G.R. No. 77770 December 15, 1988 ATTY. JOSE S.

GOMEZ, DELFINA GOMEZ ESTRADA, ENRIQUITA GOMEZ OXCIANO, BENITA GOMEZ GARLITOS, REYNALDO GOMEZ ESPEJO, ARMANDO GOMEZ, ERLINDA GOMEZ GUICO, EUGENIA GOMEZ CALICDAN, AZUCENA GOMEZ ORENCIA, TEODORO S. GOMEZ, JR., and ALEJO S. GOMEZ (now deceased) represented by his wife, LETICIA Y. GOMEZ, and children, namely, MARGIE GOMEZ GOB, JACINTO Y. GOMEZ, ALEJO Y. GOMEZ, JR., and MARY ANN Y. GOMEZ, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO G. ADUCAYEN Judge Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) Branch LVI, HON. CHIEF, LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION, Quezon City, Metro Manila, and SILVERIO G. PEREZ, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission, Quezon City, Metro Manila, respondents.

PADILLA, J.: The present case originated with the filing by petitioners on 30 August 1968 in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, of an application for registration of several lots situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan. The lots applied for were Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1 0, 11 and 12 of Plan Psu54792 Amd.-2. The lots were among those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran, 1 wherein this Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of Consolacion) who, together with Consolacion's son, Luis Lopez, inherited from her parcels of land when Consolacion Gomez died intestate. Petitioners alleged that after the death of Teodoro Y. Gomez, they became the absolute owners of the subject lots by virtue of a Quitclaim executed in their favor by Luis Lopez. The lots (formerly portions of Lots 15,16, 34 and 41 covered by Plan Ipd-92) were subdivided into twelve lotsLots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The subdivision plan was duly approved by the Bureau of Lands on 30 November 1963. Petitioners agreed to allocate the lots among themselves. After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5 August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in petitioners' favor. 2 On 6 October 1981, the trial court issued an order 3 expressly stating that the decision of 5 August 1981 had become final and directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision of 5 August 1981.

On 11 July 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission (now known as the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration), submitted a report to the court a quo stating that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. He recommended that the decision of 5 August 1981, and the order of 6 October 1981 be set aside. Petitioners opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition was raised by the Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and that the decision of 5 August 1981 should be implemented because it had long become final and executory. After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision on 25 March 1985 setting aside the decision dated 5 August 1981 and the order dated 6 October 1981 for the issuance of decrees. 4 Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by respondent judge on 6 August 1985 for lack of merit. 5 Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with this Court which in turn referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. 6 On 17 September 1986, the appellate court rendered judgment, 7 dismissing the petition and stating, among others, thus In resum, prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the respondent Judge has still the power and control over the decision he rendered. The finality of an adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case takes place only after the expiration of the one-year period after entry of the final decree of registration (Afalla vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622; Valmonte vs. Nable, 85 Phil. 256; Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil. 113). When the respondent Judge amended his decision after the report of the respondent officials of the Land Registration office had shown that homestead patents had already been issued on some of the lots, respondents cannot be faulted because land already granted by homestead patent can no longer be the subject of another registration (Manalo vs. Lukban, et al., 48 Phil. 973). WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We resolve to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated 10 March 1987. 8Hence, this recourse. Several issues are raised by petitioners in this petition. The more important issues before the Court are: (a) whether or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the decision of 25 March 1985 which set aside the lower court's earlier decision of 5

August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981; (b) whether or not the respondents Acting Land Registration Commissioner and Engr. Silverio Perez, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission, have no alternative but to issue the decrees of registration pursuant to the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order for issuance of decrees, dated 6 October 1981, their duty to do so being purely ministerial; (c) whether or not "the law of the case" is the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran,supra, which held that the lands adjudicated to Consolacion Gomez were not public lands, and therefore they could not have been acquired by holders of homestead titles as against petitioners herein. It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction. Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. 9 This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. 10 Petitioners contend that the report of respondent Silverio Perez should have been submitted to the court a quobefore its decision became final. But were we to sustain this argument, we would be pressuring respondent land registration officials to submit a report or study even if haphazardly prepared just to beat the reglementary deadline for the finality of the court decision. As said by this Court in De los Reyes vs. de Villa: 11 Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land. This requires technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys

become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the Chief Surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code, section 177). Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render reports is not limited to the period before the court's decision becomes final, but may extend even after its finality but not beyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the decree. Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. 12 They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings ." 13 The foregoing observations resolve the first two (2) issues raised by petitioners. Petitioners next contend that "the law of the case" is found in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran, et al., supra, where it was decided by this Court that the lands of Consolacion M. Gomez, from whom petitioners derive their ownership over the lots in question, were not public lands. A reading of the pertinent and dispositive portions of the aforesaid decision will show, however, that the lots earlier covered by homestead patents were not included among the lands adjudicated to Consolacion M. Gomez. The decision states: With respect to the portions of land covered by homestead certificates of title, we are of opinion thatsuch certificates are sufficient to prevent the title to such portion from going to appellants aforesaid, for they carry with them preponderating evidence that the respective homesteaders held adverse possession of such portions, dating back to 1919 or 1920, accordingly to the evidence, and the said appellants failed to object to that possession in time. (Emphasis supplied) Wherefore modifying the judgment appealed from, it is hereby ordered that the lots respectively claimed by Agustin V. Gomez, Consolacion M. Gomez, and Julian Macaraeg, be registered in their name, with the exclusion of the portions covered by the homestead certificates ... . (Emphasis supplied.) 14 The report of respondent land registration officials states that the holders of the homestead patents registered the lots in question in the years 1928 and 1929. The

decision in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran was promulgated on 31 December 1931. Hence, the subject lots are specifically excluded from those adjudicated by the aforesaid decision to Consolacion M. Gomez. It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in cadastral proceeding. 15 The aforecited case of Government vs. Abran, therefore, is not "the law of the case", for the lots in question were not private lands of Consolacion M. Gomez when homestead patents were issued over them in 1928-1929. There is sufficient proof to show that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already titled lands way back in 1928 and 1929 as shown by Annexes "A", "B", "C", and "D" of respondents' Memorandum. 16 Lastly, petitioners claim that if the decision of 5 August 1981 of the lower court is sustained, the homestead title holders may still vindicate their rights by filing a separate civil action for cancellation of titles and for reconveyance in a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. Conversely, the same recourse may be resorted to by petitioners. "(T)he true owner may bring an action to have the ownership or title to land judicially settled, and if the allegations of the plaintiff that he is the true owner of the parcel of land granted as free patent and described in the Torrens title and that the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were never in possession of the parcel of land and knew that the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest have been in possession thereof be established, then the court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner thereof." 17 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners-appellants. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras and Regalado, JJ., concur. Sarmiento, J., is on leave. G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS, Respondent. DECISION

TINGA, J.: The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land registration case. It is a hardly novel issue, yet petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) pleads that the Court rule in a manner that would unsettle precedent. We deny certiorari and instead affirm the assailed rulings of the courts below. The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. It was alleged therein that on 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental rendered a Decision Adicional in Expediente Cadastral No. 14, captioned as El Director De Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan y Otros.1 In the decision, the CFI, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots, together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who had established their title to their respective lots and their continuous possession thereof since time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, upon the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree of registration.2 Among these lots was Lot No. 771 of the Sibulan Cadastre, which was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion (married to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both residents of Sibulan, Negros Oriental.3 Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, eventually acquired Lot No. 771 in its entirety. By way of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia Calingacion sold her undivided one-half (1/2) share over Lot No. 771 to the Spouses Abierra, the parents of Nillas. On the other hand, the one-half (1/2) share adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion was also acquired by the Spouses Abierra through various purchases they effected from the heirs of Eugenia between the years 1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor of the Spouses Abierra.4 In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite these multiple transfers, and the fact that the Abierra spouses have been in open and continuous possession of the subject property since the 1977 sale, no decree of registration has ever been issued over Lot No. 771 despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 771. The records do not precisely reveal why the decree was not issued by the Director of Lands, though it does not escape attention that the 1941 Decision was rendered a few months before the commencement of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December of 1941. No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), although it entered its appearance on 13 May 1997 and simultaneously deputized the City

Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to appear whenever the case was set for hearing and in all subsequent proceedings.5 Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and received her documentary evidence. No evidence was apparently presented by the OSG. On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision6 finding merit in the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of confirmation and registration based on the 1941 Decision.1avvphi1.net The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in main that the right of action to revive judgment had already prescribed. The OSG further argued that at the very least, Nillas should have established that a request for issuance of a decree of registration before the Administrator of the LRA had been duly made. The appeal was denied by the appellate court in its Decision7 dated 24 July 2003. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land registration cases. The Court of Appeals also noted that it would have been especially onerous to require Nillas to first request the LRA to comply with the 1941 decision considering that it had been established that the original records in the 1941 case had already been destroyed and could no longer be reconstructed. In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the principles of prescription and laches do apply to land registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues.8 Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by statute of limitations.9 It bears noting that the Republic does not challenge the authenticity of the 1941 Decision, or Nillas's acquisition of the rights of the original awardees. Neither does it seek to establish that the property is inalienable or otherwise still belonged to the State. The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals10 and Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro.11 Shipside was cited since in that case, the Court dismissed the action instituted by the Government seeking the revival of judgment that declared a title null and void because the judgment sought to be revived had become final more than 25 years before the action for revival was filed. In Shipside, the Court relied on Article 1144 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in declaring that extinctive prescription did lie. On the other hand, Heirs of Lopez involved the double registration of the same parcel of land, and the subsequent action by one set of applicants for the issuance of the decree of registration in their favor seven (7) years after the judgment had become final. The

Court dismissed the subsequent action, holding that laches had set in, it in view of the petitioners' omission to assert a right for nearly seven (7) years. Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more general but definite jurisprudential rule that favors Nillas and bolsters the rulings of the lower courts. The rule is that "neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case."12 The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v. Menla,13 decided in 1961, wherein the Court refuted an argument that a decision rendered in a land registration case wherein the decree of registration remained unissued after 26 years was already "final and enforceable." The Court, through Justice Labrador, explained: We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the assignment [of error], except insofar as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings[,] the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom. Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. x xx x x x x There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is xxx that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court

or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.14 The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a decision in a land registration case was reiterated five (5) years after Sta. Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos, etc., et al. v. De Banuvar, et al.15 In that case, it was similarly argued that a prayer for the issuance of a decree of registration filed in 1962 pursuant to a 1938 decision was, among others, barred by prescription and laches. In rejecting the argument, the Court was content in restating with approval the above-cited excerpts from Sta. Ana. A similar tack was again adopted by the Court some years later in Rodil v. Benedicto.16 These cases further emphasized, citing Demoran v. Ibanez, etc., and Poras17 and Manlapas and Tolentino v. Llorente,18 respectively, that the right of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance of a writ of possession of the land never prescribes.19 Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules on prescription and laches to land registration cases has been repeatedly affirmed. Apart from the three (3) cases mentioned earlier, the Sta. Anadoctrine was reiterated in another three (3) more cases later, namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano,20 Cacho v. Court of Appeals,21 and Paderes v. Court of Appeals.22 The doctrine of stare decisis compels respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent any compelling argument to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent strategy employed by the Republic in its present petition is to feign that the doctrine and the cases that spawned and educed it never existed at all. Instead, it is insisted that the Rules of Court, which provides for the five (5)-year prescriptive period for execution of judgments, is applicable to land registration cases either by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.23 The Republic further observes that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 has no provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to land registration proceedings. We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that the principle enunciated therein offers a convincing refutation of the current arguments of the Republic. Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty

exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration. The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not contain any provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reason being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land registration cases in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads: SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. - After the judgment directing the registration of title to land has become final, the court shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment and of the order of the court directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and a certificate stating that the decision has not been amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the Commissioner shall cause to be prepared the decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate of the corresponding original certificate of title. The original certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The decree of registration shall be signed by the Commissioner, entered and filed in the Land Registration Commission. The original of the original certificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall be sent, together with the owners duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or province where the property is situated for entry in his registration book. The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review. The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration system is geared towards the final and definitive

determination of real property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had attained finality would simply frustrate such goal. Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time decisions in land registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have been no need for Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to file a petition for revival of judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and proceeds from the assumption that the judgment is susceptible to prescription. The primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty to issue the decree of registration remains. If it is sufficiently established before that body that there is an authentic standing judgment or order from a land registration court that remains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the issuance of the decree of registration. However, the Court sees the practical value of necessitating judicial recourse if a significant number of years has passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented decision or order, as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree of registration, a judicial evaluation would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the judgment or order sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other than prescription or laches that might preclude the issuance of the decree of registration. What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of Lopez? Even though the Court applied the doctrines of prescription and laches in those cases, it should be observed that neither case was intended to overturn the Sta. Ana doctrine, nor did they make any express declaration to such effect. Moreover, both cases were governed by their unique set of facts, quite distinct from the general situation that marked both Sta. Ana and the present case. The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not arise from an original action for land registration, but from a successful motion by the Republic seeking the cancellation of title previously adjudicated to a private landowner. While one might argue that such motion still arose in a land registration case, we note that the pronouncement therein that prescription barred the revival of the order of cancellation was made in the course of dispensing with an argument which was ultimately peripheral to that case. Indeed, the portion of Shipsidedealing with the issue of prescription merely restated the provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to prescription, followed by an observation that the judgment sought to be revived attained finality 25 years earlier. However, the Sta. Ana doctrine was not addressed, and perhaps with good reason, as the significantly more extensive rationale provided by the Court in barring the revival of judgment was the fact that the

State no longer held interest in the subject property, having divested the same to the Bases Conversion Development Authority prior to the filing of the action for revival. Shipside expounds on this point, and not on the applicability of the rules of prescription. Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as precedent on still another point, relating to its pronouncements relating to the proper execution of the certification of non-forum shopping by a corporation. In contrast, Shipside has not since been utilized by the Court to employ the rules on prescription and laches on final decisions in land registration cases. It is worth mentioning that since Shipside was promulgated in 2001, the Court has not hesitated in reaffirming the rule in Sta. Ana as recently as in the middle of 2005 in the Paderes case. We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu proved even more unconventional than that in Shipside. The property involved therein was the subject of two separate applications for registration, one filed by petitioners therein in 1959, the other by a different party in 1967. It was the latter who was first able to obtain a decree of registration, this accomplished as early as 1968.24 On the other hand, the petitioners were able to obtain a final judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which time the property had already been registered in the name of the other claimant, thus obstructing the issuance of certificate of title to the petitioners. The issues of prescription and laches arose because the petitioners filed their action to enforce the 1979 final judgment and the cancellation of the competing title only in 1987, two (2) years beyond the five (5)-year prescriptive period provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court did characterize the petitioners as guilty of laches for the delay in filing the action for the execution of the judgment in their favor, and thus denied the petition on that score. Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail x x x," and indeed even if the petitioners therein were somehow able to obtain a certificate of title pursuant to the 1979 judgment in their favor, such title could not have stood in the face of the earlier title. The Court then correlated the laches of the petitioners with their pattern of behavior in failing to exercise due diligence to protect their interests over the property, marked by their inability to oppose the other application for registration or to seek enforcement of their own judgment within the five (5) -year reglementary period. Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual dilemma that negates its application as precedent to the case at bar, or to detract from Sta. Ana as a general rule for that matter. The execution of the judgment sought for belated enforcement in Heirs of Lopez would have entailed the disturbance of a different final judgment which had already been executed and which was shielded by the legal protection afforded by a Torrens title. In light of those circumstances, there could not have been a "ministerial duty" on the part of the registration authorities to effectuate the judgment in

favor of the petitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither could it be said that their right of ownership as confirmed by the judgment in their favor was indubitable, considering the earlier decree of registration over the same property accorded to a different party. The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the general presumption that the final judgment, with which the corresponding decree of registration is homologous by legal design, has not been disturbed by another ruling by a co-extensive or superior court. That presumption obtains in this case as well. Unless that presumption is overcome, there is no impediment to the continued application of Sta. Ana as precedent.25 We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal viability of Shipside or Heirs of Lopezconcerning the applicability of the rules of prescription or laches in land registration cases. Suffice it to say, those cases do not operate to detract from the continued good standing of Sta. Ana as a general precedent that neither prescription nor laches bars the enforcement of a final judgment in a land registration case, especially when the said judgment has not been reversed or modified, whether deliberately or inadvertently, by another final court ruling. This qualifier stands not so much as a newly-carved exception to the general rule as it does as an exercise in stating the obvious. Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the 1941 Decision constituted res judicatathat barred subsequent attacks to the adjudicates title over the subject property. The Republic submits that said decision would operate as res judicata only after the decree of registration was issued, which did not happen in this case. We doubt that a final decisions status as res judicata is the impelling ground for its very own execution; and indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a defense or as a factor in relation to a different case altogether. Still, this faulty terminology aside, the Republics arguments on this point do not dissuade from our central holding that the 1941 Decision is still susceptible to effectuation by the standard decree of registration notwithstanding the delay incurred by Nillas or her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and the reasons for such delay, following the prostracted failure of the then Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of registration. In this case, all that Nillas needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights of the original adjudicates her predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to the decree of registration albeit still in the names of the original prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in interest. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and the Republic does not offer any compelling argument to dispute such proof. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-25660 February 23, 1990

LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, MAURO RENOBLAS, TELESFORO BALONDIA, FELIX ABANDULA, F AUSTOGABAISEN, ISIDORO ELIVERA, RAYMUNDO BONGATO, MARTIN ROLLO N, EUSTAQUIO MEDANA, DOROTEO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAURA, MACARIO GEPALAGO, GREGORIO ITAOC, ALEJANDRO RENOBLAS, SIMEON BARBARONA, GREGORIO RENOBLAS, FRANCISCO ASOY, TEOFILA GUJELING, FABIAN VILLAME, VICENTE OMUSORA, PEDRO BALORIA, GREGORIO ITAOC, TERESITA ITAOC, FAUSTINO ITAOC, FORTUNATO ITAOC, FLORENTINA GEMENTIZA, RESTITUTA OMUSORA, ZOILA OMUSORA, FELISA OMUSORA, ROBERTO HAGANAS, FELISA HAGANAS, FERMIN HAGANAS, VICTORIANO HAGANAS, JULIA SEVILLA, ROMAN MATELA, MARCELA MATELA, DELFIN MATELA, PELAGIO MATELA, ROBERTA MATELA, PROCOPIO CABANAS and SERAFINA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellants, vs. TEODORO VANO, JOSE REYES, ROSARIO REYES, SALUD OGILVE BELTRAN, AMALIA R. OGILVE, FLORA VDA. DE COROMINAS, JESUSA REYES, LOURDES COROMINAS MUNOZ, JUAN COROMINAS, LOURDES C. SAMSON CEBALLOS, SOLEDAD C. SAMSON RAMA, DOLORES V. GARCES FALCON, JAIME GARCES, JOAQUIN REYES, and PEDRO RE R. LUSPO, defendants- appellees. G.R. No. L-32065 February 23,1990 LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAORA, MARTIN ROLLON, GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA, SIMEON BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX ABANDOLA, SATURNINA GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING, TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS HAGANAS, PASTOR ASNA and MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, and MARIANO OGILVE, et. al., respondents. G.R. No. L-33677 February 23, 1990 LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAORA, MARTIN ROLLON, GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA, SIMEON BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX ABANDOLA, SATURNINA GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING, TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS NAGANAS, PASTOR ASNA and MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol,

Branch 1, The Provincial Sheriff, Province of Bohol, and MARIANO OGILVE, et. al., respondents. Lord Marapao and Lorenzo A. Lopena for petitioners. Roque R. Luspo for respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.: On February 7, 1974, We resolved to allow the consolidation of these three cases, considering that they involve the same parties and parcels of land: (1) G.R. No. L25660---this is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol (now Regional Trial Court) 1 dated May 12,1964 dismissing the cases of some of the plaintiffs-appellants and its order dated August 25, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration and the motion to declare the defendants- appellees in default; (2) G.R. No. L32065---this is a petition for certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol dated May 14, 1970 directing the execution of its prior order dated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt; (3) G.R. No. L-33677--- this is a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition of the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol dated June 2, 1971 directing the demolition of the houses of the petitioners. On February 15, 1988, We resolved to require the parties to manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting these cases, or supervening events have transpired which render these cases moot and academic or otherwise substantially affect the same. On March 25, 1988, the petitioners filed an ex parte manifestation that they are still very much interested in the just prosecution of these cases. The antecedent facts are as follows: G.R. No. 25660 On April 1, 1950, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for registration of the parcels of land allegedly inherited by them from Juan Reyes, in Land Registration Case No. 76, L.R.C. Record No. N-4251. On July 26,1951, administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo filed an amended application for registration. After hearing, the land was registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 400 (pp. 84-85, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On October 9, 1962, a complaint for reconveyance of real properties with damages and preliminary injunction, Civil Case No. 1533, (pp. 2-19, Record n Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) was filed by plaintiffs-appellants before the Court of First Instance of Bohol. It was alleged that they are the lawful owners of their respective parcels of land including the improvements thereon either by purchase or inheritance and have been in

possession publicly, continuously, peacefully and adversely under the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years tacked with the possession of their predecessors-in-interest. However, those parcels of land were included in the parcels of land applied for registration by the heirs of Juan Reyes, either by mistake or fraud and with the intention of depriving them of their rights of ownership and possession without their knowledge, not until the last part of 1960 when the defendants-appellees, through their agents, attempted to enter those parcels of land claiming that they now belong to the heirs of Juan Reyes. To the complaint, the defendants-appellees moved to dismiss on two grounds (pp. 19-22, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), namely: (1) for lack of cause of action and (2) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment. On July 20, 1963, the court a quo issued an order denying defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss (pp. 29-30, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). However, acting on the motion to set aside such order (pp. 31-32, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), on May 12, 1964, the same court issued another order reversing itself partially (p. 56, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the cases herein of the plaintiffs Alejandro Renoblas, Fausto Cabaisan, Fabian Villame, Gregorio Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc, Fortunato Ita-oc, Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas, Victorians Haganas, Julia Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Roberto Matela, Procopio Cabaas and Vicente Amosora are hereby dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata with these plaintiffs paying proportionately eighteenth forty one (18/41) of the costs, but the petition to dismiss the case of the rest of the plaintiffs is hereby denied. SO ORDERED. On May 28,1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were dismissed filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 57- 58, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On July 24, 1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were not dismissed filed a motion to declare the defendants-appellees in default for failure to file their answer with the time prescribed by law (pp. 68-75, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On the other hand, defendantsappellees filed their opposition to the motion for reconsideration praying that the complaint as regards the rest of the plaintiffs-appellants be likewise dismissed (pp. 7580, Record on Appeal; p. 7 Rollo). On August 25, 1965, the court a quo issued an order in connection therewith (pp. 8298, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) denying all motions. The case is now before Us with the following as assignments of errors (p. 3, Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants; p. 9, Rollo), to wit: I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASES OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS WHOSE NAMES ARE ALREADY MENTIONED ABOVE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THEIR CASES ARE BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT OF RES ADJUDICATA. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS WHOSE CASES ARE NOT DISMISSED TO DECLARE THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES IN DEFAULT FOR HAVING FAILED TO FILE THEIR ANSWER WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY LAW. On August 12, 1966, a resolution was issued by this Court dismissing the appeal as regards the second issue because the order appealed from was merely interlocutory, hence, not appealable (pp. 35-38, Rollo). On August 17, 1988, petitioners Alex Abandula, Mauro Renoblas, Simeon Barbarona, Fabian Villame, Macario Gepalago, Eustaquio Medana, Julia Sevilla, Gregorio Itaoc, Francisco Asoy and Martin Rollon filed a motion to withdraw their appeal on the ground that they are now the absolute owners and possessors of their respective parcels of land subject of Civil Case No. 1533. The appeal is not impressed with merit. The plaintiffs-appellants claim that no evidence was presented by the defendantsappellees that they (plaintiffs-appellants) were notified of the date of the trial on the merits of the application for registration nor were they given copies of the decision of the trial court. Likewise, they contend that res judicata is not applicable in an action for reconveyance. The allegations that no evidence was presented by the defendants-appellees that plaintiffs-appellants were notified of the date of the trial on the merits of the application for registration nor were they given copies of the decision of the trial court are new issues. It is a well-settled rule that, except questions on jurisdiction, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below and it is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings (Cordero vs. Cabral, G.R. No. 36789, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532). The other contention that res judicata is not applicable in an action for reconveyance is not plausible. The principle of res judicata applies to all cases and proceedings, including land registration and cadastral proceedings (Republic vs. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35376, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 65; Paz vs. Inandan 75 Phil. 608; Penaloza vs. Tuazon, 22 Phil. 303). It is a settled rule that a final judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, is conclusive in a

subsequent case between the same parties and their successors in interest litigating upon the same thing and issue, regardless of how erroneous it may be. In order, therefore, that there may be res judicata, the following requisites must be present: (a) The former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281; Ramos vs. Pablo, G.R. No. 53692, Nov. 26,1986, 146 SCRA 24). The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate (Sy Kao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61752, Sept. 28,1984,132 SCRA 302). The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and is founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium (Carandang vs. Venturanza, G.R. No. L41940, Nov. 21,1984,133 SCRA 344). To ignore the principle of res judicata would be to open the door to endless litigations by continuous determination of issues without end (Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 80294- 95, Sept. 21, 1988, 165 SCRA 515). Thus, when a person is a party to a registration proceeding or when notified he does not want to participate and only after the property has been adjudicated to another and the corresponding title has been issued files an action for reconveyance, to give due course to the action is to nullify registration proceedings and defeat the purpose of the law. In dismissing the cases of some of the petitioners, the court a quo meticulously discussed the presence of all the elements of res judicata (pp. 36-38; pp. 42-54, Record on Appeal; p. 7; Rollo): There is no question that in that Registration Proceedings, LRC Record No. N-4251, Land Registration Case No. N-76, the Court of First Instance of the province of Bohol had jurisdiction of the subject matter, that said court had rendered a judgment on the merit that was terminated in the Court of Appeals since December, 1958, and that decision is now final with a decree of registration over the parcels of land described in the application issued to the applicants. The subject matter (the parcels of land) now claimed by the plaintiffs in this case at bar are the same, or at least part of the parcels already adjudicated registration in that registration case to the persons, some of them are made

defendants in this case before us. The cause of action between the two cases are the same, ownership of these parcels of land, though the forms of action are different, one is an ordinary Land Registration and the other is reconveyance. 'It is settled that notwithstanding the difference in the form of two actions, the doctrine ofres adjudicata will apply where it appears that the parties in effect were litigating for the same thing. A party can not, by varying the form of action, escape the effects of res adjudicata (Aguirre vs. Atienza, L-10665, Aug. 30, 1958; Geronimo vs. Nava No. L-1 21 1 1, Jan. 31, 1959; Labarro vs. Labateria et al., 28 O.G. 4479). 'Well settled is the rule that a party can not by varying the form of action, or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies. (Francisco vs. Blas, et al., No. L-5078; Cayco, et al., vs. Cruz, et al., No. L-1 2663, Aug. 21, 1959). 'Accordingly, a final judgment in an ordinary civil action, determining the ownership of certain lands is res adjudicata in a registration proceeding where the parties and property are the same as in the former case (Paz vs. Inandan 75 Phil. 608; Penaloza vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303).' xxx xxx xxx But are there identities of parties in this case before us and the former registration proceedings? Identity of parties means that the parties in the second case must be the same parties in the first case, or at least, must be successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the former action or proceeding, or when the parties in the subsequent case are heirs (Chua Tan vs. Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411; Martinez vs. Franco, 51 Phil. 487-1 Romero vs. Franco, 54 Phil. 744; Valdez, et a]. vs. Penida No. L- 3467, July 30, 1951). xxx xxx xxx Returning our attention to the case at bar, and with in mind the principles of res adjudicata above-quoted, we noticed that many of the plaintiffs were not oppositors in the former registration case, but many are children of the former oppositors. In such a case we have to determine the case of every plaintiff, if the former decision in the land registration case is conclusive and binding upon him.

xxx xxx xxx The defendants had proven that the adjoining owners and claimants of the parcels of land object of registration proceeding had been notified when the land was surveyed. These persons notified according to the surveyor's certificate, Exhibit "B" were as follows: Cipriano Samoya, Fausto Baguisin, Silveria Pahado, Enojario Laroda, Alejandro Renoblas, Heirs of Gregorio Lofranco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Adriano Toloy, Bartolome Omosura, Marcelina Asilon, Gregorio Baguinang, et al., Nicolas Omosura, Simon Lagrimas, et al., Martin Quinalayo, Gorgonio Baquinang, Demetrio Asolan, Catalino Orellena, Heirs of Catalina Palves, Manuel Mondano, Angel Mondano, Victoriano Balolo, Eugenio del Rosario, Verinici Bayson, Felomino Ruiz, Apolonio Horbeda, and Mun. of Calape. The following persons were notified by the Chief of the Land Registration Office of the initial hearing (Exhibit "J") of the registration proceedings enjoining them to appear on June 16,1952, at 8:30 a.m., before the Court of First Instance of Bohol to show cause why the prayer of said application should not be granted: the Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Public Works and the Director of Forestry, Manila; the Provincial Governor, the Provincial Fiscal and the District Engineer, Tagbilaran, Bohol; the Municipal Mayor, Gorgonio Baguinang, Demetrio Azocan, Catalino Orellena, Manuel Mondano, Angel Mondano, Victoriano Bolalo, Eugenio del Rosario, Verinici Bayson, Filomeno Ruiz, Apolonio Horboda, the Heirs of Gregorio Lofranco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Adriano Toloy, Bartolome Omosura, Marcelina Asilom, Gregorio Baguinang, Nicolas Omosura, Simon Lagrimas and Martin Quinalayo, Calape, Bohol; the heirs of Catalino Polvos, Fausto Baguisin, Cipriano Samoya, Silveria Pohado, Enojario, Laroda, Alejandro Renoblas and Leoncio Barbarona, Antequera Bohol. And after the application had been filed and published in accordance with law the following persons represented by Atty. Conrado D. Marapao filed opposition to that registration proceeding: Felipe Cubido, Simon Lagrimas, Simeon Villame, Felix Lacorte, Victor Omosura, Germana Gahil, Anastacio Orillosa, Enerio Omosura, Valeriano Tuloy, Cipriano Sanoya, Pablo Dumadag, Andres Reimbuncia, Roman Reimbuncia, Celedonio Cabanas, Moises Cabanas, Calixto Gohiting, Gervasio Sevilla, Pedro Omosura, Daniel Itaoc, Luis Omosura, Bartolome Omusura, Nicasio Omosura, Calixto Sevilla, Teodora Omosura, Jose Sabari, Silverio Lacorte, Silverio Tuloy, Gertrudes Sevilla, Teodora Sevilla, Magno Orillosa, Gervacia Sevilla, Marcos Hagonas, Eleuterio Pandas, Pablo Omosura, Fabian Villame, Teodoro Omosura, Magdalina Asilom, Mauricio Matela, Marciano Ordada, Eusebio Omosura, and Gregorio Repelle, (Exhibit "E"), Atty. Juna V.

Balmaseda in representation of the Bureau of Lands, and Asst. Fiscal Norberto M. Gallardo in representation of the Municipality of Calape. Plaintiffs Mauro Renoblas and Gregorio Renoblas are children of plaintiff Alejandro Renoblas. Plaintiff Telesforo Balanda is son-in-law of Alejandro, being the husband of Juliana Renoblas, daughter of Alejandro. Plaintiff Alejandro Renoblas was not one of the oppositors in the registration proceedings, but he was notified of the initial healing of that registration case and by the surveyor that surveyed the land object of registration (Exhibit J-Movant). Therefore, the decision of the land registration proceeding is binding upon him and his case is dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata with costs. xxx xxx xxx Plaintiff Fausto Cabaisan was notifed by the surveyor and that notice of the initial hearing. And though he was not an oppositor, the former land registration proceeding is binding on him. Therefore, this case is dismissed in so far as Fausto Cabaisan is concerned with costs. xxx xxx xxx Plaintiffs Gregorio Ita-oc, Teresita Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc and Fortunate Itaoc are children of Daniel Ita-oc, one of the oppositors in the registration proceedings. They claim parcel No. 10 described in paragraph 2 of the complaint. Gregorio Ita-oc testified that his land was inherited by said plaintiffs' mother from her father, Pio Sevilla. The evidence on record (Exhibits J-3, J- 4, J-5). However (sic), shows that the land is declared in the name of Daniel Ita-oc, a former oppositor in the registration case. Hence, these plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of Daniel Ita-oc, and, therefore, are bound by the decision in that registration case. Their case, therefore, is dismissed, with costs. "Plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas and Victoriano Haganas are children of Marcos Haganas, a former oppositor in the registration case. Marcos testified that his claim before was only two hectares, while the claim of his children is seven hectares, which come from his wife, not from him. These plaintiffs claim two parcels, one under Tax Declaration No. R-4452, and Tax Declaration No. R-8456. It appears that Tax Declaration No. R-4452 (Exhibit M) is in the name of Marcos Haganas and the land described under Tax Declaration No. R-8456 was bought by the spouses Marcos Haganas and Tomasa Sevilla from Gertrudis Sevilla in 1956 (Exhibit M-3), who was an oppositor in the registration proceeding. Therefore, plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas, and Victoriano Haganas are successors-in-

interest to properties in which the decision in the registration case is conclusive and binding to their predecessors-in-interest. Hence, their case here is dismissed with costs. Plaintiff Julia Sevilla is the wife of Marcelo Matela, who was the oppositor in the registration proceedings. Plaintiffs Roman Matela, Marcela Matela, Delfin Matela, and Roberta Matela are their children. She has no son by the name of Pelagic. Julia testified that the land now claimed by her children came from her father Pio Sevilla. The land that was claimed by Mauricio Matela as oppositor was in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5099. This is the same land now claimed by plaintiffs Julia Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Marcela Matela, Delfin Matela, and Roberta Matela (Exhibit 0-4). These plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of Mauricio Matela, who is bound by the decision in that land proceeding wherein he was the oppositor. Therefore, the case of these plaintiffs are dismissed with costs. Plaintiff Procopia Cabanas was the wife of Andres Reambonancia, oppositor in the land registration proceedings. She claims parcel No. 20 described in paragraph 2 of the complaint bearing Tax Declaration No. R8121. It appears that this land is declared in the name of Andres Reambonancia (Exhibit N-3) who, as oppositor in the land registration case, is bound by the decision of that case. Therefore, the case of plaintiff Procopia Cabanas as successor-in-interest to Andres Reambonancia, is hereby dismissed, with costs. Plaintiff Vicente Amosora is the son of Enerio Amosora and Florencia Gahil both oppositors in the former registration case. The land claimed by plaintiff Vicente Amosora is described as parcel No. 24 of paragraph 2 of the complaint under Tax Declaration No. R-6107, under the name of his father Enerio Amosora. Since Enerio Amosora was an oppositor in the former land registration of which this land was a part, the decision of that land registration case is conclusive and binding not only to Enerio Amosora, but also to his successor-in-interest, plaintiff Vicente Amosora, whose case therefore, is dismissed with costs. G.R. No. L-32065 Upon the death of administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3561 was issued in the name of Pedro R. Luspo and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562 was issued in the name of several persons (p. 36, Rollo). A writ of possession dated November 6, 1959, a first alias writ of possession dated January 6, 1961, and a second alias writ of possession dated July 2, 1966 were issued by the trial court against the petitioners. A sample of the guerilla-like, hide and seek tactics employed by the petitioners was proved by the official report of the deputy

sheriff dated January 21 1960. Another evidence of petitioners' refusal to sign and to vacate was a certification dated July 22, 1966 and the Sheriffs return dated October 25, 1966. On March 29, 1967, a petition for contempt was filed by Mariano Ogilve, who is one of the registered owners of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562, against the petitioners for refusing to vacate the land occupied by them and for refusing to sign the Sheriffs return. On May 6, 1969, the court a quo issued a resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 47, Rollo): FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, make it of record that Procopia Reambonansa voluntarily left the land and dropped out from the case; the charge of contempt against Alejandro Renoblas (who died) is dismissed and each of the remaining 22 respondents are hereby found guilty of contempt under Sec. 3-b of Rule 71 and are hereby sentenced each to pay a fine of One Hundred Pesos, authorizing the Constabulary Detachment at or near Candungao Calape Bohol to collect the same and to transmit the money to the Clerk of this Court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of one day for every P2.50 or fraction of a day, the said Constabulary Detachment to effect the commitment if any of them is unable to pay the fine. The fingerprints of each of these 22 respondents shall also be taken by the constabulary and filed with the record of this case. It is so ordered. On June 4, 1969, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforestated resolution whereas Ogilve filed an opposition thereto. On February 14, 1970, the motion for reconsideration was denied. On March 18, 1970, another motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners on the ground of pendency of the action for reconveyance in Civil Case No. 1533 and their appeal in G.R. No. L25660. On May 14, 1970, the court a quo ordered the proper officers to actually execute the resolution dated May 6, 1969. Hence, the present petition. Petitioners raise the following issues: I THAT THE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT ANY COMPLAINT FILED IN COURT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, NOR FOR RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP AND

POSSESSION OF THE PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION AGAINST THE HEREIN PETITIONERS. II THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRIT OF POSSESSION AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, WHO WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE REGISTRATION PROCEEDING AND WHO WERE NOT DEFEATED OPPOSITORS OF THE SAID APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION. The petition is impressed with merit. Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the said land registration case, as their names do not appear in the amended application for registration; that they have occupied the subject parcels of land for more than thirty (30) years which began long before the filing of the application for registration; and that after the hearing of the registration case, they continued in possession of the said land. In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration in his name necessarily carried with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element of the right of ownership. The issuance of the writ of possession is, therefore, sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the generally accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests (Romasanta et. al. vs. Platon, 34 O.G. No. 76; Abulocion et. al. vs. CFI of Iloilo, et. al., 100 Phil. 554 [1956]). A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree (Demorar vs. Ibaez, et al., 97 Phil 72 [1955]). The petitioners' contention that they have been in possession of the said land for more than thirty (30) years which began long before the filing of the application for registration and continued in possession after the hearing of the registration case, worked against them. It was a virtual admission of their lack of defense. Thus, the writs of possession were properly issued against them. However, We do not subscribe to the ruling of the court a quo that petitioners are guilty of contempt. Under Section 8 (d) of Rule 19, Rules of Court, if the judgment be for the delivery of the possession of real property, the writ of execution must require the sheriff or other officer to whom it must be directed to deliver the possession of the property, describing it, to the party entitled thereto. This means that the sheriff must dispossess or eject the losing party from the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the winning party. If subsequent to such dispossession or ejectment the losing party enters or attempts to enter into or upon the real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession of the person

adjudged to be entitled thereto, then and only then may the loser be charged with and punished for contempt (Quizon vs. Philippine National Bank, et. al., 85 Phil. 459). According to this section, it is exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff to execute, to carry out the mandates of the judgment in question, and in fact, it was he himself, and he alone, who was ordered by the trial judge who rendered that judgment, to place the respondents in possession of the land. The petitioners in this case had nothing to do with that delivery of possession, and consequently, their refusal to effectuate the writ of possession, is entirely officious and impertinent and therefore could not hinder, and much less prevent, the delivery being made, had the sheriff known how to comply with his duty. It was solely due to the latter's fault, and not to the disobedience of the petitioners' that the judgment was not duly executed. For that purpose, the sheriff could even have availed himself of the public force, had it been necessary to resort thereto (see United States v. Ramayrat 22 Phil. 183). G.R. No. L-33677 On March 22,1971, Mariano Ogilve filed a Motion for a Writ of Demolition which was granted by the trial court on April 5, 1971 (pp. 42-43, Rollo) against those who were adjudged guilty of contempt. On April 29, 1971, the petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of said order. On June 2, 1971, the trial court issued another order, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 48, Rollo): WHEREFORE, in the absence of writ of preliminary injunction Deputy Provincial Sheriff Pedro Aparece must not only take P.C. soldiers with him but also carpenters to effect the demolition, the carpenters being at the expense of the Luspo. IT IS SO ORDERED. Hence, the present petition. The issue here is whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and thus excluded the herein petitioners from the use and enjoyment of their right to which they are entitled when he (respondent judge) issued the order of demolition on April 5, 1971 and again on June 2, 1971 (p. 107, Rollo). On July 14, 1971, this Court issued a temporary restraining order (p. 51, Rollo). The petition is not impressed with merit. The petitioners allege that the respondent-judge cannot issue a writ of demolition pending the resolution of G.R. No. L-32065. We rule that the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 was not a bar to the issuance of the writ of demolition. It is significant to note that the subject matter of the petition in G.R. No.

L-32065 is the order dated May 14, 1970 directing the execution of the prior order dated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt and not the writs of possession themselves. Thus, the respondent Judge correctly issued the writs of demolition. In Meralco vs. Mencias, 107 Phil 1071, We held: [I]f the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant therein (Demorar vs. Ibanez, 97 Phil. 72; Pasay Estate Company vs. Del Rosario, et al., 11 Phil. 391; Manlapas vs. Llorente 48 Phil. 298), a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition, would be ineffective. xxx xxx xxx [The issuance of the writ of demolition] is reasonably necessary to do justice to petitioner who is being deprived of the possession of the lots in question, by reason of the continued refusal of respondent ...... to remove his house thereon and restore possession of the promises to petitioner. ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1) In G.R. No. L-25660, the appeal is DENIED and the orders of the Court of First Instance dated May 12, 1964 and August 25, 1965 are AFFIRMED; the motion to withdraw the appeal of some of the plaintiffs-appellants is GRANTED; 2) In G.R. No. L-32065, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the Court of First Instance dated May 14, 1970 is SET ASIDE; and 3) In G.R. No. L-33677, the petition is DISMISSED and the order of the Court of First Instance dated June 2, 1971 is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order is LIFTED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 123346 March 31, 2009

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATION, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 134385 March 31, 2009

ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRI-CULTURE, INC., Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE, ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO, ALSON AND VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA AND RENE POLICAR, AND ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, Respondents. RESOLUTION TINGA, J.: In the Courts Resolution dated 14 December 2007,1 the Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the instant case on remand. The Special Division was composed of three Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, with Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga as Chairperson; Justice Lucas Bersamin as Senior Member; and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as Junior Member. We instructed the Special Division to proceed as follows: The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this Resolution. In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is directed to make the following determinations based on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings before it, to wit: i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims of title to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917? ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks and Araneta? iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks? iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so what are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the Government

and whether any of the parties is able to trace its title to the title acquired by the Government through expropriation. v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail. WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with Parts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution. SO ORDERED.2 The Special Division proceeded to conduct hearings in accordance with the Resolution. The parties to these cases, namely CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT), Manotok Realty Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (the Manotoks), the Heirs of Jose B. Dimson (Heirs of Dimson), and Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta), were directed by the Special Division to present their respective evidence to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Special Division rendered a 70-page Report3 (Report) on 26 November 2008. The Special Division submitted the sealed Report to this Court. Before taking action on the Report itself, we dispose of a preliminary matter. On February 17, 2009, the Manotoks filed a motion beseeching that copies of the report be furnished the parties "so that they may submit their comments and objections thereon in accord with the principle contained in Sec. 10, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court." We deny the motion. It is incorrect to presume that the earlier referral of these cases to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence was strictly in accordance with Rule 32. Notably, Section 1 of said Rule authorizes the referral of the case to a commissioner "by written consent of both parties," whereas in the cases at bar, the Court did not endeavor to secure the consent of the parties before effectuating the remand to the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, our earlier advertence to Rule 32 remains proper even if the adopted procedure does not hew strictly to that Rule, owing to our power under Section 6, Rule 135 to adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding which appears conformable to the spirit of the Rules to carry into effect all auxiliary processes and other means necessary to carry our jurisdiction into effect. Moreover, furnishing the parties with copies of the Sealed Report would not serve any useful purpose. It would only delay the promulgation of the Courts action on the Sealed Report and the adjudication of these cases. In any event, the present Resolution quotes extensively from the sealed Report and discusses its other substantive segments which are not quoted.

The Report is a commendably exhaustive and pellucid analysis of the issues referred to the Special Division. It is a more than adequate basis for this Court to make the following final dispositions in these cases. I. We adopt the succeeding recital of operative antecedents made by the Special Division in its Report. THE PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS DIMSON v. ARANETA CA-G.R. CV. NO. 41883 & CA-G.R. SP No. 34819 [SC-G.R. No. 134385] On 18 December 1979, DIMSON filed with the then Court of First Instance ["CFI"] of Rizal a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against ARANETA. On 7 May 1980, DIMSON amended his complaint and included Virgilio L. Enriquez ["ENRIQUEZ"] as his co-plaintiff. In said Amended Complaint, DIMSON claimed that he is the absolute owner of a 50hectare land located in Bo. Potrero, Malabon, Metro Manila covered by TCT No. R15169, [Lot 25-A-2] of the Caloocan Registry of Deeds. Allegedly, DIMSON had transferred the subject property to ENRIQUEZ by way of an absolute and irrevocable sale on 14 November 1979. Unfortunately though, DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ discovered that the subject property was being occupied by ARANETA wherein an "agricultural school house" is erected and that despite repeated demands, the latter refused to vacate the parcel of land and remove the improvements thereon. ARANETA, for its part, refuted said allegations and countered that it is the absolute owner of the land being claimed by DIMSON and that the real properties in the Araneta Compound are "properly documented and validly titled." It maintained that it had been in possession of the subject parcel of land since 1974. For this reason, the claims of DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ were allegedly barred by prescription. During the trial, counsel for ARANETA marked in evidence, among others, certifications from the Land Registration Commission attesting that TCTs Nos. 13574 and 26538, covering the disputed property, are in the names of ARANETA and Jose Rato, respectively. ARANETA also offered TCT No. 7784 in evidence to prove that it is the registered owner of the land described therein. On 28 May 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision upholding the title of DIMSON over the disputed property xxx

Undaunted, ARANETA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 41883, which was later consolidated with CA-GR. SP No. 34819 in view of the inter-related issues of the two cases. In its 30 May 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41883, sustained the RTC Decision in favor of DIMSON finding that the title of ARANETA to the disputed land in a nullity. In CA-GR. SP No. 34819, the Court of Appeals likewise invalidated the titles of ARANETA, relying on the Supreme Court ruling in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals, which declared null and void the certificates of title derived from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 may 1917. It was also held that ARANETA failed to sufficiently show that the Order sought to be nullified was obtained through extrinsic fraud that would warrant the annulment thereof. Dissatisfied still, ARANETA filed a Motion for Reconsideration And/Or New Trial espousing therein as basis for its entreaty the various letters from different government agencies and Department order No. 137 of the Department of Justice, among others. On 16 July 1998, the various Motions of ARANETA were denied by the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the Court ordered DIMSON to maintain status quo until the finality of the aforesaid judgment. Consequently, ARANETA filed a petition before the Supreme Court. Refuting the factual finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, ARANETA contended that there in only one OCT 994 covering the Maysilo Estate issued on 3 May 1917 pursuant to the Decree No. 36455 issued by the Court of Land Registration on 19 April 1917 and added that there were subsequent certifications issued by the government officials, notably from the LRS, the DOJ Committee Report and the Senate Committees Joint Report which attested that there is only one OCT 994, that which had been issued on 3 May 1917.1avvphi1 CLT v. MANOTOK CA-G.R. CV. No. 45255 [SC-G.R. No. 123346] On 10 August 1992, CLT filed with the Regional Trial Court ["RTC"] A COMPLAINT FOR Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages against the MANOTOKS and the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila District II (Calookan City, Metro Manila) ["CALOOCAN RD"]. In its Complaint, CLT alleged that it is the registered owner of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate located in Caloocan City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T177013, a derivative title of OCT No. 994. As a basis of its proprietary claim, CLT averred that on 10 December 1988, it had acquired Lot 26 from its former registered owner, Estelita I. Hipolito ["HIPOLITO"], by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate

Mortgage. HIPOLITOs title was , in turn, a direct transfer from DIMSON, the registered owner of TCT No. 15166, the latter having acquired the same by virtue of a Court Order dated 13 June 1966 issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557. On the other hand, the MANOTOKS maintained the validity of their titles, which were all derivatives of OCT No. 994 covering over twenty (20) parcels of land located over a portion of Lot 26 in the Maysilo Estate. In substance, it was contented that the title of CLT was an offspring of an ineffective grant of an alleged undisputed portion of Lot 26 by way of attorneys fees to its predecessor-in- interest, Jose B. Dimson. The MANOTOKS, in this connection, further contended that the portion of Lot 26, subject of the present controversy, had long been disposed of in favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio and hence, there was nothing more in said portion of Lot 26 that could have been validly conveyed to Dimson. Tracing the legitimacy of their certificates of titles, the MANOTOKS alleged that TCT No. 4210, which cancelled OCT No. 994, had been issued in the names of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio on Sept ember 1918 by virtue of an Escritura De Venta executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and Don Enrique Lopes on 21 August 1918. TCT No. 4210 allegedly covered an approximate area of 19,565.43 square meters of Lot 26. On even date, TCT No. 4211 was transferred to Francisco Gonzales on the strength of an Escritura de Venta dated 3 March 1920 for which TCT No. T-5261, covering an area of 871,982 square meters was issued in the name of one Francisco Gonzales, married to Rufina Narciso. Thereafter, TCT No. T-35485, canceling TCT No. T-5261, was issued to Rufina Narcisa Vda. de Gonzales which was later replaced with the names of Gonzales six (6) children. The property was then subdivided and as a result of which, seven (7) certificates of titles were issued, six (6),under the names of each of the children while the remaining title was held by all of them as co-owners. Eventually, the properties covered by said seven certificates of title were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines. These properties were then later subdivided by the National Housing Authority ["NHA"], into seventy-seven (77) lots and thereafter sold to qualified vendees. As it turned out, a number of said vendees sold nineteen (19) of these lots to Manotok Realty, Inc. while one (1) lot was purchased by the Manotok Estate Corporation. During the pre-trial conference, the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, approved the creation of a commission composed of three commissioners tasked to resolve the conflict in their respective titles. Accordingly, the created Commission convened on the matter in dispute. On 8 October 1993, Ernesto Erive and Avelino San Buenaventura submitted an exhaustive Joint Final Report ["THE MAJORITY REPORT"] finding that there were

inherent technical infirmities or defects on the face of TCT No. 4211, from which the MANOTOKS derived their titles (also on TCT No. 4210), TCT No. 5261 and TCT No. 35486. Teodoro Victoriano submitted his Individual Final Report ["THE MINORITY REPORT"] dated 23 October 1993. After the conduct of a hearing on these reports, the parties filed their respective comments/objections thereto. Upon order of the trial court, the parties filed their respective memoranda. Adopting the findings contained in the Majority Report, the RTC, on 10 May 1994, rendered a Decision, in favor of CLT and ordered, among others, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of the MANOTOKS. The MANOTOKS elevated the adverse RTC Decision on appeal before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 28 September 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision, except as to the award of damages which was deleted. The MANOTOKS then moved for reconsideration, but said motion was denied by said appellate court in its Resolution dated 8 January 1996. After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, the MANOTOKS filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT Before the Supreme Court, the Petitioners for Review, separately filed by the MANOTOKS, ARANETA and Sto. Nio Kapitbahayan Association, Inc., ["STO. NIO"], were consolidated. Also submitted for consideration of the Supreme Court were the report of the Fact Finding Committee dated 28 August 1997 and the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 which concluded that there was only one OCT No. 994 issued, transcribed and registered on 3 May 1917. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION In its Decision dated 29 November 2005 ["THE SUPREME COURT 2005 DECISION"], the Supreme Court, through its Third Division, affirmed the RTC Decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, which declared the titles of CLT and DIMSON as valid. In invalidating the respective titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, the Supreme Court, in turn, relied on the factual and legal findings of the trial courts, which had heavily hinged on the imputed flaws in said titles. Considering that these trial court findings had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court highlighted the fact that the same were accorded the highest degree of respect and, generally, should not be disturbed on appeal.

Emphasis was also made on the settled rule that because the Supreme Court was not a trier of facts, it was not within its function to review factual issues and examine, evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. THE SUPEME COURT RESOLUTION Expectedly, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court 2005 Decision. Resolving said motions for reconsideration, with the Office of the Solicitor General ["OSG"] intervening on behalf of the Republic, the Supreme Court, in its Resolution of 14 December 2007 ["THE SUPREME CCOURT 2007 RESOLUTION"] reversed and nullified its 2005 Decision and categorically invalidated OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, which was the basis of the propriety claims of CLT and DIMSON. However, the Supreme Court resolved to remand the cases to this Special Division of the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence. To guide the proceedings before this Special Division of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court made the following binding conclusions: "First, there is only one OCT 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the ate of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on (19)* April 1917, although such dated cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the title took effect. Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated (19) April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated (19) April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the dates appearing on their respective titles. Third. The decision of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.4 II.

The parties were afforded the opportunity to present their evidence before the Special Division. The Report names the evidence submitted to the Special Division for its evaluation: CLT EVIDENCE In its Offer of Evidence,5 CLT adopted the documentary exhibits and testimonial evidence of witnesses submitted in the case filed by CLT against STO. NIO in Civil Case No. C-15491, ["CLT-STO NIO CASE"]. These pieces of evidence include, among others, the Majority and Minority Reports, the Formal Offer of Evidence in the presentation of the evidence-in-chief and rebuttal evidence in the CLT-STO NIO CASE consisting of various certificates of titles, plans by geodetic engineer, tax declarations, chemistry report, specimen signatures and letters of correspondence. MANOTOKS EVIDENCE The MANOTOKS sought admission of the following evidence: Senate and DOJ Committee Reports; certificates of title issued to them and their vendees/assignees, i.e., Republic of the Philippines, the Gonzalezes, Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio, Isabel Gil del Sola and Estelita Hipolito; deeds of absolute sale; contracts to sell; tax declarations and real property tax receipts; the Formal Officer of Evidence of Philville Development & Housing Corporation; ["PHILVILLE"], in Civil Case No. 15045; this Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV. No. 52606 between CLT and PHILVILLE; the Orders of Judge Palma dated 13 June 1966 and 16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557 and the billing statements of SSHG Law Office. They also submitted in evidence the Affidavits and Supplemental Affidavits of Rosa R. Manotok and Luisa T. Padora; Affidavits of Atty. Felix B. Lerio, Atty. Ma. P.G. Ongkiko and Engineer Jose Marie P. Bernabe; a copy of a photograph of BM No. 9; certified true copy of coordinates and reference point of L.M. No. 1 and BM No. 1 to 10 of Piedad Estate and TCT No. 177013 of CLT.6 DIMSON EVIDENCE In their Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence,7 DIMSON submitted the previous decisions and resolutions passed relative to these cases, various certifications of different government agencies, OCT 994, subdivision plan of Lot 25-A-2, observations of Geodetic Engineer Reggie P. Garcia showing the relative positions of properties within Lot 25-A; the Novation of Contract/Deed of Sale and Mortgage dated 15 January 1948 between Rato, Don Salvador Araneta and Araneta Institute of Agriculture; copies of various certificates of titles to dispute some of the titles held by ARANETA; several letter-requests and official receipts. ARANETA EVIDENCE

ARANETA, in turn, offered in evidence various certificates of title, specifically, OCT No. 994, TCT No. 8692; TCT No. 21857; TCT No. 26538; TCT No. 26539; TCT No. (7784)738 and TCT no. 13574. It also marked in evidence the certified true copies of Decree No. 36577; the DOJ and Senate Reports; letters of correspondence to the Land Registration Commission and the Register of Deeds of Malabon City; survey plans of Lot 25-A and TCT r-15169 of Dimson and; the affidavit of Engineer Felino M. Cortez and his curriculum vitae. ARANETA also offered the certified true copy of TCT No. 6196 in the name of Victoneta, Inc.; TCT No. 13574 in the name of ARANETA; certifications issued by Atty. Josephine H. Ponciano, Acting Register of Deeds of Malabon city-Navotas; certified true copy of Judge Palmas Order dated 16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557; Circular No. 17 (which pertains to the rules on reconstitution of titles as of 19 February 1947) and its official receipt and; the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 994.89 III. We now turn to the evaluation of the evidence engaged in by the Special Division. To repeat, the Special Division was tasked to determine the following issues based on the evidence: i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 dated 3 May 1917: ii. Whether the respective imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the Supreme Court 2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence. Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat said claims? iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of the 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of the Araneta and the Manotoks? iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so, what are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the Government, and is any of the parties able to trace its title acquired by the government through expropriation? v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail. The ultimate purpose of the inquiry undertaken by the Court of Appeals was to ascertain which of the four groups of claimants were entitled to claim ownership over the subject properties to which they claimed title thereto. One set of properties was

disputed between CLT and the Manotoks, while the other set was disputed between Araneta and the Heirs of Dimson. As can be gleaned from the Report, Jose Dimson was able to obtain an order in 1977 issued by Judge Marcelino Sayo of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City on the basis of which he was able to register in his name properties belonging to the Maysilo Estate. Judge Sayos order in turn was sourced from a 1966 Order issued by Judge (later Supreme Court Associate Justice) Cecilia Muoz-Palma of the CFI of Rizal. Dimsons titles reflected, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917.10 Among these properties was a fifty (50)-hectare property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 151169, which apparently overlapped with the property of Araneta covered by TCT No. 13574 and 26538.11 Araneta was then and still is in possession of the property. The Araneta titles state, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. Consequently, Dimson filed an action for recovery of possession against Araneta. Another property in Dimsons name, apparently taken from Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate, was later sold to Estelita Hipolito, who in turn sold the same to CLT. Said property was registered by CLT under TCT No. T-177013, which also reflected, as its mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917.12 Said property claimed by CLT encroached on property covered by titles in the name of the Manotoks. The Manotoks traced their titles to TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, both issued in 1918 and both reflecting, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917.1avvphi1 It is evident that both the Heirs of Dimson and CLT had primarily relied on the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 as the basis of their claim of ownership. However, the Court in its 2007 Resolution held that OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 was inexistent. The proceedings before the Special Division afforded the Heirs of Dimson and CLT alike the opportunity to prove the validity of their respective claims to title based on evidence other than claims to title the inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT No. 994. Just as much was observed by the Special Division: Nonetheless, while the respective certificates of title of DIMSON and CLT refer to OCT 994 issued on 19 April 1917 and that their previous postulations in the present controversies had been anchored on the supposed validity of their titles, that which emanated from OCT 994 of 19 April 1917, and conversely the invalidity of the 3 May 1917 OCT 994, the Supreme Court has yet again allowed them to substantiate their claims on the basis of other evidentiary proofs: Otherwise stated, both DIMSON and CLT bear the onus of proving in this special proceedings, by way of the evidence already presented before and such other forms of evidence that are not yet of record, that either there had only been an error in the course of the transcription or registration of their derivative titles, or that other factual and legal bases existed to validate or substantiate their titles aside from the OCT No. 994 issued on 19 April 1917.13

Were they able to discharge such burden? A. We begin with the Heirs of Dimson. The Special Division made it clear that the Heirs of Dimson were heavily reliant on the OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917. [DIMSON], on the strength of Judge Sayos Order dated 18 October dated 18 October 1977, was issued separate certificates of title, i.e., TCT Nos. 15166, 15167, 15168 and 15169, covering portions of the Maysilo Estate. Pertinently, with respect to TCT No. 15169 of DIMSON, which covers Lot 25-A-2 of the said estate, the following were inscribed on the face of the instrument. "IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19th day of April in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA pageNA , as Original Certificate of Title No. 994 pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. Case No. 4429 Record No. ______ This Certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No. 994/NA, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.14 From the above accounts, it is clear that the mother title of TCT no. 15169, the certificate of title of DIMSON covering the now disputed Lot 25-A-2, is OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. Manifestly, the certificate of title issued to DIMSON, and as a matter of course, the derivative title later issued to CLT, should both be voided inasmuch as the OCT which they emanated had already been declared inexistent.15 The Special Division noted that the Heirs of Dimson did not offer any explanation why their titles reflect the erroneous date of 19 April 1917. At the same time, it rejected CLTs explanation that the transcription of the erroneous date was a "typographical error." As can be gleaned from the records, both DIMSON and their successor-in-interest CLT, had failed to present evidence before this Court to prove that there had been a mere typographical error in the transcription of their respective titles with regard to the date of registration of OCT No. 994. CLT specifically harps on this assertion that there had only been a typographical error in the transcription of its title. 16 On the other hand, while DIMSON had refused to categorically assert that there had been such a typographical error causing the invalidity of their title, their failure to proffer any reason or argument which would otherwise justify why their title reflects 19 April 1917 and not 3 May 1917 leads this Court to conclude that they simply had no basis to support their proprietary claim.

Thus, without proffering any plausible explanation as to what led to the erroneous entry of the registration dated of OCT 994, DIMSON are left without any recourse but to substantiate their claim on the basis of other evidence not presented during the proceedings below, which would effectively prove that they had a valid proprietary claim over the disputed properties. This is specifically true because DIMSON had previously placed reliance on the MWSS doctrine to prove the validity of their title.17 Absent such explanation, the Heirs of Dimson were particularly constrained to rely on the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo, which was allegedly sourced from the 1966 Order of Judge Muoz Palma. On that issue, the Special Division made the following determinations: It should be recalled that in their appellees brief in CA-G.R.CV No. 41883, therein appellee Jose Dimson specifically denied the falsity of TCT No. R-15169 alleging that the contention "is already moot and can be determined by a controlling decision."18 Jose Dimson expounded on his reliance as follows: "In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System (for brevity MWSS) case, Jose B. Dimsons (as private respondent) title TCT No. 15167 issued for Lot 28 on June 8, 1978 derived from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917, is overlapping with MWSS title TCT No. 41028 issued on July 29, 1940 derived from the same OCT 994, registered on May 3, 1917. (Same facts in the case at bar; Jose B. Dimson (plaintiff-appellee) title TCT No. R15169 issued for Lot 25-A-2, on June 8, 1978, is overlapping with defendantappellants title TCT Nos. 13574 and 21343, not derived from OCT No. 994." 19 So viewed, sans any proof of a mechanical error in the transcription or annotation on their respective certificates of title, the present inquiry then hinges on whether the Order dated 13 June 1966 issued by then Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557 ["PALMA ORDER"] and Judge Sayos Order dated 18 October 1977 ["SAYOS 18 OCTOBER 1977 ORDER"], can be validated and authenticated. It is so since the brunt of the proprietary claims of both DIMSON and CLT has its roots on said Orders. Perforce, in consideration of the foregoing, this leads Us to the THIRD ISSUE as presented by the Supreme Court, to wit: "Whether the factual and legal bases of Palmas 13 June 1966 Order and Sayos 18 October 1977 Order are true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?" As it is, in contending that their certificates of title could be validly traced from the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994, DIMSON point out that their title was issued pursuant to a

court order issued by Judge Palma in Case No. 4557 and entered in the memorandum of Encumbrance of OCT No. 994. DIMSON also insist that TCT Nos. 8692, 21857 and 26538 were mere microfilmed or certified copies and, therefore, inadmissible. Lastly, DIMSON reiterated the flaws and irregularities which voided the titles of the ARANETA in the previous proceedings and focused on the burden of ARANETA to present evidence to defeat their titles. The foregoing contentions of DIMSON find to factual and legal basis. As we see it, Sayos 18 October 1977 Order, which apparently confirmed Palmas 13 June 1966 Order, raised serious questions as to the validity of the manner by which it was arrived at. It is worthy to note that as early as 25 August 1981, counsel for the ARANETA applied for a subpoena duces tecum addressed to the Clerk of Court of CFI Pasig for the production of the records of LRC Case No. 4557 for purposes of determining the genuineness and authenticity of the signature of Judge Palma and also of her Order granting the confirmation. A certain Atty. Contreras, Officer-in-Charge of the said court, appeared and manifested in open court that the records pertaining to the petition for Substitution of names of Bartolome Rivera, et al. could no longer be located inasmuch as they had passed hands from one court to another. What is perplexing to this Court is not only the loss of the entire records of Case No. 4557 but the admission of Judge Sayo that he had not seen the original of the Palma Order. Neither was the signature of Judge Palma on the Order duly proven because all that was presented was an unsigned duplicate copy with a stamped notation of "original signed." Equally perplexing is that while CFI Pasig had a Case No. 4557 on file, said file pertained not to an LRC case but to a simple civil case.20 Thus: "Atty. Directo: The purpose of this subpoena duces tecum is to present your Honor the Order Order (sic) of Judge Palma in order to determine the genuineness and authenticity of the signature of Judge Palma in this court order and which order was a basis of a petition in this court to be confirmed. That is the reason why we want to see the genuineness of the signature of Judge Palma. COURT: No signature of Judge Palma was presented in this court. it was a duplicate copy not signed. There is a stamp only of original signed. Atty. Directo: That is the reason why we want to see the original. Court:

I did not see the original also. When the records of this case was brought here, I checked the records, there were so many pages missing and the pages were renumbered but then I saw the duplicate original and there is a certification of a woman clerk of Court, Atty. Molo. Atty. Directo: That is the reason why we want to see this document, we are surprised why it is missing. Court: We are surprised also. You better ask Judge Muoz Palma. Atty. Contreras: May I make of record that in verifying our records, we found in our original vault LRC application no. N-4557 but the applications were certain Feliciano Manuel and Maria Leao involving Navotas property because I was wondering why they have the same number. There should be only one. Atty. Directo: Aside from that, are there other cases of the same number? Atty. Contreras: No, there should be only number for a particular case; that must be a petition after decree record. Atty. Ignacio: This 4557 is not an LRC Case, it is a simple civil case. xxxxxx Moreover, both the MANOTOKS and ARANETA insist that Palmas 13 June 1966 Order had been recalled by a subsequent Order dated 16 August 1966, ["RECALL ORDER"],21 wherein the trial court dismissed the motion filed by DIMSON on the courts findings that " x x x whatever portion of the property covered by OCT 994 which has not been disposed of by the previous registered owners have already been assigned and adjudicated to Bartolome Rivera and his assignees, as a result of which there is no portion that is left to be given to the herein supposed assignee Jose Dimson."

However, We are reluctant to recognize the existence and due execution of the Recall Order considering that its original or even a certified true copy thereof had not been submitted by either of the two parties relying on it despite having been given numerous opportunities to do so. Be that as it may, even if We are to consider that no Recall Order was ever issued by then Judge Palma, the validity of the DIMSON titles over the properties in the Maysilo Estate becomes doubtful in light of the fact that the supposed "share" went beyond what was actually due to Jose Dimson under the Compromise Agreement with Rivera. It should be recalled that Palmas 13 June 1966 Order approved only the conveyance to Jose Dimson of "25% of whatever share of Bartolome Rivera has over Lots 25, 26, 27, 28-B and 29 of OCT 994 x x x subject to availability of undisposed portion of the said lots."22 In relation to this, We find it significant to note the observations contained in the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 that, based on the assumption that the value of the lots were equal, and "(C)onsidering that the share of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal was only 1-189/1000 percent of the Maysilo Estate, the Riveras who claimed to be the surviving heirs of Vidal will inherit only 197, 405.26 square meters (16,602,629.53 m2 x 1.1890%) or 19.7 hectares as their share.23 Even if we are to base the 25% of Jose Dimson on the 19.7 hectares allotted to the Riveras, it would appear that Jose Dimson would only be entitled to more or less five (5)hectares of the Maysilo Estate. Obviously, basing only on TCT No. 15169 of Dimson which covered a land area of 50 hectares (500,000 square meters),24 it is undisputable that the total properties eventually transferred to Jose Dimson went over and beyond his supposed 25% share. What is more, Palmas 13 June 1966 Order specifically required that "x x x whatever title is to be issued herein in favor of Jose Dimson, the same shall be based on a subdivision plan duly certified by the Land Registration Commission as correct and in accordance with previous orders issued in this proceedings, said plan to be submitted to this court for final approval. Interestingly however, despite such requirement, DIMSON did not submit Survey Plan LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 4429 SWO-5268 which allegedly was the basis of the segregation of the lands, if only to prove that the same had been duly approved and certified correct by the Land Registration Commission. What was submitted before the RTC and this Court was only the Subdivision Plan of Lot 25-A-2 which notably does not bear the stamp of approval of the LRC. Even an inspection of the exhibit for CLT does not bear this Survey Plan, which could have, at the very least, proven the authenticity of the DIMSON title. Indeed, We find the absence of this piece of evidence as crucial in proving the validity of the titles of DIMSON in view of the allegation of contending parties that since the survey plan upon which the land titles were based contained the notation "SWO,"

meaning that the subdivision plan was only a product of a "special work order," the same could not have passed the LRC. Neither was it duly certified by the said office.25 In addition, the Special Division took note of other irregularities attending Dimsons TCT No. R-15169. [Firstly], OCT No. 994 showed that Lot 25-A of the Maysilo Estate was originally surveyed on "September 8-27, 1911, October 4-21 and November 17-18, 1911." Yet, in said TCT No. R-15169, the date of the original survey is reflected as "Sept. 8-27, 1911" and nothing more.26 The variation in date is revealing considering that DIMSONs titles are all direct transfers from OCT No. 994 and, as such, would have faithfully adopted the mother lots data. Unfortunately, no explanation for the variance was ever offered. Equally worthy of consideration is the fact that TCT No. 15169 indicates that not only was the date of original registration inexistent, but the remarks thereon tend to prove that OCT No. 994 had not been presented prior to the issuance of the said transfer certificate. This manifest from the notations "NA" on the face of DIMSONs title meaning, "not available." It bears emphasizing that the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to the purchaser without the production of the owners duplicate is illegal (Rodriguez v. Llorente, 49 Phil. 826) and does not confer any right to the purchaser (Philippine National Bank vs. Fernandez, 61 Phil. 448 [1935]). The Registrar of Deeds must, therefore, deny registration of any deed or voluntary instrument if the owners duplicate is not presented in connection therewith. (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 40 Phil. 19 [1926]; Hodges vs. Treasurer of the Phil. 50 Phil. 16 [1927].27 In has also been held that, in cases where transfer certificates of title emanating from one common original certificate of title were issued on different dates to different persons or entities covering the same land, it would be safe to conclude that the transfer certificate issued at an earlier date along the line should prevail, barring anomaly in the process of registration.28 Thus, "(w)here two certificates purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. X x x. In successive registration, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder or whose claim is derived directly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. x x x"29 xxx Still another indication of irregularity of the DIMSON title over Lot No. 25-A is that the issuance of the Sayo Order allegedly confirming the Palma Order was in itself suspect. Gleaning from the records, DIMSON filed the Motion only on 10 October 1977, or eleven (11) years after obtaining the supposed sanction for the issuance of titles in this name. Besides, what was lodged by Jose Dimson before the sala of then Judge Palma was not a simple land registration case wherein the only purpose of Jose Dimson was

to establish his ownership over the subject parcels of land, but, as reflected in the Palma Order, the subject of the case was the confirmation of Jose Dimsons claim over the purported rights of Rivera in the disputed properties. The case did not partake of the nature of a registration proceeding and thus, evidently did not observe the requirements in land registration cases. Unlike in a land registration case, therefore, Jose Dimson needed to file an action before Judge Sayo to seek "confirmation" of Palmas Order dated 13 June 1966. So viewed the general rule proscribing the application of laches or the statute of limitations in land registration cases,30 as well as Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in relation to its provisions on revival of judgment applies only to ordinary civil actions and not to other or extraordinary proceedings such as land registration cases, is clearly not applicable in the present case. The legal consequences of laches as committed by DIMSON and their failure to observe the provisions of Rule 39 should, therefore, find application in this case and thus, the confirmation of DIMSONs title, if any, should fail. Parenthetically, the allegations of DIMSON would further show that they derive the validity of their certificates of title from the decreased Jose Dimsons 25% share in the alleged hereditary rights of Bartolome Rivera ["RIVERA"] as an alleged grandson of Maria Concepcion Vidal ["VIDAL"]. However, the records of these cases would somehow negate the rights of Rivera to claim from Vidal. The Verification Report of the Land Registration Commission dated 3 August 1981 showed that Rivera was 65 years old on 17 May 1963 (as gathered from the records of Civil Case Nos. 4429 and 4496).31 It can thus be deduced that, if Rivera was already 65 years old in 1963, then he must have been born around 1898. On the other hand, Vidal was only nine (9) years in 1912; hence, she could have been born only on 1905. This alone creates an unexplained anomalous, if not ridiculous, situation wherein Vidal, Riveras alleged grandmother, was seven (7) years younger than her alleged grandson. Serious doubts existed as to whether Rivera was in fact an heir of Vidal, for him to claim a share in the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate.32 These findings are consonant with the observations raised by Justice Renato Corona in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion on our 2007 Resolution. To wit: TCT No. T-177013 covers Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate with an area of 891,547.43 sq. m. It was a transfer from TCT No. R-17994 issued in the name of Estelita I. Hipolito. On the other hand, TCT No. R-17994 was a transfer from TCT No. R-15166 in the name of Jose B. Dimson which, in turn, was supposedly a direct transfer from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917. Annotations at the back of Hipolito's title revealed that Hipolito acquired ownership by virtue of a court order dated October 18, 1977 approving the compromise agreement

which admitted the sale made by Dimson in her favor on September 2, 1976. Dimson supposedly acquired ownership by virtue of the order dated June 13, 1966 of the CFI of Rizal, Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 4557 awarding him, as his attorney's fees, 25% of whatever remained of Lots 25-A, 26, 27, 28 and 29 that were undisposed of in the intestate estate of the decedent Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, one of the registered owners of the properties covered by OCT No. 994. This order was confirmed by the CFI of Caloocan in a decision dated October 13, 1977 and order dated October 18, 1977 in SP Case No. C-732. However, an examination of the annotation on OCT No. 994, particularly the following entries, showed: AP-6665/0-994 Venta: Queda cancelado el presente Certificado en cuanto a una extencion superficial de 3,052.93 metros cuadrados y 16,512.50 metros cuadrados, y descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P Leuterio, el primer casado con Deogracias Quinones el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido el certificado de Titulo No; 4210, pagina 163 Libro T-22. Fecha del instrumento Agosto 29, 1918 Fecha de la inscripcion September 9, 1918 10.50 AM AP-6665/0-994 Venta: Queda cancelado el presente Certficado el cuanto a una extencion superficial de 871,982.00 metros cuadrados, descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primer casado con Deogracias Quinones el segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido el certificado de Titulo No 4211, pagina 164, Libro T-22. Fecha del instrumento Agosto 25, 1918 Fecha de la inscripcion September 9, 1918 10:50- AM Based on the description of Lot No. 26 in OCT No. 994, it has an area of 891,547.43 sq. m. which corresponds to the total area sold in 1918 pursuant to the above-cited entries. Inasmuch as, at the time the order of the CFI of Rizal was made on June 13, 1966, no portion of Lot No. 26 remained undisposed of, there was nothing for the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal to convey to Dimson. Consequently, Dimson had nothing to convey to Hipolito who, by logic, could not transmit anything to CLT. Moreover, subdivision plan Psd-288152 covering Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate described in Hipolito's certificate of title was not approved by the chief of the Registered Land Division as it appeared to be entirely within Pcs-1828, Psd-5079, Psd-

5080 and Psd-15345 of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. How Hipolito was able to secure TCT No. R-17994 was therefore perplexing, to say the least. All these significant facts were conveniently brushed aside by the trial and appellate courts. The circumstances called for the need to preserve and protect the integrity of the Torrens system. However, the trial and appellate courts simply disregarded them.33 The Court thus adopts these findings of the Special Division on the validity of Jose Dimsons titles, which he obtained consequent to the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo. Consequently, we cannot give due legal recognition to any and all titles supposedly covering the Maysilo Estate obtained by Dimson upon the authority of either the purported 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma or the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo. B. Indubitably, as between the titles of ARANETA and the MANOTOKS and their predecessors-in-interest, on one hand, and those of DIMSON, on the other, the titles held by ARANETA and the MANOTOKS must prevail considering that their titles were issued much earlier than the titles of the latter. Our findings regarding the titles of Jose Dimson necessarily affect and even invalidate the claims of all persons who seek to derive ownership from the Dimson titles. These include CLT, which acquired the properties they laid claim on from Estelita Hipolito who in turn acquired the same from Jose Dimson. Just as much was concluded by the Special Division as it evaluated CLTs claims. For its part, CLT contended that even at the trial court level, it maintained that there was only one OCT No. 994 from where its claim emanates. It argued that its case against the MANOTOKS, including that of STO. NIO, was never decided based on the doctrines laid down in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals34 and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.35 Before this Special Division, CLT insists that the MANOTOKS failed to submit "new" competent evidence and, therefore, dwelling on the alleged flaws of the MANOTOKs titles, "the findings and conclusions of the court-appointed commissioners as adopted by the trial court, then upheld by the Honorable Court in its Decision dated 28 September 1995 and finally affirmed in the Supreme Courts Decision dated 2 9 November 2005, therefore stand, as there is no reason to disturb them." Furthermore, CLT contends that the Orders of Judge Palma and Judge Sayo are no longer open to attack in view of their finality. Lastly, CLT asserts that the properties covered by the MANOTOKS titles and those covered by the expropriation proceedings did not property pertain to and were different from Lot 26 owned by CLT. Thus, it maintains that the MANOTOKS cannot use as basis for the validity of their titles the expropriation undertaken by the Government as a means of staking their claims.

To restate, CLT claims the 891,547.43 square meters of land covered by TCT No. T17701336located in Malabon, Caloocan City and designated as "Lot 26, Maysilo Estate, LRC Swo-5268." TCT No. T-177013 shows that its mother titles is OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. Tracing said claim, Estelita Hipoloto executed a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage in favor of CLT on 10 December 1988. By virtue of this transfer, Hipolitos TCT No. R-1799437 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, CLTs TCT No. 223677/R-17994 of TCT No. R-17994. Hipolito, on the other hand, was a transferee of the deceased Dimson who was allegedly the registered owner of the subject land on the basis of TCT No. 15166. In view of the foregoing disquisitions, invalidating the titles of DIMSON, the title of CLT should also be declared a nullity inasmuch as the nullity of the titles of DIMSON necessarily upended CLTs propriety claims. As earlier highlighted, CLT had anchored its claim on the strength of Hipolitos title and that of DIMSONs TCT No. 15166. Remarkably and curiously though, TCT No. 15166 was never presented in evidence for purposes of tracing the validity of titles of CLT. On this basis alone, the present remand proceedings remain damning to CLTs claim of ownership. Moreover, considering that the land title of CLT carried annotations identical to those of DIMSON and consequently included the defects in DIMSONs title, the fact that whatever typographical errors were not at anytime cured by subsequent compliance with the administrative requirements or subjected to administrative correction bolsters the invalidity of the CLT title due to its complete and sole dependence on the void DIMSON title.38 IV. The task of the Special Division was not limited to assessing the claims of the Heirs of Dimson and CLT. We likewise tasked the Special Division to ascertain as well the validity of the titles held by the Manotoks and Araneta, titles which had been annulled by the courts below. Facially, these titles of the Manotoks and Araneta reflect, as their valid mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. Nonetheless, particular issues were raised as to the validity of the Manotok and Araneta titles independent of their reliance on the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 vis--vis the inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT No. 994. A. We begin by evaluating the Araneta titles. The Special Division quoted the observations of the trial court, which upheld Dimsons claim over that of Ar aneta, citing the following perceived flaws of TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, from which Araneta derived its titles, thus: Let us now examine TCT 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma. Rato from where defendant was said to have acquired TCT 13574 and TCT 7784 now TCT 21343 in the name of Araneta and the other documents related thereto:

1) Perusal of TCT 26538 shows that its Decree No. and Record No. are both 4429. In the same vein, TCT 26539 also shows that it has Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429. However, Decree No. 4429 was issued by the Court of First Instance, Province of Isabela (Exhibit I) and Record No. 4429, issued for Ordinary Land Registration Case, was issued on March 31, 1911 in CLR No. 5898, Laguna (Exhibit 8, 8-A Bartolome Rivera et al.) How then could TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 both have Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, which were issued in Court of First Instance, Province of Isabela and issued in Laguna, respectively. 2) TCT no. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name of Jose Ma. Rato are not annotated in the Original Certificate of Title 994, where they were said to have originated. 3) The Escritura de Incorporacion de Philippine Land Improvement Company (Exhibit I) executed on April 8, 1925 was only registered and was stamped received by the Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission only April 29, 1953 when the Deed of Sale & Mortgage was executed on August 23, 1947 (Exh. 5 defendant) and the Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale and Mortgage executed on November 13, 1947 (Exh. M0. So, that when Philippine Land Improvement was allegedly given a special power of attorney by Jose Ma. Rato to represent him in the execution of the said two (2) documents, the said Philippine Land Improvement Company has not yet been duly registered. 4) TCT 26538 and 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma. Rato, both cancel 21857 which was never presented in Court if only to have a clear tracing back of the titles of defendant Araneta. 5) If the subject matter of the Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit 5 defendant) is TCT 26539, why is it that TCT 13574 of defendant Araneta cancels TCT 6196 instead of TCT 26539. That was never explained. TCT 6196 was not even presented in Court. 6) How come TCT 26538 of Jose Ma. Rato with an area of 593,606.90 was cancelled by TCT 7784 with an area of only 390,282 sq.m. 7) How was defendant Araneta able to have TCT 7784 issued in its name, when the registration of the document entitled Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit M) was suspended/denied (Exhibit N) and no title was received by the Register of Deeds of Pasig at the time the said document was filed in the said Office on March 4, 1948 (Exhibit N and N-1).

Under Sec. 55 of Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) now Sec. 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, no new certificate of title shall be entered, no memorandum shall be made upon any certificate of title by the register of deeds, in pursuance of any deed or other voluntary instrument, unless the owners duplicate certificate is presented for such endorsement. 8) The sale by Jose Ma. Rato in favor of defendant Araneta is not reflected on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT 26538 (Exhibit 7-defendant) meaning that TCT 26538 still exists and intact except for the encumbrances annotated in the Memorandum of Encumbrances affecting the said title (Exhibits 16, 16-A and 16-N David & Santos) 9) In the encumbrances annotated at the back of TCT 26539 (Exhibit 4defendant) there appears under entry No. 450 T 6196 Victoneta, Incorporated covering parcel of land canceling said title (TCT 26539) and TCT 6196 was issued ( x x x) which could have referred to the Deed (sic) of Sale and Mortgage of 8-23-47 (Exhibit 5-defendant) entered before Entry 5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company, with Date of Instrument: 1-10-29, and Date of Inscription: 9-21-29. In TCT 26838 this Entry 5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company (Exhibit 16-J-1) appears, but the document, Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage dated November 13, 1947 (Exhibit M) does not appear. Entry marked Exhibit 16-J-1 on TCT 26538 shows only the extent of the value of P42,000.00 invested by Jose Ma. Rato in the Philippine Land Improvement Company. Said entry was also entered on TCT 26539. The Court also wonders why it would seem that all the documents presented by defendant Araneta are not in possession of said defendant, for according to witness Zacarias Quintan, the real estate officer of the said defendant Araneta since 1970, his knowledge of the land now in possession of defendant Araneta was acquired by him from all its documents marked in evidence which were obtained only lately when they needed for presentation before this Court.3940 The Special Division then proceeded to analyze these factual contentions, and ultimately concluded that the Araneta claim to title was wholly valid. We adopt in full the following factual findings of the Special Division, thus: As for the proprietary claim of ARANETA, it maintains that it has established by direct evidence that its titles were validly derived from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. With regard to the imputed flaws, it asseverates that these were unfounded and thus, labored to refute all of them. ARANETA further expounded on the nullity of the Palma and Sayo Orders which was the basis of DIMSONs titles.

The documentary exhibits it proffered traced its certificates of title to OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. From the titles submitted, its predecessor-in-interest was Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon ["RATO"], one of the co-heirs named in OCT No. 994, who was allotted the share of nine and five hundred twelve one thousandths (9-512/1000) percent share of the Maysilo Estate.41 For this reason, to ascertain the legitimacy of the derivative title of ARANETA, the origin and authenticity of the title of RATO need to be reassessed. Verily, attesting to RATOs share on the property, Entry No. 12343/O -994 of the Owners Duplicate Copy of OCT no. 994, records the following: "12343/O-994 Auto: Jose Rato y Tuason - - - Queda cancelado el presente seartificado en cuanto a una estension superficial de 1,405,725.90 metro Cuadrados mas o menos descrita en el Lote No. 25-A-3, an virtud del auto dictado por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Riza, de fecha 28 de Julio de 1924, y que en au lugar se had expedido el Certificados de Titulo No. 8692, folio 492 del Tomo T-35 del Libro de Certicadads de Transferencia. Date of Instrument Julio 28, 1924. Date of Inscription Agosto 1, 1024 10:19 a.m. SGD. GLICERIO OPINION, Register of deeds Agosto 19, 192442 In accordance with the decree, RATO was issued on 1 August 1924, TCT No. 869243 which covers "Lote No. 25 A-3 del plano del subdivision, parte del Lote No. 25A, plano Psu-(not legible), "Hacienda de Maysilo," situado en el Munisipio de Caloocan, Provincia del Rizal x x x."44 The parcel of land covers an approximate area of "UN MILLION CUATROCIENTOS CINCO MIL SETECIENTOS VEINTICINCO metros cuadrados con NOVENTA decimetros cuadrados (1,405,725.90) mas o menos." As reflected under Entry No. 14517.T-8692,45 the parcel of land covered under this certificate of title was subdivided into five (5) lots under subdivision plan Psd-6599 as per Order of the court of First Instance of Rizal. Consequently, TCT Nos. 21855, 21856, 21857, 21858 and 21859 were issued. Focusing on TCT No. 21857 issued on 23 May 1932, this certificate of title issued in RATOs name,46 cancelled TCT No. 869247 with respect to the property it covers. On its face, TCT No. 21857,48 was a derivative of OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. It covers Lot No. 25 A-3-C of subdivision plan Psd-6589, being a portion of Lot No. 25-A3, G.L.R.O Record No. 4429. Thereafter, TCT No. 21857 was cancelled by TCT No. 2653849 and TCT No. 2653950 which were both issued in the name of Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon on 17 September 1934.

With respect to TCT No. 26539, the certificate of title showed that it covered a parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of the subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C having an approximate area of 581,872 square meters.51 Thereafter, TCT No. 26539 was cancelled by TCT No. 619652 whose registered owner appears to be a certain Victoneta, Inc. This parcel of land has an area of 581,872 square meters designated as section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25A-3-C. As shown on its face, TCT No. 6196 issued on 18 October 1947 in the name of Victoneta, Inc. and its mother title were traced from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. Later, TCT No. 6196 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 13574 was issued in favor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture on 20 May 1949.53 It covers a parcel of land designated as section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C. It has an aggregate area of 581,872 square meters. On the other hand, appearing under Entry No. 16086/T-No. 13574 of TCT No. 6196 is the following: "Entry No. 16086/T-No. 13574 SALE in favor of the ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, vendee: Conveying the property described in this certificate of title which is hereby cancelled and issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13574, page 74, Book T-345 in the name of the vendee. (Doc. No. 149, page 98, Book II, S. of 1949 of Notary Public for Manila, Hospicio B. Bias). Date of Instrument May 18, 1949 Date of the Inscription May 30, 1949 at 11:00 a.m.54 TCT No. 2653855 in turn showed on its face that it covers a parcel of land designated as Section 1 of subdivision plan Psd-10114 being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C having an area of 592,606.90 square meters.56 On 4 March 1948, TCT No. 26538 was cancelled by TCT No. 7784, which was issued in favor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture. TCT No. 7784 covers four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 390,282 square meters.57It would appear from the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 34819 consolidated with CA-G.R. CV No. 41883 that TCT No. 7784 was eventually cancelled by TCT No. 21343.58 As per attachment of ARANETA in its Answer dated 6 march 1980 filed in Civil Case No. 8050, a mere copy of TCT No. 21343 showed that it covers a parcel of land designated as Lot 6-B of the subdivision plan Psd-24962 being a portion of Lot 6, described as plan Psd-21943, G.L.R.O. Record No. 4429 with an approximate area of 333,377 square meters.59 However, for reasons unknown, a copy of TCT No. 21343, whether original or certified true copy thereof, was not submitted before this Court.

In summation, ARANETA had shown that RATO, as one of the co-owners of the property covered by OCT NO. 994, was assigned Lot No. 25-A-3. His evidence of ownership is reflected on TCT No. 8692 issued in his name. RATO held title to these parcels of land even after its subdivision in the 1930s. Further subdividing the property, RATO was again issued TCT No. 21857, and later TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, still covering Lot No. 25 A-3-C. In all his certificates of title, including those that ultimately passed ownership to ARANETA, the designation of the lot as either belonging to or portions of Lot 25-A-3 was retained, thereby proving identity of the land. More importantly, the documentary trail of land titles showed that all of them were derived from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. For purposes of tracing ARANETAs titles to Oct No. 994, it would appear that the evidence presented ultimately shows a direct link of TCT Nos. 7784 and 13574 to said mother title. Suffice it to state, the origin and legitimacy of the proprietary claim of ARANETA had been well substantiated by the evidence on record and on this note, said titles deserve validation. Under the guidelines set, we shall now proceed to evaluate the imputed flaws which had been the previous bases of the trial court in invalidating ARANETAs titles. One of the flaws observed on the titles of ARANETAs predecessor -in-interest was that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in Ratos name refer to Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, as basis of their issuance. This is being questioned inasmuch as Decree No. 4429 refers to a decree issued by the CFI of Isabela while Record No. 4429 was issued for ordinary Land Registration Case No. 31 March 1911 in CLR No. 5898 of Laguna. Explaining this discrepancy, ARANETA insisted that the same was a mere typographical error and did not have any effect on the validity of their title. It further contended that the number "4429" was the case number of Decree No. 36455 and was used interchangeably as the record number. This Court finds that the incorrect entry with respect to the Decree and Record Number appearing on the title of ARANETAs predecessor-in-interest cannot, by itself, invalidate the titles of ARANETAs predecessors-in-interest and ultimately, that of ARANETA. To the mind of this Court, the incorrect entries alluded to would not have the effect of rendering the previous titles void sans any strong showing of fraudulent or intentional wrongdoing on the part of the person making such entries. Fraud is never presumed but must be established by clear and convincing evidence.60 The strongest suspicion cannot sway judgment or overcome the presumption of regularity. The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass.61 The Supreme Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc.62 acknowledged that certain defects on a certificate of title, specifically, the interchanging of numbers, may occur

and "it is certainly believable that such variance in the copying of entries could be merely a typographical or clerical error." In such cases, citing with approval the decision of the appellate court, the technical description in the title should prevail over the record number.63 Thus, what is of utmost importance is that the designation and the technical description of the land, as stated on the face of the title, had not been shown to be erroneous or otherwise inconsistent with the source of titles. In ARANETAs case, all the titles pertaining to Lot No. 25 had been verified to be an offshoot of Decree No. 36455 and are all located in Tinajeros, Malabon. At any rate, despite the incorrect entries on the title, the properties, covered by the subject certificates of title can still be determined with sufficient certainty. It was also opined that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name of RATO had not been annotated on OCT No. 994 from which said titles had supposedly originated. It should be stressed that what partially cancelled OCT No. 994 with respect to this subject lot were not TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539 but TCT No. 8692 issued on 1 August 1924. In fact, TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539 are not even the immediate predecessors of OCT No. 994 but were mere derivatives of TCT No. 21857. Logically therefore, these two certificates of title could not have been annotated on OCT No. 994, they not being the preceding titles. In any case, a perusal of OCT No. 994 shows an entry, which pertains to Jose Ma. Rato but, on account of the physical condition of the copy submitted to this Court, the entry remains illegible for us to make a definite conclusion.64 On the other hand, Entry No. 12343/O-994 found on the Owners Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 994 specifically recorded the issuance of TCT No. 8692 over Lot No. 25-A-3.65 The other flaws noted on ARANETAs certificates of title pertained to its failure to present TCT Nos. 21857, 6196 and 21343. As we have discussed, ARANETA offered in evidence a certified microfilm copy of TCT No. 21857 and a certified true copy of TCT No. 6196 marked as Exhibits 5-A1A and 19-A1A, respectively. However, it failed to submit a copy of said TCT No. 21343. Be that as it may, we will not hasten to declare void TCT No. 7784 as a consequence of such omission, especially so since TCT No. 21343 appears to be a mere derivative of TCT No. 7784. Given that the validity of TCT No. 7784 had been preponderantly proven in these proceedings, the authenticity of said title must be sustained. Besides, ARANETAs failure to submit TCT No. 21343 had never been put into issue in these proceedings. With respect to the difference in the area of more than 200,0000 square meters between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No. 26538, we find that the trial court failed to consider the several conveyances of portions of TCT No. 26538 before they finally passed on to ARANETA. Thus, on the Memorandum of Encumbrance of TCT No. 26538, it is apparent that portions of this piece of land had been sold to various individuals before the same were transferred to ARANETA on 4 march 1948. Naturally,

since the subject land had been partially cancelled with respect to the portion disposed of, it could not be expected that the area of TCT No. 26538 will remain the same at the time of its transfer to ARANETA. Even assuming that the entire area covered by TCT No. 26538 had been disposed of, this fact alone, cannot lend us to conclude that the conveyance was irregular. An anomaly exists if the area covered under the derivative title will be much more than its predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this is not so in the case before us. The trial court, relying on Exhibit "N", further asserted that ARANETA should not have been issued TCT No. 7784 considering that the registration of the Novation of Contract, deed of Sale & Mortgage was suspended/denied and no title was received by the Register of Deeds of Pasig at the time the said document was filed in the said Office on march 4, 1948. A perusal of Exhibit "N" submitted before the trial court, shows that the suspension or denial was merely conditional considering that the person seeking registration had give days within which to correct the defects before final denial thereof. As we see it, the Notice merely contained a warning regarding the denial of the registration of the voluntary deed but, in no way, did it affect the vested rights of ARANETA to be land. The fact that the title to the land was subsequently issued free from any notation of the alluded defect creates a reasonable presumption that ARANETA was in fact able to comply with the condition imposed. This is especially true since the notice itself contained a note, "Just Completed," written across the face of the letter. Records also reveal the RTCs observation with regard to Aranetas failure to disprove the result of the plotting made on the subject land (Exhibit K) to the effect that TCT 26538 overlaps portion of TCT 15159 and TCT 26539 also overlaps the other portion of said TCT R-15169. The trial court further noted that "TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson) and TCT 26539 (Jose Rato) and TCT 21343 (Araneta) are overlapping each other within Lot 25-A. That portion of TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson) along bearing distance points to 17 to 18 to 19 to 20 to 21 to 1 and 2 shaded in yellow color in the Plan is not covered by TCT 21343 (Araneta)."66 Scrutinizing Exhibit "K," it becomes apparent that the said evidence relied upon was only a private survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Reggie P. Garcia which had not been duly approved by the Bureau of Lands and was based only on photocopies of relevant land titles.67 What is more, said geodetic engineer also failed to adequately explain his observations, approach and manner of plotting the relative positions of the lots.68 From all indications, the conclusions reached by said geodetic engineer were anchored on unfounded generalizations. Another defect cited on ARANETAs title was the absence of any entry on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. 26538 of the alleged sale between RATO and ARANETA. As pointed out by ARANETA, the copy of TCT No. 26538 submitted to the trial court contained entries only up to the year 1947, thus, explaining the (1) lack of entry with regard to the issuance of TCT No. 7784 in favor of ARANETA considering

that the same was issued a year later and; (2) entry pertaining to Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company which was entered way back on 21 August 1929. Nonetheless, it still cannot be denied that Rato and ARANETA together with Don Salvador Araneta, entered into a voluntary agreement with the intention of transferring the ownership of the subject property. Moreover, no conclusion should have been reached regarding the total cancellation of TCT No. 26538 inasmuch as TCT No. 7784 cancelled the former certificate of title to the extent only of Three Hundred Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Two (390,282) square meters. Notably also, with the evident intent to discredit and refute the title of ARANETA, DIMSON submitted TCT Nos. 2653869 and 21857,70 which are both derivatives of OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917 and cover parcels of land located in Malabon, Rizal. However, these certificates of title reflect different registered owners and designation of the land covered. Pertinently, Exhibit "M-Dimson" relating to TCT No. 26538, registered on 12 June 1952, points to one Angela Bautista de Alvarez as the registered owner of a 240 square meter of land designated as Lot No. 19, Block 14 of the subdivision plan Psd5254 being a portion of Lot No. 7-A-1-A. This certificate of title cancels TCT No. 14112/T-348 and refers to a certain TCT No. 30473 on the inscriptions. Exhibit "N-Dimson," on the other hand, pertaining to TCT No. 21857 was issued on 30 March 1951 to one Angela I. Tuason de Perez married to Antonio Perez. This certificate of Title covers a parcel of land described as Lot No. 21, Block 16 of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-140, G.L.R.O. Record No. 4429. It ahs an area of 436 square meters and cancels TCT No. 21856. Exhibit "Q-Dimson"71 consisting of TCT No. 8692 covers two parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Block No. 44 of the consolidation Subdivision Plan Pcs-188 with a total area of 3,372 square meters. It was issued to Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated on 7 May 1948. This certificate of title cancelled TCT No. 46118. Comparing these titles to those of the ARANETA, it is apparent that no identity of the land could be found. The Supreme Court, in the case of Alonso v. Cebu City Country Club, Inc.72 agreeing with the Court of Appeals dissertation in said case, ruled that there is nothing fraudulent for a certificate of title to bear the same number as another title to another land. On this score, the Supreme Court elucidated as follows: "On the question that TCT No. RT-1310 (T-1151) bears the same number as another title to another land, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there is nothing fraudulent with the fact that Cebu Country Club, Inc.s reconstituted title bears the same number as the title of another parcel of land. This came about because under General Land Registration Office (GLRO) Circular No. 17, dated February 19, 1947, and Republic Act No. 26 and Circular No. 6, RD 3, dated August 5, 1946, which were in force at the

time the title was reconstituted on July 26, 1946, the titles issued before the inauguration of the Philippine Republic were numbered consecutively and the titles issued after the inauguration were numbered also consecutively starting with No. 1, so that eventually, the titles issued before the inauguration were duplicated by titles issued after the inauguration of the Philippine Republic x x x." Parenthetically, in their Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Courts Resolution dated 30 October 2008, DIMSON objected to the admissibility of Exhibits 4-A1A to 7A1A on the ground that ARANETA failed to submit the original copies of these certificates of title and contended that the "originals" contain different "contents" from their own Exhibits M, N and Q.73 The fact that the entries contained in ARANETAs pieces of evidence are different from that of DIMSONs do not automatically make ARANETAs exhibits inferior replications or a confirmation of their falsity. Interestingly, the objection regarding the non-submission of the "original copy" had not been raised by DIMSON in their Comments/Objections to Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence (Of Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.).74 In any case, we find the objections unwarranted considering that certified true copies or certified microfilm copies of Exhibits 4-A1A to 7-A1A had been submitted by ARANETA in these proceedings. Lastly, on the alleged non-registration of Philippine Land Improvement Company at the time the special power of attorney was executed by Jose Ma. Rato to represent him in the execution of the deed of conveyances, the same only proves that Philippine Land Improvement Company was not yet registered and this does not go as far as proving the existence or non-existence of the company at which time it was executed. In effect, the company was not precluded to enter into contracts and be bound by them but it will do so at the risk of the adverse effects of non-registration under the law. Ultimately, the question of whether the aforesaid certificates of title constitute as clouds on ARANETAs titles are not for this Court to rule upon for purposes of the present remand. Needless to state, it is not for the Heirs of Dimson to rely on the weakness of ARANETAs titles and profit from it. Rather, they should have focused on the strength of their own titles since it is not within our office to decide in whose hands the contested lands should go, our task being merely to trace back the parties claims to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917.75 There is no question that the Araneta titles were derived from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917, particularly from the share of Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon, one of the co-heirs named in OCT No. 994. The Special Division correctly assessed, among others, the reference to Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429 in some of the antecedent titles of Araneta76 as mere clerical errors that could not have invalidated said titles, "4429" being the case number of Decree No. 36455, and the designation and the technical description of the land on those titles not having been shown to be erroneous or variant with the source title. The Special Division also correctly considered that the trial court had failed to take into account the several conveyances of TCT No. 26538 before it was ultimately transferred to Araneta in 1948, which explain the difference in area

between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No. 26538. The imputed overlap of TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 with the titles held by Dimson was based on a private survey which had not been duly approved by the Bureau of Lands. The alleged absence of any entry on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. 26538 of the sale of the property between Rato and Araneta did not, according to the Special Division, discount the fact that Rato and Araneta entered into a voluntary agreement with the intention of transferring the ownership of the subject property. Finally, the Special Division noted that the titles derived from OCT No. 994, which Dimson had submitted as evidence to discredit the Araneta claim, pertain to properties wholly different from those covered by the Araneta titles. There is no cause to dispute the factual findings and conclusions of the Special Division on the validity of the Araneta titles, and we affirm the same. B. It appears that the claim to title of the Manotoks is somewhat more controversial. The Special Division did not discount the fact that there could have been flaws in some of the intervening titles between the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 and the present titles of the Manotoks. However, the significant event was the expropriation proceedings undertaken by the Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947. At least some of the titles in the name of the Manotoks were sourced from the titles issued to and subsequently distributed by the Republic. The Special Division explained the milieu in full: VALIDITY OF THE MANOTOK TITLES The notation under Entry No. 6655/O-994, found on page 17 of OCT 994 of the Owners Duplicate Copy, shows that Lot No. 26 had been a subject of sale in favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P. Leuterio.77 The notations reads: "Ap. 6655/O-994 Venta: Queda Cancelado el presente Certificado en cuanto a una extension superficial de 3,052.93 Metros cuadrados y 16,512.50 metros Cuadrados y descrita en elLote No. 26 vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruis y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primar casado con Diogracias Quinones y el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se be expedido el Certificado de Titulo No. 4210, Pagina 163, Libro T-22. Date of the Instrument Aug. 29, 1918 Date of Inscription Sept. 9, 1918 10:50 a.m. (GD) L. GARDUNIO, Register of Deeds" "Ap. 6665/O-994-Venta: Queda Cancelado el presente Cerficiado en cuanto a una extension superficial de 871,982.00 metros cuadrados, descrita en el Lote No. 26, vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primar casado con

Deogracias Quinones y el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se be expedido el Certificado de Titulo No. 4211, Pagina 164, Libro T-No. 22. Date of Instrument Aug. 21, 1918 Date of Inscription Sept. 9, 1918 10:50 a.m. (SGD.) L. GARDUNIO, Register of Deeds" As a result, TCT No. 4211 was cancelled by TCT No. 5261 which was issued in the name of Francisco Gonzales. Inscribed on the "Memorandum of the Incumbrances Affecting the Property Described in this Certificate" was the sale executed in favor of Francisco Gonzales dated 3 March 1920. Thus, on 6 April 1920, TCT No. 5261 was issued in the name of Francisco Gonzales.78 On 22 August 1938, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled by TCT No. 35486 in the names of Jose Gonzales y Narciso married to Maria P. Gutierrez, Consuelo Susana Gonzales y Narciso married to Alfonso D. Prescilla; Juana Francisco Gonzales y Narciso married to Fortunato de Leon; Maria Clara Gonzales y Narciso married to Delfin Hilario; Francisco Felipe Gonzales y Narciso married to Pilar Narciso, and Concepcion Andrea Gonzales y Narciso married to Melquiades M. Virata, Jr. Appearing on the "Memorandum" of TCT No. 5261 is NOTA: Ap 2111 which reads as follows:79 "A/2111 Adjudicado el torreno descrito en este certificado de titulo, a Rufina Narciso Vda. de Gonzales, a cuenta de la participacion de osia esta en (not legible) los tienes de la eseledad de genanciales. Habida entre la misma y el finado Francisco J. Gonzales, per una orden del Hon. Fernando Jugo, Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila Sala II, dienada el 20 de Septiembre de 19 (not legible), en el Expidiente de intestado del nombrado Francisco J. Gonzales, No. 49034, se cancela el presente certificado de tituto y se expide otre a hombre decha Rufina Narciso, con (not legible) No. 35486, folio 86, Tomo T-168 del libro de transferencias, archivando se la copia de dicha orden da que se ha heche referencia en al Legajo T-No. 35486. (SGD) Registrado de Titulos." TEODORO GONZALES,

The property was later subdivided into seven lots in accordance with subdivision plan Psd-21154.80 Partitioning the lots among the co-owners, TCT No. 35486 was eventually cancelled and in lieu thereof six (6) certificates of titles were individually issued81 to Francisco Gonzaless six (6) children, specifically, TCT Nos. 136 8-1373 while TCT No. 1374 was issued in favor of all the children.82

As previously mentioned, the properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368-1374 were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines and were eventually subdivided and sold to various vendees. Eighteen (18) lots were obtained by MRI from the years 1965 to 1974, while it acquired the lot covered by TCT No. 165119 in 1988. On the other hand, MEC acquired from PhilVille Development Housing Corporation Lot No. 19-B by virtue of Deed of Exchange executed in its favor for which, TCT No. 232568 was issue don 9 May 1991. The 20 certificates of titles were traced by the MANOTOKS, as follows: 1) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 which has an area of 4,988 square meters. MRI purchased this lot from one Basilio Caina who was issued TCT No. 7526 which cancelled TCT Nos. 36657-62 registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.83 2) TCT No. 7762, covering Lot 1-C, was obtained by MRI from one Narcisa Buenaventura. The Parcel of land has an approximate area of 2,876 square meters. Buenaventuras ownership was evidenced by TCT No. 7525,84 deriving the same from TCT No. 36657-63.85 3) TCT No. 8012 in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 12-1 having an area of 20,000 square meters.86 This certificate of title was traced from one Filemon Custodio who held TCT No. 7792. Custodio was in turn a transferee of Guillermo Rivera, the latter having been issued TCT No. 7760 by virtue of sale between him and then Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation ["PHHC"]. The latter title eventually cancelled TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic.87 4) TCT No. 9866 issued to MRI covers Lot No. 21 and has an approximate area of 23,979 square meters. MRIs certificate of title was derived from TCT No. 9854 registered in the name of Filemon Custodio, a transferee of Jose Dionisio, who was issued TCT No. 9853. Dionisios title in turn cancelled the Republics TCT No. 36657-63.88 5) TCT No. 21107 issued to MRI covers Lot 22 with an approximate area of 2,557 square meters. MRI acquired the same by virtue of sale between him and Francisco Custodio, holder of TCT No. 21040. Francisco Custodio was a transferee of Lorenzo Caina, registered owner of TCT No. 21039 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale between Caina and the PHHC, the latters certificate of title canceling TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic.89 6) TCT No. 21485 was issued to MRI by virtue of sale between it and Francisco Custodio, registered owner of TCT No. 21484. The certificate of title covers Lot 20 with an approximate area of 25,276 square meters Custodio was in turn a transferee of Lorenzo Caina, the latter being the registered owner of TCT No.

21013 by reason of sale between him and PHHC.90 Under Entry No. 6277/T21485, it would appear that portions of the property covered under TCT No. 21485 and TCT No. 232568 had been subject of an expropriation proceedings to which the Manotok Estate Corporation, et al. interposed no objections subject to the payment of just compensation.91 7) TCT Nos. 2640592 and 26406,93 both registered in the name of MRI, cancelled TCT Nos. 9773 and 9774, respectively. TCT Nos. 9773 and 9774 were registered in the names of Romulo, Rosalina, Lucila, Felix and Emilia all surnamed Jacinto, [JACINTOS"], before the same were transferred to MRI by reason of sale in favor of the latter. The JACINTOS certificates of title were in turn derived from TCT Nos. 8014 and 8015 issued in the name of Filemon Custodio94 Both TCT Nos. 8014 and 8015 cancelled TCT 7792/T-39. However, for purposes of tracing TCT No. 7792/T-39 to the Republics certificate of titles, this certificate of title was not submitted in evidence. 8) TCT No. 2640795 issued to MRI was traced back to the title of Lourdes Mercado Cloribel who was the registered owner of TCT No. 8404 by virtue of sale between the two, thereby transferring ownership to MRI. On the fact of TCT No. 8404, it would show that it cancelled TCT No. 8013/T41 but there is no showing in whose name TCT No. 8013 was registered and what certificate of title it cancelled. 9) TCT No. 3390496 of MRI cancelled TCT No. 8017 of Filemon Custodio by virtue of sale between the latter and MRI.97 We note that TCT No. 8017 cancelled TCT No. 7792/T-39 but there is no showing whether the same could be traced back to the Republics certificates of title. 10) TCT No. 34255, covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters, reflects MRI as the registered owner. This certificate of title cancels TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic.98 11) TCT No. 25487599 bears MRI as the registered owner of Lot 55-A with an area of approximately 1,910 square meters. This certificate of title cancelled TCT No. 41956 which covers Lot 55, also registered in the name of MRI. It would appear that MRI acquired the lot covered under TCT No. 41956 from one Joaquin Caina who was the registered owner of TCT No. 25715 being a vendee of PHHC.100 12) TCT No. 53268 of MRI covered Lot No. 15,101 which was purchased by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta who held TCT No. 53155. Villacorta in turn acquired the same land from one Eufrocina Mackay whose TCT No. 7827 was eventually cancelled by Villacortas land title.102 It would appear that TCT No. 7827 cancelled TCT No. 7826/T-40 but there is no trace to whom the latter title was registered and what certificate of title it cancelled.

13) TCT No. 55897 shows MRI as the registered owner of Lot 3 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate covering an area of more or less 20,531 square meters. This certificate of title cancelled TCT No. 53122 in the names of MRI (19,531 square meters) and one Silvestre Domingo (1,000 square meters). TCT No. 53122 in turn cancelled TCT No. 21347 registered in the names of Jesus Hipona (19,531 square meters) and Silvestre Domingo (1,000 square meters). Notably, TCT No. 21347 cancelled TCT No. 21315/T-107 but there is no indication to whom TCT No. 21315 was registered and what certificate of title it cancelled.103 14) TCT No. C-17272 reflects MRI as the registered owner of Lot 6-C which has an approximate area of 27,850 square meters. MRIs certificate of title cancelled TCT No. C-17234 registered in the names of MRI (27,750 square meters), Roberto S. David (3,0000 square meters) and Jose Madulid (500 square meters). It would appear that TCT No. C-17234 cancelled TCT No. 53124 registered in the names of MRI, Spouses Priscila and Antonio Sebastian and Jose Madulid.104 MRI also submitted in evidence a Deed of Partition between itself, Roberto David and Madulid thereby subdividing the property into Lots 6-A, 6-B and 6-C as per subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-277091.105 Again, we note that TCT No. 53124 cancelled TCT No. 21350/T-107 but the records are bereft of any indication what certificate of title it cancelled and to whom the same was registered. 15) TCT No. C-35267, covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707 square meters, was a by-product of TCT No. 25146, also registered in the name of MRI, after the same was subdivided into two lots, namely, Lot Nos. 56-A and 56-B. TCT No. 25146 cancelled TCT No. 25145 registered in the name of Quirino Labing-isa by virtue of sale in favor of MRI. In turn, TCT No. 21545 cancelled TCT Nos. (36557) 12836 to (36563) 12842.106 16) TCT No. T-121428, registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315272 which has an approximate area of 4,650 square meters. It was previously registered in the names of MRI (4,650 square meters), Ricardo Cruz (941 square meters) and Conchita Umali (1,000 square meters) under TCT No. 53123 by order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City, Branch XII and as per agreement of the parties in Civil Case No. C-424. TCT No. 53123 in turn cancelled TCT No. 21346 whose registered owners were Conchita Umali (1,000 square meters), Ricardo Cruz (941 square meters) and Jesus Hipona (4,650 square meters).107 Like some of the other titles, TCT No. 21346 cancelled TCT No. 21316 but there is no trace of this latter certificate of title. 17) TCT No. 163902, registered in the name of MRI, covers Lot No. 4-B-2 and has an area of more or less 6,354 square meters and a by-product of TCT No.

9022, also in the name of MRI, after the same was subdivided under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-334454. TCT No. 9022, in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of Filemon S. Custodio whose ownership thereon was transferred to MRI by virtue of a voluntary sale.108 TCT No. 8894 cancelled TCT No. 8846/T-45 but this latter certificate of title was not submitted in evidence for purposes of tracing back to the Republics title. 18) TCT No. 165119109 was issued to MRI by virtue of a Deed of Sale between Spouses Francisca Labing-isa and Juan Ignacio [SPOUSES IGNACIO] and MRI, as a result of which, TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO was cancelled.110 It would appear that TCT No. C-39690 cancelled TCT No. 35266/T173 but TCT No. 35266/T-173 was not submitted in evidence. 19) TCT No. T-232568 of the Manotok Estate Corporation, covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-13011152 with an area of 23,206 square meters, was derived from the certificate of title held by PhiVille Development and Housing Corporation under TCT No. 197357. MEC acquired the subject parcel of land by virtue of Deed of Exchange between it and PHILVILLE DATED 9 May 1991.111 TCT No. 197357 cancelled TCT No. 195730/T-974 but there is no trace what certificate of title the latter title cancelled. By and large, all the certificates of title submitted by the MANOTOKS, including their derivative titles, were all traced to OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. Likewise, they declared all the lots covered by such titles for taxation purposes. Without doubt, MRI had successfully traced back some of their certificates of title to the valid OCT No. 994, they having acquired the lots from some of the vendees of the PHHC after the same were expropriated by the Republic from the Gonzalezes. The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Jose Leon Gonzales, et al. To bolster this fact, paragraph "r" of the Majority Report noted that the seven properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 were expropriated by the Republic from the Gonzalezes. The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court in Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose Leon Gonzaels, et al. To bolster this fact, paragraph "r" of the Majority Report noted that the seven properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 were expropriated by the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation which were later consolidated and subdivided into 77 lots for resale to tenants. No sign of protest was ever raised by CLT on this point.112

The fact of expropriation is extremely significant, for titles acquired by the State by way of expropriation are deemed cleansed of whatever previous flaws may have attended these titles. As Justice Vitug explained in Republic v. Court of Appeals,113 and then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno reiterated in Reyes v. NHA:114 "In an rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance."115 This doctrine was derived from the opinion of then Chief Judge (now U.S. Supreme Court Justice) Stephen Breyer in Cadorette v. U.S.,116 which in turn cited the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carmack 117 that "[b]y giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance."118 In annulling the Manotok titles, focus was laid on the alleged defects of TCT No. 4211 issued in September of 1918. However, TCT No. 4211 was issued decades before the property was expropriated. Thus, any and all defects that may have attended that particular title would have been purged when the property covered by it was subsequently acquired by the State through eminent domain. The Special Division noted as much: As it is, the validity of most of MRIs certificates of title should be upheld because they were derived from the Republics valid certificates of title. In fact, some of the MANOTOKS titles can be traced back to the Governments titles as a result of the expropriation in 1947. Relevantly, the titles of the Republic, as the predecessor-in-interest of the MANOTOKS, are presumed valid by virtue of their acquisition resulting from the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain that need not be granted even by the fundamental law. Thus, the alleged flaws concerning the certificates of title issued previous to the exercise of the State of its inherent power did not affect or render invalid the subsequent transfers after the forced sale. Indeed, when land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired or any reversion to the former owner.119 The Special Division also took exception to the majority report of the Commissioners (Majority Report) who had been tasked by the trial court to examine the validity of the Manotok titles. The Majority Report had arrived at several conclusions with respect to the TCTs from which the Manotok titles were derived.120 The Special Division, however, concluded that such report was in

fact tainted by the fact that it was determined "outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties." To wit: In meeting the issue, the MANOTOKS disproved the "opinion" with regard to the alleged defects of their titles inasmuch as the majority report submitted before the trial court was made outside the scope of the tasks which the trial court confined them to perform. The MANOTOKS also argued that before this proceeding on remand, CLT failed to introduce evidence of such flaws neither were the concerned geodetic engineers presented as witnesses. Moreover, the MANOTOKS further maintained that CLT failed to submit any factual or legal bases to prove the authenticity and validity of the Palma and Sayo Orders. They insisted that the Palma Order was a void one for being conditional and having resulted to the issuance of "duplicate certificates of land title." With respect to the imputed flaws on the MANOTOKS titles which were based on the Majority Report, we find that the bases of the alleged defects proceeded from unreliable sources thus, tainting the veracity of the said report. The records of the case between CLT and the MANOTOKS reveal that the parties approved the creation of a commission to resolve only these two issues, to wit: "x x x These issues to be resolved by the 3 Commissioners are as follows: 1) Whether or not the property covered by the Transfer Certificates of Title of defendants pertain to or involve Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate presently titled in the name of the plaintiff; and 2) Whether or not the property covered by the title of the plaintiff and the property covered by the titles of the defendants overlap.121 Scrutinizing the Majority Report upon which the trial courts conclusions were based, it would appear that the findings therein were outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties. Specifically, the deductions with regard to the technical infirmities and defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 4210, 5261 and 35486 do not involve the question of whether or not the subject properties were identified as Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo estate or whether there was overlapping of titles. Records bear out that the MANOTOKS took exception to the procedure taken citing therein the "ultra vires" acts of the two Commissioners. In addition, the majority report focused on the alleged flaws and inherent technical defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486, ranging from the language of the technical descriptions, absence of subdivision plan, lot number and survey plan. Evidently, these defects go only as far as the certificates of title issued prior to those of the Republic.

Remarkably, no specific flaw was found on the MANOTOKS titles indicating any irregularity on their issuance. In fact, the Commissioners who signed the majority report even concluded that only TCT Nos. 4211, 4210, 5261, 35486, 1368 thru 1324 (sic)122 were irregularly and questionably issued without any reference to the MANOTOKS certificates of title.123 Otherwise stated, the imputed flaws affect only those certificates of title issued prior to those registered in the name of the Republic. No flaw had been specifically identified or established in the proceedings below, which would taint the titles held by the MANOTOKS in so far as the regularity of their issuance is concerned.124 At the same time, the Special Division was not prepared to uphold the validity of all of the Manotok titles. It took issue with the particular titles which could not be retraced to the titles acquired by the Republic of the Philippines by way of expropriation. Although the MANOTOKS had traced their title from the vendees of PHHC, there are, however, some certificates of title which could not be traced back to the titles previously held by the Republic specifically, MRIs TCT Nos. 26405 and 26406, 26407, 33904, 53268, 55897, C-17272, T-121428, 163903, 165119 and MECs TCT No. T232568. As to these certificates of title, the MANOTOKS failed to make any specific reference to the preceding certificates of title which they cancelled and to whose names they were subsequently transferred and registered. Thus, we find no sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to their origins.125 V. The Special Division supplied the following precise and concise summary of its conclusions: In prcis, the factual milieu of the present controversy and the evidence on record clearly establish the failure of DIMSON and CLT to substantiate their titles and overcome the onus of proving that said titles are derivatives of OCT 994 registered on 3 May 1917, and not 19 April 1917, as what is reflected in their titles. In contrast, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, both of which had consistently anchored their proprietary claims on OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917, have, in this remand proceeding, been able to support their claims of ownership over the respective portions of the Maysilo Estate. Except in the case of the MANOTOKS which had failed to substantiate the validity of some of their certificates of title, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA presented evidence proving the identity, the extent and the origin of their titles. Answering the issues assigned by the Supreme Court relative to the tenability of the respective imputed flaws in the titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA and whether such flaws are sufficient to defeat said claims, this Court finds that, as discussed above, such flaws are inconsequential and ineffectual in invalidating the MANOTOKS and ARANETA titles.

Significantly, since the respective certificates of title of herein contending parties are contradictory to each other and stand to refute the validity of their opposing titles, it cannot be gainsaid that said certificates of title have correspondingly been subjected to dispute on the basis of separate and distinct imputed flaws. Still, the crucial difference between the imputed flaws allegedly tainting said contending titles, DIMSON and CLT on one hand, and the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, on the other, is that the imputed flaws purportedly beleaguering the respective certificates of title of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA relate to the mechanical and technical aspect of the transcription of their titles and are therefore inconsequential to the import and validity thereof. Said imputed flaws do not depart from the fact that the predecessors-in-interest of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA had been clothed with the right of ownership over the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate. On the other hand, the flaws attending the titles of DIMSON and CLT primarily stem from infirmities attending or otherwise affecting the very crux of their claim of ownership. Having derived their titles from RIVERA, whose title is questionable and dubious to the core, DIMSON and CLT cannot rightly insist on the validity of their titles. Such flaws are hard to overcome as they delve into the substance of their proprietary claims. As stated, DIMSON and CLT miserably failed to overcome their onus and instead opted to hap on the supposed flaws of the adverse parties. For these reasons, the titles of DIMSON and CLT should be declared a nullity. xxx From the foregoing evaluation and in conformity with the Supreme Court 2007 Resolution, this Court arrived at the following conclusions as to the status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances: 1. As categorically declared by the Supreme Court, there is only one OCT 994, the registration date of which had already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917. OCT 994 which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is null and void. 2. In view thereof and in addition to other grounds we have already discussed, the certificates of title of the deceased Jose Dimson and his successor-ininterest, CLT, having been traced back to OCT 994 dated 19 April 1917, are NULL and VOID and thus vest no legal right or claim in favor of DIMSON and CLT. 3. The 13 June 1966 Palma Order and the 18 October 1977 Sayo Order, on which DIMSON and CLT anchor the validity of their respective titles, do not substantiate their proprietary claims. While the existence of said Orders are admitted, the legal import thereof nonetheless fails to confer a semblance of legality on the titles of DIMSON and consequently, of CLT, more so, a superior right to defeat the titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, respectively.

4. Portions of Lot No. 26 pertinent to this controversy, particularly that being disputed by the MANOTOKs and CLT, were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to tenants. The MANOTOKS, thus as successor-in-interest of the Republic, were able to establish that some of their certificates of title had indeed originated or were derived from said expropriated parcels of land. 5. The evidence on record confirm that the certificates of title covering the land being claimed by ARANETA were derived from OCT NO. 994 registered on 3 May 1917 thereby ultimately showing a direct link of TCT Nos. 7784 and 13574 to said mother title. By reason of which, that is either belonging to or portions of Lot 25-A-3 as previously owned by RATO, had been well substantiated and proven to be superior to that of DIMSON. 6. For reasons above-stated and in view of the established rights of ownership of both the MANOTOKS and ARANETA over the contested properties, we find that the imputed flaws on their titles cannot defeat the valid claims of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA over the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate.126 Inasmuch as we agree with the factual findings and evaluation of the Special Division, we likewise adopt the above conclusions. As we earlier stated, it was incumbent on the Heirs of Dimson and/or CLT to establish their claim to title for reasons other than the fact that OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 is extant. They failed to do so. It should be noted that the instant cases arose from separate actions filed by Jose Dimson and CLT seeking the recovery of possession and/or annulment of title against Araneta and the Manotok Group. Thus, the burden of evidence was on Dimson and CLT to establish the strength of their respective claims of ownership, and not merely to rely upon whatever weaknesses in the claims of the Manotoks and Araneta for their causes of action to prosper. The well-settled legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.127 In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.128 We now proceed to tackle the recommendations submitted by the Special Division. They are as follows: RECOMMENDATIONS Apropos to said conclusions, this Court hereby respectfully makes the following recommendations regarding the validity of the conflicting proprietary claims as interposed by the herein contending parties:

1. To declare with finality that the certificates of title of DIMSON and CLT including other derivative titles issued to their successors-in-interest, if any, are NULL and VOID, thus invalidating their legal claims over the subject parcels of land. 2. To declare LEGAL and VALID the proprietary claims the MANOTOKS over the parcels of land covered by the following certificates of title: a) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 which has an area of 4,988 square meters. b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot 1-C, with an approximate area of 2,287 square meters. c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot No. 12-1 having an area of 20,000 square meters. d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot No. 21 and has an approximate area of 23,979 square meters. e) TCT No. 21107 covering Lot 22 with an approximate area of 2,557 square meters. f) TCT No. 21485 covering Lot 20 with an approximate area of 25,276 square meters. g) TCT No. 34255 covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters. h) TCT No. 254875 covering Lot 55-A with an area of approximately 1,910 square meters. i) TCT No. C-35267 covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd292683 with an approximate area of 9,707 square meters. With regard to the following certificates of title, namely: 3.A. MANOTOK REALTY INC. a) TCT No. 26405 covering Lot No. 12-E with an area of 1,0000 square meters. b) TCT No. 26406 covering Lot No. 12-F with an area of 1,000 square meters.

c) TCT No. 26407 covering Lot No. 12-B with an area of 1,000 square meters. d) TCT No. 33904 covering Lot No. 12-H with an area of 1,802 square meters. e) TCT No. 53268 covering Lot No. 15 purchased by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta with an approximate area of 3,163 square meters. f) TCT No. 55897 covering Lot 3 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate covering an area of more or less 20,531 square meters. g) TCT No. C-17272 covering Lot 6-C which has an approximate area of 27,850 square meters. h) TCT No. T-121428 covering Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315278, which has an approximate area of 4,650 square meters. i) TCT No. 163902 covering Lot No. 4-B-2 with an area of more or less 6,354 square meters allegedly a by-product of TCT No. 9022, which in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of Filemon S Custodio. j) TCT No. 165119 which allegedly cancelled TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO by virtue of a Deed of Sale between said Spouses and MRI. 3.B. MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION a) TCT No. T-232568 covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd13011152 with an area of 23,206 square meters. The foregoing certificates of title (3.A and 3.B), failing to make specific references to the particular certificates of title which they cancelled and in whose name they were registered, may be declared NULL and VOID, or in the alternative, subject the same to further technical verification. 4. To declare LEGAL and VALID the title of ARANETA respecting parcels of land covered by the following certificates of title: a) TCT No. 13574 covering a parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C with an aggregate area of 581,872 square meters;

b) TCT No. 7784 covering four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 390,383 square meters.129 The first, second and fourth recommendations are well taken as they logically arise from the facts and conclusions, as determined by the Special Division, which this Court adopts. The third recommendation that eleven (11) of the titles held by the Manotoks be declared null and void or subjected to further technical verification warrants some analysis. The Court has verified that the titles mentioned in the third recommendation do not, as stated by the Special Division, sufficiently indicate that they could be traced back to the titles acquired by the Republic when it expropriated portions of the Maysilo Estate in the 1940s. On the other hand, the Manotok titles that were affirmed by the Special Division are traceable to the titles of the Republic and thus have benefited, as they should, from the cleansing effect the expropriation had on whatever flaws that attached to the previous titles. However, although the Special Division did not concede the same benefit to the other Manotok titles named in the third recommendation, at the same time it did not conclude that such titles were false or fraudulently acquired. Absent such a finding, we are disinclined to take the ultimate step of annulling those titles. Said titles have as their origin what we have acknowledged to be a valid mother title OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. This is in stark contrast with the titles of CLT, the oppositors to the Manotoks, which all advert to an inexistent mother title. On their face, the Manotok titles do not reflect any error or fraud, and certainly the Special Division do not point to any such flaw in these titles. Nothing on the face of the titles gives cause for the Court to annul the same. It is worth mentioning that the Special Division refused to adopt the Majority Report earlier rendered in the case between the Manotoks and CLT, said report having exhaustively listed the perceived flaws in the antecedent TCTs from which the Manotoks derived their claim. The Special Division concluded that such findings had been reached by the Commissioners in excess of their original mandate and, thus, ultra vires. Assuming that such flaws were extant, they existed on the titles and anteceded the expropriation of the properties by the Government. As stated earlier, such expropriation would have cleansed the titles of the prior flaws. But even if the Manotok titles enumerated in the third recommendation could not be sourced from the titles acquired by the Republic through expropriation, still the rejection of the Majority Report signifies that the flaws adverted to therein could not form the basis for the annulment of the titles involved. Indeed, the Special Divisions rejection of the Majority Report further diminishes any ground to annul the Manotok titles referred to in the third recommendation.

Yet, the Court is cognizant that the inability to trace the Manotok titles specified in the third recommendation to those titles acquired by the Government through expropriation puts such titles in doubt somehow. In addition, the Court is aware that the ground utilized by the Special Division in rejecting the Majority Report that the determinations were made outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties -- does not categorically refute the technical findings made therein. Those circumstances, while insufficient for now to annul the Manotoks titles listed in the third recommendation, should be sufficiently made public. Hence, in lieu of annulling the Manotok titles per the Special Divisions third recommendation, the Court deems it sufficient to require the Registers of Deeds concerned to annotate this Resolution on said titles so as to sufficiently notify the public of their unclear status, more particularly the inability of the Manotoks to trace the titles without any gap back to OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. If there should be any cause for the annulment of those titles from a proper partys end, then let the proper case be instituted before the appropriate court. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the Report of the Special Division and issues the following reliefs: 1) The certificates of title of the DIMSONs and CLT including other derivative titles issued to their successors-in-interest, if any, are declared NULL and VOID, thus invalidating their legal claims over the subject parcels of land; 2. The proprietary claims of the MANOTOKS over the parcels of land covered by the following certificates of title are declared LEGAL and VALID, to wit: a) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 which has an area of 4,988 square meters. b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot 1-C, with an approximate area of 2,287 square meters. c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot No. 12-1 having an area of 20,000 square meters. d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot No. 21 and having an approximate area of 23,979 square meters. e) TCT No. 21107 covering Lot 22 with an approximate area of 2,557 square meters. f) TCT No. 21485 covering Lot 20 with an approximate area of 25,276 square meters.

g) TCT No. 34255 covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters. h) TCT No. 254875 covering Lot 55-A with an area of approximately 1,910 square meters. i) TCT No. C-35267 covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd292683 with an approximate area of 9,707 square meters. 3) The following certificates of titles in the name of ARANETA are hereby declared LEGAL and VALID, to wit: a) TCT No. 13574 covering a parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C with an aggregate area of 581,872 square meters; b) TCT No. 7784 covering four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 390,383 square meters. 4) On the following titles in the name of Manotok Realty, Inc. or Manotok Estate Corporation, to wit: a) TCT No. 26405 covering Lot No. 12-E with an area of 1,0000 square meters; b) TCT No. 26406 covering Lot No. 12-F with an area of 1,000 square meters; c) TCT No. 26407 covering Lot No. 12-B with an area of 1,000 square meters; d) TCT No. 33904 covering Lot No. 12-H with an area of 1,802 square meters; e) TCT No. 53268 covering Lot No. 15 purchased by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta with an approximate area of 3,163 square meters; f) TCT No. 55897 covering Lot 3 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate covering an area of more or less 20,531 square meters; g) TCT No. C-17272 covering Lot 6-C which has an approximate area of 27,850 square meters; h) TCT No. T-121428 covering Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd315278, which has an approximate area of 4,650 square meters;

i) TCT No. 163902 covering Lot No. 4-B-2 with an area of more or less 6,354 square meters allegedly a by-product of TCT No. 9022, which in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of Filemon S. Custodio; j) TCT No. 165119 which allegedly cancelled TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO by virtue of a Deed of Sale between said spouses and MRI; k) TCT No. T-232568 covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd13011152 with an area of 23,206 square meters. the Registers of Deeds concerned are ordered to annotate that as determined in the foregoing Resolution, the registered owners of the said titles "failed to make any specific reference to the preceding certificates of title which they cancelled and to whose names they were subsequently transferred and registered," thereby leading the Supreme Court "to find no sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to their origins."130 Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989 DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR, respondents. Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent Amelia Bisnar.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.: Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the decision dated May 27, 1988, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426, entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands," affirming in toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private respondents' application for confirmation and registration of their title to two (2) parcels of land in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256. In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on July 20,1976, the applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869, respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq. m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq. m.)

situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of land (p. 41, Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo). On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the application on the grounds that: 1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land or lots applied for, the same not having been acquired by any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish Government, such as, (1) ' titulo real' or royal grant, (2) the 'concession especial' or special grant, (3) the 'composicion con el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de compra 'or title by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or possessory information under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent applicable laws. 2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application. 3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation, (pp. 17-19, Record on Appeal). (pp. 14-15, Rollo.) On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was approved on March 14, 1977, and included the following allegation: Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby apply for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land as owners for more than fifty (50) years. (p. 16, Rollo.) After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the applicants, herein private respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo). On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the classification of the lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the

absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this petition, the government alleges that: 1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable agricultural land, mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts; 2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership; and 3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as amended. (p. 19, Rollo.) The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended. The petition is impressed with merit. In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled: As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branchof the government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.) It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).

Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]). Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling in Amunategui that: In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application. (Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.) WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The application for registration in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of the former Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed without costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 155450 August 6, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Regional Office No. 2, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND VICTORIA TURINGAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN,respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the 21 May 20012 and 25 September 20023 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The 21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Facts On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No. 3819284 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11585 5 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag. On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277,6 issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,7 issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters. On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928. The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property. The investigating team reported that: A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.

B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.8 Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982." In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation. On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles9 on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as alienable and disposable. On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss. 10 Private respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496.11 Private respondents also stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against private respondents.12 On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.13 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared:

The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which this court may annul are those which the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." The Amended Complaint contains no such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. 14 (Citations omitted) Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. The Issues Petitioner raises the following issues: 1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer available; 2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction; 3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended complaint and in the motion to dismiss; 4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan; 5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance over the land;

6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and 7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case. The Ruling of the Court While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit. Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree.15 We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated: 11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government had the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the timberland area is null and void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine constitution. xxxx 15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in the name of the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force and effect whatsoever.16 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not alienable and disposable.

Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioners failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." In Ancheta v. Ancheta,17 we ruled: In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.18 Since petitioners complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioners complaint were factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.19 Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the complete and proper determination of the case. However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits. Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the

Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain. Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.20 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.21 Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular Government,22we ruled: From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person x x x23 (Emphasis supplied) Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable. In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps24 petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.25 The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874,26 which provides: SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into (a) Alienable or disposable (b) Timber and (c) Mineral lands and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government and disposition.

Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874. It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides: SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasipublic uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied) However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law. Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,27 the Republic sought to annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 92628 and 2874. The Court ruled: We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted

above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied) As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review. The finality of the trial courts decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides: SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution." 29 When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs. MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated, respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents. DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands. There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition,

mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land. The Antecedents G.R. No. 167707 Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.5 On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7 On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reservesunder the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801. Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan. In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10 Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public

forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.12 The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.13 The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. 15 The titles were issued on August 7, 1933.16 RTC and CA Dispositions On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land. SO ORDERED.17 The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of

disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22 The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. 23 The Republic then appealed to the CA. On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24 The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present petition under Rule 45. G.R. No. 173775 On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes. On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.31 Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition. On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.33 Issues G.R. No. 167707 The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.34 G.R. No. 173775 Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely: I. AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705? II. HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE? III. IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV. IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657. V. CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY? 35 (Underscoring supplied) In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws. Our Ruling Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 36 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts. But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain. The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law, 41 giving the government great leeway for classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively

classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46 All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.47Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.49 Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."51 The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52 The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,56 from the date of its inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.58 In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64 x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours) On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.66 Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68 On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.69 After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.71 Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No.

1073,73 which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74 The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344. On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property.78 It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.79 A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified." 82 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.86 In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.87

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands.Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown." 90 Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case. Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91 This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.: x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands. xxxx Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.93 To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands. If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine. The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State. In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated: In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the

contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours) Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.97 Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,98 did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926. We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila,100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.103 Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue inKrivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral. Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name. A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled: "Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands." Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours) Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain. PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass

of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land. Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island;111 that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands touri sm industry, do not negate its character as public forest. Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution 112 classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry114 is particularly instructive: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied) There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine thelegal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership. Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides: No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides: Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development. Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801. The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.119 More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan,

Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation. It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.121 In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.123 Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes. Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights. Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus: SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain. That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705. In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests. While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied) Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point: Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a). Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.127 Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time

immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.128 As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property. Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.129Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130 Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945. We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession. The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945. Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064. The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.

One Last Note The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess. For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law. More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill133 now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide. In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress. To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their pro motion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134 The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a

number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue.135 WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows: 1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. 2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.