4 RELEVANCE - AUTUMN 2005 ~ VOL. 14, NO. 4 BIRTH OF THE U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS by Al Mauroni Given, the current interest in “weapons of mass destruction,” it might be easy to see the rationale bchind the U.S. Army's retention of a full-time, pro fessional branch such as the Chemical Corps. That "t always the case, however. In reorganizations after major conflicts in the past, the army leadership has always sought to reduce manpower and adjust infrastructure to meet immediate resource demands. Several times since 1918, the army has questioned the niced for professional chemical weapons specialists espite the proliferation of nation states and terrorist ‘groups seemingly intent on arming themselves with these weapons. After World War I, the army con- sidered eliminating its newly-established Chemical Warfare Service. Following World War I, it was only the discovery of German nerve agents that led the leadership to reconsider the decision to eliminate the Chemical Warfare Service. In late 1972, following the Vietnam conflict, General Creighton Abrams ordered the Army Staff to begin disestablishing the Chemical Comps and transferring its “special weapons” troops to the Ordnance Corps. Cold War threats and intelligence from the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East changed that decision, Each time, had those initial decisions been carried out, the army would have been without chemical defense capabilities during a subse- ‘quent war. To the nation’s good fortune, American sol- diers have never been attacked with chemical weapons since World War I, although there have been threats of the use of such weapons. This is due in no small part to the army’s ability to develop and field a strong chemi- cal defense capability, a capability that is relevant to this day. The chemical threat has broadened to include biological weapons, radiological devices, and muclear ‘weapons, and the amy has adapted to these threats through changing doctrine, training, organization, and material. The specialists who provide these cupabil- ties are in the Chemical Corps—called the Chemical Warfare Service prior t© 1947, To better understand this organization, we must examine the requirements and actions of the American Expeditionary Forces dut- ing World War Modern chemical warfare was bom with the German army's use of chlorine gas at Ypres in April 1915 Chemical warfare on the scale seen during the Great War was unprecedented. Its appearance on the bat- Hefield was a result of the maturation of the science of chemistry and industrial production technologies that had begun in the late nineteenth century. Some arms control advocates, perhaps sensing the potential utility of industrial chemicals during wartime, tried to use the Hague Conventions of the late 1880s to out law “asphyxiating or deleterious gases” and “poison ‘or poisoned weapons.” The trench warfare and vast ‘numbers of troops involved in the First World War put pressure on the generals to find new technologies to break the stalemate. German scientists first suggested using toxic industrial chemicals, action justified—in their minds—by French use of riot control agents against German troops in August 1914. After several failed attempts at delivering chemical agents on the battlefield using projectiles, Dr. Fritz Haber came up with the idea of using chlorine gas cylinders positioned in the front line trenches. While the gas proved effec- tive in rupturing the Allied lines, the Germans failed to adequately follow up on their success. But this new technology showed promise in breaking the deadlock. Both sides rushed to invest in the development of new ‘gases and new delivery systems. As new agents were developed—blood agents, sneezing gases, tear gases, choking agents, blister agents—each side countered with new defensive equipment—protective masks for humans, horses, and dogs; impregnated clothing; waming sirens and gongs; and improvised collective shelters. While the Germans, British, and French were lob- bing chemical rounds at each other over the next two years, the U.S, Army remained completely unprepared for this new weapon system. The army had no expe- rience, doctrine, or equipment. When the American Expeditionary Forces arrived in France in the summer of 1917, US. forces were unprepared for gas warfare is unclear why that was so, given the time lag and the growing use of gas warfare in the conflict. Once in Europe, General John Pershing appointed his chief engineer, Lieutenant Colonel Amos Fries, 0 establish a Gas Service to train and equip the American forces and to develop an offensive gas capability£ RELEVANCE _ AUTUMN 2 Beginning in September 1917, the Gas Service worked to equip the Americans with British protective masks and to tran to deliver gas using British Stokes moras, Livens projectors and French seventy-fives. American troops were initially caught off guard by German gas attacks, naively thinking that if they did not attack the Germans with gas, the Germans would not do so either. Afler some heavy casualties, the Americans quickly learned to improve their “gas diseipline.” Back in the United States, the response to chemi cal warfare was uncoordinated, The Army Medical Department was tasked to develop gas masks and other defensive equipment, using research conducted by the Butea of Mines. The Ordnance department was to produce toxie agents and fill chemical shells. The Signal Corps was to procure gas alarms. Following the British example, the Corps of Engineers was assigned to employ gas weapons on the battlefield. British gas experts ftom the Royal Engineers arrived to assist in the taining In Tune 1918, the War Department ereated the Chemical Warfare Serviee to coordinate the develop- ment of offensive munitions and the procurement of dofensive equipment. Major General William Sibert, the architect of the Panama Canal and former com- ‘ander of the 1 Infantry Division, became the first chief of the Chemical Warfare Service. As a gen- cxal officer of some acclaim, recently arrived from the theater of war, he gave the new service a credible name to lead its efforts. Under his direction, the army built four production plants at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, to manufacture chlorine, chloropicrin, phos- ‘gene, and mustard agent, producing some 1,600 tons by war's end. These chemicals were shipped to Europe in 55-gallon drums to be loaded into British and French shells. By the end of the war, the Chetnical Warfare Service would have 1,680 officers and 20,518 enlisted Its insignia, « pair of crossed chemical retorts on a six-sided hexagon representing the benzene ring, denoted the organization’s laboratory roots. (Ed. ‘This is still the officer branch insignia of the Amy Chemical Comps.) The I Gas Regiment, formerly the 30 Engineer Regiment (Gas and Flame}, arrived in Europe in early 1918 following training at American University in Washington. D.C. Two companies of the regiment joined British forces to gain experience, firing some forty tons of gas projectiles in March and April, From 5 — VOL. 14, NO. April to September, other companies of the regiment supported French gas operations. But many American ‘commanders were reluctant to use chemical weapons, having litle experience with such weather-depend- ent weapons systems and fearing German retaliation, But German gas attacks continued, and the American forces soon responded in kind, The German spring, offensives of 1918 saw the highest level of chemical warfare of the war In June 1918, companies of the 1" Gas Regiment ‘moved into the American sector of the front to conduct, offensive gas operations. In general, there were two types of artillery tactics employing gas. “Destructive ire” consisted of two minutes of intense bombard- ‘ment with gas shells that resulted in a dense gas cloud designed to inflict heavy casualties. “Neutralizing, bombardment” was intended to hinder and exhaust enemy personnel, a mix of seventy-five percent high explosive and twenty-five percent gas, designed to force the enemy into protective shelters and gas masks. Such a response was believed to wear down troops: physically and mentally limiting their ability to defend an attacked position. Counterbattery fie using gas was also seen as an effective artillery tactic, since it was often impossible to completely neutralize an enemy artillery battery with high explosives alone, During the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the 1" Gas Regiment supported American operations with gas ‘When German anillery retaliated with mustard rounds, one infantry regiment being supported by a gas com= pany refused to allow the firing of a second gas attack But this did not stop the German use of gas. ‘The I* Gas Regiment also supported French operations, but USS. forces never really mastered the art of employing ‘288 weapons. This hesitancy is perhaps understand- able. given the army's initial unreadiness and the steep leaming curve of learning to defend against gas Those commanders who did allow gas usage became enthusiastic supporters of the Chemical Warfare Service, while many others were not, an ‘uneven view that became even more exaggerated after and retaliate. the war Nearly one-third of all American casualties were gas-related, numbering about 70,000. Only one in sixty was a fatality, however, in contrast t9 the 75,000 anillery casualties, one inten of whom died. Gas was not @ major contributor to fatalities, nor had its use changed the outcome of any campaign, Of course, nei= | i | _J£ RELEVANCE - AUTUMN 2005 ~ VOL.14,NO.4 ther tanks nor sireraft decided any battle on their own either. Gas did have a significant emotional impact con how the military and the public viewed the war General Pershing noted: “Whether or not gas will be employed ip future wars is « matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question.” ‘The Chemical Warfare Service was intended as a |___temporary wartime organization, programmed 0 go out of existence six months after the end of hostili- ties. Secretary of War Newton Baker and Army Chief" of Staff General Peyton March were both advocates of eliminating this new chemical warfare capability Even General Pershing was undecided as to the need for a permanent organization. Upon his return to the States, Colonel Fries worked closely with prominent military and civilian leaders, to include the American Chemical Society, to lobby Congress for retention of the Chemical Warfare Service. While he empha- sized the need to ensure that the U.S. military had a strong defensive and offensive capability against future ‘chemical threats, the American Chemical Society was pethaps more interested in getting a look at German patents in the chemistry field. Colonel Fries was pro- moted to brigadier general and took over the Chemical Warfare Service in February 1920. In July, Congress ‘made the Service a permanent part of the army, with responsibilities to continue “the investigation, devel- ‘opment, manufacture or procurement and supply of all smoke and incendiary materials, all toxie gases, and all gas defense appliances ‘The interwar years were lean ones for the Chemical Warfare Service, as for the army as a whole, The Service worked closely with commercial chemical ‘companies and agricultural interests on peacetime applications of chemical agents to maintain personne! and skills. Still ts numbers dropped to less than five hhundred military personnel and about one thousand civilians. ‘The Geneva Protoco! for the Probibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or other Gases, and of Bacterial Methods of War (better known as the Geneva Protocol of 1925) attempted to limit the manufacture and use of chemical weapons, but allowed nations that ‘were attacked with chemical agents the right of retalia- tion in kind. The United States Senate refused to ratify the treaty, though, voicing a concern that the nation needed t0 protect itself through the development of an offensive capability. From 1930 10 1941, the Chernical Warfare Service focused on refining the production of ‘chemical warfare agents and developing better delivery systems. These included adding rifling to the British Stokes mortar and adopting the 42-inch mortar for the delivery of smoke and chemical agents as well as high explosives. Gas bombs were developed to take advantage of bomber aircraft, predicted by many to be the decisive arm of any future war, ‘The Chemical Warfare Service was revitalized by World War 11, as the War Department recognized the need to develop both defensive equipment and a retalia- tory capability in the event that Germany or Japan were to use chemical or biological agents against American troops. The buildup of arsenals, proving grounds, and ‘taining bases almost rivaled the Manhattan Project in scale. While there was no actual use of chemical or biological agents against U.S, forces during the war, the discovery of nerve agents in Germany after the war ‘was enough fo convince Congress of the need to retain the capabilities of the Chemical Warfare Service. On 2 August 1946, Congress established the Chemical Corps as an official branch of the United States Army. The United States unilaterally terminated its offen- sive biological weapons program in 1972, and ended the offensive chemical weapons program in 1990. As noted above, the Chemical Corps was nearly disestab- lished in 1972, but Cold War threats and conflicts in the Middle East affirmed the need for the Chemical Corps’ expertise in defending against such threats. Throughout its history, what is today the Army Chemical Corps has been the sole military agency that provides dedicated professionals to address the threat of chemical, biologi- cal, and nuclear weapons. Its members have never for- gotten their roots, ‘The distinctive unit insignia of the old Chemical Warfare Service, approved in 1934, was 2 green dragon breathing fire, with the motto Elementis Regamus Proclium—"Let Us Rule the Battle by Means of the Elements.” The regimental crest of today’s ‘Chemical Corps is a shield diagonally divided in two. ‘The upper right has the same green dragon, The lower left isa tee scarred by artillery fire, reminiscent of the battlefields of the Great War {Ed.—This isan edited version of a much longer arti- cle on the entire history of the Army Chemical Corps that first appeared in On Point, the quarterly publica- tog of the Amy Historical Foundation, in 2004.)