Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Kuril Balance: A Balance Paper on the Potential Conflict Between Japan and Russia
Wolf
Mendl,
Japan's
Northern
Territories:
An
Asian
Falklands?,The
World
Today
,
Vol.
43,
No.
6
(Jun.,
1987),
p.
99;
2
Ibid.
Also,
see
map
in
Appendix
1.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
1
3
Kuril
Islands6.
However,
the
Soviet
Union
refused
to
sign
that
treaty,
mainly
because
it
was
unclear,
what
islands
were
to
be
included
into
the
Kuril
Islands
group.
The
current
Japanese
position
is
that
islands
up
to
and
including
Iturup
are
Northern
Territories
and
that
their
ownership
should
be
Japanese,
as
per
Treaty
of
Shimoda7.
However,
the
Soviet
Union
and,
later,
Russian
Federation
never
actually
relieved
control
of
the
islands.
Importance
of
the
Kurils
One
might
wonder
why
do
two
great
nations
have
a
conflict
that
spans
over
a
century
over
a
group
of
very
small
islands
that
are
barely
populated
and
have
no
industrial
value
of
any
importance.
There
is
no
consensus
on
this
issue,
but
several
viewpoints
are
expressed
in
the
modern
society.
One
of
them
argues
that
the
Kurils
are
of
strategic
importance
to
Russia.
Ekaterina
Koldunova
from
the
Moscow
State
University
says
that
the
Southern
Kurils
offer
strategic
access
to
the
Pacific
for
Russia.
That
may
seem
plausible,
but
the
evidence
does
not
support
it
later
on
in
this
paper
we
will
see
that
there
are
no
strategic
forces
on
the
Southern
Kurils8.
A
second
viewpoint
is
that
the
importance
of
the
Northern
Territories
to
both
countries
lies
in
their
Exclusive
Economic
Zones9.
The
waters
around
the
Southern
Kurils
are
rich
in
marine
life
in
fact,
they
have
been
referred
to
as
some
of
the
richest
fishing
grounds
in
the
world10.
Since
fishing
is
a
major
source
of
food
in
Japan,
it
is
reasonable
to
assume
that
this
viewpoint
holds
some
merit.
Ibid.
Ibid.,
p.
100
8
Ekaterina
Koldunova,
The
Kuril
Islands
are
of
strategic
importance
to
Russia,
Russia
Today,(12
May
2009),
<http://rt.com/politics/the-kuril-islands-are-of-strategic-importance-to-russia/
>
[accessed
12
November
2012].
9
Dmitry
Gorenburg,
The
Southern
Kuril
Islands
Dispute
(PONARS
Eurasia
Policy
Memo
No.
226,
September
2012),
<http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm_226_Gorenburg_Sept2012.pdf>
[accessed
12
November
2012].
10
Stephen
Kotkin,
The
Northern
Territories
Dispute
and
Russo-Japanese
Relations:
Volume
1,
between
War
and
Peace,
1697-1985;
Volume
2,
Neither
War
Nor
Peace,
1985-1998
by
Tsuyoshi
Hasegawa
Journal
of
Japanese
Studies,
Vol.
26,
No.
1
(Winter,
2000),
pp.
270-274;
7 6
4 Finally, there are numerous experts who say that the main reason why the two countries cannot agree on the ownership of the islands is national pride. Russians feel like keeping possession of the islands is a matter of national honor and that giving them away would be seen as an admission of weakness11. While attribution of causality may be difficult in this case, as it is in many social disputes, it is probably safe to say that all of these interests play a role in the dispute. Furthermore, because of the complexity of the issue, it is not likely that a diplomatic solution will be reached anytime soon, which creates potential for an armed conflict. Conflict Assumptions The goal of this paper is to analyze the potential armed conflict between Japan and Russia over the Southern Kurils. For the purposes of this paper, the following assumptions have been made about this conflict: Japan would be the initial aggressor The purpose of the aggression would be to seize the islands up to and including Iturup and fortify them to minimize the possibility of Russia conquering them back again. No third country would choose to exploit the moment and launch an offensive against either Russia or Japan during this conflict. If the initial Japanese offensive is successful, Japan will not try to capitalize on the advantage by conquering larger parts of Russia than just the Kuril Islands. Russia will have no intelligence warning it about the incoming attack.
Dmitry
Gorenburg,
The
Southern
Kuril
Islands
Dispute
(PONARS
Eurasia
Policy
Memo
No.
226,
September
2012),
<http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm_226_Gorenburg_Sept2012.pdf>
[accessed
12
November
2012].
11
Ship Quantity 5 5 4 9 1 7 4
6 FSM PCFG MSO MSC Amphibious Logistics and support At a first glance, this does not seem to be too formidable of a power. The fleet only has one thirty year-old cruiser, supported by seven destroyers14. However, the real force here is the submarine fleet 23 subs, 5 of which can carry ballistic missiles, are capable of taking out major naval forces. In addition to the ships, the Pacific Fleet has a naval aviation force. Table 2 shows the airplanes that it consists of15: Table 2 Aircraft class (NATO) BBR FTR ASW MP Aircraft type Tu-22M MiG-31 Tu-142M Il-38 Quantity 17 30 14 15 9 10 2 5 4 15+
This
is
a
sizeable
force
of
aircrafts
that
fill
different
functions.
Tu-22M
are
long- range
bombers,
which
can
destroy
almost
any
type
of
ships,
as
well
as
many
ground
targets.
MiG-31s
are
fighters
that
provide
cover
for
the
navy
from
enemy
jets,
and
the
Tu-142Ms
and
the
Il-38s
are
designed
to
find
and
take
out
enemy
submarines.
Ministry
of
Defense,
Guard
rocket
cruiser
of
project
1164
Varyag,
(
1164
),
at
<http://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/type/navy/pacific/flagship.htm>,
[accessed
November
14,
2012].
15
International
Institute
for
Strategic
Studies,
Chapter
Five:
Russia,
Military
Balance,
#1(111),
p.191;
14
7
Aviation
While
the
Russian
Navys
Pacific
forces
may
not
seem
like
a
formidable
force,
the
real
Russian
strength
in
the
region
lies
with
its
Air
Force.
Table
3
shows
the
Air
Force
assets
that
Russia
has
available
in
the
region16.
Table
3
Aircraft
class
(NATO)
FTR
FTR
FGA
FGA
FGA
ATK
ISR
In
addition
to
these
aircraft,
the
Russian
Air
Force
has
72
helicopters
in
the
Eastern
District,
which,
while
not
specifically
equipped
to
deal
with
submarines,
can
still
be
useful
against
surface
vessels.
Together
with
the
aircraft,
they
present
a
formidable
air
force,
which
could
be
the
deciding
factor
in
almost
any
conflict
around
the
world.
It
is
important
to
note
that
Russia
chooses
to
use
the
planes
own
radars
in
combination
with
ground-based
radar
stations
to
find
enemy
aircraft.
That
choice
can
significantly
alter
the
course
of
an
air
battle.
Other
military
forces
While
for
geographic
reasons
Navy
and
Air
Force
are
going
to
be
the
primary
war
assets
in
this
conflict,
it
should
be
noted
that
Russia
has
other
forces
in
the
region,
which
may
come
into
play.
The
first
asset
that
is
worth
mentioning
is
the
16
Quantity 60 14 115 10 48 72 28
Ibid.
8
Russian
18th
machine
gun-artillery
division
that
protects
the
Kuril
Islands17.
It
consists
of
two
bases,
the
first
one
located
on
Kunashir
and
the
second
on
Iturup.
However,
as
the
Russian
media
reports,
the
bases
are
pretty
ineffective.
About
80%
of
their
equipment
requires
repairs
and
they
are
still
using
some
arms
from
World
War
II18.
These
bases
have
no
significant
anti-air
assets
that
could
turn
the
air
battle
around.
Hence,
it
is
unlikely
that
these
bases
would
be
of
importance
in
a
XXIst
century
conflict
around
the
islands.
The
second
asset
that
is
important
to
mention
is
the
Russian
Strategic
Forces.
Russia
has
the
nuclear
capacity
to
wipe
Japan
off
the
face
of
the
Earth19.
Finally,
an
asset
group
that
should
be
mentioned
in
this
paper
is
Russias
military
assets
in
central
and
Western
parts
of
the
country.
Russia
has
a
great
number
of
military
assets
including
over
1600
aircraft
and
67
submarines
scattered
around
the
country20.
While
they
will
not
participate
in
the
initial
phases
of
the
conflict,
there
is
the
potential
for
them
to
join
the
fight,
if
the
war
goes
on
for
an
extended
period
of
time.
It
would
also
be
prudent
to
mention
a
military
capability,
which
Russia
does
not
have,
but
one
that
it
used
to
own,
one
that
could
be
instrumental
in
deciding
the
outcome
of
this
war.
Medium
range
ballistic
missiles
(MRBMs)
that
had
been
developed
in
the
Soviet
Union
were
destroyed,
as
part
of
the
Intermediate-Range
Nuclear
Forces
Treaty
between
the
USA
and
the
USSR21.
Not
having
MRBMs
is
a
serious
blow
to
Russian
military
capabilities,
especially
in
a
region
where
the
sheer
mass
of
their
ground
forces
cannot
be
used
to
achieve
victory.
17
Top War, Minister of Defense promised to rearm the 18 machine-gun-artillery division, ( 18 - ), at <http://topwar.ru/3272-ministr-oborony-poobeshhal-perevooruzhit-18-pulemyotno-artillerijskuyu- diviziyu.html>, [accessed 14 November 2012]. 18 Ibid. 19 More precisely - 1605 nuclear warheads. Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Chapter Five: Russia, Military Balance, #1(111), p.183; 20 Ibid. 21 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, (signed at Washington December 8, 1987), <http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/inf>, [accessed 15 November 2012].
th
9
Strategic
Thinking/Doctrine
The
official
Russian
Military
Doctrine
last
reviewed
in
2010
does
not
list
Japan
among
the
key
threats
that
Russia
sees
for
its
well-being22.
In
fact,
most
of
the
threats
that
it
lists
are
concerned
with
other
countries
trying
to
topple
the
Russian
government,
rather
than
with
foreign
nations
trying
to
conquer
Russian
territory.
It
is
also
quite
important
to
note
the
Russian
doctrine
on
the
use
of
nuclear
weapons.
The
Russian
Military
Doctrine
states
that
Russia
reserves
the
right
to
use
nuclear
weapons,
if
Russia
is
attacked
by
weapons
of
mass
destructions,
or
if
a
conventional
attack
on
Russia
threatens
the
very
existence
of
the
country23.
Since
this
paper
is
assuming
a
war
that
would
largely
revolve
around
a
few
very
small
islands,
it
is
unlikely
that
nuclear
weapons
would
be
used.
Even
the
members
of
the
Russian
government
would
probably
not
regard
the
Kurils
as
central
to
the
very
existence
of
Russia.
The
big
question
about
the
Russian
doctrine
is
whether
Russia
would
allow
itself
to
lose
a
small
war.
There
are
two
ways,
in
which
the
situation
could
proceed
if
the
early
Japanese
offensive
were
successful.
The
first
is
that
Russia
could
cede
control
over
the
Kurils
and
stop
the
war
quickly,
like
it
did
after
the
loss
at
Tsushima
a
century
ago.
The
second
way,
in
which
the
Russian
government
could
choose
to
proceed,
is
to
escalate
this
conflict
into
a
prolonged
all-out
war
against
Japan
where
Russia
would
not
stop
until
the
Kuril
Islands
were
reclaimed.
This
option
may
seem
likely
at
first
Putins
ambitions
seem
to
be
nothing
less
than
to
be
the
new
Peter
the
Great
in
terms
of
how
well
he
reforms
the
Russian
army24.
A
defeat
in
a
war
against
Japan
would
certainly
undermine
his
status
as
a
military
reformer
and,
hence,
would
be
undesirable.
However,
I
do
not
think
that
this
option
is
likely.
It
is
often
the
case
that
the
primary
motivation
of
a
political
leader
is
to
stay
in
power25.
President
of
Russia,
The
War
Doctrine
of
the
Russian
Federation,
(
),
(02.05.2010),
at
<
http://xn--d1abbgf6aiiy.xn--p1ai/ref_notes/461>,
[accessed
24
November
2012].
23
Ibid.
24
Carolina
Vendil
Pallin,
Russian
Military
Reform:
A
Failed
Exercise
in
Defence
Decision
Making,
(UK:T&F
Books
2008),
pp.
149-150;
25
Bruce
Bueno
de
Mesquita,
Alastair
Smith,
The
Dictators
Handbook,
(Public
Afairs,
2012)
p.
49;
22
10
And
for
Putin,
or
any
successor
of
his,
a
prolonged
war
would
be
unwise.
The
power
base
of
the
current
government
is
already
beginning
to
erode
and
a
prolonged
war
for
a
group
of
largely
irrelevant
islands
could
make
the
Russian
population
very
unhappy,
perhaps
even
enough
to
demand
a
change
in
leadership26.
That
means
that
Russia
would
try
to
end
the
war
with
one
massive
counteroffensive,
rather
than
to
try
to
go
for
the
long
term.
Combat/Military
Preparedness
It
is
frequently
noted
that,
while
the
Russian
Armed
Forces
are
pretty
strong
on
paper,
they
may
be
quite
weak
in
reality.
The
Russian
military
is
described
as
lacking
in
coordination,
having
low
morale
and
lacking
able
commanders
and
supporting
officers27.
Furthermore,
the
Russian
military
equipment
frequently
doesnt
work.
Russia
is
notorious
for
having
rockets,
fighter
jets,
and
satellites
falling
out
of
the
sky28.
There
are
multiple
reasons
for
that.
A
commission
that
had
been
charged
with
looking
into
one
of
the
more
notorious
Russian
military
incidents,
the
sinking
of
the
Kursk
submarine,
reported
a
shocking
level
of
negligence
on
all
levels
of
the
command;
stunning
breaches
of
discipline
and
shoddy,
obsolete,
and
poorly
maintained
equipment29.
As
if
that
wasnt
enough,
the
Russian
soldiers
arent
getting
anywhere
near
enough
training.
For
example,
the
Naval
Airforce
pilots
on
average
fly
just
about
40
hours
a
year30.
That
is
nowhere
near
enough
to
be
proficient
by
comparison,
the
US
Marine
Corps
Aviation
pilots
on
average
fly
for
between
248
and
365
hours
per
year31.
Moreover,
Russia
still
employs
a
conscription
system,
which
means
that
at
any
given
point
its
armed
26
Living with Putin, again, The Economist, (16 July 2012), at <http://www.economist.com/node/21556955>, [accessed 15 November 2012]. 27 Carolina Vendil Pallin, Russian Military Reform: A Failed Exercise in Defence Decision Making, op. cit, p. 151; 28 Julia Ioffe, Why Russia Is The Worlds Deadliest Place To Fly, Forbes, (02 November 2011), <http://www.forbes.com/sites/juliaioffe/2011/11/02/why-russia-is-the-worlds-deadliest-place-to-fly/>, [accessed 15 November 2012]. 29 Zoltan Barany, Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p 49; 30 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Chapter Five: Russia, Military Balance, #1(111), p.186; 31 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Chapter Three: North America, Military Balance, #1(111), p.62;
11 forces are filled with people with little to no training or experience, most of whom are not dedicated to being soldiers. In addition to that, the Russian command seems to be making questionable tactical decisions with their assets. In the war with Georgia, for example, Russia sent a strategic bomber Tu-22M3 on a reconnaissance mission, during which it was shot down32. This was a highly wasteful use of a very valuable asset, and, so far, it does not seem that Russian command is on track for making better decisions than the ones made during the war with Georgia. That leads me to conclude that through the combination of these factors, the Russian Armed Forces would not perform very well in a modern armed conflict. Through an educated guess, I would estimate that only around half of the Russian forces in the region will actually be able to perform their duties, and a lot of them wouldnt be able to execute their maneuvers properly.
Japan
Unlike
Russia,
Japan
is
small
and
its
interests
are
highly
localized.
Hence,
it
would
be
fully
able
to
utilize
all
of
its
armed
forces
from
the
beginning
of
the
conflict.
Considering
that
the
two
countries
have
comparable
levels
of
military
expenditures
($72
billion
per
year
for
Russia
to
$59
billion
per
year
for
Japan),
just
because
of
Japans
geographic
position,
the
country
would
be
at
a
strong
advantage33.
Navy
The
Japanese
Maritime
Self-Defense
force
has
an
impressive
array
of
ships,
listed
in
Table
434.
Roger
N.
McDermott,
Russias
Conventional
Armed
Forces
and
the
Georgian
War,
US
Army
War
College,
(2009),<
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/09spring/mcdermott.pdf>
[accessed
15
November
2012].
33
Background
paper
on
SIPRI
military
expenditure
data,
2011,
(Stockholm
International
Peace
Research
Institute),
(Stockholm,
2012),
<
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/sipri-factsheet-on- military-expenditure-2011.pdf>,
[accessed
15
November
2012].
34
International
Institute
for
Strategic
Studies,
Chapter
Six:
Asia,
Military
Balance,
#1(111),
p.246;
32
12 Table 4 Ship Class SSK CVH CGHM DDGHM DDGM DDM FFGM PBFG MCM+MSO+MSD Amphibious Logistics and support Quantity 18 1 2 20 7 3 16 6 37 25 77
These
ships
are
generally
divided
into
escort
flotillas
with
7-8
warships
in
each.
On
the
surface,
it
is
superior
to
the
Russian
Pacific
Fleet
in
every
way
in
terms
of
naval
combat
it
has
twice
as
many
carriers
as
the
Pacific
Fleet,
almost
3
times
as
many
destroyers,
and
even
a
small
aircraft
carrier.
Moreover,
the
large
number
of
support
ships
would
ensure
the
success
of
continuous
operations
outside
of
Japanese
harbors.
Japan
does,
however,
have
fewer
submarines
than
Russia
in
the
region.
The
advantage
that
Japan
has
in
submarine
warfare
is
that
the
Japanese
submarines
are
relatively
modern
and
among
the
most
advanced
submarines
in
the
world,
while
Russia
mainly
uses
submarines
that
are
a
few
decades
old35.
Since
were
talking
about
submarine
warfare,
where
stealth
and
electronics
are
key,
Japan
might
actually
have
the
upper
hand
in
this
instance.
Gordon
Arthur,
Submarines
Gain
Buoyancy
in
Asia-Pacific
Region,
Defense
Review
Asia,
(27
April
2012),
<http://www.defencereviewasia.com/articles/160/SUBMARINES-GAIN-BUOYANCY-IN-ASIA-PACIFIC- REGION
>
[accessed
15
November
2012].
35
13 Japan also has Naval Aviation forces. 93 of its 95 combat aircraft are P-3C Orions36. These planes are designed to find and destroy submarines, as well as to get reconnaissance information and relay it to other military groups. These aircraft would make it very hard for Russian subs to approach Japanese ships unnoticed. Aviation The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force counts 374 combat capable aircraft, as well as numerous support planes. The breakdown of the combat aircraft by type is presented in Table 5 below37. Table 5 Aircraft class (NATO) FTR FGA FGA ISR Aircraft type F-15J F-2/F-2B F-4E RF-4E Quantity 202 87 72 13
The
first
thing
that
is
quite
distinct
about
the
Air
Self-Defense
force
is
that
it
is
very
fighter-oriented
and
lacks
long-range
bombers.
In
fact,
there
are
no
dedicated
bombers
in
it
whatsoever.
However,
both
F-4Es
and
F-2s
can
be
armed
with
a
variety
of
bombs
and
other
air-to-ground
weapons,
so
Japan
does
have
sufficient
capacity
to
bomb
Russian
ground
targets
en
masse.
The
second
thing
to
note
about
the
Japanese
air
force
is
that
it
uses
AEW&C
planes
to
spot
enemy
aircraft.
That
may
be
a
vulnerability
for
Japan
during
their
offensive
operations.
Other
military
assets
For
the
most
part,
naval
and
air
forces
would
be
the
only
military
assets
used
by
Japan
in
this
conflict.
There
is
a
possibility
that
Japan
could
use
artillery
fire
to
take
out
the
existing
military
bases
on
the
Southern
Kurils,
but
planes
or
ships
could
do
36 37
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Chapter Six: Asia, Military Balance, #1(111), p.247; Ibid.
14
the
job
equally
well.
It
is
possible
that
Japan
will
transport
some
ground-based
anti- air
weapons
to
the
islands,
if
it
successfully
captures
them
that
would
make
it
easier
to
maintain
air
dominance
over
the
islands.
Another
force
that
could
be
used
that
is
not
sea-
or
air-related
is
a
cyber
attack
force,
but
Japan
has
not
reported
having
one.
Japanese
Ministry
of
Defense
did
state
cyberspace
as
a
priority
for
the
next
couple
of
years,
but
its
documents
only
reveal
defensive
intentions38.
And
while
Japan
may
actually
be
working
on
developing
cyber
attacks,
we
have
no
evidence
to
support
this
theory,
so
cyber
attacks
will
not
be
featured
in
this
scenario.
Another
factor
that
is
crucial
to
understanding,
how
this
conflict
would
play
out,
is
that
the
USA
provides
a
nuclear
deterrence
shield
for
Japan39.
That
is
a
significant
deterrent,
which
might
make
Russia
think
twice
about
using
nuclear
weapons
to
retaliate
against
such
a
local
strike,
as
the
one
on
Kuril
Islands.
Strategic
Thinking/Doctrine
Japanese
military
doctrine
is
very
defense-oriented.
In
fact,
its
National
Defense
Program
Guidelines
explicitly
state
that
Japan
maintains
its
armed
forces
for
defensive
purposes
only40.
That
being
said,
countries
rarely
write
that
they
intend
to
conquer
all
of
their
neighbors
in
their
national
doctrines
that
would
antagonize
other
countries
and
reduce
the
first
strike
advantage
by
making
neighboring
countries
prepare
for
the
possibility
of
an
invasion.
In
fact,
evidence
suggests
that
Japan
is
becoming
more
offensive
in
its
military
exercises.
A
few
years
ago
the
Air
Self-Defense
Force
conducted
its
first
live
bomb-dropping
exercises41.
Such
exercises
can
be
viewed
as
circumstantial
evidence
that
the
defensive-only
attitude
is
waning.
Toward
Stable
and
Effective
Use
of
Cyberspace,
(Tokyo,
report
prepared
by
the
Japanese
Ministry
of
Defense),
<http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/others/pdf/stable_and_effective_use_cyberspace.pdf>,
[accessed
15
November
2012].
39
National
Defense
Program
Guidelines,
(Tokyo,
report
prepared
by
the
Japanese
Ministry
of
Defense),
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/pdfs/h23_ndpg_en.pdf>,
[accessed
15
November
2012].
40
Ibid.
41
Norimitsu
Onishi,
Bomb
by
Bomb,
Japan
Sheds
Military
Restraints,
New
York
Times,
(23
July
2007),
p.
A1;
38
15 Combat/Military preparedness Overall, Japan has a relatively high level of combat preparedness. Its pilots train for a respectable 150 hours a year42. Its officers and soldiers frequently train together with their American counterparts43. However, there is the issue of Japan lacking practice Japan hasnt participated in an actual war since World War II. And it is a valid point of view that military exercises do not give as much experience as real war experience. In the case of an armed conflict with Russia, this disparity only really applies to high-level commanders. People who serve in the Eastern MD in Russia have not seen any wars during their military careers either, so Japan is unlikely to be at a serious disadvantage because of its peaceful decades.
The
Theater
Geography
The
Kuril
Islands
are
small
islands,
located
very
close
to
Hokkaido.
Because
of
the
location
of
the
military
bases
of
both
countries,
the
islands
are
in
range
of
all
the
aircraft
that
Russia
and
Japan
have
in
the
region.
However,
it
is
important
to
note
that
some
Russian
airfields
are
located
pretty
far
inland.
The
water
in
the
Kuril
straits
is
pretty
deep
the
deepest
strait
is
7600
feet
deep44.
Submarines
can
easily
pass
through
without
having
to
rise
higher
and
risk
being
detected.
Overall,
the
islands
provide
a
perfect
location
for
a
test
of
naval
and
air
powers.
Key
points
to
control
The
winner
of
the
conflict
is
the
country,
which,
at
the
end
of
the
war
occupies
Kunashir,
Iturup,
Shikotan
and
Habomai
islands.
As
far
as
places
that
offer
their
holders
tactical
advantages
go
controlling
the
straits
between
the
islands
is
important,
because
it
limits
the
naval
movement
of
your
opponent.
Otherwise,
the
geography
of
the
theater
is
pretty
simple.
International
Institute
for
Strategic
Studies,
Chapter
Six:
Asia,
Military
Balance,
#1(111),
p.247;
National
Defense
Program
Guidelines,
(Tokyo,
report
prepared
by
the
Japanese
Ministry
of
Defense),
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/pdfs/h23_ndpg_en.pdf>,
[accessed
15
November
2012].
44
The
Okhotsk
Sea,
(Oceanographic
Atlas
of
the
Bering
Sea,
Okhotsk
Sea
and
Japan/East
Sea),
<http://pacificinfo.ru/data/cdrom/2/HTML/e_3_00.htm>,
[accessed
15
November
2012].
43 42
16 Indigenous population The indigenous population is unlikely to play any significant role in the conflict over the islands. The total population of the islands is around 17,000, they are not armed well and there is little space for them to conduct partisan warfare45. They could come into play if the dispute were to be resolved by the international community through democratic means, but this paper focuses on the military solution to the issue.
The
Conflict
The
First
Strike
In
modern
warfare
between
large
countries,
the
advantage
of
a
first
strike
can
be
critical.
During
World
War
II,
we
have
seen
the
Germans
crush
the
French
in
the
matter
of
days
and
the
Soviets
do
the
same
to
the
Japanese,
not
to
mention
all
the
other
rapid
campaigns
of
the
XXth
century.
It
would
stand
to
reason
that
Japan
would
try
to
exploit
this
advantage
as
much
as
possible
and
try
to
eliminate
as
many
of
the
Russian
military
assets
in
the
region
as
it
can
to
limit
the
options
available
to
Russia
for
a
counterattack.
Figure
1
shows
how
the
Japanese
see
the
military
theater
around
the
islands46.
Yuzhno-Kurilsk
Journal;
Between
Russia
and
Japan,
a
Pacific
Tug
of
War,
New
York
Times,
(02
October
2002),
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/02/world/yuzhno-kurilsk-journal-between-russia-and-japan-a- pacific-tug-of-war.html?pagewanted=2&src=pm>,
[accessed
15
November
2012].
46
Security
Environment
Surrounding
Japan,
(Tokyo,
report
prepared
by
the
Japanese
Ministry
of
Defense),
<http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2010/12Part1_Chapter2_Sec4.pdf>,
[accessed
15
November
2012].
45
17 Figure 1
While Japan could just take the islands straight away, it would find its forces surrounded by Russian planes and ships. A smart and ambitious goal for the first strike would be to take out the Russian naval groups both near the Sea of Japan and Kamchatka, as well as all of the airfields shown on this map. After that, Japan could take the Kuril Islands and Russia wouldnt be able to launch a counteroffensive without bringing its forces from other military districts. That would give Japan time to fortify the islands and install coastal and anti air defenses. Moreover, if all of the airfields were destroyed, Russia would have no way to try and restore air superiority in the region for a while. Taking out the Russian Pacific Fleet would be relatively easy simultaneous strikes from Japanese subs, carriers and aircraft would almost certainly sink all of the Russian ships in the region. Some submarines might escape, but they would be
18
alone
in
a
region
with
a
lot
of
enemy
presence
and
no
harbors
to
dock
at.
Moreover,
the
Japanese
have
plenty
of
Orions
to
hunt
the
subs
down.
The
airfields
might
provide
a
slightly
more
difficult
challenge
for
the
Japanese.
The
airfields
that
are
the
furthest
away
from
the
Russian
airspace
border
(the
three
on
the
left
of
Figure
1)
are
approximately
700
miles
inland.
The
maximum
speed
of
F-4Es
is
Mach
2.23,
or
approximately
1470
miles
per
hour47.
That
means
that
the
Russian
aircraft
stationed
there
will
have
just
under
30
minutes
to
take
off
and
meet
Japanese
planes
in
the
air.
Normally
that
would
be
a
reasonable
time
for
an
advanced
military
force
to
react,
but
in
the
case
of
Russia
there
are
two
factors
to
consider
the
mountain
of
bureaucracy
and
lack
of
experience
of
fighter
pilots.
I
do
not
think
that
the
Russian
pilots
at
these
bases
will
both
get
permission
to
and
actually
take
off
in
the
case
of
an
offensive.
Moreover,
these
bases
are
unlikely
to
hold
more
than
75
or
so
planes48.
Because
the
other
airfields
are
located
so
close
to
the
Russian
airspace
borders,
Japan
can
allocate
a
100
or
so
planes
to
those
particular
bases.
While
the
Japanese
Air
Self-Defense
Force
might
sustain
some
losses,
it
can
almost
definitely
destroy
the
airfields
with
the
first
strike.
A
coordinated
first
strike
on
all
of
the
important
targets
at
once
would
require
significant
competence
and
coordination,
however,
with
the
modern
communication
technologies
in
play,
I
have
full
confidence
that
Japan
would
be
able
to
pull
it
off
without
major
mistakes.
The
way
Japan
would
have
to
do
it
is
depicted
below.
47
Laurence
K.
Loftin,
Quest
for
Performance:
The
Evolution
of
Modern
Aircraft
SP-468.
(Washington,
DC:
National
Aeronautics
and
Space
Administration,
History
Office,
Scientific
and
Technical
Information
Branch,
1985).
48
There
are
14
Russian
airfields
in
the
region
and
3/14
of
the
number
of
Russian
aircraft
in
the
region
is
74.36.
19 Figure 2
In this figure, blue arrows represent naval attacks and red arrows represent air strikes. All of these movements must start at the same time, as soon as the group that goes the furthest West crosses the border. That gives Japan an advantage of confusion the Russians wont know whats going on until the first bombs start falling. And an average Russian officer would never take the responsibility for shooting first initiative is not praised in the Russian Armed Forces. So, this plan of attack may buy a few minutes for the aircraft that have to go to the furthest bases.
20 Now, there is always the possibility that the Japanese first strike would fail at destroying the Russian airfields, either because of an intelligence leak or because of poor execution. In that case, Japanese forces would have to actually face the forces of the Eastern MD in a series of straight up battles. Now, the goal of the Russians would be to simply protect the airfields until the Western forces relocate to crush the Japanese. So, the Japanese would be operating on a tight schedule, racing to destroy the airfields. That means that they would have to actively extend their planes over enemy land, where the enemy has radars and anti air. Moreover, the Japanese would have to move their AEW&C planes pretty far into the open. And if the Eastern Russians have the good sense to target them down, they could just win that fight on their own, without having to wait for the Western forces Japanese Air Self-Defense Force is unlikely to be able to operate very well, while blind, since they rely on multiples of radars over their own territory, where they usually practice. Counter-Offensive However, if Japan succeeded in its first strike, Russia would be left with just two options, neither of which would be very appealing for the country. The first thing it could do is to try and go for the long-term war, building new airfields and moving war assets in from the West. In the meantime, it could launch a major submarine raiding campaign on Japanese ships. However, there are a few drawbacks to this approach. The first one is that once the Japanese control the region, they are unlikely to be surprised by submarines their anti submarine forces are pretty large. The second drawback is that Russia risks all of its Air Force and Navy assets, which it cannot afford to rebuild. With the low levels of staff competence, it is a real risk that should not be discounted. The third drawback is that building airfields under bombardment is pretty difficult and is likely to result in some losses. The final drawback is that it would draw Russia into a prolonged war, which, as previously mentioned, would be problematic for those in power. The other way, in which Russia could proceed, is to threaten to nuke Japan or to actually nuke it. While either option may achieve the desired military objective, which is to make the Japanese leave the Kurils, both options are liable to put the
21 world on the brink of nuclear holocaust, because of the US-Japanese alliance. This may not be something even the Russian leadership is willing to do. The grimness of the situation, which Russia would face if Japan succeeded in its first strike, underlines the benefits of having MRBMs. The thing about MRBMs is that they can be launched from railways, theres no need to build actual facilities like airfields. For a country as large as Russia, medium range ballistic missiles could be a very good tool of conventional deterrence, simply because of the range that they would cover with the help of the Russian railroad network. Moreover, MRBMs are perfect at clearing out enemy armed formations in scarcely populated areas. Prolonged war In the event that Russia decides to go for a prolonged war, a stalemate is likely to occur for a while. Japan would not have the land forces to successfully invade mainland Russia, and Russia would not have the capacity to reclaim the islands. In that case, as is usually the case with long wars, the country with the stronger economic backbone would be likely to win. In this case, the country is Japan. Japan is currently spending much less on its military in terms of its GDP than Russia. If it were to catch up in that metric, it would outproduce Russia by almost a factor of three49. And while war weariness might appear faster in a relatively more liberal country of Japan, economics is likely to be the key determinant of victory.
Conclusions
Japan
beats
Russia
What
might
have
seemed
unthinkable
a
few
decades
ago
seems
like
a
likely
possibility
today.
The
permanently
peaceful
Japan
has
the
capacity
to
beat
an
ex- superpower
in
a
conventional
war.
This
is
a
very
rare
example
of
a
country
that
has
no
nuclear
weapons,
but
one
that
can
win
an
offensive
war
against
a
country
with
a
Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data, 2011, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), (Stockholm, 2012), < http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/sipri-factsheet-on- military-expenditure-2011.pdf>, [accessed 15 November 2012].
49
22
large
nuclear
arsenal50.
That
being
said,
the
conflict
was
defined
in
very
narrow
terms.
It
is
still
rather
unlikely
that
Japan
has
the
capacity
to
conquer
the
whole
of
Russia.
That
does
not
reduce
the
significance
of
these
results.
Japans
primary
interests
are
ocean-based
and
Japan
is
developing
a
force
that
is
very
effective
at
working
in
this
arena.
First
strike
is
key
As
almost
any
campaign
between
two
opponents
of
similar
levels
of
military
strength,
this
one
can
be
decided
by
a
single
factor.
In
this
case,
its
the
execution
of
the
first
strike
by
Japan.
Because
naval
and
air
assets
are
much
more
difficult
to
replenish,
a
successful
first
strike
can
win
a
naval
war.
Russia
needs
to
change
its
ways
It
is
quite
obvious
from
this
paper
that
Russia
needs
to
find
new
ways
of
defending
its
territories.
I
can
see
two
ways
to
do
this.
The
first
one
is
to
leave
the
IRNF
treaty
and
to
begin
producing
medium
range
ballistic
missiles.
Russia
still
has
a
fairly
advanced
level
of
missile
technology,
which
could
allow
it
to
develop
very
strong
conventional
weapons.
MRBMs,
apart
from
their
obvious
military
potential,
can
also
serve
as
deterrents
for
local
conflicts
that
generally
dont
invoke
the
use
of
nuclear
weapons.
The
second
way
for
Russia
to
boost
its
defense
is
to
change
its
doctrine
to
one
that
would
allow
Russia
to
use
nuclear
weapons
in
a
conflict
of
any
scale.
That
will
make
potential
attackers
think
twice,
even
those
under
the
US
missile
shield.
Moreover,
Russia
could
negotiate
with
the
USA
to
reach
an
agreement,
where
the
defensive
use
of
tactical
nukes
does
not
trigger
an
automatic
nuclear
response.
Finally,
it
is
fairly
obvious
that
Russias
geographic
position
is
not
conducive
to
it
being
a
naval
power.
The
difficulty
of
moving
its
fleets,
combined
with
the
lack
of
funding
for
building
new
ones
should
make
Russia
reconsider
its
priorities.
It
may
just
do
better
by
switching
funding
to
highly
mobile
land-based
groups.
Moreover,
if
Russia
loses
the
ambition
to
project
power
over
the
Pacific,
it
could
actually
give
50
Although, to be fair, the US nuclear umbrella is almost equivalent to owning nuclear weapons.
23 away the Kurils without considering it a loss. Hence, it would need its Pacific fleet even less than it does now.
24 Appendix 1
25
Works
cited:
1. Gordon
Arthur,
Submarines
Gain
Buoyancy
in
Asia-Pacific
Region,
Defense
Review
Asia,
(27
April
2012),
<http://www.defencereviewasia.com/articles/160/SUBMARINES-GAIN-BUOYANCY- IN-ASIA-PACIFIC-REGION
>
[accessed
15
November
2012].
Background
paper
on
SIPRI
military
expenditure
data,
2011,
(Stockholm
International
Peace
Research
Institute),
(Stockholm,
2012),
<
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/sipri- factsheet-on-military-expenditure-2011.pdf>,
[accessed
15
November
2012].
Zoltan
Barany,
Democratic
Breakdown
and
the
Decline
of
the
Russian
Military,
(Princeton,
NJ:
Princeton
University
Press,
2008),
p
49;
Dmitriy
Boltenkov,
The
Russian
Navys
New
Look
Reform
in
2009-2011,
Moscow
Defense
Brief
#2(28),
2012,
<http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2012/item3/article3/>,
[accessed
14
November
2012].
Bruce
Bueno
de
Mesquita,
Alastair
Smith,
The
Dictators
Handbook,
(Public
Afairs,
2012)
p.
49;
Dmitry
Gorenburg,
The
Southern
Kuril
Islands
Dispute
(PONARS
Eurasia
Policy
Memo
No.
226,
September
2012),
<http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm_226_Gorenburg_Sept2012.pdf>
[accessed
12
November
2012].
International
Institute
for
Strategic
Studies,
Chapter
Five:
Russia,
Military
Balance,
#1(111),
pp.183,190-191;
International
Institute
for
Strategic
Studies,
Chapter
Six:
Asia,
Military
Balance,
#1(111),
pp.246-247;
International
Institute
for
Strategic
Studies,
Chapter
Three:
North
America,
Military
Balance,
#1(111),
p.62;
Julia
Ioffe,
Why
Russia
Is
The
Worlds
Deadliest
Place
To
Fly,
Forbes,
(02
November
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