Economic History Association

Economic Crises and the European Revolutions of 1848 Author(s): Helge Berger and Mark Spoerer Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Jun., 2001), pp. 293-326 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2698022 Accessed: 15/08/2010 00:06
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Economic Crises and the European Revolutionsof 1848

HELGEBERGERAND MARK SPOERER
Recent historical research tends to view the 1848 revolutions in Europe as caused by a surge of radical ideas and by long-term socioeconomic problems. However, many contemporary observers interpretedmuch of the upheaval as a consequence of shortterm economic causes, specifically the serious shortfall in food supply that had shaken large parts of the Continent in 1845-1847, and the subsequent industrial slump. Applying standard quantitative methods to a data set of 27 European countries, we show that it was mainly immediate economic misery, and the fear thereof, that triggered the European revolutions of 1848.

in WestInthe 1990s theacceleration of economicandpoliticalintegration of Eastern Europeled to anincreasing ernEuropeandthedemocratization interest in the turbulentyear 1848, when large parts of the Continent experienceda strivingforpolitical participationandself-determination.1 The recent sesquicentennialhas given rise to a wealth of literature,especially in countries where 1848 meant a first step towards more democratic political institutions, including Germany,Austria, Hungary,and Romania. Many of these studies reflect the scholarly trend away from social history. To be sure, even after the "culturalturn"most historians concede that structuralsocioeconomic problems contributed to rising populardiscontent. But whereasin the 1970s and 1980s long- and shortterm socioeconomic determinantswere pivotal in explanations of the
1848 revolutions, short-term economic factors now tend to be marginalized; instead, greater weight is placed on the spread of liberal and democratic ideas, and on the inflexible and increasingly outdated political institutions of the time, which were ill-suited to cope with the societal
The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 61, No. 2 (June 2001). ? The Economic History Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507. Helge Berger, CES, University of Munich, and CESifo; Mark Spoerer, University of Hohenheim, Stuttgart;e-mail: spoerer@uni-hohenheim.de. Address correspondence to Helge Berger, CES, Schackstrasse 4, 80539 Munich, Germany. E-mail: h.berger@ces.vwl.uni-muenchen.de. The article has benefited greatly from discussions at the 1848 Conference in Offenburg, seminars at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), the Center for Comparative History of Europe (Berlin), and the 1998 EHA Meeting in Durham, NC. Rolf Dumke, Timothy Guinnane, Bertrand Roehner, Richard Tilly, Eugene White, and especially Sheilagh Ogilvie provided very helpful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank Jonas Ljungberg, Lars Svensson, Jan Luiten van Zanden, and other members of the discussion group EH.RES for providing useful references and data. Michael Kopsidis was kind enough to provide data on Prussian grain prices compiled from archival sources. Additional comments by the editor, Jan de Vries, the assistant editor, Heath Pearson, and a referee considerably improved the article. See for example Kaelble, "1848."

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problems of early industrialization.2 Surprisinglyfew authorsstress the deep economic crisis that immediately precededthe revolutionary events: thatmentionshort-run witnesstheplethora of monographs economicfactors not at all or only in passing,andthe manyeditedvolumesthatlack a single paperon the economiccrisis precedingthe events of 1848.3 to ourunderstandButwhileideasandinstitutions undoubtedly contribute fortheupheaval of 1848,theyfail to explain ing of the generalpreconditions of the events.Here a more the timing,simultaneity, or regionaldistribution observersintereconomicperspectivemightbe helpful.Manycontemporary pretedmuch of what was going on as a directconsequenceof the serious in 1845-1847 shortfallin basic food suppliesthathad shakenthe Continent and triggeredfamine and hungerriots throughoutEurope, especially in Ireland,Flanders,andSilesia.4A radicalvariantof this argument interprets the revolutionsof 1848 in the broadercontext of class conflict-a view atthetimeby KarlMarxandFriedrich championed Engels,andlaterrefined by JurgenKuczynski.5However, this materialisticview is by no means confined to Marxist historiography. Another early proponentwas Ernst Prussianstatistician, who maintained Engel, the nineteenth-century thatthe the bomb"in manypartsof Europe.6 economic crisis was what "triggered This strongemphasison economicfactorsis also reflectedin one strandof the Anglo-Saxon literature, rangingfromW. W. Rostow, Eric Hobsbawm,
and George Rude to Charles, Louise, and Richard Tilly.7 It is supported by
2 Issuesat stakewerethe material deprivation of largepartsof the rural population (pauperism) and in individualaffairs,for instance,throughmilitaryconscriptionand discretionary stateintervention taxation.For an overviewsee Sperber, EuropeanRevolutions, pp. 47-49. 3 Wehave systematically checkedmonographs andpapercollectionscoveringthe 1848 revolutions in English,German, andLatinlanguages publishedsincethe mid-1990s fordiscussionsof short-term socioeconomicdevelopments suchas theincrease of foodpricesin 1845-1847 ortheeconomicdownturnof 1846-1848. Hobelt(1848) and Bruckmulller andHausler(1848), who analyzethe revolution in Austria,do not discuss economicfactorsat all. Neitherdo Schroeder (Transformation) nor Broers (Europe),nor the contributionson Hungaryin Fischer(UngarischeRevolution).In the accountof For SwitzerJudson(Wien)of the revolutionin Austriasocioeconomicfactorsarerarelymentioned. in Hildbrand land,the contributions andTanner (Zeichen)do not referto economicfactors.Some of and Weishaupt the work on Switzerland collectedin Ernst,Tanner, (Revolution)does mention ecoGerman literature nomicfactors,butthesearenot foundto be causal.Evenin theabundant anniversary theeconomiccrisisis almosttotallyneglected.See DipperandSpeck,1848; Dowe, Haupt,andLange1848;Gall,1848;Hardtwig, Revolution; Jansen andMergel, Revolution; Lill,Revoluwiesche,Europa tion; Mommsen,1848; Rill, 1848; Timmermann, 1848; and Langewiesche,Revolutionen.Notable exceptionsareSperber, EuropeanRevolutions; Hahn,"Soziookonomische Ordnung"; Hein,Revoluand Stirrner, earlieraccountsof the 1848 revolutions tion;L6veque,Ebranlement; Crise.In contrast, socioeconomicfactorsin greatdetail:see for exampleStearns, Revoluanalyzedlong and short-term tions,pp. 11-35; C. Tillyet al., RebelliousCentury; Siemann,DeutscheRevolution; Pinkney,Decisive Years; Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, pp. 681f.; andPrice,Revohitions,pp. 7, 24-26. 4 Sigmann,1848, pp. 183-85. ' Kuczynski,"Wirtschaftliche und soziale Voraussetzungen." 6Engel, "Getreidepreise," p. 251 (ourtranslation). 7Rostow, British Economy;Hobsbawm,"EconomicFluctuations"; Rud6, "WhyWas ThereNo Revolution?";C. Tilly et al., Rebellious Century;and R. Tilly, Vom Zollverein. See also Stearns,

Revolutionsof 1848
a numberof empiricalstudiesof social disorderin the 1840s, which stress of economicmotives.8 ForFrance,ErnestLabrousse the importance explicof 1789, 1830, and 1848to changesin agricultural itly linkedtherevolutions outputandprices.9 Weproposethatit is preciselytheseeconomiccrisesthataremost helpful in explaining the simultaneityand regional distributionof the European undoubtturmoilof 1848.Inotherwords,even thoughideasandinstitutions edly shapedthe events in question,it was economic misery and the fear of the economic view of the thereofthattriggeredthem. This resurrection between the geographic 1848 revolutionsis based on the high correlation acrossEurope.In of economicdistressandpoliticalturbulence distribution the a after countries that suffered significantfood-supply fact, identifying mechanism shock in 1845-1847, anddiscussingevidenceof a propagation that prolonged the crisis well into 1848, we find that there is an almost perfect geographicalmatch between economic crises and revolutionary namelythe existence or absence activities.We also show that institutions, of a repressivepolitical regime,while largelyirrelevant to the occurrence of revolutionary activity,hada significantinfluenceon theform such activity took:revolutionstendedto be moreviolent if the regimewas repressive. The articleproceedsas follows. We firstinvestigatethe size and signifishock thathit most European countriesin the seccance of the grain-price ond half of the 1840s. To graspthe extentto which these shocks were inwe estimatetheforecasterrors deedunexpected, of standard adaptive-expectations models for a data set encompassinggrainprices for 27 countries countriesexperibetween 1820 and 1850. It turnsout thatmost European enced a severeprice shock in 1846 or 1847. We then explorethe propagationmechanism thatextendedthecrisiswell into 1848,findingevidencethat the agricultural falling consumptionand investmentdemandtransformed sector.We supplyshock into a lagged demandshock to the manufacturing completeour argument by drawinga connectionbetweenpolitical activity and its possible economiccauses. The economic view of the 1848 revolutionsrelies heavily on the occurcrisis acrossEurope.But what defines an economic renceof an antecedent crisis?What sort of crisis will triggerpolitical activism?And who will be the activists? A possible startingpoint is the conceptof revolution.Among the many standoutwithrespectto therevoludefinitionsavailable,two characteristics tions of 1848: (i) the use of violence, or the crediblethreatthereof, in an
Revolutions, pp. 32-35; Price, Revolutions, pp. 17-22; and Sperber, European Revolutions, pp. 105-07. 8 See for example R. Tilly, "Popular Disorders," pp. 11-20; Bergmann, "Okonomische Voraussetzungen" and Wirtschaftskrise;and Gailus, Strajie. 9Labrousse, "1848."

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effortto changethe politicalsystem;and(ii) collectiveaction,thatis, active ' Accordingly, involvementof "thecrowd"in thateffort. in whatfollows we will define a revolutioneitheras widespread collective violence targetedat changingthepoliticalsystem,or as immediate andsubstantial constitutional reformimplemented to preventit. The potentialor actualinvolvementof a large numberof individualshas important consequencesfor our question here. Obviously,our understanding of why a revolutiondid or did not take place shouldnot be basedsolely on an analysisof elites andtheireconomic situation.While lawyers, publishers,journalists,doctors, and academics were undoubtedlyimportant protagonists duringthe 1848 upheavals,they would not havebeen ableto effectrevolutionon theirown. It was the lower classeswho providedthe"muscle." Thusourfocusmustshiftfromthewellknownrevolutionary to averagemen andwomen, especiallyin protagonists the capitals,whererevolutionary activitieswere most pronounced." Economic distressis transfornedinto revolutionary actionthroughthe mediationof severepopularfearof a deteriorating socioeconomicsituation. has explainedwhy andhow economicdiscontentcan Hansjorg Siegenthaler 12 Underthe conditionsof the reacha threshold thattriggerspoliticalaction. this couldonly takethe formof revolutionary post-NapoleonicRestoration, activityin the sense definedabove.The questionis how to measureboththe discontentandthe threshold.
AGRICULTURAL ORIGINSOF THE ECONOMICCRISIS

fluxthrough Householdsexperience macroeconomic changesin theirreal is it While this as true as was the first half of the budgets. today during nineteenthcentury,the channelsthroughwhich an economic crisis would influence the family budgetwere differentthen. On the expenditureside, lower-class households around 1850 still spent between two-thirds and of theirincomeson nourishment.'3 The bulk of the food purthree-quarters chasedconsistedof grainproductsandpotatoes,whichrendered household budgetsvery sensitiveto changesin thepricesof these goods. This sensitivity was greaterthe smallerthe overall size of the budget, as low-income
'?Kimmel, Revolution, pp. 4-7; and Goldstone, Revolution, pp. 7-12. We follow the broader definitions of Kimmel, which do not require that a revolution be successful. This broad definition is similar to the notion of revolution in C. Tilly ("Revolutions," pp. 519-24) and what he defined later as a "revolutionary situation" (European Revolutions, p. 10). " Labrousse, "1848," p. 77. Quote from Steams, Revolutions, p. 12. 12 Siegenthaler, Regelvertrauen, pp. 157-64. 13 In England, 81 percent in 1790 and 78 percent in 1904-1913 (Phelps Brown and Hopkins, "Seven Centuries," p. 297); 63 percent in all households in Milan in 1847 (Maddalena, Prezzi, p. 330); 73 percent in Berlin in 1800 (Abel, Agrarkrisen, p. 245); and 59 percent among Prussian rural workers in 1847, 67 percent among urban workers in 1837 and 1847 (Saalfeld, "Lebensverhaltnisse," pp. 236-39). Rural workers, of course, produced more of their own food than did urban workers.

Revolutionsof 1848
0.3 0.2 O OOO

297

-0.2
-0.3 ' ' ' ' ,
I

-0.4

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0 Rye

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

1 FIGURE OF PRUSSIANGRAINMARKETS,1820-1850 THE INTEGRATION Notes: Plotted are the annualfirst differencesof the originalprice series, in logs. For illustrative sampleproducesa highlysignificantcoefficient purposes,we omit one outlier.The full (abbreviated) in ryeandwheatprices,thecoefficientfortherawdata of 0.77 (0.73). Due to seasonality of correlation is much larger: 0.93 (full sample). tableVg/l ff. Source:Kopsidis,Marktintegration,

households tend to allocate more of their budgets to food (Engel's Law).14

In addition,the abilityof householdsto protecttheirlivelihood by substitutingamongfoodstuffswas limited.Fortheperiod 18 16-1 850, the literature on Prussiareportscorrelationcoefficients of 0.87 for wheat and rye of local prices, and0.67 for wheatandpotatoprices. 5 The tightintegration grain markets in this period is illustratedby Figure 1, which plots bimonthlypercentagechangesin wheatpricesoverthepreviousyearagainst a similar series for rye prices between 1820 and 1850 for the Prussian districtof Arnsberg. In principle,dataon grainprices shouldallow us to obtainan idea of the time path of household expenditures priorto 1848. Gettinga grip on the revenueside of householdbudgetsis somewhatmore difficult.On the one wages were fairlystablein the hand,it is well knownthatnominalindustrial To the extentthatthis is a valid stylized fact, the first half of the century.16 easily accessibledataon grainpriceswouldalsoprovideus with dataon real powerof fully employedwage laborers. wages, andthus on the purchasing
14 Accordingto Drameet al. (Siecle,p. 20), thepriceelasticityof demandforwheathoveredaround France. 0.6 throughout nineteenth-century by Ebelingand forCologne1818-1850 arereported p. 62. Similarresults '5 See Bass,Hungerkrisen, p. 306). Irsigler ("ZurEntwicklung," 16 Ldhne.ForBelgium,France,and p. 27; andGerhard, see G6mmel, Realeinkommen, Germany HistoricalStatistics,p. 181. GreatBritainsee Mitchell,International

298
160 40 120

Berger and Spoerer

160 40 120 100 80 60

200 80 60

40

40

England
20 O. . 1820 160 .,.-., . . 1823 . . . . . 1830 . . . . . 1835 20

France
. . 1840 . . . . . 1845 . . . .......... 1850

.... .......

1840

O 1845

1850

1820

1825

1830

1835

830 160

140

140

100~~~~

100

40SAK
20

40
Prussia
20

Sweden
. . .
1840

0
1820

.
1825

.
1830

.
1835

.
1845

.
1850

O "
1820 1825

. ^ .- .
1830

.
1835 1840 1845 1850

2 FIGURE EUROPEAN WHEAT PRICES, 1820-1850 Notes: The series are for London, the region around Paris, Berlin, and Stockholm county. Sources: See the Appendix.

Onthe otherhand,thereis hardlyanyreliableinfornationon effectiveworkincome to computea meaningful ing hours,whichmakesit almostimpossible atleast,is to turn employment A feasiblesolution,fornonagricultural series.17 activfromthe overalllevel of industrial to Okun'sLawto inferemployment
ity.18 We have good reason to believe that this "law" was also valid for the

produc(in fact,moreso thantoday),anddataon industrial century nineteenth tion, at least at the sectorallevel, areavailablefor a numberof countries. Summingup, it seems possible to put togethera sufficiently accurate pictureof the economicwell-beingof householdspriorto the politicalturmoil that shook Europearound1848. To that end we have assembled27 series (see Appendixfor details);four of them arepresentedin grain-price Figure2. All series are for wheatprices, with the exception of Oldenburg into gramsof fine silver per and Russia (rye), and have been transformed Wheneverpossible, we have hectoliter,the classic unit in price history."9
17 This point has been discussedby Hobsbawm, "Machine Breakers," p. 4. 18 Fora similar "Crises France, see Weir, 6conomiques," approach to theanalysisofprerevolutionary

p.938. pp. 290-95) used gramsof silver '9 See Braudeland Spooner, "Prices," p. 394. Abel (Agrarkrisen, were century, nearlyall European currencies per kilogramof wheat.In the firsthalf of the nineteenth still on silver or bimetallicstandards.

Revolutionsof 1848

299

0.9:
0.8 Europe -Prussia

0.70.60.50.4u
0.3 .

0.20.1

1820

1822

1824

1826

1828

1830

1832

1834

1836

1838

1840

1842

1844

1846

1848

1850

FIGURE 3 THE CONVERGENCE OF EUROPEANa AND PRUSSIANb WHEAT PRICES, 1823-1850 a Five groups of Continental countries: Southeast (Switzerland, Lombardy, Papal States, Austria,

Hungary), West (France, Belgium), Center (Germany [aggregated], Netherlands), and North (Finland,

Norway,Sweden).b Eightprovinces. forGermany see JacobsandRichter, Sources:See theAppendix; (aggregated) p. 74. Groj3handelspreise,

tried to gatherdata for the country'scapital,the likely center of political activity.These differonly slightlyfromthe nationalaverages,however.20 andvariations acrossEurope.Whereas Figure2 revealsboth similarities the price patternsin Franceand Prussialook very similar,the English and The Englishseries shows especiallythe Swedishexperiencelook different. the impactof the easingof the CornLaws in 1842;andtheirfinal repealin 1846 may help to explainthe relativemodestyof the increasein thatyear. Notwithstandingthese and other idiosyncrasies,however, the series for to sharea numberof regularities. France,Prussia,andEnglandappear One of them is a price spike-and thus, presumably, a blow to living standards for the majorityof the population-during the period 1845-1847. This shouldnot come as a surprise. Thereis evidenceof a convergenceof European grain marketsby this time, due to cheaperland and sea transport.21 the phenomenon the coefficientof variaFigure3 illustrates by comparing
20 ForAustria, and Sweden,wherebothnational France, Prussia, andcapitalseriesareavailable, the of correlation coefficient between bothseriesis on average higherthan0.90 andneversmaller than0.80. Someregional seriesshowa somewhat larger standard deviation thando thenational averages. Ourresults do not dependon the choiceof the aggregation level,however. See theAppendixfordetailson the data. 21 Forthe impact of the CornLawson BritishwheatpricesandEuropean wheat-price convergence, see Williamson,"Impact," pp. 124-29.

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tion among differentregions of Prussiawith the coefficient of variation anddifferEurope.Despiteits largeterritory amongfive areasof continental ecoent climaticzones, Prussiacan be regardedas a fairlywell integrated with this benchmark, the prolonged Compared nomic areain this period.22 startingat levels convergenceis quiteremarkable: periodof pan-European fourtimeshigher,by the 1840s the regionshadreachedroughlycomparable levels of marketintegration. in the time pathsportrayed in Figure2. But thereare also discrepancies While in FranceandPrussiathe years 1845-1847 aremarked by a dramatic increasein grainprices, the price movementsin Englandand Sweden in This discrepancy may irregular. these yearsdo not standout as particularly Considera householdthat,basedon pastexperience,takesthe be important. necessaryto insureitself against"regular"-andthusin principrecautions as long as a price ple foreseeable-fluctuationsin the cost of living. Clearly, increasestayswithinthe expectedrange,we would not expectan extraordinarypolitical reaction.If, however,an exceptionalprice "shock"severely and unexpectedlydiminishedthe real budgetof a largepartof the population, such a backlashseems muchmore likely. lends itself to a more formalexposition.We can picture The argument householdsat any given time t as formingexpectationsaboutthe cost of living at time t + 1 based on an adaptiveexpectationsmodel
n

Pt,+,
j=o

t,jPt- j

( 1)

wherepe andp are expectedand actualfood prices and the lag length n is Thetime-dependent d and 8 areOLS parameters assumedto be constant. coefficientsfrom an autoregressive (AR) model estimatedwith the present andpast observations onp availableat time t
n

Pt

8 jPt-l-j +?t j=O

(2)

where ? is a randomvariable following standardassumptions.That is, householdsupdatetheirestimatesfor d and 6 in everyperiodt to produce the best availableforecastabout p' 1, the following period's price level. But the forecast will not be perfect. We can then define a price andirregular "shock"-a highlyunanticipated pricemovementin the sense introduced earlier-as a significant(scaled) ex-post forecasterror e t = Pt+, Pt+i O(.)0
22

(3)

pp. OOf. Fremdling and Hohorst,"Marktintegration,"

Revolutions of 1848

301

where 6 is a scaling factor that increasesin the sample length t and the (1 x n) vector of observations onp used to forecastpt.+, p,,. If we define
0-[]+t+I(Ptpt

)-,Pt+,],"4

with Pt being the (t x n) matrixof observationsused to forecastp in all

previous periods (n + 1, from Equation 2.23As
. . ,

t), e, , is just the standard recursive residual et

N[09

2]

(5)

a significantdeviationof the scaled forecasterrorfromzero indicatesboth a "shock"in the sense definedabove and a structural breakin the model. Computingthe scaled forecasterrorset+,for our set of 27 countriesis a straightforward exercise once the lag length n is determined. We set n = 5 for each country,which allows the AR process-and, thus, the predicin the time series.24 tors-to cover both cyclical and acyclicalregularities The majorityof the series run from 1820 to 1850; with the exception of Finland,all arestationary.25 Figure4 presents,forthe fourcountriesalready selected for Figure 2, computedforecast errors and the respective twostandard-error bands.The interpretation of this figureis fairlyeasy.If at any point in time the chartline deviatespositively (negatively)from zero, the actualpricelevel atthispointexceeded(fell shortof) the estimated expectations of households.If a deviationis greater thantwice the standard errorof the model used to computethe forecast-that is, if it breachesone of the dottedboundaries-we regardthe shock as significant. Beforewe move on, a briefdiscussionof the threshold dividing"normal flux" and "shocks"is called for. Ourtwo-standard-error criterionis purely on theconventional statistical, notionof statistical building From significance. a strictly historical thismightseemsomewhat perspective arbitrary. However, the statisticalcriterion does not seem unreasonable; indeed,it very closely otherplausible approximates threshold Forinstance, criteria. simplyfocusing on the numberof pre-revolutionary years in which grainpriceswere above theiraveragevalueleadsto a very similarprofileof shocksacrosscountries.

See for example Greene, Econometric Analysis, pp. 216f. Price cycles were well known to contemporaries. They are also quite obvious in the present data. For evidence on cycles in grain prices see for instance Bauemfeind and Woitek, "Agrarian Cycles." 25Based on standard ADF tests. The price series for Baden, Hesse, Saxony, Sweden, and Wurttemberg are only stationary around a trend. However, recalculating the AR models with difference-filtered data or introducing a trend into the estimated model does not change the results. The same is true for the Finnish series. Only Hesse remains a borderline case. The complete data set (grain prices as well as computed forecast errors) for the sample is available on request.
23 24

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England France
40

40*

20

20

<

A /\~

V
.2

0 \/
-------B

------------------------

l - - 1840 1842 1844 1846

W
1848 1850

-60 1826
60

-60 1828 1830 1832 1834 1836 1838 1840 1842 1844 1846 1848 1850 1826
60

1828

1830

1832

1834

1836

1838

Prussia

Sweden

40

40 4

s 50
20

'--

~~~~~ ~~~~
--

---

-----

->

*20
2

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

-----

---

----

-_

-40

2~~
1828 1830 1832

~~FRCS
1834 1836 1838 1840 1842

GRI-RC
1844 1846 1848 1850

.40 ,

EROS
1828 1830 1832

1826-185
1834 1836 1838 1840 1842 1844 I84 1848 1850

-601 *

. 60

1826

1826

4 FIGURE FORECAST GRAIN-PRICE ERRORS, 1826-1850 Sources: See the Appendix.

of the forecastmodelleadsto criterion Note also thatthe two-standard-error 18 around of i O. value in an interval very robustresults:anyotherthreshold countries the among 1 shocks 848 ofpre2 produces theverysamedistribution to this issue. in our sample(see Table3, column3).26We will return yields resultsthatare criterion In the event, using the two-standard-error verymuchin line withthosedisplayedin Figure2. Whilethepanelsforboth FranceandPrussiafeaturea significantpositiveprice shock in 1846/47 (as negative shock as prices returnedto normal in well as a corresponding 1848), thosefor EnglandandSwedendo not. Thereasonforthis is thateven thoughthe lattercountriesexperiencedhigherprices priorto 1848, these increasesstayedwithinthe confinesof the nornal ups anddownsof the cost of living. This is obvious in the case of Sweden,but it is also true for England,whereonly the fall in pricesafterthe good harvestof 1847 qualifiesas a shock relativeto expectations-albeit a positive one.27 FromFigure4-and fromsimilarfiguresforthe other23 countriesin our countriesdid indeedsuffer sample28-it follows thata numberof European
26 Such a ruledoes, however,ignorethe role thatpriceexpectations mighthaveplayedin the accuin the impactof the agrarian crisis on households. mulationof bufferstocksand, ultimately, 27 Ireland data)was a very differentcase. Fora comparable (for which we do not have comparable Famine," pp. 114-18. approach see Solar,"Great 28 All figuresare availableon request.

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a significantcost-of-living shockjust priorto 1848. It is temptingto jump aheadandcompare theregionaldistribution ofthese findingswiththe occurrenceof politicalturbulence. Butthereis a problemof timing.Despite some variancein the onset of the various grain-priceshocks, in virtuallyevery case the year 1848 itself was characterized by sizableprice decreases,not increases.To some extent this mightbe an artifactof the frequencyof the data.To see whetherthis is the case, Figure5 shows monthlywheatprices for the regionaroundParisandfor Berlin.Inboth cases, wheatprices were at a low level at the beginningof 1845. The price increasewhich followed acceleratedin mid-1845, pausedbrieflyaroundthe turnof 1846, and then resumedwith a vengeanceinto the summerof 1847, when a thirdconsecutive bad harvest was expected all over Europe.29 Thus, what consumers in bothcountries was farmorethana "blip": it was a seemingly experienced incessant price increase over two-and-a-halfyears. Moreover, although the end of thatyeartheyremainedabove pricesfell aftermid-1847, through the averagefor 1838-1845.30Still, by the time political unrest startedto spreadacrossEuropein early 1848, the cost of living haddefinitelymoderated in both regions. Even in Berlin, where prices were on the rise again laterin the year,the surprisingly good harvestsof 1847 helped household to regaintheiraveragelevels duringthe firsthalf of 1848. expenditures To some extent,the time lag betweenthe peak of the food-priceincrease (and the subsistencecrisis it caused) and the political unrestis not totally unexpected.The reason is that people who face starvationare physically weak andfocusedon survival.It is only aftertheyhaveregainedtheirphysical forces and digested their recenttraumathatthey startto (re)actpolitiFromthis perspective,the time lag is unsurprising. But there is an cally.31 additionaleconomiclink betweenthe two events.
OF THE CRISISTO THE INDUSTRIALSECTOR, 1847-1848 PROPAGATION

In fact, one of the reasonswhy so manycontemporary observersinsisted crisis andtherevolutionswas on a close connectionbetweenthe agricultural
the forner's lagged propagation into other sectors of the economy.32In this age, all the world's economies were still greatly influenced by fluctuations in agriculture. With a majority of households earning close to the subsistence level, costlier foodstuffs translated into lower demand for all

29Boot, Commercial Crisis,p. 66.

30 The dominant agrarian cycle has a lengthof eightyears.See Bauemfeindand Woitek,"Agrarian

Cycles." 31 Steams,Revolutions, Ancienregime,p. 219. p. 34; see also Tocqueville, 32 See for exampleRoscher,OberKornhandel, pp. 61-65.

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Paris
180-

160-

140 -

120 -

100

80-

60 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848

160 -

Berlin
140 -

120 -

100

80-

60-

401840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848

FIGURE 5

MONTHLY WHEAT PRICES IN PARIS AND BERLIN, 1840-1848 Notes: The dotted lines mark the average wheat price 1838-1845. Sources: Amtsblatt 1840-1849; Labrousse, Romano, and Dreyfus, Prix, p. 196f.

Revolutionsof 1848

305

would not have been The translation othergoods, notablymanufactures.33 in an attemptto down their ran households savings some immediate,as smooth consumption.However,it seems plausibleto presumethat lower reduced channel)and, consequently, householddemand(the consumption channel)would eventuallyturnan agridemand(theinvestment investment crisis as well. culturalcrisis into an industrial Let us firstdiscuss how the food crisis influencedbusiness attitudesand investment behavior. During a negative food-supply shock, purchasing power is shifted from (net) food consumersto (net) food producers.As nutritionalstatusdeclines toward-or even falls below-the subsistence level, demandbecomes price-inelastic.This was the case in 1845-1847, when net food consumers,especially the urbanlower andmiddle classes, were forced to reduce their rate of saving and run down their financial While their savings fell, savings by net food producerspresumassets.34 ably increased;but since food producerswill have spent at least some of their windfall on purchasesof other goods, the overall effect of the price increaseon creditdemandmusthave been positive. Underthe rules of the by contrast,creditsupplymust have contracted. various specie standards, a gold drainas grainimportssoaredand for instance, experienced England, of the money hertradebalanceturnednegative,thusinducinga contraction A thirdfactorin the tighteningof credit was misspeculation.In supply.35 mid-1847, as harvest forecasts switched from gloomy to optimistic and massive cornimportsfromRussiaandthe United Stateswere reachingthe markets,prices plummetedandmanytradersfoundthemselves in desperate need of credit. This furtherincreasedinterestrates all over Europe.36 the strainput on borrowers,beIn fact, the available dataunderestimate cause most interest-rateseries are regulatedbank rates which were not always adjustedto marketconditions.As a result, borrowerswere often subjectto creditrationing.37
33 ForFrance see Labrousse ("Panoramas"),who relies on monthly data, and the simulations ofLdvyLeboyer and Bourguignon (French Economy, pp. 227-31), which show a time lag of one year. For the Prussian textile industry see Blumberg (Deutsche Textilindustrie,pp. 200-05, 382), who uses quarterly data. For the general crisis of crafts in 1847-1848 see Kuczynski, Lage, pp. 1.1 78f., 2.85-97; and Bergmann, Wirtschaftskrise, pp. 50, 63-70. 3" See for instance Obermann, "Wirtschafts- und sozialpolitische Aspekte," for evidence on dissaving in Prussian lower- and middle-class households. " Described in detail by Boot, Commercial Crisis, ch. 6. See also Ward-Perkins, "Commercial Crisis." 36 For monthly London market and bank rates see Ward-Perkins, "Commercial Crisis," p. 94. For annual series of short-tern European interest rates see Homer, History, pp. 208, 230, 242, 252, 265, and 270. 3 For England see Boot, Commercial Crisis, p. 49; for Prussia see Obermann, "Wirtschafts- und sozialpolitische Aspekte," p. 163, and Lichter, Preujiische Notenbankpolitik, p. 22. In England, the commercial crisis was immediately overcome when the Bank of England was allowed to lend at a bank rate above 8 percent. See Ward-Perkins, "Commercial Crisis," p. 78; and Boot, Commercial Crisis, p.52.

306

Berger and Spoerer

series show a local While most of the availableEuropeaninterest-rate conditions on investment tighter financial 1847, the impact of maximumin was felt as early as the second half of 1846 and, due to the planninglags analywell into 1848.Eventhoughempirical demand, involvedin investment this view is seriouslyhampered by the qualityof the interestsis supporting For rate data,it seems to be in line with the availableanecdotalevidence.38 fims failedbetweenmid-1846 andthe end instance,we know thatnumerous saw lack of of 1848, especiallyin the textile sector,andthatcontemporaries The visible slowdown in railway-track creditas one of the main culprits.39 and (to a somewhatlesser extent)England investmentin France,Germany, of the (mostlyprivate)German The profitability also pointsin thatdirection. duringthe crisis, andeventuallyinvestmentwas railwaycompaniesdropped most FrenchrailBy contrast, scaledback to meet the financingconstraints. here it was lack of public fundsdue to the food ways had been nationalized; crisis which made the governmentcancel railwayinvestmentprograms.In both countries,this seriously affectedthe metals and mining sectors from the endof 1848.? In sum,it would seem thatthe deteriospring1847through crisis of 1845-1847 rationof financialconditionsin the wake of the agrarian had a sizable laggedimpacton firn failuresandinvestmentbehavior,which the crisis acrosssectorsandinto the criticalyear 1848. transmitted from the investmentto the consumptionchannel,we can apply Turning mechanism. a somewhatmore directtest for the existence of a propagation Althoughthereareno reliabledataon householddemandfor manufactured goods, it seems reasonableto rely on grainprices as a proxy for the changes in household demand. The question to be addressedis whether there is and of the graincrisis intomanufacturing evidence for a laggedpropagation possibly, following Okun's Law, on to employment. As a first step, we Grangercausalitytest. In a nutshell, subjectthe data at hand to a standard the test asks how much of the growthpath of, say, Frenchmanufacturing outputcan be explainedby lagged values of Frenchgrainprices, and viceare addedto an AR model versa.41 In both cases the possible determinants of the endogenous variable. Causalityin the sense of the test should be interpreted conservatively.For instance,rejectionof the null hypothesisof "no causality"in the case of lagged grain prices influencing production
below. pp. viii-x; Obermann,"Wirtschafts-und sozialSee for example Labrousse, "Panoramas," pp. 648-52. Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, politische Aspekte,"pp. 162-67; and Wehler, Entwick40 See Labrousse, and Spreeand Bergmann,"Konjunkturelle "1848" and "Panoramas"; lung,"pp. 314-2 1. The growthof the Germanrail networkdid not accelerateagainbeforethe 1850s. Crisis,"p. 87) and Boot (CommercialCrisis, pp. 20, 81) point out that Ward-Perkins ("Commercial continuedrailwayinvestmentstabilizedthe UK economyby late 1847. 41 For the calculationsin Table 1, we use the price datadescribedin the Appendix.Replacingthe price data for capitalcities by nationalaveragesleadsto only very slight deviations.The same is true for the regressionresultsin Table2.
3 38 We commenton selected econometric resultsin note 44

Revolutionsof 1848
TABLE1 GRANGERTESTSOF CAUSALITY,1820-1850

307

Country Austria England

France

Direction GrainPrices-) Manufacturing -+ GrainPrices Manufacturing GrainPrices - Manufacturing -4 GrainPrices Manufacturing

Grain Prices
-+

Lag 1 0.05 0.70 0.13 0.55

0.06

Lag 2 0.07 0.45 0.07 0.89

0.01*

Lag 3 0.12 0.70 0.09 0.12

0.01*

Lag 4 0.08 0.89 0.05* 0.20

0.06

Lag 5 0.14 0.86 0.10 0.36

0.17

Manufacturing

-) GrainPrices Manufacturing 0.28 0.50 0.61 0.89 0.66 Hufigary GrainPrices-+ Manufacturing 0.01* 0.00* 0.03* 0.02* 0.15 -+ GrainPrices Manufacturing 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.13 Netherlands GrainPrices-+ Manufacturing 0.14 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.20 -+ GrainPrices Manufacturing 0.40 0.74 0.40 0.34 0.37 Prussiaa GrainPrices - Manufacturing 0.03* 0.00* 0.01* 0.06 0.03* -+ GrainPrices Manufacturing 0.77 0.43 0.44 0.15 0.23 Sweden GrainPrices - Manufacturing 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.01* 0.02* -> GrainPrices Manufacturing 0.20 0.44 0.61 0.46 0.13 a Textileproduction only. Notes:P(F-stat)forGranger testsatdifferent lag lengths.All dataareannual; grainpricesarein levels, productiondata are in growthratescomputedas first differencesof the raw data in logs. Asterisks indicate rejectionof HO ("no causality"at conventionallevels). Grangercausality is commonly as meaningthatthe"causal"series interpreted precedestheotherseriesandcontainsinformation useful in predictingit. Sources:See the Appendix.

would suggestthatthe formerseriesprecedesthe latterandhelpsin forecasting it. Table 1 presentsourresults.The model is symmetrical: the firstrow reportsthe numberof lags for the AR process, as well as the numberof lagged exogenous variablesincluded. The period under considerationis again 1820-1850. The main message of Table 1 is that grainprices are indeed Grangercausalformanufacturing in somecountries, butthe conversefails to hold for any single country.The resultsfor Austriaand the Netherlandsare somewhat weak, but still suggestive. The results for Englandfall in the same category,but herewe shouldnot be surprised given England'sleadingrole in the processof industrialization. In general,the evidenceclearlysuggests that changes in grainprices precededchanges in the growthrate of nonagricultural activity.The resultslend credibilityto our claim that the economic crisisof 1845-1847, initiated by badharvests,extendedinto 1848by triggeringa crisis in the manufacturing sector.Or did it? After all, the existenceof Granger-causality betweengrainpricesandmanufacturing does not necessarilyimplythata significantshock(in the sense definedabove)to the formerseries also causeda significantshockto the latter. In orderto see whetherthereare significantshocks in the availableproductiondatafollowingsignificantshocksin grainprices,we againmakeuse of the methodestablishedabove. Figure6 presentsforecasterrors(from a model similarto equation2) for the dataused in Table 1. Again, we set the

308
30

Berger and Spoerer

30

20

Austria
,

20

England
v_ ___

10

10

.210

. .20-

1842

1843

1844

1845

1846

1847

1848

1849

1850 1827 1829 1831 1833 1835 1837 1839 1841 1843 1845 1847 1849

-20.30

.20

,_

.20

.10 -30

_.10 . .

,. . , . , , , , , , , , , , .30

?_---

20

France 20Netherland

,o

_S

Io

1832

183

3 1837

l839

1841

1843

1845

184

184

50 1840 1841

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-v---

-----------------------------

1842 1843

1844 18 45

1846

1847 1848

l849 1850

30 -230S

20

Neerlanc

20

Prungar

-30-

. 30-

30.

30~~~~~~~~~3
-20 _____ _ __ __

-20

1832

1834

1836

183

1840

1842

1843

1846

1848

184 l839

1843

1844

1847

184 1890

1847

1848

1849

Sources:ASee the Appendix.

20

~~~~Sweden

Noes Al rwhrtsi

ecn.Pusi:txiepouto ny Netherlands:2modelsincludes-trend.
<-A

*,0~~~~~~~\O

.20.

.30

1827

1829

1831

1833

1835

1837

1839

1841

1843

1845

1847

1849

FIGURE 6

INDUSTRIAL SHOCKS, 1827-1850

Notes:All growth rates in percent. Prussia: textile production only. Netherlands: model includes trend. Sources:See the Appendix.

Revolutionsof 1848

309

lag of the AR partuniformly to n = 5 acrossall countries,even thoughsome of the dataseriesarerather short:the French,Prussian,andHabsburg series startonly in 1820, 1828, and 1830,respectively. Theremaining series,however, runfrom 1815 to 1850.42 Austria, France, Hungary, and Prussia show significant negative shocks to manufacturingin 1848, whereas England and Sweden, which were also spared a shock in grain prices, do not. The anomaly is the Netherlands,which experienced a grain-priceshock but no manufacturing shock. Otherwisewe find that all countriesincluded in the manufacturingdataset thatwere hit by (spared)a significant grain-priceshock in 1846/47 also found themselves suffering (exempt) from a significant industrialrecession in 1848.43 Even thoughFigure6 addsconsiderably to the evidenceproducedby the Granger tests, there are still reasonswhy the propagation argument might not yet be convincing.First,the manufacturing data could themselves be influenced by the revolutionary activityof 1848. After all, workersprotesting in the streets are not at theirworkbenches.Second, statisticalsignificance does not guaranteethat the strengthof the connectionbetween the andmanufacturing sectorswas sufficientto explainthe downagricultural turnin production.Describingthe correlation betweenthe variablesusing a simplemultivariate regressionmodel addressesbothproblems.Ourexercise includesEngland,France,Prussia,the Habsburg countries,the Netherlands,and Sweden. We estimatetwo variantsof the following equation
m

Yt= +Z

i-l

S't-s+6pt- +%J848t +?

(6)

Equation6 basically describes an AR model with an added structural component,where y is the growthratein manufacturing (in percent),p is the price of grain (in grams of fine silver per hectoliter), and 1848 is a The dummyvariablethatequalsone in the year 1848 andzero otherwise.44 discussionof Granger causalitysuggeststhatgrainprices enterwith a lag. Thedummyvariable takesaccountof thepossibilitythatthe industrial crisis
42 All seriesarestationary according to standard ADF tests.Inthe case of the Netherlands the series is stationary to changesin the lag lengthof the AR arounda trend.The resultsarerobustwith regard modelused to computethe forecastsand standard errors. "shocks" "4Againthestatistical ruleidentifying is quiterobust.Table3 revealsthatlowerthresholds for the forecasterrors work equallywell. See also note 51. Figuresfor all countriesare availableon request. 4 We use m = 4 to economizeon degreesof freedom.We have also experimented with one-period laggednominalandrealinterest ratesas explanatory variables forEngland, France, andPrussia.Where interest rateshada negativeimpacton output significant, growth.Theresultswithregard to grainprices and the revolutiondummywere similarto the resultspresentedin Table2. Additional results are available on request.

310
a

Berger and Spoerer

** (at (not = lag Notes:= I Textile Sources: *
=
p,4,

y y y y Period R2(adj.) 1848,

at

HAC See and reported). Significant -0.63 -0.94 -0.80 Significant (4.81) -0.33 0.64 (6.33) the at Significant 1835-50 at 21.19*** -0.22*** larger) production at the the t-statistics Austria the5 10 1 only. suggest Appendix. -0.11 -0.53 0.66 -9.82 -0.56 -0.92 (1.63) (1.10) -0.28 (2.25) 13.99* 1835-50 no percent percent (absolute) percent are in level. level. 0.28 level. 1820-50 -0.61 -0.07 -0.27 -0.32 -0.62 (1.65) (2.31) 13.54** England

autocorrelation of theparentheses. In all residuals. cases The the AR(m models = for4)

-0.31 -0.54 -0.59 (3.17) (2.18) -0.43 (2.65) 0.36 15.42** -0.09** 1820-50 10.49***

0.39 1825-50

9.58 -0.51 -0.18 -0.68 (3.59) -0.39 (1.52) -0.16*** France DETERMINANTS

-0.33 -0.05 -0.48 -0.45 5.54 (3.71) (1.80) 0.64 (0.83) -0.08* 1825-50 -12.38***

OF (see

England, elements of the France, the models are Netherlands, jointly and significant Sweden at include a conventional linear and levels a (Wald quadratic F-test). trend term Q-tests

0.46 1835-50

0.58 0.54 -0.18 (3.37) -0.21 (3.79) 4.20*** -0.09***

TABLE 2 equation 6) Hungary MANUFACTURING

0.53 -0.11 0.66 -0.58 -0.04 1.26 0.20 (1.11) (1.88) (0.24) -6.55* 1835-50

0.18 1820-50

-0.18 -0.14 -0.06 7.74 -0.39 -0.20 (0.95) (1.07)

GROWTH

0.15 4.01 8.81 0.18 -0.15 -0.38 -0.07 -0.20 (0.58) (0.92) (1.10) 1820-50 -0.09 -0.76 -0.70 (4.11) 0.18 (3.91) 31.78*** -0.42***

RATES Netherlands

0.57 1833-50

Prussia' -0.13 -0.65 -0.64 0.59 (2.77) (2.49) 0.09 (2.49) 1833-50 -13.08** -0.29** 23.18**

0.49 1820-50

-0.68 -0.37 -0.34 (3.07) -0.16 (3.70) 10.87*** -0.14*** Sweden

2.22 -0.31 -0.71 -0.39 (1.29) (2.86) -0.19 (3.48) 0.48 1820-50 11.05*** -0.15***

Revolutionsof 1848

311

of 1848mighthave been a consequenceof therevolution,not of the agriculturalsupplyshock. Table2 presentsOLS estimatesof equation6. Let us first considercolumns(i), which exclude the time dummy.From whathas been said aboutthe channelslinkingagriculture with manufacturing, we shouldexpectthe grain-price coefficientsto be negativeandsignificant.And indeed,the sign of the impactof grainprices is as anticipated in all cases, andlacks statisticalsignificanceat conventional levels only in the cases of England(the industrial leader)andthe Netherlands. thatsome of thetime seriesarerather Considering short,theperformance of the consumption channelis quiterobustwith regardto the introduction of the 1848 dummyvariable(columns(ii)). The dummyhas at least a marginallysignificantnegativeimpactfor France,Hungary, andPrussia,while the impact in England (which did not have a revolution)is significantly positive. In the cases of Austria,the Netherlands, and Sweden,the dummy remainsinsignificant. Butwhile therevolutions playedsome role in shaping manufacturing activity,an important partof the explanation of the slumpin productionin 1848 obviously still derives from lagged grain prices. The negative sign onpt-l remainsunchangedacrosscountriesand,with the exat least marginally ception of AustriaandHungary, significant.In the case of Englandthe grain-price variableactuallygains in significanceafterthe introduction of 1848. The resultsfor the Dutch dataremainunchanged.45 Whatwas the quantitative impactof the 1847 graincrisis on manufacturing? Takefor instancePrussiaandFrance,which displaya significantcoefficientonp,l in bothcolumns.Grainpricesin Prussia(France)increased by 27.12 (37.85) gramsof fine silver from 1846 to 1847. Based on the estimatedcoefficientsin Table2, Columns(ii), this translated into a decrease in 1848 manufacturing outputof 7.86 (3.03) percentagepoints or 32.67 (23.03) percentof the actualdecline.Accordingto Columns(i), the decline explainedby the graincrisisis even larger(47.31 and46.06 percent,respectively). In England,the negativeimpactof the agricultural price increaseon in the two-percentage-point industrial expansionremained range-too low, thatis, to force an overalldecline in real activity.We can concludethatthe sectorwas considerquantitative impactof the graincrisis on the industrial able in France,Prussia,andthe Habsburg countries,butnot in morehighly industrialized England.
AND REVOLUTION CRISIS

So farwe have establishedthe existenceof a regionalpatternof significant shocks to grainprices-and, thus, to the cost of living in a numberof
Note that to the extent that the revolution is in fact endogenous to the economic crisis, we should rely on a model excluding the 1848 dummy
45

312

Berger and Spoerer

1845 and 1847; we then linked the grain

European countries-between

crisis to the manufacturing sector,which helps explainthe propagationof the initialshock into 1848. But we still have to connectour economicfindings with the politicaldata. It is not altogether to determine straightforward whethera given country a or not. For the non-Gennancountrieswe follow experienced revolution the consensusin the literature, to whichFrance,the Italianstates, according Switzerland, Austria,Bohemia,andHungary experienced widespread political violence and thus, clearly,revolutionsin any sense of the word. In the broadersense defined above, Belgium, Denmark,and the Netherlands, violence onlyby undertaking which were ableto avoidwidespread preemptive constitutionalreform, also qualify as revolutionarysituations.46 By contrast,the otherScandinavian states,England,Russia,and Spainneither experienced widespread politicalviolence,norsawtheirgovernments forced to change the constitutionsignificantly.For Ireland,which experienced severe agrarian crime but arguably no revolutionary action, we could not datafor our sampleperiod.47 find reliablegrain-price For the Germanstates, evaluationis much more difficult.The German of 1848 has long been determined historiography by the Prussia-centered Butin the 1840s the Germanstateswere unification. perspectiveof German fully independententities with quite differentpolitical paths, some with constitutions(as in southernGermany),othersabsolutistand more or less repressive(such as Prussia).Unlike Europeas a whole, the Germanstates in our sample can be classed into only two groups. Widespread violence occurredin Baden, Bavaria, Hamburg,Hesse-Darrnstadt, MecklenburgSchwerin, Prussia, Saxony, and Wurttemberg; preemptiveconstitutional concessions occurredin Bremen,Brunswick,and Oldenburg.Not one of them failed to experienceeitherpoliticalviolence or preemptivereform.48 in Table3, which covers nearlythe whole Ourfindingsare summarized with of of Europe the exceptions Iceland,Ireland, a few Italianand Portugal, some smaller Germanstates, and the Europeanterritories of the Ottoman The datain the firstfive columnsreferto grainprices. Column 1 Empire.49 reports average wheat or rye prices for 1838-1845, and column 2 the
46 A possibly critical case could be the Netherlands, which Steams (Revolutions, p. 1) would not include in the second group. 4" See O Grada, Ireland, and for data sources Solar, "Great Famine," pp. 114f., 120. Note, however, that the absence of data seems equally spread across the different categories. For instance, we also lack grain-price data for Romania and Sicily, which experienced severe political turmoil. For the different states see Stearns, Revolutions; Price, Revolutions; Kaelble, "1848," p. 262f.; and Goldstone, Revolution, p. 285. The two Italian countries in our sample, Lombardy and the Papal States, both experienced strong revolutionary turmoil (see Sperber, European Revolutions, pp. 109f., 222). 48 See Valentin, Geschichte, vol. 1, for the 1848 revolutions in the German states. 49For these countries we were unable to find compatible grain price data extending back to the 1820s.

Revolutionsof 1848

313

Papal Baden France Prussia Austria Bavaria Bremen Belgium Saxony Hungary Bohemia Denmark Hamburg Lombardy Brunswick Oldenburgc Switzerland Netherlands States WOrttemberg Hesse-Darmstadt Mecklenburg-Schw.

(1) 67.11 72.91 39.01 76.68 61.48 52.13 62.33 87.88 82.58 88.32 93.82 52.89 70.02 76.96 66.32 76.12 73.99 73.30 71.20 93.80 75.90

Price Wheat Average 1838-45a

125.21 81.51 109.51 (2) 149.18 101.23 127.28 110.68 140.13 136.57 146.72 105.12 110.89 92.34 108.72 103.96 135.99 100.29 128.70 (47) (47) (47) (47) 119.13(47) (47) (47) (47) (47) (47) (47) (47) (47) (47) (47) 119.69(47) (47) (47) 79.34(47) (47) (47)

Wheat (Year) 1845-48a Maximum Price

3 2 2 2 2 2

3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3

(3)

High Years Prices of 184547b Grain AGRICULTURA Agriculture Error

2.31 2.71 2.41 2.41 2.51 2.23 2.45 2.23 2.74 2.72 (4) 2.33 2.27 2.38 2.24 2.54 2.57 2.59 2.76 2.56 1.16 (47) (47) (47) (46) (47) (46) (47) (45) (47) (46) (47) (46) (45) (47) (47) (46) (47) 2.19(47) (47) (47) (46) Maximum INDUSTRIAL, SE(Year) Price-Forecast 1845-48
TABLE AND 3

yesyesno yesyesyes

yesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyes (5)

Price Shock Grain1845-48? POLITICAL

-4.06

-24.02

-4.93

-10.64

(6) (%) 1848 -8.04 Growth Industrial

SHOCKS,

0.57

-2.48

-2.02

-2.63

(7) -2.49

Error 1848 Industry SEForecast Production-1845-1848

no

yes

yes

yes

yes (8)

Shock 1848? in Industrial

no no no no no no

no no yesyesno yesyesyesno no no yesyesno yes (9)

1848? Before Repression in Politics

(yes) (yes) (yes) (yes) (yes) (yes) yesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyes (10) 1848? Revolution

314
'
b a

Berger and Spoerer

Rye Spain Russiac Finland Grams Sweden Norway Sources: England Number of prices. See of fine the years in silver per Appendix. which (1) Price 115.31 105.34 89.28 75.76 50.72 73.57 Wheat Average 1838-45a grain hectoliter.

prices Wheat (Year) 1845-48a Maximum (47) Price (45) 119.74(47) 134.68(47) (48) (45) exceeded 81.44 141.27 44.12 73.69 (2) the 1 2 0 2 1 1 average for (3) High Years Prices of 1845-47b Grain Agriculture

Error 1838-45 1.81 (4) 1.25 1.75 2.13 -0.34 -0.10 TABLE Maximum (47) (45) (46) (47) (46) (47) SE(Year) Price-Forecast 1845-48 (Column 31). no no no yesno no (5) Price Shock Graincontinued 1845-48?

1.69

3.94

(6) (%) 1848 Growth Industrial

1.08

1.09

(7)

Error 1848 Industry SEForecast Production-

no

no

(8)

Shock 1848? in Industrial

no yesyesno yesno

(9)

1848? Before Repression in Politics

no no no no no no

(10) 1848? Revolution

Revolutionsof 1848

315

maximumprice between 1845 and 1848. Column3 reportsthe numberof yearsbetween 1845 and 1847 in whichpricesreachedheightsexceedingthe averageof 1838-1845. Incolumn4 the maximum price-forecast error of the years 1845 to 1848 is dividedby the corresponding standard error. Whether the deviationof the actualfromthe forecasted pricebetween 1845 and 1848 was a "shock"in the sense definedabove (deviationgreaterthantwo standarderrors),is indicatedin column5. Columns6-8 repeatthe shock analysis for those countriesfor which we have industrial productiondata.If the deviationbetweenactualandforecasted industrial growthis greater thantwo standard errors,we note a production shock in column 8. The next step is to confrontthese resultswith the politicaldatain the last two columns.Column9 indicateswhether ornotthepoliticalatmosphere on the eve of 1848 was repressive,and column 10 indicateswhetheror not a countryexperienceda revolutionin thatyear.Forcountrieswith immediate andsubstantial constitutional changesbutno widespread violence,the "yes" is in parentheses. Now we are able to give an answerto the questionof whetherthe European revolutionsof 1848 were caused, or at least stronglyinfluenced,by short-term economic factors. Comparing columns 8 and 10 we find that, with the exceptionof theNetherlands, those countriesknownto have experiencedan industrial shock underwent a revolutionas well. By contrast,in Englandand Sweden therewas neitheran industrial productionshock nor a revolution.It is also reassuring that,verymuchin line with the analysisin the preceding section, the shocks in food prices and manufacturing are Evidenceforjust seven countriesmay not be totallyperhighly correlated. let us comparecolumns5 and8, which register suasive,however.Therefore the occurrence of shocksin grainprices andmanufacturing. Again with the exceptionof the Netherlands,we find thatonly countriesshowing a price shock in 1845-1848 experienceda manufacturing shock in 1848, andviceThis further to versa. findingadds weight ourhypothesisthata propagation mechanismextendedthe shock waves of the agrarian crisis into 1848. On the basis of this hypothesiswe can comparethe earlierprice shocks in column 5 directlywith the politicaldatafor 1848 in column 10 even for those countriesfor which we do not have productiondata. The resultis surprisingly clear-cut.Thereis a near-perfect regionalmatchbetween grain-price shocks and revolutions:among the 21 states experiencingrevolutionary turmoil, 20 had been hit by a grain-priceshock between 1845 and 1847. is an outlier.Conversely, of the six countrieswithouta revoOnlyDenmark lution only one, Norway, showed signs of a price shock in the grain market.50
0These resultsare in line with those of Goldstone(Revolution,pp. 343-48), who finds a high geographicalcorrelation betweenpopulationpressureand statecrises in Europebetween 1750 and

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The outcome is also remarkably robustwith regardto the underlying definitionof economic "shocks." As pointedout earlier,the two-standarderrorthresholdis merelya statistical ruleof thumb.However,a comparison of columns4 and 10 revealsthatindeedany thresholdvalue between 1.82 and2.18 wouldhaveyieldedthe sameresults,namelythat25 of the 27 cases supportoureconomicview of the 1848 revolutions.51 The robustness of the resultstronglysuggestsa positive correlation betweenthe size of the price shock andthe likelihoodof a revolution.Indeed,a simplelogit model exercise revealsthatanincreasein thepre-1848grain-price forecasterrorsignifof revolutionary icantlyincreasesthe probability activity.52 Note also that less sophisticatedmeasuresof the depth of the agrarian crisis lead to comparable findings.For instance,a comparisonof columns 3 and 10 shows thatthe numberof yearsin the period 1845-1847 in which a countrysuffered from relativelyhigh grainprices is also a remarkably good predictorof revolutionary activity in 1848. Of the politically stable countries,only Norwayand Spainhad experienced morethana single year of highgrainpricesin thepreviousthree.By contrast, all countries undergoing revolutionendureda minimumof two years of above-average prices before 1848. Is there anythingwe can say about the outliers?First, regional factors may have played a role. It is interestingto note thatthe countriesfor which our hypothesisfails (Denmark,Norway,andthe Netherlands)all abutthe North Sea, as do all those countries(exceptingtiny Brunswick)thatexperienced some sort of economic traumain the mid-1840s, and yet avoided violent revolutionin 1848 (see Figure7). Second, institutionalandpolitical factorsmay have been important. An obvious candidateis poor relief, which may have bolsteredthe dispensingregime's legitimacy. We have, however, found it very difficultto gathercomparableinformationfor our sample countries.The most comprehensivecomparativestudy is that of PeterLindert,who compares tenEuropean countries andfinds,significantly
1850. Note, however,thatourresultsareimmuneto the criticismthatthe explanatory variable(in our case the price shocks)is endogenous. s' Similarly, column7 showsthatanythreshold betweenzeroand - 2.01 will separate countries with or withoutshocksin industrial in a way thatis compatible production with the economicview (except for the Netherlands). 52 Wehaveestimated a ML-binary logitmodelfortheoccurrence of a revolution, with a constantand the grain-price forecasterrorin 1847, for the 27 countries or regionsin our sample.The LHS variable is constructed as a dummythattakesthe value I when column 10 in Table3 shows eithera "yes"or a "(yes),"and0 otherwise. Theestimated coefficientforthegrain-price forecasterroris 1.83 with a SE of 0.57 (significant atthe4 percentlevel).Thistranslates intoan increasein theprobability of a revolution for a one-unitincreasein the 1847 forecasterror fromzero of about21 percentage points.A oneunit increasefroma forecast-error level of 1 (2) increasesthe probability of a revolution by about46 (23) percentage points.The McFadden-R2 is 0.18. The standard deviationof the 1847 forecasterrors is 0.88. Using the grain-price forecasterrors listedin Table3, which for some countriesdeviatesfrom the 1847 figure,does not changethe qualitative results.Detailsareavailableon request.

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,-.-

..^..

...... .... . W

ei

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~cc

<P

GA~~~~~~~~~~~~~4
\ b

o~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~gp

7 WHEATPRICESIN EUROPE Notes: Left: averagewheat price, 1820-1845. Middle: maximumwheat price, 1845-1848. Right: FIGuRE in garams of fineC silverper hectolitre.ABC, Abc, abc: intensityof price shock(if any). All pricesare constitutional with violentrevolution,immediate change,or neither. Country
Source: Table 3, cols. 2 and 4.

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for ourpurposes,thatpoor reliefper capitain Englandandthe Netherlands were far higherthanin the othercountries.53 One institutional factorthatcan be assessed,though,is whethera regime was repressiveor not. It is interesting that,as column9 of Table3 indicates, theNorthSea countries wereall governedby nonrepressive, liberalregimes. To pursuethis idea, we employedthe logit model for explainingthe likeliin general(discussedabove),alongwitha model hoodof politicalrevolution explainingviolentrevolutionin particular. We findthatwhereasanincrease in the grainpriceforecasterror significantly increased the likelihoodof both violent and preemptiverevolution,the presence of a repressivepolitical regime affected only the probabilityof violence. Violent revolutionwas significantlylikelierto occurunderrepressive politicalregimes.54 Ourfindings thussupport the ideathatthecharacter of the regimelargelydetermined theform of political upheavalin 1848, but thatit was the economic crisis that set the wheels of revolutionin motion.
CONCLUSIONS

the 1848 revolutionsin Europeemphasize Manyhistoriansinvestigating the force of ideas as theirleadingcause. The economic crisis startingwith the bad harvestof 1845 is regarded,at most, as one of numerousenabling factors.In view of the analysisput forwardin the presentstudy,this view the political dynamicsresultingfrom the extreme severely underestimates of 1845-1848. A morepointedstatement of this view economicfluctuations would be thatit was economicmisery,ratherthan"ideas,"thatcaused the outbreak of revolutionsin early 1848. As an initial step, we have here establisheda propagationmechanism crisis of 1845-1847 with the subsequentindustrial linkingthe agricultural time-seriestools, it has crisis of 1846-1848. Using a numberof standard been shown that over the period 1820-1850 there was a systematicand in France,Prussia, andindustry betweenagriculture significantrelationship theworld'sleadingand andSweden-but notin England, Austria,Hungary, most highly industrialized economy,nor in the Netherlands.In particular, thereis evidencethatan increasein grainprices-a good proxy for the cost
See Lindert, "Poor Relief," pp. 113-18. a dummy variable that takes the value one when column 9 of Table 3 indicates the presence of a repressive regime in the above-mentioned model explaining the occurrence of revolution (violent or preemptive) produces no significant effects. The ML-binary logit model for the occurrence ofviolent revolution includes a constant, the grain-price forecast errorin 1847, and the dummy variable indicating repression. The LHS variable is constructed as a dummy that takes the value one when column 10 of Table 3 shows a "yes." The estimated coefficients for both the grain-price forecast error (1.43) and the repressive-regime dummy (2.52) are significant at least at the 4 percent level. The McFadden-R2 is 0.26. Again, we arrive at qualitatively similar results when we use the forecast errors as presented in Table 3 instead. Details are available on request.
5

54Including

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of living at the time-led aftera certainlag to a decline in manufacturing activity.As such, the dramaticincreasein food prices in 1845-1847 must have had a strong negative effect on productionand employmentin the industrial sectorsby 1848, the yearof politicalunrest.This resultis potentially important. It allows us to drawdirectinferencesaboutthe occurrence of revolutionary activityfromthe rich dataon European grainprices. In a second step, we have demonstrated the regionalpatternof the economic shocksthathit variousEuropean countriespriorto 1848. It turnsout that "shocks,"defined as significantforecasterrorsbased on an adaptive expectations model,helpto predictrevolutionary activity:if-and only if-a countrywas subjectto a shock in 1845-1848, it experiencedrevolution. Using themuchsparser available dataon manufacturing we findthatFrance, Prussia,Austria,and Hungarysuffereda shock-like decline in industrial productionin 1848, paralleledby significantrevolutionary activity.While this resultis very much in line with the economicview of the 1848 events, it is based on a rathersmallnumberof observations. However,makinguse of the link establishedabove between agriculture and manufacturing, we againturnto grainpricesforhelp. In fact,the regionalpattern of grain-price shocks is very similarto thatof industrial crises:if a countrywas subjected to a grain-price shock between 1845 and 1847, then it went on to undergo revolutionin 1848. Of 21 countriessubjectto a grainprice shock, 20 followed this crudebut obviouslypowerfulrule, Norway being the peaceful exception.Among the six countriesthat escapedgrain-priceshocks, only Denmark andin oursenserevolutionary, experienced far-reaching, constitutional reform.These resultsare very robustwith regardto the underlying definition of an economic shock. We conclude that the occurrenceof an economic shock in the later 1840s was an important the factorin triggering 1848 revolutionsacrossEurope. Whileinstitutions-namely,thepresenceor absenceof a repressive political regime-add little to the explanationof revolutionary activityas such, we findthattheydid exerta significantinfluenceon the formthatthis activity took. The revolutionsof 1848 tended to be violent if the regime was repressive.We conclude that the presence of repressiveregimes did not triggerrevolutionary events, but did help to shapethem. Ideology also played a role, but probablyonly in combinationwith economic crisis. The peasants and artisansof the 1840s, suffering a severe deterioration in theirsocioeconomicstatus,neededsome kindof alternative vision-realistic or otherwise-before theywouldbecomerevolutionaries. At the time,thesealternatives wereofferedbypeasantleaderswho appealed to traditional conceptionsof fairness(E. P.Thompson's"moral economy"55) and by politically discontentedtownsmen who called for liberalismand
" Thompson, "Moral Economy."

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democracy. In contrast to the crises of 1816/17, when there was still hope that the forces of restoration could be defeated, the crisis of 1845-1848 took place in the context of a much larger and more popular variety of political alternatives that called for immediate action.56Here, at least, we see historical singularities. The likelihood that revolutionary ideology was a necessary condition for upheaval transcends a narrow economistic approach. But although the economic crises did not provide the brains, they did supply the brawn. Revolutionary agitators,pursuing their goals in an undemocratic and often repressive political environment, needed violence (or the credible threat of it) as a political instrument, and only the "crowd" could provide it.57We conclude that without the economic crisis of 1845-1848, which so obviously endangered the economic welfare of so many people and discredited the ancien regime so thoroughly, there would not have been the critical mass to support these new ideas. Hence no explanation of the European revolutions of 1848 should neglect short-tenn economic factors.

Appendix: Data Sources

Political data (intensity of repression, intensity of revolution) are taken for Germany and the Austrian Empire from Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, chs. 7 and 8, and Valentin, Geschichte, chs. 4, 6, and 7. For the European states, see Steams, Revolutions, Price, Revolutions, Sperber, European Revolutiots, and the articles in Dowe, Haupt, and Langewiesche, Europa, ch. 1. Numerous other historical works were consulted which are not in the list of references. Please contact the authors for a list. Grain-price data would ideally be an average for the harvest year, weighted by sales and expressed in, well, euros. The currency problem can quite easily be overcome by transforming recorded local prices per local unit into grams of fine silver per hectoliter. For the conversion of currencies, measures of capacity, and measures of weight we used Klimpert, Lexikon, at times checked by and supplemented with data in other literature on the subject. As both the levels and the volatility of the data are strongly influenced by the way the average is calculated, we have ignored the few available series for the harvest year or ones which relied only on one or two dates per year. This, for example, is the case for the Lisbon price series of Magalhaes Godinho, Prix, pp. 76-78. Very probably the only series that is partially weighted by sales is the one for France, where the weighting was (or was supposed to be) done at the very first level of recording (see Drame et al., Siecle, ch. 4). Whenever possible, we have tried to find data for the country's capital, because these were the prices actually observed (and responded to) in the political center. If not stated otherwise, the data are available annually from 1815 to 1850. The abbreviations in parentheses are the country codes used in Figure 7. Country codes in capitals stand for violent revolutions; initial capitals mean preemptive revolution; lower case means no revolution.

56 The similar see C. Tilly neither faminenorsocialunrest; food-price increaseof 1854-1855 created et al., RebelliousCentury. " Hobsbawmhas termed Breakers," p. 57). this "bargaining by riot"("Machine

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p. 484; 1. Austria (AUS; Lower Austria, contains Vienna): F61des,"Getreidepreise," production1830-50 Komlos, HabsburgMonarchy,pp. 294f. miningand industrial p. I.297. in Deutschland," 2. Baden (BAD; Mannheim,Heidelberg):"Getreidepreise 3. Bavaria(BAV;Munich):Seuffert,Statistik,p. 124. 4. Belgium (Bel): Seuffert,Statistik,p. 401. pp. 99-101. 5. Bohemia (BOH;Prague):Schebek,Collektiv-Ausstellung, andKaufhold,Preise, pp. 204f. 6. Bremen(Bre):Gerhard 7. Brunswick(Bru):Soetbeer,Beitrdge,p. 8. p. 397, wheatprices 8. Denmark(Den; Copenhagen,1819-50): Weisz, "Getreidepreise," p. 489. The by usingryepricesfromF6ldes,"Getreidepreise," 1819-32 extrapolated is series 0.72. the wheat and 1833-50 between rye correlation p. 125,cf alsoWeisz,"Getreidepreise," Rostow,BritishEconomy, (eng;London): 9. England andHarley, p. 727. Crafts Growth," "Output production p. 350; Britishindustrial p. 492. 10. Finland(fin): F6ldes, "Getreidepreise," Paris):Labrousse,Romano, and Seine-et-Oise,surrounds 11. France(FRA;departement andBouguignon, 1820-50 Levy-Leboyer production Dreyfus,Prix, 196f.;industrial French economy,table A-IV. in Deutschland," p. 1.296. 12. Hamburg(HAM):"Getreidepreise der hessischenZentralstelle,p. 334. 13. Hesse (HES; 1822-50): Mittheilungen p. 485; mining and indus14. Hungary(HUN; Pest, 1819-50): F6ldes, "Getreidepreise," trialproduction1830-50 Komlos, HabsburgMonarchy,p. 294f. (LOM;Milan):Maddalena,Prezzi,p. 379. 15. Lombardy im Grossherzogthum Mecklenburg," (MEC;Rostock):"Getreidepreise 16. Mecklenburg pp. 26,28. pro17. Netherlands (Net; Utrecht):PosthumusandKetner,Inquiry,pp. 422f.; industrial pp. 62f. ductionSmits, Horlings,and van Zanden,"Measurement," p. 518. 18. Norway (nor; 1820-50): F6ldes, "Getreidepreise," p. 5. 19. Oldenburg (Old;rye prices 1817-50): "Durchschnittspreise," p. 482. 20. PapalStates (PAP;Rome): F6ldes, "Getreidepreise," 21. Prussia (PRU; Berlin): 1815 Seuffert,Statistik,p. 386; 1816-60 Engel, "Getreidepreise,"p. 257; woolen weaving production1828-50 Blumberg,Deutsche Textilindustrie,p. 382. 22. Russia (rus;Moscow, rye prices):Mironov,Chlebnieceny, pp. 235-37. pp. 66f. des statistischen Vereins, 23. Saxonia (SAX; Dresden 1820-50): Mittheilungen 375 for 1821 (1832-50). Statistik, p. obvious Seuffert, corrected), misprint (1820-31, 24. Spain (spa; Barcelona):price index (1913=100) from Sarda,Politica Monetaria,pp. 303-05, rebasedin prices by Consejo SuperiorBancario,Dictamen, pp. 39, 109. Obviousmisprintfor 1848 corrected. producHistoryof Prices, pp. 124-27; industrial 25. Sweden (swe; Stockholm):Jorberg, tableII. tion Schon, Historiskanationalrdkenskaper, 26. Switzerland(swi): HistorischeStatistik,p. 480. II.120f. "Durchschnittspreise," and Trudinger, (WUR):Maihrlen 27. Wurttemberg REFERENCES 3rd edn. Hamburg: Parey,1978. undAgrarkonjunktur. Abel, Wilhelm.Agrarkrisen Amtsblatt der K6niglichen Regierung zu Potsdam und der Stadt Berlin. Nowawes 1840-1849. wdhrendder ersten Hdlfte des 19. Jahrin PreuJ3en Hungerkrisen Bass, Hans-Heinrich.

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