G.R. No.

L-8409

December 28, 1956

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitionerappellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and
CARLOS EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father,
Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the
City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all
surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the
deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore,
that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order,
dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence, the
case is before us on appeal taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned
sister and brothers.
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for
Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate, in the Court of First Instance
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always
been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other
properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who
treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres
Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A Espaa Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). While
transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke

(probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's)
aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST
Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before November 26, 1952. On this date, he
contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in
said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to
hypertensive heart disease", at the age of seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he
never stayed or even slept in said house at Espaa Extention.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San
Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he
retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary,
for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained"
(Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate
of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres
Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following
conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical
presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of
Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624;
Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the
decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been in Quezon City several
days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that
place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have manifested
his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand,
did not testify thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of the
appellants herein, that "the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon
City". Moreover, said appellee did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate full brother and
son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No.
889-A Espaa Extention was purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast some light on his
(decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This notwithstanding, the lower court held that the
decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the acquisition of said
property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is untenable.lawphil.net
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had been adviced to
do so "due to his illness", in the very words of herein appellee. It is not improbable in fact, its
is very likely that said advice was given and followed in order that the patient could be near
his doctor and have a more effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly
changed by presence in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge
that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws,

by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906;
U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Moreover, some of his children, who used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga,
remained in that municipality. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said
property at No. 889-A Espaa Extention, Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on October 29,
1952, or less than a month before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his
residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates used by the decedent in
aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo
mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days
prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice
that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate full brothers of the herein appellee, was a witness to
said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the deceased by his first marriage, including
said appellee, were represented on that occasion and would have objected to said statement about
his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from appellee's failure to prove satisfactory
that the decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly
and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the
retention of the old domicile 1 which is particularly strong when the domicile is one of the
origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent has not been
offset by the evidence of record.
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, and
refused to entertain the same in the order appealed from. The reason therefor are deducible from
its resolution in rejecting said documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then
held:
Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the records for
whatever action oppositors may want to take later on because until now the personality of
the oppositors has not been established whether or not they have a right to intervene in
this case, and the Court cannot pass upon this question as the oppositors refuse to submit
to the jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should be
dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before
appellants had established their "personality" to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their
filiation. When appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to establish their relation with
the deceased, as his alleged illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's
objection thereto stating:

Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are
now trying to prove the status of your client; you are leading so that. The main point here
is your contention that the deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why
I allowed you to cross-examine. If you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors,
I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court.
This is not yet the time to declare who are persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)
Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of the decedent,
because of their alleged lack of "personality", but, when tried to establish such "personality",
they were barred from doing so on account of the question of venue raised by him. We find
ourselves unable to sanction either the foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the
inference it drew from the circumstances surrounding the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one
hand, he declared that appellants could not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence
of the decedent, for they contestedthe jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the
order appealed from, that, by cross-examining the appellee, said appellants had submitted
themselves to the authority of the court.
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the
lower court, appellants' counsel announced that he would take part therein "only to question the
jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the crossexamination of petitioner herein, said counsel tried to elicit the relation between the decedent and
the appellants. As, the appellee objected thereto, the court said, addressing appellants' counsel:
"Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish
the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the
jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel refused to do so, stating: "I
will insist on my stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1
and 2, for the reason that appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they
maintain that these proceedings should bedismissed." Thus, appellants specially made of record
that they were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the
purpose only of assailing the same, and the court felt that appellants were not giving up their
stand, which was, and is, a fact.
At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to
object to appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were: (a)
their alleged relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under
the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the
lower court should have admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper
effect, in connection with the issue under consideration.

Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this
connection, it appears that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga received a petition of appellants herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of
the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition for
the docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter
petition was granted by an order dated November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of
said court on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 957. On December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio
(the children of the decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for the
dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case, before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953. This motion was granted in an order dated
December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to
which "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did
not pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the
court first taking cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of
the Rules of Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or more courts
with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of
the authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case had been previously filed
before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same would then be defeated by the
will of one of the parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents
who have properties in several provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of their respective
estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said provinces, not only
because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction and, hence, the one first taking
cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts but, also, because the statement to this
effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court immediately follows the last part of
the next preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled
the court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.lawphil.net
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more
courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was

filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana
Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before
the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed
and the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it
should, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is dismissed, with
costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court
of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.

MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is
sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba,
presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2,
1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending
that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served
upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the
proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G.
Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G.
Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that
she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as
regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B.
Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May
8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or
incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the
estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the
court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by
Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17,
24, and 31, 1973, in theBayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of
Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the
original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado
G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last
place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia
and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio,
who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia

and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in
favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix.
The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the
reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original
petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental
petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest
of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G
Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to
take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to
secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar
on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real
properties making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B.
Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order
of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the
supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction
over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was
improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit
from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G.
Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the
court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde,
with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special
administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not
been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix
for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in
behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action,
jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule
and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge
Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2,
Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that
the administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang

Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the
special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take
custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent
with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of
the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to
Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words like "married
to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the
issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B.
Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the
supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters
of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured.
Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court
and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular
administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or
reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the
authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also
asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and
also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and
remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B.
Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that
the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of
the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of
November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the
issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c)
jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e)
delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's
motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other
three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix,
copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her
the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to
Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing
Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the name of
Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge
Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his

residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the
residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death his
residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing
in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for
certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No.
27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four
orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of
the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue,
among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery
of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before
Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for
lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith
elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B.
Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente
G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a
bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the
pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She
manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the
Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until
Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of
Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and
Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975,
and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the

motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed
their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order
granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the
payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity
of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for
certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Pao from further acting in the case. A
restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for
the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of
administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition
therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought,
and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the
decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and
the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be
appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest,
and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no
assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate,"
is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over
the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed
and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or

changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be
fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably
with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or
that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it
has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is
just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction
over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of
the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court,
however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A
fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and
issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised
Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall
be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the
actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal
rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence
of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely
stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna,
and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed

the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For
her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To
say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is,
according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in
his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other
papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision,
Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that
Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was
at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A
death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by
Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence
was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's
residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement
and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two
parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the
Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land
in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in
Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at
Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C.
Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper
venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When
improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before
Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or
venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere
practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on
the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of
the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is
another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving
spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary
or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a
will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of
the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the
allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the
basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the
probate court. 15That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his
personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that

discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the
same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not
be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the
judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in
appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this
respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law,
the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such,
if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The
good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of
a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late
Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no
relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter,
incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia
is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized
that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a
regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are
entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The
issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the
court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter
Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B.
Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of
candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First District of
Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his
spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,
Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado
G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly
decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon
City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon
City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado
G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be
approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from
continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc.
No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to

deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate
obligations is hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Muoz Palma, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 133743

February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029

February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12,
1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134
in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo),
who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo
contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942
out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel.
On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint
for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of
America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children
by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have
any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should

have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior
to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in
seeking the dismissal10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo
exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus,
she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph
2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph
2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of
Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration.
It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the
petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was
deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by
Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers
on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995,
Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous
motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position
papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It
found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but
said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place
of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that
although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in
Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in
Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue
of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus

With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the
enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view
sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the
express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be
denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can
institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the
Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in
Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous
with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo
never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because
it was performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife
of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he
resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down
the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the
decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to
say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated
as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place
of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from
1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She
also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100

San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of
the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letterenvelopes 48from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and
the deceaseds calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage
to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis
allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino
wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the
latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that
his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the
law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still
in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties
between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph
2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. TheVan Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one
of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien
spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the
cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the
Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law
is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts
and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia
v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,
she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with
the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws
as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless,
we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties
that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to
the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by

petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A.,
then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before
the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime
under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of coownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x x81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or
as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.