d'Etat for Europe (2011) European Law Review 98 Chalmers et. al, European Union Law: Text and Materials (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at p.23 Craig, European Union Administrative Law (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) The commitment to self-determination is evident from the wording of Article 1 TEU that marked a new stage in the processin which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen. Craig, P., Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis (2012) Journal of Common Market Studies, 50: 7287 at p.73 Chalmers et. al, European Union Law: Text and Materials (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at p.363 Craig, European Union Administrative Law (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at p. 390 Burca, The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union, Modern Law Review Volume 59, Issue 3, pp 349376, May 1996. Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Article 67.
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Ibid, Article 7(2) Ibid, article 7(3) Jancic observes that the problem of privity existed in Portugal prior to the Barosso Initiative which essentially endeavours the same aims as the early warning mechanism. See Davor Jancic, The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy boost? Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 8, Issue 1, pp. 78-91 P. Kiiver, The early-warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: the national parliament as a Conseil d'Etat for Europe (2011) European Law Review 98 at p99. Similar views were forwarded by in Chalmers et. al, European Union Law: Text and Materials (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at p.130 Ibid Craig, European Union Administrative Law (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) Jancic observes that the Parliaments faced strong negative attitude from the Commission in EU law-making. See Davor Jancic, The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy boost? Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 8, Issue 1, pp. 78-91 at p.86 European Commission, A Ctitizens Agenda: Delivering Results for Europe, COM (2006) 211, p.9. This move reaffirms the EUs view in the 2001 Laeken Declaration which drew attention to the Union's shortcomings in this matter, making compliance with the subsidiarity principle a priority in the reform process. The European Council comprises heads of governments. Davor Jancic, The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy boost? Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 8, Issue 1, pp. 78-91 Jancic observes starkly varying degrees of voluntarism in the BI process. Davor Jancic, The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy boost? Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 8, Issue 1, pp. 78-91 at p.8691 Craig, European Union Administrative Law (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at p.394 Craig, P., Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis (2012) Journal of Common Market Studies, 50: 7287 According to Craig, the The De Larosire report on failures in the regulatory regime concerning financial supervision provides merely one high-profile example of this. See Craig, P., Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis (2012) Journal of Common Market Studies, 50: 7287 at p.80; Craig, European Union Administrative Law (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Chalmers et. al, European Union Law: Text and Materials (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at p.364 Case C-377/98 Netherlands v European Parliament and Council (Biotechnology Directive) [2001] ECR I-7079 There have only been 20 challenges so far which includes several duplicate challenges. However, the paucity in precedents may not offer a proper sample size for legal analysis. See Craig, P., Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis (2012) Journal of Common Market Studies, 50: 7287 at p.80 P. Kiiver, The early-warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: the national parliament as a Conseil d'Etat for Europe (2011) European Law Review 98 at p98 Kiiver shares this insight on a minimum standard for EU involvement.
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