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Published by Janz Serrano
under Prof. dela Cerna 2nd sem AY '11-'12
credits go to the persons cited in the document
under Prof. dela Cerna 2nd sem AY '11-'12
credits go to the persons cited in the document

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Published by: Janz Serrano on Apr 08, 2013
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Eusebio v. Eusebio, et. al
Concepcion, J.
Eugenio filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for appointment asadministrator of the estate of his deceased father, Andres. Illegitimate siblings of Eugenio, Amanda et al, opposed the petition contending that venue was improperly laid.CFI Pampanga, according to oppositors, is the correct venue since San Fernando was thetrue domicile of the deceased whose estate is being settled. CFI Rizal overruled the
opposition and granted Eugenio’s petition. On appeal, the SC reversed CFI Rizal –
venue,indeed, has been improperly laid! Following Rule 75, Sec. 1 (now Rule 73, Sec.1),
“If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death xxx.
Although it is true that shortly before his death Andres bought a house in QC andbegan moving his belongings from San Fernando thereto, the SC found that there was no
clear showing of Andres’s intention to change domicile. The evidence weighed by the CFI
Rizal actually proved that Andres still considers San Fernando as his true domicile andthat he was moving to QC only for medical purposes without definite intention (
)to change the same. Moreover, there is a presumption in law
changes of domicile.In other words, there is a presumption in favor of the continuance of an existingdomicile. Therefore, the burden of proving a change of domicile lies on those who allegedthat a change has occurred. Failing this, and absent any evidence of intention/animus, it is to be presumed that the party has retained the last domicile known to have beenpossessed by him. This follows from the principle that a domicile acquired is retaineduntil another is gained.
Appeal from an order of CFI Rizal (Quezon City) granting Eugenio’s petition for
appointment as administrator of the estate of his deceased father Andres over theobjection of his illegitimate siblings, Amanda et al.
It is not disputed that up to Oct 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been,domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as someother properties
Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, whotreated him resided at Quezon City, Andres bought a house and lot at latter City,located along España Extension.
While transferring his belongings to his new house, Andres suffered a stroke forwhich reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) residence, where Andresremained until he was brought to the UST Hospital sometime before Nov. 26, 1952
On the day of Nov. 26, Andres contracted marriage in
articulo mortis
with hiscommon law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in UST hospital. Two days later, Nov. 28,he died of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of 74 years. Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in the house he just bought at QC. The domicile of origin of Andres was San Fernando, Pampanga, wherehe resided for over seventy (70) years
100 Phil 593 (1956)
Almost a year later, on Nov 16, 1953, Eugenio, legitimate son of Andres, filed withthe CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his
father, Andres. According to Eugenio’s petition, Andres was residing in the City of 
Quezon at the time of his demise
Amanda, et al, objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of Andres and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed,therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had beenimproperly filed
By an order, CFI Rizal overruled this objection and granted Eugenio
’s petition~
Hence, this appeal taken by Amanda et al. The appeal hinges on the
of theresidence (domicile) of Andres at the time of his death on Nov 28, 1952
Issue/s and Held:
WON venue was improperly laid with CFI Rizal -
Rule 75 (now Rule 73), section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
 Where estate of deceased persons settled.
If the decedent is an inhabitant of thePhilippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is aninhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which hehad estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of adecedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdictionassumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in anappeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appearson the record.
It is clear from the above Rule that the CFI having jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of a deceased RESIDENT of the Philippines (citizen or alien) is the one inthe province in which the decedent resides AT THE TIME OF DEATH
From the facts, although Andres bought a house in QC and started moving hisbelongings thereto, the presumption is that he retained his original domicile, and,hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary. It is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained"
Under the circumstances of the case at bar, if Andres established another domicile, it must have been one of choice. The following are the conditions essential indetermining change of domicile: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2)physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently
Admittedly, Andres was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been inQuezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down towhether he intended to stay in that place
the answer to this last 
question is NO.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does Andres appear to havemanifested his wish to live indefinitely in QC. Eugenio, who took the witness stand,
did not testify thereon, despite his allegation in his answer that "the deceased (had)decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon City"
Eugenio also did not introduce the testimony of his brother Dr. Jesus Eusebio, uponwhose advice, presumably, the house and lot in QC was purchased, and who,therefore, might have cast some light on Andres's purpose/intention in buying theproperty
The CFI’s position that Andres’s acquisition of the QC pro
perty is proof enough of hisintention to change domicile is UNTENBALE. Evidence shows that the QC house andlot were bought because Andres had been adviced to do so "due to his illness". Saidadvice was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor andhave a more effective treatment 
It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in aplace merely for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that onewill never again be able, on account of illness, to return home."
Also militating against the claim of change of domicile is that fact that Andres didnot part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Additionally, in thedeed of sale of the QC house and lot, Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as hisresidence. Similarly, residence certificates used by Andres in acknowledging thedeed of sale before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly,the marriage contract signed by the deceased when he was married, in
at the UST Hospital two (2) days prior to his demise stated that his residenceis San Fernando, Pampanga
Alfonso, one of the legitimate full brothers of Eugenio, was a witness to saidwedding, thus indicating that the children of the deceased by his first marriage,including Eugenio, were represented on that occasion and would have objected tosaid statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart fromEugenio's failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to establish hishome in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death,prove the contrary
At any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile
which isparticularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin
has not been offset bythe evidence of record
 Side Issue 1:
The CFI rejected the oppositors’ evidence and refused to entertain the same on the
ground that said documents should not be admitted in evidence beforeappellants/oppositors had established their "personality" to intervene in the case,referring seemingly to their filiation. But when appellants/oppositors sought duringsaid hearing, to establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged illegitimatechildren, His Honor, the trial Judge refused to hear the appellants/oppositors unlessthey agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the CFI
the procedure adopted by the
lower court or the inference it drew from the circumstances surrounding the case isREPREHENSIBLE!
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, onthe one hand, he declared that appellants could not be permitted to introduceevidence on the residence of the decedent, for they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by cross-examining the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to the authorityof the court 
Appellants/oppositors were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not onlytheir right to object to Eugenio's petition, but, also, that venue had been laidimproperly. Clearly, the lower court should have admitted their evidence and giventhereto the proper effect, in connection with the issue under consideration.
 Side Issue 2:
It appears that CFI Pampanga received a petition of appellants/oppositors hereinfor the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio" docketedas Special Proceedings No. 957
The children of Andres by first marriage moved for the dismissal of saidproceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case before the CFI Rizal. Thismotion was granted, relying upon Rule 75, section 1, to wit: "the court first takingcognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction tothe exclusion of all other courts."
Although said CFI Pampanga dismissal order is now final, it cannot affect theoutcome of the case at bar. Said order did not pass upon the question of domicile orresidence of the decedent 
Moreover, the quoted provision of the Rules of Court (Rule 75, Sec.1) refers to casestriable before two or more courts with
jurisdiction. It could not possiblyhave intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested therein by law,merely because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to whichjurisdiction is denied by law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of oneof the parties
More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who haveproperties in several provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of theirrespective estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction
 and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts
but, also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of theRules of the Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence,which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled the court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of thedecedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit orproceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when thewant of jurisdiction appears on the record.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts, and thequestion of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case wasfiled shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue (Taciana Vda. De Borja vs.Tan)
Hence, should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue hadbeen improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and thecorresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court 
 Fule v. CA
Martin, J
Fule, as creditor of the estate of Amado, filed a petition for letters of administration in the CFI Calamba, Laguna and was appointed as special adminstratrix.
Preciosa, the surviving spouse, opposed this petition. During the pendency of the Fule’s
appeal before the SC, Preciosa filed a petition for letters of administration before the CFIof Rizal, QC Branch over the same intestate estate of Amado. HELD: The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of lettersof administration merely constitute venue. Since the last place of residence of Amadowas at Quezon City, and
at Calamba, Laguna, the venue for Fule's petition for lettersof administration was improperly laid in the CFI of Calamba.
Virginia G. Fule filed with the CFI Laguna (Judge Malvar), a petition for letters of administration alleging that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia,
a property owner of Calamba
died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personalproperties in Calamba and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the HonorableCourt." She moved
ex parte
for her appointment as special administratrix over theestate. Judge Malvar granted the motion.
MR was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia contending that the order appointing Fule asspecial administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petitionfor letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in theestate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for theappointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado, sheshould be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Fule is adebtor of the estate of Amado. She prayed that she be appointed specialadministratrix of the estate, in lieu of Fule, and as regular administratrix after duehearing.
While the MR was pending resolution, Preciosa filed a motion to remove Fule asspecial administratrix alleging Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
Fule filed a Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator.This modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during thelifetime of Amado, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado; (3) the allegationthat Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is thesurviving spouse of Amado and that she has expressly renounced her preferentialright to the administration of the estate in favor of Fule; and (4) that Fule beappointed as the regular administratrix.
74 SCRA 189 (1976)
The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa for the reasonthat it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the CFI of Laguna, of which the court wasnot possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.
An omnibus motion was filed by Fule praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as tosecure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative MarketingAssociation, Inc.
Preciosa opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by JudgeMalvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the deceased."
Judge Malvar issued an order denying the MR of Preciosa and admitting thesupplementation petition.
Preciosa moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition orover the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue wasimproperly laid; and (3) Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado.
Preciosa filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as specialadministratrix, reasoning that the said Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde,with whom Amado has no relation.
3 motions were filed by Preciosa: (1) to enjoin the special administratrix fromtaking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not beendetermined as belonging to Amado (2) to remove the special administratrix foracting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and (3) filed inbehalf of the minor Agustina, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action,jurisdiction, and improper venue.
Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Fule and the motion todismiss filed by Preciosa.
the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2,Rule 80, subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that theadministration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with theCanlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remainwith the latter
the special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order totake custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and personaleffects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters CooperativeMarketing Association, Inc.
Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative MarketingAssociation, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa certificates of title in hername without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear.
The issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order denyingPreciosa's motion to reconsider the appointment of Fule and admitting thesupplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original

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