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T2 B3 Relevant Articles and Reports 2 of 5 Fdr- Changing American Intelligence- Draft Report- CIA History Staff 913

T2 B3 Relevant Articles and Reports 2 of 5 Fdr- Changing American Intelligence- Draft Report- CIA History Staff 913

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DRAFT—Not
for citation or distribution
Unclassified
Changing American
Intelligence
Six
Episodes
Michael
Warner
CIA
History
Staff
You
cannot discuss
reform
without
reference
to
form.
O.K. Chesterton
The
American intelligence establishment may not be the
world's
largest, but it is
surely
the costliest and it wields perhaps the broadest range of capabilities. For now it is
also
arguablythemost newsworthy.Itsvery prominence means thatitsaccomplishments
and
shortcomings, real or perceived,
often
appear in sharp relief. It also
suggests
thatsome
form
of intelligence
reform
may be likely as the White
House
and
Congress
demand
that intelligence do more to support the war on terrorism and military"transformation." Indeed,thepresshasreportedon allmannerofintelligence
reform
proposals since the attacks of
11
September 2001.
While
significant
changes in the Intelligence Community seem possible, there is
no
consensus about what must change and
how.
What complicates the discussion is the
difficulty
ofunderstandinghow theintelligence agenciesandcapabilitiesfittogetheras awhole—how they complement and compete with one another, as well as how they wereconstructedandcollectively developed.Few Americans—eventhose workingin
intelligence—have
agood graspof thestructureas a
functioning
system,andeven fewerhave watched that system evolve. Theoretical models of how corporations and militaryorganizations
function
offer
some insights, but these are usually models of single entities,
not
of what the Intelligence Community is—a collection of
offices
and agencies with
different
missions, cultures,
and
legal authorities.
The
best way to understand how the American intelligence establishment canchange mightbe tolearnhow it has in
fact
changedin thepast. Historical examplescanshow policymakers
the
bounds
of
what
is
possible
and
beneficial
for
intelligence
in ourconstitutional
order. While no
official
history of the Community exists, students of
intelligence can
still glean insights
from
what
has
already been declassified
and
publicly
discussed.
The following six episodes
were
selected and arranged in the hope of illustrating
why
American intelligence evolved as it
did,
what its
major functions
are,
and
how,
at
times,
its components have meshed in a totality greater than the sum of its parts. Theyshow the several disciplines of the Community, and how those disciplines provideactionable, secret information to users, and support through clandestine activities the
implementation
of US
foreign
and security policies. They were also chosen to illuminate
the
varietyofwaysinwhich reformsof theCommunity have cometopass,and toshow
different
ways
in
which
reform
can be
made
to
work.
1
Unclassified
 
DRAFT—Not
for
citation
or
distribution
Unclassified
Defending
the
Homeland
in
World
War I
The
first
mission of any nation's intelligence structure is to
defend
the nation, its
population,
and its vital interests. Historically those nations with intelligence systemscreated them in hopes of augmenting the
efforts
of their military and domestic securityorganizations to protect the regime
from
threats, both internal and external. Indeed,intelligence gradually emerged
as a
profession
as
much
from
the
"domestic security"field as
from
the military art. This was indeed the case in the United States, where theevents that caused the federal government to create a rudimentary but permanentintelligence establishment came about
as a
result
of the
First World War.
That
struggle tempted Germany and Britain to compromise American neutrality
during
the 32 months in which the United States remained aloof
from
the
conflict.
Eachside wanted access
to
American goods
and
capital,
and
wanted
to
deny
it to the
other.The Germans took the more dangerous and risky approach.
Germany's
noisy butcomparatively
bloodless
sabotage
campaign
in the
United
States reached
its
height
in
1916, when agents resorted
to
desperate measures
to
slow
the flow of war
materiel
to the
Allies.
Themost spectacular incidentwas theexplosionatBlackTompierin NewYorkharbor, which shook
the
city
and
caused millions
of
dollars worth
of
damage.
The
campaign
was
costly
to
Berlin, however, because it—with
Germany's
waging
of
unrestricted submarine warfare—convinced many Americans that
the
Kaiser
was a
ruthless enemy
of the
United
States.
1
British diplomats and operatives had an easier task. They strove to confirm in
American
mindsthesuspicion that German agents roamedthestreets,andalsotodampenWashington's complaints about
Britain's
blockade
of
Central Europe
and its
aggressive
censorship
of cable and
mail
traffic.
America's reaction to the Zimmerman Telegram in
early
1917 was in part a triumph for British intelligence.
Germany's
famous overture toMexico
was
authentic enough,
but its
presentation
to
President Wilson
was
made moreconvincing thanks
to the
efforts
of
Royal Navy codebreakers
and
some adroit espionage
by
British agents.
After
America joined the Allies that
April,
US policymakers andsecurity services remained dependent upon the British for strategic intelligence andcounterintelligence leads—a situation that London could
not
help
but to
exploit
to its ownadvantage.
2
The Germans and the British were able to
affect
public sentiment and policydecisions in America in part because of the weakness of this nation's security andintelligencestatutes and services. In 1914 no federal law banned peacetime espionage
and
sabotage, which meant that
federal
agencies
had no
warrant
to
investigate
the
German campaign,andthat bewildered local authorities were
left
totheirowndevices.Congress redressedthe firstproblembypassingtheEspionageAct of
1917,
thestatute
that
still
undergirds American counterintelligence law. Passage of the Act alsoempowered
the
Justice Department
to
tackle
the
second problem;
its
Bureau
of
Michael
Warner,
"The
Kaiser Sows Destruction: Protecting
the
Homeland
theFirst
TimeAround,"
Studies
in
Intelligence
46:1 (2002),
pp.
3-9.
2
Christopher Andrew,
For the President's
Eyes
Only:
Secret Intelligence
and the
AmericanPresidency from Washington
to
Bush
(New York: HarperCollins, 1996
[1995]),
pp.
38-52.
2
Unclassified
 
DRAFT—Not
for citation or distribution
UnclassifiedInvestigation
took
the
lead
in the nation's
counterattack
on
German operatives.
The
Bureau (which was renamed the FBI in 1935) has been the premier Americancounterintelligence service ever since,
in
part because
of J.
Edgar
Hoover's
determinationto professionalize it in order to ensure that foreign agents never again mounted anothersabotage campaign on American soil.The larger
effort
against
sabotage
also prompted the military to establishpermanent codebreaking teams. Decrypting
the
coded messages
of
German agents
originally
formed much
of the
early work
of the US Army's
codebreaking section,
MI-8,
housed in a reconstituted Military Intelligence Division and headed by Herbert O.Yardley. Yardley spent much of this career in the State Department, however, and hegrasped
the
potential
to
exploit
his
cryptologic
prowess
to
garner positive intelligence
from
diplomatic
and
military communications. Although Secretary
of
State Stimson
in
1929halted
State's
subsidy of the Yardley operation with the famous sentiment that"Gentlemen
do not
read each
other's
mail,"
by
that time
the
Army
and
Navy cryptologicprograms were permanently established and building the capability that would serve so
well
in thenext
conflict.
3
The widespread impression that Britain and Germany had taken advantage ofAmerica in World War I had two more far-reaching effects on the
public's
view ofintelligenceissues.
A
generation
of
Americans drew
the
lesson that enemy aliens
in our
midst
can cause great mischief in wartime, and therefore must be closely watched. Thissentiment lasted into World
War II,
when
it
colored public opinion against German-
and
Japanese-Americans, and even into the Cold War, where it
fueled
allegations ofCommunist influence and fears of a Soviet
Fifth
Column. The second
effect
was apopular resentment against foreign intrigue that,
until
the
fall
of France and Pearl Harbor,restrained
America's
response
to the
rise
of the
totalitarianism
in
Europe.
This attitude
in
Congress
and to a
lesser extent
in the
Executive Branch helped
to
ensure that Americanintelligence capabilities—though professionalized
and
made more capable through
the
efforts
oftheirnewcodebreaking
offices—would
remain smallanddefensively orientedthroughthe inter-war years.As
a
result
of
World
War I and the
violence
on
American soil, policymakers
quietly
agreed that maintaining a permanent intelligence establishment—like a
professional,
standingmilitary—wascheaper
and
safer than building
one
from
scratch
in
wartime. Before
the
20
th
Century
the
ways
of
conducting intelligence
had not
changed
much
since Biblical times, but in the First World War the use of electronic signals,overhead imagery, and air power had created new arenas for intelligence exploitation,new demands for military and policy support, and new security challenges. Nevertheless,thenation as a whole was still not ready to maintain either its military or its intelligence
capability
at a size that would enable them to exercise much
influence
in policymaking,or
project
more than a token presence overseas.
Creating
an
Offensive
Intelligence Capability
3
G.J.A. O'Toole,
Honorable
Treachery:
A
History
of
US
Intelligence, Espionage,
and
CovertAction fromtheAmerican Revolutionto the CIA
(New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991),
pp.
330-343.
3
Unclassified

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