G.R. No.

L-48321             August 31, 1946

OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor

General Rafael Amparo for appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential

lot located in the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the
name of Oh Cho.

The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of

title to the lot, and on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of
the public domain.

Oh Cho, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880
to filing of the application for registration on January 17, 1940.

The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and
adds that the lower court, committed an error in not declaring null and void
the sale of the lot to the applicant.

Oh Cho invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be
applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public
Land Act (C.A. No. 141).

Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed
under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his
predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrease promulgated
by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information
under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not
1
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant below to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest
since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest.
(Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) Oh Cho
does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by
his first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.

As Oh Cho failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is
entitled to decree or registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).

As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the
provisions of the Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make
pronouncement in this case on the nature or classifications of the sought to
be registered.

It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the
applicant immediate predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a
decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its registration; and that
he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessor
in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been
acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's
immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the condition
precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply
for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least
since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest
failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to the
title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus
be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their
predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for
its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.

It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared
null and void. In a suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the
sale, such pronouncement would be necessary, if the court were of the
2
opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case where the vendors do
not even object to the application filed by the vendee.

Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration

dismissed, without costs.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

3
G.R. No. 150000             September 26, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
TRI-PLUS CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated September 14, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60671, which affirmed the
judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Metro Cebu in
LRC Case No. N-21 granting herein respondent's application for registration
of title to Lots Nos. 1061 and 1062 of the Cadastral Survey of Consolacion,
Cebu.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On April 30, 1997 Tri-Plus Corporation2, through its president, Euclid C. Po,
filed with the MTC of Consolacion, Metro Cebu,3 an Application for
Registration of Title over two parcels of land designated as Lots 1061 and
1062 of the cadastral survey of Consolacion, Cebu, containing an area of
3,939 and 4,796 square meters, respectively, and located at Barangay
Tayud, Consolacion, Cebu.4 In its application, Tri-Plus alleged that it is the
owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of land, including the
improvements thereon, having acquired the same through purchase; and
that it is in actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful
possession of the subject properties in the concept of an owner for more
than 30 years, including that of its predecessors-in-interest.5 The case was
docketed as LRC Case No. N-21.6

On September 4, 1997, the trial court received an Opposition to the

Application for Registration filed by the Republic of the Philippines through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on the grounds that neither the
applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question
4
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title submitted by
the applicant which consists, among others, of tax declarations and receipts
of tax payments, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of its open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept
of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the claim of ownership in
fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant may no longer be availed
of by the applicant because it failed to file an appropriate application for
registration in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 892; and that the subject parcels of land are portions of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and are not subject to
private appropriation.7

On September 19, 1997, Tri-Plus presented documentary evidence to prove

compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the law. On even date, a
Manifestation and Motion was filed by the heirs of Toribio Pepito praying
that they be given a period of 10 days within which to file their written
opposition.8 However, the oppositors failed to file their written opposition on
time. The trial court then commissioned its clerk of court to receive evidence
from the applicant and directed the former to submit a report thereon.
Accordingly, a Commissioner's Report was submitted on the proceedings
taken.9

In its Judgment dated February 26, 1998, the MTC made the following
finding and conclusion:

The totality of the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, of the

applicant clearly shows that it and its predecessors-in-interest had
been in actual, public, exclusive and continuous possession in concept
of owner of the parcels of land above-mentioned for no less than thirty
(30) years prior to the filing of the instant petition for registration of its
imperfect title. This being so, the applicant is entitled that its title be
confirmed under the provisions of the Torrens System of Registration.10

Accordingly, it disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered

declaring the applicant TRI-PLUS LAND CORPORATION the
5
 exclusive and absolute owner of Lot 1061 of the Cadastral Survey of
Consolacion, Cebu, as shown on plan Ap-07-002362 (Exhibit "J") and
described in its corresponding technical description (Exhibit "K"), and
Lot 1062 of the Cadastral Survey of Consolacion, Cebu, as shown on
plan Ap-07-002366 (Exhibit "O") and described in its corresponding
technical description (Exhibit "P").

Once this decision becomes final, let an Order for the issuance of the
decree of registration for Lots 1061 and 1062, Consolacion Cadastre,
be issued in the name of TRI-PLUS LAND CORPORATION.

SO ORDERED.11

The OSG appealed the trial court's judgment with the CA.12

Subsequently, the Land Registration Authority (LRA), through its Director on

Registration, submitted a Report dated August 6, 1998 to the MTC,
pertinent portions of which read as follows:

1. Two (2) parcels of land described as Lots 1062 and 1061, Cad. 545-
D, Consolacion Cadastre on Plan Ap-07-002366 and Ap-07-002362,
both situated in the Barangay of Tayud, Municipality of Consolacion,
Province of Cebu, are being applied for original registration of title;

2. After examining the afore-said plan discrepancy was noted in the

bearings and distances of line 3-4 and 4-5 of Lot 1061, Ap-07-002362,
being S.57 deg. 19'W 8.02m. and S.52 deg. 10'W 18.24, which do not
conform with the bearings and distances (N. 52 deg. 01'E., 18.00m)
and (N. 52 deg. 47'E., 17.71m.) along lines 12-13 and 11-12,
respectively of plan Rs-07-01-000358, lot 1508, Consolacion Cad. 545-
D, decreed in LRA (NALTDRA) Record No. N-60851.

3. That the above discrepancy was brought to the attention of the

Regional Technical Director, DENR, Land Management Services,
Region VII, Mandaue City, for verification and correction in a letter
dated 7 July 1998.

4. This Authority is not in a position to verify whether or not the parcels

of land subject of registration are already covered by land patent.13
6
On September 14, 2001, the CA rendered the presently assailed Decision
finding no reversible error in the appealed judgment, thereby, affirming the
same.14

Hence, herein petition based on the following assignments of errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE THE CASE, BECAUSE THE
IDENTITY OF THE LAND REMAINS UNCERTAIN.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO DISCHARGE THE
BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT IS DISQUALIFIED FROM
ACQUIRING LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.15

As to the first assigned error, Republic contends that the CA erred in relying
on the original survey plan approved by the Lands Management Services of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) when it
ruled that the applicant was able to duly establish the identity of Lot 1061.
This reliance, petitioner argues, is mistaken considering that the Report of
the Director on Registration of the LRA pointed to a discrepancy in the
bearings and distances of the boundaries which separate Lot 1061 from an
adjoining land, Lot 1058. This discrepancy, petitioners submit, casts doubt
on the identity of the land subject of the application for registration.
Petitioner then concludes that if there is uncertainty in the metes and
bounds of the property sought to be titled, the trial court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Hence, the proceedings

7
before the trial court, including its decision granting the application for
registration, are void.

As to the second assignment of error, republic argues that the CA erred in

holding that the applicant was able to prove that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Petitioner contends
that a mere notation appearing in the survey plans of the disputed
properties showing that the subject lands had been classified as alienable
and disposable on June 25, 1963 is not sufficient to establish the nature and
character of these lands. Petitioner asserts that there should be a positive
act on the part of the government, such as a certification from the DENR, to
prove that the said lands are indeed alienable and disposable. Petitioner
further contends that even if the subject properties were classified as
alienable and disposable on June 25, 1963, the law, nonetheless, requires
that such classification should have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Anent the last assigned error, petitioner contends that since the applicant
failed to discharge the burden of proving that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable, there is no basis for the CA to rule that these
properties are private lands.

In its Comment, respondent tri plus that it was able to prove the identity of
Lot 1061 with certainty. While it admits the discrepancy in the bearings and
distances which form the boundary between Lot 1061 and the adjoining Lot
1058, respondent contends that such discrepancy is merely technical in
nature because Lots 1058 and 1061 remain the same and that there is
neither an increase nor decrease in the area of the subject lot sought to be
titled; and that what was required by the LRA in its Report was for the
applicant to correct and adjust the bearings and distances of Lot 1061 in
order to conform to the boundaries of Lot 1058.

Respondent also argues that the notations appearing in the survey plans of
the subject properties serve as sufficient proof that these lands are alienable
and disposable. Respondent asserts that the survey plans were duly
approved by the DENR, Lands Management Services whose official acts
are presumed to be in accordance with law.

8
Lastly, respondent argues that its predecessor-in-interest's continuous,
actual, adverse and peaceful possession of the subject properties in the
concept of an owner for a period of more than 30 years, coupled with the
fact that they declared these lands in their name, gives a strong
presumption in respondent's favor that the subject properties no longer form
part of the public domain.

Parties filed their respective Memoranda.16

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

At the outset, however, the Court does not agree with petitioner's contention
in its first assigned error that respondent failed to properly identify Lot 1061
which is one of the lots sought to be titled.

Insofar as the identity of the land subject of an application for original

registration is concerned, this Court has laid down the rule, as follows:

The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly

approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original
registration of land is a mandatory requirement. The reason for this
rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not
overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a
previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be
overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. The
failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioner's application
for registration.17

However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals18 and in the

more recent cases of Spouses Recto v. Republic of the
Philippines19 and Republic of the Philippines v. Hubilla20, the Court ruled that
while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes
is the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands (now the Lands
Management Services of the DENR), blueprint copies and other evidence
could also provide sufficient identification. In the present case, respondent
submitted in evidence a blueprint copy of the Advance Plan of Lot
106121 and a Technical Description22 thereof, both of which had been duly
certified and approved by the Lands Management Services of the DENR.
The Court finds these pieces of evidence as substantial compliance with the
9
legal requirements for the proper identification of Lot 1061. The discrepancy
in the common boundary that separates Lot 1061 from Lot 1058, as
contained in the LRA Report does not cast doubt on the identity of the
subject lot. As the CA correctly held, the discrepancy is not substantial
because it does not unduly increase or affect the total area of the subject lot
and at the same time prejudice the adjoining lot owner. It is only when the
discrepancy results to an unexplained increase in the total area of the land
sought to be registered that its identity is made doubtful. Besides, only a
portion of the many boundaries of Lot 1061 has been found to bear a
discrepancy in relation to the boundary of one adjoining lot and the LRA
Report simply recommends that the Lands Management Services of the
DENR verify the reported discrepancy and make the necessary corrections,
if needed, in order to avoid duplication in the issuance of titles covering the
same parcels of land.

Petitioner's argument that, on the basis of the LRA Report, the MTC should
have dismissed respondent's application for registration for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, is without merit. The MTC could not
have possibly done this because said Report was submitted to the trial court
more than five months after the latter rendered its Decision. A copy of the
LRA Report attached to the present petition shows that it is dated August 6,
1998 while the MTC decision was rendered much earlier on February 26,
1998. In fact, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) perfected its appeal
by filing a notice of appeal of the MTC Decision on April 2, 1998, which is
also prior to the submission of the LRA report. Hence, by the time the LRA
report was submitted to the MTC, the latter has already lost jurisdiction over
the case, not on the ground cited by petitioner but because the appeal to the
CA was already perfected, vesting jurisdiction upon the appellate court.

In any case, while the subject lands were properly identified, the Court finds
that respondent failed to comply with the other legal requirements for its
application for registration to be granted.

Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a)
that the land forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under

10
a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June
12, 1945.23

In the present case, the Court finds merit in petitioner's contention that
respondent failed to prove the first requirement that the properties sought to
be titled forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain.

Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the

classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive
Department. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.24 All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State.25 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by
the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.26

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to

establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.27

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject
lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan
stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable.
However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act
or statute.28 The applicant may also secure a certification from the
Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.29 In the
case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by
the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only
to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has
nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper

11
government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are
indeed alienable and disposable.

As to the second requirement, testimonial evidence were presented to prove

that respondent's predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
subject lots in the concept of an owner for the period required by law. The
first witness was Thelma Pilapil who claims to be the daughter of
Constancia Frias from whom respondent bought Lot 1061. Pilapil testified
that her family has been in possession of Lot 1061 since her birth.30 When
her testimony was offered on October 7, 1997, she was 40 years
old.31 Deducting 40 years from 1997, it means that her family started
possession of Lot 1061 only in 1957. The second witness who was
presented was Tomas Frias from whom respondent bought Lot 1062. Frias
testified that he was 67 years old at the time that his testimony was taken on
October 7, 1997.32 He claims that he started owning the subject lot when he
was 17 years old and had been in possession of the same since
then.33 Hence, by simple arithmetic, the testimony of Frias proves that he
came to possess Lot 1062 only in 1947. While he testified that Lot 1062 was
previously owned by his father and that he inherited the property from his
parents, no evidence was presented to show that the latter indeed
previously owned the said property and that they had been in possession of
the same on or before June 12, 1945.

Moreover, other pieces of evidence presented by respondent to prove the

period of its possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest show that
the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes beginning only in
1961.34 This date may be considered as relatively recent considering that
respondent's predecessors-in-interest claim to have been in possession of
the subject properties as early as 1947. While belated declaration of a
property for taxation purposes does not necessarily negate the fact of
possession, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are,
nevertheless, good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual, or at least, constructive possession.35 In the present case,
respondent failed to explain why, despite the claim of its predecessors-in
interest that they possessed the subject properties in the concept of an
owner as early as 1947, it was only in 1961 that they started to declare the
same for purposes of taxation.
12
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent and its predecessors-in-
interest failed to prove that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the subject properties under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, as required by law.

Well-entrenched is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration

cases rests on the applicant who must show clear, positive and convincing
evidence that his alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and
duration required by law.36 In the present case, the Court finds that
respondent failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the legal
requirements that the lands sought to be titled are alienable and disposable
and that its predecessors-in-interest were already in possession of the
subject lots since 1945 or earlier.

As to the last assigned error, respondent having failed to prove that the
subject properties are alienable and disposable public lands, the Court
agrees with petitioner that there would be no basis in concluding that these
lands have already become private. The presumption remains that said
properties remain part of the inalienable public domain and, therefore, could
not become the subject of confirmation of imperfect title.

Finally, while it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the

distribution of alienable public lands as a spur to economic growth and in
line with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards
upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the
prejudice of the national patrimony.37 The Court must not, therefore, relax
the stringent safeguards relative to the registration of imperfect titles.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court

of Appeals dated September 14, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 60671
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Tri-Plus Corporation's
application for registration and issuance of title to Lots 1061 and 1062,
Consolacion Cad-545-D, in LRC Case No. N-21 filed with the Municipal Trial
Court of Consolacion, Metro Cebu, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

13
14
G.R. No. 167707              October 8, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND

NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS,
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO,
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR
OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those similarly
situated, respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775              October 8, 2008

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE

LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A
LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR
LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of

Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.

15
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition
for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which
granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest
and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white
sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine
tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in
the bone-shaped island’s three barangays.5

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

(DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay

Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named

persons.7

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued

Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands,
caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-
829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded
them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto
Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

16
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over
their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes
and paid realty taxes on them.10

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its

implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man.
Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of
private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No.
141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the
lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed
the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island
was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass
of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code,11 as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial
confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable,
whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the

following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of
parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted
with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees
had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or
less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land
they were occupying for tax purposes.12

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely
legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or
17
impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego
with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their
respective memoranda.13

The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island,
more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco
S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed
before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on

August 7, 1933.16

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-

claimants, with a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that

Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to
the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in
Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner
prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by
respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey
does not in itself constitute a title to the land.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands

titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA
Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could
not be the subject of disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private
ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the
Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in
Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as
part of the forest reserve.22

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The
Republic then appealed to the CA.

18
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby

rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the
decision of the lower court.24

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a

declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of
a forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence,

the present petition under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying
Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land
(protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation
likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the
centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form
part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo

Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested
rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of
their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also
invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building
internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.31

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation

reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither
mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land

19
Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period
entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not

have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being
public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot
be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the
executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands
of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for
a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land
classification of Boracay Island.33

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those
similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.34

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS

IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN
BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30
YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM
PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC
FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?

II.
20
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT
OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF
BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED
YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE

AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-
REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE
TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.

IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006,

VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS
PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a)
OF RA 6657.

V.

CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE

SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF
THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN
BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-

claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775)
have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The
twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to
secure title under other pertinent laws.

Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

21
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in
relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874
and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President
Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439 issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following
divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement,
mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may
be provided by law,41 giving the government great leeway for
classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural
lands may be alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified
under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine
has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.46

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.47 Thus, all lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
State as part of the inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the
State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for
private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed
of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the
favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be

22
granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of
their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.49

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and
possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The
Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands
that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain."51

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage

Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic
registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory
information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land,
under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree.54 Under
Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory
information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is
converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years
of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and
adverse,56 from the date of its inscription.57 However, possessory
information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the
Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the
State.58

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo
real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion
con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase;
and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines

under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this
law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into
three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
23
lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by
means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold
system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public
lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine
Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64

x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No.

926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act

No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established
a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute,
indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.66

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act

No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the
homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It
permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the
controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.67 Under
the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July
26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act

No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more
comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos
and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the
same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and
occupation en concepto dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26,
1894, was required.69

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No.
2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as
amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification
and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.71
24
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time
immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded
by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision
was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for possession
and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74

The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.76 Under the
decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of
their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the
decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered
lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529,
known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the
various laws relative to registration of property.78 It governs registration of
lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including
chattel mortgages.79

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is

required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court
has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact,
Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those
lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."82

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of

the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application
is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a positive act
declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the
25
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.86

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative

action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before
2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
They call for proof.87

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or
portions of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was
already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government
of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old
cases that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the
lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."90

Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These

cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or
portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which
land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether
the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on
proof presented in each case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the

Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with
26
implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.91 This was the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro
S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it
stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally

released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private
ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.

xxxx

Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.

Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine
Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision
vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so
that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending
upon the preponderance of the evidence.93

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it
was then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus
evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De

Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public domain had been
automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By
no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public
domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines,
except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and
disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and

27
worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-
entrenched Regalian doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land

registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more
specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation
of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or
administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly
cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of
Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of
the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute.

Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof
that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could
adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption.
In Ankron, this Court stated:

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General

admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one
class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has
trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that
one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof
of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals.
While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for
"agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a
question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or
mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or
the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act
No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the
land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or
mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the
rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified
as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case
must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard
for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We
28
believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge
that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands
that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary
is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration
case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof.
Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to
be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a
manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether
it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or
the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance,
under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself
what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private
interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter
case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of
proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of
the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the
"public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land.
(Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of

lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already became
private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in
Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the
President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands
into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no
longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain.97

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued
their title in 1933,98 did not present a justiciable case for determination by
the land registration court of the property’s land classification. Simply put,
there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the
Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No.
926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for
judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine
29
the property’s land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on
Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v.

Register of Deeds of Manila,100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No.
141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public
domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.103

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally

different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots
were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so,
whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an
alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from acquiring
agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether
unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
agricultural.

Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned

in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No.
2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated,
those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the
Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber,
or mineral.

Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not
create a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also
contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the
requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted
the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their
name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of

Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,107-a ruled:

30
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided
for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for
the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act
operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands
remained in the government; and that the government’s title to public land
sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between
Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of
the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are
alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an

unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064.
Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No.
705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public
domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of

the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a
public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been
the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of
which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD
No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso
facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.
31
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD
No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island.
Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the
way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local
and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort,
rather than a forest land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso

beach resorts on the island;111 that the island has already been stripped of
its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will
destroy the island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as public
forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest
or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to
large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees
and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry114 is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it
of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and

"forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain as
appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land
while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any
32
rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island,
and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been
replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial
establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to
alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for

judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not
convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants
argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978
entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation
classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants
assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole
of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the
Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in
Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and
disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural.
Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and
areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:

No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the
PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves.
(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely

recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department
pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular
recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development’s authority to declare
areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the

Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act

needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable
or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as
33
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale
behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves
and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to
be administered by the PTA – to ensure the concentrated efforts of the
public and private sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential
with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply
put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and
ecological purposes. It does not address the areas’ alienability.119

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island,
but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines,
such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental
Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto
Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan
de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay
Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be
declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is
clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of

Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private
ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the
President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who
has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands.121

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public
domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public
lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the
Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent such
classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered
open to disposition.123

34
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved
forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation
likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line
of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form
part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or

irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay
Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within
her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064
violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands.
They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705,
President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without
running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall

cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131
and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or
suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until
Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public
domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did
not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay
Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD
No. 705.
35
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically
state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were
unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land
until released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification"

of land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of
Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law.
We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section
4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there has been no previous
classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest
purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or
some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
"reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section
4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law
delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to
those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the
Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or
classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Forestry Code.127

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of

imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights
over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141,
namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-
36
interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from
June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.128

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No.
1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land.
The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying
the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.

Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on

the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must
fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and
disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present
Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is
already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law
itself.129 Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the
land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were
classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first
element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their
lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory
relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to

prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax
declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of
recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court
that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12,
1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having
been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions
of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their
continued possession and investments give them a vested right which
cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
37
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants
do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give
them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This
Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence
presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand,
private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over
their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and
considerable investment in the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and
international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of
years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the
Court commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply
the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang
batas at ito ang dapat umiral.

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible
to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA
No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the
residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments
on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean
lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders
of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their
possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for
original registration of title, such as by homestead131 or sales
patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to

acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain
requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill133 now
pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill
will become a law is for Congress to decide.
38
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step
necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not
be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the
island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer
overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its
remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress
and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their

promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and
activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our
environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by
Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public
policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have
written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the
pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development
and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital
segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by
now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a
number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees,
watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their
contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As
waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the
fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come
the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property – crops,
livestock, houses, and highways – not to mention precious human lives.
Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a
lumberman’s decalogue.135

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court

of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.

39
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

40
G.R. Nos. 171947-48             December 18, 2008

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT

OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by
DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR.,
DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA
LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA,
FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS
BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R.
OPOSA, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change,

has of late gained the attention of the international community. Media have
finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of
forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper
disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental
destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer
simply heals by itself.2 But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate
crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and
procrastinators can still be heard.

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the
nature of their respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked
to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers,
shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies
and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry
41
the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the
norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the
environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic
efficiency and commitment.

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past,
once brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot
for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying
expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and
institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.

This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned

Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them
the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila
Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the
RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had
fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This
environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from:

x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of

omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and
present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination
of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants
must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered
to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B
waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.3

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued

neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a
violation of, among others:

(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced

ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);

42
 (3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);

(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);

(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);

(8) Executive Order No. 192;

(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);

(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and

(12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be

ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted
concrete plan of action for the purpose.

The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club
followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the
Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental
Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from
different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal
coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number
(MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a
safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or
the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.4

Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System

(MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS’ efforts
to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second
Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study
43
being conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its
Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes
accumulated or washed to shore.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of

respondents. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby

rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies,
jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and
restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-
diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-
agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed,
within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their
respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and
concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the
bay.

In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate

[sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction
and increase their capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings,
provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal
of waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay,

to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic
and hazardous substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of
ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from
docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

44
 Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and
appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid
disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as
re-use or recycling of wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic

Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its
waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.

Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely

for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other

nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These
nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in
Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the
government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing
debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-
biodegradable garbage in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of

septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities
for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from
septic tanks.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people

through education the importance of preserving and protecting the
environment.

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to

protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.

No pronouncement as to damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.

The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed
before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were
eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
45
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine
Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and
five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a
petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9,
2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated
appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.

Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent
provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of
specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart
from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning
purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is
not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA Sustained the RTC

By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal

and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court’s
decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic
functions under existing laws.7

Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule
45 petition on the following ground and supporting arguments:

THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT

HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E.,
IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DECLARING THAT
SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS
SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL
COLIFORMS.

ARGUMENTS

46
 [SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE
CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT
COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL

II

THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS

NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE
COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.

The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152

under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations,
envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of
specific pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be compelled by
mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral
arguments.

Our Ruling

We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the
premises.

The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay

Can be Compelled by Mandamus

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial

duty.8 A ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor judgment."9 It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising
under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by
law."10 Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters
involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion
one way or the other.

Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain
adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves
policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency
47
concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to
make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by
undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the
exercise of discretion.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is

clear and that petitioners’ duty to comply with and act according to the clear
mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion. According to
respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for
example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which
discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents
maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to
alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is
the MMDA’s ministerial duty to attend to such services.

We agree with respondents.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties
as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties,
on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the
MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be
done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said
so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza11 in which the Court directed the City
of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027
directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from operating
their business in the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" within six months from
the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant
case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative
garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory
imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and
delineates the scope of the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include:

Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and

implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for
proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include
48
 the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related
facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs
intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)

The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid

Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria
for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the
minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in
the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and
37 of RA 9003,12 enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among
others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and
operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such
effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is
set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in
its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system
cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act
officially according to their judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is
one that "allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or
not to perform."14 Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or
not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed
for want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes

and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies
are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions
relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to
perform these duties. Consider:

(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,15 is the primary
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and
proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of
the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand,
designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its
enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water
49
quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Act’s Sec.
19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s]
its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other
pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available
methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution."

The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water

Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management
Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan
which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas.
Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:

Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government

agency responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this Act
x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the
following functions, powers and responsibilities:

a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four

(24) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the
Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or
as the need arises, said report;

b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within

twelve (12) months following the completion of the status report;

c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action

Plan within 12 months following the completion of the framework for
each designated water management area. Such action plan shall be
reviewed by the water quality management area governing board
every five (5) years or as need arises.

The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is
in the process of completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality
Management Framework.16 Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to
submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan.17 Again, like the
MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it
under RA 9275.

50
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested
that the DENR, with the assistance of and in partnership with various
government agencies and non-government organizations, has completed,
as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with
estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the
Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and
rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.

The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of
some of its phases should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to
fast track what are assigned them under existing laws.

(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction,

supervision, and control over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the
territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns
of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:

(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as

may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities
and towns comprising the System; x x x

(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over
local water districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations
for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local
water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate,
and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal
of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the
LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage
and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe
collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of
the country.19 In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to
provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.

(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code

of 1987 (EO 292),20 is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and
enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper
utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under
51
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with
local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of
establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that
fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized
and managed on a sustainable basis.21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is
charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of
water quality standards in marine waters.22 More specifically, its Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall
primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for
the development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and
aquatic resources.

(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national
government, is tasked under EO 29223 to provide integrated planning,
design, and construction services for, among others, flood control and water
resource development systems in accordance with national development
objectives and approved government plans and specifications.

In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to

perform metro-wide services relating to "flood control and sewerage
management which include the formulation and implementation of policies,
standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage
and sewerage system."

On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between

the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily
responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country,
DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood control services.
The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage
services shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and
encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages) in
violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.

(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast
Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,24 or the Marine Pollution Decree
of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and
regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the
Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance
52
with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control
Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective
implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the
law, apprehend violators who:

a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship,

vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-made structures
at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial
and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;

b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be

thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge,
or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf,
manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of
any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets
and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any
navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into
such navigable water; and

c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any

navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water,
where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable
water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or
otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed
or increase the level of pollution of such water.

(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP
Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police functions over the
Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police
functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter
acquires the capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime
Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and perform the police
functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group
shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and
regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the
Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group
53
were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and
regulations.25

(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish,
develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system
in support of trade and national development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO
513 states that the PPA has police authority within the ports administered by
it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its
purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions
of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area.
Such police authority shall include the following:

xxxx

b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of
persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the port of
watercraft.27

Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a

signatory to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,28 the Philippines, through the PPA,
must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and
terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine
ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to
prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other
ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at
ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at
ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime
Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.

(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain

adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well
as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for
the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which
would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.29

Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are
frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as
roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open
54
dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non-
biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of
open dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management
facilities without an environmental compliance certificate.

Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA
7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed "when persons or entities
occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in
coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can
dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along
the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers,
waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and
Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay,
the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and
removal of such structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in
violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the
DPWH and concerned agencies.

(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the

Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the
establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water
supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA
9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other
concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the
collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and
operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not
considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage
management system shall be employed.

In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the

Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.131 of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the
DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper
disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict
enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation

55
clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these
companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.

(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine

Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on
environmental education in its school curricula at all levels.32 Under Sec.
118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on
Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and
pursue a nationwide educational campaign to promote the development,
management, conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is
directed to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school
curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management principles.33

(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under

Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient
and sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively
achieve the country’s development objectives.34

One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the

Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall
pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the
protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and
marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among
others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control,
and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of water
resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate
economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of water
resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality
management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot
be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection,
water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a
comprehensive management program for water pollution focusing on
pollution prevention.

Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain
the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the country’s development
objectives.
56
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves
clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate
of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that
their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.

Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment

Code encompass the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific
pollution incidents?

Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water

has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its
best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such
measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to
meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the

polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his
own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies
concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up
operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged
against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject,
o, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code
(PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.

The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:

SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of

Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes pollution in or
pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing
standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any
pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water
bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use:
57
 Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are
necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same,
the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies
concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup
operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed
by the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper
administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost
incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to
such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.

As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is

more apparent than real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to
this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in
the cleanup operations.

Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment

Code concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific
pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the
twin provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g)
and (h), which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental
spills," as follows:

g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the

pollutants discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill
condition.

h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances

in water that result from accidents such as collisions and groundings.

Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely

direct the government agencies concerned to undertake containment,
removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of
the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec.
20 is limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are situations that
presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring
the corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing
the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires
"cleanup operations" to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition,
58
which means that there must have been a specific incident of either
intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as
mentioned in Sec. 62(h).

As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec.

62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal,
and cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners’
posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the
coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD
1152 may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-
day operations of businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of
pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however,
emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even
enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as
among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to
Sec. 20 of PD 1152.

To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues,

coupled with their narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has
contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming,
respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup
coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase
"cleanup operations" embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by
such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases "cleanup operations"
and "accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter
where said section is found.

Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way
state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves
to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific
pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even
in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage."
This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when
appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the
prescribed water quality standards." In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade
the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution
incident.
59
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched,
indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the
pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left
behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall
undertake the cleanup work for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion,
that they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when
there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not undertake
the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As
earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code
comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in
even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus,
cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of
RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the
happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said
with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once
valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce
a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management.
This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather
than limiting them to specific pollution incidents."35

Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the

implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact
that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is
well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general
pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with
reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152
mentions "water pollution incidents" which may be caused by polluters in the
waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water
bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the
other hand, specifically adverts to "any person who causes pollution in or
pollutes water bodies," which may refer to an individual or an establishment
that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that
the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water
pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless
polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond the specific
pollution incident level.

60
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies
concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to
apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be
amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has
been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to
contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of
setting, it behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup
operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152,
covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the
initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality
of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning
phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the
rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the
Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic
exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again
deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275,
and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the
petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on
continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and
duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its
water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as
"continuing mandamus,"36 the Court may, under extraordinary
circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its
decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to
enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River
from industrial and municipal pollution.37

The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other
unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-
Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Parañaque-
Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other
minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which
discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage,
61
into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor
responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay,
these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of
illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained
resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of
water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.38

Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures

is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code,39 which prohibits the building of
structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways.
Art. 51 reads:

The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and
lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3)
meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and
forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to
the easement of public use in the interest of recreation,
navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be
allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)

Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial

establishments standing along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other
major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated
as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly
contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and
the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-
complying industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the
necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their
industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into the
Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such
period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to
transfer their operations.

At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for
petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian
Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro
62
Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As
there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as
it is shocking. Some highlights of the report:

1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the

Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming
quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic
liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison
the surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life,
and the environment.

2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large

amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas,
which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to
sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an
understatement.

3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous

contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into
ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems and
Manila Bay.40

Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more
than ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant
violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced
below:

Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid

Waste.––No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor any
practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs
which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed
after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled
dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this
Act. (Emphasis added.)

RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of
five (5) years which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but

63
no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed
standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.

In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA

9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and
other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste,
and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal
facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system
that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27
of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater
pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized
transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs.
4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or
machine of substances to the aquatic environment including
"dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum
or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances
[and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid
substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made
structure."

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to

emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments
and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official
duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a
need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks,
some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective
offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a

historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the
day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the
plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead,
daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated,
with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their
minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State,
through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection
of the Manila Bay.

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The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners
must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work
before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must
reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot
shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in
cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by
petitioners’ hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a
specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the
cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.

RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform

and improve waste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution
for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.41 Even
assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding
petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing
them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to
keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.
Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision

of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September
13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but
with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening
events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed

defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve
Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B
sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative

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 Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.

In particular:

(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary

agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and
proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19
of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency
responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to
fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for
the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the
earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with
concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful
implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its
indicated completion schedules.

(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of

1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991,42 the DILG, in
exercising the President’s power of general supervision and its duty to
promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under
Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs
in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to
inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along
the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction,
such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and
other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the
Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have
wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by
existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these
LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes
to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent
industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these
rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or
imposition of fines and other sanctions.
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(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is directed to provide,
install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water
treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the
earliest possible time.

(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and
in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and
maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe
collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest
possible time.

(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered

to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to
assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the
fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.

(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime
Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each
other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing
laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the International

Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to
immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of
solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay
waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.

(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and
projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in
coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group,
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other
agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and
other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other
applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila.
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The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood
control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan,
Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned
government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and
other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan)
Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De
Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge
wastewater into the Manila Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a

sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year
from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and
in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary
landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension
and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the
respective penal provisions of RA 9003,47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean
Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.

(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA

9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all
licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the
treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic
tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a
reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of
cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.

(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of

RA 9003,49 the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste
management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school
curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and,
through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward
achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila
Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.

(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the

General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the
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expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water
quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development objective to
attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection,
preservation, and revival of our marine waters.

(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA,

DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS,
LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall,
from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly
progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this
Decision.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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