Melanie's Thesis

Goldberg, Melanie
Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict
TEXT IN CONTEXT: DETERMINING THE PUBLIC RELATIONS UNDERDOG IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Melanie Goldberg Brooklyn College Presidential Scholar 2013 With the Help of: Professor Paul Moses Professor, Department of English, Brooklyn College Professor Lee Quinby Director, Macaulay Honors Thesis Colloquium
Goldberg, Melanie
Preface
In January 2012, I had the privilege of being able to visit the Israeli border of the Gaza Strip. Being a Jew, I could only stand a couple of miles from the border, and not enter the strip, since Hamas bans all Jews entry. While I was with the Hasbara Fellowships group, I snapped a few pictures of Gazas skyline, heard a few speeches I currently cant remember, and left with the memories of a blimp-like structure, operated by Hamas, floating in the sky, constantly monitoring its people. That evening, I met up with a friend in Jerusalem to tell her of my days activities. I brought out my camera to help tell my stories. As I completed telling her the events of the day, she flipped through the last of my pictures. Hey-wait, you didnt tell me you visited Tel Aviv today too! she commented. Thats because I didnt, I answered, confused. She turned my camera towards me and I saw that she had gotten to the pictures I had snapped of Gazas skyline. Thats Gaza, I clarified. The worlds image of the Gaza strip is one they receive from the media. That image is one of a desolate war zone instead of what it truly is, a land controlled by its
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governing party Hamas complete with its own stock exchange (World Bank), because thats the message the media constantly sends (Hoffman). Very few westerners have ever visited the region; therefore they solely rely on those images the media provides. In this thesis I pursue the debate surrounding who first provides the pictures to the media, and what the reporters then portray in their writing as a result. What they portray is what educates their readers on the Middle East region and the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is crucial for those readers to be able to form a fully and fairly reported view surrounding the incidents that occur there.
Goldberg, Melanie
Introduction
It may take a minute to believe someones fabrication, but it takes far longer to change an initial perception. Thats what perpetually sticks in peoples minds. When it comes to the media, every incident allows for a crucial short amount of time critical to affecting the medias angle when reporting. Certainly this was the case for the 2010 Freedom Flotilla incident involving Israel and its Defense Forces, the humanitarian and activist groups, Hamas, and the Palestinians. On May 31st, 2010, members of the Israel Defense Force raided the Freedom Flotilla as it attempted to breach the naval blockade Israel was imposing on Gaza (Palmer 3). What resulted was the death of nine of the flotillas members and numerous injuries on both sides. The remaining flotilla participants were taken into custody by the Israeli authorities (Palmer 3). In this thesis, I argue that the immediate media responses to this incident demonstrate a clear lack in Israels 2010 crisis management PR showing stark evidence of their inadequate press relationships. The field of public relations is an area of the Arab-Israeli conflict that isnt explored often. PR, in short, is what dictates the different versions of incidents, depending on which side provides the press release. It also allows for the context behind each incident to be developed and explained. In a region so far removed from the Western nations, and one as tumultuous as it consistently proves to be, context can play a major part when interpreting each incident. Forming an unbiased context involves an education in the regions history and affairs, especially for members of the media. The general public relies on the press to understand world affairs, and without the proper amount of information provided to the media from both sides involved in each incident,
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the media end up presenting a biased version of an incident. Balanced PR exists to try and provide both sides to every incident and establish the context behind them. This thesis explores the historical necessity of good crisis management and adequate press relationships necessary for Israel to be on equal ground with its neighbors in this perpetual, ongoing conflict. I use the Freedom Flotilla incident as a basis for my claims. In the coming sections, I show that the initial media released after the incident proved that in the PR battle, the pro-Palestinian humanitarian and activist groups had gotten their side of the incident out to the media first, proclaiming Israel as solely responsible for the actions that occurred aboard the flotilla (NGO Monitor). Three months later, when the United Nations Human Rights Council released their report on the incident, they too found Israel to be solely responsible (UNHRC). This shows that even three months later, Israel still had not adequately presented their version of the events that occurred, resulting in further distortion of Israels world image. Finally, over one year later, the United Nations Palmer Report was released, divvying the blame between the NGOs and Palestinians for breaching Israels legal blockade on Gaza, and Israel, for forcefully stopping the flotilla (Palmer). It also concluded that the main goal of the flotilla participants was to bring publicity to the humanitarian situation in Gaza by attempting to breach the blockade (Palmer 29, Israeli Commission Report 278). This means that the main goal of the flotilla was a highly organized publicity event while delivering aid was just secondary. However, the media doesnt have a year to come to this type of accurate conclusion. They have immediate deadlines, and if Israel wants to stand on equal footing with those they are at war with, they must develop a PR team comparable to those with which they fight. In a
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war as complex as the Arab-Israeli conflict, sometimes accurate interpretation of incidents is all about the context. In the following sections, I first present the context behind the actions that occurred aboard the Freedom Flotilla by providing an extensive history of Israel and its neighbors called Background: A Brief History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (8-17). I then delve into the significance of PR, especially in regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in The Significance of Public Relations (18-19) and The Significance of Public Relations Regarding the 2010 Freedom Flotilla Incident (20-22). I then detail Israels 2010 PR team in Israels Public Relations Team in 2010 (23-26) Analyses of the initial press releases given to the media then are presented in Summary of the Early Press Releases Regarding the Flotilla Incident By NGOs and Israel (27-34) along with how those releases affected the medias initial reports in Early Press Published United States (35-38). I then show how the UN Palmer Report presents the most accurate analysis of the incident and acknowledges the context behind it in The Significance and Analysis of The UNs Palmer Report (39-50). In there, I also mention the UNHRC document, and explain how the Israeli version of the events still didnt reach the key people prior to its publication, resulting in the report once again remaining one-sided. Furthermore, I explain why it is necessary that an accurate analysis be available in all initial reporting in The Necessity of Accuracy in Initial Reporting (51). Finally, I conclude with how proper public relations plays an important role in ensuring accuracy in the media, complete with suggestions for Israel to reform its PR team, in Suggestions for Israels PR Modifications and Sample Press Release (52-54). My goal with this is to help Israel
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improve its overall world image and provide factual knowledge of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the world at large.
Goldberg, Melanie
BACKGROUND: A Brief History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

In order to understand major historical events, it is necessary to look into the background of what led those involved to any specific achievement or confrontation. Middle Eastern affairs, especially those involving the Arab-Israeli Conflict, involved many complexities throughout its long-struggle-filled history. Knowledge of basic ArabIsraeli history allows the context behind each isolated incident to arise, this allowing one to look at each incident objectively and form more substantial and accurate opinions. Therefore, to understand the events that led to the raid on the Freedom Flotilla, I have chosen to start at the very beginning of the current era of the Arab-Israeli Conflict; a beginning that has led to a very eventful and deadly present, but will hopefully lead to a calmer, more peaceful future. The Jewish State of Israel is surrounded by those nations who call it their enemy. At its northern border lies Lebanon; while to the east lie Syria and Jordan. Its south faces Egypt, the Sinai and Saudi Arabia. Its western border is along the Mediterranean Sea and, since 2005, also contains the Gaza Strip. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 put the notion of a Jewish state into peoples minds, citing the first world power, Great Britain, as in favour of a Jewish national home in what was known as Palestine (BBC). By 1922, the League of Nations formed a Mandate for Palestine, which designated Palestine as the national home for the Jewish people under direct British Rule, and Transjordan as an Arab state for the Arab Palestinians to be under the joint rule of the Hashemite family and the British (League of Nations). However, this British rule angered some of the areas population, including the Jewish Palestinians whose ancestors had lived in that area since before the destruction of the second temple. It also angered the Bedouins, and Arab
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Palestinians, resulting in internal battles (Jewish Virtual Library). The British were unsure of how to mediate between the native Arab Palestinians and the native and immigrant Jewish people for whom they had just created a state. The UN Partition Plan of 1947 attempted to settle this matter by relinquishing the British of any power over the region, and giving the Arab Palestinians a state that included Jordan, and most of the land thats outside Israels pre-1967 borders. The Jewish state was to be formed with the land that was left but Jerusalem was to be ruled internationally (Israels Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Finally, on May 14th, 1948 the Jewish State of Israel was declared, allowing for a full pullout of all British forces (Hasbara 135). The next day, the Arab Legion, which included Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Iraq, declared war on the newborn Jewish state, hoping to ensure that the Jews would not keep their ancestral homeland (Jewish Virtual Library). They claimed that the Arab Palestinians were being left out of the conversation regarding the status of the land in Palestine, since it was their homeland as well. However, by January 1949, their efforts proved fruitless, and the borders of the state of Israel were officially finalized (Hasbara 185). The Gaza Strip, at Israel s Southern border near Egypt, was declared by the Arab League as an independent entity governed by the All-Palestine government. However, it was not recognized by those countries outside of the Arab League (Shlaim). In February 1949, Egypt and Israel signed an armistice agreement that settled the borders of Egypt and the Gaza Strip with Israel, leaving Egypt in control of the Gaza Strip and those who resided within its borders (Gardus 369). Those same borders are still abided by today (Gardus 370).
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The 1950s held a period of mass immigration from Jews of Arab lands as well as the remnants of the European Jewry after the Holocaust to Israel (Hasbara 135). This allowed the country to grow and prosper, leading to a period of innovation. Since Israel is mostly swampland, the new immigrants needed to make the land arable. By 1951, they established the Hula Valley Reclamation Program, turning swamps into arable lands. Israel also supported the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, accepting the new Republic of Egypt within the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset (Jewish Virtual Library). But peace would not last for long. By July 1956, Egypt decided to nationalize the Suez Canal and block the strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping (Owen). Israel responded by declaring war in October. A day later, Britain and France joined Israel in its war effort (Owen). By March 1957, the canal was finally reopened to Israeli trade and policed by the UNEF to ensure that this nationalization of a public resource would never happen again (Jewish Virtual Library). However, Israel also maintained a military presence in the Sinai Peninsula to ensure that its trade would not be blocked again. Israel only agreed to pull out when satisfactory arrangements are made with the international force that is about to enter the Canal Zone (Alteras 246). This war marked the beginning of a long range of hostilities in the region, as terrorist attacks became a regular occurrence carried out by Israels neighbors (Jewish Virtual Library). Then, with the foundation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1964 (Hasbara 135), a declaration proclaiming that it is a national duty to bring up individual Palestinians in an Arab revolutionary manner was sent out calling on every Palestinian to be prepared for the armed struggle and [be] ready to sacrifice his wealth and his life in order to win back his homeland and bring about its liberation (Kadi 137-
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141). The PLO was established by Arab states in the Arab League Summit in Cairo in 1964 to ensure that an Arab state in Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the time of the British mandate" would be formed. They also sought to "prohibit the existence and activity of Zionism and called for the use of all means necessary to make certain that this was possible (Kadi 137-141). In 1968, Yasser Arafat was named the PLOs head; he pushed for the use of guerrilla warfare under the fedayeen organizations against Israel (AP). By June 1967, Israel was facing imminent attacks from Egypt, Syria and Jordan (Hasbara 135). So the IDF launched a pre-emptive strike against the three countries, and two of their borders, trying to ensure that theyd be able to defend themselves and their state (Hasbara 135). Six days later, Israel declared victory and acquired the land that formed the new defensible borders of Israel, which now included Judea and Samaria, the remainder of Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights (Hasbara 135). That following September, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser declared in the Khartoum Conference the Three Nos: No peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, and no recognition of Israel (Hasbara 135). The early 1970s held Israel and Egypts War of Attrition, where Egypt launched countless attacks on Israels positions in the internationally governed Suez Canal (Hasbara 135). That was followed quickly by Egypt and Syria launching an unexpected joint attack against Israel on Yom Kippur 1973, which held heavy casualties for Israel (Hasbara 135). Although Israel was named the victor, the nation suffered a heavy loss, including the resignation of their first female prime minister, Golda Meir. Israels Arab neighbors, clearly not succeeding on the war front now realized that they could not
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crush Israel by force (Brown). Rather, they formulated a new agenda: one of diplomacy, public relations, negotiations and propaganda. A time of peace with Egypt would soon arrive, however, when the Camp David Accords ended with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat signing a formal peace treaty on March 26th, 1979. The main features of the treaty were mutual recognition of each other as sovereign countries to end the state of war, normalization of relations between the two countries and the complete withdrawal by Israel from the Sinai Peninsula as Egypt had agreed to leave the area demilitarized. The agreement also allowed for the Suez Canal, the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be from hereon out international waterways. Most notably, the Accords ended with Egypt being the first Arab state to officially recognize Israel as a Jewish state (Camp David Accords). Although the borders were relatively calm at this point, Israels new enemy was internal: the radical Islamic extremists who were part of the fedayeen and the PLO (Jewish Virtual Library). The PLO declared the first Intifada on Israel that began on Dec 8th, 1986 and lasted for about seven years (Hasbara 135). Throughout this period of extreme violence, over 3,000 Israelis were wounded and 160 Israelis were killed (BTselem). Finally, this era of terror ended as the PLO and Israel signed a mutual recognition agreement in September 1993, soon to be known as the Oslo Accords (Hasbara 135). That marked the first time Israel would trade land for peace, by making its first withdrawal from most of the Gaza Strip in May 1994 (Hasbara 135). However, almost immediately thereafter, Palestinian terrorists initiated a campaign of suicide bombers throughout Israel (Hasbara 135). Israel did stick to their side of the Oslo
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Accords though, removing its army from big centers of Palestinian populations, including Jericho and Hebron (Hasbara 135). Upon the failure of the Camp David Summit in July 2000, however, a full-fledged second intifada was launched and a wave of suicide bombings and armed attacks began (Hasbara 134). By 2008, over 1,000 Israelis were murdered in terrorist attacks, most of them civilians (BTselem). In response to this era of terror, Israel erected the Security Fence to serve as an important function in national security, and the Roadmap for Peace was announced by the Quartet of the Middle East consisting of the UN, the EU, Russia and the US (Hasbara 134). This roadmap detailed a plan for a lasting peace and a resolution for the IsraeliPalestinian conflict (Roadmap for Peace). It also pushed for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to announce his plan to unilaterally disengage from Gaza by 2005 (Hasbara 134), since he felt that Israel must break the current stalemate of the peace process, and performing this pullout would show how serious Israel was in wanting peace (BBC). Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority (PA) endorsed the disengagement plan (Hasbara 134). From August to September 2005, Israel began its historic pullout of Gaza, removing over 8,000 Jewish inhabitants of the area and removing a strong sector of its agricultural economy (Hasbara 134). However, that didnt cease the Palestinians rocket fire as many had hoped (Hasbara 134). Hope for peace was lost further when on January 25th, 2006 Hamas won the parliamentary elections in Gaza (Hasbara 134), and even further when IDF Sergeant Gilad Shalit was kidnapped while patrolling the Gaza/Israel border in June 2006 (Hasbara 133). Hamas, also known as the Islamic Resistance Movement, is designated a terrorist organization by Israel and the US (Greenberg). Its charter cites that Israel will exist and
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will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, our struggle against Jews is very great and very serious, and initiatives and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement (The Hamas Charter). Since they became the governing body of Gaza, it has become increasingly difficult for Israel to have diplomatic relations with the inhabitants there, complicating hopes for a peaceful solution even more. To make matters worse for Israel, Fatah (the governing party of the Palestinian Authority) and Hamas signed the Mecca Accord in February 2007, to become the first ever unity government over the Palestinians in Gaza (Hasbara 133). By default, this meant that the Hamas Charters statements were now accepted by the PA, which halted any semblance of peace talks entirely. Throughout all this, barrages of rockets shot from Gaza kept raining on Israeli civilians (Hasbara 133). However, the unity of Fatah and Hamas didnt last long. By June 2007, Hamas decided to take over Gaza, kicking Fatah out, and angering the PA (Hasbara 133). By December 27, 2008, with the rocket count from Gaza into Israel at over 10,000, and Hamas refusing to resume a cease-fire with Israel, the IDF announced Operation Cast Lead in order to protect its Southern citizens (Hasbara 133). Its aim was to stop the rocket fire constantly bombarding Israel. After three weeks, Israel announced a unilateral ceasefire and twelve hours later Hamas announced only a one-week ceasefire (CBC News). However, since Israel still had an obligation to protect its citizens, one week of quiet was not enough. So, it decided to impose a naval blockade of the Gaza Strip (Hasbara 133). So, to comply with international regulations, Israel allowed and still allows limited numbers of humanitarian supplies from aid organizations to be delivered
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through the land crossings in Ashkelon. In May 2010, this included over 1.5 million liters of diesel fuel and gasoline, fruits and vegetables, wheat, sugar, meat, chicken and fish products, dairy products, animal feed, hygiene products, clothing and shoes. Whatever items were prevented from entering were certain household items used to create homemade rockets (Ehrlandger, Cooper). It was later exposed that to ensure that Gazas citizens didnt starve, Israel counted calories of what they let in so that no one could claimed they died from lack of food. Constant pressure on Hamas was still applied by these restrictions to try to find a peaceful solution and cease their rocket fire (AP). By mid-2010 though, certain members of the international community felt that the situation in Gaza was unsustainable. Therefore, the Free Gaza Movement, the European Campaign to End the Siege on Gaza, the Greek Ship to Gaza Campaign, the Swedish Ship to Gaza, the International Committee to End the Siege on Gaza and the Turkish NGO, nsan Hak ve Hrriyetleri ve nsani Yardm Vakf, or, in English, the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), partnered to form the Freedom Flotilla (IHH 10-11). The IHH is on Israels banned NGO list for its links with Hamas, and, as of this publication, the US government is currently debating whether it should be on its list of foreign terrorist organizations for its possible links to Al Quaeda (Christian Science Monitor). However, the IHH website proclaims that it has worked to prevent the violation of human rights and liberties, without regard to nation, religion, language or race (IHH 6). Currently, it fulfills its proclamation in 120 countries and regions spread over five continents and is motivated to create a collective consciousness (IHH 6). The entire flotilla movement was also heavily endorsed by Turkey (IHH 6).
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The intentions of the flotilla were to try to breach the naval blockade set up by Israel on Gaza (Palmer 27), so that they could ostensibly only provide the citizens of Gaza with food and necessary supplies for life (IHH 20). However, on May 31st, 2010, members of the IDF raided the Mavi Marmara boat resulting in the untimely and unintentional deaths of nine of the flotillas members and numerous injuries on both the Israeli and humanitarian sides, including gunshot wounds to two Israeli soldiers and a fractured skull of another (Simmons 330). The remainder of the flotilla participants were taken into custody by the Israeli authorities and were released and deported by June 3, 2010 (Palmer 3). The IDF then transferred all allowed goods that had been aboard the flotilla to Gaza (Hasbara 133). Israels government claimed that these deaths aboard the Mavi Marmara were unintentional but because the activists attacked the soldiers with weapons, the soldiers were forced to react and retaliate (Simmons 330). From the video footage released by the IDF, one can see the flotilla participants attacking the soldiers with steel pipes, wooden clubs, knives and slingshots (IDF Blog). However, the members of the Mavi Marmara vehemently deny this, and claim the IDF were the ones who attacked them violently and brutally, and used excessive force (IHH 20-26). The aftermath of this incident is still a blockaded Gaza, albeit lighter, rockets still being shot at Israels Southern citizens, and non-existent Israel and Turkish relations (Eligur). Although the UN investigation and subsequent Palmer Report found that both sides were to blame for the deaths (Palmer 4), a survey of the initial media response and reports released was one mostly sympathizing with the flotilla activists and solely blaming Israel for what had occurred aboard the flotilla (NGO Monitor). I believe that
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this initial media response is due to Israels lack of diplomatic public relations back in 2010, resulting from inadequate crisis management and insufficient press relationships.
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The Significance of Public Relations

With any incident, the media will become informed via press releases sent by each involved partys PR team. The media will then try and speak to top leaders, witnesses of the incident as well as participants to get the full story of what had occurred. However, only with the proper PR team sending out press releases in a timely manner will the media know who the most knowledgeable people to speak to will be. The media will then capitalize on those press releases by contacting the mentioned officials. Thats when the story angle will be formed. Governments contain PR teams to manage their reputations either through promotional materials, or by getting the media to cover the positive aspects their country offers. The United States specifically has the State Department to accomplish this (Seitel 270). Thats how they maintain their world image and how they can ensure that it stays positive. However, PR doesnt just consist of propaganda. Proper PR teams also contain internal bodies to handle crises and to maintain the relationships with the media, so that each side of every scenario is able to be heard by the media. The United States has designated a sector of the Defense Department to ensure this happens (Seitel 272). However, in contrast to the organization of the US PR body, Israel has an inadequate PR team when it comes to their crisis management and maintaining media relationships. Plenty of advocacy organizations, such as The David Project, StandWithUS, Hasbara Fellowships and Israel Campus Coalition, work to ensure that the positive attributes of the state of Israel are conveyed to the media and the general public (Hillel). However, government propaganda differs greatly from crisis management. Propaganda does not need a context, nor is it time sensitive. Crisis management is. Proper
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media relationships, too, are an essential part of any crisis management team. This ensures that they can convey the involved partys reasoning behind any incident, so that both sides may be heard before the media deadline. Therefore, because Israel lacks such a team, it has become increasingly difficult for it to maintain a positive world image in the media, and, consequently, worldwide. By contrast, the Palestinians have proven to be experts at maintaining their media relationships and capitalizing on crises. Also, because plenty of human rights groups have taken up their plight, including the six who promoted the Freedom Flotilla of 2010 (IHH 10-11), the press relationships these groups maintain and the releases they send out gain a lot of traction. In addition, because Hamas has made it close to impossible for journalists to enter the Gaza Strip (Reporters Without Borders), it has become increasingly difficulty to report on the welfare of its current citizens. In turn, this makes it complicated for humanitarian rights groups to envision what is currently taking place there. NGO Monitor, an organization formed to keep an eye on human rights groups specifically focused on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, believes that humanitarian rights activists can only assume Gazas conditions from the releases (NGO Monitor) created by the Palestinians and their supporters as well as the photo documentation (Simmons 330) they provide. When the media reports on an incident in the Arab-Israeli conflict, they use those humanitarian rights groups to be experts on situations and to corroborate the information they receive via the Palestinians. Many journalists then decide what information to use when publishing, and do not confirm these reports with their own eyes.
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The Significance of Public Relations Regarding the 2010 Freedom Flotilla Incident
Israels giving of the entire Gaza Strip to the Palestinians in 2005 as a land for peace initiative (Hasbara 134) has determined a lot of the political tensions surrounding the country over the last seven years. It has yet to be deemed successful as a tactic to attain peace, since it has caused war (Hasbara 133), constant fear amongst Israels southern citizens as rockets rain down daily upon them (Hasbara 133-134), and a lot of unnecessary Israeli world-image damage. Because of all this, the Gaza pullout has indeed become one of the most monumental and controversial events in Israels short modern history. In 2006, Hamas, a group that is deemed a terrorist organization by the US and Israel (Washington Post 10/2012), was democratically elected to be the governing body of the citizens of Gaza (Hasbara 134). Since then, it has been difficult to report on the welfare of its citizens because of the lack of access to the strip (Foxman). However, to stop the raining of rockets on its Southern citizens, the IDF formed a naval blockade on Gaza in September 2007 (Ehrlandger, Cooper). To comply with international regulations, they still allowed limited humanitarian supplies from aid organizations to enter the Gaza Strip (Ehrlandger, Cooper). Whatever they prevented from entering was to help circumvent the homemade rockets from being created from certain household items (Ehrlandger, Cooper). However, Israel would let everything in through the land crossings in the Israeli city of Ashkelon, after proper inspection (Ehrlandger, Cooper). From September 2005 to May 2010, there had been over 10,000 rockets launched leading to twenty-eight casualties and countless other mental and physical injuries to Israeli citizens
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residing in the south (Hasbara 133). Therefore, the blockade was deemed legal by the UN (Palmer). However, many humanitarian rights groups were under the impression that Gaza was in disarray and that its citizens were starving and suffering from Israels prevention of goods into Gaza (IHH 10-11). Therefore, in 2010 the members of six NGOs formed the Freedom Flotilla (IHH 10-11) and tried to breach the naval blockade (Palmer 27), so that they could ostensibly provide the citizens of Gaza with only food and necessary supplies for life (IHH 20). But on May 31st, 2010, members of the IDF raided the flotilla killing nine of the flotillas members and resulting in other injuries to all parties involved (Palmer 3). In retrospect, Deputy Speaker of the Knesset and member of Israels right wing party, the Likud, Danny Danon determined that this incident presented a clear lack in Israels crisis management PR as well as their inadequate media relationships. His book, Israel: the Will to Prevail, indicates that Israel doesnt have as strong a PR team as the Palestinians and humanitarian groups (Danon 85). Israels government has an evident lack in crisis management and media relations, and therefore they do not stand on equal footing with the Palestinians and the humanitarian rights groups that support them. One can see from the early media released on the incident that the Palestinian side was the one advocated for (Simmons 330). According to the founder of a media watchdog organization, Honest Reporting, Shraga Simmons in his book David and Goliath, confirmed that the video footage the IDF captured from the helicopter which had dropped the soldiers onto the Flotilla was released over ten hours after the incident and only with Hebrew subtitles (Simmons 330). This further emphasized the worlds image of the
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incident, which had already been influenced by the earlier releases from the proPalestinian NGOs. Three months later, upon the release of the UN Human Rights Council report of the incident, it too found Israel solely to blame (UN Human Rights Council 53). Again, this shows how Israels crisis management team could not properly get Israels version out, further distorting the worlds impression of what had occurred aboard the flotilla. However, it should be noted that Israel did not participate in the UNHRC investigation because it was known as a vehemently anti-Israel entity. It was clear that during the 2010 raid, the NGOs were the first to release their version of the incident to the media and, therefore were the first to be contacted for comment (NGO Monitor). Since they solely sympathized with the flotilla activists and Gazas citizens, that story was the version initially presented (NGO Monitor). The UN Human Rights Council report too sympathized with the flotilla (UNHRC 53). However, the UN Palmer Report released in September 2011, over a year after the incident, cited both the activists and the Israelis equally at fault for the raid and its outcome (Palmer 3). This incident highlights Israels lack of a good PR team, especially when dealing with crisis management and media relations, which inevitably leads to media distortion and a faulty worldwide perception of Israeli actions. However, nothing is ever black and white. So it is Israels obligation to get out the entire context surrounding each incident quickly and efficiently so that it has a fair shot in objectivity when concerning a war as complex as this.
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Israels Public Relations Team in 2010

It was frustrating for me the amount of time it took and the difficulty in finding out what Israel currently has in place as their PR team and what they had in place back in 2010. As of this publication, I can only confirm the information I found out through experts in the field currently residing in Israel. I have yet to find a website or book that explains their system. In January 2012, I was able to secure an interview with Avi Mayer, the director of new media at the Jewish Agency for Israel, an 80-year old organization, that promotes the Zionistic ideals and connections to Israel, and is dedicated to forging a commitment between the Jewish people and the state of Israel, and the 2012 winner of the Hasby award for excellence in social media. He explained that, Israel's public diplomacy strategy is overseen by the National Information Directorate, based in the Prime Minister's Office. Every government agency, however, had its own spokespeople and tends to interpret talking points in its own way. The IDF, the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs Ministry, the Israel Police, and the Government Press Office are all examples of government agencies that maintain their own press operations, even when receiving guidance from the National Information Directorate (Mayer). What Mayer was saying is that, because Israel functions as a coalition government, their media operations are scattered. A coalition government means a cabinet of parliamentary government in which several political parties cooperate (Dictionary.com). Since there is no party in Israel that wins the majority in an election, the party with the most votes must combine with others, sometimes even sacrificing their
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mantras, in order to form a unity government. As of 2010, there were sixteen parties in the parliament, two of them Palestinian (Isseroff). However, there was no uniform agency that either spoke to the media, or maintained relationships with them. Rather, each agency, controlled by its own political party in the coalition was responsible for dealing with the media. This makes things difficult for journalists, since they get many different versions of a story depending on whom they spoke with. In a crisis, like the flotilla incident, this has proven to be highly detrimental to Israels image around the world. The National Information Directorate was created six years ago, after the Second Lebanon War in 2006 (To Inform is To Influence). This was because, to many, even though Israel had a tactical victory in the war, the outcome was a strategic loss as Israel had lost the war on public opinion. By 2008, when Israel invaded Gaza in Operation Cast Lead, again there was a tactical victory, but there was still a clear lack in the information being sent to the media. It became clear that their PR had gotten better, but was far from perfect. Journalists, videographers, social media writers (including Mayer) and bloggers [were embedded] within the fighting units and sought to file information reports before all others (To Inform is To Influence). The National Information Directorate also attempted to coordinate all the public affairs, but they mostly focused on the military units in coordinating a unified message, not including the other involved parties (To Inform is To Influence). Two things should be noted in regard to the improvement of Israeli PR though: the involvement and presence in social media and the release of information in Arabic. This shows that in 2010, when social media was in use by forty-six percent of the world daily (Kate, HeyWire) including the journalists, Israel didnt use it at all. Approximately
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twenty-eight percent of the world uses social media as their primary source of news (Densley). If Israel is not represented there, people will not learn about it nor will they hear its side. Only in 2009 did Israel set up an agency to handle all its social media affairs. However, it still has yet to present a united message. The introduction of the release of information in Arabic also was a new strategy for the government to take. Beforehand, the Palestinians were just receiving information in their native tongue via their media. However, now they could access Israeli information in Arabic as well, giving them more of an education of the two sides of the conflict, and, hopefully, a better preparation of knowledge if they were to begin peace talks again. In June 2012, Former Israel Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said, the state comptrollers critical report on the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010 shows that only one government body, the Foreign Ministry, should be in charge of Israels media relations. He elaborated that it should only be the foreign ministry because, of the skill and deployment that allow it to respond in real time and deal with the false versions being put out by hostile parties, can take on these kinds of public relations missions to media worldwide. Lieberman noted that at the time of the flotilla incident, several different official bodies, including the military spokesperson, the National Information Directorate and the Ministry for Hasbara and Diaspora Affairs, were responsible for PR, creating what he called disorganization and problems (Times of Israel). These problems are evident when looking into the initial media released surrounding the flotilla incident. However, as regards terrorist organizations and their media relations, according to Mayer, he can't comment on how terrorist organizations run their media operations, but they do tend to have designated spokespeople, and they
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also tend to develop relationships with journalists. Like other bodies, they also use social media. And although terms of use would seem to bar the use of social media platforms for terror purposes, they are not always strictly upheld (Mayer). You can see examples of this from the facebook pages Free Gaza with over 40,000 followers, and the IHH Official with over 4,000 followers. Their pages consistently update themselves with breaking news and photos, accessible to anyone. Both pages were created in late 2008 and include contact emails for anyone with questions. These pages are in addition to the releases sent out by the NGOs that support the Palestinian cause and the IHH almost immediately after the raid. The organizations were prepared to get their word out, while Israel was greatly lagging behind at getting any unified message out to the media and to the general public.
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Summary of the Early Press Releases Regarding the Flotilla Incident By NGOs and Israel
The hours in the aftermath of the flotilla incident were crucial to all the parties involved. It was their chance to get their version of what occurred out to the media. Because the incident happened in the early hours of the morning, the media would be reporting any new information as breaking news to which their audiences would awake. At most, all the public had known before May 31st was that there was a Freedom Flotilla sent with humanitarian aid which was trying to breach Israels blockade of Gaza. Therefore, the media now did not only have to report on the incident, but they also had to form the context in which it had occurred, called b-matter. B-matter can come from a number of sources. Predominantly it comes from a good PR team with good media relationships and skills to react quickly and effectively in times of crises. The incident happens, the media learns about it through a general newswire like AP or Reuters, and then the media turns to the PR team they have a relationship with to learn more about the facts which led up to the incident. From the early press releases I reviewed, thirty-five were sent by NGOs (NonGovernmental Organizations) criticizing and blaming Israel solely for the incident and all injuries and deaths which had occurred aboard the flotilla (NGO Monitor). I found highlights of the early releases on NGO Monitors website, and then followed the links mentioned to the specific NGO site which held the full release to corroborate that the highlighted quote on NGO Monitor was indeed factual. NGO Monitor, a pro-Israel site that provides information and analysis, promotes accountability, and supports discussion on the reports and activities of NGOs claiming to advance human rights and humanitarian agendas. The aim of NGO Monitor is to generate and distribute critical analysis and
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reports on the output of the international NGO community for the benefit of government policy makers, journalists, philanthropic organizations and the general public. They intend to publicize distortions of human rights issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict and provide information and context for the benefit of NGOs working in the Middle East. They want to lead an informed public debate on the role of humanitarian NGOs. NGO Monitor's objective is to end the practice used by certain self-declared 'humanitarian NGOs' of exploiting the label 'universal human rights values' to promote politically and ideologically motivated agendas. Their board consists of Elie Wiesel, Alan Dershowitz, as well as countless other experts and dignitaries. According to NGO Monitor, the initial press releases sent out by these selfproclaimed civil society and human rights groups ignore the video evidence of violent activists attacking Israeli soldiers with knives and clubs, accuse Israel of piracy for intercepting the boats, obscure the role of radical Islamic Turkish group IHH, which has extensive ties to Hamas and other terror organizations, and omit the involvement of the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), a co-organizer of the flotilla and known for its strategy of provoking violent confrontations with the Israeli military (NGO Monitor). In addition, all those releases failed to mention that the flotilla had refused to deliver humanitarian aid via the Israeli port of Ashdod, and further refused to deliver letters to kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit believed to be held by Hamas in Gaza. The releases also omitted the fact that the flotilla members had been singing anti-Semitic and intifada chants while on board (NGO Monitor). What the releases state emphatically, though incorrectly, was that Israel solely was at fault for what had occurred aboard the flotilla. Amnesty International released
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early May 31st saying, Israeli killings of Gaza ship activists must be investigatedthe activists on the ships made it clear that their primary purpose was to protest against the continuing Israeli blockade, which constitutes collective punishment and so is a breach of international law (Amnesty International). However, the organization refrained from elaborating and pointing out that Hamas was shooting rockets at Israels southern citizens in response to and in protest of Israeli government actions was also a form of collective punishment and should be investigated as well. War on Want, a United Kingdom NGO, sent a release calling for their government to act, saying, this form sends a letterto demand the UK government hold Israel to account for this brutal attack (War on Want). Another release on May 31st, from the Gaza Civil Society which includes the Arab Cultural Forum, International Solidarity Movement, Palestinian Network of Non-Governmental Organisations, Gaza Community Mental Health Program and Red Crescent Society Gaza Strip, called for a global response to hold Israel accountable for the murder of foreign civilians at sea and illegal piracy of civilian vessels carrying humanitarian aid for Gaza (Gaza Civil Society, NGO Monitor). What both releases failed to mention were the videos released by the IDF that showed the weapons like machetes aboard the Mavi Marmara and that those weapons had been used violently against the IDF by the activists as the IDF attempted to take over the ship. They also didnt mention that Israel had offered countless times to transfer humanitarian aid into Gaza through the port of Ashdod. The Alternative Information Center called the incident, a massacre and a piracy in international waters against the Freedom Flotillathe Israeli Navy perpetrated a new crime against humanity when it attacked the Freedom FlotillaIsrael created a blood
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bath against civilian ships carrying hundreds of internationals from many countries (AIC). Numerous reporters in the media picked up on these hot terminologies, and used them when reporting the incident. The use of these terms implicates Israel, which can prove problematic when promoting accuracy in reporting. Since almost all these releases were published either on May 31st or June 1st, the day of or the day after the incident, one cannot be sure the information provided was corroborated with the correct and knowledgeable people. Also, since the releases were from many different countries, they reached a diverse array of a vast amount of people (NGO Monitor). The media could not simply ignore a quantity of releases that vast, diverse and immediate. Therefore, they had to capitalize on them, reporting the facts as the NGOs portrayed them to be, without hearing Israels side since it hadnt reached them yet, and without knowing who the proper contacts were to reach out to. Still, most importantly, the fact that the Freedom Flotilla organizers had been anticipating such a media opportunity was not reported. Aboard the flotilla, one could find members of parliament, academics, journalists, authors, NGO representatives, religious representatives, and activists (IHH 15). The members on board were from thirty-seven countries and who had representatives from important media organizations from most of those countries with them. This allowed the IHH to get their story out first, since they had their media partners aboard (IHH 15-16). On the flotilla were also Turksat satellite frequency and satellite phones, which the ship was using to communicate with the media and international public opinion (IHH 20). The IHH also claimed the ships of the flotilla were being watched live online via a live blog (IHH 38). This showed that the planners of the flotilla wanted to ensure that anything and
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everything that went on aboard the ships would be reported by them first, before anyone else could get their version of the incident out. They made sure to understand the immediacy of the media, and capitalized on it. In addition, the flotilla was comprised of six ships, five of which went peacefully to Israels port of Ashdod with their cargo (StandWithUs). The sixth, the Mavi Marmara, which is the one were focusing on, carried 577 passengers (IHH 12), including babies, women and the elderly (IHH 21). It was also the only one who protested the IDF warnings. No reporter questioned why there were the elderly and babies on a flotilla, which was heading to ostensibly deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza. However, as has been common for many terrorist organizations, including Hamas, the more children or those deemed helpless affected by Israeli actions, the better the terrorists look in the media, and the positive exposure they get as a result (Katz). The IHH even claims that during the raid it was announced via satellite frequency that these terrorist attacks [performed by the IDF] should immediately be halted; this frequency at first had not been noticed and thus not blocked and it was broadcasting the massacre that the Israelis were inflicting on the civilian activists (IHH 22]. As of the publication of this document however, this broadcast of the alleged IDF attacks against the activists is yet to be found, online or otherwise. The video footage found online though is confirmed by the Palmer Report later on (Palmer). It depicts the IDF approaching the Mavi Marmara, sending out warnings saying, you are now approaching an area of hostilities which is under a naval blockade. The Israeli government supports the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the civilian population of the Gaza strip and invites you to enter the Ashdod Port after which you can
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return to your home port aboard the vessels on which you arrived (IDF Blog). This message was sent at about 9PM in English to the vessels part of the flotilla. The response by the flotilla members, captured on the same video, stated obscenities like, Shut the fuck up, Go back to Auschwitz, and Were helping Arabs go against the US. Dont forget 9/11 guys (IDF Blog). A second video shows the IDF trying to specifically board the Mavi Marmara (IDF Blog). At around 4:30AM, it shows the soldiers attempting to board the ship via a ladder and a raft. Thats when you can see that they are met with iron pipes, water hoses, chains and electric disc saws to remove the ladders the IDF was using. Upon their failure to board via the raft, you see the IDF in a Black Hawk helicopter carrying fifteen soldiers. Recall that the Mavi Marmara had over five hundred participants on board. Only bringing fifteen soldiers meant the IDF did not expect any sort of extreme confrontation, unless they planned to lose such a battle. As the helicopter hovered over the ship you see a few stun grenades being thrown on board the flotilla to ensure the soldiers could land safely and carry out their mission of taking over and halting the Mavi Marmara. That cleared the roof of the flotilla only for some brief moments, as the rope the soldiers used to board was thrown down. However, almost immediately thereafter, one could see activists tie the rope to the flotilla. Therefore, a second rope had to be thrown down for the soldiers to begin to board. As every soldier slid down, it was clear that each was met with two to four activists wielding weapons. According to the IDF and photo documentation thereafter, those weapons included knives, iron bars and axes (IDF Blog). It became clear that when another soldier slid down, a gun was fired, with the bullet hitting the IDF soldier in the stomach. As the other soldiers realized they were being put in life-
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threatening situations such as battling knife wielding activists, and being thrown around from deck to deck, they opened fire with live ammunitions. Consequently, five soldiers were stabbed or shot and three were thrown from the decks. Thats when a second helicopter arrived, this time with twelve soldiers. These soldiers secured the roof quickly, but were met again with violent resistance when trying to get to the lower decks. Thats where the video documentation stops (IDF Blog). The videos found on the IDF Blog, the IDFs personal outreach to the public that explains what actions it took paired with its social media accounts, are great and detailed, and perfect for anyone who wants the context of the situation according to Israels take on the events. However, the detailed video was not published until Israels Eiland Team of experts concluded their investigation of the incident on July 13, 2010, almost a month and a half after the incident (IDF Blog). Clips from the final videos were released though, but only ten hours after the incident due to the fact that the helicopter with the video was transporting the injured activists and soldiers to nearby Israeli hospitals for treatment (Simmons 330). These clips showed the IDF being beaten and stabbed and other modes of violence that occurred aboard the flotilla, which caused numerous injuries. However, ten hours was simply too late. In todays instantaneous news cycle, where every split second determines who will get the scoop, reporters are compelled to leap to conclusions based on pre-conceived notions (Simmons 330). When stories are gathered quickly and under pressure, the media rely on a very superficial understanding of the event and its dynamics. So, the stories are not always completely accurate, since reporters depend on the context via other sources, like a PR crisis management team.
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According to Shraga Simmons, newsrooms have shrunk 25-percent in the past three years alone making it harder to quickly fact check stories and to do proper research (Simmons 331). Simmons, as the founding editor of HonestReporting, a pro-Israel media watchdog group, produced a film in 2010 exposing the distortion of the media coverage regarding the flotilla raid, which garnered in upwards of 200,000 views on Youtube. He also published, David and Goliath, a study of Western media bias in reporting the Israeli-Arab conflict. The 500-page book is sourced with over 2,000 footnotes and includes statistical studies that document a pervasive pro-Palestinian slant he found while studying the media. He delves into the reporting that surrounded the Gaza Flotilla, as well as what acts the Israel PR team took, while addressing those actions the Palestinian and humanitarian groups took. In his book he also provides the distorted news reports from the US, which were initially released. As Steven Waldman writes in his 2011 publication The Information Needs of Communities: the Changing Media Landscape in a Broadband Age, Old-fashioned shoe-leather reporting the kind where a journalist hits the street, conducts interviews, probes and unearths key information is too often replaced by a superficial Google search (Waldman). This leads to plenty of misreporting, and always lengthy, yet barely ever read corrections pages. Lastly, although highly consequential, this leads to faulty perceptions of incidents within the general public, since most of the public learns about such things solely via the media.
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Early Press Published United States

Because Israel lacks an adequate PR crisis management team and substantial media relations, I cannot blame the media completely for the way they initially reported the incident. Clearly, the pro-Palestinian humanitarian groups and the Palestinians had a handle on getting the releases out in the proper and timely fashion. However, it is still the medias duty to do their own research so that they know for sure that what the releases say are indeed factual. When it came to The New York Times report of the incident, one can see that the initial article acknowledges the releases as well as the IDF video. However, it did not say that the video represented the Israeli side, the side later to be determined as factual by the Palmer Report (Palmer). Rather, it said the video was merely supporting an Israeli claim, and subsequently quoted the Free Gaza movement saying the video was a lie (Kershner). The BBC also contributed to the perpetration of the one-sidedness, saying the idea of the activists possessing weapons was just cheap [Israeli] propaganda, despite the video footage provided by the IDF, which explicitly shows the activists using weapons against the soldiers (BBC). But it seemed, the media refused to give credence to the IDF video, while just accepting the paper releases from the pro-Palestinian humanitarians and Palestinians as factual without their citing any proof. But even those initial articles werent the worst of them. Currently and in 2010, most major news organizations relied on and subscribe to general newswires to get their breaking stories, as well as what stories they should follow, and do additional reporting on. These newswires usually just write the basics, trying to stick to the unbiased facts. The most popular newswires include the Associated Press (AP) and Reuters. However,
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when reporting the flotilla incident these two newswires did not stay completely unbiased. The AP forced readers, and news agencies, to read deeper before even mentioning what had occurred to the IDF as they boarded the flotilla, and therefore delayed the facts as the Palmer Report would soon prove (Gutkin). Reuters was even worse, citing a Factbox where it quoted Mavi Marmara activists testimony such as, When we went up to the deck, they emerged from the helicopters and military boats and attacked uswe told them that we were unarmed. Our sole weapon was water (Reuters). My problem is not with Reuters quoting Mavi Marmara activists testimony. It is with Reuters giving unqualified credence to the testimony with the title Factbox. That lends the presentation of the incident to be one-sided, when trusting the testimony of only one party as factual, and completely discrediting the IDF video, which showed a different version of the incident, and omitting that such a video even existed. What was even more problematic was that the activist quoted, Mutlu Tiryaki, was not even aboard the Mavi Marmara, but on a different boat of the flotilla that had surrendered peacefully to the IDF (Simmons 332). Lastly, the biggest foul committed by Reuters was the picture it published of an injured man; the caption read pro-Palestinian activist. In actuality, the man was indeed an IDF soldier (Rozkovsky). What Reuters committed was not so shocking. Reuters has had a reputation of cropping out items from pictures that would otherwise be deemed sympathetic to the Israeli cause. In 2006, during the war between Lebanon and Israel, they had numerous incidents of creating more smoke, and reusing photographs from past incidents to overdramatize Palestinian suffering (Simmons 333). For their photographers, this
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incident proved to be no different, with them cropping out knives from the flotilla activists hands, and even removing a pool of blood that was surrounding an Israeli soldier (Simmons 333). Since Reuters is one of the top agencies that the media turns to for reliable coverage of incidents, I hold them very accountable for the slanted coverage provided by the other major news outlets. Because Reuters is providing the news, and supposedly unbiased, its okay for the media to rely on them. However, with t heir reputation regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, I think its about time the media took a stand and stopped using Reuters as a source for accurate coverage of the incidents surrounding the conflict. However, some of the additional slanted coverage did not stop with the misrepresentation of all the activists as completely non-violent. A CNN report stated that no country has the right to touch ships traveling in international waters (Zakaria). The New York Times added, Israels operation in international watersis unacceptable under any clause of international law (Kershner) and the Chicago Tribune headline read, Piracy on the High Seas (Press). The problem with all this misreporting is that, although the Palestinian and proPalestinian humanitarian releases claimed otherwise, the international law according to the San Remo Manual dictated that it is permissible to attack a vessel on the high seas when that vessel is believed on reasonable grounds to be carrying contraband or breaching a blockade, and after prior warning they intentionally and clearly refuse to stop (San Remo Manual, Simmons 334). The U.S. Defense Departments Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations and the UN Charter on the Law of the Sea affirm this as well (Simmons 334). So if the media organizations would have performed a little bit of
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research on the releases information, they would have found Israels blockade on Gaza to be legal, and call the motives that pushed the ensuing flotilla incident into question, as was soon to be done by the UN Palmer Report. As I have argued, with a proper crisis management team, Israel could have sent all this information in a release early on, and prevented a lot of these headlines. Sadly, this was not the case. Sure, the media did not perform adequate research, and had gotten their sources from one side, providing a distorted view of the incident to the public. But that is in part due to Israel not providing their side to the media in a timely fashion. With a proper PR team, complete with adequate media relationships and good crisis management, Israel might have been able to give balance to the image of the flotilla incident presented to the public by the media.
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The Significance and Analysis of The UNs Palmer Report

In the months following the flotilla incident many inquiries were conducted leading to the various reports and opinions published. Although there is some significance to the internal investigations done by both Turkey and Israel, I found that the United Nations Report of the Secretary-Generals Panel of Inquiry in the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident, also known as The Palmer Report, is the report most accurate, delving into the two states inquiries as well as conducting research of its own. It is also the report most internationally accepted, including by the United States. Created by the UN Investigative Committee formed in response to the Israeli raid on the flotilla, The Palmer Report established that the incident and its outcomes were not intended by either Turkey or Israel. Both states took steps in an attempt to ensure that events did not occur in a manner that endangered individuals lives and international peace and security (Palmer 50). This means, that the blame was now divided between the Israelis, the activists and the Palestinians. This was concluded after more than a year of investigation into the incident. It was accepted by Israel as unbiased. However, Turkey rejected it (Palmer 104-105). Members of the committee included Sir Geoffrey Palmer, President Alvaro Uribe, Mr. Joseph Ciechanover Itzhar and Mr. Suleyman Ozdem Sanberk. Two of these members were representatives from Turkey and Israel, so that they could guide the committee to the proper people to be contacted about the incident. The goal of the report was to bring a lasting solution to the situation in Gaza and to grant its people and those of Israel the promise of normal daily lives (Palmer 10).
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The panel had six months to gather information to form educated conclusions and operated on consensus (Palmer 13). Although it did not contain the power to exercise any of the suggestions and conclusions it reached (Palmer 7), it hoped that the two countries would heed the suggestions and exercise what they agreed with and/or deemed proper. It is important to note that while the Turkish Commission had to answer to its own government, Israels Commission was independent of any party (IDF Blog). The report began by dissecting the Interim and Final Reports of Turkeys National Investigation. It cited that there was a diplomatic understanding reached between Turkey and Israel that the vessels in the convoy would not force a breach of the blockade and would change their destination to the port of Al-Arish if necessary, and that Israel in turn would refrain from using force against the vessels (Palmer 17, Turkish Commission Interim Report 10-11, 16-17). This is particularly significant because of what had indeed occurred and what Israel had expected as it boarded the flotilla. The final Turkish Report claimed then that Israel used excessive force (Palmer 20, Turkish Commission Interim Report 16-17) before and after boarding, and it breached the principle of freedom on the high seas since its naval blockade was illegal (Palmer 22, Turkish Commission Interim Report 17). Finally, Turkey also requested that Israel make reparations for the wrongs committed, including through the provision of compensation to the families of the victims (Palmer 26, Turkish Commission Interim Report 60-62, 109-112). The Palmer Report also summed up Israels National Investigations conclusions in the same way. Of utmost significance was that Israel issued a formal Notice to Mariners and broadcast on maritime radio, and conveyed to relevant flag States directly
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its imposition of a naval blockade on January 3rd, 2009 on the Gaza Strip to prevent weapons, terrorist and money from entering or exiting the Gaza Strip by seaonly after other options were considered (Palmer Report 27, Israeli Commission Report 36, 53-58, 62-63, 111). Israel found the blockade necessary because an armed conflict was taking place between it and Palestinian terrorist organizations because of the thousands of rockets and mortars [that] have been fired into Israel in ever growing numbers from the Gaza Strip since 2001 (Palmer 27, Israeli Commission Report 27-31.) Therefore, Israel deemed its blockade lawful in response to a prevailing security threat (Palmer 28, Israel Commission Report 58-61). In addition, Israel also felt that the main goal of the flotilla participants was to bring publicity to the humanitarian situation in Gaza by attempting to breach the blockade (Palmer 29, Israeli Commission Report 278). It concluded by finding that the actions carried out by Israel to enforce the naval blockade were legal pursuant to the rules of international law (Palmer 37, Israeli Commission Report 280). This is particularly relevant since this confirms the context in which the activists formed the flotilla, which then justified Israels response to it. Upon analyzing both reports, it is important to note that the Palmer Report also found it necessary to provide a context behind the incident (Palmer 38), as I have done in the beginning of this thesis. A proper background, for example a brief history or quotes from active figures, allows the public to come to more accurate conclusions of their own. Also, most importantly, proper PR teams can provide the context quickly to the media, who will then disseminate the full story to the public. The most vital part of the context behind the flotilla incident that the Palmer Report found was the legality of the naval blockade, as it was the backdrop against
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which the Panel must carry out its task of identifying ways to avoid similar incidents in the future (Palmer 38). It found the blockade to be a reactionary measure on the part of the Israeli military, so it could provide security to its southern citizens. Therefore, the report found the blockade legal under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter that states the right of a nation to engage in self defence (Palmer 39). It found that Israel has faced and continues to face a real threat to its security from militant groups in Gaza[resulting] in more than 5,000 [rockets being] fired between 2005 and January 2009, when the naval blockade was imposing [putting] hundreds of thousands of Israeli civilians in the range of these attacks (Palmer 39). The recognition of the legality of the blockade under the UN is particularly important because it put the measures of the NGOs and other organizations that put together the flotilla under scrutiny. The report deemed Israels blockade a necessary step for Israel to take in order to protect its people and to defend itself (Palmer 40). Therefore, the panel is not persuaded that the naval blockade was a disproportionate measure for Israel to have taken in response to the threat it faced (Palmer 41). Next, the report emphasized that the Arab-Israeli conflict has become one of an international affair, due to the international calls by Hamas for others to follow their example and attack Israel (Palmer 41). So, since the conflict involves an international audience, so too, the law governing it is international law. It also warned those who assume that Israels blockade is to punish Gazas citizens for electing Hamas should be wary, since the naval blockade was imposed over a year after the election. Therefore, the report found that the blockade was not imposed as a collective punishment. Rather, they
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found it was just a matter of self-defense in the international spectrum on behalf of Israel (Palmer 43). The report then addressed the prospect of aid delivered by the flotilla, since the flotilla claimed that that was its ultimate intention. However, it found that the prospect of delivering significant supplies to Gaza by sea is very low [and] indeed such supplies were not entering by sea prior to the blockade (Palmer 43, Israeli Commission Report 54). This creates a significant push to the theory that the flotilla incident was intended as one of publicity, one far greater than the Israeli PR team in place could handle. The report did note that the UN Human Rights Councils (UNHRC) report on the incident and the Turkish Report do not agree with these conclusions because they do not acknowledge the legality of Israels blockade (Palmer 44). The Palmer Report found this disagreement a main cause for the miscommunication between Israel, the NGOs and Turkey, all of which were obligated to contact and coordinate with Israel to deliver the aid (Palmer 44). However, the two pro-Palestinian entities ignored such a necessity and also ignored Israels offer to deliver goods via the port of Ashdod (Palmer Report 44, Israeli Commission Report 110,121,139). It should be noted that the UNHRC report was released three months after the incident and placed all blame solely on Israel (UNHRC). However, this was not shocking since Israel refused to cooperate with this investigation due to the known nature of the council being vehemently anti-Israel, passing an unwarranted 32 anti-Israel condemnations (ADL). In the UNHRCs short life, they have also had Mahmoud Ahmadenijad and Moamar Ghadaffi in prominent positions within their committees (ADL), further promoting their anti-Israel stance. It is a matter of dispute whether or not it was smart for Israel not to participate in the investigation for
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publicity purposes. However, since it did participate in Palmers investigation, most would say its actions were correct in not participating with an anti-Israel one so soon after the incident. However, in contrast with the other two reports, the Palmer Report discovered that the main organizer of the flotilla, the IHH, formed a document that clearly stated that the, purposes of this journey are to create an awareness amongst the world publicand delivering humanitarian relief to the Palestinians (Palmer 46, Turkish POC Response of 11 April 2011, Appendix 1, Palestine Our Route, Humanitarian Aid Our Load: Gaza Flotilla Individual Participation Form, Principles [Principles] 1). The IHH ensured that the document was signed by all the flotilla participants (Palmer 46). This clearly shows that publicity was the flotillas primary purpose and deliverin g the aid secondary. Therefore, this further implicates Turkey and the NGOs on the circumstances surrounding the incident, and the context that led the IDF to board the flotilla as the panel seriously questions the true nature and objectives of the flotilla organizers (Palmer 46). The report added that considering the number of people on board the ships, the quality of the goods aboard, and the lack thereof of humanitarian goods on the largest vessel, the Mavi Marmara, they question its reasons and purpose (Palmer 47). The final straw for the report was the number of journalists on board on the ships, which gives further power to the conclusion that the flotillas primary purpose was to generate publicity (Palmer 47). Furthermore, the flotilla passengers committed that they would not obey the decisions, warnings or demands of the government of countries in the region regarding the ship (Palmer 46, Turkish POC Response of 11 April 2011, Appendix 1, Palestine
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Our Route, Humanitarian Aid Our Load: Gaza Flotilla Individual Participation Form, Guarantee [Guarantee] 12). So, even though Israel had clearly warned the flotilla ships not to breach the blockade as one could hear from the IDF video recording, the flotilla clearly had no intention of changing course or stopping (Palmer 49). It should also be noted that it is very likely the flotilla didnt even intend to reach the port of Gaza since no adequate port facilities exist in Gaza capable of receiving vessels the size of the Mavi Marmara (Palmer 47) and the members rejected the suggestions for the alternative land routes (Palmer 47, Turkish Commission Report 17, Israeli Commission Report 123). Lastly, Hamas was said to be preparing a celebration to meet the flotilla, further reinforcing its ties to the terrorist movement (Palmer 47, Israeli POC Response of 11 April 2011, Annex O, at 2-3). Next the report acknowledged that even though most participants did agree not to bring aboard any weapons on their journey, the IHH had forty activists who did not pass through security in Istanbul and were in charge of the Mavi Marmara vessel (Palmer 48, Israeli Commission Report 206-208), one of which actually described himself as the IHH security guard (Palmer 48, Turkish Commission Report, Annex 5/3/xvi at 2). This shows that there was every possibility of these forty carrying arms, as no one had checked them. This also reinforces Israels claim that they were not the only ones using live fire. The Palmer Report also emphasized that they found the whole flotilla a dangerous and reckless act considering the amount of people involved and the clear risk of force being used to stop it (Palmer 48). Therefore, the report found that the actions of the flotilla needlessly carried the potential for escalation (Palmer 48) and it is even clear to the Panel that preparations were made by some of the passengers on the Mavi Marmara well
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in advance to violently resist any boarding attempt (Palmer 56, Israeli Commission Report 210-215). This point is very important when reporting on this incident, since it enforces that blame is due to the NGOs and participants involved, particularly the IHH. It shows what the previous reports and media publications had neglected to mention: that Israel had tried to halt the escalation, but they had no choice but to stop the flotilla participants as they consistently refused to listen and abide by their legal blockade of Gaza. How many times was Israel expected to warn the flotilla before it raided the vessel? The report found that Israel had done its due diligence and had to capitalize on the chance to protect its citizens from the harm caused to them by Gaza almost daily. The report then detailed how diplomatic efforts were used to try and stop the flotilla before it departed Turkey. It was satisfied by Israels extensive and genuine efforts in diplomacy, either by offering to deliver the goods through their land crossings or by its continuous talks with Turkey (Palmer 50). However, the report believed that more couldve been done on Turkeys part to warn the passengers that force was to be used if they did not abide by the blockade and Israels wishes. The report said that more could have been done to warnand to dissuade them from their actions (Palmer 50). Thats why when Israel warned the flotilla activists that all necessary measures would be taken to enforce the blockade, it was justified for them to say so (Palmer 51, Israeli Commission Report 131, 138). Also, since the flotilla had made no indication of changing its course, it was reasonable for the Israeli Navy to conclude that the vessels of the flotilla intended to proceed to Gaza (Palmer 52). However, the report still did suggest that since the last of the four warnings was at 2:00 a.m., another warning closer
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to the raid could have been issued (Palmer 52, Israeli Commission Report 138, Turkish Commission Report 20), which might have prevented the escalation of violence aboard the vessels since it would not have been a surprise. In Israels Eiland Teams Report published in July 2010, Israel accepted this, and additionally mentioned that they had wished for and intended to use less force. They thought the take-over operation by surprise just before dawn was motivated by the desire to avoid publicity as much as by operational considerations. This was reinforced by the communication blackout imposed against the Mavi Marmara (Palmer 53, Israeli Commission Report 120-121, 141, Turkish Commission Report 20). This is a very important point when considering Israels PR team in 2010. The team actually thought that a discreet raid of a large vessel carrying a large amount of people could actually be kept quieter than one with proper warnings. They also thought that the media would adhere by a communication blackout and not assume the worst upon only hearing one version of the events. This is utterly illogical when dealing with a crisis. If you want the media to hear your side of the events, then you must make sure you are adhering to all protocol and policy so that they cannot misinterpret any of your actions. This is especially true if you lack relationships in the media, like Israel does, and have a bad track record with the media, which is often critical of your actions. Their intentions made no sense and clearly proved to be very ineffective. Finally, the report concluded that the blame due Israel was that it had a too heavy response too quickly as the Mavi Marmara didnt present an immediate military threat to Israel (Palmer 53). Therefore, the report ultimately shared the same conclusion as Israels Eiland Teams report stating, clear warnings and the controlled and isolated use
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of force may have helped avoid a wider and more violent confrontation such as the one that occurred (Palmer 53, Israeli Commission Report 273). Both determined Israels actions to board the vessels with such substantial force at a great distance from the blockade zone with no final warning immediately prior to boarding was excessive and unreasonable (Palmer 54). However, since the report was of the impression that the flotilla should never have been formed to breach Israels legal blockade of Gaza, it believed there would have been no violence if the activists aboard would have abided by international law by honoring the blockade and using the land crossings offered by Israel and Egypt to transfer the goods aboard the ships. The report then described what they concluded occurred aboard the ships. It still was unsure over who started shooting live fire first, but it cleared the IDF personnel descending from the first helicopter as starting it (Palmer 56-57). It knew the IDF faced significant, organized and violent resistance (Palmer 57) either in the form of metal bars, slingshots, chains and staves as was clear from the evidence of members of t he flotilla wearing life or bullet proof vests and gas masks in anticipation of violence before the IDF even boarded (Palmer 56, Turkish Commission Report Annexes 7/5,7/13,7/15). It also found that firearms were taken from IDF personnel (Palmer 57). Since both sides were injured by live fire, it found significant proof to concur that both sides made use of the weapons. Also, the report discovered that three soldiers were indeed taken below deck, and mistreated and placed at risk during the incident (Palmer 58). This is why the Israels Eiland Teams report pleads that their actions were consistent with their rules of engagement and the exercise of self defence (Palmer 58, Israeli Commission Report 279). However, the report still found it difficult t o identify
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specific incidents described by soldiers as related to a specific casualty from among the nine activists who died during takeover (Palmer 58, Israeli POC Response of 11 April 2011, at 28). Due to the chaotic nature of the events, the report understood that it was hard to make decisions in a split second. Still, it found no adequate explanation provided for the nine deaths and was not comfortable with the level of force used by the IDF in the incident (Palmer 60). Nonetheless, the report found both sides equally at fault for the deaths: the activists on the Mavi Marmara for preparing to respond violently to a takeover, and the Israelis, for not adequately warning of a violent and forceful takeover. That is how the report concluded its investigation of the Mavi Marmara (it later addressed the other ships that didnt meet the IDF violently), complete with suggestions for what to do in the future to prevent such incidents and a commendation of Israels actions since the incident to ease the blockade it still holds over Gaza (Palmer 69, Israeli Commission Report 94). It has been proven in the past that flotillas are not an effective way to deliver supplies to Gaza. UN Officials and the Quartet have stressed that such convoys are not helpful in resolving the basic economic problems of Gaza and that they needlessly carry the potential for escalation (Palmer 67, Briefing by Mr. B. Lynn Pascoe, UnderSecretary-General for Political Affairs, to the Security Council on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, U.N. SCOR, 65th Session, 6363th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6363 (July 21, 2010). A Freedom Flotilla should never have been formed, as it would surely not help the situation, and, if anything, worsens it. Violence and breaching of international law should never be used as a method of getting publicity, even if both parties are actively participating in the media. The problem with this incident
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was that Israel was not as active in the media as the flotilla and its supporters were. Therefore, precedence dictated that those who participated on the Freedom Flotilla would get their side out first, no matter the outcome. However, perhaps if Israel had a better image in the media, the activists would have thought twice about their tactic of breaching the blockade to attract publicity.
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The Necessity of Accuracy in Initial Reporting

The general public relies on the media when they want to know what is occurring in the world. When flipping through the morning paper, or scanning the webpage, people ordinarily scan the headlines. They dont usually read the correction pages. They focus on the few words that stand out. Therefore, its imperative that the media get the full story published, the first time. People dont generally check updates. They just rely on the story they read initially to be factual. Because of the complexity surrounding the flotilla incident, it was difficult for the media to discern the full story at first. Therefore, a debate can be made over whether it was ethical for them to only publish half of the story, before they acquired the releases of the other side. The media outlets had an obligation to maintain their standards of getting the story out quickly, and appease their advertisers who expected them to be the best. However, accuracy can be neglected when such actions occur and when speed is put before facts. Nonetheless, in the current media spectrum, a country cannot expect an outlet to put accuracy before their revenues. Theyre in the business to survive and beat out the competition. Therefore, its the countrys obligation to reach out to the media quickly via their complete PR teams. Vice versa, it is the medias obligation to seek out both sides to comment on an incident. In order for Israel to complete its PR team, it must modify what it currently has in place so that the media situation surrounding the flotilla incident never will occur again.
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Suggestions for Israels PR Modifications and Sample Press Release

Good PR is important because it dictates the context surrounding every incident that occurs in a region, whether it is good or bad. It also helps maintain the reputations of those involved. The best way to get your side across is by an immediate press release sent to already established press contacts. Context and reputations are especially important when it comes to politics and war. By providing the background to a situation that is occurring, a good PR team allows for the general public to form their own opinions on the situation. However, for Israels PR team to be on equal footing with that of the Palestinians and their supporters, Israel must modify its current team. Below are my suggestions for modification: Firstly, a totally new division of crisis management must be established. A crisis erupts; the PR team acts quickly to educate the media why the crisis is occurring. For example, a press release should have been sent immediately to the press explaining the Israeli raid on the flotilla, complete with the video footage. Instead, one was sent ten hours after the incident, while the Palestinians and their supporters had theirs sent that morning within the first few hours of the incident. Secondly, each PR team member should have good media relationships and press contacts. These press relationships or those individuals in media can be called upon quickly and relied on to tell an unbiased version of the events. For example, if Israel had a relationship with a reporter at each publication, it is possible that their stories wouldn't have had to be updated with the Israeli version of the events. Rather, it would have had both sides from the start.
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Below is a sample press release of what I believe Israel could have sent out to the media immediately following the incident. ****FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**** BREAKING: IDF MET WITH VIOLENT RESISTANCE AS IT ATTEMPTS TO HALT FLOTILLA ATTEMPTING TO BREACH LEGAL BLOCKADE OF GAZA The Israel Defense Forces were violently attacked by members aboard the Mavi Marmara early May 31st, as it tried to halt it from breaching Israels legal blockade of Gaza. In a video taken by the Israeli helicopter on the scene, one can see the soldiers being shoved, beaten and thrown from the upper decks as they tried to take over the ship. One can also see that the participants were prepping to violently resist the IDF here. As of this release, there are 9 confirmed dead activists and numerous injuries on both sides. Israel has airlifted the severely injured to nearby hospitals where they will be provided with the proper medical attention. Israel has also confiscated all materials aboard the ship in order to conduct a proper investigation. The Mavi Marmara was a member of the Freedom Flotilla, a coalition of alleged humanitarian aid ships bound for the Gaza Strip. Its message was to bring publicity to the humanitarian situation in Gaza by attempting to breach the blockade and to provide aid. It was funded by a number of humanitarian and activist groups including the IHH, which has been said to have links to the terrorist organization, Hamas. This is the same flotilla that refused to deliver aid to the captive Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, being held as a prisoner in Gaza for the past four years. Israel had been in contact with the coalition for a number of weeks and had repeatedly asked it to deliver the aid through the land crossings via Israel or Egypt. The coalition had refused. In repeated warnings before the attack, which can be heard here and here, the IDF calls for the Mavi Marmara to stop and redirect its course to the land crossings. As the video reflects the IDF was met with insults such as go back to Auchwitz, and profanity. There was no indication of the Mavi Marmara planning to change its course. According to the UN, Israels blockade of Gaza is completely legal as it is a war zone, since Israeli civilians are being attacked daily by rocket fire from Gaza. Since 2000, over 12,000 rockets have been fired. This situation is unsustainable and Israel has a duty to protect its citizens. Israel also delivers aid to Gaza weekly, as you can see from this chart. Aboard the ship, no humanitarian aid was found. Instead the IDF discovered a number of weapons, which can be viewed here.
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None of the other ships met the IDF with resistance. All the members have been taken to the port in Ashkelon and will be deported as soon as possible. Press Contact: Name, Phone Number, Email ### Although you cannot see the links to the videos throughout the release, you can imagine from my previous descriptions what they portray. If Israel had capitalized on the information they had and disseminated it to the media in a quick and timely fashion, much of the distortion within the media surrounding the incident may have been prevented. In turn, this promotes accuracy and a full picture of the incident so that the public can interpret it for themselves. This is why good PR helps the general public in educating them, along with helping the entity it represents.
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Conclusion
I want to conclude by making it clear that the purpose of this thesis is not to exonerate Israel nor is it to condemn the Palestinians and their supporters. Rather, I seek to show that with every story, there is a necessary context to be acknowledged. Nothing is ever black and white. I showed that sometimes the media does not do their full job, and that, for now, articles written immediately after an incident should be accepted with speculation. Also, sometimes too, its not just the medias fault. Public relations teams are a major player in how the public views events, especially those so removed from them as the Arab-Israeli conflict. Still, my research showed that when it comes to those events, the pro-Palestinian PR teams prove to be much stronger than the Israeli one at the moment. My incident to highlight this major discrepancy between the two teams is that of the Freedom Flotilla of May 2010. I went into great detail over the different releases, articles and reports published immediately thereafter, and then a year later. I showed that with proper communications and research, the proper conclusions can be reached, as we see from the publication and overall international acceptance of the Palmer Report (Palmer). I also then noted that the main reason the Freedom Flotilla was organized was determined as one of publicity, and one of high caliber (Palmer). Israel has never even come close to planning such a stunt. That in itself shows how advanced pro-Palestinian PR teams are, since they had the knowledge to know that such a stunt would generate their desired attention. However, as the Palmer Report later noted, the events of 31 May 2010 should never have taken place as they did (Palmer 3). They divvied the fault on
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both the NGOs and Palestinians for breaching Israels legal blockade of Gaza, and Israel, for stopping the flotilla in a forceful manner (Palmer). This conclusion showed that with the proper research, or with the proper PR teams in place providing information from both sides, accurate reports can be made and the general public can be given the full truth by the media. I know that to many, PR leaves a bad taste in their mouths: the taste of cover-up. However, to fully understand the events taking place in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to form an educated opinion about that which occurs, one must know the context behind each incident. That involves extensive knowledge of Israeli history and culture. While I dont expect everyone to know this information, I do feel the average person relies on journalists who cover the conflict to provide them with adequate background information, information that is not simply found in a google search. If Israel would form a proper PR team, complete with adequate media relationships and crisis management, I do believe similar misunderstandings and the undue tarnishing of Israels name will be more unlikely to take place in the future. In reference to Palestinian propaganda, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu once said, unfortunately, if you repeat a falsehood endlessly, it assumes the cache of truth (Lazaroff). The Prime Minister is right, however this does that mean that Israel has no chance of redeeming its biblical legacy of being a light unto the nations. I firmly believe that if Israel forms a proper PR team, it will have a better chance of standing on equal footing with the Palestinians in the media. Then and only then, will Israel stand a chance in the war of words in the international arena, and world audiences at large.
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Addendum
As I was editing the final draft of this thesis, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a public apology to Turkey for that which occurred aboard the Mavi Marmara almost three years prior. On March 22nd, 2013, with US President Obamas encouragement, Netanyahu stated, that the tragic results regarding the Mavi Marmara were unintentional and that Israel expresses regret over injuries and loss of life. It was added that in light of the Israeli investigation into the incident, which pointed out several operational errors, Prime Minister Netanyahu apologized to the Turkish people for any errors that could have led to loss of life and agreed to complete the agreement on compensation (Pipes). However, it should be noted that the apology rung clear with that which was stated in the Palmer Report. Israel only apologized for the amount of force they used when raiding the ship. They did not apologize for the blockade, and will not. According to the Palmer Report, there is no reason they should. Nonetheless, one can question the usefulness of a delayed apology, all these years later. Sure, it would be nice if TurkishIsraeli ties can be normalized once again. But is this a realistic possibility? According to Israels current Minister of Economy and Trade Naftali Bennett, that may not be the case. He said, since the apology was made public, it appears (Turkish Prime Minister) Erdogan is doing everything he can to make Israel regret it, while conducting a personal and vitriolic campaign at the expense of Israel-Turkey relations. Let there be no doubt, no nation is doing Israel a favor by renewing ties with it. It should also be clear to Erdogan that if Israel encounters in the future any terrorism directed against us, our response will be no less severe (Pipes). He added that it seems that the PR on the Turkish front is still
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emphasizing how they weakened Israel, and endorsing plans to continue to use terror as an option when opposing Israeli actions. With a partner like this, Israels words of apology are useless and empty. Sure, they publicized their apology. But without showing the Turkish response, they are bound to be stuck in the same cycle once again. The side of the apology is shown; now its up to Israel to show the true colors of its partner, so that the two sides of the story can be seen, and an educated understanding can be developed by the general public.
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64- Waldman, Steven. The Information Needs of Communities, United States Federal Communications Commission, July 2011. Print. 65- War On Want. "Call on the UK Government to Hold Israel to Account for the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Attack | War on Want." War On Want. Waronwant.org, 31 May 2010. Web. 18 Mar. 2013. <http://www.waronwant.org/campaigns/fightingoccupation-in-palestine/hide/action/16928-write-to-the-foreign-secretary-anddeputy-prime-minister-to-demand-the-government-hold-israel-to-account-for-thefreedom-flotilla-attack>. 66- World Bank. "West Bank and Gaza Financial Sector Review." World Bank. World Bank, Dec. 2008. Web. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WBGFS RreportNov.08pdf.pdf>. 67- Zakaria, Fareed. Interview with Turkish Foreign Minister. CNN. 6 Jun. 2010. Web. 2 Dec. 2012.

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Goldberg, Melanie

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

BACKGROUND: A Brief History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Significance of Public Relations

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Israels Public Relations Team in 2010

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Early Press Published United States

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Significance and Analysis of The UNs Palmer Report

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Necessity of Accuracy in Initial Reporting

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Suggestions for Israels PR Modifications and Sample Press Release

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Melanie's Thesis

Melanie's Thesis