[G.R. No. 117472.
February 7, 1997] Argument:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEO
ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case
affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of
raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed
sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in
effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme
penalty of death.
On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-
appellant. The motion raises the following grounds for the reversal of
the death sentence:
"[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since the
pardon by the offended party and her mother before the filing of the
complaint acted as a bar to his criminal prosecution.
[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission of
the offense in the Complaint and throughout trial prevented the
accused-appellant from preparing an adequate defense.
[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the accused-appellant
was the father or stepfather of the complainant and in affirming the
sentence of death against him on this basis.
[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process and
manifested bias in the conduct of the trial.
[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel and to due process, due to the
incompetence of counsel.
[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se:
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death
penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation of Article III,
Sec. 19 ( I ) of the 1987 Constitution.
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution.”
MAIN ISSUE: whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust,
excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional
proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.
COURT:
In Harden v. Director of Prison, we ruled:
"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive.
In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court
said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies
there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than
the mere extinguishment of life.’"
We had ruled in the 1951 case of Limaco that:
"x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the
supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective.
However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as
long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it
is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless
of their private opinions,”
His thesis is two-fold: (1) that the death penalty law is
unconstitutional per se for having been enacted in the absence of
compelling reasons therefor; and (2) that the death penalty for rape is a
cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against punishment of such nature.
COURT:
1. The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the
death penalty entails:
(1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes;
(2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that
qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description
set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be
imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in
court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with
the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and
(3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly
motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.”
In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we
find the definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause
provides that
"x x x the crimes punishable by death under this Act are
heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and
which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency
and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.”
We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient
criterion of what is to be considered a heinous crime. This criterion is
deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances of the victim, the
accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime, its
proximate consequences and effects on the victim as well as on
society, to afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to
exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases
where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but
the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
*The court enumerated the crimes punishable by RP to death*
All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform
penalty for all of them being not mandatory death but the flexible
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In other words, it is
premature to demand for a specification of the heinous elements in
each of foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily
penalized with death. The elements that call for the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death in these crimes, would only be relevant when
the trial court, given the prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua,
instead actually imposes the death penalty because it has, in
appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the attendance of
certain circumstances in the manner by which the crime was
committed, or in the person of the accused on his own or in
relation to the victim, or in any other matter of significance to the
commission of the crime or its effects on the victim or on society,
which circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous,
odious, or hateful, or inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious,
atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society.
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of
death is imposed in the following crimes. *The court enumerated the
crimes punishable by death*
- these crimes are clearly heinous by their very nature.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of
heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified
crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other
crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they
are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized
by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in
contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called
to pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial
court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial
discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally
alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court
to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659
which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel
and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all
discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the
discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing
juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or
standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the
intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on
the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly
because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life.

Thus, construing R.A. No. 7659 in parimateria with the Revised Penal
Code, death may be imposed when (1) aggravating circumstances
attend the commission of the crime as to make operative the provision
of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum
penalty; and (2) other circumstances attend the commission of the
crime which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in
contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the imposition of the
death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the guided
discretion granted in the trial court to cognize circumstances that
characterize the commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is
an infinity of circumstances that may attend the commission of a crime
to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man is capable
of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law
each and every loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus
that R.A. 7659 provides the test and yardstick for the determination of
the legal situation warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death. Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever existing danger
of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in meting out the
death sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the possibility of executing
an innocent man or one criminal but not heinously criminal, R.A. 7659
is replete with both procedural and substantive safeguards that ensure
only the correct application of the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that
congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-
impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a
requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be
perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the
death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death
penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal
reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and
irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming
upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law
to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is
that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of
law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for
heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty
for said crimes.”
we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether or not
a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the
circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in
fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye
for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". We have already demonstrated earlier
in our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture of life simply
because life was taken, never was a defining essence of the death
penalty in the context of our legal history and cultural experience;
rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the
perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts
that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with
severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses
from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies
based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have
so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim
and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual
threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government,
they must be permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate,
this court has no doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of
rape, as we have held in the case of People v. Cristobal: 46
"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another
person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the
respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every
person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for
life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency
and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself."

2. We now proceed to answer accused-appellant's other ground for

attacking the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that the death
penalty imposed in rape is violative of the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.)
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia

The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the
arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was
imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense
theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death
penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the
black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that
is given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to
impose the death penalty.

Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their

operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is
an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the
laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICIANO MUÑOZ, alias "Tony", et al., accused, MARVIN
MILLORA, TOMAS TAYABA, alias "Tamy Tayaba" and JOSE
MISLANG, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
As established by the prosecution, Feliciano Muñoz, Marvin Millora,
Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified men
went to the house of Mauro Bulatao and asked for the address of his
son Arsenic. All four of them went inside while the rest surrounded the
house. All eleven men were armed. Mauro, who was then bathing his
horse, was called by the accused. As he approached and while under
his house, he was met by Millora who simply shot him at arm's
length with a "long firearm," hitting him in the mouth and killing
him as he fell. At that precise time, Muñoz, Tayaba and Mislang
were standing by Millora, evidently giving him armed support. None
of them made any move to restrain or dissuade him. 4
After killing Mauro, the four accused dragged out of the house his
sixteen year old son, Aquilino, and knocked him down. Muñoz kicked
him several times in the head as he lay on the ground while the
others looked on in silent approval or at least without objection. They
then took the bleeding man with them to look for their third target,
Alejandro Bulatao. 5
In Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to go with them
and direct them to her husband. They found him tending to their cows
with his son Pedro. Muñoz ordered Alejandro and his wife to lie
down and then, even as Pedro pleaded for his father's life, shot
Alejandro twice in the head, killing him instantly. Millora, Tayaba
and Mislang, along with their companions, merely stood by as the
brutal act was committed. Juana watched her husband's death in terror
and the 12-year old boy made a desperate run for his life as one of the
accused fired at him and missed. 6
The second victim having been murdered as the first, the accused then
vented their violence on Aquilino, whom Muñoz again brutally kicked
as the others looked on. Aquilino was entirely defenseless. Finally,
Muñoz ended the boy's agony and shot him to death, hitting him
in the head and body. Muñoz and Minora then picked up all the
empty shells and fled with the rest of their companions, leaving the
terrified Juana with the two grisly corpses. 7
The three appellants invoked individual defenses which the trial court
correctly rejected as false and unbelievable. All claimed the Bulataos
were killed as a result of an exchange of gunfire with a rather hazy
group and each claimed he was not involved in the shoot-out.
COURT:
RE: degree of participation
We agree that the three appellants, together with Muñoz and their
seven other companions, participated in the killings of the three
Bulataos in the manner described by the witnesses for the prosecution.
The defenses of the herein appellants should be, as they properly were,
rejected as undeserving of belief in the light of the more convincing
and telling evidence submitted by the government.
However, we do not accept the different degrees of participation
assigned by the court a quo to each of the appellants in each of the
three offenses imputed to them. In Criminal Case No. 0176,
Millora was found guilty as principal and Muñoz and the other
two herein appellants only as accomplices, and in Criminal Case
Nos. 0177 and 0178, Muñoz was found guilty as principal and the
herein appellants only as accomplices. 34 In support of this finding,
the trial court said that there was no evidence of conspiracy to
justify holding each of the accused equally liable for the three
murders.
We hold that there was. Indeed, it is clear that from the very start,
when the eleven men went out to look for the suspected cattle
rustlers, there was already an agreement among them to ferret out
and punish the Bulataos whom they had condemned beforehand.
They knew whom they were looking for. They knew where to look for
them. They sought each of them with drawn and ready weapons. When
they reached Mauro Bulatao's house, four of them went inside while
the rest deployed themselves in strategic positions. When Millora
shot Mauro, the appellants and the others stood by with guns at
the ready. Nobody moved to dissuade or stop him. Together they
dragged Aquilino from the house and the rest watched while Muñoz
kicked him in the head while helpless on the ground. Together, they
took him with them and then forced Juana Bulatao to lead them to her
husband. The rest stood by with their weapons as Muñoz shot
Alejandro in the head. No one interceded to stop him from also
killing Aquilino. There is no question that the group moved in
concert, pursuing a common design previously agreed upon, that
made each of them part of a conspiracy. 35 As such, each of them is
liable in equal degree with the others for each of the three killings.
Each member of the conspiracy to commit the crime of murder is
guilty as a co-principal, regardless of who actually pulled the
trigger that killed the three victims. It is settled that in a conspiracy
the act of one is the act of all.
RE: DEATH PENALTY
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, but this was
modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution
providing as follows:
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless,
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the
death penalty whenever it was called for under the said article but
instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua as mandated by the
above provision. The maximum period of the penalty was thus in
effect lowered to the medium, the same period applied, as before,
where the offense was not attended by any modifying circumstance,
with the minimum period, i. e., reclusion temporal maximum, being
still applicable in all other cases. The three-grade scheme of the
original penalty, including death, was thus maintained except that
the maximum period was not imposed because of the
constitutional prohibition.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution
abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder
to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These
should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the
three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree
feel that Article III, Section 19(l) merely prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to  reclusion perpetua,
also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be
maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there
is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of
the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death
penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it
and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a
settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under
consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort
to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for
its interpretation.
At that, the Court finds that such resort, even if made, would not be of
much assistance either in the case at bar. Accepting arguendo that it
was the intention of the framers to abolish the death penalty, we are
still not convinced from the debates in the Constitutional
Commission that there was also a requirement to adjust the two
remaining periods by dividing them into three shorter periods.
This is not a necessary consequence of the provision as worded.
Article III, Section 19(l) does not change the periods of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only
insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and
reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and
minimum penalties remains unchanged.
The Court relies that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities
that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the
death penalty and another who committed the murder without the
attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both
punishable with the same medium period although the former is
concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is the
will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question of
wisdom, not construction.
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the
Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and
exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply
them and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as
determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on
this prerogative of the lawmaking body.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic
aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of
the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the
penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which,
conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is
still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we impose on all the
accused-appellants for each of the three murders they have committed
in conspiracy with the others.
In People v. Gavarra 37 Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court
that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed
for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua" thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period.
Later, without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera in People v. Masangkay 38 and through
Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People v. Atencio 39 divided the
modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were
specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People v. Intino, 40 as
follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the
minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the
medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO BON, appellant.
FACTS:
Eight (8) Informations2 were filed within the period from 21 August
2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Gumaca, Quezon against appellant, charging him with the rape of
AAA3 and BBB,4 the daughters of his older brother.
AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first
molested in 1994 in the house appellant had shared with her
grandmother. She thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her
grandmother. It was only three (3) years after, in 1997, that she slept in
the said house, yet again she was sexually abused by appellant. She
was then nine (9) years old.7
AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by
appellant for the third time, again at the house of her
grandmother.8 The following year, when she was twelve (12), she was
abused for the fourth time by appellant
BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by appellant
in 1997 when she was ten (10) years old, also at the house appellant
shared with her grandmother. BBB further testified that in 1998 and
1999, she was raped again by appellant on several occasions, the rapes
occurring under threat of a bladed weapon, and regardless of the time
of day.15
RTC: convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. (death)
CA: agreed with the rulings of the RTC in regard to six (6) of the
eight (8) death sentences imposed on appellant
however, the CA downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos.
6906 and 6908 to attempted rape. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals reduced the penalties attached to the two (2) counts of
rape from death for consummated qualified rape to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape.
(The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were
properly appreciated in this case. )
ISSUE:
whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the
penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated
qualified rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.
COURT:
We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on
appellant for the six (6) counts of rape. The sentence of death imposed
by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be
affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines."
The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the attempted rape
of AAA, to "an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum," for each count of attempted rape.
There is no doubt as to the validity of this sentence at the time it was
meted prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the
Revised Penal Code establishes the penalty to be imposed upon the
principals of an attempted felony:
ART. 51. xxx — A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed
by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the
principals in an attempt to commit a felony.54
What is the penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law"
for attempted rape? Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which
incorporates the amendments introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353,
prescribes:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common
law spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x55
The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly
proven to have been under eighteen years of age and to have been
raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the
death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.—For the purpose of graduating
the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57,
inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as
principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or
accessories, the following rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible,
the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following
that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in
Article 71 of this Code.56
xxxx
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special
attention, crucial as it is to our disposition of this question. The
provision reads:
Art. 71. Graduated scales. — In the case in which the law prescribes a
penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given
penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in
graduating such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in
which is comprised the given penalty:
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the
following graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correctional
6. Arresto mayor
7. Destierro
8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
10. Fine57
xxxx
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees
lower than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum
penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted
rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of three divisible
periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum.
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty
for attempted rape, with a maximum penalty within the range
of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the
penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not
been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without
complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the
problem concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced
to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty
two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a
penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a
penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest
remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so
followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu
of reclusion temporal.
The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on crimes,
such as qualified rape as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, for which the imposable penalty was death alone. Thus, our
ruling will bear no direct effect on the sentencing of accomplices and
accessories or persons guilty of the attempted or frustrated stage of
felonies for which the imposable penalty was "reclusion perpetua to
death."
Hence, it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the
penalty of death does not refer to the penalty of "reclusion
perpetua to death.”
2 SCHOOLS OF THOUGHTS
1. First, it can be claimed that the present application of the penalties
for attempted rape of a minor (among many examples) does not
"impose the death penalty," since none of the convicts concerned
would face execution through the application of the penalty for
attempted rape. Hence, the statutory provisions enforced in
determining the penalty for attempted rape, or other crimes not
punishable by death, are not amended by Rep. Act No. 9346.
2. the operation of the provisions imposing the penalty for attempted
rape of a minor necessarily calls for the application, if not its
literal imposition, of death as a penalty, in the context of applying
the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code. If we were to construe "impose" as to mean "apply,"
then it could be argued that Article 71 was indeed amended by
Rep. Act No. 9346. After all, the application of Article 71 to
crimes such as attempted rape of a minor call for the actual
operation of the death penalty not only in theory, but as a means of
determining the proper graduated penalty.
COURT:
There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on legislative
intent, the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that limits its effects
only to matters relating to the physical imposition of the death penalty.
(it would actually equalize the penalties for principals and accomplices
in any crime at all.)
The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant
the penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted
felonies, clearly results in illogical, iniquitous and inconsistent effects.
In contrast, no similar flaws ensue should we construe Rep. Act No.
9346 instead as not having barred the application of the death penalty
even as a means of depreciating penalties other than death. In
particular, the operative amendment that would assure the integrity of
penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted
felonies lies in Article 71, which ranks "death" at the top of the scale
for graduated penalties.
Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in
Article 71 will have the effect of appropriately downgrading the proper
penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories, frustrated and
attempted felonies to the level consistent with the rest of our penal
laws. Returning to our previous examples, Y, the convicted
accomplice in kidnapping for ransom, would now bear the penalty
of reclusion temporal, the penalty one degree lower than that the
principal X would bear (reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be
consistent with Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as
Article 71, as amended, to remove the reference to "death." Moreover,
the prospect of the accomplice receiving the same sentence as the
principal, an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be
eliminated. Thus, the same standard would prevail in sentencing
principals and accomplices to the crime of kidnapping in ransom, as
that prescribed to the crime of simple kidnapping.
In re: Muñoz case
For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is whether
Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to delete the word "death" as
expressly provided for in the graduated scale of penalties under
Article 71. Muñoz did not engage in an analogous inquiry in relation
to Article 71 and the Constitution, for what was relevant therein was
not the general graduated scale of penalties, but the range of the
penalties for murder. Herein, at bare minimum, no provision in Rep.
Act No. 9346 provides a context within which the concept of "death
penalty" bears retentive legal effect, especially in relation to Article
71. Unlike the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 9346 does expressly
stipulate the amendment of all extant laws insofar as they called for the
imposition of the penalty of death.
Yet in truth, there is no material difference between "imposition" and
"application," for both terms embody the operation in law of the death
penalty. Since Article 71 denominates "death" as an element in the
graduated scale of penalties, there is no question that the operation of
Article 71 involves the actual application of the death penalty as a
means of determining the extent which a person's liberty is to be
deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346 unequivocally bars the application
of the death penalty, as well as expressly repeals all such statutory
provisions requiring the application of the death penalty, such effect
necessarily extends to its relevance to the graduated scale of penalties
under Article 71.
We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended
to retain the operative effects of the death penalty in the
graduation of the other penalties in our penal laws. Munoz cannot
enjoin us to adopt such conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not swaddled
in the same restraints appreciated by Muñoz on Section 19(1), Article
III. The very Congress empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the
imposition of the death penalty once thought it best to do so, through
Rep. Act No. 7650. Within the same realm of constitutional discretion,
Congress has reversed itself. It must be asserted that today, the legal
status of the suppression of the death penalty in the Philippines has
never been more secure than at any time in our political history as a
nation.
Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the death
penalty, we do not acknowledge that Muñoz lacked legal justification
when it was decided; that its application as precedent prior to Rep. Act
No. 9346 was erroneous; or that previous sentences imposed on
convicts on the basis of Muñoz were wrong. Muñoz properly stood as
the governing precedent in the matter of sentences that passed finality
prior to Rep. Act No. 9346; and the consistent reliance by the courts
on its doctrines entrenched its footing in criminal law jurisprudence.
Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal
Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation
of penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the
determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned
not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower
than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty
shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of
Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS:
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against
AAA, a five (5) year old girl. After almost four (4) years, AAA’s
father filed a complaint5 for acts of lasciviousness against herein
accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the
charge to rape.
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her
[cousin and two other playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling
Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the
backyard of Saling Crisologo’s house. She agreed. Unknown to
appellant, [AAA’s cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA’s] shorts and
underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he
ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and
inserted his penis into [AAA’s] private organ. Appellant made an up-
and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain
inside her private part and said "aray." She also felt an intense pain
inside her stomach.
RTC: found him guilty and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua.
CA: modified the penalties imposed by the RTC by imposing the
death penalty
COURT:
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659,32 was the governing law at the time the accused-appellant
committed the rape in question. Under the said law, the penalty of
death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven
years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years
old at the time the rape was committed, was alleged in the information
and proven during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate,
which showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty
should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed
by the CA. We cannot agree with the CA’s conclusion that the
accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2)33 of the Revised
Penal Code.
When accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted
that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18
years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have
taken place "in any month and date in the year 1996." Since the
prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when
the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was
committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In
assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all
doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more
beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has
appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the
accused regarding his age.34
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a
minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because
of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty
of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.35 Thus, the proper
imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS:
On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charged with eight
(8) counts of rape in separate informations.
(the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree (uncle)
RTC: sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH
CA: The death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua in
accord with Rep. Act No. 9346.
To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-
appellant guilty of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts
of qualified rape.
COURT:
Penalties
On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the former Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the crime of rape
with reclusion perpetua. The sixth paragraph thereof also provides
that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law-spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
a reduction of the above penalty is in order.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of
the accused-appellant the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority. Although this matter was not among the issues raised before
the Court, we still take cognizance of the same in accordance with the
settled rule that "[i]n a criminal case, an appeal throws open the entire
case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors,
though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment."68
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on
February 23, 1982 and that he was only 13 years old when the first
incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995.72 Other than his
testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove the date of his
birth. However, the records of this case show neither any objection
to the said testimony on the part of the prosecution, nor any
contrary evidence to dispute the same. Thus, the RTC and the Court
of Appeals should have appreciated the accused-appellant’s minority
in ascertaining the appropriate penalty.
RE: 1st count of statutory rape
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic
Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, the said law is still
applicable given that Section 68 thereof expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentences. — Persons who have been convicted and are serving
sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below
the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the
offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall
likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall
be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and
their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be
immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other
applicable law.
People v. Sarcia73 further stressed that "[w]ith more reason, the Act
should apply to [a] case wherein the conviction by the lower court is
still under review."
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 9344 is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child
shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of
the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws. (Emphases ours.)
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the
minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility in paragraphs 2 and 3
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,74 "i.e., from ‘under nine years
of age’ and ‘above nine years of age and under fifteen’ (who acted
without discernment) - to ‘fifteen years old or under’ and ‘above
fifteen but below 18’ (who acted without discernment) in determining
exemption from criminal liability."75
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46 was allegedly committed in 1995, the
testimony of the accused-appellant sufficiently established that he was
only 13 years old at that time. In view of the failure of the prosecution
to prove the exact date and year of the first incident of rape, i.e.,
whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously discussed,
any doubt therein "should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being
more beneficial to the latter."76 The Court, thus, exempts the
accused-appellant from criminal liability for the first count of rape
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No.
9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable
therefor.
RE: 2nd and 3rd counts of rape
For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the
year 1999, the accused-appellant was already 17 years old. We
likewise find that in the said instances, the accused-appellant acted
with discernment. In Madali v. People,77 the Court had the occasion to
reiterate that "[d]iscernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be
known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the
facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case." In this
case, the fact that the accused-appellant acted with discernment was
satisfactorily established by the testimony of AAA, which we had
already found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified that she at first did
not tell anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at the hands of
the accused-appellant because the latter told her that he would kill her
mother if she did so. That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA
in an effort to conceal his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full
well that what he did was wrong and that he was aware of the
consequences thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and in conformity with our ruling in
Sarcia, when the offender is a minor under eighteen (18) years of
age, "the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes
of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still
the penalty to be reckoned with." Thus, for the second and third
counts of rape, the proper penalty imposable upon the accused-
appellant is reclusion perpetua for each count.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-
appellant the circumstance of his minority, the latter would have been
entitled to a suspension of sentence for the second and third counts of
rape under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who is
under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence, without need of application.
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be supplied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on
Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.1awphi1
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied
in the instant case given that the accused-appellant is now about 29
years of age and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to
the application of a suspended sentence, namely, when the child
reaches a maximum age of 21.
Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic Act
No. 9344 is warranted in the instant case, to wit:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps
and Other Training Facilities. — A child in conflict with the law may
after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the [Bureau of Corrections],
in coordination with the [Department of Social Welfare and
Development].
Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the second
and third incidents of rape shall not be affected by the above
disposition and the same shall be enforced in accordance with law and
the pronouncements in the prevailing jurisprudence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN
DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y
KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y AMPIL,
NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON
A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
FACTS:
For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659
That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 o’clock in the evening at No.
118 FB Harrison Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named-accused conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together,
did then and there by force and intimidation, and the use of high
powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry
away and deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty against her will for
the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was
made as a condition for her release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱400,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of
Lucia L. Chan in the said amount and such other amounts as may be
awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.
RTC: convicting Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao,
Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for
Ransom. Hence, they appealed to the CA.
CA: It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y
RAFON was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
COURT:
As reflected in the records, 58 the prosecution was not able to proffer
sufficient evidence to hold her responsible as a principal. Seeing that
the only evidence the prosecution had was the testimony59 of Chan to
the effect that on 13 August 1998 Perpenian entered the room where
the victim was detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding
stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court opines that Perpenian
should not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as an
accomplice to the crime.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her
criminal liability.1âwphi1 Assuming arguendo that she just came to
the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was inevitable that she
acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she
saw Chan being guarded in the room. A rational person would have
suspected something was wrong and would have reported such
incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to
add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held
before that being present and giving moral support when a crime is
being committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in
the crime committed.61 It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s
presence and company were not indispensable and essential to the
perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only liable as
an accomplice.62 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People
v. Clemente, et al.,63 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the
participation of the offender will be considered as that of an
accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of
Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of R.A. No. 9344, 65 a determination
of whether she acted with or without discernment is necessary.
Considering that Perpenian acted with discernment when she was 17
years old at the time of the commission of the offense, her minority
should be appreciated not as an exempting circumstance, but as a
privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,66 the suspension of sentence of a
child in conflict with the law shall still be applied even if he/she is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer
benefit from the aforesaid provision, because under Article 40 of R.A.
No. 9344,67 the suspension of sentence can be availed of only until the
child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one
(21) years. This leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce
judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an
accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Since this Court has ruled that death as utilized in Article 71 of the
Revised Penal Code shall no longer form part of the equation in
the graduation of penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, 68 the
penalty imposed by law on accomplices in the commission of
consummated kidnapping for ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the
penalty one degree lower than what the principals would bear
(Reclusion Perpetua).69  off her shorts and underwear. Fearing for her life, MMM obeyed the
Applying Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty
should then be adjusted to the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law for accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to
Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that
prescribed by law (Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty, which is one
degree lower than the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the
range of Prision Correccional; and the maximum penalty shall be
within the minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent any aggravating
circumstance and there being one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the
Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one
(1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA",
Accused-Appellant
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged with two (2) counts of Statutory Rape.
When the crime was committed, MMM was 11 years old, 8 while the
accused-appellant, MMM's uncle,9 was 15 years old.
The prosecution submits that sometime in the first week of June 2002,
at about three o'clock in the afternoon, MMM went to the nipa
plantation to defecate but before she was able to do so, accused-
appellant, armed with a knife, suddenly appeared. He approached
MMM, poked a knife at her neck, ordered her to bend over, and took
orders of accused-appellant. MMM tried to resist but accused-
appellant was still able to force his penis inside MMM' s vagina.
MMM felt pain and cried. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant
put on his briefs and shorts then left. When she got home, MMM
immediately took a bath and noticed bloodstain on her underwear.
Afraid of accusedappellant's threats of killing her, MMM kept mum
and did not disclose to anyone the tragedy that happened to her that
day.
Twice nangyari
However, about two. weeks after the second rape, MMM' s
grandmother noticed that there was something unusual in the way
MMM was walking. This prompted her to confront MMM. 13 Upon
learning of what happened to MMM, the victim's aunt, brought the
former to the Municipal Health Office of Manapla, Negros Occidental
for examination, 14 and thereafter to the police authorities, before
whom the victim executed her sworn statement. 15
RTC: Taking into consideration the privilege mitigating circumstance
of minority, this Court, in Criminal Case No. 5214-69, sentences
accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
CA: However, as accused-appellant Joery Deliola y Barrido is a child
in conflict with the law, the pronouncement of his sentence is hereby
SUSPENDED and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court,6th Judicial Region, Branch 69, Silay City, Negros Occidental,
for appropriate disposition in accordance with Section 38 of Republic
Act No. 9344.
COURT:
To determine the appropriate penalty, we refer to the pertinent law on
the matter. According to R.A. No. 9344,47 as amended:48
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - x x x
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the
fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.
To reiterate, the law says that a minor is fifteen (15) years of age on
the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birth date. In A.M. No.
02-l-18- SC49 dated November 24, 2009, the Supreme Court likewise
defined the age of criminal responsibility as the age when a child,
fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old or above but below eighteen (18)
years of age, commits an offense with discernment.
Accused-appellant testified that he was born on 14 April
1987, 50 making him 15 years and 2 months old when the crime
was committed. We are now left with the question of whether or not
accused-appellant acted with discernment. In People v. Jacinto, 51 we
explained that discernment is the mental capacity of a minor to fully
grasp the consequences of his act, known and determined by taking
into account all the facts and circumstances presented by the records in
each case.
That the accused-appellant acted with discernment when he raped the
victim is demonstrated by the following surrounding circumstances:
(1) the victim was a helpless minor; (2) accused-appellant secured the
consummation of the offense with a weapon; (3) he satisfied his lust
by penetrating the victim from behind; and (4) he threatened the victim
not to report what happened. Taking all these facts into consideration,
accusedappellant clearly knew that what he did was wrong.
Considering that the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship were alleged and proven during trial, 52 accused-appellant
shall be criminally liable for the crime of Qualified Statutory Rape.
However, given that accused-appellant was only 15 years old and 2
months when the crime was committed, the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority should be appreciated; thus, the penalty next
lower in degree than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. 53 In
accordance with the controlling jurisprudence on the matter, 54 for
purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of
death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, we affirm the
ruling of the lower courts and impose upon accused-appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Although it is acknowleged that accused-appellant was qualified for
suspension of sentence when he committed the crime, Section 40 of
R.A. 934455 provides that the same extends only until the child in
conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years old. Nevertheless, in extending the application of RA No. 9344
to give meaning to the legislative intent of the said law, we ruled
in People v. Jacinto, 56 as cited in People v. Ancajas,57 that the
promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should
extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21)
years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a
child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration in order that he/she may be given the
chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the
community. 58 Thus, accused-appellant is ordered to serve his
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities, in accordance with
Section 51 59 of R.A. 9344.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CONRADO LUCAS Y BRIONES, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Chanda Lucas y Austria, then seventeen years old, charged her natural
father, accused Jose Conrado Lucas, of attempted rape committed
against her on 12 February 1991. She revealed therein that she was
first raped by him when she was only nine years old.
Contention: he could not be validly convicted of rape in Criminal
Case No. Q-91-18466 under a complaint for attempted rape only. He
cites the rule that when the offense proved is more serious than that
charged, the accused can only be convicted of the offense charged.
COURT:
Accordingly, the accused should be convicted of attempted rape only.
The penalty for attempted rape is prision mayor, which is two degrees
lower than that provided by law for rape. 34 The accused is entitled to
the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and for attempted rape
he may be sentenced to a penalty whose minimum should be within
the range of prision correccional and whose maximum should be
within the range range of prision mayor, taking into account the
modifying circumstances. The alternative circumstance of relationship
provided for in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code should be
appreciated against the accused considering that the offended party,
Chanda, is his descendant. In crimes against chastity, such as rape,
relationship is aggravating. 35
Prior to R.A. No. 7659, 36 the presence of modifying circumstances
would not affect the penalty of reclusion perpetua prescribed for the
crime of rape because such a penalty was then indivisible and under
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed. However, pursuant to Section 21 of R.A.
No. 7659, which amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal
Code, reclusion perpetua has now a defined duration, i.e.,
from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. There is,
however, no corresponding amendment to Article 76 of the same
Code for the purpose of converting reclusion perpetua into a
divisible penalty with three specific period — minimum, medium,
and maximum — and including it in the table provided therein
showing the duration and the time included in each of the periods.
It may thus be said that although the law has now fixed the
duration of reclusion perpetua, it did not make explicit its intention
to convert it into a divisible penalty. In any event, Article 65 of the
Code which provides:
Art. 65. Rules in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three
periods. — In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not
composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained
in the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions of time
included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of
the three portions.
may be applied. Accordingly, the time included in the penalty
of reclusion perpetua (twenty [20] years and one [1] days to forty
[40] years) can be divided into three equal portions, with each
composing a period. The periods of reclusion perpetua would then be
as follows:
minimum — 20 years and 1 day to 26 years and 8 months
medium — 26 years, 8 months and 1 day to 33 years and 4 months
maximum — 34 years, 4 months and 1 day to 40 years
Taking into account the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
relationship in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, the accused may
finally be sentenced to thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of reclusion perpetua. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru Private Complainant
BRIAN VICTOR BRITCHFORD, Petitioner
Considering again such aggravating circumstance, the accused may be vs.
sentenced in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 to an indeterminate SALVADOR ALAPAN, Respondent
penalty ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and fACTS:
one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum.
respondent Salvador Alapan (respondent) and his wife Myrna
Alapan (Myrna) were charged with eight (8) counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.

the Spouses Alapan borrowed ₱400,000.00 from petitioner Brian

Victor Britchford (petitioner) with a promise that they would pay the
said amount within three (3) months. To secure the indebtedness,
respondent issued eight (8) postdated checks.

When the checks matured, petitioner deposited then at the Philippine

National Bank (PNB), Olongapo City branch. One week thereafter,
PNB informed petitioner that the checks were dishonored for the
reason that the account against which the checks were drawn was
closed. Petitioner immediately informed respondent of the dishonor of
the checks.

On their part, the Spouses Alapan averred that their account was
closed only on the last week of October 2005 because they suffered
business reverses. They nonetheless stated that they were willing to
settle their monetary obligation.

MTC: convicted respondent of eight (8) counts of violation of B.P.

Big. 22. It imposed a penalty of fine instead of imprisonment
considering that respondent's act of issuing the bounced checks was
not tainted with bad faith and that he was a first-time offender. On the
other hand, the MTC acquitted Myrna because she did not participate
in the issuance of the dishonored checks.

After the MTC judgment became final and executory, a writ of

execution was issued. The writ, however, was returned unsatisfied.
Petitioner thus filed a Motion to Impose Subsidiary Penalty 3 for
respondent's failure to pay the fine imposed by the MTC.

MTC denied the motion on the ground that subsidiary

imprisonment in case of insolvency was not imposed in the
judgment of convicion.

RTC: respondent could not be made to undergo subsidiary

imprisonment because the judgment of conviction did not provide for
such penalty in case of non-payment of fine.

ISSUE:

WHETHER RESPONDENT MAY UNDERGO SUBSIDIARY

IMPRISONMENT FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE FINE.

COURT: NO

Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly

stated in the judgment of conviction.

Another reason which militates against petitioner's position is the lack

of provision pertaining to subsidiary imprisonment in the judgment of
conviction. People v. Fajardo, 18 in relation to Republic Act. No. 5465
which amended Article 39 of the RPC, discusses the rationale behind
the necessity for expressly imposing subsidiary imprisonment in the
judgment of conviction, viz:

The first paragraph of article 39 of the Revised Penal Code reads as

follows:

ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. - If the convict has no property with

which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding
article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate
of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules: ...
Article 78 of Chapter V of the same Code, in its pertinent part,
which deals with the execution and service of penalties, provides:

ART. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. - No penalty

shall executed except by virtue of a final judgment.

A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed
by law, nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those
expressly authorized thereby.

It is a fundamental principle consecration in section 3 of the Jones

Law, the Act of Congress of the United States of America approved on
August 29, 1916, which was still in force when the order appealed
from was made, that no person may be deprived of liberty without due
process of law. This constitutional provision was in a sense
incorporated in article 78 of the Revised Penal Code prescribing that
no penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment.
As the fact show that there is no judgment sentencing the accused to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvent to pay the fine
imposed upon him, because the said subsidiary imprisonment is not
stated in the judgment finding him guilty, it is clear that the court
could not legally compel him to serve said subsidiary imprisonment. A
contrary holding would be a violation of the laws aforementioned.
That subsidiary imprisonment is a penalty, there can be no doubt,
for, according to article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, it is imposed
upon the accused and served by him in lieu of the fine which he
fails to pay on account of insolvency. There is not a single provision
in the Code from which it may be logically inferred that an accused
may automatically be made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in a case
where he has been sentenced merely to pay a fine and has been found
to be insolvent. Such would be contrary to the legal provisions above-
cited and to the doctrine laid down in United States vs. Miranda (2
Phil., 606, 610), in which it was said: "That judgment of the lower
court fails to impose subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency for
indemnification to the owner of the banca, but only imposes subsidiary
punishment as to the costs. In this respect the judgment is erroneous
and should be modified."

We, therefore, conclude that an accused who has been sentenced by

final judgment to pay a fine only and is found to be insolvent and
could not pay the fine for this reason, cannot be compelled to serve the
subsidiary imprisonment provided for in article 39 of the Revised
Penal Code. [emphasis supplied]19

Indeed, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides that "should

only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there
is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment." However, the Circular does
not sanction indiscriminate imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for
the same must still comply with the law.

Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary

imprisonment in case of failure to pay the penalty of fine. Thus,
subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed without violating
the RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.