Fishman 1 Max Fishman Professor Roberts ENGL 145-18 6 May 2013 Coming to a Kim Jong-understanding For years tensions

have escalated in East Asia as a result of threats from North Korea. Most recently the communist regime has intensified the standoff with a series of nuclear scares triggered by the launch of their Kwangmyongsong-3 Unit 2 satellite in December of 2012. A state of panic ensued as officials in South Korea and Japan speculated North Koreas nuclear arms capability. Pushing matters further, North Korea ended its armistice from the Korean War and threatened its neighboring nations with land invasions, prompting South Korea and Japan to deploy missile defense systems on standby. With the closure of the joint industrial town of Kaesong, analysts speculate that the last straw has been pulled and a conflict in Korea is imminent. This fierce sabre-rattling involves the most drastic measures North Korea has taken to date and, as a result, the west perceives them as a nation united in belligerence under the rule of a madman. Western media propagandizes North Korea by painting a picture of insanity through sensationalist news reports and movies such as Team America and Red Dawn, which does nothing for North Koreas reputation but heighten a mix of fear and ridicule in its Western perception. However, if we look beyond the propaganda to get a more objective look at North Korea, well see a nation acting out of desperation and taking drastic measures because thats the only option it has. All of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Koreas actions, as crazy as they

Fishman 2 seem to an outsider, serve logical goals and actually promote the well being of the nation as a whole. To build an understanding of North Koreas situation, it is essential to look at the nations history. From their beginning in 1945, North Korea has faced geopolitical and resource disadvantages, as 38th parallel cut the North off from nearly two thirds of the peninsulas industrial and agricultural complements (Central Intelligence Agency). Additionally, most of Koreas political structure was centered in Seoul after thousands of Japanese officials, including administrators, policemen, teachers, and industrial technicians fled the north as the Red Army advanced into Korea (Paige). Communist Party officials from the USSR stepped in to oversee the development of the new nation by placing many Soviet-Korean administrators in political offices and initiating a program that would force the North Koreans to depend on the Soviet system for survival. Some of the features of this program were a loan of 212 million rubles and a trade network with the USSR and its satellite states (Paige). The result of this dependence on the Soviets was an opportunity for the new leader Kim Il-sung to rise to power by unifying the many communist factions of North Korea during the transitional era from Red Army occupation to self-governance. The early Il-sung regime led the DPRK to a promising period of industrial progress until it abruptly ended with the Korean War. Even though the war was counted as a loss for the UN, the coalition had at least completed their objective of crippling the North Korean economy. UN forces succeeded in the destruction of several heavy industrial centers, steel plants, and the Norths only oil refinery in Wonsan, resulting in a disproportional amount of imports to exports in North Korean trade (Paige). In addition to the necessity of large volume imports of industrial

Fishman 3 capital from the Soviet Union, the DPRK at this point on had to import nearly fifteen times its own crude oil production capabilities in order to maintain operation of its industries (Central Intelligence Agency). Though North Korea was able to overcome many of these issues under the bold leadership and planning of the Kim Il-sung era, all of these deficiencies from the beginning are still felt today and even led to its stagnation and near collapse in the early 90s. Though the Kim Il-sung era brought apparent progress to North Korea and the nation seemed to be on the trajectory to become a world power, North Koreas dependence on the Soviet system once again became obvious with the fall of the USSR. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 immediately triggered two massive issues for the DPRK: the new Russian Federation cut back 90% of trade with North Korea and required that the nation repay all debts from the Soviet era (Suh and Lee). What was once a growing economy stagnated nearly overnight and Kim Ilsung did everything he could to recover his nation until his death in 1994. The former leaders son, Kim Jong-il assumed power and tried to continue his fathers legacy of growth and progress but soon had to change his focus when such an agenda was nearly impossible to promote in a country torn by famine, a weak economy, and food shortages (Suh and Lee). The Kim Jong-il era marked the beginning of the DPRKs frantic struggle. With the absence of the USSR, it became obvious that North Korea was not as self-sufficient as it boasted. The same spread of famine and floods in the mid-nineties hit China and South Korea as well, but they were able to purchase what they needed from trade partners unlike North Korea (Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart). Unwilling to open the North Korean markets to the world, Kim Jong-il pushed a series of economic reforms known as Songun that involved the nationalization of most of North Koreas industries under military control (Chosun, Songun). Despite marginal crisis recovery as a

Fishman 4 result of Songun, North Korea became increasingly isolated from the rest of the rapidly globalizing world. In addition to facing symptoms of isolation such as inefficiency and cheap quality, the minimal aid the United States provided North Korea began to dwindle until it stopped completely in 2009 (Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart). At this point the DPRK was desperate to preserve its regime and began resorting to seemingly insane amounts of militarization to keep itself from being muted by big power. This ability to grab the attention of world leaders through slews of threats became an asset to North Korea, as it is one of the only things it is capable of (Tatlow). However, Kim Jong-ils military-first policies made the UN view North Korea as a threat, which led to a series of tough sanctions in attempts to cull the new warmongering trends. Unfortunately for the UN, these resolutions garnered the opposite results from what they had hoped. One such chain of events started with a hold on North Korean bank accounts in 2005, to which North Korea responded with a series of missile tests the next year. Trying to end this behaviour, the UN tightened sanctions, which cemented a pattern of North Korean nuclear missile tests after each new sanction. Mike Chinoy, an analyst who has visited the DPRK many times, says that this evidence proves that US policy toward North Korea clearly does not work and that we should follow a diplomatic strategy like Churchill had proposed during the Cold War. A look through our history with the Soviet Union would also suggest that tensions could relax with leader-to-leader summits just like they had during Reagans meetings with Gorbachev. Instead, US policy follows a vicious cycle of sanctions that have done nothing but increase North Korean aggression.

Fishman 5 Despite being shrouded by propaganda from both domestic and foreign sources, Kim Jong-un is trying to improve the well-being of his nation. Because of this propaganda, its hard to decipher the intentions of the current DPRK leader, as western media spins him as insane to mock and belittle him, while on the other hand North Korean media glorifies the man to the level of a demigod. To better analyze Kim Jong-uns agenda, we need to get a good look at what we know for sure: the most obvious observation of the young leader is that he tries to emulate his grandfather rather than his father through his appearance and charismatic speeches. If this is true then it is entirely possible that Kim Jong-un is trying to bring North Korea back to the growth trajectory of the Kim Il-sung era. Hearkening back to the days of his grandfather proves a good strategy for Kim Jong-un, as he can exude a nostalgic image of the strong and fearless leader who led his peoples nation to prosperity several decades before. This interpretation has led analysts to speculate that his warmongering rhetoric is probably part of a much bigger domestic policy struggle (Haggard). When Kim Jong-un assumed power, the political-military elite of North Korea, mostly compromised of old generals accustomed to the warmongering of the Kim Jong-il era, did not take the young leader very seriously. If Kim Jong-uns goal is regime survival, then it is necessary for him to gain the respect of these generals and consolidate power before he can move along with any of his other domestic goals (McCurry). Little is known about Kim Jong-uns domestic plans because outsiders know him by his foreign policy actions, but several pieces of evidence could shed a little light on his speculative agenda. First, Kim Jong-un was educated and raised in Europe, which sets him apart from his predecessors. Second, his first speeches as leader discussed plans to minimize military involvement in politics and to rebuild North Korean infrastructure and manufacturing industries

Fishman 6 (Chosun, Signs of Change). Third, there is evidence that Kim Jong-un may not hate the United States as much as were told to believe. He has been known to love basketball and recently invited superstar Dennis Rodman to North Korea and had his revolutionized pop music group, Moranbong, perform the theme from Rocky as the famous training montage was shown behind the musicians (Korean Central Television). These details about the DPRKs current head of state provide evidence that he may try to modernize his nation during his reign and possibly complete his grandfathers goal of Korean unification. It is said that the sum is greater than the parts and this saying applies greatly to the current state of North Korean affairs. By putting each of these topics together, a bigger picture seems to appear. The DPRK becomes a nation more deserving of sympathy than of hatred or fear a nation trapped in a vicious cycle perpetuated by its enemies sanctions and its own actions during times of crisis. Western media capitalizes on the extreme measures North Korea is forced to take and spins them as a loose cannon ready to start a nuclear war rather than a nation struggling to survive while it rebuilds itself so it can catch up to the rest of the world.

Fishman 7 Works Cited Central Intelligence Agency. Korea, North. cia.gov. Central Intelligence Agency, 29 Apr. 2013. Web. 1 May 2013. Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart. North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation. 5 Apr. 2013. R41259. U.S. Congressional Research Service. Web. 27 Apr. 2013. Chinoy, Mike. Our policy toward North Korea isnt working. WP Opinions. The Washington Post, 29 Mar. 2013. Web. 27 Apr. 2013. Haggard, Stephen. Kim Jong Un is not crazy. CNN Opinion. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., 2 Apr. 2013. Web. 1 May 2013. Korean Central Television. KCTV, Pyongyang. n/d. Web. McCurry, Justin. Kim Jong-un has made a decent fist of rattling the US. The Guardian. Guardian News and Media Limited, 5 Apr. 2013. Web. 1 May 2013. N. Koreas Songun Ideology the Next Juche? The Chosun Ilbo. Chosun, 3 May. 2005. Web. 27 Apr. 2013. Paige, Glenn D. The Korean Peoples Democratic Republic. Hoover Institution Studies. Ed. Jan F. Triska. Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1996. Print. Signs of Change in Kim Jong-uns New Years Speech. The Chosun Ilbo. Chosun, 2 Jan. 2013. Web. 1 May 2013. Suh and Lee. North Korea After Kim Il Sung. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998. Print. Tatlow, Didi Kirsten. North Korea: Not Crazy but Very Misunderstood. IHT Rendezvous. The New York Times Company, 2 Apr. 2013. Web. 27 Apr. 2013.