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Rapid Deployment
as a response to an
Active Shooter Incident
Illinois State PoliceAcademy2003
 
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Table of Contents
Introduction....................................................2The Tactic.....................................................4The Incidents...................................................5The Findings & Patterns...........................................6The Conclusions.................................................8The Recommendations............................................9Rapid Deployment in a post 9-11 Environment........................15The Experts’ Opinions...........................................16Synopsis of Incidents............................................22
 
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 Introduction
In less than 33 years, the U.S. law enforcementcommunity has experienced two watershed eventswhich shaped our response to incidents involving anactive shooter. The first rude awakening was perpetrated by Charles Whitman from the clock tower at the University of Texas at Austin. In a sniper incident lasting 90 minutes, Whitman killed 15 andwounded 31 victims. Whitman's training in the U.S.Marine Corps apparently prepared him well for dealingwith targets as distant as 500 yards from his perch onthe 30
th
floor observation deck.Many regard this incident as the impetus of dramaticchange in police training and response. Some agenciesissued long-range rifles and trained their officers in therole of counter-sniper, while other agencies formedmore comprehensive para-military teams with evengreater capabilities. The genesis of what would becomeSpecial Weapons and Tactics teams (SWAT)undoubtedly began at 11:48 a.m. on August 1, 1966 inthe form of Charles Whitman's murderous spree. Notably, Whitman was finally stopped that day by two police officers and an armed citizen who teamed up toattack his sniper perch and kill him.The evolution of SWAT teams in U.S. police agenciesfollowed a rather hopscotch pattern around the nation.Most large cities had very well equipped and trainedteams, while some suburban and rural areas basicallyignored the concept or developed mutual-aidagreements with neighboring teams. Outside of major metropolitan areas, few agencies expected incidentsrequiring a SWAT-type response. Another importantconsideration is the fact that SWAT teams areexpensive and time consuming.Most agencies developed policies setting clear guidelines for the activation of a SWAT team. Patrolofficers in these agencies were generally trained to waitfor SWAT when an incident justified deployment of thespecial team. Patrol officers were expected to"Contain, Isolate and Negotiate” until SWAT arrived.During this same time, the primary mission of mostSWAT teams was evolving. Originally, most SWATteams were structured for scenarios involving snipers(or other barricaded gunmen) and hostage incidents. Inactuality, active shooters, barricaded gunmen andhostage incidents are infrequent. So, many SWATteams trained heavily but rarely deployed.Administrators looking for ways to justify their investment in these units realized that the entry teamcomponent of SWAT units was perfectly suited toconduct high-risk raids for the service of arrest or search warrants. Many SWAT teams now spend asmuch as 80 percent of their time conducting pre- planned raids, not emergency response missions.What does this brief history of SWAT have to do witha study of Rapid Deployment - Immediate Actiontactics for patrol officers? More than 32 years after Charles Whitman's rampage, two teenagers in Coloradologged a similar death and injury toll at another school... this time a high school.Within 13 minutes of the first police call to the April20, 1999 incident at Columbine High School, DylanKlebold and Eric Harris killed 13 and wounded 24.Unlike Whitman's sniper incident, the Columbine eventwas planned around explosives. Klebold and Harrishad set a large improvised bomb in the school cafeteriawith a timer set to go off when the lunch crowd would provide nearly 500 victims. The killers planned toshoot any fleeing students from positions they wouldtake up in the parking lot. Only when their bomb failedto detonate did Klebold and Harris enter the school tokill who they could with firearms.In researching the Whitman shooting in Austin, littlecriticism of the police response could be found.Anyone who left cover within Whitman's field of firewas shot down. Indeed, one police officer was amongthe dead that day in Austin. No one on that day hadheard of SWAT, a concept which came later.At the Columbine incident, however, the police wereloudly criticized. Even other police agencies have joined in the condemnation of the police response to theattack perpetrated by Klebold and Harris. AtColumbine, numerous SWAT units deployed as quicklyas possible and made entry into the school within 45minutes of the first call. In fact, the shooters committedsuicide at about the same time the first SWAT team wasentering the other side of the massive school.
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