Professional Documents
Culture Documents
June18,2013
ROGERS:
Thecommitteewillcometoorder. GeneralAlexander,DeputyAttorneyGeneralCole,ChrisInglis,DeputyDirectorJoyceandMr.Litt, thankyouforappearingbeforeustoday,especiallyonshortnotice. TherankingmemberandIbelieveitisimportanttoholdanopenhearingtoday,andwedon'tdoa tremendousamountofthose,toprovidethisHouseandthepublicwithanopportunitytoheardirectly fromyouhowthegovernmentisusingthelegalauthoritiesthatCongresshasprovidedtotheexecutive branchsincetheterroristattacksofSeptember11th,2001. I'dalsoliketorecognizethehardworkofthemenandwomenoftheNSAandtherestofthe intelligencecommunitywhoworkdayinanddayouttodisruptthreatstoournationalsecurity.People attheNSAinparticularhaveheardaconstantpublicdrumbeataboutalaundrylistofnefariousthings theyareallegedtobedoingtospyonAmericansallofthemwrong.Themisperceptionshavebeen great,yettheykeeptheirheadsdownandkeepworkingeverydaytokeepussafe.
ROGERS:
And,GeneralAlexander,pleaseconveyourthankstoyourteamforcontinuingeveryday,despitemuch misinformationaboutthequalityoftheirwork.Andthankthemforallofusforcontinuingtoworkto protectAmerica. IalsowanttotakethismomenttothankGeneralAlexanderwhohasbeenextendedasnationalsecurity adviserinonewayoranotherthreedifferenttimes.That'sapatriot. Thisisaverydifficultjobataverydifficulttimeinourhistory.Andforthegeneraltoacceptthose extensionsofhismilitaryservicetoprotectthisnation,Ithinkwithallofthethe,again,the misinformationoutthere,Iwanttothankyouforthat. Thankyouforyourpatriotism.ThankyouforcontinuingtoservetoprotecttheUnitedStates,again. Andyouhavethatgreatburdenofknowinglotsofclassifiedinformationyoucannottalkpubliclyabout. Iwantyoutoknow,thankyouonbehalfofAmericaforyourservicetoyourcountry. Thecommitteehasbeenextensivelybriefedontheseeffortsoveraregularbasisasapartofour ongoingoversightresponsibilityoverthe16elementsoftheintelligencecommunityandthenational intelligenceprogram. Inordertofullyunderstandtheintelligencecollectionprogramsmostofthesebriefingsandhearings havetakenplaceinclassifiedsettings.Nonetheless,thecollectioneffortsunderthebusinessrecords provisioninSection702oftheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActarelegal,courtapprovedand
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subjecttoanextensiveoversightregime. Ilookforwardfromhearingfromallofthewitnessesabouttheextensiveprotectionsandoversightin placefortheseprograms. GeneralAlexander,welookforwardtohearingwhatyou'reabletodiscussinanopenforumabouthow thedatathatyouhaveyouobtainfromprovidersundercourtorder,especiallyunderthebusiness recordsprovision,isused. AndDeputyAttorneyGeneralCole,welookforwardtohearingmoreaboutthelegalauthorities themselvesandthestateoflawonwhatprivacyprotectionsAmericanshaveinthesebusinessrecords. Oneofthefrustratingpartsaboutbeingamemberofthiscommittee,andreallychallenge,issittingatthe intersectionofclassifiedintelligenceprogramsandtransparentdemocracyasrepresentativesofthe Americanpeople. Thepublictruststhegovernmenttoprotectthecountryfromanother9/11typeattack,butthattrustcan starttowanewhentheyarefacedwithinaccuracies,halftruthsandoutrightliesaboutthewaythe intelligenceprogramsarebeingrun. Oneofthemoredamagingaspectsofselectivelyleakingincompleteinformationisthatitpaintsan inaccuratepictureandfostersdistrustinourgovernment. Thisisparticularlysowhenthoseofuswhohavetakentheoathtoprotectinformationthatcandamage thenationalsecurityifreleasedcannotpubliclyprovideclarifyinginformationbecauseitremains classified. Itisattimeslikethesewhereourenemieswithourenemieswithinbecomealmostasdamagingasour enemiesontheoutside. Itiscriticallyimportanttoprotectsourcesandmethodssowearen'tgivingtheenemyourplaybook. It'salsoimportant,however,tobeabletotalkabouthowtheseprogramshelpprotectussotheycan continuetobereauthorized.Andthenwehighlighttheprotectionsandoversightofwhichthese programsoperateunder. GeneralAlexander,youandIhavetalkedoverthelastweek,abouttheneedtotobeabletopublicly elaborateonthesuccessstoriestheseauthoritieshavecontributedtowithoutjeopardizingongoing operations.Iknowyou'llhavetheopportunitytotalkaboutseveralofthosetoday. Iplacetheutmostvalueinprotectingsourcesandmethods.Andthat'swhyyou'vebeen,Ithink,so diligentinmakingsurethatanythingthat'sdisclosedcomportswiththeneedtoprotectsourcesand methods.Sothat,again,wedon'tmakeiteasierforthebadguysoverseas,terroristsinthiscase,todo harmtoUnitedStatescitizens,andIrespectthat. Ialsorecognizethatwhenweareforcedintothepositionofhavingsopubliclydiscussedintelligence programsduetoirresponsiblecriminalbehaviorthatwealsohavetobecarefultobalancetheneedfor secrecywhileeducatingthepublic. Ithinkyouhavestrucktherightbalancebetweenprotectingsourcesandmethodsandmaintainingthe public'strustbyprovidingmoreexamplesofhowtheseauthoritieshavehelpeddisruptterroristplots
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Well,Iagreewithreallyalotofwhatthechairmansaid. GeneralAlexander,ChrisInglis,youknow,yourleadershipinNSAhasbeenoutstanding.AndIjust wanttoacknowledgethepeoplewhoworkatNSAeveryday.NSAisinmydistrict.Ihavean occasiontocommunicate,andalotofthepeoplewhogotoworktoprotectourcountry,whowork hardeveryday,areconcernedthatthepublicthinkthey'redoingsomethingwrong.Andthat'snotthe caseatall. Andthemostimportantthingwecandoheretodayisletthepublicknowthetruefacts.Iknowthat ChairmanRogersandIandothermembershaveaskedyoutohelpdeclassifywhatwecan,thatwillnot hurtoursecurity,sothepubliccanunderstandthatthisimportant(sic)islegal,whywe'redoingthis programandhowitprotectsus. We'reheretodaybecauseofthebrazendisclosureofcriticalclassifiedinformationthatkeepsour countrysafe.Thiswidespreadleakbya29yearoldAmericansystemsadministratorputourcountry andouralliesindangerbygivingtheterroristsareallygoodlookattheplaybookthatweusetoprotect ourcountry.Theterroristsnowknowmanyofoursourcesandmethods. There'sbeenalotinthemediaaboutthissituation.Someright.Alotwrong.We'reholdingthisopen hearingtodaysowecansettherecordstraightandtheAmericanpeoplecanheardirectlyfromthe intelligencecommunityastowhatisallowedandwhatisnotunderthelaw.Weneedtoeducate membersofCongressalso,withthepublic. Tobeclear,theNationalSecurityAgencyisprohibitedfromlisteninginonphonecallsofAmericans withoutproper,courtapprovedlegalauthorities. Weliveinacountryoflaws.Theselawsarestrictlyfollowedandlayeredwithoversightfromthree branchesofgovernment,includingtheexecutivebranch,thecourtsandCongress. Immediatelyafter9/11,welearnedthatagroupofterroristswerelivingintheUnitedStatesactively plottingtokillAmericansonourownsoil.Butwedidn'thavetheproperauthoritiesinplacetostop thembeforetheycouldkillalmost3,000innocentpeople. Goodintelligenceisclearlythebestdefenseagainstterrorism.Therearetwomainauthoritiesthathave beenhighlightedinthepress,thebusinessrecordsprovisionthatallowsthegovernmenttolegallycollect whatiscalledmetadata,simplythephonenumberandlengthofcall.Nocontent,noconversations.This authorityallowsourcounterterrorismandthelawenforcementofficialstoclosethegaponforeignand
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domesticterroristactivities.Itenablesourintelligencecommunitytodiscoverwhetherforeignterrorists havebeenincontactwithpeopleintheU.S.whomaybeplanningaterroristattackonU.S.soil. ThesecondauthorityisknownasSection702oftheFISAAmendmentAct.Itallowsthegovernment tocollectthecontentofemailandphonecallsofforeignersnotAmericanslocatedoutsidethe UnitedStates.Thisallowsthegovernmenttogetinformationaboutterrorists,cyberthreats,weaponsof massdestructionandnuclearweaponsproliferationthatthreatenAmerica. ThisauthorityprohibitsthetargetingofAmericancitizensorU.S.permanentresidentswithoutacourt order,nomatterwheretheyarelocated. Bothoftheseauthoritiesarelegal.Congressapprovedandreauthorizedbothofthemoverthelasttwo years.Infact,theseauthoritieshavebeeninstrumentalinhelpingpreventdozensofterroristattacks, manyonU.S.soil. Butthefactstillremainsthatwemustfigureouthowthiscouldhavehappened.Howwasthis 29yearoldsystemsadministratorabletoaccesssuchhighlyclassifiedinformationandaboutsuch sensitivematters?Andhowwasheabletodownloaditandremoveitfromhisworkplaceundetected? Weneedtochangeoursystemsandpractices,andemploythelatestintechnologythatwouldalert superiorswhenaworkertriestodownloadandremovethistypeofinformation.Weneedtosealthis crackinthesystem. Andtorepeatsomethingincrediblyimportant:TheNSAisprohibitedfromlisteningtophonecallsor readingemailsofAmericanswithoutacourtorder.Period.Endofstory. Lookforwardyourtestimony.
ROGERS:
Chairman,RankingMember,thankyouforthekindwords.Iwilltellyouitisaprivilegeandhonorto serveasthedirectoroftheNationalSecurityAgencyandthecommanderoftheU.S.CyberCommand. Asyounoted,wehaveextraordinarypeopledoinggreatworktoprotectthiscountryandtoprotectour civillibertiesandprivacy. Overthepastfewweeks,unauthorizeddisclosuresofclassifiedinformationhaveresultedin considerabledebateinthepressaboutthesetwoprograms. Thedebatehadbeenfueled,asyounoted,byincompleteandinaccurateinformation,withlittlecontext providedonthepurposeoftheseprograms,theirvaluetoournationalsecurityandthatofourallies,and theprotectionsthatareinplacetopreserveourprivacyandcivilliberties. Today,wewillprovideadditionaldetailandcontextonthesetwoprogramstohelpinformthatdebate. Theseprogramswereapprovedbytheadministration,Congressandthecourts.Frommyperspective, asoundlegalprocessthatweallworktogetherasagovernmenttoprotectournationandourcivil
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libertiesandprivacy.
ALEXANDER:
Ironically,thedocumentsthathavebeenreleasedsofarshowtherigorousoversightandcomplianceour governmentusestobalancesecuritywithcivillibertiesandprivacy. LetmestartbysayingthatIwouldmuchratherbeheretodaydebatingthispointthantryingtoexplain howwefailedtopreventanother9/11.ItisatestamenttotheongoingteamworkoftheCentral IntelligenceAgency,theFederalBureauofInvestigation,andtheNationalSecurityAgency,working withouralliesandindustrypartners,thatwehavebeenabletoconnectthedotsandpreventmore terroristattacks. TheeventsofSeptember11,2001occurred,inpart,becauseofafailureonthepartofourgovernment toconnectthosedots.SomeofthosedotswereintheUnitedStates.Theintelligencecommunitywas notabletoconnectthosedomesticdots,phonecallsbetweenoperativesandtheU.S.andAlQaida terroristoverseas.Followingthe9/11commission,whichinvestigatedtheintelligencecommunity's failuretodetect9/11,CongresspassedthePATRIOTAct. Section215ofthatact,asithasbeeninterpretedandimplied,helpsthegovernmentclosethatgapby enablingthedetectionoftelephonecontactbetweenterroristsoverseasandoperativeswithintheUnited States.AsDirectorMuelleremphasizedlastweekduringhistestimonytothetotheJudiciary Committee,ifwehadhadSection215inplacepriorto9/11,wemayhaveknownthatthe9/11 hijackerMihdharwaslocatedinSanDiegoandcommunicatingwithaknownAlQaidasafehousein Yemen. Inrecentyears,theseprograms,togetherwithotherintelligence,haveprotectedtheU.S.andourallies fromterroristthreatsacrosstheglobetoincludehelpingpreventtheterroristthepotentialterrorist eventsover50timessince9/11.Wewillactuallybringforwardtothecommitteetomorrowdocuments thattheinteragencyhasagreedon,thatinaclassifiedsetting,giveseveryoneofthosecasesforyour review.We'lladdtwomoretodaypubliclywe'lldiscuss.Butasthechairmannoted,ifwegiveallof thoseout,wegiveallthesecretsofhowwe'retrackingdowntheterroristasacommunity.Andwe can'tdothat.Toomuchisatriskforusandforourallies.I'llgointogreaterdetailaswegothroughthis testimonythismorning. Ibelievewehaveachievedthesecurityandrelativesafetyinawaythatdoesnotcompromisethe privacyandcivillibertiesofourcitizens.Wewouldliketomakethreefundamentalpoints.First,these programsarecriticaltotheintelligencecommunity'sabilitytoprotectournationandourallies'security. Theyassisttheintelligencecommunityeffortstoconnectthedots. Second,theseprogramsarelimited,focused,andsubjecttorigorousoversight.Theyhavedistinct purposesinoversightmechanisms.Wehaverigoroustrainprogramsforouranalystsandtheir supervisorstounderstandtheirresponsibilitiesregardingcompliance. Third,thedisciplinedoperationoftheseprogramsprotectstheprivacyandcivillibertiesoftheAmerican people.Wewillprovideimportantdetailsabouteachofthose.First,I'dI'dasktheDeputyAttorney GeneralJimColetodiscusstheoverarchingframeworkofourauthority. Sir.
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COLE:
Thankyouthankyou,General. Mr.Chairman,Mr.RankingMember,membersofthecommittee,asGeneralAlexandersaid,and andasthechairmanandrankingmemberhavesaid,allofusinthenationalsecurityareaareconstantly tryingtobalanceprotectingpublicsafetywithprotectingpeople'sprivacyandcivillibertiesinthis government.Andit'saconstantjobatbalancingthis. Wethinkwe'vedonethisintheseinstances.TherearestatutesthatarepassedbyCongress.Thisthis isnotaprogramthat'soffthebooks,that'sbeenhiddenaway.Thisispartofwhatgovernmentputs togetheranddiscusses.Statutesarepassed.Itisoverseenbythreebranchesofourgovernment,the Legislature,theJudiciary,andtheExecutiveBranch.Theprocessofoversightoccursbefore,during, andaftertheprocessesthatwe'retalkingabouttoday. AndIwanttotalkalittlebithowthatworks,whatthelegalframeworkis,andwhatsomeofthe protectionsarethatareputintoit.Firstofall,whatwehaveseenpublishedinthenewspaper concerning215thisisthebusinessrecordsprovisionsofthePATRIOTActthatalsomodifyFISA. You'veseenoneorderinthenewspaperthat'sacoupleofpageslongthatjustsaysunderthatorder, we'reallowedtoacquiremetadata,telephonerecords.That'soneoftwoorders.It'sthesmallestofthe twoorders.Andtheotherorder,whichhasnotbeenpublished,goesinto,ingreatdetailwhatwecan dowiththatmetadatahowwecanaccessithowwecanlookthroughitwhatwecandowithit,once wehavelookedthroughitandwhattheconditionsarethatareplacedonustomakesurethatwe protectprivacyandcivillibertiesand,atthesametime,protectpublicsafety. Letmegothroughafewofthefeaturesofthis.Firstofall,it'smetadata.Thesearephonerecords. Thesethisisjustlikewhatyouwouldgetinyourownphonebill.Itisthenumberthatwasdialed from,thenumberthatwasdialedto,thedateandthelengthoftime.That'sallwegetunder215.Wedo notgettheidentityofanyofthepartiestothisphonecall.Wedon'tgetanycellsiteorlocation informationastowhereanyofthesephoneswerelocated.And,mostimportantly,andyou'reprobably goingtohearthisabout100timestoday,wedon'tgetanycontentunderthis.Wedon'tlisteninon anybody'scallsunderthisprogramatall. Thisisunder,asIsaid,section215ofthePATRIOTAct.Thishasbeendebatedandupfor reauthorization,andreauthorizedtwicebytheUnitedStatesCongresssinceitsinceptionin2006andin 2011.Now,inorderthewayitworksis,thethereisanapplicationthatismadebytheFBIunder thestatutetotheFISAcourt.WecallittheFISC.TheyaskforandreceivepermissionundertheFISC underthistogetrecordsthatarerelevanttoanationalsecurityinvestigation.Andtheymustdemonstrate totheFISCthatitwillbeoperatedundertheguidelinesthataresetforthbytheattorneygeneralunder executiveorder12333.Thisiswhatcoversintelligencegatheringinthefederalgovernment. Itislimitedtotangibleobjects.Now,whatdoesthatmean?Thesearelikerecords,likethemetadata, thephonerecordsI'vebeendescribing.Butitisquiteexplicitlylimitedtothingsthatyoucouldgetwitha grandjurysubpoena,thosekindsofrecords.Now,it'simportanttoknowprosecutorsissuegrandjury subpoenasallthetimeanddonotneedanyinvolvementofacourtoranybodyelse,really,todoso. Underthisprogram,weneedtogetpermissionfromthecourttoissuethisaheadoftime.Sothereis courtinvolvementwiththeissuanceoftheseorders,whichisdifferentfromagrandjurysubpoena.But
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thetypeofrecords,justdocuments,businessrecords,thingslikethat,arelimitedtothosesametypesof recordsthatwecouldgetthroughagrandjurysubpoena. Now,theordersthatwegetlast90days.Sowehavetoreupandrenewtheseordersevery90days inordertodothis.Now,therearestrictcontrolsoverwhatwecandoundertheorder.And,again, that'sthebigger,thickerorderthathasn'tbeenpublished.There'srestrictionsonwhocanaccessitin thisorder.ItisstoredinrepositoriesatNSAthatcanonlybeaccessedbyalimitednumberofpeople. Andthepeoplewhoareallowedtoaccessithavetohavespecialandrigoroustrainingaboutthe standardsunderwhichthattheycanaccessit. Inordertoaccessit,thereneedstobeafindingthatthereisresponsiblesuspicionthatyoucan articulate,thatyoucanputintowords,thatthepersonwhosephonerecordsyouwanttoqueryis involvedwithsomesortofterroristorganizations.Andtheyaredefined.It'snoteveryone.Theyare limitedinthestatute.Sotherehastobeindependentevidence,asidefromthesephonerecords,thatthe personyou'retargetingisinvolvedwithaterroristorganization.
COLE:
IfthatpersonisaUnitedStatesperson,acitizen,oralawfulpermanentresident,youhavetohave somethingmorethanjusttheirownspeeches,theirownreadings,theirownFirstAmendmenttype activity.Youhavetohaveadditionalevidencebeyondthatthatindicatesthatthereisreasonable, articulablesuspicionthatthesepeopleareassociatedwithspecificterroristorganizations. Now,oneofthethingstokeepinmindisunderthelaw,theFourthAmendmentdoesnotapplytothese records.TherewasacasequiteanumberofyearsagobytheSupremeCourtthatindicatedthattoll records,phonerecordslikethis,thatdon'tincludeanycontent,arenotcoveredbytheFourth Amendmentbecausepeopledon'thaveareasonableexpectationofprivacyinwhotheycalledand whentheycalled.That'ssomethingyoushowtothephonecompany.That'ssomethingyoushowto many,manypeoplewithinthephonecompanyonaregularbasis. Oncethoserecordsareaccessedunderthisprocessandreasonablearticulablesuspicionisfound,that's foundbyspeciallytrainedpeople.Itisreviewedbytheirsupervisors.Itisdocumentedinwritingahead oftimesothatsomebodycantakealookatit.Anyoftheaccessingthatisdoneisdoneinanauditable fashion.Thereisatrailofit.Soboththedecisionandthefactsthatsupporttheaccessingandthequery isdocumented.Theamountthatwasdone,whatwasdoneallofthatisdocumentedandreviewed andauditedonafairlyregularbasis. Therearealsominimizationproceduresthatareputintoplacesothatanyoftheinformationthatis acquiredhastobeminimized.Ithastobelimitedanditsuseisstrictlylimited.Andallthatissetoutin thetermsofthecourtorder.AndifanyU.S.personsareinvolved,thereareparticularrestrictionson howanyinformationconcerningaU.S.personcanbeusedinthis. Now,thereisextensiveoversightandcompliancethatisdonewiththeserecordsandwiththisprocess. Everynowandthen,theremaybeamistakeawrongphonenumberishidorapersonwhoshouldn't havebeentargetedgetstargetedbecausethereisamistakeinthephonerecord,somethinglikethat. Eachofthosecomplianceincidents,ifandwhentheyoccur,havetobereportedtotheFISAcourt immediately.Andletmetellyou,theFISAcourtpushesbackonthis.Theywanttofindoutwhydid thishappen,whatweretheproceduresandthemechanismsthatallowedittohappen,andwhathave
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youdonetofixit.Sowheneverwehaveacomplianceincident,wereportittothecourtimmediately andwereportittoCongress.WereportittotheIntelligenceCommitteesofbothhousesandthe JudiciaryCommitteesofbothhouses. WealsoprovidetheIntelligenceandJudiciaryCommitteeswithanysignificantinterpretationsthatthe courtmakesofthe215statute.Iftheymakearulingthatissignificantorissueanorderthatissignificant initsinterpretation,weprovidethose,aswellastheapplicationswemadeforthoseorders,tothe IntelligenceCommitteeandtotheJudiciaryCommittee. Andevery30days,wearefilingwiththeFISC,withthecourt,areportthatdescribeshowwe implementthisprogram.Itincludesadiscussionofhowwe'reapplyingthereasonable,articulable suspicionstandard.Ittalksaboutthenumberofapprovedqueriesthatwemadeagainstthisdatabase, thenumberofinstancesthatthequeryresultsandcontainaU.S.personinformationthatwasshared outsideofNSA.Andallofthisgoestothecourt. Atleastonceevery90daysandsometimesmorefrequently,theDepartmentofJustice,theOfficeof theDirectorofNationalIntelligence,andtheNSAmeettoassessNSA'scompliancewithallofthese requirementsthatarecontainedinthecourtorder.Separately,theDepartmentofJusticemeetswiththe inspectorgeneralfortheNationalSecurityAgencyandassessesNSA'scomplianceonaregularbasis. Finally,thereisbystatutereportingofcertaininformationthatgoestoCongressinsemiannualreports thatwemakeontopoftheperiodicreportswemakeifthere'sacomplianceincident.Andthoseinclude informationaboutthedatathatwasrequiredandhowweareperformingunderthisstatute. Soonceagainkeepinginmind,allofthisisdonewiththreebranchesofgovernmentinvolved:oversight andinitiationbytheexecutivebranchwithreviewbymultipleagenciesstatutesthatarepassedby Congress,oversightbyCongressandthenoversightbythecourt. Now,the702statuteundertheFISAAmendmentsActisdifferent.Underthis,wedogetcontent,but there'sabigdifference.Youareonlyallowedunder702totargetforthispurposenonU.S.persons whoarelocatedoutsideoftheUnitedStates.SoifyouhaveaU.S.permanentresidentwho'sin Madrid,Spain,wecan'ttargetthemunder702.OrifyouhaveanonU.S.personwho'sinCleveland, Ohio,wecannottargetthemunder702.Inordertotargetaperson,theyhavetobeneitheracitizennor apermanentU.S.resident,andtheyneedtobeoutsideoftheUnitedStateswhilewe'retargetingthem. Now,there'sprohibitionsinthisstatute.Forexample,youcan'treversetargetsomebody.Thisiswhere youtargetsomebodywho'soutoftheUnitedStates,butreallyyourgoalistocaptureconversations withsomebodywhoisinsidetheUnitedStates.Soyou'retryingtodoindirectlywhatyoucouldn'tdo directly.Thatisexplicitlyprohibitedbythisstatute.Andifthereiseveranyindicationthatit'sbeing done,becauseagain,wereporttheusethatwemakeofthisstatutetothecourtandtotheCongress, thatisseen. Youalsohavetohaveavalidforeignintelligencepurposeinordertodoanyofthetargetingonthis.So youhavetomakesure,asitwasdescribed,thatit'sbeingdonefordefinedcategoriesofweaponsof massdestruction,foreignintelligence,thingsofthatnature.Thesearealldonepursuanttoanapplication thatismadebytheattorneygeneralandthedirectorofnationalintelligencetotheFISC.TheFISC givesacertificatethatallowsthistargetingtobedoneforayearperiod.Itthenhastoberenewedatthe endofthatyearinorderforittobereupped.
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Now,there'salsothereisarequirementthat,again,thereisreporting.Youcannotunderthetermsof thisstatutehaveandcollectanyinformationonconversationsthatarewhollywithintheUnitedStates. Soyou'retargetingsomeoneoutsidetheUnitedStates.IftheymakeacalltoinsidetheUnitedStates, thatcanbecollected,butit'sonlybecausethetargetofthatcalloutsidetheUnitedStatesinitiatedthat callandwentthere.IfthecallsarewhollywithintheUnitedStates,wecannotcollectthem. Ifyou'retargetingapersonwhoisoutsideoftheUnitedStatesandyoufindthattheycomeintothe UnitedStates,wehavetostopthetargetingrightaway.Andifthere'sanylagandwefindoutthatwe collectedinformationbecauseweweren'tawarethattheywereintheUnitedStates,wehavetotake thatinformation,purgeitfromthesystems,andnotuseit. Now,there'sagreatdealofminimizationproceduresthatareinvolvedhere,particularlyconcerningany oftheacquisitionofinformationthatdealsorcomesfromU.S.persons.AsIsaid,onlytargetingpeople outsidetheUnitedStateswhoarenotU.S.persons.Butifwedoacquireanyinformationthatrelatesto aU.S.person,underlimitedcriteriaonlycanwekeepit. Ifithastodowithforeignintelligenceinthatconversationorunderstandingforeignintelligence,or evidenceofacrimeorathreatofseriousbodilyinjury,wecanrespondtothat.Otherthanthat,we havetogetridofit.Wehavetopurgeit,andwecan'tuseit.Ifweinadvertentlyacquireanyofit withoutmeaningto,again,oncethat'sdiscovered,wehavetogetridofit.Wehavetopurgeit. Thetargetingdecisionsthataredoneare,again,documentedaheadoftime,reviewedbyasupervisor beforethey'reeverallowedtotakeplaceinthebeginning.TheDepartmentofJusticeandtheOfficeof theDirectorofNationalIntelligenceconductonsitereviewsofeachtargetingthatisdone.Theylookat themtodetermineandgothroughtheaudittodeterminethattheyweredoneproperly.Thisisdoneat leastevery60daysandmanytimesdonemorefrequentlythanthat. Inaddition,ifthere'sanycomplianceissue,itisimmediatelyreportedtotheFISC.TheFISC,again, pushesback:Howdidthishappen?Whataretheprocedures?Whatarethemechanismsyou'reusingto fixthis?Whathaveyoudonetoremedyit?Ifyouacquiredinformationyoushould(sic)have,haveyou gottenridofitasyou'rerequired?Andinaddition,we'reprovidingCongresswithallofthatinformation ifwehavecomplianceproblems. WealsoreportquarterlytotheFISCconcerningthecomplianceissuesthathavearisenduringthat quarter,ontopoftheimmediatereportsandwhatwe'vedonetofixitandremedytheonesthatwe reported.
COLE:
toCongressthatreportsoncompliance,thenumberofdisseminationsunderthisprogramthatrelateto U.S.persons,thenumberoftargetsthatwerereasonablybelievedatthetimetobeoutsidetheUnited StateswhowerelaterdeterminedtobeintheUnitedStates,andwhenthatwasdone.Soinshort,there is,frombefore,duringandaftertheinvolvementofallthreebranchesoftheUnitedStatesgovernment, onarobustandfairlyintimateway.I'dliketomakeoneotherobservation,ifImay,onthis.Wehave triedtodothisinasthorough,asprotective,andastransparentawayaswepossiblycan,consideringit isthegatheringofintelligenceinformation. Countriesandalliesofoursallovertheworldcollectintelligence.Weallknowthis.Andtherehave recentlybeenstudiesabouthowtransparentoursystemisintheUnitedStates,comparedtomanyof ourpartners,manyintheE.U.CountrieslikeFrance,theU.K.,Germany,whoweworkwithregularly. AndareportthatwasjustrecentlyissuedinMayofthisyearfoundthattheFISAAmendmentsAct,the statutethatwe'retalkingabouthere,andIwillquote,"Imposesatleastatmuch,ifnotmore,due processandoversightonforeignintelligencesurveillancethanothercountries."AndthisincludesE.U. countries.Anditsaysunderthis,theU.S.ismoretransparentaboutitsprocedures,requiresmoredue processprotectionsinitsinvestigationsthatinvolvenationalsecurity,terrorismandforeignintelligence. Thebalanceisalwaysoneweseektostrivetotoachieve.ButIthinkasI'velaidouttoyou,wehave doneeverythingwecantoachieveit.AndIthinkpartoftheproofofwhatwe'vedoneisthisreportthat cameoutjustlastmonth,indicatingoursystemisasgood,andfranklybetter,thanallofouralliesand liaisonpartners.ThankyouMr.Chairman.
ALEXANDER:
Mr.Chairman,Iwillnowswitchtothevalueoftheprogram,andtalkaboutsomestatisticsthatwe're puttingtogether.Aswestated,theseprogramsareimmenselyvaluableforprotectingournation,and securitythesecurityofourallies.Inrecentyears,theinformationgatheredfromtheseprograms providedtheU.S.governmentwithcriticalleadstohelppreventover50potentialterroristeventsin morethan20countriesaroundtheworld.FAA702contributedinover90percentofthesecases.At least10oftheseeventsincludedhomelandbasedthreats.Inthevastmajority,businessrecords,FISA reportingcontributedaswell.IwouldalsopointoutthatitisagreatpartnershipwiththeDepartmentof HomelandSecurityinthosewithadomesticnexus. ButtherealleadfordomesticeventsistheFederalBureauofInvestigation.Ithasbeenourhonorand privilegetoworkwithDirectorMueller,andDeputyDirectoryJoycewhoI'llturnitnowoverto Sean?
JOYCE:
TerrorismTaskForceandNYPDandfoundbombmakingcomponentsinbackpacks.Zazilater confessedtoaplottobombtheNewYorksubwaysystemwithbackpacks.AlsoworkingwithFISA businessrecords,theNSAwasabletoprovideapreviouslyunknownnumberofoneofthe coconspiratorscoconspirators,AdisMedunjanin.ThiswasthefirstcoreAlQaidaplotsince9/11 directedfromPakistan.Anotherexample,NSAutilizing702authoritywasmonitoringaknown extremistinYemen.ThisindividualwasincontactwithanindividualintheUnitedStatesnamedKhalid Ouazzani.OuazzaniandotherindividualsthatweidentifiedthroughaFISAthattheFBIappliedfor throughtheFISCwereabletodetectanascentplottingtobombtheNewYorkStockExchange. Ouazzanihadbeenprovidinginformationandsupporttothisplot.TheFBIdisruptedandarrestedthese individuals.AlsoDavidHeadley,aU.S.citizenlivinginChicago.TheFBIreceivedintelligence regardinghispossibleinvolvementinthe2008Mumbaiattacksresponsibleforthekillingofover160 people.Also,NSAthrough702coverageofanAlQaidaaffiliatedterroristfoundthatHeadleywas workingonaplottobombaDanishnewspaperofficethathadpublishedthecartoondepictionsofthe ProphetMohammed.Infact,Headleylaterconfessedtopersonallyconductingsurveillanceofthe Danishnewspaperoffice.He,andhiscoconspiratorswereconvictedofthisplot. Lastly,theFBIhadopenedaninvestigationshortlyafter9/11.Wedidnothaveenoughinformation,nor didwefindlinkstoterrorismandthenweshortlythereafterclosedtheinvestigation.However,theNSA usingthebusinessrecordFISAtippedusoffthatthisindividualhadindirectcontactswithaknown terroristoverseas.Wewereabletoreopenthisinvestigation,identifyadditionalindividualsthrougha legalprocess,andwereabletodisruptthisterroristactivity.Thankyou.Backtoyou,General?
ALEXANDER:
Sothat'sfourcasestotalthatwe'veputoutpublicly.Whatwe'reintheprocessofdoingwiththe interagencyislookingatover50casesthatwereclassified,andwillremainclassified,thatwillbe providedtobothoftheIntelCommitteesoftheSenateandtheHouse,toallofyou.Those50cases rightnowhavebeenlookedatbytheFBI,CIAandotherpartnerswithinthecommunity,andthe NationalCounterterrorismCenterisvalidatingallofthepointssothatyouknowthatwhatwe'veputin thereisexactlyright.Ibelievethenumbersfromthosecasesissomethingthatwecanpubliclyreveal, andallpubliclytalkabout. Whatweareconcerned,asthechairmansaid,istogoingintomoredetailonhowwestoppedsomeof thesecases,asweareconcerneditwillgiveouradversariesawaytoworkaroundthose,andattack us,orourallies.Andthatwouldbeunacceptable.Ihaveconcernsthattheintentionalandirresponsible releaseofclassifiedinformationabouttheseprogramswillhavealong,andirreversibleimpactonour nation'ssecurity,andthatofourallies.Thisissignificant.IwanttoemphasizethattheForeign IntelligenceisthebesttheForeignIntelligenceProgramthatwe'retalkingabout,isthebest counterterrorismtoolsthatwehavetogoaftertheseguys. Wecan'tlosethosecapabilities.Oneoftheissuesthathasrepeatedlycomeup,wellhowdoyouthen protectcivillibertiesandprivacy?Whereistheoversight?Whatareyoudoingonthat?Wehavethe deputydirectoroftheNationalSecurityAgency,ChrisInglis,willnowtalkaboutthatandgiveyou somespecificsaboutwhatwedo,andhowwedoitwiththeseprograms.
INGLIS: 11
Thisauthoritydoesnot,therefore,allowthegovernmenttolisteninonanyone'stelephonecalls,even thatofaterrorist.Theinformationacquiredunderthecourtorderfromthetelecommunications providersdoesnotcontainthecontentofanycommunications,whatyouaresayingduringthecourseof theconversation,theidentitiesofthepeoplewhoaretalking,oranycellphonelocationalinformation. AsyoualsoknowthisprogramwasspecificallydevelopedtoallowtheU.S.governmenttodetect communicationsbetweenterroristsoperatingoutsidetheU.S.,whoarethemselvescommunicatingwith potentialoperativesinsidetheU.S.,agaphighlightedbytheattacksof9/11. ThecontrolsontheuseofthisdataatNSAarespecific,rigorous,anddesignedtoensurefocuson counterterrorism.Tothatend,themetadataacquiredandstoredunderthisprogrammaybequeried onlywhenthereisareasonablesuspicionbasedonspecificanddocumentedfactsthatanidentifier,like atelephonenumber,isassociatedwithspecificforeignterroristorganizations. Thisdeterminationisformallyreferredtoasthe"reasonablearticulablesuspicionstandard."Duringall 2012,the12monthsof2012,weatNSAapprovedfewerthan300uniquenumbers,whichwerethen usedtoinitiateaqueryofthisdataset. Thesecondprogram,authorizedunderSection702oftheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct, authorizestargetingonlyforcommunicationsofforeignerswhoarethemselvesnotwithintheUnited Statesforforeignintelligencepurposes,withthecompelledassistanceofanelectroniccommunications serviceprovider. AsInotedearlier,NSAbeingaforeignintelligenceagency,foreignintelligenceforusisinformation relatedtothecapabilities,intentions,oractivitiesofforeigngovernments,foreignorganizations,foreign persons,orinternationalterrorists.Letmebeveryclear.Section702cannotbeandisnotusedto intentionallytargetanyU.S.citizenoranyU.S.person,anypersonknowntobeintheUnitedStates,a personoutsidetheUnitedStatesifthepurposeistoacquireinformationfromapersoninsidetheUnited States.Wemaynotdoanyofthosethingsusingthisauthority. Theprogramisalsokeyinourcounterterrorismefforts,asyou'veheard.Morethan90percentofthe informationusedtosupportthe50disruptionsmentionedearlierwasgainedfromthisparticular authority.Again,ifyouwanttotargetthecontentofaU.S.personanywhereintheworld,youcannot usethisauthority.Youmustgetaspecificcourtwarrant. I'dliketonowdescribeinfurtherdetailssomeoftherigorousoversightforeachoftheseprograms. First,fortheSection215program,alsoreferredtoasbusinessrecordsFISA,controlsand(ph) determinehowwemanageandusethedataareexplicitlydefinedandformallyapprovedbytheForeign
12
IntelligenceSurveillanceCourt. First,themetadatasegregatedfromotherdatasetsheldbyNSAandallqueriesagainstthedatabase aredocumentedandaudited.Asdefinedintheordersofthecourt,only20analystsatNSAandtheir twomanagers,foratotalof22people,areauthorizedtoapprovenumbersthatmaybeusedtoquery thisdatabase.Allofthoseindividualsmustbetrainedinthespecificproceduresandstandardsthat pertaintothedeterminationofwhatismeantbyreasonable,articulablesuspicion. Every30days,NSAreportstothecourtthenumberofqueriesanddisseminationsmadeduringthat period.Every90days,theDepartmentofJusticesamplesallqueriesmadeacrosstheperiodand explicitlyreviewsthebasisforeveryU.S.person,oreveryU.S.identityquerymade.Again,wedonot knowthenamesoftheindividualsofthequerieswemightmake. Inaddition,onlysevenseniorofficialsatNSAmayauthorizethedisseminationofanyinformationwe believethatmightbeattributabletoaU.S.person.Again,wewouldnotknowthename.Itwouldonly bethetelephonenumber.AndthatdisseminationinthisprogramwouldonlybemadetotheFederal BureauofInvestigationatdeterminingthattheinformationisrelatedtoandnecessarytounderstanda counterterrorisminitiative. TheForeignIntelligenceSurveillancecourtreviewstheprogramevery90days.Thedatathatwehold mustbedestroyedwithinfiveyearsofitsacquisition.NSAandtheDepartmentofJusticebriefed oversightcommitteesontheemploymentoftheprogram.Weprovidewrittennotificationofall significantdevelopmentswithintheprogram.TheDepartmentofJusticeprovidesoversightcommittees withallsignificantforeignintelligencesurveillancecourts'opinionsregardingtheprogram. Turningmyattentiontothe702program,theForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourtannuallyreviews certification,whicharerequiredbylaw,thatarejointlysubmittedbytheattorneygeneralandthe directorofnationalintelligence.Thesecertificationsdefinethecategoriesofforeignactorsthatmaybe appropriatelytargetedand,bylaw,mustincludespecifictargetingandminimizationproceduresthatthe attorneygeneralandthecourtbothagreeareconsistentwiththelawandtheFourthAmendmentofthe Constitution.TheseproceduresrequirethatacommunicationoforconcerningaU.S.personmustbe promptlydestroyedafterit'sidentified,eitherasclearlynotrelevanttotheauthorizedpurpose,orasnot containingevidenceofacrime. Thestatutefurtherrequiresanumberofreportstobeprovidedtoboththecourtandtheoversight committees.AsemiannualassessmentbytheDepartmentofJusticeandtheOfficeoftheDirectorof NationalIntelligence,regardin(ph)compliancewiththetargetingandminimizationproceduresan annualI.G.assessmentthatreportscompliancewithproceduralrequirementslaidoutwithintheorder thenumberofdisseminationsthatmayrefertoU.S.persons,thenumberoftargetslaterfoundtobein theUnitedStates,andwhetherthecommunicationsofsuchtargetswereeverreviewed. AnannualdirectorofNSAreportisalsorequiredtodescribethecomplianceeffortstakenbyNSAand addressthenumberofU.S.personidentitiesdisseminatedinNSAreporting.Finally,Foreign IntelligenceSurveillanceCourtproceduresrequireNSAtoinformthecourtofanynovelissuesoflaw ortechnologyrelevanttoanauthorizedactivityandanynoncompliancetoincludetheExecutive Branch'splanforremedyingthatsameevent.InadditiontotheproceduresI'vejustdescribed,the DepartmentofJusticeconductsonsitereviewsatNSAtosampleNSA's702targetingandtasking
13
Sotowrapup,Chairman,firstI'dliketojusthitonwhenwesaysevenofficials,that'sseven positionsthatatNSAcandisseminateU.S.personsdata.Today,thereare10peopleinthose positions.OneofthoseisourSIGINToperationsofficer.Everyoneofthosehavetobe credentialed.ChrisandIaretwoofthoseofficials. Idowanttohitacoupleofkeypoints.First,withourindustrypartners,underthe702program,the U.S.governmentdoesnotunilaterallyobtaininformationfromtheserversofU.S.companies.Rather, theU.S.companiesarecompelledtoprovidetheserecordsbyU.S.law,usingmethodsthatareinstrict compliancewiththatlaw. Further,asthedeputyattorneygeneralnoted,virtuallyallcountrieshavelawfulinterceptprograms underwhichtheycompelcommunicationproviderstosharedataaboutindividualstheybelieve representathreattotheirsocieties.Communicationprovidersarerequiredtocomplywiththose programsinthecountriesinwhichtheyoperate.TheUnitedStatesisnotuniqueinthiscapability. TheU.S.,however,operatesitsprogramunderthestrictoversightandcomplianceregimethatwas notedabovewithcarefuloversightsbythecourts,Congress,andtheadministration.Inpractice,U.S. companieshaveputenergyandfocusandcommitmentintoconsistentlyprotectingtheprivacyoftheir customersaroundtheworld,whilemeetingtheirobligationsunderthelawsofU.S.andothercountries inwhichtheyoperate.AndIbelievetheytakethoseseriously. Ourthirdandfinalpoint,asAmericans,wevalueourprivacyandourlibertyourcivilliberties. AmericansasAmericans,wealsovalueoursecurityandoursafety.Inthe12yearssincetheattacks onSeptember11th,wehavelivedinrelativesafetyandsecurityasanation.Thatsecurityisadirect resultoftheintelligencecommunity'squieteffortstobetterconnectthedotsandlearnfromthemistakes thatpermittedthoseattackstooccuron9/11. Inthose12years,wehavethoughtlongandhardaboutoversightandcomplianceandhowweminimize theimpactonourfellowcitizens'privacy.Wehavecreatedandimplementedandcontinuetomonitor monitoracomprehensivemissioncomplianceprograminsideNSA.Thisprogram,whichwas developedbasedonindustrybestpracticesandcomplianceworkstokeepoperationsandtechnology alignedwithNSA'sexternallyapprovedprocedures. OutsideofNSA,theofficerofthetheOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence,Departmentof Justice,andtheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourtproviderobustoversightaswellasthis committee.Idobelievewehavethatbalanceright. Insummary,theseprogramsarecriticaltotheintelligencecommunity'sabilitytoprotectournationand ourallies'security.Theyassisttheintelligencecommunity'seffortstoconnectthedot.Second,these programsarelimited,focused,andsubjecttorigorousoversight.Theyhavedistinctpurposesand
14
Yes,Mr.Chairman,Mr.RankingMember,membersofthecommittee,Ijustwanttospeakverybriefly andaddressacoupleofadditionalmisconceptionsthatthepublichasbeenfedaboutsomeofthese programs. ThefirstisthatcollectionunderSection702oftheFISAAmendmentsActissomehowalooseningof traditionalstandardsbecauseitdoesn'trequireindividualizedwarrants.And,infact,exactlytheopposite isthecase.ThekindofcollectionthatisdoneunderSection702,whichiscollectingforeignintelligence informationforforeignersoutsideoftheUnitedStateshistoricallywasdonebytheexecutivebranch underitsownauthoritywithoutanykindofsupervisionwhatsoever. AndasaresultoftheFISAAmendmentsAct,thishasnowbeenbroughtunderajudicialprocesswith thekindofrestrictionsandlimitationsthathavebeendescribedbytheotherwitnesseshere.So,infact, thisisatighteningofstandardsfromwhattheywerebefore. ThesecondmisconceptionisthattheFISAcourtisarubberstampfortheexecutivebranch.And peoplepointtothefactthattheFISAcourtultimatelyapprovesalmosteveryapplicationthatthe governmentsubmitstoit. ButthisdoesnotrecognizetheactualprocessthatwegothroughwiththeFISAcourt.TheFISAcourt isjudges,federaldistrictjudgesappointedfromaroundthecountrywhotakethisoninadditiontotheir otherburdens.They'reallwidelyrespectedandexperiencedjudges.Andtheyhaveafulltime professionalstaffthatworksonlyonFISAmatters. WhenweprepareanapplicationforforaFISA,whetherit'sunderoneoftheseprogramsora traditionalFISA,wefirstsubmittothecourtwhat'scalleda"readcopy,"whichthecourtstaffwill reviewandcommenton. Andifandtheywillalmostinvariablycomebackwithquestions,concerns,problemsthattheysee. AndthereisaniterativeprocessbackandforthbetweenthegovernmentandtheFISAcourttotake careofthoseconcernssothatattheendoftheday,we'reconfidentthatwe'representingsomething thattheFISAcourtwillapprove.Thatishardlyarubberstamp.It'sratherextensiveandseriousjudicial oversightofthisprocess. Thethirdpoint,thethirdmisconceptionthatIwanttomakeisthattheprocesswehavehereisonethat simplyreliesontrustforindividualanalystsorindividualpeopleatNSAtoobeytherules. AndIjustIIwon'tgointodetailastotheoversight,becauseIthinkit'sbeenadequately describedbytheothers.Butthepointis,thereisamultilayeredlevelofoversight,firstwithinNSA,then involvingmyagency,theOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligenceandtheDepartmentofJustice andultimatelyinvolvingtheFISAcourtandtheCongresstoensurethattheserulesarecompliedwith.
15
AndthelastpointthatI'dthelastmisconceptionIwanttoaddressisthatthisinformationshouldn't havebeenclassifiedanditwasclassifiedonlytotoconcealitfromtheAmericanpeopleandthatthe leaksofthisinformationarenotdamaging. And,Mr.ChairmanandMr.RankingMember,youbothmadethispoint.Theseare,asGeneral Alexandersaid,extremelyimportantcollectionprogramstoprotectusnotonlyfromterrorists,butfrom otherthreatstoournationalsecurity,awidevariety. Andtheyhaveproducedahugeamountofvaluableintelligenceovertheyears.Wearenowfacedwith asituationthatbecausethisinformationhasbeenmadepublic,weruntheriskoflosingthesecollection capabilities.We'renotgonnaknowformanymonthswhethertheseleaksinfacthavecausedustolose thesecapabilities.Butififtheyiftheydohavethateffect,thereisnodoubtthattheywillcauseour nationalsecuritytobeaffected. Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
ROGERS:
Allright,andbutyouhavealsohadmilitaryservice.Isthatcorrect?
INGLIS:
Sir,Idid.Iservedforaperiodof13yearsonactivedutyintheUnitedStatesAirForce,andthen transitionedtotheNationalSecurityAgency.
ROGERS:
Soyourosetotherankofof?
INGLIS:
IwasbrigadiergeneralintheAirNationalGuard.Asinallthings,it'scomplicated. (CROSSTALK)
ROGERS:
Great.Well,thankyouforthatservice. Youmentionedin"queriesoflessthan300,"whatdoeswhatdoesthatmean?
INGLIS:
Well,describetheinquiryit'snotputyoudon'tputinaname?
INGLIS:
Wedonot,sir.
ROGERS:
Soyouputin... (CROSSTALK)
INGLIS:
Theonlythingwegetfromtheprovidersarenumbers.Theonlythingwecouldpossiblythenbounce againstthatdatasetarenumbers,themselves.
ROGERS:
Right.Sotherearenonamesandnoaddressesaffiliatedwiththesephonenumbers.
INGLIS:
No,therearenot,sir.
ROGERS:
OK.Justphonenumbers.
INGLIS:
That'sright,sir.
ROGERS:
OK.Goahead.
INGLIS: 17
Soananalystwouldthentrytodeterminewhethertherewasadescribable,itmustbewritten, documentationthatwouldsaythatthereisasuspicionthatthisisattributedtoaforeignterroristplotand theremightbeaU.S.nexus. Afterhavingmadethatdetermination,theywouldmakeafurtherchecktodeterminewhetheritis possibletodiscernthatthismightbeassociatedwithaU.S.person.Thewayyouwouldinferthatisyou mightlookattheareacodeandsaythatareacodecouldlikelybeintheUnitedStates.Weallknow thatwithinthisarea,thatifyouseeanareacodethatbeginswith301,thatwouldbeMaryland.That wouldbeyouronlyinsightintowhetherornotthismightbeattributabletoaU.S.person. Ifthatweretobethecase,thenthecaseforareasonable,articulablesuspiciousmustgetafurther reviewtoensurethatthisisnotasituationwheresomebodyismerelyexpressingtheirFirstAmendment rights. Ifthat'sallthatwas,iftheyweremerelyexpressingtheirFirstAmendmentrights,howeverobjectionable anypersonmightfindthat,thatisnotabasistoquerythedatabase. Ifitgetsthroughthosechecks,thenatthatpoint,itmustbeapprovedbyoneofthose20plustwo individuals20analysts,speciallytrainedanalysts,ortheirtwomanagerssuchthatitmightthenbe appliedasaqueryagainstthedataset.Again,thequeryitselfwouldjustbeanumber,andthequery againstthedatasetwouldthendeterminewhetherthatnumberexistsinthedatabase.That'showthat queryisformed.And,again... (CROSSTALK)
ROGERS:
Sotheresponseisnotanameit'sanaddress.It'saphonenumber.
INGLIS:
Itcannotbe.Ifitweretobeanameorifitweretobeanaddress,therewouldbenopossibilitythatthe databasewouldreturnanymeaningfulresults,sincenoneofthatinformationisinthedatabase.
ROGERS:
Justaphonenumberpopsbackup.
INGLIS:
Again,Ijustwanttomakeveryclear,therearenonamesandnoaddressesinthatdatabase.
INGLIS:
Therearenot,sir.
ROGERS:
OK.Andwhyonlylessthan300queriesofphonenumbersintothatdatabase?
18
INGLIS:
Arethosequeriesreportedtothecourt?
INGLIS:
Isthereacourtapprovedprocessinordertomakethatqueryintothatinformationofonlyphone numbers?
INGLIS:
Yes,sir.Thecourtexplicitlyapprovestheprocessbywhichthosedeterminationsweremade,andthe DepartmentofJusticeprovidesarichoversightauditingofthatcapability.
ROGERS:
Great.Thankyou. GeneralAlexander,istheNSAonprivatecompany'sserversasdefinedunderthesetwoprograms?
ALEXANDER:
Wearenot.
ROGERS:
IsistheNSAhavetheabilitytolistentoAmericans'phonecallsorreadtheiremailsunderthesetwo programs?
ALEXANDER:
No,wedonothavethatauthority.
ROGERS:
DoesthetechnologyexistattheNSAtoflipaswitchbysomeanalysttolistentoAmericans'phone
19
callsorreadtheiremails?
ALEXANDER:
No.
ROGERS:
SothetechnologydoesnotexistforanyindividualorgroupofindividualsattheNSAtoflipaswitchto listentoAmericans'phonecallsorreadtheiremails?
ALEXANDER:
Thatiscorrect.
ROGERS:
Investigatingterrorismisnotanexactscience.It'slikeamosaic.Andwetrytotakethesedisparate piecesandbringthemtogethertoformapicture.Therearemanydifferentpiecesofintelligence.We haveassets.Wehavephysicalsurveillance.Wehaveelectronicsurveillancethroughalegalprocess phonerecordsthroughadditionallegalprocessfinancialrecords. Also,theseprogramsthatwe'retalkingaboutheretoday,they'reallvaluablepiecestobringthatmosaic togetherandfigureouthowtheseindividualsareplottingtoattacktheUnitedStateshereorwhetherit's U.S.interestsoverseas. So,everydot,asGeneralAlexandermentioned,weheartheclichefrequentlyafter9/11about connectingthedots.Icantellyouasateam,andwiththecommitteeandwiththeAmericanpublic,we cometogethertoputallthosedotstogethertoformthatpicturetoallowustodisrupttheseactivities.
ROGERS:
inthebeginning,Iwouldbeconcerned,too.So,thisisveryimportantthatwegetthemessageoutto theAmericanpublicthatwhatwedoislegalandwe'redoingittoprotectournationalsecurityfrom attacksfromterrorists. Now,thereareoneareathat,Mr.Litt,youyouaddressedthisbutIthinkit'simportanttojust reemphasizetheFISAcourt.Youknow,again,it'sunfortunate,whenpeopledisagreewithyou,they attackyou.Theysaythingsthataren'ttrue.WeknowthatthesearefederaljudgesintheFISAcourt. Theyhaveintegrity,andthattheywillnotapproveanythingthattheyfeeliswrong.Wehave90day periodswherethecourtlooksatthisissue. Iwanttoaskyou,though,GeneralAlexander,doyoufeelinanywaythattheFISAcourtisa rubberstampbasedontheprocess?Ourforefatherscreatedagreatsystemofgovernment,andthat's checksandbalances.Andthat'swhatweare.That'swhatwedointhiscountrytofollowour Constitution.It'sunfortunatethatthesefederaljudgesarebeingattacked.
ALEXANDER:
Idonot.Ibelieve,asyouhavestated,thefederaljudgesonthatcourtaresuperb.Ournationwouldbe proudofwhattheydoandthewaytheygobackandforthtomakesurewedothisexactlyright. Andeverytimewemakeamistake,howtheyworkwithustomakesureitisdonecorrectlytoprotect ourcivillibertiesandprivacyandgothroughthecourtprocess.Theyhavebeenextremelyprofessional. Thereis,frommyperspective,norubberstamp. It'skindofinteresting.It'slikesayingyoujustrana26milemarathonsomebodysaid,"Well,thatwas justajog."Everytimeweworkwiththecourt,thedetailsandthespecificsofthatthatgofromusup throughtheFBI,throughtheDepartmentofJusticeandthroughthecourtoneachoneofthoseorders thatwegotothecourt.Thereistremendousoversight,complianceandwork.AndIthinkthecourthas doneasuperbjob. Moreimportantly,ifIcould,whatweworkedhardtodoistobringallofthesealltheseundercourt supervisionforjustthisreason.Imean,we'vedonetherightthing,Ithink,forourcountryhere. Thankyou.
RUPPERSBERGER:
So,thisisaverydifficultquestion,especiallywhenthatpersonisasystemadministratorandtheyget
21
greataccess...
RUPPERSBERGER:
Whydon'tyousaywhatasystemadministratoris?
ALEXANDER:
OK.Thankyou. Iyieldback.
ROGERS:
(OFFMIKE)
THORNBERRY:
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Andthankyouallforbeinghere,andformakingsomeadditionalinformationavailabletothepublic.I knowit'sfrustratingforyou,asitisforus,tohavethesetargetednarrowleaksandnotbeabletotalk aboutthebiggerpicture. GeneralAlexander,youmentionedthatyou'regoingtosendustomorrow50casesthathavebeen stoppedbecauseoftheseprograms,basically.Fourhavebeenmadepublictothispoint.AndIthink therearetwonewonesthatyouaretalkingabouttoday.ButIwouldinviteyoutoexplaintousbothof thosetwonewcasesMowlin(ph)andtheOperationWiFicase.Andoneofthemstartswitha215 oneofthemstartswitha702. AndsoIthinkit'simportantforyoutoprovidetheinformationabouthowtheseprogramsstopped thoseterroristattacks.
ALEXANDER:
OK.I'mgoingtodeferthis,becausetheactualguyswhoactuallydoalltheworkand(inaudible)isthe FBI,andgetitexactlyright.I'mgoingtohaveSeandothat.Goahead,Sean.
JOYCE:
Thatisabsolutelycorrect.Andifyourecall,under702,ithastobeanonU.S.personoutsidethe UnitedStates,andthenalsooneofthecriteriaislinkedtoterrorism.
THORNBERRY:
OK.WouldyousaythatthistheirintentiontoblowuptheNewYorkStockExchangewasaserious plot?Oristhissomethingthattheykindofdreamedabout,youknow,talkingamongtheirbuddies?
JOYCE:
Ithinkthejuryconsidereditserious,sincetheywereallconvicted.
THORNBERRY:
OK.Andandwhatabouttheotherplot?October,2007,thatstartedIthinkwitha215?
JOYCE:
I'msorry.Repeatformeagainwhattheywereplottingtodo.
JOYCE:
Heasactuallyhewasprovidingfinancialsupporttoanoverseasterroristgroupthatwasadesignated terroristgroupbytheUnitedStates.
THORNBERRY:
Buttherewassomeconnectiontosuicidebombingsthattheyweretalkingabout,correct?
23
JOYCE:
NotintheexamplethatI'mcitingrighthere.
THORNBERRY:
Oh,I'msorry,thegroupinSomaliatowhichhewasfinancing,that'swhattheythat'swhattheydodo inSomalia,correct?
JOYCE:
Thatiscorrect,andasyouknow,aspartofourclassifiedhearingsregardingtheAmericanpresencein inthatareaoftheworld.
THORNBERRY:
OK.OK,thankyou. Chairman(OFFMIKE)
ALEXANDER:
IfIcould,Congressman,justjusthitacouplekeypoints.It'sover50cases.AndthereasonI'mnot givingaspecificnumberiswewanttherestofthecommunitytoactuallybeefthoseupandmakesure that(inaudible)wehavethereisexactlyright.I'dgiveyouthenumber50X.Butifsomebodysays, "Well,notthisone."Actually,whatwe'refindingoutistherearemore.Theysaid,"Youmissedthese threeorfour."Sothosearebeingaddedtothepacket. Onthetopofthatpacketwe'llhaveasummaryofallofthese,thelistingofthose.Ibelievethose numbersarethingsthatwecanmakepublic,thatyoucanuse,thatwecanuse.Andwe'lltrytogiveyou thenumbersthatapplytoEurope,aswell,aswellasthosethathadanexusintheUnitedStates. Theissueontermsofreleasingmoreonthespecificoverseascasesis(inaudible)ourit'sourconcern thatinsomeofthosenow,goingintofurtherdetailsofexactlywhatwedidandhowwediditmay preventusfromdisruptingafutureplot. Sothat'ssomethingthatworkinprogress.Ourintentistogetthattothecommitteetomorrowforboth bothIntelCommitteesfortheSenateandHouse.
THORNBERRY:
Great.Thankyou.
ROGERS:
Mr.Thompson?
THOMPSON:
Ibelievetheanswertothatisyes,butIwoulddeferthattothedeputyattorneygeneral.
COLE:
Ithashappened.It'snotoften,butitdoeshappen.
THOMPSON:
Thankyou. Mr.Cole,whatkindsofrecordscomprisethedatacollectedunderthebusinessrecordsprovision?
COLE:
Haveyoupreviouslycollectedanythingelseunderthatauthority?
COLE:
Underthe215authority?
THOMPSON:
Correct.
COLE:
I'mnotsurebeyondthe215andthe702thatansweringaboutwhatwehaveandhaven'tcollected hasbeendeclassifiedtobetalkedabout.
THOMPSON:
That'scorrect.
THOMPSON:
Andandthereactuallyhasbeendatathathasbeeninadvertentlycollectedanditwasdestroyed, nothingelsewasdonewithit?
COLE:
That'scorrect.Thethisisaverystrictprocessthatwegothroughinthatregard.Youcangeta wrongdigitonaphonenumberandyoucollectthewrongnumber,somethinglikethat.Andwhenthat's
25
discovered,that'stakencareofinthatway.
THOMPSON:
Andwhodoesthechecking?Whowhodeterminesifsomethinghasbeeninadvertentlycollectedand thendecidesthatit'sneedstobedestroyed?
COLE:
Ihavenoidea.
THOMPSON:
Anybodyelse?
ALEXANDER:
I'mnotsureIunderstandthecontextofthespecialimmunity.
THOMPSON:
IIdon'teither.That'swhy... (CROSSTALK)
ALEXANDER:
Wetreatyouwithspecialrespect. (LAUGHTER)
THOMPSON:
Hesaidwitha"specialimmunitytoitssurveillance."
ALEXANDER:
Didyouwanttoaddtothat?
INGLIS(?):
No,IwouldsimplyhavesaidthatyourstatusasU.S.personsgivesyouaspecialstatus,aswe've describedthroughoutthishearing.
THOMPSON:
Yes,thatisaccurate.Withoutthe702toolwewouldnothaveidentifiedNajibullahZazi.
THOMPSON:
Thankyou.Ihavenofurtherquestion. Iyieldbackthebalanceofmytime.
ROGERS:
Mr.Miller?
MILLER:
Well,it'sactuallybusinessrecords,FISA,it'stheFBI(inaudible). Goahead.
JOYCE:
TheFBIispartoftheprocess.ItthengoesovertotheDepartmentofJustice.Andtheyaretheones iftheDAGwantstocommentonthat.
COLE:
Thecourtisasinglejudge?
COLE: 27
Iguessthecruxofmyquestionis,wouldtherebeawaythatifyoudidnotgettheanswerthatyou wantedfromacertainjudgecouldyougotoanotherFISAcourtjudgeandaskforanotheropinion?
COLE:
LITT:
Thankyou.Iyieldback.
ROGERS:
Ms.Schakowsky?
SCHAKOWSKY:
ThankyouMr.Chairman.GeneralAlexander,doyoufeelthatthisopenhearingtodayjeopardizesin anywayournationalsecurity?
ALEXANDER:
HowmanypeoplewereinthesamepositionasSnowdenwas,asasystemsmanagertohaveaccessto thisinformationthatcouldbedamagingifreleased?
ALEXANDER:
Howmanyofthoseareoutsidecontractors,ratherthan...
ALEXANDER:
ALEXANDER:
Well,we'reactuallycountingallofthosepositions.I'llgetyouanaccuratenumber.
SCHAKOWSKY:
Well,I'mgoingtoreferthatovertoMr.LittbecausetheclassifyingauthorityonthatwouldbeDNI.
LITT:
Asyoumayknow,wehavebeenworkingforsometimeontryingtodeclassifyopinionsoftheFISA court.It'sbeenaverydifficulttask,becauselikemostlegalopinions,youhavefactsintermingledwith legaldiscussion.Andthefactsfrequentlyinvolveclassifiedinformation,sensitivesourcesandmethods. Andwhatwe'vebeendiscoveringisthatwhenyouremovealloftheinformationthatneedstobe classified,you'releftwithsomethingthatlookslikeSwisscheese,andisnotreallyverycomprehensible. Havingsaidthat,IthinkasasGeneralAlexandersaid,there'sinformationoutinthepublicdomain now.There'sthedirectorofnationalintelligencedeclassifiedcertaininformationabouttheseprograms lastweek. Andasaresultofthat,wearegoingback,takinganotherlookattheseopinionstoseewhether,inlight ofthatdeclassification,there'snowwecanmakeamorecomprehensiblereleaseoftheopinion.So theanswertothatis,wearelookingatthatandandfranklywewouldliketoreleaseittothepublic domain,asmuchofthisaswecan,withoutcompromisingnationalsecurity.
SCHAKOWSKY:
IthinkGeneralAlexander,sowhatothertypesofofrecordsarecollectedunderthisSection215? Cancanyoutalkaboutthatatall?
ALEXANDER:
Yeah,forNSAtheonlytheonlyrecordsthatarecollectedunderbusinessrecords215isthis telephonydata.That'sall.
SCHAKOWSKY:
Andisthereauthorizationtocollectmore?
ALEXANDER:
Under215forus?No,thisistheonlythatwedo.Nowitgetsintootherauthorities,butit'snotours. AndIdon'tnowiftheI'llpassthattotheattorneygeneralbecauseyou'reaskingmenowoutsideof
30
NSA.
COLE:
Whataboutemails?
COLE:
ThankyouMr.Chairman.
ALEXANDER:
Thankyou.Iyieldback.
CONAWAY:
Isthereaaninternalcontrolaudit,sotospeakthatlooksattheentiresystemthatsays,we'vegotthe waterfrontcovered?Andwe'redoingwhatweneedtodo?
COLE:
Andthatpersonwouldhavetherequisiteclearancestoknowallthedetails? (CROSSTALK)
LITT:
Andwhowhodotheyreportto?Isthatreportpublic?
LITT:
It'sthepresident'sboard.Isuspectthattotheextentthey'remakingaclassifiedreport,itwouldnotbe
32
public.Totheextentthattheycanmakeanunclassifiedreport,it'suptothemwhetherornotitbecomes public.
CONAWAY:
OK.Andit'smechanicallyoverwrittenandallofthebackupcopiesofthataredoneawaywith,and...
INGLIS:
Yes,sir.
CONAWAY:
OK.
INGLIS:
NotthatI'mawareofrightnow.But,obviously,thecourtsaresufferingundersequestration,like
33
everybodyelse.SoIdon'tknowwhat'sgonnahitthemaswegoforward.
CONAWAY:
Thankyou,sir, Iyieldback.
ROGERS:
Mr.Conaway. Mr.Langevin?
LANGEVIN:
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Andgentlemen,Iwanttothankyouallforyourtestimonyheretodayandforyourservicetoourour country. I'masmembersofthecommittee,Ihavebeenbriefedontheprogram,andandIknowtheexcess ofduediligenceyou'vegonethroughtomakesurethatthisisdoneright. SoIthinkit'simportantthatthisdiscussionisbeinghadthismorning.Andhopefullyit'sgonnagive greaterconfidencetotheAmericanpeoplethatalltheagenciesinvolvedhavedottedtheiri'sand crossedtheirt's. Iespeciallythinkit'shelpfulthatwehavethediscussionabouttheFISAcourttodayandandhow detailedthetherequestshavetobebeforetheygetapprovalandit'smadeclearthatthesearenot justonepagedocumentsthatarepresentedtoaFISAjudgeandthenit'srubberstamped. Itactuallygoesthroughexcessiveduediligence,andandbeforeitevengetstothepointwherethe judgeseesit.And,obviously,iftheifallthecriteriahavebeenmet,thenitgetsitgetsapproved, andifit'sifthecriteriahavenotbeenmet,it'sgonnaberejected. So,Iwon'tbelaborthatpoint,exceptingthat'sbeenhadbeenaveryfruitfuldiscussion. ButcanyoutalkfurtherabouttheagaintheroleoftheI.G.andgointothatthatthatprocessa littlemoresothatthetheamountofreviewtheI.G.does,onceaqueryhasbeenmadeintermsofthe rangeofqueriesthathavebeenmade,Ithinkthat'swouldbeimportanttoclarify.
INGLIS:
OK.
COLE(?):
SosoIthinkeithermaybeImisspokeororyoumisspoke.Wewewearenotlookingat allatU.S.persons.The702isanyoneoutsidetheUnitedStates.AndevenifaU.S.personisoutside oftheUnitedStates,itdoesnotincludeitinthe702coverage. OK,soit'sanonU.S.personoutsidetheUnitedStates,andithastohavethere'sthreedifferent criteriaitgoesthrough.Oneofthoselinksisterrorism.Sothatiswherespecificallyonlycertain individualsaretargeted.Thoseones,oneofthecriteria,linkedtoterrorism. Onnumerousoccasions,asI'veoutlinedinsomeoftheexamples,thoseindividualsoutsidetheUnited StateswerediscoveredcommunicatingwithsomeoneinsidetheUnitedStates. Wethenthatis,beingtippedfromtheNSA.Wethengothroughthelegalprocesshere,theFBI does,regardingthatU.S.person.Sowegoandwehavetoservewhat'scalledanationalsecurityletter toidentifythesubscriber.It'smuchlikeasubpoena. Followingthat,ifwewanttopursueelectronicsurveillance,wehavetomakeaspecificapplication
35
regardingthatpersonwiththeFISAcourthere.
LANGEVIN:
OK.Thankyou.
ROGERS:
That'sanimportantpointwecan'tmakeenough. Mr.Lobiondo?
LOBIONDO:
So,under702,IthinkthebestcaseissomethatSeanJoycemade.Ifwesee,ifwe'retrackingaknown terroristinanothercountry,sayPakistan,Yemenorsomeplace,andweseethemcommunicatingwith someoneintheUnitedStates,andithasaterrorismnexus,focusedondoingsomethingintheUnited States,wetipthattotheFBI. Soourjobistoidentify,seethenexusofit.Itcouldbeinanothercountryaswell.Sosometimes,we'd seesomebodyinthatoneofthosecountriesplanningsomethinginEuropeorelsewhere.Wewould thensharethatthroughintelligencemeetingstothosecountries. ButwhenitcomesintotheUnitedStates,ourjobends.We'retheoutsideandweprovidethattothe insideFBItotakeitfromthere.Sothey,then,takeitandsay,"Doesthismakesense?"They'llgoup,as Seanexplained,lookattheprocessforgettingadditionalinformationtoseeifthisisaleadworth following.
LOBIONDO: 36
AndwhatdoesthegovernmenthavetodoifitwantstotargetaU.S.personunderFISAwhenthey're locatedabroadwhenthey'renothere?Whatwhatwouldbetheprocessforthegovernment?
COLE:
Andwhatifyou... (CROSSTALK)
INGLIS:
And,sir,ifImight.Andagain,thatcouldnotbedoneunder702.There'saseparatesectionofthe ForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActthatwouldallowthat,butitwouldnotbedoableunder702.
LOBIONDO:
Andandwhatifyouwanttomonitorsomeone'scommunicationintheUnitedStates?
COLE:
So,Ijustwanttoreemphasizethat.YouyouhavetospecificallygototheFISAcourtandmake yourcaseastowhythisinformationisnecessarytobeaccessed.
COLE:
That'scorrect.
LOBIONDO:
Andwithoutthat,youhavenoauthorityandcannotdoitanddonotdoit.
COLE:
That'scorrect.
LOBIONDO:
OK.Thankyou. Iyieldback,Mr.Chairman.
ROGERS: 37
Great.Thankyouverymuch. Mr.Schiff?
SCHIFF:
Anddoesthecourtscrutinizeafteryoupresentbacktothecourt,"thesearetheoccasionswherewe foundreasonablearticulablefacts,"dotheyscrutinizeyourbasisforconductingthosequeries?
COLE:
Yes,theydo.
SCHIFF:
Soitmaybesomethinglikethatthatwe'dbringbackandlookat.Sowearegoingtolookatthat.And wehavealreadycommittedtodoingthatandwewilldothat,andgothroughallthedetailsofthat.
SCHIFF:
AndIwouldjustencourageinthelastsecondthatbeyondthetwoprogramsatissuehere,tothedegree youcandeclassifyotherFISAcourtopinions,Ithinkit'sinthepublicinterest.
39
LITT:
Yes,Ithinkthat'spartofwhatwe'redoing.
SCHIFF:
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
COLE:
Doyouhaveafollowup?
SCHIFF:
It'smorethelattertheaggregatenumberwherewe'vemadeaquery.Andifthere'sanyproblemsthat havebeendiscovered,thenwewithspecificityreporttothecourtthoseproblems.
SCHIFF:
Itmaybeworthconsideringprovidingthebasisofthereasonableandarticulablefactsandhavingthe courtreviewthatasaasafurthercheckandbalance.I'djustmakethatsuggestion.
ROGERS:
Mr.Cole,myunderstanding,though,isthateveryaccessisalreadypreapprovedthatthewayyouget intothesystemiscourtapproved.Isthatcorrect?
COLE:
Andandjusttobeclear,soiftheydon'tfollowthecourtapprovedprocess,thatwouldbea
40
variation,thatwouldhavetobereportedtothecourt?
COLE:
That'scorrect.
ROGERS:
OK.Butyouaremeetingthecourtapprovedprocesswitheveryquery?
COLE:
That'scorrect.
INGLIS:
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Mr.Cole,reallywhat'shappenedhereisthatthetotalityofmanyproblemswithintheexecutivebranch hasnowtarnishedthefinefolksattheNSAandtheCIA.AndIjustmadeashortlisthere,but,you know,rightafterBenghazitherewasthere'sliesafterBenghazi,fourdeadAmericans.Fastand Furious,theCongressstillismissingdocuments.WehavedeadAmericansanddeadMexicancitizens. YouatleasttappedintoorgotphonerecordsfromAPreporters,FoxNewsreporters,includingfrom theHouseGalleryrightherewithinthisbuilding. Lastweek,asyouknow,A.G.HolderhasbeenisbeingaccusedbytheJudiciaryCommitteeof possiblylyingtothecommittee. Andthentotopitalloff,youhave,youknow,anIRSofficialwhowithotherofficialsranlikeacovert mediaoperationonaFridaytohelp,youknow,trytoreleasedocumentstothinkthatthiswouldjustgo awayaboutthereleaseofpersonaldatafromU.S.citizensfromtheIRS. Sonowyouknow,Iunderstandwhenmyconstituentsaskme,"Well,iftheIRSisleakingpersonal data"GeneralAlexander,thisquestion'sforyou"howdoIknowforsurethattheNSAandthe and(inaudible)peoplethataretryingtoprotectthiscountryaren'tleakingdata?" SoMr.Mr.Rogersaskedthequestionabout,youknow,howdoweknowthatthatsomeone fromtheWhiteHousejustcan'tgoturnaswitchandbegintolistentotheirphoneconversations?
41
Thankyou,Congressman. Ithinkthekeythekeyfactshere.Whenwedisseminatedata,everythingthatwedisseminateandall thequeriesthataremadeintothedatabaseare100percentauditable.Sotheyareauditedbynotonly theanalystswho'sactuallydoingthejobbuttheoverseersthatlookandsee,didhedothatrightorshe dothatright. Ineverycasethatwehaveseensofarwehavenotseenoneofouranalystswillfullydosomething wronglikewhatyouyoujustsaid.That'swheredisciplinaryactionwouldcomein. WhatIhavetooverwriteunderwriteiswhensomebodymakesanhonestmistake.Thesearegood people.Iftheytransposetwolettersintypingsomethingin,that'sanhonestmistake.Wegobackand say,nowhowcanwefixit?Thetechnicalcontrolsthatyoucanseethatwe'readdinginhelpfixthat. Butisitisourintenttodothisexactlyright. Inthat,oneofthethingsthatwehaveistremendoustrainingprogramsforourpeoplethattheygo through.HowtoprotectU.S.personsdata?HowtointerfacewiththebusinessrecordFISA?The rolesandresponsibilitiesunderFAA702.Everyone,includingmyself,atNSAhastogothroughthat trainingtoensurethatwedoitright. Andwetakethatveryseriously.Ibelievethebestintheworldat(ph)termsofprotectingourprivacy. AndIwouldjusttellyou,youknow,theotherthingthat'ssometimesconfusedhereisthat,"Well,then they'regettingeverybodyelseintheworld."Butourourapproachisforeignintelligenceyouknow, it'sthesamethinginEurope.We'renotinterestedininwell,one,wedon'thavethetime.And, two,oursistoprotectourcountryandourallies.Ithinkwedothatbetterthananyoneelse. Now,Chris,anythingifyouwanttoaddtothat?
INGLIS:
nationalsecurity.Canyougointoafewofthosespecifics?
JOYCE:
General?
ALEXANDER:
Sothetobeclear,Snowdendidnothavethecertificatesnecessarilynecessarytoleadthatpublic forum?
ALEXANDER:
Absolutely.
ALEXANDER:
...expectus.Sothat'swhereIneedtoreallyjointhatdebateonthissidetomakesurethatwhatwedo isexactlyright.Ithinkonthingslikehowweminimizedata,howwerunthisprogram,thethosekinds ofthings,Ithinkwecanwewe'retryingtobethat'swhyChriswentthroughthosegreatdetails. IthinkthosearethingsthattheAmericanpeopleshouldknow.Becausewhattheyfindoutisshoot, lookattheoversight,thecompliance,andthetrainingthatarepeoplearegoingthrough.Thisishuge. Thisisn'tsomerogueoperationthatagroupofguysupatNSAarerunning.Thisissomethingthathave oversightbythecommittees,thecourts,theadministrationina100percentauditableprocessona businessrecordFISA. Youknow,that'sextraordinaryoversight.AndIthinkwhentheAmericanpeoplelookatthat,theysay, "Wow,forlessthan300selectors,thatamountofoversight"andthat'swhatwejointlyagreedtodo. Ithinkthat'stremendous.
SEWELL:
Samelevelofsecurityclearanceandthesameprocessforsecuringthem.
45
SEWELL:
OK. Thankyou.Iyieldbacktherestofmytime.
ROGERS:
Thankyou. Mr.Westmoreland.
WESTMORELAND:
Numberone,thatwasnotaFISAcourt.IntheRosencase,therewerenophonesbeingtapped.Itwas justtoacquireacoupleofemails.Andthereisavery,veryrobustsystem.It'ssetoutinregulationsthat theDepartmentofJusticefollowsofthekindsofscrubbingandreviewthatmustbedonebeforeany subpoenalikethatcanbeissued. Youhavetomakesurethatyou'veexhaustedallotherreasonableavenuesofinvestigationthatthat's donebeforeyouevengettothedecisionaboutwhetherornotsuchaaprocessshouldbeused.You havetomakesurethattheinformationyou'relookingatisvery,verytailoredandonlynecessarytruly necessarytobeabletomovetheinvestigationforwardinasignificantway. Therehastherearerestrictionsonwhatcanbedonewiththeinformation.Anditgoesthroughavery longprocessofreviewfromtheU.S.attorney'sofficethroughtheUnitedStatesattorneyhimorherself, intothe,usually,thecriminaldivisionoftheJusticeDepartment,throughtheassistantattorneygeneralof thecriminaldivision,throughthedeputyattorneygeneral'sofficeandup,ultimately,totheattorney generalsigningit.Itgetsalotofreviewbeforethat'sdoneunderthecriteriathatwehaveinour guidelinesandourCFR.
WESTMORELAND:
SosotheDOJdidn'tbecause(inaudible)asecurityleak,theDOJdidn'tcontacttheFBIorthe NSA,ortherewasnocoordinationwiththat?ItwasstrictlyaDOJcriminalinvestigation?
COLE:
Well,theFBIdoescriminalinvestigationwith...
WESTMORELAND:
Iunderstand.
COLE: 46
...theDepartmentofJustice.Andtheywerecontactedinthatregard.ButitwasnotpartoftheFISA process.ItdidnotinvolvetheNSA.
WESTMORELAND:
AndIthinkthat'swhatweneedtobeclearof,is...
COLE:
Correct.
WESTMORELAND:
...thatitwasabsolutelynotpartoftheFISAprocess.Andthatisalotmoredetailedandalotmore scrutinizedasfarasgettinginformationthanwhatthiswas.Isthatcorrect?
COLE:
Well,they'rebothverydetailedandveryscrutinizedprocesses.They'retheyhavedifferentaspectsto them.Butthey'rebothveryunusually,frankly,detailedandscrutinized,bothofthoseprocesses.
WESTMORELAND:
Sowouldhehavebeenfamiliarwiththeseprogramsathispreviousjob?
ALEXANDER:
Mr.Westmoreland,ifIjustmight...
WESTMORELAND:
Yes?
LITT:
Thankyou.Iyieldback.
HIMES:
ThankyouMr.ChairmanandItoowouldliketothankthepanelforappearingheretodayandforyour servicetothecountry.IthinkI'vetoldeachofyouthatinmylimitedtimeonthiscommittee,I'vebeen heartenedbyyourcompetence,andbythecompetenceoftheagenciesinwhichyouwork.I'llalsoadd thatI'veseennothinginthelastweek,weekandahalftosuggestthatanyoftheseprogramsthatare beingdiscussed,areoperatinginanywayoutsidethelaw.AndIwouldaddthatthecontrolsthat appeartobeinplaceontheseprogramsseemseemsolid.I'llalsosaythatIdon'tknowthatthere's anywaytodooversightwithoutapostureofskepticismonthepartoftheoverseers. AndsoIhopeyou'lltakemyobservationsandquestionsinthatspirit.AndI'dliketolimitmyquestions andobservationspurelytoSection215andtheVerizondisclosures,whichquitefrankly,troubleme. Theytroublemebecauseofthebreadthandthescopeoftheinformationcollection.Theytroubleme becauseIthinkthisishistoricallyunprecedentedintheextentofthedatathatisbeingcollectedon potentiallyallAmericancitizens.Andthecontrolswhichyou'velaidoutforus,notwithstanding,Ithink new(sic)forthiscountry.Weknowthatwhenacapabilityexists,there'sapotentialforabuse.Mr. NunesranthroughalotofcurrentissuesgoingbacktoJ.EdgarHooverbuggingthehotelroomsof MartinLutherKing,toNixon,toconcernsaroundtheIRS. Ifacapabilityexists,fromtimetotimeitwillbeabused.AndoneofthethingsthatI'mconcernedabout isthisindividualwhoIwho'sresumewouldIthinkmakehimmakeitunlikelythathewouldgetan unpaidinternshipinmyoffice,hehadaccesstosomeofthemostsensitiveinformationthatwehave. Andperhapshecouldhave,orsomeonelikehim,couldhavechosenadifferentpath.Couldhave accessedphonenumbersandthoughwespentalotoftimeonthefactthatyoudon'tgetnames,we allknowthatwithaphonenumberandGoogle,youcangetanameprettyquickly.
48
HecouldhavechosentomakeapointaboutCongressmanHimesmaking2:00amphonecallsoutofa barinWashington.OrtheCEOofGooglemakingphonecalls.Oranythingreally.Informationthatwe holdtobeprivate.SoIguessI'vegottwoquestions.IguessIdirectthisoneon215toMr.Littand thenMr.Cole.Wheredowedrawtheline?Soinotherwords,solongastheinformationisnot informationtowhichIhaveareasonableexpectationofprivacyunderMarylandv.Smithandunder Section215powers,wheredowedrawtheline? Couldyou,forexamplehavevideodata?AsIwalkaroundWashingtonmyIsupposethatyoucould probablyreconstructmydaywithvideothatiscapturedonthirdpartycameras.Couldyoukeepthatin awaythatisanalogoustowhatyou'redoingwithphonenumbers?Andagainwithallofthecareful guardsandwhatnot,couldyounotreconstructmydaybecauseIdon'thaveareasonableexpectation ofprivacyaroundIknowthat'sahypothetical,butI'mtryingtoidentifywherethelineis?
COLE:
Well,Ithinkthetherealissuehereishowit'saccessed?Whatitcanbeusedfor?Howyoucan actually...
HIMES:
III'mstipulatingthatthatsystem,eventhoughweknowit'snotperfect,I'mstipulatingthatthat systemisperfect.AndI'masking,whereisthelimitastowhatyoucankeepinthetank?
COLE:
IIthinksomeofitisamatterfortheUnitedStatesCongresstodecideaspolicymatters,andthe legislatingthatyoudosurroundingtheseacts,astowhereyou'regoingtodrawthoselines.Certainlythe courtshavelookedatthisanddeterminedthatunderthestatuteswehave,thereisarelevance requirement,andthey'renotjustsayingoutofwholeclothyou'reallowedtogatherthesethings.You havetolookatitalltogether.Andthey'reonlysayingthatyoucangatherthisvolumeunderthese circumstances,undertheserestrictions,withthesecontrols.Withoutthosecircumstancesandcontrols andrestrictions,thecourtmaywellnothaveapprovedtheordersunder215toallowthatcollectionto takeplace. Soyoucan'tseparatethatout,onefromtheotherandsay,justtheacquisition,whatcanwedo? Becausetheacquisitioncomestogetherwiththerestrictionsonaccess.
HIMES:
Andifthoserestrictionsandcontrolsareadequate,there'stheoreticallynorestrictiononyourabilityto storeinformationonanythingforwhichIdonothavethereasonableexpectationforprivacy?
COLE:
I'llreferbacktoNSA... (CROSSTALK)
HIMES:
Letme... (CROSSTALK)
49
HIMES:
...Idohaveonemorequestion. (CROSSTALK)
HIMES:
Yeah,thisistheconversationIdohaveonemoremuchmore...
ALEXANDER:
CanI...
HIMES:
...specificquestion.
ALEXANDER:
...canIhit...
HIMES:
Yeah.
ALEXANDER:
...ifIcould.I'llaskformoretimeifIcould,becauseIdothinkwhatyou'veaskedisveryimportant.So yourquestionis,couldsomebodygetoutandgetyourphonenumberandseethatyouwereatabar lastnight?Theanswerisno.Becausefirstinoursystem,somebodywouldhavehadtoapprove,and there'sonly22peoplethatcanapprove,areasonablearticulablesuspiciononaphonenumber.Sofirst, thathastogetinput.Onlythosephonenumbersthatareapprovedcouldthenbequeried.Andsoyou havetohaveoneofthose22breakalaw.Thenyouhavetohavesomebodygoinandbreakalaw. Andthesystemis100percentauditable,soitwillbecaught. Thereisnowaytochangethat.Andsoonthatsystem,whoeverdidthatwouldhavebrokenthelaw. Thatwouldbewillful.Andthenthatpersonwouldbefoundbythecourttobeinviolationofacourt order,andthat'smuchmoreserious.Wehaveneverhadthathappen.
HIMES:
Yeah.No,IIthankyou.Iappreciatethat,andIIsortofIthinkit'sreallyimportanttoexplore thesethesebrightlinesaboutwhatyoucankeepandwhatyoucan't.Again,Idon'tseeanything aboutthecontrolsystemsthataretroubling,butIdohaveonelastquickquestionifthechairmanwill indulgemein.General,thisisIguessforyouandit'sit'ssomethingthatIaskedyouinclosedsession. Asweweighthis,becauseobviouslywe'reweighingsecurityagainstprivacyandwhatnot,asweweigh this,Ithinkit'sreallyimportantthatweunderstandexactlythenationalsecuritybenefit.AndIlimit myselfto215here. 50episodes.Idon'tthinkit'sadequatetosaythat702and215authoritiescontributedtoourpreventing 50episodes.Ithinkit'sreallyessentialthatyougradetheimportanceofthatcontribution.ThequestionI askedyou,andandyoucananswernow,orI'dreallyliketogetintothis.Howmanyofthose50 episodeswouldhaveoccurred,butforyourabilitytousetheSection215authoritiesasdisclosedinthe Verizonsituation?Howessential,notjustcontributingto,buthowessentialaretheseauthoritiesto
50
stoppingwhichterroristattacks?
ALEXANDER:
OK.Forclarityover50.Andin90percentofthosecasesFAA702contributed,andin50percentI believetheywerecritical.Wewillsendthattothecommittee.
HIMES:
Thisis702you'retalkingabout?
ALEXANDER:
Thisis702.
HIMES:
OK.
ALEXANDER:
Now,shiftingtothebusinessrecordFISA,andI'lldoaMuttandJeffhere,I'mnotsurewhichoneI am.There'sjustover10thathadadomestic.Andthevastmajority...
HIMES:
10ofthe50weresection...
ALEXANDER:
Justover10. (CROSSTALK)
HIMES:
Andhowmanywouldyousaywerecritical.
ALEXANDER:
No.No,you're...
HIMES:
I'msorry.
ALEXANDER:
...letmefinish.
HIMES:
DidIgetitwrong?
ALEXANDER:
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
ROGERS:
(OFFMIKE)
BACHMANN:
Thatistrue.It'sdestroyedwhenitreachesfiveyearsofage.
BACHMANN:
Andhowlongdothephonecompaniesontheirownmaintaindata?
INGLIS:
No,thesearecourtordersthatrequiretheircompliancewiththetermsofthecourtorder.
BACHMANN:
Soletmejustfortherecordstate,isNSAspyingtodayorhaveyouspiedonAmericancitizens?
INGLIS:
WewedonottargetU.S.personsanywhereintheworldwithoutaspecificcourtwarrant.
BACHMANN:
AnddoestheNSAlistentothephonecallsofAmericancitizens?
INGLIS:
WedonottargetorlistentothetelephonecallsofU.S.personsunderthattargetingwithoutaspecific courtwarrant.
BACHMANN:
DoestheNSAreadtheemailsofAmericancitizens?
INGLIS:
Sameanswer,ma'am.
BACHMANN:
DoestheNSAreadthetextmessagesofAmericancitizens?
INGLIS:
Again,wedonottargetthecontentofU.S.personcommunicationswithoutaspecificwarrant anywhereontheearth.
BACHMANN:
InmytimeatNSA,no,ma'am.
BACHMANN:
Doesthegovernmentkeepthevideodata,likeMr.Himeshadjustquestioned?Doesthegovernment haveadatabasewithvideodatainit,trackingmovementsoftheAmericanpeople?
INGLIS: 53
No,ma'am. (CROSSTALK)
BACHMANN:
I'msorry.That'snotthemicrophoneisn'ton.
INGLIS:
NSAdoesnotholdsuchdata.
ALEXANDER:
Yeah,andwedon'tknowofanydataanybodythatdoes.SoIthinkthoseareheld,asyouseefrom Boston,byindividualshopownersand(inaudible).
BACHMANN:
Butbutdoesthefederalgovernmenthaveadatabasewithvideodatainittrackingthewhereabouts oftheAmericanpeople?
JOYCE:
TheFBIdoesnothavesuchadatabase,noramIawareofone.
BACHMANN:
DowedoestheAmericangovernmenthaveadatabasethathastheGPSlocationwhereaboutsof Americans,whetherit'sbyourcellphonesorbyanyothertrackingdevice?Isthereaknowndatabase?
INGLIS:
NSAdoesnotholdsuchadatabase.
BACHMANN:
We'renotallowedtodothat,nordowedothat,unlesswehaveacourtordertodothat.Anditwould beonlyinspecificcasesandalmostalwaysthatwouldbeanFBIlead,notours.
BACHMANN:
SodowemaintainadatabaseofalloftheemailsthathaveeverbeensentbytheAmericanpeople?
ALEXANDER:
No.No,wedonot.
BACHMANN:
Doweisthereadatabasefromourgovernmentthatmaintainsadatabaseofthetextmessagesofall Americans?
ALEXANDER: 54
NononethatIknowof,andnoneatNSA.
BACHMANN:
AndsoIthinkwhatyouhavetoldthiscommitteeisthattheproblemisnotwiththeNSA,thatistrying tokeeptheAmericanpeoplesafe.You'vetoldusthatyouhave100percentauditablesystemthathas oversightbothfromthecourtandfromCongress. Itseemstomethattheproblemhereisthatofanindividualwhoworkedwithinthesystem,whobroke laws,andwhochosetodeclassifyhighlysensitiveclassifiedinformation.Itseemstomethat'swhereour focusshouldbe,onhowtherecouldbeabetrayaloftrustandhowatraitorcoulddosomethinglikethis totheAmericanpeople.Itseemstomethat'swhereourfocusmustbeandhowwecanprevent somethinglikethatfromeverhappeningagain. Letmeaskyouropinion:HowdamagingisthistothenationalsecurityoftheAmericanpeoplethatthis trustwasviolated?
ALEXANDER:
Ithinkitwasirreversibleandsignificantdamagetothisnation.
BACHMAN:
HasthishelpedAmerica'senemies?
ALEXANDER:
Ibelieveithas.AndIbelieveitwillhurtusandourallies.
BACHMANN:
Iyieldback,Mr.Chair.
ROONEY:
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Iwanttothankthepanel. Youknow,oneofthenegativesaboutbeingsolowonthetotempoleuphereisbasicallyallthe questionsthatIwantedtoaddresshavebeenasked. AndIthinkI'mreallyproudofthiscommitteebecauseonbothsidesoftheaisle,alotofthequestions wereverypoignant.AndIhopethattheAmericanpeopleandthosethatareintheroomhavelearneda lotaboutwhathappenedhereandlearnedalotaboutthepeopleonthepanel. Icansayspecifically,GeneralAlexander,mytimeontheIntelligenceCommittee,Ihavemorerespect foryou.AndI'mgladthatyou'retheoneuptheretestifyingsotheAmericanpeoplecanseedespite whatthey'rewhat'sbeingportrayedandthesuspicionsthatareoutthere,thatthereisnobodybetter toarticulatewhathappenedandwhatwe'retryingtodothanyourself. SoIwanttothankyouforthat. WeweI'llaskacouplebasicquestionsthatIthinkthatmighthelpclearsomethingsup. Mr.Cole,youtalkedabouthowthetheFourthAmendmentisn'tapplicableunderthebusiness recordsexceptionandthePatriotActSection215,applicablecaselaw,Marylandv.Smith,etcetera.
55
Certainly.Firstofallweaswesaid,wedon'tgivethereasonablesuspiciontothecourtaheadof time.Theysetoutthestandardsforustouse. Buttheanalogy,andI'vehearditusedseveraltimesis,ifyou'relookingforaneedleinthehaystack, youhavetogetthehaystackfirst.Andthat'swhywehavetheabilityunderthecourtordertoacquire andthekeywordhereisacquireallofthatdata. Wedon'tgettouseallofthatdatanecessarily.Thatisthenextstep,whichisyouhavetobeableto determinethatthereisreasonable,articulablesuspiciontoactuallyusethatdata. Soifwewanttofindthatthereisaphonenumberthatwebelieveisconnectedwithterrorist organizationsandterroristactivity,weneedtohavetherestofthehaystack,alltheothernumbers,to findoutwhichonesitwasincontactwith. And,asyouheardMr.Inglissay,it'saverylimitednumberoftimesthatwemakethosequeries becausewedohavestandardsthathavetobemetbeforewecanevenmakeuseofthatdata.Sowhile itsitsthere,itisusedsparingly.
ROONEY:
DidyouoranybodythatyouknowattheNSAbreakthelawintryingtoobtainthisinformation?
COLE:
IamawareofnobodywhohasbrokenthelawattheNSAinobtainingtheinformationinthelawful sense.There'sotherissuesthatwehavewiththeleaksthathavegoneonhere.
ROONEY:
AndmaybethisquestionisforGeneralAlexander:Basedoneverythingthatwe'veheardtoday,doyou seeanyproblemswitheither702or215thatyouthinkshouldbechangedbythisbody?
ALEXANDER:
Sothosearethestepsthatwewillabsolutelythey'llgobackandandlookattheentirearchitecture andthat'sacommitmentthatFBIandNSAhasmadetotheadministrationandtothiscommittee.
ROONEY:
Finalquestion,Mr.Joyce,what'snextforMr.Snowdenwecanexpect?
JOYCE:
Justice.
ROONEY:
Iyieldback,Mr.Chairman.Thankyou. (CROSSTALK)
POMPEO:
Great.Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Thankyouallforbeingheretoday.Youknow,thishasbeenthishasbeenagreathearing.Ithinkthe Americanpeoplewillhavegottenachancetohearfromfolkswhoareactuallyexecutingthisprogramin animportantway,andthey'llhaveachoicewhethertobelieveMr.InglisandGeneralAlexanderora felonwhofledtocommunistChina. Forme,there'saneasyanswertothat. Therearethosewhotalkaboutthewaronterrorwindingdown,theysaywe'retowardtheendofthis, theseprogramswerecreatedpost9/11tocountertheterroristthreat,butforthesoldiersfighting overseasandouralliesandforusintheStates. GeneralAlexander,Mr.Joyce,doyouthinktheseprogramsarejustasmuchneededtodayasthey wereintheimmediateaftermathof9/11?
ALEXANDER:
Ido.
JOYCE:
Yes,that'scorrect.
POMPEO:
Doyouhavesomethingtoadd,General?
ALEXANDER:
That'sexactlyright.Infact,anyplace,anytimewecanhelp,wewilldoit.
POMPEO:
ALEXANDER:
Notbeyondtheareacode.
POMPEO:
No,wedon't.
POMPEO:
...we'vegotthatright.
ALEXANDER:
Wedon'thavethatinthedatabase.
POMPEO:
Yes.
POMPEO:
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.I'llmakethisbrief. Iwanttofirstofallthankallwitnessesfortheirtestimony,fortheirservice,andforallyou'vedoneto strengthenandmaintainthisprogram. Myquestion,GeneralAlexander,isistoyouandalsoperhapstoMr.Joyce, Severaltimesinyourtestimonyyoureferenced9/11andhowandIrecallafterSeptember11ththere wasawasaloudchallengetotheintelligencecommunitytodoabetterjobofconnectingthedots,be moreaggressive,beyouknow,bemoreforwardthinking,trytoanticipatewhat'sgoingtohappen, thinkoutsidethebox,allthoseclichesweheardatthetime. AndasIseeit,thisisaverylegitimateandlegalresponsetothatrequest. Iwouldaskyou,GeneralAlexander,oryou,Mr.Joyce,Ibelievereferencedthecase,afterSeptember
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Idon'tknow,Congressman,iftheattackcouldhavebeenprevented.WhatIcantellyouisthatisatool thatwasnotavailabletousatthetimeof9/11.Sowhentherewasactuallyacallmadefromaknown terroristinYementoKhalidMihdharinSanDiego,wedidnothavethattoolorcapabilitytotrackthat call. Now,thingsmayhavebeendifferent,andwewillneverknowthat,unfortunately. Sothatisthetoolthatwe'retalkingabouttodaythatwedidnothaveatthetimeof9/11. Movingforward,asyoumentionedaboutthethestockexchange,herewehaveasimilarthingexcept thiswasunder,again,the702program,whereNSAtippedtousthataknownextremistinYemenwas talkingorconversingwithanindividualinsidetheUnitedStates,welateridentifiedasKhalidOuazzani. AndthenwewereabletogouponourlegalauthoritieshereintheUnitedStatesonOuazzani,whowas inKansasCityandwereabletoidentifytwoadditionalcoconspirators. Wefoundthroughelectronicsurveillancetheywereactuallyintheinitialstagesofplottingtobombthe NewYorkStockExchange. So,astoreallysummarize,asImentionedbefore,allofthesetoolsareimportant. AndasCongressmanSchiffmentioned,weshouldhavethisdialogue.Weshouldallbelookingfor ways,asyousaid,thinkingoutsidetheboxofhowtodoourbusiness. ButIsitherebeforeyoutodayhumblyandsaythatthesetoolshavehelpedus.
KING:
General?
ALEXANDER:
helpthat. IdeallygoingfromMihdhar,wewouldhavebeenabletofindtheotherteams,theotherthreeteamsin theUnitedStatesand/oroneinGermanyorsomeotherplace. SotheabilitytousethemetadatafromthebusinessrecordFISAwouldhaveallowedus,webelieve,to seesome. Now,soit'shypothetical.Therearealotofconditionsthatwecanputthatwecouldputonthere. You'dhavetohavethisright.You'dhavetohavetheRASright. Butwedidn'thavethatability.Wecouldn'tconnectthedotsbecausewedidn'thavethedots. Andso,Ithinkwhatwe'vegothereisthatoneadditionalcapability,onemoretooltohelpuswork togetherasateamtostopfutureattacks.AndasasSeanhaslaidout,youknow,whenyoulookat this,youknow,theNewYorkCitytwoandothers,Ithinkfrommyperspective,youknow,those wouldhavebeensignificanteventsforournation.Andso,Ithinkwhatwe'vejointlydonewith Congressishelpedsetthisprogramupcorrectly.
KING:
Thatiscorrect,Chairman.
ROGERS:
Andso,withoutthatinitialtip,youmightnothavefoundtheotherveryweightyevidencethathappened subsequenttothattip.Isthatcorrect?
JOYCE:
Absolutely.
ROGERS:
JOYCE:
Thatiscorrect.
ROGERS:
AndandaccordingtointheunclassifiedreportthattipultimatelyledtotheFBI'sopeningofafull investigationthatresultedintheFebruary2013conviction.Isthatcorrect?
JOYCE:
Yes,itis,Chairman.
ROGERS:
No,actually,hewasthesubjecttoapriorinvestigation...
ROGERS:
Thatwasclosed.
JOYCE:
...severalyearsearlierthatwasclosed...
ROGERS:
Right.
JOYCE:
...becausewecouldnotfindanyconnectiontoterrorism.
ROGERS:
Right.
JOYCE:
Andthen,ifwedidnothavethetipfromNSA,wewouldnothavebeenabletoreopen...
ROGERS:
Reopenthecase.Butatthetime,youweren'tinvestigatinghim?
JOYCE:
Absolutelynot.Itwasbasedon... (CROSSTALK)
ROGERS:
JOYCE:
No,wedidnot.Sowehadtoservelegalprocesstoidentifythatsubscriberandthencorroborateit. AndthenwelaterwentuponelectronicsurveillancewithanorderthroughtheFISC.
ROGERS:
Andandwhenyouwentupontheelectronicsurveillance,youusedacourtorder,awarrant...
JOYCE:
Thatiscorrect.
ROGERS:
...asubpoena?Whatdidyouuse?
JOYCE:
WeusedaFISAcourtorder.
ROGERS:
Allright.Soyouhadtogoback.Youhadtoproveastandardofprobablecausetogouponthis individual'sphonenumber.Isthatcorrect?
JOYCE:
That'sright.Andasbeenmentioned,hopefullyseveraltimestoday,anyoneinsidetheUnitedStates,a U.S.person,whetherthey'reinsideoroutside,weneedaspecificcourtorderregardingthatperson.
ROGERS:
No,theydonot.Youcanjustgetagrandjury'ssubpoena,and,separatefrompreservingit,youcan acquirethemwithagrandjurysubpoena.Andyoudon'tneedtogotoacourttodothat.
ROGERS:
Right,sothatisalowerlegalstandardinordertoobtaininformationonaU.S.citizenonacriminal matter.
COLE:
That'scorrect,Mr.Chairman.
ROGERS:
Right.
COLE:
Andyoudon'tneedacourtaheadoftime.
ROGERS:
Soso,intotal,thisisamuchmoreoverseenand,bytheway,onacriminalembezzlementcasein Chicago,youwouldn'tbriefthattoCongress,wouldyou?
COLE:
No,wewouldnot,notasanormalcourse.
ROGERS:
That'scorrect.InanormalcriminalembezzlementcaseinChicago,youwouldhavetheFBIandthe JusticeDepartmentinvolved.Andthat'saboutit.
ROGERS:
Right.
COLE:
obtainedareofthesamekind.
ROGERS:
Yes,theydo.
ROGERS:
DotheyperformeconomicespionageactivitiestargetedatU.S.companiesintheUnitedStates?
JOYCE:
Yes,theydo.
ROGERS:
Dotheyconductespionageactivitiestowardmilitaryandintelligentservices,bothhereandabroad,that belongtotheUnitedStatesofAmerica?
JOYCE:
Yes,theydo.
ROGERS:
Dotheytargetpolicymakersanddecisionmakers,DepartmentofStateandotherotherpolicy makersthatmightengageinforeignaffairswhenitcomestotheUnitedStates?
JOYCE:
Yes.
ROGERS:
Wouldyouhowwouldyouratethemasanadversarialintelligenceservicegiventheotherintelligence servicesthatweknowareadversarial,theRussians,theIranians,theothers?
JOYCE:
Theyareoneofourtopadversaries.
ROGERS:
Yeah.AndyouhavehadastringofsuccessesrecentlyinprosecutionsforChineseespionageactivities intheUnitedStates.Isthatcorrect?
JOYCE:
Thatiscorrect.
ROGERS:
Andso,thathasbeenbotheconomic,and,ifIunderstandit,aswellasthemilitaryefforts.Sothey've beenveryaggressiveintheirespionageactivitiestowardtheUnitedStates.Isitwouldyouisthata
65
fairassessment?
JOYCE:
IthinktheyhavebeenveryaggressiveagainstUnitedStatesinterests.
ROGERS:
Verycarefully. (LAUGHTER) Withalotoflegaloversight.IIthinkoneofthethingsthatyouknow,it'spublicknowledgeout thereaboutthecyberactivitiesthatwe'reseeing.ButIalsothinkthatwhat'smissing,perhaps,inthis conversationwiththeChineseiswhat'swhat'sacceptablepracticeshere.AndIthinkthepresident hasstartedsomeofthatinthediscussionswiththethenewpresidentofChina. AndIthinkthat'ssomeofthestuffthatweactuallyhavetohave.Thisneednotbeanadversarial relationship.IthinkourcountrydoesalotofbusinesswithChina,andweneedtolookat,howcanwe improvetherelationswithChinainsuchawaythatbothourcountriesbenefit?Becausewecan.AndI thinkthat'sgoodforeverybody. Whatconcernsmeisnowthisprogramandwhatwe'retalkingaboutwithChina,asgotIthinkwe've gottosolvethisissuewithChinaandthenlookatwaystomovetomoveforward.AndIthinkwedo havetohavethatdiscussiononcyber.Whatiswhataretherightstandards,havethatdiscussionboth privatelyandpublicly.Andit'snotjustourcountry.It'sallthecountriesoftheworld,aswellasChina.
ROGERS:
Yes.
ROGERS:
Wouldyouarguethattheyengageincyberactivitiestostealbothmilitaryandintelligencesecretsofthe UnitedStates?
ALEXANDER:
Yes.
ROGERS:
Ithinkthat'sthat'scorrect.
ROGERS:
Yeah,IIwantedtosay,ifIcould,justacouplethings,becausetheydidn'tcomeupininthis testimony.But,first,thankstothiscommittee,theadministrationandothers,inthesummerof2009we setupthedirectorDirectorateofCompliance.Putsomeofourbestpeopleinittoensurethatwhat we'redoingisexactlyright.Andthiscommitteewasinstrumentalinhelpingussetthatup.Sothat'sone point. Whenwetalkaboutoversightandcompliance,peoplethinkit'sjustonceinawhile,buttherewas rigorousactionsbyyouandthisentirecommitteetosetthatup. Thesecondis,intheopenpressthere'sthisdiscussionaboutpatternanalysisthey'reouttheredoing patternanalysisonthis.Thatisabsolutelyincorrect.Wearenotauthorizedtogointothedata,norare wedataminingordoinganythingwiththedataotherthanthosequeriesthatwediscuss,period.We're notauthorizedtodoit.Wearen'tdoingit.Therearenoautomatedprocessesrunninginthebackground pullingtogetherdatatryingtofigureoutnetworks. Theonlytimeyoucandopatternanalysisis,onceyoustartthequeryonthatqueryandwhereyougo forward.Youcan'tgoinandtrytobringupyouknow,Ihavefourdaughtersand15grandchildren.I
67
AndIdoappreciateit.AndIwanttocommendthefolksfromtheNSAhavealwayswe'venever hadtoissueasubpoena.Allthatinformationhasalwaysreadilyprovided.Youmeetwithus regularly.WehavestaffandinvestigatorsattheNSAfrequently.Wehaveanopendialoguewhen problemshappenwedodealwiththeminaclassifiedway,ininawayIthinkthatAmericanswould beproudthattheirelectedrepresentativesdealwithissues. AndI'mnotsayingthattherearesomehiddenissuesouttheretherearenot. Iknowthishasbeendifficulttocomeandtalkaboutverysensitivethingsinapublicway.Inorderto preserveyourgoodworkandtheworkonbehalfofallthepatriotsworkingtodefendAmerica,Istill believeitwasimportanttohaveameetingwherewecouldatleast,insomeway,discussandreassure thelevelofoversightandredundancyofoversightonaprogramthatweallrecognizeneededanextra careandattentionandlotsofsetsofeyes.Ihopetodayinthishearingthatwe'vebeenabletodothat. IdobelievethatAmericahastheresponsibilitytokeepsomethingssecretasweservetoprotectthis country.AndIthinkyoualldothatwell.Andthedarndestthingisthatwemayhavefoundthatitis easierforasystemsanalystorasystemsadministratortostealtheinformationthanitisforusto accesstheprograminordertopreventaterroristattackintheUnitedStates.Andwe'llbeworking moreonthoseissues. Andwehavehadgreatdialogueaboutwhat'scomingonsomeotheroversightissues. Again,thankyouvery,verymuch.Thankyouallforyourservice.AndIwishyouallwelltoday.
ListofPanelMembersandWitnessesPANELMEMBERS:
REP.MIKEROGERS,RMICH.CHAIRMAN REP.MACTHORNBERRY,RTEXAS REP.JEFFMILLER,RFLA. REP.K.MICHAELCONAWAY,RTEXAS REP.PETERT.KING,RN.Y. REP.FRANKA.LOBIONDO,RN.J. REP.DEVINNUNES,RCALIF. REP.LYNNWESTMORELAND,RGA. REP.MICHELEBACHMANN,RMINN.
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REP.JOEHECK,RNEV. REP.TOMROONEY,RFLA. REP.MIKEPOMPEO,RKAN. REP.JOHNA.BOEHNER,ROHIOEXOFFICIO REP.C.A.DUTCHRUPPERSBERGER,DMD.RANKINGMEMBER REP.MIKETHOMPSON,DCALIF. REP.JANSCHAKOWSKY,DILL. REP.JIMLANGEVIN,DR.I. REP.ADAMB.SCHIFF,DCALIF. REP.LUISV.GUTIERREZ,DILL. REP.JIMHIMES,DCONN. REP.EDPASTOR,DARIZ. REP.TERRIA.SEWELL,DALA. REP.NANCYPELOSI,DCALIF.EXOFFICIO
WITNESSES:
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