.R. No.
144057             January 17, 2005 existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review
the Decision1 of the Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921.
The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the
Regional Trial Court (RTC),2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan
dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC)3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated
February 18, 1998, which granted the application for
registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit
(Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal
age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the
MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration
of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas,
Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No.
10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP – 060414-
014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters.
The application seeks judicial confirmation of
respondent’s imperfect title over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on
the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the
government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of
Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date,
however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal
opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the
court issued an order of general default against the
whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles
and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of
land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax
Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July 9, 1992,
Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the
heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he
renounced all his rights to the subject property and
confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming
sometime in 1955 or 1956.5 Subsequently, the heirs of
Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the
same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her
attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator
introduced improvements, planted trees, such as
mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to
old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject
land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding
the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue
of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-
interest have occupied the land openly and in the
concept of owner without any objection from any private
person or even the government until she filed her
application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public
prosecutor manifested that the government did not
intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose
Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico
Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice.
On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision
ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the
operation of the Property Registration Decree or
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title
thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied
for was declared alienable and disposable only on
October 15, 1980, per the certification from Regional
Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Region VI.7 However, the court denied the motion for
reconsideration in an order dated February 18,
1998.81awphi1.nét
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the
order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8.
On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision,
dismissing the appeal.9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court
rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the
Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the
RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure
question of law was filed by the Republic on September
4, 2000.10
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals
contending that the appellate court gravely erred in
holding that there is no need for the government’s prior
release of the subject lot from the public domain before it
can be considered alienable or disposable within the
meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in
possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for
the required period.11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is
necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree that the subject land be first
classified as alienable and disposable before the
applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court12 in arguing that the
property which is in open, continuous and exclusive
possession must first be alienable. Since the subject
land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980,
Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section
14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to
1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG
argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
governing original registration proceedings, bears close
examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title under Section 14(1) –
that the property in question is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation, and; that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable
and disposable character of the land should have
already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section
14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision,
qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim
of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words
restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they
are immediately associated, and not those distantly or
remotely located.13 Ad proximum antecedents fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would
result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the
OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which
were not declared alienable or disposable before June
12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration,
no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to
reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and
disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that before June 12,
1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section
14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is
still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the
need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective
of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there
is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding
in Republic v. Court of Appeals .14 Therein, the Court
noted that "to prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute."15 In that case, the subject
land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and
disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the
alienable status of the land, compounded by the
established fact that therein respondents had occupied
the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the
application for registration of the said property. In the
case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject
property was released and certified as within alienable
and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals,17 wherein the Court noted that while the
claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only
in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as
alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration
therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had
filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the
property was declared alienable and
disposable.1awphi1.nét Thus, in this case, where the
application was made years after the property had been
certified as alienable and disposable,
the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,18 such as those
which form part of a reservation for provincial park
purposes19 the possession of which cannot ripen into
ownership.20 It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,21 forest
land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter
how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property,
unless such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable.22 In the case at bar, the
property in question was undisputedly classified as
disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is
inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by
the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original
registration through ordinary registration proceedings.
The right to file the application for registration derives
from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June
12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimant’s open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but
those titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936,
the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the
right to register their title to agricultural lands of the
public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However,
this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which
provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must
have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the
reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point
is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True,
the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of
the public domain," while the Property Registration
Decree uses the term "alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain." It must be noted though that the
Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands."24 Clearly,
the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree
and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the
application for registration of alienable lands of the public
domain, possession over which commenced only after
June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of "those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code.25 There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of
at least thirty (30) years.26 With such conversion, such
property may now fall within the contemplation of
"private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible
to registration by those who have acquired ownership
through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have
the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it
having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty
years old.27 The inherent nature of the land but confirms
its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural.
There is no impediment to the application of Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly
accomplished by the lower courts.l^vvphi1.net
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that Naguit had been in possession in the
concept of owner for the required period. The argument
begs the question. It is again hinged on the assertion—
shown earlier to be unfounded—that there could have
been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980,
when the subject land was declared alienable or
disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right
to apply for registration owing to the continuous
possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of
the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is
primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the
factual findings made by lower courts. Notably,
possession since 1945 was established through proof of
the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time
Naguit purchased the property as well as tax
declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax
declarations and realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they
are good indicia of the possession in the concept of
owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes
for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property and announces his
adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens
one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.28

Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of

land by the respondent can be traced back to that of her
predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945
or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any
cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which
may be properly brought under the operation of the
Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the
land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous,
peaceful and without any opposition from any private
person and the government itself makes her right thereto
undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under
the law.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the

assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12,
2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200726, November 09, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MATEO LAO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision2 dated February 1, 2012 issued by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No.
81180.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Facts
On November 16, 2000, Mateo Lao (Lao) filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Liloan-
Compostela, Cebu an Application for Original
Registration of Title of two parcels of land situated in
Barangay Estaca, Compostela, Cebu. The subjects of
the Application are Lot Nos. 206 and 208 covered by
Compostela Subdivision AP-072218-001228 containing
a total area of 8,800 square meters.3 Lao alleged in his
Application that he acquired the subject properties by
purchase and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same in the
concept of owners prior to June 12, 1945.4 Lao attached
in his application the following documents: (1) tracing
cloth plan; (2) white print of plan; (3) technical
description of the subject properties; (4) Geodetic
Engineer's Certificate; and (5) Certificate of
Assessment.5
The case was set for initial hearing by the MCTC on
January 11, 2002; Lao's counsel offered evidence to
establish the jurisdictional facts of the case. After
marking the jurisdictional requirements, the case was
called three times for the benefit of any oppositors to the
application. There being no oppositors, the MCTC issued
an Order of General Default, except as against the
State.6 Lao testified that he acquired the subject
properties in 1990 from Vicente Calo (Vicente), as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. He claimed that
he possessed the subject properties through his
caretaker Zacarias Castro (Zacarias), who planted the
same with different kinds of fruit-bearing trees.7
Zacarias, testifying in behalf of Lao, alleged that he is
familiar with the subject properties since he is the owner
of a lot adjacent thereto. He averred that the subject
properties were initially owned by his father Casimiro
Castro (Casimiro). After his father's death, the subject
properties were possessed by Perpetua Calo (Perpetua),
and later by Vicente who sold the same to Lao in 1990.
Zacarias claimed that he has been the caretaker of the
subject properties from the time the same were owned
by Perpetua in the 1950s up to the present.8
On July 26, 2002, the MCTC rendered a Decision
granting Lao's application. The case was later re-opened
after the MCTC received the Opposition filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) on August 8,
2002.9 Trial on the merits of Lao's application ensued
thereafter.
Consequently, however, the MCTC rendered a Decision
dated November 28, 2002, granting Lao's application.
Thus, the MCTC directed the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title over the subject properties. The
petitioner appealed the Decision dated November 28,
2002 of the MCTC to the CA, maintaining that Lao has
failed to establish that he and his supposed
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject properties under a claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945.10
On February 1, 2012, the CA rendered the herein
assailed Decision,11 affirming the MCTC ruling. The CA
opined that the evidence presented by Lao reflects the
twin requirements of ownership and possession over the
subject properties for at least 30 years. The CA further
held that Lao and his predecessors-in-interest have been
religiously paying taxes on the subject properties, which
is good indicium of possession in the concept of an
owner.12
In this petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner
maintains that the requirement of open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject properties under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 had not been complied
with.13 Further, the petitioner claims that the lower courts
erred in granting Lao's application since there was no
proof that the subject properties had been classified as
within the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.14
On the other hand, Lao avers that the subject properties
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain; he explains that the Land Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) would not have approved the tracing
cloth plan of the subject properties if the same are not
alienable and disposable.15 He further claims that the
lower courts' findings as regards the nature of his and
his predecessors-in-interest's possession and
occupation of the subject properties are findings of fact,
which is conclusive upon this Court.16
Issue

Essentially, the issue for the Court's resolution is
whether Lao's application for original registration of the
subject properties should be
granted.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the Court
The petition is granted.
Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
enumerates those who may apply for original registration
of title to land, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:cralawlawlibrary
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private
lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in
any other manner provided for by law.
xxxx
A perusal of Lao's application shows that he applied for
original registration of the subject properties under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, claiming that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in peaceful, open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the same in the concept of owners prior to
June 12, 1945.17
Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, it is imperative for
an applicant for registration of title over a parcel of land
to establish the following: (1) possession of the parcel of
land under a bona fide claim of ownership, by himself
and/or through his predecessors-in-interest since June
12, 1945, or earlier; and (2) that the propetiy sought to
be registered is already declared alienable and
disposable at the time of the application.18
The lower courts erred in ruling that Lao was able to
establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same in the
concept of owners prior to June 12, 1945. It is settled
that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of
ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer
general statements, which are mere conclusions of law
rather than factual evidence of possession.19 "Actual
possession consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property."20
The CA, in concluding that Lao met the required
possession and occupation of the subject properties for
original registration, opined
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It bears stressing that [Lao] and his [predecessors-in-
interest] have been religiously paying taxes thereon.
In Rosalina Clado-Reyes[,] et al. v. Spouses Limpe, the
Supreme Court reiterated that tax declarations or realty
tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership.
Nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
at least constructive possession. Here, the payment of
the taxes on the subject land by [Lao] and his
[predecessors-in-interest] adequately established the
fact of their successive possession over the lot.
Moreover, contrary to the allegations of [the petitioner],
[Lao] and his [predecessors-in-interest], particularly
[Vicente], had in fact performed acts of possession over
the subject land. [Vicente] had cultivated the land
through [Zacarias], its caretaker, as supported by the tax
declarations showing that the land was planted with fruit
bearing trees. This jibes with [Zacarias'] assertion that at
the time that he worked on the land of [Vicente], he was
asked to appropriate the land's income for the payment
of real estate taxes as the latter was already living
abroad. This proves that [Vicente] actually exercised
acts of ownership and dominion over the subject land
and that his possession thereof was not mere fiction.
That he appointed a caretaker over the land shows
[Vicente's] vigilance in protecting his interest over his
property. The same actuations can be readily gleaned
from [Lao] who also engaged the services of [Zacarias]
to care for and guard the land that he bought from
[Vicente].21
The Court does not agree.
Lao's testimony only established that he exercised
possession over the subject properties, through
Zacarias, when he acquired the same in 1990. On the
other hand, Zacarias' testimony only showed that he was
the caretaker of the subject properties since the 1950s
when the same were still owned by Perpetua.
Further, Lao only mentioned the vanous transfers of the
subject properties from the original owner, Casimiro, to
Perpetua; from Perpetua to Vicente; and from Vicente to
him. He failed to establish the specific period covering
the alleged possession of each of the purported
predecessors-in-interest. Furthermore, Lao's allegation
as regards the supposed ownership of the subject
properties by his predecessors-in-interest is bereft of any
documentary proof.
Moreover, as pointed out by the petitioner, Lao failed to
offer a reasonable explanation as to why the subject surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public
properties were declared for taxation purposes in the domain.25cralawred
name of a certain Ambrocio Calo who, however, was not
even identified by Lao as one of his predecessors-in- WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
interest. Clearly, the totality of evidence presented by disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
Lao failed to establish that he and his predecessors-in- dated February 1, 2012 issued by the Court of Appeals
interest have been in peaceful, open, continuous, in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 81180 is hereby REVERSED
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of and SET ASIDE. Mateo Lao's Application for Original
the same in the concept of owners since June 12, 1945 Registration of Title of Lot Nos. 206 and 208, GSS-1272,
or earlier. under Compostela Subdivision AP-072218-001228,
is DENIED for lack of merit.
Lao's claim of ownership of the subject properties based
on the tax declarations he presented will not prosper. It SO ORDERED.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
is only when these tax declarations are coupled with
proof of actual possession of the property that they may
become the basis of a claim of ownership.22 As already
stated, Lao failed to prove that he and his predecessors-
in-interest actually possessed the subject properties
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The lower courts likewise failed to consider that Lao has

not even presented a scintilla of proof that the subject
properties form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. "The well-entrenched rule is
that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private
dominion presumably belong to the State. The onus to
overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption
that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable and disposable rests with the applicant."23

The applicant for land registration must prove that the

DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area
per verification through survey by the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO). In addition, the applicant for land registration
must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.24

Lao failed to present any evidence showing that the

DENR Secretary had indeed approved a land
classification and released the land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable, and that the subject
properties fall within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. Lao merely
presented a tracing cloth plan, supposedly approved by
the Land Management Bureau of the DENR, which
allegedly showed that the subject properties indeed form
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.

It bears stressing that a notation in a survey plan

indicating that a parcel of land is inside the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not constitute
a positive government act validly changing the
classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere

G.R. No. 208350, November 14, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HEIRS
OF SPOUSES TOMASA ESTACIO AND EULALIO
OCOL, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA,***J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of
the Decision2 dated February 20, 2013, and
Resolution3 dated July 26, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96879. The CA affirmed the
Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in LRC Case
No. N-11598 granting respondents' application for
registration and confirmation of title over three (3)
parcels of land located at Barangay Calzada, Taguig City
with a total area of 11,380 square meters.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn September 19,
2008,5 respondents, Heirs of Spouses Tomasa Estacio
and Eulalio Ocol filed with the RTC of Pasig City, Branch
266 an application for land registration under
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree. The
application covers three (3) parcels of land described as
follows: a) Lot 2 under approved survey plan Ccs-00-
000258 with an area of 3,731 square meters; b) Lot
1672-A under approved subdivision plan Csd-00-001798
consisting of 1,583 square meters; c) a lot under
approved survey plan Cvn-00-000194 consisting of
6,066 square meters.6 The total assessed value of the
parcels of land is P288,970.007chanrobleslaw
On October 6, 2008, the RTC issued a Notice of Initial
Hearing, copy furnished the Land Registration Authority
(LRA). The notice was sent to the Official Gazette for
publication and was served on all the adjoining owners.
It was likewise posted conspicuously on each parcel of
land included in the application.8 During the initial
hearing on January 13, 2010, respondents, by counsel,
presented the jurisdictional requirements (Exhibits "A" to
"I" and their sub-markings). There being no private
oppositor, an Order of General Default was issued
except against the Republic of the Philippines.
At the ex-parte presentation of evidence on January 22,
2010, respondents Rosa Ocol, 72 years old, and Felipe
Ocol, 70 years old, testified that they are the children of
the late Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol (Exhibits "U"
and "V"). They inherited the subject lots from their father
and mother who died on February 1, 1949 and March
22, 1999, respectively. When Felipe Ocol was only about
eight years old and Rosa was still in grade school, their
parents developed and cultivated the subject lots as rice
fields. In the 1940's, there were only a few houses
around their house. At present, one of the lots is
residential while the two remaining lots have become
idle. Their parents and grandparents had been in
continuous, actual and physical possession of the lots
without any interruption for more than sixty five (65)
years. Felipe and Rosa have been in possession of the
land for more than fifty (50) years. There is n0 existing
mortgage or encumbrance over the said
lots.9chanrobleslaw
Respondents presented witness Antonia Marcelo who
was 85 years old at the time she testified. She is the
neighbor of Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol
in Barangay Calzada where she has been residing for
more than fifty (50) years. She testified that during her
childhood days, she used to play on the subject lots and
had seen the spouses Ocol cultivate the lots by planting
vegetables, rice and trees.10chanrobleslaw
In support of their application, respondents presented
documentary evidence which sought to establish the
following:
1. The first lot which is Lot 2 of the conv. Subd.
plan Ccs-00-000258 with an area of 3,731
square meters was declared for taxation
purposes in the names of Tomasa Estacio and
Eulalio Ocol in the years 1966, 1974, 1979,
1985, 2000 and 2002 (Exhibits "T" to "T-7");
2. The second lot which is Lot 1672-A under
approved subdivision plan Csd-00-001798
consisting of 1,583 square meters was declared
for taxation purposes in the names of Tomasa
Estacio and Eulalio Ocol in the years 1942,
1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1985, 1994, 2000 and
2002 (Exhibits "R" to "R-10");
3. The third lot which is a lot under approved
survey plan CVN-00-000194 consisting of 6,066
square meters, being a conversion of Lot 1889,
MCadm, 590-D Taguig Cadastral Mapping, was
declared for taxation purposes in the names of
Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol in the years
1949, 1974, 1979, 1985, 2000 and 2002
(Exhibits "S" to "S-6");
4. The subject lots used to have larger areas but
certain portions were taken and designated as
legal easements. On December 17, 2009, the
real property tax on the subject lots, declared in
the names of Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol
as owners, were paid (Exhibits "Q", "Q-1" and
"Q-2");
 5. The subject lots were surveyed for Tomasa Vda.
de Ocol as evidenced by the Geodetic
Engineers' Certificates and Conversion
Subdivision Plans (Exhibits "J", "K", "L", "P", "P-
1", and "P-2");
6. The subject lots are verified to be within
alienable and disposable land under Project No.
27-B Taguig Cadastral Mapping as per LC Map
No. 2623 approved on January 3, 1968 as
evidenced by Certifications dated January 28,
2010 issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources-National Capital Region
(Exhibits "J-3, "K-2" and "L-3").11
On February 11, 2010, respondents formally offered their
documentary evidence. The RTC set the case for
presentation of evidence of the government on April 16,
2010. On the date of the hearing, there was no
appearance from the government. Hence, the court,
upon motion of applicants, considered the case
submitted for resolution.
On August 12, 2010, the RTC issued an Order granting
the respondents' application for registration of title to the
subject properties, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered thus: the
title of the heirs of Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol,
namely, Rosa Ocol; and Felipe Ocol, to the three (3)
parcels of land above-described is hereby CONFIRMED.
Upon the finality of the judgment, let the proper Decree
of Registration and Certificates of Title be issued to the
applicants pursuant to Section 39 of P.D. 1529.
Let two (2) copies of this Order be furnished the Land
registration Authority Administrator Benedicta B. Ulep
thru Salvador L. Oriel, the Chief of the Docket Division of
said Office, East Avenue, Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC found that respondents were able to prove that
their predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject lots
from 1966 until 2002 with respect to the first lot; from
1942 to 2002, with respect to the second lot; and from
1949 to 2002 with respect to the third lot, as shown in
the tax declarations. The court posited that even if the
subject lots were declared as alienable and disposable
public land only on January 3, 1968, respondents had
already "acquired title to the land according to P.D.
1529" by virtue of the continued possession of the
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest from
January 3, 1968 to the present.13chanrobleslaw
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner
raising the following grounds:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Respondents did not comply with the
requirements in acquiring ownership of the
subject lots by prescription because the few tax
declarations of respondents failed to substantiate
the requirement of open, continuous, notorious
and exclusive possession of the subject lots for
the required period as stated in the case of Wee
vs. Republic;14
(b) The evidence is insufficient to establish the
nature of possession because the testimony of
witness Antonia Marcelo with regard to the
cultivation of the subject properties by spouses
Ocol does not convincingly prove possession and
enjoyment of the subject lots to the exclusion of
other people;
(c) There was no declaration, either in the form of a
law or a presidential proclamation, showing that
the lots are no longer intended for public use or
for the development of national wealth, or that it
has been converted to patrimonial property as
stated in the case of Heirs of Malabanan v.
Republic.15
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC
on February 15, 2011.
The RTC opined that the case of Wee vs. Republic16 is
not applicable in the instant case because the parcels of
land involved in the said case are "unirrigated ricefields".
In the instant case, the first and third lots are ricefields
while the second lot is a residential one as shown in the
tax declarations. The RTC averred that, even prior to the
dates stated in the tax declarations specifically during
the 1940s, spouses Tomasa and Eulalio Ocol had
started planting rice on the first and third lots as testified
to by respondents. The testimony was corroborated by
witness Antonia Marcelo, who is 15 years older than the
respondents, when she testified that she played on the
subject lots and had seen the spouses Ocol cultivate the
same by planting vegetables, rice and trees in the
1930s. As to the second lot, the RTC gave credence to
the testimony of respondents that in the 1940s,
respondents' house was already erected on the said lot.
According to the court, such is proof that the lot has
been used for residential purposes even prior to 1942
which is the earliest date of the tax declaration on the lot.
The RTC further held that the case of Heirs of
Malabanan vs. Republic17 does not apply in the case at
bar because the said case involved a 71,324-square-
meter lot, while the subject lots have a total area of
11,380 square meters only. The court pointed out that
respondents are not just entitled to a grant of their
application under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 but also
under Section 14(2) of the same law because
respondents had proven that their predecessors-in-
interest were in possession of the subject lands earlier
than 1945. Thus, there is no need for an express
government manifestation that the property is
patrimonial, or that such is no longer intended for public
service or for the development of national wealth.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the CA. In a
Decision dated February 20, 2013, the CA affirmed the
Decision of the RTC. The fallo of the Decision
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and
the Order dated August 12, 2010, of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 266, in L.R.C. Case No. N-
11598 (LRA Record No. N-79393) is AFFIRMED IN
TOTO.
SO ORDERED.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In affirming the RTC Order, the CA made the following
ratiocinations:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the case at bar, the applicants-appellees seek the
confirmation of their ownership to the subject lands not
based on prescription, but based on their claim that "they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bonafide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier". (Section
14[1], PD 1529). The requirement of prior declaration
that the property is patrimonial property of the State,
therefore, does not apply. As explained in Heirs of
Malabanan, for application based on Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, it is enough that the
property is alienable and disposable property of the
State and the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land under a bonafide claim of ownership
from June 12, 1945 or earlier. Both of these
requirements are present in this
case.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner
but the same was denied by the CA on July 26, 2013.
Hence, this petition, raising the following
errors:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. THE RECORD IS BEREFT OF PROOF
THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES
HAD BEEN CLASSIFIED AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE;
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian, which would support
respondents' claim that the subject lands are alienable
and disposable. The certification of Senior Forest
Management Specialist Corazon D. Calamno and Chief
of the Forest Utilization and Law Enforcement Division of
the DENR should not be treated as sufficient compliance
with the requirements of the law because she was not
presented during trial to testify on the contents of the
certification.
On the second ground, petitioner argues that there is
insufficient evidence of acts of dominion on the part of
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest for the
following reasons:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Respondents did not explain how the properties
were acquired. The only explanation as to the
acquisition of Lot 1672-A was that it was first
acquired from a certain Gregorio, without even
mentioning the date of acquisition as well as any
document evidencing the same.21
(b) It was unusual for respondents' parents to
possess and occupy three (3) parcels of land that
are not contiguous to one another;
(c) Respondents were able to present a tax receipt
only for the year 2009;
(d) In terms of improvements, respondents did not
go to the extent of specifying whether fences
were erected on the lots. While they claim that
crops were planted, it did not appear that they
exclusively and continuously enjoyed the
possession of the lots;
(e) While respondents consistently affirm the
development of the lots as ricefields, they failed
to consider the fact that the second lot, Lot 1672-
A, is a residential land as stated on the tax
declaration of the land.

2. THE RECORD IS BEREFT OF PROOF
THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN
OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE
AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION Of
THE SUBJECT LOTS UNDER A BONA
FIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP SINCE
JUNE 12, 1945, OR EARLIER;
3. ALTERNATIVELY, RESPONDENTS
CANNOT INVOKE PRESCRIPTION
UNDER SECTION 14(2) OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529.
THE SUBJECT LOTS HAVE NOT
BEEN CONVERTED INTO
PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY OF THE
STATE.20
On the third ground, petitioner avers that respondents
cannot invoke prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D.
1529 because they failed to present the necessary
documents which would show that the subject properties
are no longer intended for public service or no longer
used for the development of the national wealth. They
did not present a declaration in the form of a law or a
Presidential Proclamation.
In their Comment,22 respondents counter that the
certifications issued by the DENR constitute substantial
compliance with the legal requirement, and that with their
continuous possession of the subject lots for more than
thirty (30) years, they had acquired ownership over the
subject lots through prescription under Section 14(2) of
P.D. 1529.

On the first ground, petitioner states that respondents In Reply,23 petitioner maintains that respondents failed to
failed to present a copy of the original certification, establish their compliance with the requisites for original
registration either under Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2)
of P.D. No. 1529. The certifications of Senior Forest
Management specialist Corazon C. Calamno and the
Chief of the Forest Utilization and Law Enforcement
Division of the DENR did not comply with the legal
requirements for lack of approval by the DENR Secretary
and for lack of certification by its legal custodian.
Respondents failed to establish that the State expressly
declared, either through a law or a presidential
proclamation, that the parcels ofland are no longer
retained for public service or the development of national
wealth, or that they had been converted into patrimonial
properties. Without such, the subject lots remain part of
public dominion.
Petitioner further maintains that the tax declarations do
not represent regular assertion of ownership because of
the large gaps in the years between declarations. Such
sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation in the concept of an owner. And that,
since the parcels of land are not contiguous, alleged
possession and occupation over one parcel of land
cannot prove possession and occupation over the other
parcels of land.24chanrobleslaw
The petition is meritorious.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or
alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of
the inalienable public; domain. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration, who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
presented to establish that the land subject of the
application is alienable or
disposable.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration
Decree provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Those who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands
by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
xxx
In the Order of the RTC granting the registration of the
subject lots, it was stated that respondents had
"acquired title to the land according to P.D. 1529" by
virtue of the continued possession of the respondents
and their predecessors-in-interest from January 3, 1968
to present. On motion for reconsideration, however, the
court added that respondents are not just entitled to a
grant of their application under Section 14(2) of the P.D.
1529, but also under Section 14(1) of the same law
because respondents had proven that their
predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the
subject lots earlier than 1945. The CA explained,
however, that the confirmation of the ownership to the
subject lots is not based on prescription, but on Section
14 (1), since it was established that the lots are alienable
and disposable, and the applicants are in continuous
possession thereof since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
To distinguish between registration under Section 14(1)
of P.D. No. 1529 from the one filed under Section 14(2)
of P.D. No. 1529, this Court held in the case of Heirs of
Mario Malabanan v. Republic:26
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis
of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on
the basis of prescription. Registration under Section
14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14(2) is made available both
by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil
Code.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is
based on possession and occupation of the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain since June 12,
1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land was
susceptible to private ownership at that time. The
applicant needs only to show that the land had already
been declared alienable and disposable at any time prior
to the filing of the application for
registration.28chanrobleslaw
On the other hand, registration under Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529 is based on acquisitive prescription and
must comply with the law on prescription as provided by
the Civil Code. In that regard, only the patrimonial
property of the State may be acquired by prescription
pursuant to the Civil Code. For acquisitive prescription to
set in, therefore, the land being possessed and occupied
must already be classified or declared as patrimonial
property of the State. Otherwise, no length of possession
would vest any right in the possessor ifthe property has
remained land of the public dominion.29chanrobleslaw
Moreover, Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
public land acquired under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073.30 Under Section 14(1),
respondents need to prove that: (1) the land forms part
of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
from June 12, 1945 or earlier. These the respondents
must prove by no less than clear, positive and
convincing evidence.31chanrobleslaw
In the case at bar, the first requirement was not satisfied.
To prove that the subject property forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the
respondents presented three certifications - two are
dated January 29, 2010 (Exhibits "J-3" and "K-2") and
one is dated January 28, 2010 (Exhibits "L-3") - issued
by Senior Forest Management Specialist Corazon D.
Calamno and Chief of the Forest Utilization and Law
Enforcement Division of the DENR-National Capital
Region.32 The certification attests that the lots are
verified to be within alienable and disposable land under
Project No. 27-B Taguig Cadastral Mapping as per LC
Map No. 2623 approved on January 3, 1968,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This is to certify that the tract of land as shown and
described at the reverse side hereof xxx as surveyed by
Geodetic Engineer Jose S. Agres, Jr. for Tomasa Vda de
Ocol is verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable
Land, under Project No. 27-B of Taguig City as per LC
Map 2623, approved on January 3,
1968.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
However, the certifications presented by the respondents
are insufficient to prove that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable. We reiterate the standing
doctrine that land of the public domain, to be the subject
of appropriation, must be declared alienable and
disposable either by the President or the Secretary of the
DENR. Applicants must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
records. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,34 this Court explicitly
ruled:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO35 to
certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application
for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent
failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Republic v. Bantigue Point Development
Corporation,37 this Court deemed it appropriate to
reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties,
viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State. The applicant for land
registration has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of State ownership by establishing through
incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be
registered is alienable or disposable based on a
positive act of the government. We held in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is
insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable
character of the land sought to be registered. The
applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR
Secretary has approved the land classification and
released the land in question as alienable and
disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original
registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or
PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records.
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO
certification in support of its application. Clearly, this falls
short of the requirements for original
registration.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Similarly, in Republic v. Cortez,39 this Court declared
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx. To prove that the subject property forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
Cortez adduced in evidence a survey plan Csd-00-
000633 (conversion-subdivision plan of Lot 2697,
MCadm 594-D, Pateros Cadastral Mapping) prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Oscar B. Fernandez and dertified by
the Lands Management Bureau of the DENR. The said
survey plan contained the following
annotation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Project No. 29,
classified as cuienable & disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development on Jan. 3, 1968.
However, Cortez' reliance on the foregoing
annotation in the survey plan is amiss; it ciloes not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that the subject property remains part
of the inalienable public domain. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Tri-Plus Corporation,40 the Court clarified
that, the applicant must at the very least submit a
certification froi:n the proper government agency stating
that the parcel of land subject of he application for
registration is indeed alienable and
disposable, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must
be presented to establish that the land subject of the
application is alie table or disposable.
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the
character of the subject lands as required by law is the
notation appearinin the Advance Plan stating in effect
that the said properties are alienable and disposable.
However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law.
To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an appficant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators, andla legislative act or statute. The
applicant may also secure certification from the
Government that the lands applied: for are alienable and
disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan
bearing the notation was certified by the Lands
Management Services of the DENR, the cert fication
refers only to the technical correctness of the survey
plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do wh
tsoever with the nature and character of the property
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification
fromithe proper government agency to prove that the
lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and
disposable.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Clearly, the aforestated doctrine unavoidably means that
the mere certification issued by the DENR does not
suffice to support the application for registration,
because the applicant must also submit a copy of the
original classification of the land as alienable and
disposable as approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records.42chanrobleslaw
Hence, in the instant case, the DENR certifications that
were presented by the respondents in support of their
application for registration are not sufficient to prove that
the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR
Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still
imperative for the respondents to present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary,
which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as
a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in
granting the application for registration in spite o£ the
failure of the respondents to prove by well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable.43chanrobleslaw
Anent the second requirement, the tax declarations do
not prove respondents' assertion. Although respondents
claim that they possessed the subject lots through their
predecessors-in-interest since the 1930s, their tax
declarations belie the same. The earliest tax declarations
presented for the first lot was issued only in 1966, while
the earliest tax declaration for the third lot was issued in
1949.
If it is true that the parents of respondents had been in
possession of the properties in the 1930s as testified to
by witness Antonia Marcelo, why was the first lot
declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in
1966, and the third lot was declared only in 1949? While
belated declaration of a property for taxation purposes
does not necessarily negate the fact of possession, tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are,
nevertheless, good indicia of possession in the concept
of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least,
constructive possession.44chanrobleslaw
That the subject properties were first declared for
taxation purposes only in those mentioned years gives
rise to the presumption that the respondents claimed
ownership or possession of the subject properties
starting in the year 1966 only with respect to the first lot;
and year 1949, with respect to the third lot.45 The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes not only manifests one's sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property, but also announces
an adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties with an intention to contribute needed
revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens
ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.46chanrobleslaw
Likewise, this Court notes that the tax declarations on
the subject properties presented by the respondents
were only for the years 1966, 1974, 1979, 1985, 2000
and 2002 with respect to the first lot (Lot 2 of the conv.
Subd. plan Ccs-00-000258 with an area of 3,731 square
meters); for the years 1942, 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979,
1985, 1994, 2000 and 2002 with respect to the second
lot (Lot 1672-A under approved subdivision plan Csd-00-
001798 consisting of 1,583 square meters); for the years
1949, 1974, 1979, 1985,2000 and 2002 with respect to
the third lot (a lot under approved survey plan CVN-00-
000194 consisting of 6,066 square meters being a
conversion of Lot 1889, MCadm, 590-D Taguig
Cadastral Mapping).
Thus, there are only six tax declarations for the first lot,
nine tax declarations for the second lot and five tax
declarations for the third lot within the alleged actual and
physical possession of the lands without any interruption
for more than sixty five (65) years. In Wee v. Republic of
the Philippines,47 this Court stated
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax
declarations (for the years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980 and
1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more
than 45 years (1945-1993). This type of intermittent
and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does
not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation. In any event, in the
absence of other competent evidence, tax declarations
do not conclusively establish either possession or
declarant's right to registration of
title.48chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Moreover, this Court emphasizes that respondents paid
the taxes due on the parcels of land subject of the
application only in 2009, a year after the filing of the
application. There is no showing of any tax payments
before 2009. This Court held in the case of Tan, et al.
vs. Republic:49
Tax declarations per se do not qualify as competent
evidence of actual possession for purposes of
prescription. More so, if the payment of the taxes due
on the property is episodic, irregular and
random such as in this case. Indeed, how can the
petitioners claim of possession for the entire
prescriptive period be ascribed any ounce of
credibility when taxes were paid only on eleven (11)
occasions within the 40-year period from 1961 to
2001?50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From the foregoing, this Court doubts the respondents'
claim that their predecessors-in-interest have been in
continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owners from June
12, 1945, or earlier. The evidence presented by the
respondents does not prove title thru possession and
occupation of public land under Section 14(1) of P.D.
1529.
Further, the RTC ruled that with the continuous
possession of the subject lots for more than 30 years,
respondents had acquired ownership over the subject
lots through prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D.
529. This view was adopted by the respondents in their
Comment,51 to the petition.
An application for original registration of land of the
public domain under Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529 must show not only that the land
has previously been declared alienable and disposable,
but also that the land has been declared patrimonial
property of the State at the onset of the 30-year or 10-
year period of possession and occupation required under
the law on acquisitive prescription.52chanrobleslaw
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of
prescription for purposes of acqmring ownership and
registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D.
No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State
expressly declares that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. xxx
In this case, there is no evidence showing that the
parcels of land in question were within an area expressly
declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of
the State, or to be no longer intended for public service
or the development of the national wealth.
Evidently, there being no compliance, with either the first
or second paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529,
the Regalian presumption stands and must be enforced
in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated February 20, 2013, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 96879, affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 266, in LRC
Case No. N-11598, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
application for registration and confirmation of title filed
by respondents Heirs of Spouses Tomasa Estacio and
Eulalio Ocol over three parcels of land, with a total area
of eleven thousand three hundred eighty (11,380) square
meters situated at Barangay Calzada, Taguig City, Metro
Manila, is DENIED.

It was elucidated in Heirs of Malabanan53 that SO ORDERED.chan robles virtuallawlibrary

possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable public land for the periods provided under the
Civil Code will not convert it to patrimonial or private
property. There must be an express declaration that the
property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of national wealth. In the absence thereof,
the property remains to be alienable and disposable and
may not be acquired by prescription under Section 14(2)
of P.D. No. 1529.

This Court, therefore, stresses that there must be an

official declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public use, public
service, or for the development of national wealth before
it can be acquired by prescription; that a mere
declaration by government officials that a land of the
public domain is already alienable and disposable would
not suffice for purposes of registration under Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The period of acquisitive
prescription would only begin to run from the time that
the State officially declares that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public use, public
service, or for the development of national wealth54.

In Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr.,55 this Court reiterated the

ruling in Malabanan, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for
application for registration because his claim of
ownership and possession over the subject property
even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is

G.R. No. 179987               September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by
Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the
decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we
upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying
the application of the petitioners for the registration of a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite
on the ground that they had not established by sufficient
evidence their right to the registration in accordance with
either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is
a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang
Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-
452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On
February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an
application for land registration covering the property in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite,
claiming that the property formed part of the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30
years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of
his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001
issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which
reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot
No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for
Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang,
Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as
shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is
verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per
Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under
Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-
1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered
judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land
registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this
application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands
described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three
Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as
supported by its technical description now forming part of
the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of
legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at
Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith
issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the
judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed
to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification
stated that the property had been declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s
possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked
for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of
possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the
appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of
February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for
review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the
controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as
alienable and disposable could be counted in the
reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title
under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141)
and the Property Registration Decree. They point out
that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the
declaration of the land subject of the application for
registration as alienable and disposable should also date
back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter
dictum considering that the land registration proceedings
therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for
lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the
property had been ipso jure converted into private
property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-
interest of an alienable land of the public domain for
more than 30 years. According to them, what was
essential was that the property had been "converted"
into private property through prescription at the time of
the application without regard to whether the property
sought to be registered was previously classified as
agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on
certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by
sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the
property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-
in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit
that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings
in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v.
Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they
argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or
disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the
Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property
from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that
Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the
real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit
title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-
year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code,
in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan
filed the application for registration on February 20,
1998, he had already been in possession of the land for
almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the
land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order
to obtain a clarification with reference to the application
of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that
the decision has enlarged, by implication, the
interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It
reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to
registration only when the land subject of the application
had been declared alienable and disposable since June
12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be
imperative to discuss the different classifications of land
in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws
of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be
classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it
either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the
State, without being for public use, and is intended for
some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not
of such character, or although of such character but no
longer intended for public use or for public service forms
part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that
is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal
concept first introduced into the country from the West
by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.15 This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with
the conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also,
public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the
public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and
disposable primarily rests on the classification of public
lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified
into three, namely, agricultural, timber and
mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and
grazing land, with the reservation that the law might
provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution
into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added
national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according
to their legal classification is done exclusively by and
through a positive act of the Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit
on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only
agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated;
all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or
those classified as lands of private ownership under
Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b)
lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that
the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks
are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless
they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of
the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to
classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the
Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however,
public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest
or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is
no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively
removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form
of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to
classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends the
land to be used for public service or for the development
of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides
the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be
disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not
otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free
patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper
interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires
possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June
12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the
words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify
that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or
timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or
private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public
Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes.
The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and
disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b)
to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set
forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land
Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements
in order for his application to come under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession
and occupation of the property subject of the
application;
2. The possession and occupation must be
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have
taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must
be an agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department
is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public
domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation
to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain in order for the
provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is
already classified as agricultural land of the public
domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes
the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable
as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that
the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public
land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or
reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on
June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the
land prior to such classification or reclassification
produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date
of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over
by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy
concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be
respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as
the reckoning point of the requisite possession and
occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the
determination of which should best be left to the wisdom
of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the
period of possession and occupation, no other legislative
intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date
of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret
only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by
the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no
requirement that the land subject of the registration
should have been classified as agricultural since June
12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or
incomplete title is derived only from possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means
that the character of the property subject of the
application as alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain determines its eligibility for land
registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the
period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations
may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long
as the lands were already converted to private
ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying
the requisite period of possession prescribed by the
Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property
subject of the application of Malabanan need not be
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite
period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should
have been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land at the time of the application for
registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption
that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable
also serves to determine the point at which prescription
may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete
title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.
Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of
law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the
Government, because it is not necessary that a
certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the
Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to
unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens
by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for
the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated.
Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such
objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative
development bears out, when Congress enacted
legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to
liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the
adjudication of alienable public land to qualified
applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area
limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no
longer intended for public use or for the development of
national wealth by declaration of Congress or the
President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial
or private land of the State, the applicable provision
concerning disposition and registration is no longer
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code,
in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run
against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative
to the disposition of public land or lands of the public
domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the
Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands
that are not clearly under private ownership are
also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general
rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public
domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive
modes enumerated under Section 11 of
the Public Land Act. If the mode is
judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, the agricultural land subject of the
application needs only to be classified
as alienable and disposable as of the
time of the application, provided the
applicant’s possession and occupation
of the land dated back to June 12, 1945,
or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive
presumption that the applicant has
performed all the conditions essential to
a government grant arises,36 and the
applicant becomes the owner of the land
by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete
title. By legal fiction, the land has
already ceased to be part of the public
domain and has become private
property.37
disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has
been already converted to private
ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a
condition sine qua non in observance of
the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that
property of the State not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of
prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession - possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land
cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private
property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to
run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national
wealth.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion
for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

(b) Lands of the public domain

subsequently classified or declared as
no longer intended for public use or for
the development of national wealth are
removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted
into patrimonial lands or lands of private
ownership that may be alienated or

G.R. No. 219070
CONRADO R. ESPIRITU, JR., TERESITA ESPIRITU-
GUTIERREZ, MARIETTA R. ESPIRITU-CRUZ, OSCAR
R. ESPIRITU, and ALFREDO R. ESPIRITU, Petitioners
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
reverse and set aside the March 20, 2015 Decision1 and
June 18, 2015 Resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals {CA)  in CA-G.R. CV No. 101002, which
reversed and set aside the July 30, 2012 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 274, Parañaque
City (RTC)  in Land Registration Case No. 10-0026 (LRC
No. 10- 0026),  which approved the application for land
registration filed by the petitioners.
The Antecedents
On March 1, 2010, the petitioners, with their now
deceased sibling, Carmen Espiritu, filed before the RTC
an Application for Registration of Title to Land4 covering
a parcel of land with an area of 6,971 square meters,
located at Barangay La Huerta, Parafiaque City, Metro
Manila, and identified as Lot 4178, Cad. 299 of the
Paranaque Cadastre Case 3 (subject land).
Attached to the petitioners' application were copies of
the following documents: (1) Special Powers of Attorney
respectively executed by petitioners Oscar Espiritu
(Oscar)5  and Alfredo Espiritu (Alfredo )6 in favor of
petitioner Conrado Espiritu, Jr. (Conrado, Jr.),  to
represent them in the proceedings relating to the
application; (2) Advanced Survey Plan7 of Lot No. 4178,
Cad. 299 of the Parafiaque Cadastre Case 3; (3)
Technical Description8 of Lot 4178, AP-04-003281, being
an advanced survey of Lot 4178, Cad. 299, Parafiaque
Cadastre Case 3; and (4) Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. E-
005-01718-TR.9
The petitioners alleged that their deceased parents,
Conrado Espiritu, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.)  and Felicidad
Rodriguez-Espiritu (Felicidad),  were the owners of the
subject land; that they inherited the subject land after
their parents passed away; and that they, by themselves
and through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
open, public, and continuous possession of the subject
land in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30)
years.
Subsequently, the RTC determined that it had
jurisdiction to act on the application. Thereafter, trial
ensued, during which Oscar, Conrado, Jr., Ludivina
Aromin (Aromin),  Ferdinand
Encarnacion (Encarnacion),  and Marrieta Espiritu-
Cruz (Marrieta),  were presented as witnesses.
Encarnacion, a staff in the Docket Division of the Land
Registration Authority, testified that the notices relative to
the application for registration of the subject land were
served on the owners of the, adjoining lots.
Marrieta testified that she is one of the children of
Conrado, Sr. and Felicidad; that she was born on
February 23, 1933; that she has known the subject land
since she was seven (7) years old because her parents
owned the same; that before her parents, her
grandparents and Felicidad's parents, Dalmacio
Rodriguez and Dominga Catindig were the owners of the
subject land; that she, together with her siblings,
inherited the subject land from Conrado, Sr. and
Felicidad, who died in March 1984 and on January 10,
1986, respectively; that they possessed the subject land
openly and continuously since the death of their parents;
that the subject land was agricultural in nature because it
was being used as salt land during summer and as
fishpond during rainy season; and that there were no
adverse claimants over the subject land.
Oscar corroborated Marietta's testimony. He reiterated
that they were in possession and occupation of the
subject land because they could visit the property
whenever they wanted to, introduce improvements
thereon, and prevent intruders from entering it.
Conrado, Jr. testified that he commissioned the survey of
the subject land; that he requested and received from
Laureano B. Lingan, Jr., Regional Technical Director of
the Forest Management Services (FMS), Department of
Environment and Natural Resources-National Capital
Region (DENRNCR), a Certification, 10 dated October 6,
2010, stating that the subject land was part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and
that they utilized the subject land in their salt-making
business, which they inherited from their parents.
On cross-examination, Conrado, Jr. admitted that their
salt-making business ceased operation in 2004, and that
the subject land had become idle.
For her part, Aromin, the Chief of the Technical Services
of the DENR-NCR, testified that their office issued a
certified copy of the technical description of Lot No. 4178
(AP 04-003281) on February 18, 201 O; and that the
technical description was verified to be consistent with
the approved survey plan of Lot No. 4178.
In addition to the testimonies of their witnesses, the
petitioners also presented in evidence several tax
declarations covering the subject land, the earliest of
which was T.D. No. 318011 issued on April 28, 1970; a
Certification, 12 dated January 26, 2011, issued by the
Parañaque City Treasurer's Office stating that the real
property tax for the subject land had been fully settled up
to year 201 O; and the DENR-NCR certification alluded
to by Conrado, Jr. during his direct examination, to the
effect that the subject land was verified to be within the
alienable and disposable land under Project No. 25 of
Parañaque City, as per LC Map 2623, and that it is not
needed for forest purposes.
The RTC Ruling
In its decision, dated July 30, 2012, the RTC granted the
application for registration. The trial court opined that the
petitioners were able to establish possession and
occupation over the subject land under a bona fide  claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It gave
credence to the testimony of Marrieta that she had
known that the subject land belonged to their parents as
early as 1940 because she was already seven (7) years
old at that time.
The trial court was convinced that the petitioners were
able to prove that the subject land was part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In so
ruling, it relied on the contents of the DENR-NCR
certification. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 29 of P.D. No. 1529
as amended, judgment is hereby rendered granting the
application of the applicants, namely, Carmen R.
Espiritu, Conrado R. Espiritu, Jr., Marrieta R. Espiritu,
Oscar R. Espiritu, Alfredo R. Espiritu, and Teresita R.
Espiritu, confirming the title of said applicants over the
parcel of land fully described on its technical description
described as follows:
xxx
and ordering the registration of said parcel of land in the
name of the applicants.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding
Order for the issuance of the Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.13 (Boldface omitted)
The Republic moved for reconsideration, but its motion
was denied by the R TC in its resolution, dated April 1,
2013.
Aggrieved, the Republic, through the OSG, elevated an
appeal to the CA.14
The CA Ruling
In its assailed decision, dated March 20, 2015, the CA
reversed and set aside the July 30, 2012 RTC decision.
In reversing the trial court, the appellate court reiterated
the prevailing doctrine that to successfully register a
parcel of land, the application must be accompanied by:
(1) a CENRO or PENRO certification stating the
alienable and disposable character of the land applied
for; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official records. It opined that
the DENR-NCR certification presented by the petitioners
would not suffice to prove that the subject land was
indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable
and disposable. The CA explained that under
Department of Agriculture Orders (DAO) Nos. 20 and
38, the Regional Technical Director of the FMS had no
authority to issue certificates of land classification; and
that the petitioners failed to present a certified true copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July
30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 274 in
Parafiaque City in LRC Case No. 10-0026 is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The application for
registration of land title filed by the applicants-appellees
Carmen R. Espiritu, Conrado R. Espiritu, Jr., Marrieta R.
Espiritu, Oscar R. Espiritu, Alfredo R. Espiritu and
Teresita R. Espiritu is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.15 (Boldface omitted)
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their
motion was denied by the CA in its resolution, dated
June 18, 2015.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT AND DISMISSING
THE PETITIONERS' APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION OF TITLE.
The petitioners, relying on the cases of Republic of the
Philippines v. Serrano (Serrano )16 and Republic v. Vega
(Vega),  17 argue that they had substantially complied
with the presentation of the required proof that the land
applied for registration is alienable and disposable part
of the public domain. They assert that the DENR-NCR
certification they submitted, together with all the
documentary evidence they presented, constituted
substantial compliance with the legal requirement that
the land must be proved to be alienable and disposable
part of the public domain. The petitioners insist that the
DENR-NCR certification they submitted was
sufficient proof of the character of the subject land
because under DAO No. 2012-09,18 dated November 14,
2012, the Regional Executive Director of the DENR is
vested with authority to issue certifications on land
classification for lands situated in Metro Manila.
The petitioners further claimed that they already
submitted a certified true copy of the original land
classification covering the subject land. They assert that
in their Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 3, 2015,
filed before the CA, they attached a copy of Forestry
Administrative Order (PAO) No. 4-1141, dated January
3, 1968, signed by Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., then Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
In its Comment, 19 the Republic countered that the
petitioners failed to comply with the requirements that
the application for original registration must be
accompanied by (1) a CENRO/PENRO certification; and
(2) a certified true copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary. It contended that the
petitioners' reliance on Serrano  and Vega  were
misplaced, because the rulings therein on substantial
compliance were mere pro hac vice.  The Republic
further av.erred that while the petitioners were able to
present a copy of PAO No. 4-1141, the same had no
probative value as it was not presented during the
proceedings before the RTC. Lastly, it claimed that
assuming arguendo that the petitioners had sufficiently
established the character of the subject land as alienable
and disposable, registration would still not be proper,
considering that they failed to establish the necessary
possession and occupation for the period required by
law.
In their Reply,20 dated July 21, 2016, the petitioners
insisted on the application of Serrano  and Vega  to the
present case. They also assert that even if their copy of
F AO No. 4-1141 was not presented during the
proceedings before the RTC, the same still have
probative value. On the basis of Natividad Sta. Ana
Victoria v. Republic of the Philippines (Sta.
AnaVictoria),21  the petitioners claim that in land
registration cases, the Court has allowed the
presentation of additional certifications to prove the
alienability and disposability of the land sought to be
registered when the authenticity thereof were not
sufficiently contested.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The Court notes that the subject application was filed
under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529, considering the allegation therein of possession
and occupation in the concept of owner for more than
thirty (30) years. The trial court, however, granted the
application under Section 14(1) of the same decree after
finding that the petitioners were able to establish open,
continuous, and exclusive possession and occupation of
the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Manifestly, there has been some uncertainty under what
provision of law the present application for registration is
being sought because the requirements and basis for
registration under these two provisions of law differ from
one another. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the
basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles
registration on the basis of prescription.22 Nevertheless,
for the proper resolution of the issues and arguments
raised herein, the present application would be
scrutinized based on the requirements of the provisions
of Sections 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Registration under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529
Section 14, paragraph 1 of P.D. No. 1529 provides:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is
based on possession and occupation of the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain since June 12,
1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land was
susceptible to private ownership at that time. 23 Thus, for
registration under Section 14(1) to prosper, the applicant
for original registration of title to land must establish the
following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2)
that the applicants by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
thereof; and (3) that the possession is under a bona
fide  claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.24
Petitioners failed to prove
that the subject land is
alienable and disposable
The rule is that applicants for land registration bear the
burden of proving that the land applied for registration is
alienable and disposable. 25 In this regard, the applicant
for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable,
and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition,
he must also present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.26
In this case, during the proceedings before the RTC, to
prove the alienable and disposable character of the
subject land, the petitioners presented the DENR-NCR
certification stating that the subject land was verified to
be within the alienable and disposable part of the public
domain. This piece of evidence is insufficient to
overcome the presumption of State ownership. As
already discussed, the present rule requires the
presentation, not only of the certification from the
CENRO/PENRO, but also the submission of a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records.27
Likewise, the petitioners' claim of substantial compliance
does not warrant approval of the application.
The rule on strict compliance enunciated in Republic of
the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties (T.A.N.
Properties)28 remains to be the governing rule in land
registration cases. This rule was neither abandoned nor
modified by the subsequent pronouncements
in Vega and Serrano as these latter cases were
mere pro hac vice.  In fact, in Vega,  the Court clarified
that the ruling on substantial compliance applies pro hac
vice  and did not, in any way, detract from the Court's
ruling in T.A.N Properties  and similar cases which
impose a strict requirement to prove that the land applied
for registration is alienable and disposable.
Further, in Republic of the Philippines v. San Mateo
(San Mateo),  29 the Court expounded on the reason
behind the subsequent decisions which granted
applications for land registration on the basis of
substantial compliance, viz.:
In Vega, the Court was mindful of the fact that the trial
court rendered its decision on November 13, 2003, way
before the rule on strict compliance was laid down in
T.A.N. Properties on June 26, 2008. Thus, the trial court
was merely applying the rule prevailing at the time,
which was substantial compliance. Thus, even if the
case reached the Supreme Court after the promulgation
of T.A.N. Properties, the Court allowed the application of
substantial compliance, because there was no
opportunity for the registrant to comply with the Court's
ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the trial court and the CA
already having decided the case prior to the
promulgation of T.A.N. Properties. 30 (Italics omitted)
From the foregoing, it is clear that substantial
compliance may be applied, at the discretion of the
courts, only if the trial court rendered its decision on the
application prior to June 26, 2008, the date of the
promulgation of T.A.N. Properties. In this case, the
application for registration, which was filed on March 1,
2010, was granted by the RTC only on July 30, 2012, or
four (4) years after the promulgation of T.A.N.
Properties. Evidently, the courts did not have discretion
to apply the rule on substantial compliance. Thus, the
petitioners' reliance on Vega and Serrano, as well as
on Sta. Ana Victoria,  which similarly appreciated
substantial compliance, is clearly misplaced. Hence, the
petitioners failed to prove the first requisite for
registration under Section 14(1).
Petitioners failed to prove possession and occupation of
the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier
As to the second and third requisites, the Court concurs
with the appellate court that the petitioners failed to
establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land on or
before June 12, 1945.
In this case, the petitioners presented several tax
declarations in their names, the earliest of which dates
back only to 1970.1âwphi1 This period of possession
and occupation is clearly insufficient to give the
petitioners the right to register the subject land in their
names because the law requires that possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership should
be since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
In a similar vein, the respective testimonies of petitioners
Marietta, Oscar, and Conrado, Jr. were insufficient to
support their claim of possession and occupation of the
subject land. The only relevant testimonies offered by
the petitioners were to the effect that they had known the
subject land since they were children, as the same were
owned by their parents; that it was used as a fishpond
during the rainy season and in their salt-making business
during the summer, which business, however, ceased
operation in 2004; and that they could visit the subject
land whenever they wanted to, introduce improvements
on it, and prevent intruders therefrom.
In Republic of the Philippines  v. Remman Enterprises,
Inc.,31 the Court held that for purposes of land
registration under Section 14(1) of P .D. No. 1529, proof
of specific acts of ownership must be presented to
substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the land
subject of the application. Applicants for land registration
cannot just offer general statements which are mere
conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
possession. Actual possession consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such nature
as a party would actually exercise over his own
property. 32
In this case, the petitioners failed to sufficiently show that
on or before June 12, 1945, they and their predecessors-
in-interest actually exercised acts of dominion over the
subject land. Their assertion that they could visit the
subject land could not be considered an act of dominion
which would vest upon them the right to own the subject
land. Likewise, their general claim that they could
prevent any person from intruding thereto was
unsubstantiated by any evidence aside from their
allegations.
Finally, assuming that the use of the land in salt-making
and as a fishpond could be considered as a
manifestation of acts of dominion, the petitioners still
failed to satisfy the requirements of the law for
registration of the subject land. Although the petitioners
claim that they inherited the salt-making and fishpond
businesses from their parents, no mention was made
when the aforesaid businesses actually started operation
on the subject land. Thus, they failed to demonstrate
cultivation or use of the subject land since June 12, 1945
or earlier. Hence, the petitioners failed to establish
possession and occupation of the subject land under
a bona fide claim of ownership within the period required
by law.
From the foregoing, the subject land cannot be
registered in the name of the petitioners under Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 for their failure to prove its
alienable and disposable character, and their possession
and occupation from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements under
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529
Neither could the subject land be registered under
Section 14(2), which reads:
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands
by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the
Philippines,33  the Court explained that when Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 provides that persons "who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably
refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the
registration of lands.
For registration under this provision to prosper, the
applicant must establish the following requisites: (a) the
land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial
property of the public domain; (b) the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title,
or for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just
title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or
declared as patrimonial property of the State at the
beginning of the said 10- year or 30-year period of
possession.34
As regards the first and most important requisite, the
Court has ruled that declaration of alienability and
disposability is not enough for the registration of land
under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. There must be an
express declaration that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial property.35 This is only logical
because acquisitive prescription could only run against
private properties, which include patrimonial properties
of the State, but never against public properties.
Here, the petitioners failed to present any competent
evidence which could show that the subject land had
been declared as part of the patrimonial property of the
State. The DENR-NCR certification presented by the
petitioners only certified that the subject land was not
needed for forest purposes. This is insufficient because
the law mandates that to be subjected to acquisitive
prescription, there must be a declaration by the State
that the land applied for is no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth
pursuant to Article 422 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the
petitioners failed to prove that they acquired the subject
land through acquisitive prescription. Thus, the same
could not be registered under Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529.
In fine, the petitioners failed to satisfy all the requisites
for registration of title to land under either Sections 14(1)
or (2) of P.D. No. 1529. The CA's reversal of the July 30,
2012 RTC decision, and denial of the petitioners'
application for original registration of imperfect title over
Lot No. 4178 must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 20,
2015 Decision and June 18, 2015 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101002
are AFFIRMED. The petitioners' application for original
registration of title of Lot No. 4178 in LRC Case No. 10-
0026 is DENIED, without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

GR. No. 197472
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
Commander Raymond Alpuerto of the Naval Base
Camillo Osias, Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana,
Cagayan, Petitioner,
vs.
REV. CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ, SR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and
thus may not be the proper object of possession. Hence,
injunction cannot be issued in order to protect ones
alleged right of possession over the same.
1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari   assails the June
29, 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
GR. CV No. 89968, which dismissed the appeal
therewith and affirmed the July 3, 2007 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8
in Spl. Civil Action Case No. II-2403.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), a
missionary by vocation engaged in humanitarian and
charitable activities, established an orphanage and
school in Punta Verde, Palaui Island, San Vicente, Sta.
Ana, Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has been
in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land
located in the western portion of Palaui Island in Sitio
Siwangag, Sta. Ana, Cagayan which he, with the help of
Aetas and other people under his care, cleared and
developed for agricultural purposes in order to support
his charitable, humanitarian and missionary works.4
On May 22, 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 201 reserving for military purposes a
parcel of the public domain situated in Palaui Island.
Pursuant thereto, 2,000 hectares of the southern half
portion of the Palaui Island were withdrawn from sale or
settlement and reserved for the use of the Philippine
Navy, subject, however, to private rights if there be any.
More than two decades later or on August 16, 1994,
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Proclamation No. 447
declaring Palaui Island and the surrounding waters
situated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan as
marine reserve. Again subject to any private rights, the
entire Palaui Island consisting of an aggregate area of
7,415.48 hectares was accordingly reserved as a marine
protected area.
On June 13, 2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for
Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction5 against Rogelio C.
Biñas (Biñas) in his capacity as Commanding Officer of
the Philippine Naval Command in Port San Vicente, Sta.
Ana, Cagayan.1âwphi1 According to him, some
members of the Philippine Navy, upon orders of Biñas,
disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of the said
50-hectare portion of Palaui Island when on March 15,
2000, they commanded him and his men, through the
use of force and intimidation, to vacate the area. When
he sought assistance from the Office of the Philippine
Naval Command, he was met with sarcastic remarks and
threatened with drastic military action if they do not
vacate. Thus, Rev. Cortez and his men were constrained
to leave the area. In view of these, Rev. Cortez filed the
said Petition with the RTC seeking preliminary
mandatory injunction ordering Biñas to restore to him
possession and to not disturb the same, and further, for
the said preliminary writ, if issued, to be made
permanent.
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
After the conduct of hearing on the application for
preliminary mandatory injunction6 and the parties’
submission of their respective memoranda,7 the RTC
issued an Order8 dated February 21, 2002 granting the
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
However, the same pertained to five hectares (subject
area) only, not to the whole 50 hectares claimed to have
been occupied by Rev. Cortez, viz.:
It should be noted that the claim of [Rev. Cortez] covers
an area of 50 hectares more or less located at the
western portion of Palaui Island which is within the Naval
reservation. [Rev. Cortez] presented what he called as a
survey map (Exh. "H") indicating the location of the area
claimed by the Church of the Living God and/or Rev.
Claudio Cortez with an approximate area of 50 hectares
identified as Exh. "H-4". However, the Survey Map
allegedly prepared by [a] DENR personnel is only a
sketch map[,] not a survey map as claimed by [Rev.
Cortez]. Likewise, the exact boundaries of the area [are]
not specifically indicated. The sketch only shows some
lines without indicating the exact boundaries of the 50
hectares claimed by [Rev. Cortez]. As such, the
identification of the area and its exact boundaries have
not been clearly defined and delineated in the sketch
map. Therefore, the area of 50 hectares that [Rev.
Cortez] claimed to have peacefully and lawfully
possessed for the last 38 years cannot reasonably be
determined or accurately identified.
For this reason, there is merit to the contention of [Biñas]
that [Rev. Cortez]’ claim to the 50 hectares of land
identified as Exh. ["]H-4" is unclear and ambiguous. It is
a settled jurisprudence that mandatory injunction is the
strong arm of equity that never ought to be extended
unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law
cannot afford an adequate and commensurate remedy in
damages. The right must be clear, the injury impending
or threatened, so as to be averted only by the protecting
preventive process of injunction. The reason for this
doctrine is that before the issue of ownership is
determined in the light of the evidence presented, justice
and equity demand that the [status quo  be maintained]
so that no advantage may be given to one to the
prejudice of the other. And so it was ruled that unless
there is a clear pronouncement regarding ownership and
possession of the land, or unless the land is covered by
the torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the
undisputed owner, a writ of preliminary injunction should
not issue to take the property out of possession of one
party to place it in the hands of another x x x.
Admittedly, the documentary exhibits of [Rev. Cortez]
tended only to show that [he] has a pending application
of patent with the DENR. Even so, [Rev. Cortez] failed to
present in evidence the application for patent allegedly
filed by [him] showing that he applied for patent on the
entire 50 hectares of land which he possessed or
occupied for a long period of time. Under the
circumstances, therefore, the title of petitioner to the 50
hectares of land in Palaui Island remains unclear and
doubtful, and [is] seriously disputed by the government.
More significantly, at the time that Proc. No. 201 was
issued on May 22, 1967, [Rev. Cortez] has not perfected
his right over the 50 hectares of land nor acquired any
vested right thereto considering that he only occupied
the land as alleged by him in 1962 or barely five (5)
years before the issuance of the Presidential
Proclamation. Proclamation No. 201 had the effect of
removing Palaui Island from the alienable or disposable
portion of the public domain and therefore the island, as
of the date of [the] issuance [of the proclamation], has
ceased to be disposable public land.
However, the court is not unmindful that [Rev. Cortez]
has lawfully possessed and occupied at least five (5)
hectares of land situated at the western portion of the
Palaui Island identified as Exh "H-4". During the hearing,
Cmdr.
Rogelio Biñas admitted that when he was assigned as
Commanding Officer in December 1999, he went to
Palaui Island and [saw only] two (2) baluga families tilling
the land consisting of five (5) hectares. Therefore, it
cannot be seriously disputed that [Rev. Cortez] and his
baluga tribesmen cleared five (5) hectares of land for
planting and cultivation since 1962 on the western
portion identified as Exhibit "H-4". The Philippine Navy
also admitted that they have no objection to settlers of
the land prior to the Presidential Proclamation and [Rev.
Cortez] had been identified as one of the early settlers of
the area before the Presidential Proclamation. The
DENR also acknowledged that [Rev. Cortez] has filed an
application for patent on the western area and that he
must be allowed to pursue his claim.
Although the court is not persuaded by the argument of
[Rev. Cortez] that he has already acquired vested rights
over the area claimed by him, the court must recognize
that [Rev. Cortez] may have acquired some propriety
rights over the area considering the directive of the
DENR to allow [Rev. Cortez] to pursue his application for
patent. However, the court wants to make clear that the
application for patent by [Rev. Cortez] should be limited
to an area not to exceed five (5) hectares situated at the
western portion of x x x Palaui Island identified in the
sketch map as Exh. "H-4." This area appears to be the
portion where [Rev. Cortez] has clearly established his
right or title by reason of his long possession and
occupation of the land.9
In his Answer,10 Biñas countered that: (1) Rev. Cortez
has not proven that he has been in exclusive, open,
continuous and adverse possession of the disputed land
in the concept of an owner; (2) Rev. Cortez has not
shown the exact boundaries and identification of the
entire lot claimed by him; (3) Rev. Cortez has not
substantiated his claim of exemption from Proclamation
No. 201; (4) under Proclamation No. 447, the entire
Palaui Island, which includes the land allegedly
possessed and occupied by Rev. Cortez, was reserved
as a marine protected area; and, (4) injunction is not a
mode to wrest possession of a property from one person
by another.
Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.
On July 3, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision11
making the injunction final and permanent. In so ruling,
the said court made reference to the Indigenous
Peoples’ [Right] Act (IPRA) as follows:
The Indigenous [Peoples’ Right] Act should be given
effect in this case. The affected community belongs to
the group of indigenous people which are protected by
the State of their rights to continue in their possession of
the lands they have been tilling since time immemorial.
No subsequent passage of law or presidential decrees
can alienate them from the land they are tilling.12
Ultimately, the RTC held, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the
same is hereby GRANTED.
xxxx
SO DECIDED.13
Representing Biñas, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a Notice of Appeal14 which was given due
course by the RTC in an Order15 dated August 6, 2007.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its brief,16 the OSG pointed out that Rev. Cortez
admitted during trial that he filed the Petition for
injunction on behalf of the indigenous cultural
communities in Palaui Island and not in his capacity as
pastor or missionary of the Church of the Living God. He
also claimed that he has no interest over the land. Based
on these admissions, the OSG argued that the Petition
should have been dismissed outright on the grounds that
it did not include the name of the indigenous cultural
communities that Rev. Cortez is supposedly
representing and that the latter is not the real party-in-
interest. In any case, the OSG averred that Rev. Cortez
failed to show that he is entitled to the issuance of the
writ of injunction. Moreover, the OSG questioned the
RTC’s reference to the IPRA and argued that it is not
applicable to the present case since Rev. Cortez neither
alleged in his Petition that he is claiming rights under the
said act nor was there any showing that he is a member
of the Indigenous Cultural Communities and/or the
Indigenous Peoples as defined under the IPRA.
In its Decision17 dated June 29, 2011, the CA upheld the
RTC’s issuance of a final injunction based on the
following ratiocination:
The requisites necesary for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction are: (1) the existence of a clear
and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2)
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. Here, [Rev. Cortez] has shown
the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must
be protected and an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. Records reveal that
[Rev. Cortez] has been in peaceful possession and
occupation of the western portion of Palaui Island, Sitio
Siwangag, San Vicente, Sta. Ana[,] Cagayan since 1962
or prior to the issuance of Proclamation Nos. 201 and
447 in 1967 and 1994, respectively. There he built an
orphanage and a school for the benefit of the members
of the Dumagat Tribe, in furtherance of his missionary
and charitable works. There exists a clear and
unmistakable right in favor [of Rev. Cortez] since he has
been in open, continuous and notorious possession of a
portion of Palaui island. To deny the issuance of a writ of
injunction would cause grave and irreparable injury to
[Rev. Cortez] since he will be displaced from the said
area which he has occupied since 1962. It must be
emphasized that Proclamation Nos. 201 and 447 stated
that the same are subject to private rights, if there be
[any]. Though Palaui Island has been declared to be part
of the naval reservation and the whole [i]sland as a
marine protected area, both recognized the existence of
private rights prior to the issuance of the same.
From the foregoing, we rule that the trial court did not err
when it made permanent the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court provides that if after the trial of the action it
appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or
acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall
grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or
person enjoined from the commission or continuance of
the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory
injunction.18
Anent the issue of Rev. Cortez not being a real party-in-
interest, the CA noted that this was not raised before the
RTC and therefore cannot be considered by it. Finally,
with respect to the RTC’s mention of the IPRA, the CA
found the same to be a mere obiter dictum.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premise[s] considered, the instant
Appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed 3 July 2007
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan,
Branch 8 in Civil Case No. II-2403 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.19
Hence, this Petition brought by the OSG on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines (the Republic).
The Issue
The ultimate issue to be resolved in this case is whether
Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory
injunction.
The Parties’ Arguments
The bone of contention as the OSG sees it is the
injunctive writ since Rev. Cortez failed to prove his clear
and positive right over the 5-hectare portion of Palaui
Island covered by the same. This is considering that by
his own admission, Rev. Cortez started to occupy the
said area only in 1962. Hence, when the property was
declared as a military reserve in 1967, he had been in
possession of the 5-hectare area only for five years or
short of the 30-year possession requirement for a bona
fide  claim of ownership under the law. The OSG thus
argues that the phrase "subject to private rights" as
contained in Proclamation No. 201 and Proclamation No.
447 cannot apply to him since it only pertains to those
who have already complied with the requirements for
perfection of title over the land prior to the issuance of
the said proclamations.
Rev. Cortez, for his part, asserts that the arguments of
the OSG pertaining to ownership are all immaterial as
his Petition for injunction does not involve the
right to  possess based on ownership but on the
right of  possession which is a right independent from
ownership. Rev. Cortez avers that since he has been in
peaceful and continuous possession of the subject
portion of Palaui Island, he has the right of possession
over the same which is protected by law. He asserts that
based on this right, the writ of injunction was correctly
issued by the RTC in his favor and aptly affirmed by the
CA. On the technical side, Rev. Cortez avers that the
Republic has no legal personality to assail the CA
Decision through the present Petition since it was not a
party in the appeal before the CA.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the Petition.
For starters, the Court shall distinguish a preliminary
injunction from a final injunction.
"Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding
whereby a party is directed either to do a particular act,
in which case it is called a mandatory injunction, [as in
this case,] or to refrain from doing a particular act, in
which case it is called a prohibitory injunction." 20 "It may
be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for
and as an incident in the main action."21
"The main action for injunction is distinct from the
provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction."22 A preliminary injunction does not determine
the merits of a case or decide controverted facts. 23 Since
it is a mere preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent
threatened wrong, further injury and irreparable harm or
injustice until the rights of the parties are settled.24 "It is
usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a
substantial controversy between the parties and one of
them is committing an act or threatening the immediate
commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or
destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full
hearing can be had on the merits of the case."25 A
preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action
or proceeding prior to judgment or final order. 26 For its
issuance, the applicant is required to show, at least
tentatively, that he has a right which is not vitiated by any
substantial challenge or contradiction.27 Simply stated,
the applicant needs only to show that he has the
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his
complaint.28 On the other hand, the main action for
injunction seeks a judgment that embodies a final
injunction.29 A final injunction is one which perpetually
restrains the party or person enjoined from the
commission or continuance of an act, or in case of
mandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms the
preliminary mandatory injuction.30 It is issued when the
court, after trial on the merits, is convinced that the
applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of
permanently enjoined.31 Otherwise stated, it is only after
the court has come up with a definite pronouncement
respecting an applicant’s right and of the act violative of
such right, based on its appreciation of the evidence
presented, that a final injunction is issued. To be a basis
for a final and permanant injunction, the right and the act
violative thereof must be established by the applicant
with absolute certainty.32
What was before the trial court at the time of the
issuance of its July 3, 2007 Decision is whether a final
injunction should issue. While the RTC seemed to
realize this as it in fact made the injunction permanent,
the Court, however, finds the same to be wanting in
basis.
Indeed, the RTC endeavored to provide a narrow
distinction between a preliminary injunction and a final
injunction. Despite this, the RTC apparently confused
itself. For one, what it cited in its Decision were
jurisprudence relating to preliminary injunction and/or
mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ and not as a
final injunction. At that point, the duty of the RTC was to
determine, based on the evidence presented during trial,
if Rev. Cortez has conclusively  established his claimed
right (as opposed to preliminary injunction where an
applicant only needs to at least tentatively  show that he
has a right) over the subject area. This is considering
that the existence of such right plays an important part in
determining whether the preliminary writ of mandatory
injunction should be confirmed.
Surprisingly, however, the said Decision is bereft of the
trial court’s factual findings on the matter as well as of its
analysis of the same vis-a-vis applicable jurisprudence.
As it is, the said Decision merely contains a restatement
of the parties’ respective allegations in the Complaint
and the Answer, followed by a narration of the ensuing
proceedings, an enumeration of the evidence submitted
by Rev. Cortez, a recitation of jurisprudence relating to
preliminary injunction and/or specifically, to mandatory
injunction as an ancillary writ, a short reference to the
IPRA which the Court finds to be irrelevant and finally, a
conclusion that a final and permanent injunction should
issue. No discussion whatsoever was made with respect
to whether Rev. Cortez was able to establish with
absolute certainty hisclaimed right over the subject area.
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, as well as
Section 1 of Rule 36 and Section 1, Rule 120 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure, similarly state that a decision,
judgment or final order determining the merits of the
case shall state, clearly and distinctly, the facts and the
law on which it is based. Pertinently, the Court issued on
January 28, 1988 Administrative Circular No. 1, which
requires judges to make complete findings of facts in
their decision, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of
the case in the light of the evidence presented, and
avoid the tendency to generalize and to form conclusion
without detailing the facts from which such conclusions
are deduced.33
Clearly, the Decision of the RTC in this case failed to
comply with the aforestated guidelines.
In cases such as this, the Court would normally remand
the case to the court a quo  for compliance with the form
and substance of a Decision as required by the
Constitution. In order, however, to avoid further delay,
the Court deems it proper to resolve the case based on
the merits.34
"Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1)
there must be a right to be protected and (2) the acts
against which the injunction is to be directed are violative
of said right."35 Thus, it is necessary that the Court
initially determine whether the right asserted by Rev.
Cortez indeed exists. As earlier stressed, it is necessary
that such right must have been established by him with
absolute certainty.
Rev. Cortez argues that he is entitled to the injunctive
writ based on the right of possession (jus possesionis)
by reason of his peaceful and continuous possession of
the subject area since 1962. He avers that as this right is
protected by law, he cannot be peremptorily
dispossessed therefrom, or if already dispossessed, is
entitled to be restored in possession. Hence, the
mandatory injunctive writ was correctly issued in his
favor.
Jus possessionis  or possession in the concept of an
owner36 is one of the two concepts of possession
provided under Article 52537 of the Civil Code. Also
referred to as adverse possession,38 this kind of
possesion is one which can ripen into ownership by
prescription.39 As correctly asserted by Rev. Cortez, a
possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the
legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and
he cannot be obliged to show or prove it.40 In the same
manner, the law endows every possessor with the right
to be respected in his possession.41
It must be emphasized, however, that only things and
rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may
be the object of possession.42 The following cannot be
appropriated and hence, cannot be possessed: property
of the public dominion, common things (res
communes) such as sunlight and air, and things
specifically prohibited by law.43
Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies
heavily on his asserted right of possession, he,
nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over
which he has a claim is not part of the public domain and
therefore can be the proper object of possession.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State.44 Hence, "[a]ll lands not
appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands
remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain
unless the State is shown to have reclassified or
alienated them to private persons."45 To prove that a land
is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable
and disposable must be established.46
In this case, there is no such proof showing that the
subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared
alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to
occupy the same. Hence, it must be considered as still
inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be
appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of
possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Viewed
in this light, Rev. Cortez’ claimed right of possession has
no leg to stand on. His possession of the subject area,
even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no
matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his
favor since the property cannot be lawfully possessed in
the first place.
The same goes true even if Proclamation No. 201 and
Proclamation No. 447 were made subject to private
rights. The Court stated in Republic v. Bacas,47 viz.:
Regarding the subject lots, there was a reservation
respecting ‘private rights.’ In Republic v. Estonilo, where
the Court earlier declared that Lot No. 4319 was part of
the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation and,
therefore, not registrable, it noted the proviso  in
Presidential Proclamation No. 265 requiring the
reservation to be subject to private rights as meaning
that persons claiming rights over the reserved land were
not precluded from proving their claims. Stated
differently, the said proviso  did not preclude the LRC
from determining whether x x x the respondents indeed
had registrable rights over the property.
As there has been no showing that the subject
parcels of land had been segregated from the
military reservation, the respondents had to prove
that the subject properties were alienable or
disposable land of the public domain prior to its
withdrawal from sale and settlement and reservation
for military purposes under Presidential
Proclamation No. 265. The question is primordial
importance because it is determinative if the land can in
fact be subject to acquisitive prescription and, thus,
registrable under the Torrens system. Without first
determining the nature and character of the land, all
other requirements such as length and nature of
possession and occupation over such land do not
come into play. The required length of possession
does not operate when the land is part of the public
domain.

In this case, however, the respondents miserably failed

to prove that, before the proclamation, the subject lands
were already private lands. They merely relied on such
‘recognition’ of possible private rights. In their
application, they alleged that at the time of their
application, they had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
parcels of land for at least thirty (30) years and became
its owners by prescription. There was, however, no
allegation or showing that the government had earlier
declared it open for sale or settlement, or that it was
already pronounced as inalienable and disposable.48

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Rev. Cortez

failed to conclusively establish his claimed right over the
subject portion of Palaui Island as would entitle him to
the issuance of a final injunction.

Anent the technical issue raised by Rev. Cortez, i. e,  that

the Republic has no personality to bring this Petition
since it was not a party before the CA, the Court deems
it prudent to set aside this procedural barrier. After all, "a
party's standing before [the] Court is a [mere] procedural
technicality which may, in the exercise of [its] discretion,
be set aside in view of the importance of the issue
raised."49

We note that Rev. Cortez alleged that he sought the

injunction so that he could continue his humanitarian
works. However, considering that inalienable public land
was involved, this Court is constrained to rule in
accordance with the aforementioned.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The June 29,

2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No.
89968 denying the appeal and affirming the July 3, 2007
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan-
Branch 08 in Spl. Civil Action Case No. II-2403,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the final
injunction issued in this case is
ordered DISSOLVED and the Petition for Injunction in
Spl. Civil Action Case No. II-2403, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179990               October 23, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
DIOSDADA I. GIELCZYK, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The present petition is one for review under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Court. The Republic of the Philippines
petitioner) challenges the Decision1 dated September 21,
2007 of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-GR. CV No.
70078, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 56, which granted the
application of Diosdada I. Gielczyk (respondent) for the
original registration of title of Lot Nos. 3135-A and 3136-
A of Plans Csd-072219-004552 and Csd-072219-
004551, both situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu. The
petitioner prays that the Court annuls the CA Decision
dated September 21, 2007 in CA-GR. CV No. 70078,
and that it should dismiss Land Registration Commission
(LRC) Case No. N-452 for utter lack of merit.3
Antecedent Facts
On July 17, 1995, the respondent sought the registration
under her name of the lands denominated as Lot No.
3135-A and Lot No. 3136-A of Plans Csd-072219-
004552 and Csd-072219-004551. Both lands were
situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu.
In her verified application in LRC Case No. N-452, the
respondent claimed that she is the owner of the two
parcels of land, which are situated, bounded and
specifically described in Plans Csd-072219-004552 and
Csd-072219-004551,4 to wit:
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS
Lot 2007, Cad. 545-D, identical to lot
3135-A, Csd-072219-004552
(Luisa Ceniza)
A parcel of land (lot 20047, Cad.545-D, identical to lot
3135-A, Csd-072219-004552), being a portion of lot
3135, Cad. 545-D (new), situated in the Barrio of Jugan,
Municipality of Consolacion, Province of Cebu, Island of
Cebu. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2 by lot 20048
(identical to lot 3135-B, Csd-072219-004552), on the
SE., along line 2-3 by Camino Vicinal Road, on the SW.,
along line 3-4 by lot 3126, on the NW., along line 4-1 by
lot 3136, All [sic] of Cad. 545-D (New). Beginning at a
point marked "1" on plan being S. 83 deg. 17’E., 1878.69
m. from BLLM No. 1, Consolacion, Cebu.
thence S. 61 deg. 20’E., 40.69 m. to point 2;
thence S. 26 deg. 14’W., 57.80 m. to point 3;
thence N. 61 deg. 26’W., 38.40 m. to point 4;
thence N. 23 deg. 59’E., 58.02 m. to point of the
beginning. Containing an area of TWO THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (2,285) SQUARE
METERS, more or less. All points referred to are
indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as
follows; points 1 and 2 by P.S. cyl. conc. mons. 15x40
cms. and the rest are old P.S. cyl. conc. mons 15x60
cms. Bearings Grid; date of original survey July 14,
1987-November 11, 1987, and that of the subdivision
survey executed by Geodetic Engineer Norvic S. Abella
on November 12, 1993 and approved on May 24, 1994.5
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS
Lot 20045, Cad. 545-D, identical to
Lot 3136-A, Csd-072219-004551
(Constancio Ceniza)
A parcel of land (lot 20045, Cad.545-D, identical to lot
3136-A, Csd-072219-004551), being a portion of lot
3136, Cad. 545-D (New), situated in the Barrio of Jugan,
Municipality of Consolacion, Province of Cebu, Island of
Cebu. Bounded on the SE., along line 1-2 by lot 3135,
on the SW., along line 2-3-4 by lot 3126, on the NW.,
along line 6-1 by lot 20046, All [sic] of Cad. 545-D (New),
on the NE., along line 6-1 by lot 20046 (identical to lot
3136-B, Csd-072219-004551). Beginning at a point
marked "1" on plan being S. 83 deg. 17’E., 1878.69 m.
from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Consolacion, Cebu.
thence S. 23 deg. 59’W., 58.02 m. to point 2;
thence N. 65 deg. 10’W., 41.39 m. to point 3;
thence N. 35 deg. 15’W., 2.55 m. to point 4;
thence N. 20 deg. 43’E., 44.05 m. to point 5;
thence N. 20 deg. 44’E., 12.48 m. to point 6:
thence S. 65 deg. 37’E., 46.79 m. to point of the
beginning. Containing an area of TWO THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED TEN (2,610) SQUARE METERS, more or
less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and
are marked on the ground as follows; points 1 and 6 by
P.S. cyl. conc. mons. 15x40 cms. and the rest are old
P.S. cyl. conc. mons 15x60 cms. Bearings Grid; date of
original survey July 14, 1987-November 11, 1987, and
that of the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic
Engineer Norvic S. Abella on November 19, 1993 and
approved on May 26, 1994.6
The respondent further alleged the following: (a) that the
said parcels of land were last assessed for taxation at
₱2,400.00; (b) that to the best of her knowledge and
belief, there is no mortgage nor encumbrance of any
kind affecting said land, nor any person having interest
therein, legal or equitable; (c) that she had been in open,
complete, continuous, and peaceful possession in the
concept of an owner over said parcels of land up to the
present time for more than 30 years, including the
possession of her predecessors-in-interest; (d) that she
acquired title to said land by virtue of the deeds of
absolute sale; and (e) that said land is not occupied.7
The respondent, as far as known to her, also alleged that
the full names and complete addresses of the owners of
all lands adjoining the subject land are the following:
ADJOINING OWNERS OF LOT 3135-A:
North - Lot 3135-B owned by Mrs. Luisa Ceniza
Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu
East - Municipal Road
c/o Municipal Mayor
Consolacion, Cebu
South - Lot 3126 owned by Mr. Rene Pepito
Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu
West - Lot 3136-A owned by the applicant.
ADJOINING OWNERS OF LOT 3136-A:
North - Lot 3136-B, owned by Mr. Constancio
Ceniza
Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu
East - Lot 3135-A, owned by the applicant;
South - Lot 3126, owned by Mr. Rogelio M.
Pepito
Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu
West - Lot 3138, owned by Mr. Miguel
Hortiguela Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu8
To prove her claim, the respondent submitted the
following pieces of evidence:
(a) Approved plans of Lot Nos. 3135-A and
3136-A;9
(b) Approved technical descriptions of the same
lots;10
(c) Certification from the Chief, Technical
Services Section, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7,
Central Visayas Lands Management Services in
lieu of surveyor’s certificates;11
(d) Latest tax declarations of the lots;12
(e) Latest tax clearance of the same lots;13
(f) Deeds of Sale in favor of the respondent;14
(g) Certifications from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(CENRO), Cebu City, that the lots are alienable
and disposable;15 and
(h) Certification from the Chief, Records Section,
DENR, Region 7, Cebu City that the same lots
are not subject to public land application.16
Furthermore, when the respondent testified in court, her
testimony sought to establish the following:
(i) That the respondent acquired Lot No. 3136-A
(which is identical to Lot 20045, and is situated
in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu, with an area of
2,610 sq m), and Lot No. 3135-A (which is
identical to Lot 20047, and is situated in Jugan,
Consolacion, Cebu, with an area of 2,285 sq m)
through purchase from Constancio Ceniza and
Luisa Ceniza respectively;17
(ii) That the respondent was never delinquent in
paying the taxes for the said lots. In fact the
following tax declarations were issued for Lot
No. 3136-A: Tax Dec. No. 01258 for the year
1948; Tax Dec. No. 012459 for the year 1965;
Tax Dec. No. 20846 for the year 1980; Tax Dec.
No. 29200 for the year 1981; Tax Dec. No.
04210 for the year 1985; and Tax Dec. No.
13275 for the year 1989; while the following tax
declarations were issued for Lot No. 3135-A:
Tax Dec. No. 01670 for the year 1948; Tax Dec.
No. 012931 for the year 1965; Tax Dec. No.
021294 for the year 1968; Tax Dec. No. 25146
for the year 1973; Tax Dec. No. 01411 for the
year 1974; Tax Dec. No. 20849 for the year
1980; Tax Dec. No. 04208 for the year 1985;
Tax Dec. No. 13274 for the year 1989;18
(iii) That the said parcels of land are alienable
and disposable and are not covered by
subsisting public land application;19
(iv) That the respondent and her respective
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of Lot No. 3135-A and Lot No. 3136-A for more
than 40 years in the concept of an owner,
exclusively, completely, continuously, publicly,
peacefully, notoriously and adversely, and no
other person has claimed ownership over the
same land;20 and
(v) That the respondent is a Filipino Citizen and
that despite her marriage to an American
national, she has retained her Filipino
citizenship.21
The petitioner filed an opposition dated September 18,
1995 to the respondent’s application for registration of
title, alleging among others:
1) That neither the respondent nor her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in question since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto;22
(2) That the muniments of title and/or the tax
declarations and tax payment receipts of the
respondent attached to or alleged in the
application do not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of
the land applied for or of their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of an owner
since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto; and that
said muniments of title do not appear to be
genuine and the tax declarations and/or tax
payment receipts indicate the pretended
possession of the respondent to be of recent
vintage;23
(3) That the respondent can no longer avail of
the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis
of Spanish title or grant since she has failed to
file an appropriate application for registration
within the period of six months from February
16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 892. From the records, the petitioner
further alleged that the instant application was
filed on July 7, 1995;24
(4) That the parcel of land applied for is a portion
of the public domain belonging to the petitioner
and that the said parcel is not subject to private
appropriation.25
On November 3, 1999, the RTC rendered its
Decision26 in favor of the respondent, the dispositive
portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing undisputed facts
supported by oral and documentary evidence, the Court
finds and so holds that the applicant has registrable title
over subject lots, and the same title is hereby confirmed.
Consequently, the Administrator, Land Registration
Authority is hereby directed to issue Decree of
Registration and Original Certificate of Title to Lots 3135-
A and 3136-A [sic], both situated at Jugan, Consolacion,
Cebu in the name of the applicant DIOSDADA I.
GIELCZYK, 44 years old, Filipino, married to Philip
James Gielczyk, American national, resident of No. 4
Noel St., UHV, Paranaque, Metro Manila, as her
exclusive paraphernal property.
Upon finality of this judgment, let a corresponding decree
of registration and original certificate of title be issued to
subject lot in accordance with Sec. 39, PD 1529.
SO ORDERED.27
Not convinced of the RTC’s decision, the petitioner filed
an appeal dated August 5, 2002 before the CA, which
was also denied on September 21, 2007,28 the
dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED in its entirety.29
Thus, the petitioner filed the present Petition for Review
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, raising the
sole issue:
Issue
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION
OF LAW IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO PROVE
THAT SHE AND HER PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST
HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, COMPLETE, CONTINUOUS,
NOTORIOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND PEACEFUL
POSSESSION OVER THE LANDS SUBJECT OF THE
APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION FOR A
PERIOD OF OVER 40 YEARS THROUGH MERE TAX
DECLARATIONS AND IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF
WHEN THE SUBJECT LOTS WERE DECLARED
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN.30
Our Ruling
It must be noted that the respondent did not file any
comment on the petition despite efforts to notify her and
her counsel of record. Thus, in the Resolution 31 dated
March 30, 2011, this Court resolved to dispense with the
respondent’s comment and shall decide the instant
petition based on available records.
After a thorough study of the records, the Court resolves
to grant the petition.
The respondent failed to completely prove that there was
an expressed State declaration that the properties in
question are no longer intended for public use, public
service, the development of the national wealth and have
been converted into patrimonial property, and to meet
the period of possession and occupation required by law.
Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 or The Property Registration
Decree enumerates the persons who may apply for the
registration of title to land, to wit:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in- interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership
of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land
in any other manner provided for by law.
In the assailed decision granting the respondent’s
application for registration of title, the CA explained that
the RTC’s decision was based on Section 14(2) of P.D.
No. 1529 and not on Section 14(1) of the same
decree.32 The CA said:
However, a judicious scrutiny of the attendant facts
would reveal that the assailed decision of the RTC was
based not on PD No. 1529, Section 14(1), but under
Section 14(2) of said issuance. The pertinent portion of
the decision is quoted as follows:
"From the documentary evidence presented and formally
offered by the applicant, the Court is convinced that she
and her predecessors-in-interest has (sic) been in open,
complete, continuous, notorious, exclusive and peaceful
possession over the lands herein applied for registration
of title, for a period of over 40 years, in the concept of an
owner and that applicant has registrable title over same
lots in accordance with Sec. 14, PD 1529."
A closer scrutiny will show that the questioned decision
was based on PD No. 1529, Section 14(2).
In the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals and Naguit, it was ruled that:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree
and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the
application for registration of alienable lands of the public
domain, possession over which commenced only after
June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of "those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws."
"Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code. There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of
at least thirty (30) years. With such conversion, such
property may now fall within the contemplation of
"private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible
to registration by those who have acquired ownership
through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being been [sic]
open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may
have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree."
In the instant case, applicant-appellee was able to
present tax declarations dating back from 1948.
Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in
the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual, or
at the least constructive, possession. They constitute
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property
for taxation purposes manifests, not only one’s sincere
and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but it
also announces his adverse claim against the State and
all other interested parties, including his intention to
contribute to the needed revenues of the Government.
All told, such acts strengthen one’s bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.33 (Citations omitted)
The Court agrees with the CA’s finding that the RTC’s
grant of the respondent’s application for registration of
title was based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 and
not on Section 14(1) of the same decree. As the CA,
citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Naguit,34 correctly explained, an applicant may apply for
registration of title through prescription under Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, stating that patrimonial
properties of the State are susceptible of prescription
and that there is a rich jurisprudential precedents which
rule that properties classified as alienable public land
may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30
years.35
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,36 the Court
further clarified the difference between Section 14(1) and
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to
registration of title on the basis of possession, while the
latter entitles the applicant to the registration of his
property on the basis of prescription. Registration under
the first mode is extended under the aegis of the P.D.
No. 1529 and the Public Land Act (PLA) while under the
second mode is made available both by P.D. No. 1529
and the Civil Code. Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the
PLA, as amended by Republic Act No. 1472, the 30-year
period is in relation to possession without regard to the
Civil Code, while under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529,
the 30-year period involves extraordinary prescription
under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation
to Article 1137.37
Indeed, the foregoing jurisprudence clearly shows the
basis of the respondent’s application for registration of
title. However, the petitioner argued that the respondent
failed to show proof of an expressed State declaration
that the properties in question are no longer intended for
public use, public service, the development of the
national wealth or have been converted into patrimonial
property. It pointed out that the certification which the
respondent submitted did not indicate when the lands
applied for were declared alienable and disposable.38
On this point, the Court cannot completely agree with the
petitioner. Indeed, the respondent attempted to show
proof as to when the subject lands were declared
alienable and disposable. While the RTC and the CA
failed to cite the evidence which the respondent
submitted, the Court cannot, in the name of substantial
justice and equity, close its eyes to the September 23,
2004
Certification issued and signed by Fedencio P. Carreon
(Carreon), OIC, CENRO, which the respondent attached
in her Appellee’s brief in the CA,39 as a supplement to
her earlier submissions, particularly Annex "G" and
Annex "G-1" or the June 28, 1995 Certifications issued
by Eduardo M. Inting, CENRO.40
Carreon’s Certification is reproduced here:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICE
Cebu City
23 September 2004
CENRO, Cebu City, Lands Verification
CONSTANCIO CENIZA ET AL (Consolacion, Cebu)
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that per projection conducted by
Forester Restituto A. Llegunas a tract of land lots 3135
and 3136, Cad 545-D(New) containing an area of
FIFTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN
(15,687) square meters[,] more or less, situated at
Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu as shown and described in
the sketch plan at the back hereof as prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Aurelio Q. Caña for CONSTANCIO
CENIZA ET AL was found to be within Alienable and
Disposable Block I of Land Classification Project No. 28
per L. C. Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified
under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063 dated
September 1, 1965. (Emphasis Supplied)
This is to certify further that the subject area is outside
Kotkot-Lusaran Watershed Reservation per Presidential
Proclamation No. 1074 dated Sept. 2, 1997.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mr.
Constancio Ceniza for the purpose of ascertaining the
land classification status only and does not entitle him
preferential/priority rights of possession until determined
by competent authorities.
FEDENCIO P. CARREON
OIC, Community Environment
& Natural Resources Officer
However, following our ruling in Republic of the
Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,41 this CENRO
Certification by itself is insufficient to establish that a
public land is alienable and disposable. While the
certification refers to Forestry Administrative Order No.
4-1063 dated September 1, 1965, the respondent should
have submitted a certified true copy thereof to
substantiate the alienable character of the land. In any
case, the Court does not need to further discuss whether
the respondent was able to overcome the burden of
proving that the land no longer forms part of the public
domain to support her application for original land
registration because of other deficiencies in her
application.
Indeed, the respondent failed to meet the required period
of possession and occupation for purposes of
prescription. From the time of the declaration on
September 1, 1965 that the properties in question are
purportedly alienable and disposable up to the filing of
the application of the respondent on July 17, 1995, the
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had
possessed and occupied the said properties for only 29
years and 10 months, short of two months to complete
the whole 30-year possession period.
Granting por arguendo that the respondent and her
predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied
the subject lots since 1948, the Court cannot still tack
those years to complete the 30-year possession period
since the said lots were only declared alienable and
disposable on September 1, 1965. In Naguit, we ruled
that for as long as the land was declared alienable and
disposable, the same is susceptible of prescription for
purposes of registration of imperfect title.42 In Lim v.
Republic,43 we further clarified that "while a property
classified as alienable and disposable public land may
be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of at
least 30 years, public dominion lands become
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable but also with an
express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public use,
public service or the development of national wealth.
And only when the property has become patrimonial can
the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of
the public dominion begin to run."44
While the subject lots were supposedly declared
alienable or disposable on September 1, 1965 based on
the Certifications of the CENRO, the respondent still
failed to complete the 30-year period required to grant
her application by virtue of prescription.
The respondent failed to present specific acts of
ownership to substantiate her claim of open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and adverse possession in the
concept of an owner.
The petitioner contends that the respondent failed to
present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the
latter’s claim of open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
and adverse possession in the concept of an owner.
Here, the Court agrees with the petitioner’s argument.
In Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan v.
Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan,45 the Court ruled that for
an applicant to ipso jure or by operation of law acquire
government grant or vested title to a lot, he must be in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the lot.46 In the said case, the Court
clarified what it actually meant when it said "open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation," to wit:
The petitioner submits that even granting arguendo that
the entire Lot 138 was not assigned to it during the
Spanish regime or it is not the owner thereof pursuant to
the Laws of the Indies, its open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of Lot 138
since 1894 and for many decades thereafter vests ipso
jure or by operation of law upon the petitioner a
government grant, a vested title, to the subject property.
It cites Subsection 6 of Section 54 of Act No. 926 and
Subsection b of Section 45 of Act No. 2874.
This contention is likewise not persuasive.
One of the important requisites for the application of the
pertinent provisions of Act No. 926 and Act No. 2874 is
the "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation" of the land by the applicant.
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation
of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own property. The
phrase "possession and occupation" was explained as
follows:
It must be underscored that the law speaks of
"possession and occupation." Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of
the law is not to make one synonymous with the order
[sic]. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the
law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the
fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the
aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not be
mere fiction. As this Court stated, through then Mr.
Justice Jose P. Laurel, in Lasam v. The Director of
Lands:
x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid
down by us in Ramos v. Director of Lands . But it should
be observed that the application of the doctrine of
constructive possession in that case is subject to certain
qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that
among these qualifications is "one particularly relating to
the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the
portion actually in possession of the claimant." While,
therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession," possession under paragraph 6 of Section
54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of
Section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere
nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of
possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of
dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession
as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be
constructive, is not a mere fiction. x x x.
xxxx
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can
show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally
known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood.
Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious.
Indisputably, the petitioner has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of Lot 138-B since 1894 as evidenced by the
church structure built thereon. However, the record is
bereft of any evidence that would tend to show that such
possession and occupation extended to Lots 138-A and
138-C beginning the same period. No single instance of
the exercise by the petitioner of proprietary acts or acts
of dominion over these lots was established. Its
unsubstantiated claim that the construction of the
municipal building as well as the subsequent
improvements thereon, e.g., the rural health center,
Buruanga community Medicare hospital [sic], basketball
court, Rizal monument and grandstand, was [sic] by its
tolerance does not constitute proof of possession and
occupation on its (the petitioner’s) part. Absent the
important requisite of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereon since
1894, no government grant or title to Lots 138-A and
138-C had vested upon the petitioner ipso jure or by
operation of law. Possession under paragraph 6 of
section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b)
of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere
nominal claim.47 (Citations omitted and emphasis
supplied)
In sum, a simple claim of "open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation" does not
suffice. An applicant for a grant or title over a lot must be
able to show that he has exercised acts of dominion over
the property in question. The applicant’s possession
must not be simply a nominal claim where he only plants
a sign or symbol of possession. In other words, his
possession of the property must be patent, visible,
apparent, notorious and not clandestine; it should be
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; it should demonstrate exclusive dominion
over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use
and benefit; and it should be conspicuous, which means
generally known and talked of by the public or the people
in the neighborhood.48
The Court held in Cruz v. Court of Appeals, et al.,49 that
therein petitioners were able to show clear, competent
and substantial evidence establishing that they have
exercised acts of dominion over the property in question.
These acts of dominion were the following:
(a) they constructed permanent buildings on the
questioned lot;
(b) they collected rentals;
(c) they granted permission to those who sought
their consent for the construction of a drugstore
and a bakery;
(d) they collected fruits from the fruit-bearing
trees planted on the said land;
(e) they were consulted regarding questions of
boundaries between adjoining properties; and
(f) they religiously paid taxes on the property.50
However, in the present petition, the respondent failed to
specifically show that she and her predecessors-in-
interest had exercised acts of dominion over the subject
lots. Admittedly, the respondent’s best evidence to prove
possession and ownership were tax declarations and
receipts issued in her name or the names of her
predecessors-in-interest, but these tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or
right of possession over a piece of land. "Well settled is
the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess land when not supported by any other evidence.
The fact that the disputed property may have been
declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-
interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership."51
In the instant case, the respondent failed to show that
she or her predecessors-in-interest have exercised acts
of dominion over the said parcels of land. In fact, it was
only the respondent who testified to substantiate her
allegations in the application. She did not present
anyone else to support her claim of "open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation."
Unfortunately, her testimony simply made general
declarations without further proof, to wit:
DIRECT EXAMINATION: Q - Who is in possession of these lots?

Q - Mrs. Gielczyk, are you the same Diosdada Gielzcyk, A - I am in possession.

the applicant in this case?
Court:
A - Yes.
Physically? I thought you are residing in Manila?
Q - Are you familiar with Lots No. 3135 and 20045, both
of Consolacion, Cebu? A - Because my family is living there in Consolacion and
I always come home every month. I have my parents
A - Yes. and brothers there.

Court: Court:

Excuse me, You can answer in English? You don’t need The same property?
an interpreter?
A - Near my parents’ house,Your Honor.
A - Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
Atty. Germino:
Proceed.
Who is the owner of these lots?
Atty. Germino:
A - I am the one.
Q - How long have you been in possession of the lots?
Q - How large is 20047?
A - Including my predecessors-in-interest, for over a
A - It has an area of 2,286 square meters. period of 40 years.

Q - How much is the assessed value of Lot 20047? Q - What is the nature of your possession?

A - I do not think, ₱430.00 per square meters is the A - Adverse against the whole world, continous [sic],
assessed value reflected in the document. Court: peaceful, open and uninterrupted.

Is that reflected in the tax declaration? Q - How did you acquire Lot 20047?

Atty. Germino: A - I purchased it from Luisa Ceniza.

Yes, Your Honor. Q - Do you know how did Luisa Ceniza acquire the
same?
Court:
A - She inherited it from her father Remigio Ceniza.
Then the tax declaration would be the best evidence.
Q - Do you have a deed of sale in your favor?
Atty. Germino:
A - Yes, I have.52
Q - Do you know if there are other persons who are
interested whatsoever over the lots you have xxxx
mentioned?
Atty. Germino:
A - No sir.
Q - You said that includ[i]ng your predecessors-in-
Atty. Germino: interest, your possession including your predecessors-in-
interest has been for over forty (40) years. Do you have
Q - Are there liens and encumbrances affecting the lots? the tax declaration of Lot 20047 since 1948 until the
present?
A - No, sir.
A - Yes. A - ₱970.00

Q - Showing to you tax declaration No. 01670 in the
name of the heirs of Remigio Ceniza covering land in
Consolacion for the year 1948, please examine and tell
the court whether that is the tax declaration of Lot 20047
for the year 1948?
Q - Who is in possession of this lot?
A - I am the one.
Q - How long have you been in possession?

A - Yes, this is the one. A - Including my predecessors-in-interest is [sic] over a

period of 40 years.
xxxx
COURT: (to witness)
Atty. Germino:
Q - Personally, how long have you been in possession of
Q - Showing to you tax declaration No. 012931 in the this property?
name of heirs of Remigio Ceniza for the year 1965,
please examine the same and tell the Honorable court A - If I remember right, 1985.
what relation has that to the tax declaration of lot 20047
for the year 1965?
ATTY. GERMINO:
A - This is the same.
Q - How did you acquire lot 20045?
xxxx
A - I purchased it from Constancio Ceniza.
Atty. Germino:
Q - Do you have a deed of sale in your favor?
Q - Showing to you tax declaration No. 021294 in the
name of Luisa and Constancio Ceniza for the year 1968, A - Yes.
please examine and tell the court whether that is the tax
declaration of Lot 20047 for the year 1968? COURT:

A - Yes, this is the same. We are talking about 3136-A?

xxxx ATTY. GERMINO:

Atty. Germino: Yes, we are through with Lot 3135?

Q - Showing to you tax declaration No. [no number was COURT:

indicated in the TSN] in the name of Luisa Ceniza for the
year 1963 tell the court whether that is the tax
declaration for the year 1973? A - Yes, this is the one.53
In the continuance of her testimony, the respondent
added no further information for this Court to conclude
that she indeed exercised specific acts of dominion aside
from paying taxes. She testified thus:
xxxx
This is 3136-A equivalent to Lot 20045. Proceed.
ATTY. GERMINO:
I am showing to you a deed of absolute sale by
Constancio Ceniza over lot 3136-A acknowledged before
Notary Public Marino Martillano, as Doc. No. 2637 book
4, series of 1988, please examine this document and tell
the Court if that is the deed of sale?

Atty. Germino: A - Yes.

Q - Mrs. Gielczyk, one of the last lot subject to [sic] your xxxx
petition is Lot 20045, how large is this lot?
Q - Are you not delinquent in the payment of taxes for lot
A - 2,610 square meters. 3136-A?

Q - How much is the assess value of this lot? A - No, sir.

Q - Do you have a tax clearances [sic]? Proceed.

A - Yes, I have. FISCAL ALBURO:

Q - I am showing to you tax clearance issued by the Q - Mrs. Gielczyk, how many lots are involved in this
municipal treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu, is that the tax petition?
clearance you referred to?
A - 2 portions.
A - Yes, sir.
Q - How did you acquire this lot [sic]?
ATTY. GERMINO:
A - I purchased it [sic] from Constancio Ceniza.
We ask your Honor the tax clearance be marked as
double "C". Q - When was that?

COURT: Mark it. A - If I remember right in 1985 or 1986.

xxxx Q- In other words, you srarted [sic] possessing the

property since 1985, until the present?
COURT: (to witness)
A- Yes.
Q - You said that including your predecessor-in-interest,
your possession of the land applied for is more than 40 Q- But you are not in actual occupant [sic] of the
years, do you have a Tax Declaration of lot 3136-A from property because you are residing in Paranaque?
1948 until the present? A - Yes.
A- But I have a cousin in Consolacion.
Q - I am showing to you a bunch of Tax Declaration, 6 in
all, from the (sic) year 1948, 1965, 1980, 1981, 1985 and Q- But you are not residing in Consolacion?
1989, please examine this Tax Declaration and tell us
whether these are the Tax Declarations of Lot 3136-A
from 1948 until the present in your name? A- I used to go back and forth Cebu and Manila.

A - These are the ones. Q- Who is in charge of your property in Consolacion?

ATTY. GERMINO: A- My brothers.

We ask that the Tax Declaration in bunch be marked as Q - In other words, your property is being taken cared of
Exhibit double "F" and the succeeding Tax Declaration to by your brothers?
be marked as double "FF-1" up to double "F-5".
A - Yes.
COURT:
FISCAL ALBURO:
54
Mark it.
That is all, your Honor.
The respondent’s cross-examination further revealed
that she and her predecessors-in-interest have not ATTY. GERMINO:
exercised specific acts of dominion over the properties,
to wit: No redirect, your Honor.

COURT: COURT: (to witness) By the way, where do you stay

often?
Cross-examination?
A - Usually in Manila.
FISCAL ALBURO:
Q - Who takes care of the property in Mandaue City?
May it please the Honorable Court.
A - My brothers because there are coconut trees and
COURT: some fruits and he watched it [sic].
Q - Who is using the coconut trees and the fruits? A -
Just for consumption, there are few
coconuts.55 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing testimony of the lone witness (the
applicant-respondent herself), the Court can deduce
that, besides intermittently paying the tax dues on Lot
No. 3135-A, the respondent did not exercise acts of
dominion over it. Neither can the Court give credence to
the respondent’s claim that her predecessors-in-interest
had exercised dominion over the property since the
respondent failed to present any witness who would
substantiate her allegation. The pieces of documentary
evidence, specifically the tax declarations and the deeds
of absolute sale, can neither be relied upon because the
same revealed no indication of any improvement that
would have the Court conclude that the respondent
exercised specific acts of dominion. For instance, the
deed of absolute sale simply said that the improvements
on Lot No. 3135-A consisted of two (2) coconut trees,
one (1) mango tree, one (1) caimito tree and one (1)
jackfruit tree.56 The tax declarations have not shown any
indication supporting the respondent’s claim that she
exercised specific acts of dominion.57
As to Lot No. 3136-A, the deed of absolute sale showed
that there were 14 coconut trees, eight (8) jackfruit trees,
and a residential building, which was actually possessed
by the vendor Constancio Ceniza. Moreover, it was only
in Tax Declaration Nos. 29200, 04210 and 13275 where
it was declared that a residential building has been built
in Lot No. 3136-A.58 And based on the records, Tax
Declaration No. 29200, where the residential building
was first indicated, is dated 1981. It may be said then
that it was only in 1981 when the respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest exercised specific acts of
dominion over Lot No. 3136-A, the period of which
consists barely of 14 years. Thus, the respondent has
not completed the required 30 years of "open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation."
Clearly, from the pieces of documentary and testimonial
evidence, and considering that the respondent did not
present any other witness to support her claim, the Court
has no other recourse but to declare that she has not
presented the premium of evidence needed to award her
title over the two parcels of land.
Finally, the Court cannot end this decision without
reiterating the final words of former Associate Justice
Dante O. Tinga in the case of Malabanan59. Justice
Tinga correctly pointed out the need to review our
present law on the distribution of lands to those who
have held them for a number of years but have failed to
satisfy the requisites in acquiring title to such land.
Justice Tinga eloquently put the matter before us, thus:
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the
correctness of the legal doctrines established in this
decision.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, discomfiture over the
implications of today’s ruling cannot be discounted. For,
every untitled property that is occupied in the country will
be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot
be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating
its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply
levied the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether
declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to long-
standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is
common among the so-called "Third World" countries.
This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect
between a legal system and the reality on the ground.
The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap.
Alternative means of acquisition of these public domain
lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the
grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said
properties. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has
emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive
means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that
system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable
limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have
individually or exclusively held residential lands on which
they have lived and raised their families. Many more
have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State
with their hands. They have been regarded for
generation by their families and their communities as
common law owners. There is much to be said about the
virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such
virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law,
as the law itself considered such lands as property of the
public dominion.
It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase
of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the
settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands
of the public domain before the problem becomes
insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two
examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil
Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of
public dominion property into patrimonial.
One’s sense of security over land rights infuses into
every aspect of well-being not only of that individual, but
also to the person s family. Once that sense of security
is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for
the political branches to bring welcome closure to the
long pestering problem.60 (Citation omitted and emphasis
supplied)
Indeed, the Court can only do as much to bring relief to
those who, like herein respondent, wish to acquire title to
a land that they have bought. It is for our lawmakers to
write the law amending the present ones and addressing
the reality on the ground, and which this Court will
interpret and apply as justice requires.
WHEREFORE in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision
dated September 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 70078 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186961               February 20, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This Court is urged to review and set aside the July 31,
2008 Decision1 and February 20, 2009 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143. In its
July 31, 2008 Decision, the CA affirmed the August 27,
2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
40 of Cagayan De Oro City. The dispositive portion
thereof states:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the instant appeal is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
Decision dated August 27, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.3
In its February 20, 2009 Resolution, the CA denied the
petitioner’s August 29, 2008 Motion for Reconsideration.4
The Factual Antecedents
The respondent filed with the RTC an application for land
registration, covering a parcel of land identified as Lot
9039 of Cagayan Cadastre, situated in El Salvador,
Misamis Oriental and with an area of 9,794 square
meters. The respondent purchased the portion of the
subject property consisting of 4,708 square meters (Area
A) from Francisca Oco pursuant to a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated November 27, 1990 and the remaining
portion consisting of 5,086 square meters (Area B) from
Rosario U. Tan Lim, Nemesia Tan and Mariano U. Tan
pursuant to a Deed of Partial Partition with Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 11, 1991. It was claimed that
the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of
the subject property since June 12, 1945.
After hearing the same on the merits, the RTC issued on
August 27, 2004 a Decision, granting the respondent’s
petition for registration of the land in question, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, finding the application meritorious, and
pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the
matter, particularly the provisions of P.D. 1529, judgment
is hereby rendered granting the instant application. The
Land Registration Authority is hereby ordered to issue a
decree in the name of the applicant East Silverlane
Realty Development Corporation covering the parcel of
land, Lot 9039, Cad 237, having an area of 9,794 square
meters covered by the two (2) tax declarations subject of
this petition. Based on the decree, the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Misamis Oriental is hereby directed to
issue an original certificate of title in the name of the
applicant covering the land subject matter of this
application.5
On appeal by the petitioner, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
August 27, 2004 Decision. In its July 31, 2008
Decision,6 the CA found no merit in the petitioner’s
appeal, holding that:
It is a settled rule that an application for land registration
must conform to three requisites: (1) the land is alienable
public land; (2) the applicant’s open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and (3) it
is a bona fide claim of ownership.
In the case at bench, petitioner-appellee has met all the
requirements. Anent the first requirement, both the report
and certification issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shows that
the subject land was within the alienable and disposable
zone classified under BF Project [N]o. 8 Blk. I, L.C. Map
[N]o. 585 and was released and certified as such on
December 31, 1925.
Indubitably, both the DENR certification and report
constitute a positive government act, an administrative
action, validly classifying the land in question. It is a
settled rule that the classification or re-classification of
public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest land is now a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government. Accordingly, the
certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the
absence of contradictory evidence. As it is, the said
certification remains uncontested and even oppositor-
appellant Republic itself did not present any evidence to
refute the contents of the said certification. Thus, the
alienable and disposable character of the subject land
certified as such as early as December 31, 1925 has
been clearly established by the evidence of the
petitioner-appellee.
Anent the second and third requirements, the applicant
is required to prove his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
xxxx
In the case at bench, ESRDC tacked its possession and
occupation over the subject land to that of its
predecessors-in-interest. Copies of the tax declarations
and real property historical ownership pertaining thereto
were presented in court. A perusal of the records shows
that in 1948, a portion of the subject land was declared
under the name of Agapito Claudel. Subsequently, in
1957 until 1991 the same was declared under the name
of Francisca Oco. Thereafter, the same was declared
under the name of ESRDC. A certification was likewise
issued by the Provincial Assessor of Misamis Oriental
that previous tax declarations pertaining to the said
portion under the name of Agapita Claudel could no
longer be located as the files were deemed lost or
destroyed before World War II.
On the other hand, the remaining portion of the said land
was previously declared in 1948 under the name of
Jacinto Tan Lay Cho. Subsequently, in 1969 until 1990,
the same was declared under the name of Jacinto Tan.
Thereafter, the same was declared under the name of
ESRDC. A certification was likewise issued by the
Provincial Assessor that the files of previous tax
declarations under the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho
were deemed lost or destroyed again before World War
II.
In 1991 or upon ESRDC’s acquisition of the subject
property, the latter took possession thereto. Albeit it has
presently leased the said land to Asia Brewery, Inc.,
where the latter built its brewery plant, nonetheless,
ESRDC has its branch office located at the plant
compound of Asia Brewery, Inc.
Corollarily, oppositor-appellant’s contentions that the
court a quo erred in considering the tax declarations as
evidence of ESRDC’s possession of the subject land as
the latter’s predecessors-in-interest declared the same
sporadically, is untenable.
It is a settled rule that albeit tax declarations and realty
tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the
possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in
his actual or at least constructive possession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a
piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not
only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the
State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership.
Finally, it bears stressing that the pieces of evidence
submitted by petitioner-appellee are incontrovertible. Not
one, not even oppositor-appellant Republic, presented
any countervailing evidence to contradict the claims of
the petitioners that they are in possession of the subject
property and their possession of the same is open,
continuous and exclusive in the concept of an owner for
over 30 years.
Verily, from 1948 when the subject land was declared for
taxation purposes until ESRDC filed an application for
land registration in 1995, ESRDC have been in
possession over the subject land in the concept of an
owner tacking its possession to that its predecessors-in-
interest for forty seven (47) years already. Thus, ESRDC
was able to prove sufficiently that it has been in
possession of the subject property for more than 30
years, which possession is characterized as open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious in the concept of an
owner.7 (citations omitted)
The petitioner assails the foregoing, alleging that the
respondent failed to prove that its predecessors-in-
interest possessed the subject property in the manner
and for the length of time required under Section 48 (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
"Public Land Act" (PLA), and Section 14 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the "Property
Registration Decree" (P.D. No. 1529). According to the
petitioner, the respondent did not present a credible and
competent witness to testify on the specific acts of
ownership performed by its predecessors-in-interest on
the subject property. The respondent’s sole witness,
Vicente Oco, can hardly be considered a credible and
competent witness as he is the respondent’s liaison
officer and he is not related in any way to the
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest. That coconut
trees were planted on the subject property only shows
casual or occasional cultivation and does not qualify as
possession under a claim of ownership.
Issue
This Court is confronted with the sole issue of whether
the respondent has proven itself entitled to the benefits
of the PLA and P.D. No. 1529 on confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles.
Our Ruling
This Court resolves to GRANT the petition.
Preliminarily, with respect to the infirmity suffered by this
petition from the standpoint of Rule 45, this Court agrees
with the respondent that the issue of whether the
respondent had presented sufficient proof of the required
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership raises
a question of fact, considering that it invites an
evaluation of the evidentiary record.8 However, that a
petition for review should be confined to questions of law
and that this Court is not a trier of facts and bound by the
factual findings of the CA are not without exceptions.
Among these exceptions, which obtain in this case, are:
(a) when the judgment of the CA is based on a
misapprehension of facts or (b) when its findings are not
sustained by the evidence on record.
This Court’s review of the records of this case reveals
that the evidence submitted by the respondent fell short
of proving that it has acquired an imperfect title over the
subject property under Section 48 (b) of the PLA. The
respondent cannot register the subject property in its
name on the basis of either Section 14 (1) or Section 14
(2) of P.D. No. 1529. It was not established by the
required quantum of evidence that the respondent and
its predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject property for the prescribed statutory period.
The PLA governs the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain. Under Section 11 thereof,
one of the modes of disposing public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes is by "confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles".9 On the other hand, Section 48
provides the grant to the qualified possessor of an
alienable and disposable public land. Thus:
SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty
from Spain to the United States have applied for
the purchase, composition or other form of grant
of lands of the public domain under the laws and
royal decrees then in force and have instituted
and prosecuted the proceedings in connection
therewith, but have with or without default upon
their part, or for any other cause, not received
title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and
their heirs have occupied and cultivated said
lands continuously since the filing of their
applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities
who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at
least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in sub-section (b) hereof.
Presidential Decree No. 1073 (P.D. No. 1073), which
was issued on January 25, 1977, deleted subsection (a)
and amended subsection (b) as follows:
SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and
Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant thru himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945.
Notably, the first PLA, or Act No. 926, required a
possession and occupation for a period of ten (10) years
prior to the effectivity of Act No. 2096 on July 26, 1904 or
on July 26, 1894. This was adopted in the PLA until it
was amended by Republic Act No. 1942 on June 22,
1957, which provided for a period of thirty (30) years. It
was only with the enactment of P.D. No. 1073 on
January 25, 1977 that it was required that possession
and occupation should commence on June 12, 1945.
P.D. No. 1529, which was enacted on June 11, 1978,
codified all the laws relative to the registration of
property. Section 14 thereof partially provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provision
of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land
in any other manner provided for by law.
Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2) are clearly different.
Section 14 (1) covers "alienable and disposable land"
while Section 14 (2) covers "private property". As this
Court categorically stated in Heirs of Malabanan v.
Republic of the Philippines,10 the distinction between the
two provisions lies with the inapplicability of prescription
to alienable and disposable lands. Specifically:
At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the
entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact
which does not hold true with respect to Section 14 (1).11
Property is either part of the public domain or privately
owned.12 Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the
following properties are of public dominion:
(a) Those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads and others of similar character;
(b) Those which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
All other properties of the State, which is not of the
character mentioned in Article 420 is patrimonial
property,13 hence, susceptible to acquisitive
prescription.14
In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession
and occupation of an alienable and disposable public
land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do not
automatically convert said property into private property
or release it from the public domain. There must be an
express declaration that the property is no longer
intended for public service or development of national
wealth. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the State, and thus, may not be acquired by
prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that
"[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended
for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted
into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that
those property "which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth" are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs
to the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if
when it is "intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth". (emphasis
supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration
by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even
if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State
to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted
by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law.15
In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of
Section 14 (2) and set up acquisitive prescription against
the State, it is primordial that the status of the property
as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the
period of possession preceding the classification of the
property as patrimonial cannot be considered in
determining the completion of the prescriptive period.
To prove that its predecessors-in-interest were in
possession of the subject property on or prior to June 12,
1945 or had completed the prescriptive period of thirty
(30) years, the respondent submitted the following tax
declarations:
a) Tax Declaration in the name of Agapita
Claudel for the year 1948;
b) Tax Declarations in the name of Francisca
Oco for the years 1957, 1963, 1969, 1973, 1974,
1980, 1987, 1989 and 1991;
c) Tax Declarations in the respondent’s name for
the years 1991, 1992 and 1994;
d) Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan
Lay Cho for the years 1948 and 1952;
e) Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan
for the years 1969, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1989 and
1990; and
f) Tax Declarations in the respondent’s name for
the years 1991, 1992 and 1994.
Pursuant to Agapita Claudel’s 1948 Tax Declaration,
there were nineteen (19) coconut and ten (10) banana
trees planted on Area A. The coconut trees were
supposedly four years old, hence, the reasonable
presumption that she had been in possession even
before June 12, 1945.16
The respondent also offered the following testimony of
Vicente Oco:
"Q – Mr. Witness, If you know about what period your
predecessor has started to possess this land subject
matter of this application?
A – Per my personal knowledge, it was before the
second world war but the Municipality of El Salvador was
created on June 15, 1948 by virtue of RA 268 and it’s
started to officially function only on August 2, 1948[.]
Q – From whom did you acquire this information?
A – From the seller and the adjoining lot owners."17
To prove that its predecessors-in-interest exercised acts
of dominion over the subject property, the respondent
claimed that per Francisca Oco’s Tax Declarations, the
following improvements were introduced in Area A:
nineteen (19) coconut and ten (10) banana trees in Area
A in 1957 and 1963; thirty-three (33) coconut trees in
1969 and 1973; thirty-three (33) coconut trees, one (1)
mango tree and three (3) seguidillas vines in 1974; thirty-
three (33) coconut trees in 1980; eighty-seven (87)
coconut trees in 1987; and fifteen (15) coconut trees in
1989. Per Jacinto Tan’s Tax Declarations, there were
fifty-seven (57) coconut trees in Area B in 1973, 1974,
1980, 1989 and 1990.18
A reading of the CA’s July 31, 2008 Decision shows that
it affirmed the grant of the respondent’s application given
its supposed compliance with Section 14 (2) of P.D. No.
1529. It ruled that based on the evidence submitted, the
respondent is not qualified to register the subject
property in its name under Section 14 (1) as the
possession and occupation of its predecessors-in-
interest commenced after June 12, 1945. Nonetheless,
as the CA ruled, the respondent acquired title to the
subject property by prescription as its predecessors-in-
interest had possessed the subject property for more
than thirty (30) years. Citing Buenaventura v. Republic of
the Philippines,19 the CA held that even if possession
commenced after June 12, 1945, registration is still
possible under Section 14 (2) and possession in the
concept of an owner effectively converts an alienable
and disposable public land into private property.
This Court, however, disagrees on the conclusion arrived
at by the CA. On the premise that the application for
registration, which was filed in 1995, is based on Section
14 (2), it was not proven that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
subject property in the manner prescribed by law and for
the period necessary before acquisitive prescription may
apply.
While the subject land was supposedly declared
alienable and disposable on December 31, 1925 per the
April 18, 1997 Certification and July 1, 1997 Report of
the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO),20 the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) converted the same from agricultural to industrial
only on October 16, 1990.21 Also, it was only in 2000 that
the Municipality of El Salvador passed a Zoning
Ordinance, including the subject property in the industrial
zone.22 Therefore, it was only in 1990 that the subject
property had been declared patrimonial and it is only
then that the prescriptive period began to run. The
respondent cannot benefit from the alleged possession
of its predecessors-in-interest because prior to the
withdrawal of the subject property from the public
domain, it may not be acquired by prescription.
On the premise that the application of the respondent is
predicated on Section 14 (1), the same would likewise
not prosper. As shown by the tax declarations of the
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest, the earliest that
the respondent can trace back the possession of its
predecessors-in-interest is in 1948. That there were four-
year old coconut trees in Area A as stated in Agapita
Claudel’s 1948 Tax Declaration cannot be considered a
"well-nigh controvertible evidence" that she was in
possession prior to June 12, 1945 without any evidence
that she planted and cultivated them. In the case of
Jacinto Tan Lay Cho, the earliest tax declaration in his
name is dated 1948 and there is no evidence that he
occupied and possessed Area B on or prior to June 12,
1945. Furthermore, the testimony of the respondent’s
lone witness that the respondent’s predecessors-in-
interest were already in possession of the subject
property as of June 12, 1945 lacks probative value for
being hearsay.
It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and
occupation required to acquire an imperfect title over an
alienable and disposable public land must be "open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious" in character. In
Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba,23 this Court
explained that the intent behind the use of "possession"
in conjunction with "occupation" is to emphasize the
need for actual and not just constructive or fictional
possession.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since
these words are separated by the conjunction and, the
clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous
with the other. Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to
delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere
fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature
as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property.24 (citations omitted)
On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the
required nature of possession and occupation, thus,
requiring a reference to the relevant provisions of the
Civil Code on prescription. And under Article 1118
thereof, possession for purposes of prescription must be
"in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted". In Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo
v. Rañon,25 this Court expounded on the nature of
possession required for purposes of prescription:
It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and
under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open
when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive
when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his
own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by
the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party
who asserts ownership by adverse possession must
prove the presence of the essential elements of
acquisitive prescription.26 (citations omitted)
This Court is not satisfied with the evidence presented
by the respondent to prove compliance with the
possession required either under Section 14 (1) or
Section 14 (2).
First, the twelve (12) Tax Declarations covering Area A
and the eleven (11) Tax Declarations covering Area B for
a claimed possession of more than forty-six (46) years
(1948-1994) do not qualify as competent evidence of
actual possession and occupation. As this Court ruled in
Wee v. Republic of the Philippines:27
It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax
declarations (for the years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980 and
1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more
than 45 years (1945-1993). This type of intermittent and
sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation. In any event, in the absence of other
competent evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively
establish either possession or declarant’s right to
registration of title.28 (emphasis supplied and citation
omitted)
The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in
concept of owner," by which the respondent describes its
possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest is a
conclusion of law. The burden of proof is on the
respondent to prove by clear, positive and convincing
evidence that the alleged possession of its
predecessors-in-interest was of the nature and duration
required by law.29 It is therefore inconsequential if the
petitioner failed to present evidence that would
controvert the allegations of the respondent. A person
who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on
the basis of possession by himself and his
predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear
and convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove his title and
should not rely on the absence or weakness of the
evidence of the oppositors.30
The respondent’s claim of ownership will not prosper on
the basis of the tax declarations alone. In Cequeña v.
Bolante,31 this Court ruled that it is only when these tax
declarations are coupled with proof of actual possession
of the property that they may become the basis of a
claim of ownership.32 In the absence of actual public and
adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
purposes does not prove ownership.33
Second, that the nineteen (19) coconut trees supposedly
found on Area A were four years old at the time Agapita
Claudel filed a Tax Declaration in 1948 will not suffice as
evidence that her possession commenced prior to June
12, 1945, in the absence of evidence that she planted
and cultivated them. Alternatively, assuming that Agapita
Claudel planted and maintained these trees, such can
only be considered "casual cultivation" considering the
size of Area A. On the other hand, that Jacinto Tan Lay
Cho possessed Area B in the concept of an owner on or
prior to June 12, 1945 cannot be assumed from his 1948
Tax Declaration.
Third, that plants were on the subject property without
any evidence that it was the respondent’s predecessors-
in-interest who planted them and that actual cultivation
or harvesting was made does not constitute "well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence" of actual possession and
occupation. As this Court ruled in Wee:
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of
prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and
registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D.
No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State
expressly declares that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial.37
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is GRANTED. The July 31, 2008 Decision and February
20, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 00143 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
respondent’s application for registration of title over Lot
9039 of Cagayan Cadastre is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the mere

existence of an unspecified number of coffee plants,
sans any evidence as to who planted them, when they
were planted, whether cultivation or harvesting was
made or what other acts of occupation and ownership
were undertaken, is not sufficient to demonstrate
petitioner’s right to the registration of title in her favor.34

Fourth, Vicente Oco’s testimony deserves scant

consideration and will not supplement the inherent
inadequacy of the tax declarations.1âwphi1 Apart from
being self-serving, it is undoubtedly hearsay. Vicente
Oco lacks personal knowledge as to when the
predecessors-in-interest of the respondent started to
occupy the subject property and admitted that his
testimony was based on what he allegedly gathered from
the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest and the
owners of adjoining lot. Moreover, Vicente Oco did not
testify as to what specific acts of dominion or ownership
were performed by the respondent’s predecessors-in-
interest and if indeed they did. He merely made a
general claim that they came into possession before
World War II, which is a mere conclusion of law and not
factual proof of possession, and therefore unavailing and
cannot suffice.35 Evidence of this nature should have
been received with suspicion, if not dismissed as
tenuous and unreliable.

Finally, that the respondent’s application was filed after

only four years from the time the subject property may
be considered patrimonial by reason of the DAR’s
October 26, 1990 Order shows lack of possession
whether for ordinary or extraordinary prescriptive period.
The principle enunciated in Heirs of Malabanan cited
above was reiterated and applied in Republic of the
Philippines v. Rizalvo:36

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for

application for registration because his claim of
ownership and possession over the subject property
even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is
G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF

LANDS), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN
TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO REYES, MARINA
TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C.
TANCINCO, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Martin B. Laurea for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of

the respondent Court of Appeals (now Intermediate
Appellate Court) affirming the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch
VIII, which found that Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-131892
are accretion to the land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 89709 and ordered their registration in the
names of the private respondents.

Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco

Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial
and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan
bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.

On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an

application for the registration of three lots adjacent to
their fishpond property and particularly described as
follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Lot 1-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan

Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of
Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the
NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-
131892; on the SE., along lines 2-3-4,
by Meycauayan River; on the S.W.,
along fines 4-5-6-7-8-9, by Bocaue
River; on the NE., along line 9-10, by
property of Joaquina Santiago; on the
E., NE., and NW., along lines 10-11-12-
 1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot
2, Psu-111877). ... containing an area of
THIRTY THREE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN (33,937)
SQUARE METERS. ...
Lot 2-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan
Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of
Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the E.,
along line 1-2, by property of Rafael
Singson; on the S., along line 2-3, by
Meycauayan River; on the SW., along
line 3-4, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892;
and on the N., along line 4-1, by
property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1,
Psu-111877). ... containing an area of
FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY THREE (5,453) SQUARE
METERS. ...
Lot 3-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan
Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of
Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the
NE., along line 1-2, by property of
Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877);
and along line 2-3, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-
131892; on the S., along line 3-4, by
Meycauayan River, on the SW., along
line 4-5, by Lot 1 of plan Psu-131892;
and along line 5-6 by property of
Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877),
and on the NW., along line 6-1, by
property of Joaquina Santiago. ...
containing an area of ONE THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (1,985)
SQUARE METERS. ...
On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C.
Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a
written opposition to the application for registration.
On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial
withdrawal of the application for registration with respect
to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the
recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the
Court.
On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from
the application and trial proceeded only with respect to
Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision
granting the application on the finding that the lands in
question are accretions to the private respondents'
fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
89709. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: têñ.
£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1
& 2 of plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) are
accretions to the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 of
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, they
belong to the owner of said property.
The Court, therefore, orders the
registration of lots 1 & 2 situated in the
barrio of Ubihan, municipality of
Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, and
more particularly described in plan Psu-
131892 (Exh. H) and their
accompanying technical descriptions
(Exhs. E, E-1) in favor of Benjamin
Tancinco, married to Alma Fernandez
and residing at 3662 Heatherdown,
Toledo, Ohio 43614 U.S.A.; Azucena
Tancinco Reyes, married to Alex Reyes,
Jr., residing at 4th St., New Manila,
Quezon City; Marina Tancinco Imperial,
married to Juan Imperial, residing at
Pasay Road, Dasmariñas Village,
Makati, Rizal; and Mario C. Tancinco,
married to Leticia Regidor, residing at
1616 Cypress St., Dasmariñas Village,
Makati, Rizal, all of legal age, all Filipino
citizens.
On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a
decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads: têñ.
£îhqwâ£
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay
sinasangayunan at pinagtitibay sa
kanyang kabuuan nang walang bayad.
The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court admits of
certain exceptions. Thus in Carolina Industries Inc. v.
CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA 734) we held that
this Court retains the power to review and rectify the
findings of fact of said courts when (1) the conclusion is
a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, and impossible; (3) where
there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when
the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee.
There are facts and circumstances in the record which
render untenable the findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that the lands in question are
accretions to the private respondents' fishponds.
The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak
of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what
actually happened is that the private respondents simply
transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the
Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to
speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result
of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the
waters of the river.
On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the
testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acuña to the effect that: têñ.
£îhqwâ£
xxx xxx xxx
... when witness first saw the land,
namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were already
dry almost at the level of the Pilapil of
the property of Dr. Tancinco, and that
from the boundaries of the lots, for about
two (2) arms length the land was still dry
up to the edge of the river; that
sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil was
established on the boundaries of Lots 1
& 2 and soil from the old Pilapil was
transferred to the new Pilapil and this
was done sometime in 1951; that the
new lots were then converted into
fishpond, and water in this fishpond was
two (2) meters deep on the side of the
Pilapil facing the fishpond ... .
The private respondents submit that the foregoing
evidence establishes the fact of accretion without human
intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred
after the accretion was complete.
We agree with the petitioner.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
To the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.
The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of
three requisites before an accretion covered by this
particular provision is said to have taken place. They are
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that
it be made through the effects of the current of the water;
and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the
effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This
excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits
caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the
exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no
evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the
said property was made gradually through the effects of
the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We
agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that it
is preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares
of land came into being because of the effects of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the
private respondents who happens to be their overseer
and whose husband was first cousin of their father
noticed the four hectare accretion to the twelve hectare
fishpond only in 1939. The respondents claim that at this
point in time, accretion had already taken place. If so,
their witness was incompetent to testify to a gradual and
imperceptible increase to their land in the years before
1939. However, the witness testified that in that year,
she observed an increase in the area of the original
fishpond which is now the land in question. If she was
telling the truth, the accretion was sudden. However,
there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were
artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of
the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The
alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of
the sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result
of the transfer of the dike towards the river and
encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is
not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the
river's current on the fishpond adjoining it. It is under two
meters of water. The private respondents' own evidence
shows that the water in the fishpond is two meters deep
on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one
meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the
right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to
compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers
because of the location of his land. If estates bordering
on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced
by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of
lawful provisions, said estates are subject to
incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is
proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice the
owners thereof should be compensated by the right of
accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence,
the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his
land caused by special works expressly intended or
designed to bring about accretion. When the private
respondents transferred their dikes towards the river
bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and
not to protect their property from the destructive force of
the waters of the river.
We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General
that the testimony of the private respondents' lone
witness to the effect that as early as 1939 there already
existed such alleged alluvial deposits, deserves no merit.
It should be noted that the lots in question were not
included in the survey of their adjacent property
conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey
of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan conducted
between the years 1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion
was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33
years after it had supposedly permanently formed. The
only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas
could not have been there in 1939. They existed only
after the private respondents transferred their dikes
towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What
private respondents claim as accretion is really an
encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by
reclamation.

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of

Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private respondents.
These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan
river and are therefore classified as property of the public
domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502,
paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They
are not open to registration under the Land Registration
Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private
property in the names of the private respondents is null
and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move
back the dikes of their fishponds to their original location
and return the disputed property to the river to which it
belongs.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët