ROLANDO TING, Petitioner, 
 GOMEZ V.
CA
vs.
 Facts:
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA
L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE,
ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN
ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents.
Facts:
CFI granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora
Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 on December 10,
1976.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on
January 29, 1977.
An order was issued on November 10, 1982 directing the Land
Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of
registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting filed with the RTC an application
for registration of title to the same lot.
Respondents were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to
petitioner’s application. They argued that Ting is already barred from
filing an application on the ground of res judicata.
RTC dismissed petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata.
Petitioner’s contention:
(1) Although the decision had become final and executory on January
29, 1977, no decree of registration has been issued by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA).
(2) The December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the
failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to
execute the same within the prescriptive period (Section 6, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court)
That after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it
may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except
by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision.
Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to
the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion,
and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule
39.)
Court: Petition not meritorious
(1) The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land
registration court’s approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses
Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza’s application for registration of
the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world
including petitioner.
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a
private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court
confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may
be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when
final, res judicata against the whole world.9 It becomes final when
no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment
of confirmation and registration.
(2) Sec 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court refers to civil actions and is
not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case.
This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately
enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and
his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as
provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party.
In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition
or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person
of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the
ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust
him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration
Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or
losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further
action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an
appeal.
Gomez filed an application for the registration of several lots on Aug.
30, 1968.
The lots were among those involved in the case of Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Abran, 1 wherein this Court declared
Consolacion M. Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto
Bayambang, Pangasinan.
On 5 August 1981, the court rendered its decision granting the
application.
On 6 October 1981, the trial court issued an order 3 stating that the
decision of 5 August 1981 had become final and directed the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding
decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision of 5
August 1981.
On July 11, 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the
Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission,
recommended that the eariler decision and order be set aside on
the ground that the lots were already covered by homestead
patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land
Registration Act.
RTC- set aside the earlier decision
CA- the respondent judge denied Gomez’ motion
(1) ISSUE: whether or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue
set aside the lower court's earlier decision of 5 August 1981 and the
order of 6 October 1981. YES
GOMEZ: The said decision having become final, it may no longer be
reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside. They insist that the duty of
the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely
ministerial.
The report of respondent Silverio Perez should have been submitted to
the court a quobefore its decision became final
COURT: the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration
proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility
until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final
decree of registration.9 This Court, in several decisions, has held that
as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land
Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one
(1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title
is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion
of the court rendering it.
(2) ISSUE: whether or not the respondents Acting Land Registration
Commissioner and Engr. Silverio Perez, Chief, Division of Original
Registration, Land Registration Commission, have no alternative but
to issue the decrees of registration pursuant to the decision of 5 August
1981 and the order for issuance of decrees, dated 6 October 1981, their
duty to do so being purely ministerial. NO.
COURT: The duty is ministerial.. However, if they are in doubt upon
any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is
their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as
officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is
the act of the court. 12 They are specifically called upon to "extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings .
(3) ISSUE: whether or not "the law of the case" is the decision
in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran, supra, which held
that the lands adjudicated to Consolacion Gomez were not public
lands, and therefore they could not have been acquired by holders of
homestead titles as against petitioners herein. NO
COURT: A reading of the pertinent and dispositive portions of the
aforesaid decision will show, however, that the lots earlier covered by
homestead patents were not included among the lands adjudicated to
Consolacion M. Gomez.
The report of respondent land registration officials states that the
holders of the homestead patents registered the lots in question in the
years 1928 and 1929.
It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under the
Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible as a
Torrens title, and may no longer be the subject of an investigation for
determination or judgment in cadastral proceeding.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RODOLFO SY AND
BELEN SY, LOLITA SY, and SPOUSES TEODORICO AND
LEAH ADARNA, Respondents.
Facts:
On March 29, 1988, the Republic, through the OSG, instituted an
action for the cancellation of miscellaneous sales patents and the
corresponding certificates of title issued to the spouses Rodolfo Sy and
Belen Sy, and Lolita Sy (respondents), and the reversion of the lands
covered by them to the public domain on the ground of fraud and
misrepresentation.
RTC- rendered a decision in favor of spouses Sy
The RTC decision was received on November 14, 2007 by DENR
Region VII-Legal Division, which was the OSG's deputized special
counsel, while the OSG received its copy on April 1, 2008.
The Republic, through the deputized legal counsel, subsequently filed
a notice of appeal which was given due course by the RTC.
A notice to file brief was then sent by the CA to Atty. Ferdinand S.
Alberca (Atty. Alberca), Special Counsel of the OSG. It appears,
however, that no brief was filed, hence, the CA, dismissed the appeal.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration. In its resolution, the CA
granted the motion.
The DENR Region VII-Legal Division was, again, furnished a
copy of the resolution but the OSG was not.
Subsequently, the CA issued its Resolution dated July 5,
2012, dismissing the appeal on account of the Republic's failure to file
brief.
There being no reconsideration interposed by the Republic, the
dismissal of the appeal became final and executory and entry of
judgment was made on August 21, 2012.
Again the OSG was not furnished with a copy of such CA
Resolution.
It was only when the Regional Executive Director of the DENR
Region VII sent its 1st Indorsement dated September 27, 2013 that the
OSG was apprised of the subsequent incidents.
Republic’s contention:
It should have been furnished with the CA's resolution reinstating its
appeal, not the DENR Region VII-Legal Division. Consequently, there
was a violation of the Republic's right to due process.
Court:
It is peculiar that the CA failed to furnish the OSG with a copy of its
Resolution dated September 14, 2011, and even continued to neglect to
furnish the OSG with copies of all its subsequent resolutions.
Instead, it kept sending them to Atty. Alberca of the DENR Region
VII- Legal Division. While the OSG may have deputized the DENR
Region VII-Legal Division to assist it in the performance of its
functions, it has not totally relinquished its position as counsel for the
Republic. The deputized counsel is no more than the "surrogate" of the
Solicitor General in any particular proceeding and the latter remains
the principal counsel entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders,
notices, and decisions. Hence, any court order and decision sent to
the deputy, acting as an agent of the Solicitor General, is not
binding until it is actually received by the Solicitor General.
It must be stressed that "[t]he essence of due process is the opportunity
to be heard, logically preconditioned on prior notice, before judgment
is rendered.
Notice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to the passing of an
enforceable judgment, and together with the tribunal having
jurisdiction of the case, constitute basic elements of the constitutional
requirement of due process of law
Hence, the belated filing of an appeal by the State, or even its failure to
file an opposition, in a land registration case because of the mistake or
error on the part of its officials or agents does not deprive the
government of its right to appeal from a judgment of the court.
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and
appellee.
Facts:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the
Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which
was interrupted by the war.
In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied
by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien,
he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction.
CFI- denied also on the ground that he’s an alien
Hence the instant petition.
There was a motion to withdraw the appeal. Such motion stated no
reason whatsoever. While the motion was pending in the SC, the
DOJ issued a new circular, instructing all register of deeds to
accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens.
Court:
L E G I S L AT I V E I N T E R P R E TAT I O N O F “ P U B L I C
AGRICULTURAL LAND”
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional
The Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is
agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but
also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes.
The phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of
Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as including
residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative
interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution.
"agricultural public lands" - means "those public lands acquired from
Spain which are neither mineral nor timber lands.” (1908, in the case
of Mapa vs. Insular Government ) And with respect to residential
lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber
lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural.
Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly
revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141,
and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots
to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by
such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that
residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the
Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
"public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular
meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the
Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor
mineral.
This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural
lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are
stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for
agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial;
industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are
made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in
favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character
as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the
Constitution.
EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF PUBLIC
AGRICULTURAL LAND
Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos rendered an opinion that:
The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case
of Mapa vs. Insular Government, held that the phrase
'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired
from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands.
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the
public domain must have to be included in one or more of
these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
That it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for
agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which
determines whether it is agricultural or not.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary
of Justice who later became the Chief Justice of this Court, but also
because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late
President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the
constitutional provision under consideration. And the opinion of the
Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under
the Osmeña administration, and it was firmly maintained in this Court
by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government
— judicial, legislative and executive — have always maintained
that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural,
mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential
lots.
CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID
REY GUZMAN and EMILIANO CATANIAG, respondents.
Facts:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968,
leaving real properties in the Philippines.
His forced heirs were his widow, private respondent Helen Meyers
Guzman, and his son, David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also
American citizens.
On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim, assigning[,]
transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and
interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them
inherited from Simeon.
On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to
Emiliano Cataniag a filipino citizen
The Halilis, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint
before the RTC questioning the validity of the two conveyances --
between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the
latter and Emiliano Cataniag -- and claiming ownership thereto based
on their right of legal redemption under Art. 1621[5]of the Civil Code.
RTC- dismissed
CA- dismissed the appeal
Issue:
WON the sale between David Rey Guzman and Cataniag is valid.
Court: YES
The court mentioned of the ruling in Krivenko as to who are qualified
and disqualified to own public as well as private lands in the
Philippines.
Under section 1 of Article XIII [now Sec. 2, Art. XII] of the
Constitution, natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and with respect to
public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens.
That section 5 Article XIII closes the only remaining avenue
through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens hands.
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien
vendee to a qualified Filipino citizen? This is not a novel
question. Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private
Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can
no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional provision --
to keep our land in Filipino hands -- has been served.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA
AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents.
Facts:
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses boughtt the subject lots from
one Cristeta Dazo Belen. At the time of the purchase, respondent
spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration
of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the RTC. This time,
however, they were already Canadian citizens.
RTC- granted — The evidence thus presented established that
applicants, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had been
in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied
for registration of title under a bona-fide claim of ownership long
before June 12, 1945
CA- granted — That applicants and their predecessors in interest
had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to
the filing of the application for registration. And that at the time the
applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978, both of them were
Filipino citizens such that when they filed their application for
registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had already
passed to them.
Republic:
(1) They fall short of the required possession since June 12, 1945 or
prior thereto.
(2) And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30) years possession,
they would still be short of the required possession if the starting
point is 1979, the year they bought the land.
(3) Petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration
of title on the ground of foreign nationality
Court:
(1) Under Sec 48(b) it requires that the applicant or their
predecessors-in-interest have been in OCEN possession and
occupation of the land since June 12, 1945. It doesn’t require
that the applicant should be in possession of the land since June
12, 1945. It is enough that the period of possession has been
complied with by his predecessors-in-interest.
In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as
1937.
Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-
interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary
to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private
respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of
their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that
their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and
introduced improvements thereon.
A&D din siya (report from the Bureau of Lands )
HENCE, THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION WERE
ALREADY PRIVATE LANDS AND NO LONGER PART OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
(2) petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for
registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality.
The Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the
contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article
XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions,
to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section
7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship
may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
What governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-
born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to
be BP 185.
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who
has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under
Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private
land up to a maximum area of one thousand
square meters, in the case of urban land, or one
hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by
him as his residence. In the case of married
couples, one of them may avail of the privilege
herein granted; Provided, That if both shall
avail of the same, the total area acquired shall
not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural
lands for residential purposes, he shall still be
entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or
rural lands for residential purposes which, when
added to those already owned by him, shall not
exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time
they applied for registration of the properties in question, said
properties as discussed above were already private lands;
consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration
thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains.
The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the
public domain. They are already private in character since private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of
ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937.
The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one
(1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence
(BP 185).
It is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino
citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in
question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private
land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate
of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution.
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the
estate of JUSTINA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO,
deceased, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LUI SHE in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Wong Heng, deceased, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenzo were the
owners in common of a piece of land in Manila. Wong on the other
hand had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the subject property
Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister
died with no other heir.
Justina Santos executed a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering
the portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting
Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years.
On December 21 she another contract giving Wong the option to buy
the leased premises. The option was conditioned on his obtaining
Philippine citizenship.
It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was
withdrawn when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal.
Justina filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous
belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The
error was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned.
She again executed two other contracts, one extending the term of the
lease to 99 years, and another fixing the term of the option of 50 years.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, Petitioner-Appellee, v.
UNG SIU SI TEMPLE, Respondent-Appellant.
Facts:
The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for
record a deed of donation executed by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen,
conveying a parcel of residential land, in favor of the unregistered
religious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple", operating through three
trustees all of Chinese nationality.
The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality,
founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation and in
behalf of the latter and its trustees.
CFI- also denied
Respondent’s contention:
(1)that the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is
authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine
Commission, providing as follows:
"SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of
whatever sort or denomination, whether incorporated in the
Philippine Islands or in the name of other country, or not
incorporated at all, to hold land in the Philippine Islands upon
which to build churches, parsonages, or educational or charitable
institutions.
"SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold
the land in the name of three Trustees for the use of such
associations; . . ." (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.)
(2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of
religion clause of our Constitution [Art. III, Sec. 1(7)].
Court:
The provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must
be deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted.
The Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations.
Neither is there any such saving found in sections 1 and 2 of Article
XIII, restricting the acquisition of public agricultural lands and other
natural resources to "corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens"
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock
does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is
admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of
the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that
corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to
exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos, and the spirit
of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the
controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL, petitioner, vs. EDERLINA P.
CATITO, respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German
descent. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started engaging in
business in the country two years thereafter, and married Teresita
Santos, a Filipino citizen.
In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board without
obtaining a divorce.
When Alfred went to Sydney, Australia, he met Ederlina Catito, a
Filipina. Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and
was married to Klaus Muller, a German national.
Ederlina went back to the PH. Alfred told Ederlina that he was married
but that he was eager to divorce his wife in Australia. Alfred proposed
marriage to Ederlina, but she replied that they should wait a little bit
longer.
Alfred decided to purchase a house and lot owned byVictoria Binuya
Steckel in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title. Since Alfred knew that as an alien he was
disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that only
Ederlinas name would appear in the deed of sale as the buyer of the
property, as well as in the title covering the same.
Then Alfred found out that Ederlina was married to Klaus. He
nevertheless agreed to continue the amorous relationship and wait for
the outcome of Ederlinas petition for divorce.
In the meantime, Alfred decided to purchase another house and lot,
owned by Rodolfo Morelos covered by TCT No. 92456 located in Pea
Street, Bajada, Davao City.[19] Alfred again agreed to have the deed of
sale made out in the name of Ederlina
Alfred purchased another parcel of land from one Atty. Mardoecheo
Camporedondo, located in Moncado, Babak, Davao, covered by TCT
No. 35251. Alfred once more agreed for the name of Ederlina to
appear as the sole vendee in the deed of sale.
The couple decided to put up a beach resort on a four-hectare land in
Camudmud, Babak, Davao, owned by spouses Enrique and Rosela
Serrano. Alfred purchased the property from the spouses.
Because Ederlina was preoccupied with her business in Manila, she
executed on July 8, 1985, two special powers of attorney[28] appointing
Alfred as attorney-in-fact to receive in her behalf the title and the deed
of sale over the property sold by the spouses Enrique Serrano.
In the meantime, Ederlinas petition for divorce was denied because
Klaus opposed the same. A second petition filed by her met the same
fate. Klaus wanted half of all the properties owned by Ederlina in the
Philippines before he would agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus
threatened to file a bigamy case against Ederlina.
Alfred proposed the creation of a partnership to Ederlina, or as an
alternative, the establishment of a corporation, with Ederlina owning
30% of the equity thereof. However, Ederlina changed her mind at the
last minute when she was advised to insist on claiming ownership over
the properties acquired by them during their coverture.
Their relationship ended.
He wrote a letter accusing the Catito family of acquiring for
themselves the properties he had purchased with his own money. He
demanded the return of all the amounts that Ederlina and her family
had stolen and turn over all the properties acquired by him and
Ederlina during their coverture.[32]
Alfred filed a Complaint against Ederlina, with the RTC for the
recovery of real and personal properties located in Quezon City and
Manila.
Ederlina denied all the material allegations in the complaint, insisting
that she acquired the said properties with her personal funds, and as
such, Alfred had no right to the same. She alleged that the deeds of
sale, the receipts, and certificates of titles of the subject properties
were all made out in her name.
Alfred’s contention:
He purchased the three parcels of land subject of his complaint
because of his desire to marry the respondent, and not to violate the
Philippine Constitution. He was, however, deceived by the respondent
when the latter failed to disclose her previous marriage to Klaus
Muller
There is no evidence on record that he was aware of the constitutional
prohibition against aliens acquiring real property in the Philippines
when he purchased the real properties subject of his complaint with his
own funds.
Court: Petition is not meritorious
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as
follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain.[50]
Lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be
transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to
acquire or hold private lands or lands of the public domain. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they have also been
disqualified from acquiring private lands.
A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void
and vests no rights and creates no obligations. The petitioner, being a
party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to
have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or
property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which
involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his
losses.
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the constitutional
proscription, nor claim that he acted in good faith. The petitioner
was fully aware that he was disqualified from acquiring and
owning lands under Philippine law even before he purchased the
properties in question; and, to skirt the constitutional prohibition,
the petitioner had the deed of sale placed under the respondents
name as the sole vendee thereof.
The petitioners claim that he acquired the subject properties because of
his desire to marry the respondent, believing that both of them would
thereafter jointly own the said properties.
The respondent was herself married to Klaus Muller, a German
citizen. Thus, the petitioner and the respondent could not lawfully
join in wedlock. The evidence on record shows that the petitioner
in fact knew of the respondents marriage to another man, but
nonetheless purchased the subject properties under the name of
the respondent and paid the purchase prices therefor. Even if it is
assumed gratia arguendi that the respondent and the petitioner
were capacitated to marry, the petitioner is still disqualified to own
the properties in tandem with the respondent.
THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA
PADILLA, respondents.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for petitioner.
Facts:
On June 4, 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights"
was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered
land and the house thereon in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal
age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman.
Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the
transfer being made only to his wife.
Thereafter—and again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman and
also without any protest by him—tax declarations for the property
purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman.
On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M.
Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of Thomas Cheesman.
Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the CFI against his wife, Criselda,
and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the
ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge
and consent.
Criselda’s contention:
(1) the property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by
Criselda with funds exclusively belonging to her ("her own
separate money");
(2) Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have
any interest or right of ownership in the land; and
(3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith
Court:
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential
land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that,
"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."30
Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge
of this prohibition.
Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be
purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the
property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right
or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly
violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void.31
In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the
subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in
so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in
respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit
indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property
were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a
not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a
decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money
to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the
proceedings be reviewed and overturned.