Sipes 1

Peter Sipes First Language Acquisition

A cross-sectional look at Expectation of Competence

Introduction
Young children accomplish a major feat: they acquire the meanings of thousands of words in a few short years (Markman, Wasow & Hansen, 2003). Diesendruck and Shemer (2006) have studied two-year-old children to see how they cope with matching unfamiliar words with unfamiliar objects. Their claim, supported by the results of this study, is that two-year-old children assume that adults making requests of them expect that they (the two-year-old child) can perform the requested task. This concept is called expectation of competency. This study takes a cross-sectional look at how older children behave in the same situation. Do three-, four- and five-year-old children show the same behavior as a two-year-old child when coping with unfamiliar words and unfamiliar objects? While the results are in no way conclusive due to the limited size of sample both in number of participants (N=4) and trials where expectation of competence can be put to use, it appears that children as young as 3;0 do not employ expectation of competence when dealing with requests for unknown objects with unfamiliar names.

Literature Review
One of the problems a child has to solve in acquiring a language is associating words with objects, at least where nouns are concerned. To help explain this phenomenon, a group of researchersDiesendruck, Markman and Markson among others use social-pragmatic approaches. Like many other angles of study on first language acquisition, it bridges psychology and linguisticsas made apparent by the journal titles that the research appears in. For example research on this topic appears in journals like First Language and Cognitive Psychology. Accordingly, this sort of approach will show children as active participants in social settings. A social-pragmatic approach is complementary to a Bruner-style1 social interactionist approach, but
1

For a quick introduction to Jerome Bruners work: http://www.simplypsychology.org/bruner.html

Sipes 2

the contrast lies in that Bruner proposes that children are using language to affect the world while social-pragmatics suggests that children are relying heavily on contextual clues within social interaction. To help keep experimental procedures straight: most, but not all, of the following studies involve a child, an interviewer, two objects and something to conceal one of the objects. The adult asks the child for an object, whether named or not, and records which object the child grabs or gestures toward. Expectation of competency Since this facet of word acquisition is central to this study, it comes first. At its core, this expectation says that children, two-year-olds in Diesendruck and Shemer (2006), expect that if an adult requests something from them, that they can perform the task. Thus Expectation of Competency. In practical terms, two-year-olds, when presented with a novel name and a novel object, will look in the box. Searching under the box is not motivated by curiosity: rather that they believe that the novel name refers to the deliberately hidden object (Diesendruck & Shemer, 2006). They further say that this finding runs explicitly contrary to mutual exclusion and lexical gap filling, both of which will be discussed in later headings (2006). Mutual exclusivity assumption One strategy children use in assigning names is the Mutual Exclusivity assumption, which is to say that children will map a novel label to a novel rather than a familiar object (Markman, Wasow & Hansen, 2003). By means of example: If you ask for a ball, a child expects that a ball is a BALL. Conversely if you ask for a pood, it is not a BALL since BALL already has a name. This fact is one of those principles, like the Premak principle1, that feels intuitive and obvious, but science needs to define these sorts of things for future useas in the case of this paper.
1

In short, youve got to eat your vegetables before dessert. More at http://www.psywww.com/intropsych/ch05_conditioning/premack_principle.html

Sipes 3

The relevant detail of the Markman et al. study is that by 2 1/2 years of age, children are highly consistent in mapping a novel object label to an object whose name is as yet unknown in preference to a previously named object (2003). One of the difficulties is that previous studies were with older children, which is not a complication in the study performed below. In fact, age is one of the factors specifically investigated. Markman et al. worked with younger children to see if mutual exclusion was at play with younger children. Since they come at the study with a social-pragmatic view, they want to downplay lexical principles and focus on the double expectation that children are motivated to match referents to objects and that children expect collaboration in communication (2003). Expectation of filling lexical gaps Momen and Merriman build on the principle of mutual exclusion and suggest that children do not so much rule out the familiar kind as embrace the novel one (2002). This idea, which they call Lexical Gap Filling, is not a contradiction to mutual exclusion so much as it is further refinement of it. Again, like the Premak principle, this seems obvious, but again it is necessary to spell it out. One interesting conclusion is that the stronger the expectation of Lexical Gap Filling, the stronger should have been their tendency to select the visible picture without first checking what was in the box (Momen & Merriman 2002). So what might a reasonable explanation be? Diesendruck and Shemer suggest that young children should check the box due to expectation of competency, which is the focus of this study. Sensitivity to parents knowledge Of course, children do not learn vocabulary in a vacuum. Both mutual exclusivity and lexical gap filling are centered on the child and his expectations. ONeills study of two-year-old children suggests that when requesting toys they do take into account their partner's knowledge (1996). In itself this fact is not surprising: everybody, everywhere takes other peoples knowledge into account in communication. What is surprising is that two-year-olds are doing

Sipes 4

this. In fact ONeill reports that Ross and Lolliss 1987 study shows nine-month-old infants increased their efforts at communicating as their adult partner lowered involvement (1996). The practical effect of their sensitivity to parent knowledge is that the children should, based on this research, take into account that the interviewer knows which labels belong to which objects. Avoiding lexical overlap Diesendruck and Markson (2001) worked with three-year-old children to see how the children avoid lexical overlap. In a series of three studies, they showed that children tend to choose an unfamiliar object rather than a familiar one when asked to find the referent of a novel name (Diesendruck & Markson, 2001). Yes, this fact again. But it is however only the first part of what children do. The next steps are what is interesting: three-year-old children assume that names for objects are common knowledge and that children play on that knowledge when assigning names to objects (Diesendruck & Markson, 2001). The second step of this progression, assumption of common knowledge, plays into the nature of this study. Children are being asked to put unfamiliar names to unfamiliar objects in the study, and who would know those names better? The child herself or the interviewing adult? The child assumes, correctly for virtually any real-world situation, that the adult knows the name. Therefore this bit of research ties together mutual exclusivity, lexical gap filling and assessment of parental knowledge state. Role of discourse in word learning Tomasello, Akhtar and Carpenter (1996), like O'Neill, suggest that children pay attention to the knowledge states of adults and novelty. When a two-year-old child and two adults play with three novel objects and then the child plays with the fourth object without adults present, the child assigns the correct name to the novel object in later discussion. This correct assignment of name happens not because of mutual exclusionit cannot work with multiple novel objects and one labelbut because children use pragmatic cues. In this case, the adult expresses surprise

Sipes 5

over the last object: Oh, look, a frant! Since the two-year-old knows that both she and the adults have already seen three of the objects, the exclamation must be over the last one.

Data Collection Methodology

In contrast to Diesendruck and Shemers 2006 work using two-year-old children, the current study is cross-sectional in nature. I interviewed four children of varying ages ranging from 2;3 to 5;9 (further information in the Subject Population section). In Diesendruck and Shemer (2006), the data-collection procedure was quite involved and vastly more extensive than this study. It took many stages. Since I had limited time and money and was working with children who were older, I had to pare down Diesendruck and Shemer's procedure. Diesendruck and Shemer showed two-year-old children a series of objects (2006). In the first stage of their work, it was established that there was always an object in the bucket. Because of time limitations, I explained to the three older children that there would always be something under the basket. With the youngest child, I had to spend more time establishing the ground rules through play, though this play took minimal time in this studys one-to-one setting. In Diesendruck and Shemers next stage, children were shown two objects: one in view and one in the bucket (2006). This stage of their experiment is the focus of this study. The children were asked to get either the object in view or the object under the basket. Finally, in the third stage of Diesendruck and Shemers experiment, children were shown three objects: two in view and one in the bucket. The purpose of the third stage was to have the familiarity of one item underline the novelty of the other. During the second and third stages children were asked to either point out or give an object to the interviewer. This stage was skipped altogether in this study. Furthermore, Diesendruck and Shemer divided the questions directed to children into two types (2006). Sometimes they asked for an object by name. Sometimes the object was not

Sipes 6

named. In this study, this division was not made. All objects were asked for by name. Methods specific to this study Each child was presented with twenty trials, conducted in English, distributed over the four possible combinations shown in the following table. Table 1: Four possible situations for two objects Seen object is known Unseen object is known unknown 1 3 unknown 2 4

Situation 2, when unknown objects are asked for, and situation 4, whether the requested object was known or unknown are subject to Expectation of Competency. These specific circumstances are reported in the data as Aligns with EoC. Situation 2, when a known object is requested; situation 1; and situation 3 are all used as controls to show that the child understands the proper procedure. For each trial, I covered my inventory of objects, pictured in Figures 1 and 2 with the basket and then placed one object in view and the other out of view in the basket. In all cases, I asked for a specific object and never asked can you give me something? I asked either Where is the ball? or Can you give me the ball? Each decision made by the child was recorded. The unfamiliar objects, seen in Figure 1, were given a list of possible names that did not violate the phonetics of English (e.g. pood, feth), though they were not used in any consistent manner during trials. The familiar objects are shown in Figure 2.

Sipes 7

Figure 1: The selection of unfamiliar objects

Figure 2: The selection of familiar objects

Data
The following tables are the compilation of how the children performed in the interviews. Note on terms: For seen and unseen objects, KNOWN and UNKNOWN refer to objects that the children know labels for or do not know labels for. The requested object is either SEEN, BASKET or NOVEL. Seen and unseen refer to known objects that are either seen or unseen. Novel objects are objects are objects that children do not have a name for, either seen or unseen. In the response column, SEEN and BASKET indicate whether the child chose the seen object or the object under the basket.

Table 2: Data for child AC, 5;9 Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Seen Object known unknown known unknown known known known Unseen Object Requested Object unknown unknown known known known unknown unknown seen novel basket basket seen basket seen Response seen seen basket basket seen basket seen Aligns with EoC? N -

Sipes 8

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

unknown unknown known unknown unknown known known unknown known known known unknown unknown

unknown known unknown known unknown known known known unknown unknown known unknown known

novel basket basket novel novel basket basket novel basket seen basket novel basket

seen basket basket seen seen basket basket basket basket seen basket seen basket

N N N Y N -

Table 3: Data for child SE, 4;6 Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Seen Object known unknown known unknown known known known unknown unknown known unknown unknown known known unknown known known Unseen Object Requested Object unknown unknown known known known unknown unknown unknown known unknown known unknown known known known unknown unknown seen novel basket basket seen basket seen novel basket basket novel novel basket basket novel basket seen Response seen seen seen basket seen basket seen seen basket basket seen seen basket basket seen basket seen Aligns with EoC? N * N N N N -

Sipes 9

18 19 20

known unknown unknown

known unknown known

basket novel basket

basket basket basket

Y, with hesitation -

Note to trial 3: Child was testing me to see what I would do if she selected the wrong object after she was asked to find an unfamiliar object.

Table 4: Data for child AV, 3;0 Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Seen Object known unknown known unknown known known known unknown unknown known unknown unknown known known unknown known known known unknown unknown Unseen Object Requested Object unknown unknown known known known unknown unknown unknown known unknown known unknown known known known unknown unknown known unknown known seen novel basket basket seen basket seen novel basket basket novel novel basket basket novel basket seen basket novel basket Response seen seen basket basket seen basket seen seen basket basket seen seen basket basket seen basket seen basket seen basket Aligns with EoC? N N N N N unsure of referent N -

Table 5: Data for child CE, 2;3 Trial Seen Object Unseen Object Requested Object Response Aligns with EoC?

Sipes 10

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

known unknown known unknown known known known unknown unknown known unknown unknown known known unknown known known known unknown unknown

unknown unknown known known known unknown unknown unknown known unknown known unknown known known known unknown unknown known unknown known

seen novel basket basket seen basket seen novel basket basket novel novel basket basket novel basket seen basket novel basket

seen basket basket basket seen basket seen basket basket seen basket basket basket basket basket basket seen basket basket basket

Y Y * Y Y Y Y -

*Note to trial 10: Child selected the seen object since it was a ball and was more appealing to him than looking for whatever else he was supposed to find For the most part the children did well on tests where they were asked for familiar objects. In only three instances was there any misstep. Child CE, 2;3, was asked to find an unseen object while a ball was in view: he only wanted the ball. In following trials, the ball was never visible. Child AV, 3;0, was unsure of one of the familiar objects, though she did eventually select the correct object (in a non-expectation of competency trial). Finally, child SE, 4;6, deliberately selected a wrong item. I believe she was testing me to determine the rules of the game. Not surprisingly, the older the child, the faster the trials went.

Subject Population

Sipes 11

Four children ranging from 2;3 to 5;9 took part in the study. They are two sets of siblings living in the Chicago suburbs who are cousins (my children and my brothers children). All children are growing up in two-language households, and English is one of the languages. Their ages at the time of the study were as follows: Child AC was 5;9, Child SE was 4;6, Child AV was 3;0 and Child CE was 2;3.

Results and Discussion

The three older children all behaved contrary to expectation of competency, while the youngest child behaved as suggested in earlier studies. The youngest child, CE, behaved exactly as Diesendruck and Shemer (2006) predicted in fact, he behaved in perfect alignment. In each of the six trials that could show expectation of competency behavior, i.e. he was presented with an unfamiliar object and the request was for an unfamiliar word, he went for the hidden object. The odds of him selecting the hidden object this way in all six trials is about 2% if it were purely random chance. Given the poor odds of chance, his behavior supports their conclusion that very young children operate on the expectation of competency rather than chance. The other, older children behaved in a completely different way. When asked for an unfamiliar object with an unfamiliar name, two of the three chose the unfamiliar object in sight 83% of the time. The odds of a child choosing the same direction in five out of six trials is calculated at about 9% if it were random chance. While it is certainly conceivable that this could have happened randomly, for two of the three older children to exhibit the same rare pattern is not likely chance. Likely chance is not at play. The problem is that if chance is not at play and the children are not behaving in alignment with expectation of competence, what principle might they be employing? Now why this shift in strategies should appear is not something I feel confident about explaining, but one explanation is appealing. The typical two-year-old has a vocabulary of about

Sipes 12

200 words; the typical three-year-old has a vocabulary of about 800 words (Hart & Risely, 2003 1. Since the two-year-old has a smaller vocabulary, he may feel it is useful to check under the basket. While he is confident that the adult knows he can execute the task (Expectation of Competency), he may want to check to make sure. The three-year-old on the other hand has a much larger vocabulary than the two-year-old, and indeed child AV, 3;0, has an apparently larger vocabulary than child CE, 2;3. Is it possible that she knows that she has a larger vocabulary than she used to? If so, that could account for why she was not bothering to check the basket when presented with a request using a novel name and a novel object visible. One possible way this could function: the older children are hearing an unfamiliar word and seeing an unfamiliar object and making the reasonable inference that the visible object has the new name, which aligns with Momen and Merriman (2002). As this is happening, they are skipping mutual exclusion since they have ruled out that they do not know what the object is when compared against their current knowledge of the world and relying on lexical gap filling. After all, the presented object is novel and must have a name, which adults with their greater knowledge must know. Diesendruck and Markson's research indicates that this explanation is likely. If this study were to be done again, two things could be brought into play. First, it would be good to have more children available. While the number of trials available to demonstrate expectation of competence behavior might not increase for any child, the number of children involved would improve the statistical validity of any conclusions. Another possibility and a possible way to test it Another possibility is that older children are employing a wholly different approach to their decision making. Instead of applying a pragmatics-based approach, they apply a more statistical approach. According to Diesendruck and Markson's research (2001), children want to
1

Finding typical size of vocabulary over the ages studied in this study was not easy.

Sipes 13

avoid lexical overlap. As Momen and Merriman (2002) show, children want to fill lexical gaps. So when confronted with a novel object that has a name as of yet unknown to the children, they make a calculation, which could be similar to the Monty HallLet's Make a Dealdilemma. (And has a gorgeous, predictable format.) In the Monty Hall problem, there are two participants. One, after the game show host Monty Hall, runs a game with three doors, one of which has a prize behind it. The other player selects a door. At this point, the host opens one of the remaining non-winning doors. At this point the player may opt to choose to stay with his initial selection or switch to the other door. For statistical reasons, the correct thing to do is switch doors. It is the winner 2/3 of the time. Younger children, 8th-grade and younger in De Neys (2006), tend to stick with their original choice. As children mature into adulthood, they perceive the odds as being equal. Both are wrong, but this could lead to an interesting study to see if older children are employing a similar mental algorithm. The variation is this: a child will be asked to select one of three doors, which all hide an unknown object. The host will then tell the child something like this, One of these objects is a feth. You can see one object. There are two hidden. I will now open a door. The object behind that door is not a feth. Is the first object you selected the feth? At any point after the reveal of the second object, the child may peek at the remaining object: a peek at this point could indicate that the child is using expectation of competence. The child whether peeking or not may stay or switch, as in the standard Monty Hall problem. A group of older children could be interviewed to see if they have shifted away from the pragmatics-oriented expectation of competence decision making process to a more mathematically-oriented Monty Hall decision making process. This approach may not lend itself to language acquisition as much as it would lend itself to psychology, but it is one possible

Sipes 14

avenue of follow-up research. It would probably be necessary to modify the set-up of the study in order to capture the difference between pragmatic vs. mathematical strategies.

Conclusion
This study indicates that at some point between their second and third birthdays children come to rely less on expectation of competency and more on other principles of object naming when presented with an novel object, a hidden object and an unknown name. In all cases the children are relying on their adult conversation partners knowledge of the world. Two-year-olds assume that the adult is asking them because they can do it: expectation of competence. Older children, presumably, assume that the adult knows what the object is named and is using the name properly: mutual exclusion and lexical gap filling. While suggestive, this study is not conclusive and further research with more children would be needed to shore up this claim about older children.

Bibliography
Akhtar, Nameera, Carpenter, Malinda, & Tomasello, Michael. (1996). The role of discourse novelty in early word learning. Child Development, 67, 635645 doi:0009-3920/96/67020024S01.00 Diesendruck, Gil & Markson, Lori. (2001). Childrens avoidance of lexical overlap: a pragmatic account. Developmental Psychology, 37, 630641 doi:10.1037//0012-1649.37.5.630 Diesendruck, Gil & Shemer, Ginnat. (2006). Young children's expectation of competence in word learning. Journal of Child Language, 33, 321338 doi:10.1017/S0305000906007343 Hart, B., & Risley, T. R. (2003). The early catastrophe: The 30 million word gap by age 3. American Educator, 27(1), 4-9. Markman, Ellen M., Wasow, Judith L., & Hansen, Mikkel B. (2003). Use of the mutual exclusivity assumption by young word learners. Cognitive Psychology, 47, 241275 doi:10.1016/S0010-0285(03)00034-3

Sipes 15

Momen, Nausheen & Merriman, William E. (2002). Two-year-olds expectation that lexical gaps will be filled. First Language, 22, pp 225247 doi:10.1177/014272370202206601 ONeill, Daniela K. (1996). Two-year-old childrens sensitivity to a parents knowledge state when making requests. Child Development, 67, 659677 doi:0009-3920/96/6702-00 ll$O 1.00 Monty Hall Resources De Neys, Wim. (2006). Developmental trends in decision making: the case of the Monty Hall dilemma. In Jeanine A. Ellsworth (Ed.), Psychology of Decision Making in Education (pp. 5565). Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.