(§ SPECIAL REPORT / wMD Weapons of mass DELUSION? "WMD has become a worthless, meaningless definition By AL Mauont cal weapons as a last gasp measure To date, with the possible exception of a small num: year ago, on March 17, 2003, President George ber of aged mortar rounds, the Lied States has 'W. Bush told the nation that Saddam Hussein found no weapons of mass destruction in aq, nor had to leave Irag stressing a clear and present have any terrorists seeking WMD been connected with threat posed by thar country’s presumed Saddam's regime. weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ‘This “non-finding” underscores the fact that the very The fact that Iraq did not use — probably didn't even term WMD has lost any’ definable parameters that possess — WMD in Operation Iraq Freedom came as would allow itto be useful in public discussions: It has ‘great surprise to most political and military analysts, become a punchline for comedians; satirist use the ‘who had predicted Iraq would use chemical or biolog- term to criticize the United States’ and United King, ‘Ar Force personnel walt to process through a chemical containment area at Ramsten Ai Base, Germany, dung en exercise, ‘36 Armed Fores Journal arch 2004dom’ political leadership. From its being the high named the "word of the yeas” for 28 erican Dialect Society, we now have “wield ers of mass deception,” weapons of mass delusion’ and “weapons of mass distraction” to deseribe the ad ministrtion’s actions. We also have “weapons of mass disposal” being used in connection with U.S. support {or destroying Russia's very large chemical weapons stockpile At est, there have been military academics dis cussing a more appropriate term, "weapons of mass disruption,” when referring to chernical and biological (CB) weapons, at worst, we have "worthless, meaning: Jess definitions” to describe these unconventional ‘weapons. Further blurring the definition, many have suggested that high-yield explosives, terrorist attacks against commercial chemical and nuclear power plants, and even eyberattacks can be considered WMDs ifthe body count is high enough, ‘The result of inchuding CB weapons in policy discus- sions regarding nuclear weapons is that political and rmltary leaders have widely overblown the potential employment and effectiveness of CB weapons. ‘What has changed? For starters, atthe 18k of being self-evident, the Cold War is over. ‘The potential tnreat of CB weapons causing lange scale casualties largely evaporite, along with fears of| nuclear balisicmissile attacks, when the Berlin Wall fell and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republies was disbanded. While Russia has not yet disposed of ts massive arsenal of CB weapons, ew observers seri- ‘ously envision a conflict in which the United States en ages a superpower that could employ the thousands of tons of CB agents required to cause mass casualties ‘The best that an adversary could hope to do with CB. weapons is delay their eventual def That is not to say there is no advantage to counties Geveloping CB weapons; an the contrary, for purposes other than facing a superpower, CB weapons fit may nation-states’ politcal agendas very well Civilians, on the other hand, always will be vulers bie to CB weapons used either it wartime ora terror ist tools, but again, civilians always have been and will be vulnerable to any weapon syscem used by a profes: sional Terrorist use of CB weapons has been both infrequent and less than “massive,” considering thatthe anthrax. ‘wemtor of October 2001 was limited to 2 infected people and only five deaths. The question we need to examine therefore is: Should future employment of CB weapons be viewed as distinc, relatively smallscale targeted re- Jeases likely to result in limited casualties (albeit with high-impact results, both during military operations and {errorist incidents against civilian populations), rather than “weapons of mass destruction”? ‘ANEW ENVIRONMENT The debate over the inclusion of CB weapons in the Concept of ‘weapons of mass destruction” is not new. However, only recently have analysts seen a need to clistinguish their resulis from those caused by nuclear ‘weapons and other weapons capable of producing The best that an adversary could hope to do with chemical and biological weapons is delay their eventual defeat by a few weeks. _B-D ARMOR HOLDINGS, INC. f Aerospace & Defense Group | The Armor Holdings Aerospace and Defense Group, Blending the vehicle armor leadership of O’Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt with the survivability legacy of Simula, | Together ensuring market demands for protective and ty measures are met today and tomorrow, Dee amend eee ae CoteeEee See en eedCHEMICAL AGENT USE ‘An attack against an unprotected cvilan population ‘oul ely fer geatiyin scope and ects than ‘an stack against mitary forces, ‘Seape Population | Uap sharaterses) stan his (young 96 0) eecing owt no ek "| Smat-seleraease mass casualties — the Air Force's Massive Ordnance ‘Air Burst 21,000-pound bomb, for exaniple. The obvi ‘ous difference that most have recognized is that rls tively small amounts of CB warfare agents (less than ton of chemical warfare agents less than a llogram of biological warfare agents) will not cause mass casual ties on the modem battlefield against 2 wellaraned and properly equipped military force, For the sake of argument, let us define mass casual- ties as more than 1,000 immediate deaths and ife threatening impairinents (not including temporary in as opposed to the more traditional idea ssuallies” equates to at least one more vi {im than the total number of beds in local hospitals. 1m. 2003, military analysts such as retired Army Mai Gen. Bob Scales and Gen, Barry MeCaffrey noted that the use of CB weapons against US. forces in Iraq would not have stopped ml: tary operations from succeeding Seales also noted thatthe primary difference in assessments between Jaq and North Karea was that Iraq, did not yet have nuclear weapons: that made all the difference inthe U.S. political responses to thase regimes’ WMD programs. fvppes,inined "Rather than tating that twas sndeaty nity comet to attack Ira hecaise eee ‘was believed Saddam had CB cease weapons that posed area U.S. interests, it is more rational 19 Acseures lite w co wai Rou weming and 4 suggest the United States attacked eed a eorng eto A telnclent | emergency sponse |moderate responce rad to prevent Saddam from ob- Jecotines "jamin itingnicear weapons. Baacind ita auton” Sone te, ane a outcome ime xsates, limes, Stand the siificant ciferencebe- rns eee tween a CPrarmed adversary and a aos latcone tte ——-mcleararmed adversary. The cha: Pst incident | Expectston remediation ‘38 Armed Forces lou sk olowing requlroments | emeciton of rs Tenge arises when defense policy and strategy do not articulate this significant difference. The sad fact. is that when askministration and defense officials talk about com Dating WMD, what they really marageable es cone Chemical and biological weapons can be used onthe bate or during teronst tacks, but the use has been ate and sal scale March 2008 ‘mean is combating the threat of nuclear weapons, not CB weapons, ‘The White Houses publication of a “National Seategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction” in December 2042 falled to lay out clear distinctions about what com stitutes WMD and how the nation should respond to perceived treat. While the Department of Defense had been refining a counterproliferation strategy for the past several yeas, the national strategy guidance Stl ‘combines a strategy intended to reduce or eliminate the WMD threat during mitary operations with those being developed for homeland security efforts. ‘In 2001, the U.S. counterproliferation strategy had four pillars: counterforce, active defense, passive de fense and consequence management. The new na tional strategy moved consequence management out of counterproliferation and established it, frst, as a homeland security initiative and, second, as tool for responding to WMD incidents overseas, This change establishes the threat of terrorist use of chemical warfare agents as equal to a nation state's use of chemical warfare agents against US. forces during ‘combat. Why, then, do we not require police in US. ‘ites to wear lak jackets and Kevlar helmets, since domestic criminals and foreign military adversaries Doth use guns? ‘While CB weapons can be used on the battlefield or during terrorist incidents, the factors involved dictate ‘distinct separation in how a military force or a nation ‘develops its response to such attacks (see figure). Ad- dressing CB weapons as weapons of mass destruction is faulty in the first place, but assuming tha the use of Scud missile armed with a CB warhead is equivalent to the arrival ofan anthrax-filled letter atthe Senate post office or an explosivedadien tanker full of phos- one is selidefeating as well as folish While military forces can and should be equipped to deal with CB weapons on a battlefield, there are not enough resources or funding available to afford 247 protection for all US. citizens against such threats. Nor should we expect this protection the risk just isn't there, NEW APPROACH ‘The need to separate CB weapons from the concept ‘of WMD is necessary for several reasons, Using the term WMD merely causes many politcal and military leaders to focus on the threat of nuclear weapons to the detriment of addressing CB weapons. Many use the term as a tool for requesting additonal resources without clearly understanding to what end these re sources mus be applied and withenst having clear poi cies for employing these resources, The National Guard's WMD Civil Suppor. Teams are a good example ‘of political demands for an asset in states that cannot demonstrate a clear threat, vulnerability or need for these teams, Ideally, one would want to eliminate the tent WMD, ‘or at least ahardon the practice of addressing chen cal and biological weapons as WMDs. But tha’ not likely to happen, given the degree of entrenchment the tem) now has inthe defense vocabulary. What could help, though, is establishing new defini tons thar differentia “weapons of mass destruction” from smaller scale hazards. The following terms have neen used inthe Joint Staff's Joint Requirements OF fice for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear