G.R. No. 175746               March 12, 2008
ONG,
CHARLES L. ONG, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 25, 2006 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085, which reversed and set aside
the January 16, 2002 Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan,
Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-023, and the November 20,
2006 Resolution3 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as
duly authorized representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and
Cesar, filed an Application for Registration of Title4 over Lot 15911 (subject
lot) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of five
hundred seventy four (574) square meters, more or less. They alleged that
they are the co-owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their
exclusive property having acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony
Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is
presently unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the
concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.
After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of the Philippines
(respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the
application for registration of title. Respondent asserted that neither
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since
June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants
failed to adduce any muniment of title to prove their claims; that the tax
declaration appended to the application does not appear genuine and merely
shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that the application was filed
beyond the period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and that the subject lot is
part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of private
appropriation.
On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner
and his brothers, viz:
The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant indubitably established
sufficient basis to grant the applicant (sic) for registration. Originally, the
whole parcel of land was owned by spouses Teofilo Abellara and Abella
Charmine who acquired the same by virtue of a Deed of Sale from Cynthia
Cacho, Agustin Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho, Jover Cacho and Lauro Cacho. Later,
they sold the same parcel of land to spouses Tony C. Villamil and Alicia
Bautista, who in turn sold the same land to herein applicants.
The same parcel of land has been declared in the name of the applicant and
her predecessors-in-interest and its taxes has (sic) been religiously paid.
The said circumstances further show that the possession and ownership of
the applicant and her (sic) predecessors-in-interest over the same parcel of
land has (sic) been continuous and peaceful under bona fide claim of
ownership before the filing of the instant application for registration on [July
1, 1999].
WHEREFORE, after confirming the Order of General Default, the Court
hereby orders and decrees the registration of a parcel of land as shown on
plan ap-01-004897 approved by the Bureau of Land(s) situated in Barangay
Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, containing an area of Five Hundred Seventy
Four (574) square meters, subject of the application for registration of title,
in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529, in favor of CHARLIE L. ONG
in his behalf and as representative of his brothers namely, ROBERTO L.
ALBERTO L. ONG and CESAR L. ONG.
Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati
City, Metro Manila, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Dagupan City,
Atty. Celestino Domingo Jr., the Office of the Land Registration Authority,
Quezon City, as well as the applicant.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the
assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the
court a quo granting the application for registration of title of applicants-
appellees is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.6
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that
the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. Thus, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that they
possessed the subject lot in the nature and for the duration required by law.
However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest
have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner
since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. It
noted that the earliest tax declaration which petitioner presented is dated
1971. Consequently, petitioner could not fairly claim possession of the land
prior to 1971. Neither was petitioner able to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest actually occupied the subject lot prior to the filing of
the application. Thus, the trial court erred in granting the application for
registration of title over the subject lot.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS BROTHERS, NAMELY,
ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG AND CEZAR L. ONG, HAVE REGISTRABLE
OWNERSHIP OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF LAND
REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-023, AND
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE FORMER
SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT
REAL PROPERTY IS A PUBLIC LAND IS CORRECT.7
The petition lacks merit.
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 ("Property Registration Decree"), as amended,
provides —
SEC. 14. Who may apply. –The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for
registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.8 These requisites involve questions of fact which are not
proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings of the court a
quo are generally binding on this Court except for certain recognized
exceptions, as is the case here, where the trial court and the Court of Appeals
arrived at conflicting findings.9 After a careful review of the records, we
sustain the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. The Report10 dated January 17, 2000 of
the Bureau of Lands stated that the subject lot is "within the alienable and Costs against petitioner.
disposable zone as classified under Project 50 L.C. Map No. 698 and released
and classified as such on November 21, 1927."11 This finding is, likewise, SO ORDERED.
embodied in the Report12 dated January 7, 1999 of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) and the blue print Copy13 of the plan
covering the subject lot. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.

The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot
from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998,14 who in
turn purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen
on January 16, 1997.15 The latter bought the subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin
Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed Cacho, on July 10, 1979.16 The
earliest tax declaration which was submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration
No. 2560617 issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin Cacho and
Eufrosinia Baustista. While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of
ownership, they constitute good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner and a claim of title over the subject property.18 Even if we were to tack
petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject lot to that of their alleged
predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista in
1971, still this would fall short of the required possession from June 12, 1945
or earlier.1avvphi1

Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not

sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the
law requires possession and occupation. As held in Republic v. Alconaba:19

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to
make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds
the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that
for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it
of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.20

Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot
from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his
brothers actually occupied the subject lot.21 No improvements were made
thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on several
occasions.22 Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Tony Bautista testified that
he and his wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the time they
bought the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in
1997.23 Aside from these two testimonies, no other evidence was presented
to establish the character of the possession of the subject lot by petitioner’s
other alleged predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioner’s evidence failed to
establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his
predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature
and duration required by law.

The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who
must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged
possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required
by law.24 Unfortunately, petitioner’s evidence do not constitute the "well-
nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary in cases of this
nature.25 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the
Decision of the trial court and in denying his application for registration of
title over the subject lot.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The April 25,
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085 which
reversed and set aside the January 16, 2002 Decision of the Municipal Trial
G. R. No. 107427 - January 25, 2000
Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-023, and
the November 20, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED.
JAMES R. BRACEWELL, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition to affirm the Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 58, in LRC Case No. M-77,1 which was reversed by respondent
Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 29, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No.
26122.2 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent
court on September 30, 1992.3
The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-seven
(9,657) square meters of land located in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. The facts
show that sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr.,
acquired the said parcels of land from the Dalandan and Jimenez families of
Las Piñas; after which corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the
name of Maria Cailles. On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said
parcels of land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which
was duly annotated and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal.
Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of petitioner, cancelling
the previous Tax Declarations issued to Maria Cailles.
On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for confirmation of imperfect title under
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.4 The case was docketed as L.R.C.
Case No. 4328. On February 21, 1964, the Director of Lands, represented by
the Solicitor General, opposed petitioner's application on the grounds that
neither he nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the
subject land nor have they been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same for at least thirty (30) years prior to
the application, and that the subject land is part of the public domain.5
The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account of an
action filed by Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles before the then
Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal. The case was finally disposed of by this
Court in G.R. No. 51263 where the rights of Maria Cailles were upheld over
those of the oppositor Leonardo.6
On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration case were
forwarded to the Makati Regional Trial Court7 where it was docketed as Land
Registration Case No. M-77. The Solicitor General resubmitted his opposition
to the application on July 22, 1985,8 this time alleging the following
additional grounds: (1) the failure of petitioner to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time; and (2) that the tax declarations attached to the
complaint do not constitute acquisition of the lands applied for.
On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application of
petitioner.9 The Solicitor General promptly appealed to respondent Court
which, on June 29, 1992, reversed and set aside the lower court's Order.10 It
also denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution of
September 30, 1992.11
Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following grounds
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in finding that the commencement
of thirty (30) year period mandated under Sec. 48 (b) shall commence only
on March 27, 1972 in accordance with the classification made by the Bureau
of Forestry in First (1st) Indorsement dated August 20, 1986.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an ERROR in DRAWING
conclusion and inference that prior to the declaration by the Bureau of
Forestry in March 27, 1972, the parcels of land sought to be registered by
Applicant was part of the forest land or forest reserves.
III. The Honorable Court of Appeal ERRED and failed to consider VESTED
RIGHTS of the applicant-appellant and his predecessors-in-interest land
occupied from 1908.12
The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of title to
the subject land under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having
by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
since 1908. On the other hand, it is the respondents' position that since the
subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or disposable on
March 27, 1972,13 petitioner did not have any title to confirm when he filed
his application in 1963. Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met.
We agree with respondents.
In Republic vs. Doldol,14 the requisites to acquire title to public land were laid
down, as follows
. . . . The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended,
Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(emphasis in the original).
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land
Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public
land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same must be since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a
right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued.
Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that
the land is alienable public land. On this score, we agree with respondents
that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his
application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively
shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable or
disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot
claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of
land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private
appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of
title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or
disposable portions of the public domain.15
A similar situation in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,16 where a
homestead patent issued to the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was
cancelled on the ground that at the time it was issued, the subject land was
still part of the public domain. In the said case, this Court ruled as follows
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same
doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State (Director of
Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 340).
Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the application
is alienable or disposable. This petitioners failed to do.
We have stated earlier that at the time the homestead patent was issued to
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belong to the
inalienable and undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus, any title
issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at the
time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-
interest of the original patent applicant, the Director of Lands was not then
authorized to dispose of the same because the area was not yet classified as
disposable public land. Consequently, the title issued to herein petitioners by
the Bureau of Lands is void ab initio.

Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as
inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the same could not be the subject of
confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to be
confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable.17 In the
absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until
released therefrom and open to disposition.18 Indeed, it has been held that
the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until
the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain.19

Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry Administrative
Order recognizes private or vested rights under which his case may fall. We
only find on record the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest
Development20 from which no indication of such exemption may be gleaned.

Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his application for
confirmation of imperfect title, we see no need to discuss the other errors
raised in this petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED for

lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172102 : July 2, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HANOVER WORLWIDE

TRADING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Decision1cralaw dated May 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 70077, which affirmed the August 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 56, in LAND REG. CASE NO. N-281.
Petitioner also assails the CA Resolution2cralaw dated March 30, 2006,
denying its Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On October 15, 1993, Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation filed an
application for Registration of Title over Lot No. 4488 of Consolacion Cad-
545-D (New) under Vs-072219-000396, situated in Barrio Sacsac,
Consolacion, Cebu, containing an area of One Hundred Three Thousand
Three Hundred Fifty (103,350) square meters, more or less, pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree. The application stated that Hanover is the owner in fee
simple of Lot No. 4488, its title thereto having been obtained through
purchase evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Attached to the petition are: 1) a Verification Survey Plan; 2) a copy of the
approved Technical Description of Lot 4488; 3) a copy of the Deed of Sale in
favor of Hanover's President and General Manager; 4) a copy of a Waiver
executed by the President and General Manager of Hanover in favor of the
latter; 5) a Geodetic Engineer's Certificate attesting that the property was
surveyed; 6) a Tax Declaration; 7) a tax clearance; 8) a Municipal Assessor's
Certification stating, among others, the assessed value and market value of
the property; and 9) a CENRO Certification on the alienability and
disposability of the property.
Except for the Republic, there were no other oppositors to the application.
The Republic contended, among others, that neither Hanover nor its
predecessors-in-interest are in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or
prior thereto; the muniments of title, tax declarations and receipts of tax
payments attached to or alleged in the application do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands
applied for; Hanover is a private corporation disqualified under the
Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain; the parcels of land
applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic and
are not subject to private appropriation.
The case was then called for trial and respondent proceeded with the
presentation of its evidence. The Republic was represented in the
proceedings by officers from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On August 7, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision3cralaw approving
Hanover's application for registration of the subject lot. It held that from the
documentary and oral evidence presented by Hanover, the trial court was
convinced that Hanover and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
public, continuous, notorious and peaceful possession, in the concept of an
owner, of the land applied for registration of title, and that it had registrable
title thereto in accordance with Section 14 of P.D. 1529.
On appeal by the State, the judgment of the RTC was affirmed by the CA via
the presently assailed Decision and Resolution.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:chan robles
virtual law library
I
THE DEFECTIVE AND/OR WANT OF NOTICE BY PUBLICATION OF THE INITIAL
HEARING OF THE CASE A QUO DID NOT VEST THE TRIAL COURT WITH
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE THEREOF.
II
DEEDS OF SALE AND TAX DECLARATIONS/CLEARANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE
THE "WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE" EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO ACQUIRE
TITLE THROUGH ADVERSE OCCUPATION.cra4
Petitioner claims that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. It
avers that the RTC set the initial hearing of the case on September 25, 1995
in an Order dated June 13, 1995. Petitioner contends, however, that,
pursuant to Section 23 of P.D. 1529, the initial hearing of the case must be
not earlier than forty-five (45) days and not later than ninety (90) days from
the date of the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing. Since
the RTC Order was issued on June 13, 1995, the initial hearing should have
been set not earlier than July 28, 1995 (45 days from June 13, 1995) and not
later than September 11, 1995 (90 days from June 13, 1995). Unfortunately,
the initial hearing was scheduled and actually held on September 25, 1998,
some fourteen (14) days later than the prescribed period.
Petitioner also argues that respondent failed to present incontrovertible
evidence in the form of specific facts indicating the nature and duration of
the occupation of its predecessor-in-interest to prove that the latter has
been in possession of the subject lot under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The petition is meritorious.
As to the first assigned error, however, the Court is not persuaded by
petitioner's contention that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case. It is true that in land registration cases, the applicant must strictly
comply with the jurisdictional requirements. In the instant case, though,
there is no dispute that respondent complied with the requirements of the
law for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
With respect to the setting of the initial hearing outside the 90-day period set
forth under Section 23 of P.D. 1529, the Court agrees with the CA in ruling
that the setting of the initial hearing is the duty of the land registration court
and not the applicant. Citing Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,5cralaw this
Court held in Republic v. San Lorenzo Development
Corporation6cralaw that:chan robles virtual law library
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the land registration
court. After an applicant has filed his application, the law requires the
issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial
hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the
judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA [Land
Registration Authority]. This involves a process to which the party-applicant
absolutely has no participation. x x x
xxxx
x x x a party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of
Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the
business of such official in the performance of his duties. A party cannot
intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is
attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole
power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which
the applicant has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant
has complied with all the requirements of the law.
Moreover, it is evident in Manna Properties, Inc. that what is more important
than the date on which the initial hearing is set is the giving of sufficient
notice of the registration proceedings via publication. x x x
In the instant case, there is no dispute that sufficient notice of the
registration proceedings via publication was duly made.
Moreover, petitioner concedes (a) that respondent should not be entirely
faulted if the initial hearing that was conducted on September 25, 1995 was
outside the 90-day period set forth under Section 23 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, and (b) that respondent substantially complied with the
requirement relating to the registration of the subject land.
Hence, on the issue of jurisdiction, the Court finds that the RTC did not
commit any error in giving due course to respondent's application for
registration.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court agrees with petitioner on the more
important issue that respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to
prove that it or its predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the
subject property for the period required by law.
Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529, as amended, provides:chan robles virtual law
library
SEC. 14. Who may apply. -The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:chanrobles
virtualaw library
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.cra7
Likewise, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4
of P.D. 1073, states:chan robles virtual law library
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.cra8cralaw
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30
years or more is not sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on
January 25, 1977, it must now be shown that possession and occupation of
the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total
conformity with Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529.cra9cräläwvirtualibräry
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of law, applicants for
registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
It is true, as respondent argues, that an examination of these requisites
involve delving into questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for
review on certiorari. Factual findings of the court a quo are generally binding
on this Court, except for certain recognized exceptions,10cralaw to wit:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial Court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.cra11cralaw
The Court finds that the instant case falls under the third and ninth
exceptions.
A careful reading of the Decisions of the RTC and the CA will show that there
is neither finding nor discussion by both the trial and appellate courts which
would support their conclusion that respondent's predecessors-in-interest
had open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the disputed parcel of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
No testimonial evidence was presented to prove that respondent or its
predecessors-in-interest had been possessing and occupying the subject
property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Hanover's President and General
Manager testified only with respect to his claim that he was the former
owner of the subject property and that he acquired the same from the heirs
of a certain Damiano Bontoyan; that he caused the payment of realty taxes
due on the property; that a tax declaration was issued in favor of Hanover;
that Hanover caused a survey of the subject lot, duly approved by the Bureau
of Lands; and that his and Hanover's possession of the property started in
1990.cra12cräläwvirtualibräry
The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by respondent neither show
that its predecessor's possession and occupation of the subject land is for the
period or duration required by law. The earliest date of the Tax Declarations
presented in evidence by respondent is 1965, the others being 1973, 1980,
1992 and 1993. Respondent failed to present any credible explanation why
the realty taxes due on the subject property were only paid starting in 1965.
While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they
constitute proof of claim of ownership.cra13cralaw In the present case, the
payment of realty taxes starting 1965 gives rise to the presumption that
respondent's predecessors-in-interest claimed ownership or possession of
the subject lot only in that year.
Settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on
the applicant who must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that
his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and
duration required by law.cra14cralaw Unfortunately, as petitioner contends,
the pieces of evidence presented by respondent do not constitute the "well-
nigh incontrovertible" proof necessary in cases of this nature.
Lastly, the Court notes that respondent failed to prove that the subject lot
had been declared alienable and disposable by the DENR Secretary.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of
private dominion presumably belong to the State.cra15cralaw The onus to
overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests
with the applicant.cra16cräläwvirtualibräry
In the present case, to prove the alienability and disposability of the subject
property, Hanover submitted a Certification issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO) attesting that "lot 4488,
CAD-545-D, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED FIFTY (103,350) square meters, more or less, situated at Sacsac,
Consolacion, Cebu" was found to be within "Alienable and Disposable Block-
1, land classification project no. 28, per map 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu."
However, this certification is not sufficient.

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.17cralaw this Court held that it is not

enough for the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices
(PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable, thus:

x x x The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable x x x.cra18

In the instant case, even the veracity of the facts stated in the CENRO
Certification was not confirmed as only the President and General Manager
of respondent corporation identified said Certification submitted by the
latter. It is settled that a document or writing admitted as part of the
testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated
therein.cra19cralaw In the present case, Hanover's President and General
Manager, who identified the CENRO Certification, is a private individual. He
was not the one who prepared the Certification. The government official who
issued the Certification was not presented before the RTC so that he could
have testified regarding its contents. Hence, the RTC should not have
accepted the contents of the Certification as proof of the facts stated
therein. The contents of the Certification are hearsay, because Hanover's
President and General Manager was incompetent to testify on the truth of
the contents of such Certification. Even if the subject Certification is
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, it has no probative value in
establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.cra20cralaw

Moreover, the CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the
issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the alienability and disposability of
public lands.cra21cralaw Thus, the CENRO Certification should have been
accompanied by an official publication of the DENR Secretary's issuance
declaring the land alienable and disposable.

Respondent, however, failed to comply with the foregoing requirements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 6, 2005 Decision and March
30, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70077 and the
August 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch
56 in Land Registration Case No. N-281 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Hanover
Worldwide Trading Corporation's application for registration of Lot No. 4488
of Consolacion Cad-545-D (New), under Vs-072219-000396, Barrio Sacsac,
Consolacion, Cebu, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 144057             January 17, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision1 of the Sixth Division of the
Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate
court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC),2 Branch 8,
of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC)3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which
granted the application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit
(Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to
Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for
registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan.
The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas
Cadastre, AP – 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square
meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondent’s imperfect
title over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The
public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles,
representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later
date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the
petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general
default against the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and
the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in
1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano
executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming
(Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and
confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or
1956.5 Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale
in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same.
She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator.
The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as
mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees
which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on
the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the
subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and
in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or
even the government until she filed her application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor
manifested that the government did not intend to present any evidence
while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico
Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27,
1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be
brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and
confirmed in the name of Naguit.6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the
land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15,
1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T.
Geollegue of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region
VI.7 However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order
dated February 18, 1998.81awphi1.nét
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to
the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its
decision, dismissing the appeal.9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court
rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and
affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was
filed by the Republic on September 4, 2000.10
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the
appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the
government’s prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before
it can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No.
1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the
concept of owner for the required period.11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be
first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court12 in arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and
exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was
declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have
maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required
by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the
land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original
registration proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for
registration of title under Section 14(1) – that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that
such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying
words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.13 Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not
yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need
to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is
already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of
Appeals .14 Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute."15 In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as
alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable
status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein
respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the
application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the
petitioner admits that the subject property was released and certified as
within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,17 wherein the
Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it
was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable and
disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed.
In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years
before the property was declared alienable and
disposable.1awphi1.nét Thus, in this case, where the application was made
years after the property had been certified as alienable and disposable,
the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,18 such as those which form part of a
reservation for provincial park purposes19 the possession of which cannot
ripen into ownership.20 It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held
in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable and possession
thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property,
unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.22 In the case at bar, the property in question was undisputedly
classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is
inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on
the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains
to original registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The right
to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of
ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimant’s
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which
reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein,
but those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that
the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30)
years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended,
this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12,
1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the
public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the term
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted
though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands."24 Clearly, the subject lands
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory
P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of
the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12,
1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.25 There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.26 With
such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of
"private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June
12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive,
then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted
with coconut trees now over fifty years old.27 The inherent nature of the land
but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is
no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower
courts.l^vvphi1.net
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had
been in possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The
argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the assertion—shown
earlier to be unfounded—that there could have been no bona fide claim of
ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or
disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the
continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land
since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court
generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably,
possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50
to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax
declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and
realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only
one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces
his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also
the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act
strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.28

Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the

respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which
commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any
cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be properly
brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in
possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous,
peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the
government itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving
of protection under the law.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179987               April 29, 2009

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from
Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and
registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World.
And it has many consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in
Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have
not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state
systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru,
the informals have means of proving property ownership to each other
which are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The
informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their
own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps
which they use for their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you
walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to bark at you.
Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who does
not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law"
and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not
know how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of
persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition,
while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in
order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original
registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant
provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on
the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the
problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been
treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their
own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our
part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and
the legal principles that have developed our public land law, though our
social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic
problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D,
Silang Cadastre,2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of
71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco,3 and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-
Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly
designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to
appear on behalf of the State.4 Apart from presenting documentary evidence,
Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the
hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a
twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth
being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by
the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle,
Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan.5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine
Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he "also [knew] the property
and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco."6 The Republic
of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the
application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification
dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be
within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656
on March 15, 1982."7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and
thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan
Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported
by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is
of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang,
Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for
the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision8 reversing
the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court
held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period
of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable
was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-
DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and
disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos’ possession prior to that
date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession.
This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree was based on the Court’s ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of
Appeals;10 hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate
court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v.
Naguit,11 which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto.
Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of
Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein
which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the
first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the
hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling
doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural land.
Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the
declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in
reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act
and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,12 and on 11 November 2008,
the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal
issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for
registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land
and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with
the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because
of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree or both?13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the
Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly
contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be
considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was
void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,14 promulgated in
June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation
that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently
absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply,
the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June
1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in
Buenaventura v. Republic,15 Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic16 and
Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,17 as well as the earlier case of
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.18
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain
for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus
placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would
not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified
as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the
application, the property had already been "converted" into private property
through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively
from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more
extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the
acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial
property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands." It observes that the
Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for
application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to
the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not
the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits
that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public
lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was
declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular
factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership
thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land
Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its
enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands
of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral
lands.20 Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further
classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and
for public and quasi-public uses.21
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public
Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes
may be disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles"
through "judicial legalization."22 Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that
right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when
the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were
introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed
to "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." The OSG submits
that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be
registered.23 This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land
Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of "lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain are a larger class than only "agricultural lands."
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession
for "thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application" to
possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier." The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that
the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30)
years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended,
this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12,
1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually
the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree
codified the various laws relative to the registration of property, including
lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the
registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the
inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect.
Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who
"have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That
circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a
redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been
repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of
the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply.— The
following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the
nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right,
rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert
that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25
January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who
has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect
or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation
of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of
title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of
the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the
Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the
possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In
turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the
substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well
provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section
47 of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the
right to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended
several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads
thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail
of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only
where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided,
further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in
accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be
construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at
any time prior to the period fixed by the President.24
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted
under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted
the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the
applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable
character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945.
Following the OSG’s approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable
after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as
amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying
words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.25 Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not
yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need
to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is
already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that
which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as
pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the
point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared
alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor
is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona
fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect
titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is
significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope
and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages
from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein
is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the
notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it
suffices that the Court’s acknowledgment that the particular line of argument
used therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,26 the Court,
citing Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the
date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable
is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession…" That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is
certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura
should again be considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately
granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein
did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby
precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the
decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original
registration following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been
in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty
(50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has
any precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the
ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved
situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court’s
interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the
case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final
word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals27 since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed
before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years
after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,28 which involved a claim of
possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was
declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell,
quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the
attempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November
25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to
be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification
Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is
sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private
respondents’ application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this case.
Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the
application of appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of
the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are
forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of
public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a
confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private
respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the
alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to
prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions,
petitioner did not show that this is one of them.29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who
authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public
domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180
days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the
application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had
been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application
was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or disposable.
That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it
from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section
14(2). The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section
14(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum,
but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory
P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of
the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12,
1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.
[30 ] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[31 ]
With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation
of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June
12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive,
then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case
where petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that
provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of
possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly
appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the
possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2).
Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On
the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to
acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution
itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the
acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of real property
may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,32 or through
extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years.33 Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith,34 as well as just title.35
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides
that persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers to
the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is
the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of
private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus,
the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does
encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the
State, which a private person has acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence
holding that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession
of at least thirty (30) years.36 Yet if we ascertain the source of the "thirty-
year" period, additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how
exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of
the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original
registration of alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an
owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(emphasis supplied)37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which
made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time.
Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have
invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication,
as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article
1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription
under the Civil Code–ordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed "through
uninterrupted adverse possession… for thirty years, without need of title or
of good faith."
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No.
1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the
thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as
mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference
between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and
how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did
not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription.
It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately
preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification
as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of,
and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is
neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had
mandated such a requirement,38 similar to our earlier finding with respect to
the present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the
point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period
as basis for original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which entitled those "who have acquired ownership
over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to
apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from
the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At
the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of
prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with
respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on
prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the
civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our
interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the
case of Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus:
"[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription." The identification what consists of
patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in
full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others
of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated
in the preceding article, is patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property
belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be
subject of the commerce of man.39 Lands of the public domain, whether
declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion
and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the
President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property
of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative
definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the
commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce
of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further
provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2)
makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as
long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it
is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly
declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the
registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the
detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the
lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its
concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared
alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the
Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is
to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and
intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the
legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual
example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The
Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.," is
more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the
sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro
Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of
effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the President to
transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA)40 which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer
them.41 The President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in
whole or in part.42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military
lands subject thereof are "alienable and disposable pursuant to the
provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of government
properties."43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have
become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become
patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that
these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the
former American bases at Clark and Subic.44 Such purpose can be tied to
either "public service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article
420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and
disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a
private person or entity that such lands become private property and cease
to be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared
as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are
no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public
dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in
favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the
period of possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial
may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period.
Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial
cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the
application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the
framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that
possession during the time that the land was still classified as public
dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive
prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and
Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates
registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles
registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is
extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the
Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available
both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472,
and the thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period
under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the
period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary
prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as
amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone
without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription
under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code
should not apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted
status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither
superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration
Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set
forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2)
manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that
provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to
Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing
how our land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription,
which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership
over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by
Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of
man are susceptible to prescription," and that [p]roperty of the State or any
of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription."
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be
acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription,
which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just
title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10)
years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring
patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription,
nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time,
there are indispensable requisites–good faith and just title. The
ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and
528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,45 provisions that more or less
speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under
Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription "when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right."
Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership,
and which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been
the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples:
sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the
applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The
major premise for the argument is that "the State, as the owner and grantor,
could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the
required period of possession."47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it
assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor
is the one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription
derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any
other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or
extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the
classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for
the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been
become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the
possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events
ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land;
and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil
Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the
property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that
registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely
a mode of confirmation of ownership.48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then
did not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial
property under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the
confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period
of possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following
Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for
alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil
Code, though it arguably did not preclude such registration.50 Still, the gap
was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes
ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the
prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2)
thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who
have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who
by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of,
and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public
Land Act.51
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish
that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—
the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with
Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status
as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.
Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal
doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the
implications of today’s ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled
property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The
social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be
abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied
the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is
a phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is
common among the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm
powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on
the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative
means of acquisition of these public domain lands, such as through
homestead or free patent, have

proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the

encumbrance or alienation of said properties.52 Judicial confirmation of
imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive
means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has
considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or

exclusively held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their
families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State
with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families
and their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said
about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are
not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered
such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to
Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and
formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the
public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be
accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the
requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.

One’s sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-
being not only of that individual, but also to the person’s family. Once that
sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the
political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179987               September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A.

Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of
the parties who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009,
whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the
application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated
in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established
by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot
9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20,
1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the
property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming
that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and
occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the
judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which
reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-
D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay
Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and
described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under
Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting
Malabanan’s application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and
thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan
Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported
by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is
of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang,
Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner
and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in
Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting
that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been
declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s
possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of
computing Malabanan’s period of possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs
elevated the CA’s decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a
petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the
property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and
disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to
perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the
Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to
the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for
registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12,
1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land
registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab
initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to
support their argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into
private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public
domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was
that the property had been "converted" into private property through
prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the
property sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land
of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because
Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and
occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in
interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere
classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed
sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the
rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic
v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as
alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil
Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco
believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had
been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and
ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by
Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed
the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in
possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time
when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a
clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and
Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has
enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an
applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss
the different classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land
registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public
dominion or of private ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if
it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without
being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not
of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for
public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the
State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a
private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first
introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land
of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or
alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable
primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were
classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the
reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987
Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the
uses to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to
their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of
the Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public
land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated;
all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a)
patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private
ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b)
lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks
are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as
agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification, 25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under
existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If,
however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until
Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land
to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the
Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands,
can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of
only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section
11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly
requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the
public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to
clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber,
or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside
the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable"
further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of
the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the
applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application
to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been
in possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945,
or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the
public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the
authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must
have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order
for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already
classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine
applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and
disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However,
emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a
public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as
alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on
June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such
classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the
fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere
judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that
the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of
the requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of
Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of
the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the
fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret
only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates
that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the
registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only
from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means
that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for
land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere
lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the
lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a
result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public
Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of
Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of
possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified
as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for
registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is
inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to
determine the point at which prescription may run against the State. The
imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession
and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public
domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous,
exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law
not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not
necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to
adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino
citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number
of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear
in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative
development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No.
10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the
adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly
residential lands, subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration of
Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or
private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil
Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of
public land or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not
clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State
and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11
of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of
the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of
the time of the application, provided the applicant’s possession and
occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a
conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal
fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has
become private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no
longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are
removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted
into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or
disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private
ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition
sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property
of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character
and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land
cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never
began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a
law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration
and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185092               June 4, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CORAZON C. SESE and FE C. SESE, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSGJ, assailing the November 21, 2007 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, which dismissed its appeal
and affirmed the October 3, 2003 Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Pulilan, Bulacan (MTC), in LRC Case No. 026.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents:
Records show that on September 17, 2002, Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese
(respondents) filed with the MTC an application for original registration of
land over a parcel of land with an area of 10, 792 square meters, situated in
Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan, Province of Bulacan, and more
particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345, Pulilan Cadastre, under Plan
No. AP-03-004226.
Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a
donation inter vivos from their mother, Resurreccion L. Castro
(Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they, through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession of the subject property; and
that the property was not within a reservation.
In support of their application, respondents submitted the following
documents, namely: (1) Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of
Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor, representing their mother Resurreccion
Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; (2) Certificate of Technical Description
which was approved on December 10, 1998 by the Land Management
Service, Region III, of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR); (3) Certification in lieu of lost Surveyor’s Certificate issued by the
same authority; (4) Official Receipt of payment of real property tax over the
subject property; (5) Certification from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer
of Pulilan, stating that the registered owners of a property under Tax
Declaration No. 99-19-015-01557 were Corazon Sese and others; and (6)
Survey plan of Lot 11247, CAD 345,Pulilan Cadastre, approved by the
Regional Technical Director of the Land Management Service, Region III, of
the DENR, stating that the land subject of the survey was alienable and
disposable land, and as certified to by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1,
1927, was outside of any civil or military reservation. On the lower portion of
the plan, there was a note stating that a deed of absolute sale over the
subject property was executed by a certain Luis Santos and Fermina Santos
(the Santoses) in favor of Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.
On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, among others, that:
"This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20
LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is
outside any civil or military reservation." The said plan was approved by the
DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando,
Pampanga, on December 3, 1998.
Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the MTC issued the
Order, dated October 10, 2002, setting the case for hearing with the
corresponding publication. After compliance with all the requirements of the
law regarding publication, mailing and posting, hearing on the merits of the
application followed.
During the trial on June 4, 2003, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon)
testified on their claim over the subject lot. Thereafter, respondents
submitted their formal offer of evidence, after which the evidence offered
were admitted by the MTC in the Order, dated July 10, 2003, without
objection from the public prosecutor.
The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.
On October 3, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision,3 ordering the
registration of the subject property in the name of respondents. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant application to be sufficient in form and
substance and the applicants having established their right of ownership over
the subject parcel of land and are therefore entitled to registration thereof,
the Court thereby grants the petition.
Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the registration of the parcel of land
subject matter of this petition which is more particularly described in Plan
Ap-03-004226 Pulilan Cadastre and in their corresponding technical
descriptions in the name of Resureccion Castro.
Upon this decision becoming final, let an Order for the decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The MTC reasoned out that there was evidence to show that the subject lots
had been in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession, either by the
applicants themselves or their predecessor-in-interest. Such possession since
time immemorial conferred an effective title on the applicants, whereby the
land ceased to be public and became private property. It had been the
accepted norm that open, adverse and continuous possession for at least 30
years was sufficient. The MTC noted that evidence showed that the parcel of
land involved was not covered by land patent or a public land application as
certified to by the Community Environment and Natural Resources of
Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan. Moreover, it added that the technical
descriptions of Lot 11247 were prepared and secured from the Land
Management Sector, DENR, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, and were
verified and found to be correct by Eriberto Almazan, In-Charge of the
Regional Survey Division.
On December 19, 2003, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA, docketed
as CA-GR. CV No. 81439. In its brief,4 the OSG presented the following
assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of the public domain occupied
and possessed in concept of owner for a period of at least thirty (30) years is
entitled to confirmation of title; and b) respondents failed to prove specific
acts of possession.
The OSG argued that there was no proof that the subject property was
already segregated from inalienable lands of the public domain. Verily, it was
only from the date of declaration of such lands as alienable and disposable
that the period for counting the statutory requirement of possession would
start.
Also, there was absolutely no proof of respondents’ supposed possession of
the subject property. Save for the testimony of Corazon that "at present, the
worker of (her) mother is occupying the subject property," there was no
evidence that respondents were actually occupying the subject tract of land
or that they had introduced improvement thereon.
On November 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision5 affirming the judgment
of the MTC ordering the registration of the subject property in the name of
respondents. The decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision dated October
3, 2003 of the MTC of Pulilan, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. 026 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The CA reasoned out, among others, that the approved survey plan of the
subject property with an annotation, stating that the subject property was
alienable and disposable land, was a public document, having been issued by
the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents were prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish that
the subject property was indeed alienable and disposable.
With respect to the second issue, the CA was of the view that the doctrine of
constructive possession was applicable. Respondents acquired the subject
property through a donation inter vivos executed on July 22, 1972 from their
mother. The latter acquired the said property from the Santoses on October
4, 1950 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. Further, respondent Corazon
testified that a small hut was built on the said land, which was occupied by
the worker of her mother. Moreover, neither the public prosecutor nor any
private individual appeared to oppose the application for registration of the
subject property.
The CA also stated that respondents’ claim of possession over the subject
property was buttressed by the Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the
name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor, representing their mother
Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; the official receipt of payment
of real property tax over the subject property; and the certificate from the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the registered owner
of a property under Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 were respondents.
The CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax payments of
property were not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they
were good indicia of possession in the concept of owner.
Hence, the OSG filed this petition.
ISSUES
I nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN RULING THAT
THE APPROVED SURVEY PLAN IDENTIFIED BY ONE OF THE RESPONDENTS IS
PROOF THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.
The OSG argues that unless a piece of land is shown to have been classified
as alienable and disposable, it remains part of the inalienable land of the
public domain. In the present case, the CA relied on the approved survey
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. It is well-
settled, however, that such notation does not suffice to prove that the land
sought to be registered is alienable and disposable. What respondents
should have done was to show that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
fell within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. In addition, they should have adduced a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official records.
To bolster its argument, the OSG cites the case of Republic of the Philippine
v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,6 where the Court stated that the trial court should
not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts
stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and
admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the
land is alienable and disposable. Such government certifications do not, by
their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. As such, the certifications
are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they
do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the OSG argues that
respondents failed to present specific acts of ownership to prove open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse possession in the concept of an
owner. Facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent
evidence. As to the tax declaration adduced by respondents, it cannot be said
that it clearly manifested their adverse claim on the property. If respondents
genuinely and consistently believed their claim of ownership, they should
have regularly complied with their real estate obligations from the start of
their supposed occupation.
Position of Respondents
On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA correctly found that the
subject land was alienable and disposable. The approved survey plan of the
subject property with an annotation, stating that the subject property is
alienable and disposable land, is a public document, having been issued by
the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents are prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein and are sufficient to establish that the subject
property is indeed alienable and disposable.
7
Respondents cite the case of Republic v. Serrano,  where the Court stated
that a DENR Regional Technical Director’s certification, which was annotated
on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence, constituted substantial
compliance with the legal requirement. The DENR certification enjoyed the
presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary.
Anent the second assignment of error, respondents contend that the CA
correctly applied the doctrine of constructive possession because they
acquired the subject land from their mother, Resurreccion, through a
donation inter vivos, dated July 22, 1972.Their mother, in turn, acquired the
subject land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute
sale. They claim that a small hut was built in the said land and was occupied
by a worker of her mother. They countered that although tax declarations or
realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property which is not in
his actual or constructive custody.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The vital issue to be resolved by the Court is whether respondents are
entitled to the registration of land title under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.)No. 1529, or pursuant to Section 14(2) of the same statute.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141,8 as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073,9 provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for registration of land title
must establish and prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.10 Compliance
with the foregoing requirements is indispensable for an application for
registration of land title, under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, to validly
prosper. The absence of any one requisite renders the application for
registration substantially defective.
Anent the first requisite, respondents presented evidence to establish the
disposable and alienable character of the subject land through a survey plan,
where on its lower portion, a note stated, among others, as follows: "This
survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC
Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is
outside any civil or military reservation." The said plan was approved by the
DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando,
Pampanga on December 3, 1998. The annotation in the survey plan,
however, fell short of the requirement of the law in proving its disposable
and alienable character.
In Republic v. Espinosa,11 citing Republic v. Sarmiento12 and Menguito v.
Republic,13 the Court reiterated the rule that that a notation made by a
surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed was alienable and
disposable was not the positive government act that would remove the
property from the inalienable domain and neither was it the evidence
accepted as sufficient to controvert the presumption that the property was
inalienable. Thus:
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy of the
conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears
the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the
alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified
on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation to
prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains part
of the inalienable public domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: ‘This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land
Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of
Forestry on January 3, 1968,’ appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-
13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State..."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case)
must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms
part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered
as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be
registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineer’s notation
in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable
land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly
changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor
has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on
the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the
land in question has been declared alienable." (Citations omitted and
emphases supplied)
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application
is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable. The applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; or a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable.14
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.15 declared that a CENRO certification was
insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land
sought to be registered. The applicant must also show sufficient proof that
the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released the land in
question as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be
accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records.16
Here, the only evidence presented by respondents to prove the disposable
and alienable character of the subject land was an annotation by a geodetic
engineer in a survey plan. Although this was certified by the DENR, it clearly
falls short of the requirements for original registration.
With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession and
occupation of a parcel of land by the applicant, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier.17 A mere
showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more, by itself, is not
sufficient.18
In this regard, respondents likewise failed. As the records and pleadings of
this case will reveal, the earliest that respondents and their predecessor-in-
interest can trace back possession and occupation of the subject land was
only in the year 1950,when their mother, Resurreccion, acquired the subject
land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale.
Evidently, their possession of the subject property commenced roughly five
(5) years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning date expressly provided under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, their application for registration of land
title was legally infirm.
The respondents cannot invoke Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 which
provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.1avvphi1 The case of Malabanan v.
Republic19 gives a definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original
registration proceedings under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree. In the said case, the Court laid down the following rules:
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
xxxx
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the

public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and, thus, incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly
declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.20

Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to
commence and operate against the State, the classification of land as
alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must be able to
show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared
through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the
President that the subject land is no longer retained for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the State,
the land remains to be a property of public dominion and, hence, not
susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription.21 The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does
not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2)
of the Civil Code. It is still insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.22

For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either Section 14 (1)
or 14 (2) of P.O. No. 1529. Under Section 14 (1), respondents failed to prove
(a) that the property is alienable and disposable; and (b) that their possession
of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. Failing to prove the
alienable and disposable nature of the subject land, respondents all the more
cannot apply for registration by way of prescription pursuant to Section 14
(2) which requires possession for 30 years to acquire or take. Not only did
respondents need to prove the classification of the subject land as alienable
and disposable, but also to show that it has been converted into patrimonial.
As to whether respondents were able to prove that their possession and
occupation were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this
issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.

In fine, the Court holds that the ruling of the CA lacks sufficient factual or
legal justification.1âwphi1 Hence, the Court is constrained to reverse the
assailed CA decision and resolution and deny the application for registration
of land title of respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 21, 2007 Decision and
the October 8, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.
81439, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Application for
Registration of Title of Respondents Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese in Land
Registration Case No. 026 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 155080 - February 5, 2004

SOLEDAD CALICDAN, represented by her guardian GUADALUPE

CASTILLO, petitioner
vs.
SILVERiO CENDAÑA, substituted by his legal heir CELSA CENDAÑA-
ALARAS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the April 4, 2002 decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67266,1 which set aside the November 12,
1996 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 in Civil
Case No. D-10270.2
The instant controversy involves a 760 square meter parcel of unregistered
land located in Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The land was formerly
owned by Sixto Calicdan, who died intestate on November 4, 1941. He was
survived by his wife, Fermina, and three children, namely, petitioner Soledad,
Jose and Benigno, all surnamed Calicdan.3
On August 25, 1947, Fermina executed a deed of donation inter
vivos whereby she conveyed the land to respondent Silverio Cendaña,4 who
immediately entered into possession of the land, built a fence around the
land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon sometime in
1949, where he resided until his death in 1998.5
On June 29, 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo,
filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages"
against the respondent, alleging that the donation was void; that respondent
took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land; and that she
merely tolerated respondents possession of the land as well as the
construction of his house thereon.6
In his "Answer with Motion to Dismiss", respondent alleged, by way of
affirmative defenses, that the land was donated to him by Fermina in 1947;
and that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in
possession of the land for a period of 45 years. Moreover, he argued that the
complaint was barred by prior judgment in the special proceedings for the
"Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan", where the court
decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of properties of the
petitioner.7
On November 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the
defendant as follows:
1. Ordering defendant Silverio Cendaña to vacate the land in question and
surrender ownership and possession of the same to plaintiff; and
2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P20,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and
other litigation expenses, plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal by the respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts
decision and declared that the donation was valid. Furthermore, it held that
petitioner lost her ownership of the property by prescription.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues:
(1) whether or not the donation inter vivos is valid; and
(2) whether or not petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription.
As a rule, our jurisdiction in cases brought from the Court of Appeals is
limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the
appellate court. This is because its findings of fact are deemed conclusive and
we are not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence
already considered in the proceedings below.9
The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions:
(1) when the findings are grounded on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(4) when the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are conflicting;
(5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone beyond the
issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the appellate court is premised on a
misapprehension of facts or when it has failed to consider certain relevant
facts which, if properly taken into account, will justify a different conclusion;
(7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence upon which they are based; and
(8) when findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.10
In the case at bar, the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are conflicting; thus, we are constrained to review the findings of
facts.
The trial court found the donation of the land void because Fermina was not
the owner thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his
parents. Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses
Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law
applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of
usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently,
respondent, who derived his rights from Fermina, only acquired the right of
usufruct as it was the only right which the latter could convey.
After a review of the evidence on record, we find that the Court of Appeals
ruling that the donation was valid was not supported by convincing proof.
Respondent himself admitted during the cross examination that he had no
personal knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan in fact purchased the subject
land from Felomino Bautista. Pertinent portions of his testimony read:
Q. And Sixto Calicdan inherited this property from his parents?
A. No, sir.
Q. What do you mean by no?
A. To my knowledge and information, Sixto Calicdan bought the property
from his cousin, I think Flaviano or Felomino Bautista.
Q. So, in other words, you have no personal knowledge about how Sixto
Calicdan acquired this property?
A. I think it was by purchase.
Q. According to information, so you have no actual personal knowledge how
Sixto Calicadan acquired this property?
A. Yes, because when the property was bought by my uncle, I was not yet
born, so information only.
Q. So when you were born, you came to know already that Sixto Calicdan is
the owner of this property?
A. Yes, thru the son of Felomino Bautista who is now, I think, in Baguio.
Q. You have not seen any document to show that Sixto Calicdan purchased
the property from one Felomino Bautista?
A. None, sir.11
In People v. Guittap,12 we held that:
Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are
derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as "evidence not of what the witness
knows himself but of what he has heard from others." The hearsay rule bars
the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told
him, whether orally or in writing. In Sanvicente v. People, we held that when
evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is
without any evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay. Familiar and
fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in ruling based on respondents bare hearsay
testimony as evidence of the donation made by Fermina.
In Pensader v. Pensader we ruled that while the verbal donation under which
the defendant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the lands in question is not effective as a transfer of title, still it is a
circumstance which may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the
possession. (Underscoring ours)

Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, we find that respondent has
become the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive
prescription.
Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights
over immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner
and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should
be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.
Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title
for ten years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights
over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years without need of title or of good faith.13
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No.
D-10270 before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, and
declared respondent the rightful owner of the subject property, not on the
basis of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, which is hereby declared void, but
on extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated April 4, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 67266, which
ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. D-10270 before the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership.14 For purposes of prescription, there is just title when
the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of
the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.15

Assuming arguendo that ordinary acquisitive prescription is unavailing in the

case at bar as it demands that the possession be "in good faith and with just
title,"16 and there is no evidence on record to prove respondents "good
faith", nevertheless, his adverse possession of the land for more than 45
years aptly shows that he has met the requirements for extraordinary
acquisitive prescription to set in.

The records show that the subject land is an unregistered land. When the
petitioner filed the instant case on June 29, 1992, respondent was in
possession of the land for 45 years counted from the time of the donation in
1947. This is more than the required 30 years of uninterrupted adverse
possession without just title and good faith. Such possession was public,
adverse and in the concept of an owner. Respondent fenced the land and
built his house in 1949, with the help of Guadalupes father as his contractor.
His act of cultivating and reaping the fruits of the land was manifest and
visible to all. He declared the land for taxation purposes and religiously paid
the realty taxes thereon.17 Together with his actual possession of the land,
these tax declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of the land
occupied by him. As we said in the case of Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs
of Mariano Santiago:18

Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not

conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the [G.R. No. 175763 : April 11, 2012]
State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO AND ARACELI TANYAG, NAMELY: ARTURO TANYAG,
claim of acquisition of ownership. AIDA T. JOCSON AND ZENAIDA T. VELOSO, PETITIONERS, VS. SALOME E.
GABRIEL, NESTOR R. GABRIEL, LUZ GABRIEL-ARNEDO MARRIED TO ARTURO
Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for having been ARNEDO, NORA GABRIEL-CALINGO MARRIED TO FELIX CALINGO, PILAR M.
executed by one who was not the owner of the property donated, may still MENDIOLA, MINERVA GABRIEL-NATIVIDAD MARRIED TO EUSTAQUIO
be used to show the exclusive and adverse character of respondents NATIVIDAD, AND ERLINDA VELASQUEZ MARRIED TO HERMINIO
possession. Thus, in Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court of Appeals,19 we VELASQUEZ, RESPONDENTS.
held:
DECISION
Even assuming that the donation propter nuptias is void for failure to comply
with formal requisites, it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse
possession. With clear and convincing evidence of possession, a private
document of donation may serve as basis for a claim of ownership. VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse the
Decision[1] dated August 18, 2006 and Resolution[2] dated December 8, 2006
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81224.   The CA affirmed the
Decision[3] dated November 19, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 267 in Civil Case No. 67846 dismissing petitioners’ complaint for
declaration of nullity of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1035,
reconveyance and damages, as well as respondents’ counterclaims for
damages and attorney’s fees.cralaw
Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at Ruhale,
Barangay Calzada, Municipality of Taguig (now part of Pasig City, Metro
Manila).  The first parcel (“Lot 1”) with an area of 686 square meters was
originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel under Tax Declaration (TD)
Nos. 1603 and 6425 issued for the years 1949 and 1966, while the second
parcel (“Lot 2”) consisting of 147 square meters was originally declared in the
name of Agueda Dinguinbayan under TD Nos. 6418 and 9676 issued for the
years 1966 and 1967.[4]  For several years, these lands lined with bamboo
plants remained undeveloped and uninhabited.
Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of Jose
Gabriel, as part of her inheritance as declared by her in a 1944 notarized
instrument (“Affidavit of Sale”) whereby she sold the said property to
spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga.  Said document states:
DAPAT MALAMAN NG LAHAT NG MAKABABASA
Na, akong Benita Gabriel, balo sa nasirang Calixto Lontoc, Filipina may
karapatang gulang naninirahan sa nayon ng Palingon, Tagig, Rizal, x x x sa
pamamaguitan nitoy
ISINASAYSAY KO AT PINAGTITIBAY
1.) Na, sarili ko at tunay na pagaari ang isang lagay na lupang kawayanan na
sapagkat itoy kabahagui ko sa aking kapatid na [J]ose Gabriel, na itoy mana
ko sa aking nasirang ama Mateo Gabriel  sa kami lamang dalawa ng aking
kapatid na binabanguit ko na Jose Gabriel siyang mga anak at tagapagmana
ng aming amang nasirang Mateo Gabriel, maliban sa amin ay  wala nang iba,
kayat kami ay naghati sa mga ari-arian na na iwan sa amin ng nasirang ama
namin na Mateo Gabriel, na ang lupang kawayanang itoy may nakatanim na
walong (8) punong kawayan at na sa pook na kung pamagatan ay Ruhale
nayon ng Calzada, Tagig, Rizal, at na sa loob ng mga kahanganan at sukat na
sumusunod[:]
Na, ang kahangan sa Hilagaan Sapang Ruhale at Vicente Bunye, sa Amihanan
Felipe Pagkalinawan, sa Timugan Juan Flores, at sa Habagatan Apolonio Ocol
may sukat na 6 areas at 85 centiareas may halagan amillarada na P80.00)  in the name of Araceli Tanyag.
Pesos alinsunod sa Tax Blg. 20037, sa pangalan ng aking kapatid na Jose
Gabriel.  Na, ang lupang itoy hindi natatala sa bisa ng batas Blg. 496 ni sa
susog gayon din sa Hipotecaria Espanola itoy may mga mojon bato ang mga
panulok at walang bakod.
2.)  Na, alang-alang sa halagang SIYAMNAPO AT ANIM (P96.00) na Pisong
salaping guinagamit dito sa Filipinas na bago dumating ang mga sandaling
itoy tinaggap ko at ibinayad sa akin ng boong kasiyahang loob ko ng
magasawang GABRIEL SULIT AT CORNELIA SANGA, mga Filipinos may mga
karapatang gulang mga naninirahan sa nayon ng Calzada, Tagig, Rizal, ngayon
ay inilipat ko at ipinagbili ng bilihang tuluyan (Venta real soluta) ang
isinasaysay kong lupang kawayanan sa itaas nito ng nasabi halagang
SIYAMNAPO AT ANIM (P96.00) na Piso at sa nabanguit na magasawang
GABRIEL SULIT AT CORNELIA SANGA, gayon din sa lahat ng mga tagapagmana
nila, ngayong mga arao na ito ay ang may hawak at namamahala ng lupang
itoy ang mga nakabili sa akin na magasawang GABRIEL SULIT AT CORNELIA
SANGA.
3.) Na, ang kasulatang itoy ng bilihan ay nais na itala sa bisa ng batas Blg.
3344.
NA SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITOY ako ay lumagda sa kasulatang ito dito
sa Tagig, Rizal, ngayong ika - 28 ng Junio 1944.
(Nilagdaan) BENITA GABRIEL[5]
Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriel’s own daughter,
Florencia Gabriel Sulit, when her father-in-law Gabriel Sulit gave it to her as
part of inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit who was Florencia’s husband. 
Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to Bienvenido S. Tanyag, father of
petitioners, as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale dated October 14, 1964.
[6]
  Petitioners then took possession of the property, paid the real estate taxes
due on the land and declared the same for tax purposes, as shown by TD No.
11445 issued in 1969 in the name of Bienvenido’s wife, Araceli C. Tanyag; TD
No. 11445 cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel.   TD Nos. 3380
and 00486 also in the name of Araceli Tanyag were issued in the years 1974
and 1979.[7]
As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda Dinguinbayan to
Araceli Tanyag under Deed of Sale executed on October 22, 1968. 
Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said property and declared the
same for tax purposes as shown by TD Nos. 11361, 3395, 120-014-00482,
120-00-014-20-002-000, C-014-00180 and D-014-00182 issued for the years
1969, 1974, 1979, 1985, 1991 and 1994.[8]  Petitioners claimed to have
continuously, publicly, notoriously and adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2
through their caretaker Juana Quinones[9]; they fenced the premises and
introduced improvements on the land.[10]
Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured TD No. 120-
014-01013 in his name over Lot 1 indicating therein an increased area of
1,763 square meters.  Said tax declaration supposedly cancelled TD No. 6425
over Lot 1 and contained the following inscription[11]:
Note:   Portions of this Property is Also Declared
in the name of Araceli C. Tanyag under
T.D.#120-014-00858  686 sq. m.
Also inscribed on TD No. 120-014-00858[12] (1979) in the name of Araceli
Tanyag covering Lot 1 are the following:
This property is also covered by T.D. #120-014-01013
in the name of Jose P. Gabriel
         1-8-80
which notation was carried into the 1985, 1990 and 1991 tax declarations, all
On March 20, 2000, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 67846 alleging that
respondents never occupied the whole 686 square meters of Lot 1 and
fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in TD No. 120-014-01013 such that
Lot 1 consisting of 686 square meters originally declared in the name of Jose
Gabriel was increased to 1,763 square meters.  They contended that the
issuance of OCT No. 1035 on October 28, 1998 over the subject land in the
name of respondents heirs of Jose Gabriel was null and void from the
beginning.[13]
On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause of
action against them for they have not established their ownership over the
subject property covered by a Torrens title in respondents’ name.  They
further argued that OCT No. 1035 had become unassailable one year after its
issuance and petitioners failed to establish that it was irregularly or
unlawfully procured.[14]
Respondents’ evidence showed that the subject land was among those
properties included in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Jose P.
Gabriel[15] executed on October 5, 1988, covered by TD No. B-014-00643
(1985) in the name of Jose Gabriel.   Respondents declared the property in
their name but the tax declarations (1989, 1991 and 1994) carried the
notation that portions thereof (686 sq. ms.) are also declared in the name of
Araceli Tanyag. On October 28, 1998, OCT No. 1035[16] was issued to
respondents by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila under Decree
No. N-219177 pursuant to the Decision dated September 20, 1996 of the
Land Registration Court in LRC Case No. N-11260, covering Lot 1836 MCadm-
590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping, Plan Ap-04-002253, with an area of 1,560
square meters.
On the other hand, respondents’ TD Nos. D-014-00839 and D-014-01923
issued in 1993 and 1999 respectively, showed that respondents sold 468
square meters of Lot 1 to Jayson Sta. Barbara.[17]  The segregation of said 468
square meters pertaining to Jayson Sta. Barbara was reflected in the
approved survey plan of Lot 1836 prepared by respondents’ surveyor on
March 18, 2000.[18]
At the trial, petitioners presented their witness Arturo Tanyag, son of
Bienvenido Tanyag and Araceli Tanyag who died on March 30, 1968 and
October 30, 1993, respectively.  He testified that according to Florencia Sulit,
Benita Gabriel-Lontoc and her family were the ones in possession of Lot 1
since 1944; Benita Gabriel had executed an Affidavit of Sale declaring said
property as her inheritance and conveying the same to spouses Gabriel and
Cornelia Sulit. He affirmed that they had been in possession of Lot 1 from the
time Bienvenido Tanyag bought the land from Florencia Sulit in 1964.  Based
on the boundaries indicated in the tax declaration, they fenced the property,
installed Juana Quinones as their caretaker who also attended to the piggery,
put up an artesian well and planted some trees.  From 1964 up to 1978,
nobody disturbed them in their possession or claimed ownership of the land;
four years after acquiring Lot 1, they also purchased the adjacent property
(Lot 2) to expand their piggery.  Lot 2 was also separately declared for tax
purposes after their mother purchased it from Agueda Dinguinbayan.  He had
personally witnessed the execution of the 1968 deed of sale including its
notarization, and was also present during the physical turn over of Lot 2 by
the seller.  In fact, he was one of the instrumental witnesses to the deed of
sale and identified his signature therein.   He further described the place as
inaccessible at that time as there were no roads yet and they had to traverse
muddy tracks to reach their property.[19]
Arturo further testified that the first time they met Jose Gabriel was when
the latter borrowed from their mother all the documents pertaining to their
property.  Jose Gabriel came looking for a piece of property which he claims
as his but he had no documents to prove it and so they showed him their
documents pertaining to the subject property; out of the goodness of her
mother’s heart, she lent those documents to her brother Jose Gabriel.  built on the said portion without their permission.  She had talked to both
During the cadastral survey conducted in 1976, they had both lots surveyed
in preparation for their consolidation under one tax declaration.  However,
they did not succeed in registering the consolidated lots as they discovered
that there was another tax declaration covering the same properties and
these were applied for titling under the name of Jose Gabriel sometime in
1978 or 1980, which was after the time said Jose Gabriel borrowed the
documents from their mother. No notice of the hearings for application of
title filed by Jose Gabriel was received by them.  They never abandoned the
property and their caretaker never left the place except to report to the
police when she was being harassed by the respondents. He also recalled
that respondents had filed a complaint against them before the barangay but
since no agreement was reached after several meetings, they filed the
present case.[20]
The next witness for petitioners was Juana Quinones, their caretaker who
testified that she had been staying on petitioners’ property since 1964 or for
35 years already.  She had built a nipa hut and artesian well, raised piggery
and poultry and planted some root crops and vegetables on the land.  At first
there was only one parcel but later the petitioners bought an additional lot;
Arturo Tanyag gave her money which she used for the fencing of the
property.  During all the time she occupied the property there was nobody
else claiming it and she also had not received any notice for petitioners
concerning the property, nor the conduct of survey on the land.  On cross-
examination, she admitted that she was living alone and had no Voter’s ID or
any document evidencing that she had been a resident there since 1964. 
Although she was living alone, she asks for help from other persons in
tending her piggery.[21]
Angelita Sulit-delos Santos, cousin of petitioners and also of  respondents,
testified that she came to know the subject property because according to
her paternal grandfather Gabriel Sta. Ana Sulit, her maternal grandmother
Benita Gabriel-Lontoc mortgaged the property to him.  It was Benita Gabriel
Lontoc who took care of her, her siblings and cousins; they lived with her
until her death.  She identified the signature of Benita Gabriel in the 1944
Affidavit of Sale in favor of Gabriel Sulit.  Lot 1 consisting of 600 square
meters was vacant property at that time but her family was in possession
thereof when it was sold to Gabriel Sulit; it was her father Eliseo Sulit and
uncle Hilario Sulit, who were incharge of their property.  On cross-
examination, she was asked details regarding the supposed mortgage of Lot
1 to Gabriel Sulit but she admitted she does not know anything as she was
still very young then.[22]
Respondents’ first witness was Roberto Gabriel Arnedo, son of Luz Gabriel-
Arnedo.  He testified that when he was about 5 or 6 years old (1953 or 1954),
his grandfather Jose Gabriel used to bring him along to visit the subject
property consisting of 1,763 square meters based on the tax declaration and
OCT.  They had picnics and celebrate his grandfather’s birthday there.  He
recalled accompanying his grandfather in overseeing the planting
of gumamela which served as the perimeter fence. Jose Gabriel had not
mentioned anything about the claim of petitioners over the same land; Jose
Gabriel handed the documents pertaining to the land to his eldest aunt and
hence it now belongs to them.[23]  On cross-examination, he claimed that
during those years he had visited the land together with his grandfather, he
did not see Florencia Sulit and her family.[24]
Virginia Villanueva, daughter of Salome Gabriel, testified that they acquired
the subject property from their grandfather Jose Gabriel who had a tax
declaration in his name.   Her mother furnished them with documents such
as tax declarations and the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Jose
Gabriel; they also have an approved survey plan prepared for Salome
Gabriel.  She does not know the petitioners in this case.[25]  On cross-
examination, she said that the subject property was inherited by Jose Gabriel
from his father Mateo Gabriel; Jose Gabriel was the sole owner of the land
while Benita Gabriel has separate properties in Palingon and Langkokak.[26] 
Though they are not actually occupying the property, they visit the place and
she does not know anybody occupying it, except for the portion (486 square
meters) which petitioners sold to Sta. Barbara.  A nine-door apartment was
Sta. Barbara and with Arturo Tanyag they had meetings before the barangay;
however, petitioners filed the present case in court.  She insisted that there is
nobody residing in the subject property; there is still the remaining 901
square meters which is owned by their mother.  She admitted there were
plants on the land but she does not know who actually planted them; it was
her grandfather who built a wooden fence and gumamela in the 1960s.  As
to the hearings on the application for title, she had not attended the same;
she does not know whether the petitioners were notified of the said
hearings.  She also caused the preparation of the survey plan for Salome
Gabriel.   On the increased area of the property indicated in the later tax
declarations, she admitted the discrepancy but said there were barangay
roads being built at the time.[27]
Esmeraldo Ramos, Municipal Assessor of Taguig, testified that he was
formerly a Land Appraiser in the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Taguig
and in the course of his duties had certified one of the tax declarations in the
name of respondents (TD No. EL-014-10585).   He identified and verified said
document and the other tax declarations submitted in court by the
respondents.  He admitted that on January 10, 1980, they made the entry on
TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel that the same was cancelled by TD
No. 120-014-01013 also in the name of Jose Gabriel who presented a
supposed deed of sale in favor of Araceli Tanyag which caused the earlier
cancellation of TD No. 6425 in his name.  However, upon investigation they
found out that the seller Florencia Sulit was not the owner because the
declared owner was Jose Gabriel; even the deed of sale recognized that the
property was declared in the name of Jose Gabriel.  They also discovered
from the cadastral survey and tax mapping of Taguig that the property is in
the name of Jose Gabriel both in the Bureau of Lands and Municipal
Assessor’s Office.  As far as he knows, it was Jose Gabriel who owned the
subject property which he usually visited; he recalled that around the late
70’s and 80’s, he ordered the fencing of barbed wire and bamboo stalks on
the land which is just 3 lots away from his own property.  As to the
discrepancy in the area of the property as originally declared by Jose Gabriel,
he explained that the boundaries in the original tax declaration do not
change but after the land is surveyed, the boundaries naturally would be
different because the previous owner may have sold his property or the
present owner inherits the property from his parents.  He admitted that the
tax declaration is just for tax purposes and not necessarily proof of
ownership or possession of the property it covers.[28]
Respondents’ last witness was Antonio Argel who testified that he had
resided for 52 years on a land near the subject property and as far as he
knows it was Jose Gabriel who owns it and planted thereon.  On cross-
examination, he admitted that Jose Gabriel was not in physical possession of
the property. He just assumed that the present occupants of the property
were allowed by Jose Gabriel to stay therein because he is the owner.   There
is an apartment and three small houses existing on the property, and about
five families are living there.  He confirmed that there is a piggery being
maintained by a certain Juana who had been residing there maybe for fifteen
years already.[29]
In rebuttal, petitioners presented two witnesses who are owners of
properties adjoining that of the subject land.  Rodante Domingo testified that
it was only now did he learn that the property of Arturo Tanyag is already
titled in the name of respondents.  He was not aware of the titling
proceeding because he never received any notice as adjoining owner.  His
own property is already titled in his name and he even asked Arturo Tanyag
to act as a witness in his application for titling.[30]   On the other hand, Dado
Dollado testified that he acquired his property in 1979.  He likewise affirmed
that he did not receive any notice of the proceedings for application for
titling filed by respondents and it was only now that he learned from Arturo
Tanyag that the subject property was already titled in the names of
respondents.[31]
The last rebuttal witness for petitioners was Dominador Dinguinbayan
Ergueza, son of Agueda Dinguinbayan.  He testified that the subject property
was formerly owned by his mother and the present owner is Araceli Tanyag
who bought the same from his mother in 1968.  He described the boundaries
of the property in relation to the adjoining owners at that time; presently,
the left portion is already a street (Rujale St.) going towards the sea.  He
admitted that his wife, Livina Ergueza was an instrumental witness in the
1968 deed of sale in favor of Araceli Tanyag.[32]
In its decision, the trial court dismissed the complaint as well as the
counterclaim, holding that petitioners failed to establish ownership of the
subject property and finding the respondents to be the declared owners and
legal possessors.  It likewise ruled that petitioners were unable to prove by
preponderance of evidence that respondents acquired title over the property
through fraud and deceit.
Petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial court’s ruling.  The CA
found that apart from the Affidavit executed by Benita Gabriel in 1944
claiming that she inherited Lot 1 from their father, Mateo Gabriel, there is no
evidence that she, not Jose Gabriel, was the true owner thereof.   It noted
that just four years after Benita Gabriel’s sale of the subject property to the
Sulit spouses, Jose Gabriel declared the same under his name for tax
purposes, paying the corresponding taxes.  The appellate court stressed that
petitioners’ allegation of bad faith was not proven.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.  
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assail the CA in not finding that the respondents obtained OCT
No. 1035 in their names fraudulently and in bad faith.   They also claim to
have acquired ownership of the subject lots by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.
The issues presented are: (1) whether respondents committed fraud and bad
faith in registering the subject lots in their name; and (2) whether petitioners
acquired the property through acquisitive prescription.
Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or
vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership.  A certificate of
title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein.[33] Thus, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens
title, the registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered
property to its true owners.  The rationale for the rule is that reconveyance
does not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau
of Lands.  In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible.  What is sought instead is the transfer of the
property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person’s name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a
better right.[34]
An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is
imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of
the acts.[35]  The totality of the evidence on record established that it was
petitioners who are in actual possession of the subject property; respondents
merely insinuated at occasional visits to the land.  However, for an action for
reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, this Court has held that the party
seeking reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence his title
to the property and the fact of fraud.[36]
The CA correctly observed that the only evidence of Benita Gabriel’s
supposed title was the 1944 Affidavit of Sale whereby Benita Gabriel claimed
sole ownership of Lot 1 as her inheritance from their father, Mateo Gabriel.  
The property until 1949 was still declared in the name Jose Gabriel despite
the 1944 sale executed by Benita Gabriel in favor of spouses Gabriel and
Cornelia Sulit.  As to the alleged fraud perpetrated by Jose Gabriel and
respondents in securing OCT No. 1035 in their name, this was clearly not
proven as Arturo Tanyag testified merely that Jose Gabriel borrowed their
documents pertaining to the property.  No document or testimony was
presented to show that Jose Gabriel employed deceit or committed
fraudulent acts in the proceedings for titling of the property.
However, the CA did not address the issue of acquisitive prescription raised
by the petitioners.  In their Complaint before the lower court, petitioners
alleged –
15. Defendants never occupied the whole area of the lot covered by Tax
Declaration No. 1603 (686 sq. m.) neither were they able to set foot on the
property covered by Tax Declaration No. 6542 [sic] for the reason that those
lots had been in actual, open continuous, adverse and notorious possession
of the plaintiffs against the whole world for more than thirty years which is
equivalent to title.
x x x x[37]
Such character and length of possession of a party over a parcel of land
subject of controversy is a factual issue.  Settled is the rule that questions of
fact are not reviewable in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, as only questions of law shall be raised in such petitions.  
While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate
court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice,
review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions
based on the record.[38]
In this case, the CA was mistaken in concluding that petitioners have not
acquired any right over the subject property simply because they failed to
establish Benita Gabriel’s title over said property.  The appellate court
ignored petitioners’ evidence of possession that complies with the legal
requirements of acquiring ownership by prescription.
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor
through the requisite lapse of time.  In order to ripen into ownership,
possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted.[39]  Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine.[40]  It is continuous when uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse
possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation
of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that
it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood.  The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must
prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.[41]
On the matter of prescription, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith
and with just title for the time fixed by law.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without
need of title or of good faith.  (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners’ adverse possession is reckoned from 1969 with the issuance of
TD No. 1145 in the name of Araceli Tanyag, which tax declaration cancelled
TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel.[42]   It is settled that tax receipts and
declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the
property for which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property, they may become the basis of a claim for
ownership.[43]  Petitioners’ caretaker, Juana Quinones, has since lived in a
nipa hut, planted vegetables and tended a piggery on the land.  Aside from
paying taxes due on the property, petitioners also exercised other acts of
ownership such as selling the 468-square meter portion to Sta. Barbara who
had constructed thereon a nine-door apartment building.
It was only in 1979 that respondents began to assert a claim over the
property by securing a tax declaration in the name of Jose Gabriel albeit over
a bigger area than that originally declared.  In 1998, they finally obtained an
original certificate of title covering the entire 1,763 square meters which
included Lot 1.  Did these acts of respondents effectively interrupt the
possession of petitioners for purposes of prescription?
We answer in the negative.
In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon [44] this Court
citing Article 1123 of the Civil Code[45] held that civil interruption takes place
with the service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by filing of a
mere Notice of Adverse Claim.  Thus:
Article 1123 of the Civil Code is categorical.  Civil interruption is produced by
judicial summons to the possessor.  Moreover, even with the presence of
judicial summons, Article 1124 sets limitations as to when such summons
shall not be deemed to have been issued and shall not give rise to
interruption, to wit: 1) if it should be void for lack of legal solemnities; 2) if
the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the
proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from the
complaint.
Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial
character of civil interruption.  For civil interruption to take place, the
possessor must have received judicial summons.  None appears in the case
at bar.  The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is
nothing more than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt
respondents’ possession.  Such a notice could not have produced civil
interruption.  We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, that the execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim in
1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period because
there remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial
validity.  What existed was merely a notice.  There was no compliance with
Article 1123 of the Civil Code.  What is striking is that no action was, in fact,
filed by petitioners against respondents.  As a consequence, no judicial
summons was received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of
Appeals in its affirmance of the RTC’s ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim
cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil
interruption provided for under the law. In the instant case, petitioners were
not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962.  The
period of acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in
respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse Claim.  (Emphasis
supplied.)
From 1969 until the filing of this complaint by the petitioners in March 2000,
the latter have been in continuous, public and adverse possession of the
subject land for 31 years.  Having possessed the property for the period and
in the character required by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, petitioners have indeed acquired ownership over the subject
property.   Such right cannot be defeated by respondents’ acts of declaring
again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and obtaining a Torrens
certificate of title in their name in 1998.
This notwithstanding, we uphold petitioners’ right as owner only with
respect to Lot 1 consisting of 686 square meters. Petitioners failed to
substantiate their claim over Lot 2 by virtue of a deed of sale from the
original declared owner, Agueda Dinguinbayan.  Respondents asserted that
the 147 square meters covered by the tax declarations of Dinguinbayan
being claimed by petitioners  is not the same lot included in OCT No. 1035.
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to
recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better
right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed;
and second, his title thereto.  In regard to the first requisite, in an accion
reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the
property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the
location, area and boundaries thereof.[46]  In this case, petitioners failed to
identify Lot 2 by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so that
the same may be compared with the technical description contained in OCT
No. 1035, which would have shown whether Lot 2 consisting of 147 square
meters was erroneously included in respondents’ title.  The testimony of
Agueda Dinguinbayan’s son would not suffice because said witness merely
stated the boundary owners as indicated in the 1966 and 1967 tax
declarations of his mother.  On his part, Arturo Tayag claimed that he had the
lots surveyed in the 1970s in preparation for the consolidation of the two
parcels.  However, no such plan was presented in court.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.  The Decision  dated August
18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81224 is MODIFIED in that
petitioners heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag are hereby declared the
owners of 686 square meters previously declared under Tax Declaration Nos.
11445, 120-014-00486, 120-014-0085, B-014-00501, E-014-01446, C-014-
00893 and D-014-00839 all in the name of Araceli Tanyag, which lot is
presently covered by OCT No. 1035 issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasig,
Metro Manila in the name of respondents Salome Gabriel, Nestor R. Gabriel,
Luz Gabriel-Arnedo, Nora Gabriel-Calingo, Pilar Gabriel-Mendiola, Minerva
Gabriel-Natividad and Erlinda Gabriel-Velasquez.  Respondents are ORDERED
to RECONVEY the said 686-square meter portion to the petitioners.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-17652             June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN
CALALUNG, respondents.

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and

Sofia Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-
R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No.
1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and
Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land
allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the
owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio
Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela,
by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it
from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land
appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued
on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342.
When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its
northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in
the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on
the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan
River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance
of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964
square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the
registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of
First Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion
(19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint
(docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-
interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until
September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of
ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of
the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer
(dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves,
asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed
possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a
decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners,
and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession
thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs.
Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed
by the gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the
Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion
was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931,
because the surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary of the land
surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question.
Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun
in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the
boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs, the
accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in
1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo
Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in
question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the
testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the
incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less,
was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that same year
for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2")
when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to
defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No.
28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration
begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for
taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of
the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code
that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714,
New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to the mother or
registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art.
457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the
accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no
moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the part
of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes
manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).
Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is
necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law
does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting
that they have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have
acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land
in September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on
January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10)
years; hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription
(Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law,
part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as
registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and,
therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession by
another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered,
on September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this
opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of
alluvium, which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established
by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title
has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically
in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil
Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend
that they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention
poses the real issue in this case. The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of
the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question
pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is
registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46
of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to
that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began
only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period
required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not
quite correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific
provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural
accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of
the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act.
Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in the
certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would
virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given
therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the
land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative
manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner
against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason,
53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by
Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned.
What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the
Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of
the addition area by another person through prescription. This Court has
held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No.
19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial
court, regarding the length of time that the defendants have been in
possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question
for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area
under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he
declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration
was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the
municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay.
Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of
properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal
president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins
his own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to
be in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified
to the same effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession started
sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less than one
hectare.
petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was
registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action
in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore,
never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the
protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the
Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.

We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through
and credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, acquisitive prescription? This is a question which requires determination of
Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The
question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-
land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly,
that the plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958, because it was only then continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the
that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the
Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by the
taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.
defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to
stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and
but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or
title. This last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and
relinquished their possession to the part thus included, containing an area of before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of
some 458 square meters.1äwphï1.ñët the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by
acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their
possession — from 1933 to 1958 — is not only preponderant in itself, but is, The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with
moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional
circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were
deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to
recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they
did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until
1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too
flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees
had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides,
it was not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an
action to recover the land which was legally theirs by accession and of which,
as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are
convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in
possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and
that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their copy
of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in
favor of the defendants.

It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be

reviewed by us.

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have
acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription.

There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code
and Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial
property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The
question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just
because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making
the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that G.R. No. 178411               June 23, 2010
it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY
of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered
ADMINISTRATOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY ENGINEER OF
land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the
PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the
COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN AND SANGGUNIANG
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code.
PAMBARANGAY OF BARANGAY VITALEZ, PARAÑAQUE CITY, TERESITA A.
Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.
GATCHALIAN, ENRICO R. ESGUERRA, ERNESTO T. PRACALE, JR., MANUEL M.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or
ARGOTE, CONRADO M. CANLAS, JOSEPHINE S. DAUIGOY, ALLAN L.
give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title
GONZALES, ESTER C. ASEHAN, MANUEL A. FUENTES, and MYRNA P.
already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of
ROSALES, Petitioners,
third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the
vs.
operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have
MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS namely, ARTURO V. EBIO,
been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought
EDUARDO V. EBIO, RENATO V. EBIO, LOURDES E. MAGTANGOB, MILA V.
registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after
EBIO, and ARNEL V. EBIO, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the January 31, 2007
Decision1 and June 8, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 91350 allegedly for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The
CA had reversed the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque
City, Branch 196, issued on April 29, 2005 in Civil Case No. 05-0155.
Below are the facts.
Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land
consisting of 406 square meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez
Compound in Barangay Vitalez, Parañaque City and covered by Tax
Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio.
Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the
original occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great
grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son,
Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied
and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring
possession and occupancy,4 Pedro was able to obtain a tax declaration over
the said property in his name.5 Since then, respondents have been religiously
paying real property taxes for the said property.6
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter,
Zenaida. Upon Pedro’s advice, the couple established their home on the said
lot. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits
from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house
within the said compound.7 On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized
Transfer of Rights8 ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of
Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedro’s name were
cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebio’s name.9
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez
passed Resolution No. 08, series of 199910 seeking assistance from the City
Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-
cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road, projected to be
eight (8) meters wide and sixty (60) meters long, will run from Urma Drive to
the main road of Vitalez Compound11 traversing the lot occupied by the
respondents. When the city government advised all the affected residents to
vacate the said area, respondents immediately registered their opposition
thereto. As a result, the road project was temporarily suspended.12
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials
from the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8)
coconut trees planted on the said lot. Respondents filed letter-complaints
before the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of
Interior and Local Government and the Office of the Vice Mayor.13 On June
29, 2003, the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez held a meeting to discuss the
construction of the proposed road. In the said meeting, respondents asserted
their opposition to the proposed project and their claim of ownership over
the affected property.14 On November 14, 2003, respondents attended
another meeting with officials from the city government, but no definite
agreement was reached by and among the parties.15
On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the
respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30)
days, or be physically evicted from the said property.16 Respondents sent a
letter to the Office of the City Administrator asserting, in sum, their claim
over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue.17 The
request remained unheeded.1avvphi1
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City
on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners.18 In the course of the proceedings, respondents admitted before
the trial court that they have a pending application for the issuance of a sales
patent before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).19
On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order20 denying the petition for lack of
merit. The trial court reasoned that respondents were not able to prove
successfully that they have an established right to the property since they
have not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application
for sales patent has not yet been granted. Additionally, they failed to implead
the Republic of the Philippines, which is an indispensable party.
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.21
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On
January 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision in favor of the
respondents. According to the Court of Appeals--
The issue ultimately boils down to the question of ownership of the lands
adjoining Cutcut Creek particularly Road Lot No. 8 (hereinafter RL 8) and the
accreted portion beside RL 8.
The evidentiary records of the instant case, shows that RL 8 containing an
area of 291 square meters is owned by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by
TCT No. S-62176. The same RL 8 appears to have been donated by the
Guaranteed Homes to the City Government of Parañaque on 22 March 1966
and which was accepted by the then Mayor FLORENCIO BERNABE on 5 April
1966. There is no evidence however, when RL 8 has been intended as a road
lot.
On the other hand, the evidentiary records reveal that PEDRO VITALEZ
possessed the accreted property since 1930 per his Affidavit dated 21 March
1966 for the purpose of declaring the said property for taxation purposes.
The property then became the subject of Tax Declaration No. 20134
beginning the year 1967 and the real property taxes therefor had been paid
for the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1980,
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Sometime
in 1964 and 1971, construction permits were issued in favor of Appellant
MARIO EBIO for the subject property. On 21 April 1987, PEDRO VITALEZ
transferred his rights in the accreted property to MARIO EBIO and his
successors-in-interest.
Applying [Article 457 of the Civil Code considering] the foregoing
documentary evidence, it could be concluded that Guaranteed Homes is the
owner of the accreted property considering its ownership of the adjoining RL
8 to which the accretion attached. However, this is without the application of
the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription which is likewise
applicable in the instant case.
xxxx
The subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accreted
portion which [was] duly proven by the Appellants. It is clear that since 1930,
Appellants together with their predecessor-in-interest, PEDRO VITALEZ[,]
have been in exclusive possession of the subject property and starting 1964
had introduced improvements thereon as evidenced by their construction
permits. Thus, even by extraordinary acquisitive prescription[,] Appellants
have acquired ownership of the property in question since 1930 even if the
adjoining RL 8 was subsequently registered in the name of Guaranteed
Homes. x x x.
xxxx
Further, it was only in 1978 that Guaranteed Homes was able to have RL 8
registered in its name, which is almost fifty years from the time PEDRO
VITALEZ occupied the adjoining accreted property in 1930. x x x.
xxxx
We likewise note the continuous payment of real property taxes of
Appellants which bolster their right over the subject property. x x x.
xxxx
In sum, We are fully convinced and so hold that the Appellants [have] amply
proven their right over the property in question.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.
The challenged Order of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.22
On June 8, 2007, the appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition raising the following assignment of
errors:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A RIGHT IN ESSE IS IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;]
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT LOT IS AVAILABLE FOR ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE[;] AND
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE
COMPLAINT … FILED BY RESPONDENTS IN THE LOWER COURT.23
The issues may be narrowed down into two (2): procedurally, whether the
State is an indispensable party to respondents’ action for prohibitory
injunction; and substantively, whether the character of respondents’
possession and occupation of the subject property entitles them to avail of
the relief of prohibitory injunction.
The petition is without merit.
An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or command the
performance of an act.24 It is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction, which cannot exist except only as part or as an incident to an
independent action or proceeding. Moreover, in an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction may
issue.25
In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the
local government of Parañaque City from proceeding with the construction
of an access road that will traverse through a parcel of land which they claim
is owned by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the
river, is classified as part of the public domain, any land that may have
formed along its banks through time should also be considered as part of the
public domain. And respondents should have included the State as it is an
indispensable party to the action.
We do not agree.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial
deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This
being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect,26 in
relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership
over alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads:
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.27
Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits
along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the
alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it
may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the
owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens
system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.28
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by
prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has been,
there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public
domain.29 Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as
against the State.30
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion,31 the land
which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments
along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of
law.
Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is
such that a final decree would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the
court cannot proceed without their presence.32 In contrast, a necessary party
is one whose presence in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the
whole controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final decree
can be made in their absence without affecting them.33
In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city
government of Parañaque from proceeding with its implementation of the
road construction project. The State is neither a necessary nor an
indispensable party to an action where no positive act shall be required from
it or where no obligation shall be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar.
Neither would it be an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be
divested nor any of its rights infringed.
We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the
respondents over the contested land entitles them to the avails of the action.
A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right.34 A party seeking to
avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse
or one that is actual or existing.35 It should not be contingent, abstract, or
future rights, or one which may never arise.36
In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest,
Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In
1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local government of
Parañaque for the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In
1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him
to declare the property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was
also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot
No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL
8 to the local government of Parañaque.
From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
only one conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years,
neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its
corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion.
Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the
subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right
despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It
must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the
acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant
already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means
of acquiring ownership.37 A decree of registration merely confirms, but does
not confer, ownership.38
Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains
pending before the DENR, estop them from filing an injunction suit?
We answer in the negative.
Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either
through judicial proceedings or through administrative process. In the instant
case, respondents admitted that they opted to confirm their title over the
property administratively by filing an application for sales patent.
Respondents’ application for sales patent, however, should not be used to
prejudice or derogate what may be deemed as their vested right over the
subject property. The sales patent application should instead be considered
as a mere superfluity particularly since ownership over the land, which they
seek to buy from the State, is already vested upon them by virtue of
acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State does not have any authority to
convey a property through the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is no
longer a public land.39

Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such
principle is equally applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the
State.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2007
Decision, as well as the July 8, 2007 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 91350 are hereby AFFIRMED.

With costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12958             May 30, 1960

FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and LAUREANO VALERIANO, oppositors-appellees.

Acting Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Crispin V.

Bautista for appellee Director of Lands.
Benjamin H. Aquino for appellee Laureano Veleriano.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of

Rizal, dismissing his application for the registration of a parcel of land.

On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a

parcel of land (mangrove), situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with an
area of 37,877 square meters. Later, he amended his application by alleging
among others that he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion. To
the application, the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano and Domingo
Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez later withdrew his opposition. The
Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the public
domain, for the reason that neither the applicant nor his predecessor-in-
interest possessed sufficient title thereto, not having acquired it either by
composition title from the Spanish government or by possessory information
title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and that he had not
possessed the same openly, continuously and adversely under a bona
fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. In his turn, Valeriano alleged he
was holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by the Bureau of
Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and approved by the President.
It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the
applicant which he had acquired from the Government by virtue of a free
patent title in 1936. It has also been established that the parcel in question
was formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the
Manila Bay which boarders it on the southwest. Applicant Ignacio claims that
he had occupied the land since 1935, planting it with api-api trees, and that
his possession thereof had been continuous, adverse and public for a period
of twenty years until said possession was distributed by oppositor Valeriano.
On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is
foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide and, therefore,
formed part of the public domain.
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application, holding that the
parcel formed part of the public domain. In his appeal, Ignacio assigns the
following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question, altho an
accretion to the land of the applicant-appellant, does not belong to him but
forms part of the public domain.
II. Granting that the land in question forms part of the public domain, the
lower court nevertheless erred in not declaring the same to be the necessary
for any public use or purpose and in not ordering in the present registration
proceedings.
III. The lower court erred in not holding that the land in question now
belongs to the applicant-appellant by virtue of acquisitive prescription, the
said land having ceased to be of the public domain and became the private
or patrimonial property of the State.
IV. The lower court erred in not holding that the oppositor Director of Lands
is now in estoppel from claiming the land in question as a land of the public
domain.
Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion,
having been formed by gradual deposit by action of the Manila Bay, and he
cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which
provides that:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or
deposits on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present case was
caused by action of the Manila Bay.
Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are not
applicable because they refer to accretions formed by the sea, and that
Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention
untenable. A bay is a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same:
Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides
except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a
river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake. 7 C.J. 1013-
1014 (Cited in Francisco, Philippine Law of Waters and Water Rights p. 6)
Moreover, this Tribunal has some cases applied the Law of Waters on Lands
bordering Manila Bay. (See the cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil., 732,
involving a parcel of land bounded on the sides by Manila Bay, where it was
held that such land formed by the action of the sea is property of the State;
Francisco vs. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil., 505, involving a land claimed
by a private person and subject to the ebb and flow of the tides of the Manila
Bay).
Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in question formed part
of the public domain, having been gained from the sea, the trial court should
have declared the same no longer necessary for any public use or purpose,
and therefore, became disposable and available for private ownership.
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 reads thus:
ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused
by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no
longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes
of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the
coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of
the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case of Natividad
vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz., 2905, it was there held that:
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the
shore is no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for
coastguard service, the government shall declare it to be the property of the
owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We
believe that only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have
the authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so gained
by the sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, on for coast-guard service. If no such
declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms
part of the public domain. (Natividad vs. Director of Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case
of Vicente Joven y Monteverde vs. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134, (cited in
Velayo's Digest, VI. I, p. 52).
. . . is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor
indeed in a position to determine whether any public land are to be used for
the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters.
Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government,
through the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the
land in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or
for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership.
Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question through
acquisitive prescription, having possessed the same for over ten years. In
answer, suffice it to say that land of the public domain is not subject to
ordinary prescription. In the case of Insular Government vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19
Phil., 505 this Court said:
The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by
accretion, without previous permission from the proper authorities, although
the occupant may have held the same as owner for seventeen years and
constructed a wharf on the land, is illegal and is a mere detainer, inasmuch
as such land is outside of the sphere of commerce; it pertains to the national
domain; it is intended for public uses and for the benefit of those who live
nearby.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.