After due deliberation, we find and so hold that by virtue of the express

mandate set forth in Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, inferior
courts have jurisdiction to resolve the question of ownership raised as an
incident in an ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary
for a proper and complete adjudication of the issue of possession. Certain
guidelines, however, must be observed in the implementation of this
legislative prescription, viz.:

1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and
that ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of
ownership may be resolved but only for the purpose of determining the
issue of possession. Thus, as earlier stated, the legal provision under
consideration applies only where the inferior court believes and the
preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of the issue of
possession is dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership.

2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what
the plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of
possession.   Consequently, where the allegations of the complaint as well
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as the reliefs prayed for clearly establish a case for the recovery of
ownership, and not merely one for the recovery of possession de facto, or
where the averments plead the claim of material possession as a mere
elemental attribute of such claim for ownership,   or where the issue of
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ownership is the principal question to be resolved,   the action is not one

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for forcible entry but one for title to real property.

3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership where

the relationship of lessor and lessee has been sufficiently established in the
ejectment case,   unless it is sufficiently established that there has
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been a subsequent change in or termination of that relationship

between the parties. This is because under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them.

4. The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is
that a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Regardless of the actual condition of the
title to the property and whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a
person having a better right through an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.   Corollarily, if prior possession may be ascertained in some
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other way, then the inferior court cannot dwell upon or intrude into the issue
of ownership.

5. Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question
of who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may
resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among
the contending parties is the real owner.   In the same vein, where the
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resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the

validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on
which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise
pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood,
that any such pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed
portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
land.   Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly
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provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or

unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and
in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.