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Wellcome
History Issue 38
Africa feature Africa feature
Wellcome
History Issue 38
GUILLAUmE LACHENAL
Ater World War II, a new strategy to ghtsleeping sickness was launched. Mobilemedical teams in French and Belgian coloniesbegan to use prophylactic injections opentamidine (registered as Pentamidineand Lomidine) in mass campaigns.
‘Lomidinisation’ was the name given to the newpreventative method, which – it was hoped – wouldreplace the previous strategy, based on the screeningand treatment of infected people. During the 1950s,more than 10 million injections of Lomidine weregiven to the populations of endemic foci in West andCentral Africa. A quick eradication of trypanosomiasiswas proudly announced by colonial authorities.No more than 30 years later, public health specialistsheld a radically different view. Sleeping sickness,though contained in most African countries, wasclearly not eradicated. Moreover, it became clearthat the extensive use of preventative injectionsof Lomidine had been based on false premises.From the mid-1970s, laboratory experimentsdemonstrated that Lomidine hardly gave protectionto individuals for more than a few days. The Frenchmilitary doctor René Labusquière, a specialist intropical medicine, expressed a consensus whenstating in 1974 that Lomidine injections to healthyindividuals were “useless, dangerous, and thereforeuselessly dangerous”. From then on, ofcial historiesof colonial medicine chose to forget this episodeof public health. Once celebrated as a biomedicalrevolution, sleeping sickness chemoprophylaxiswas actively erased from medical memories. Sucha reversal is an intriguing case; it offers an occasionto investigate the role of indecisiveness and faith inthe history of a modern public health technology.Lomidine, like the other members of the diamidinefamily, is an international drug. Synthesised in 1938, itwas tested before the War by British chemotherapistsas a cure for various parasitic diseases. Its testing inAfrica began during the War, in the outpost of theLiverpool School of Tropical Medicine in Freetown,Sierra Leone. Thanks to informal contacts betweeneld medical services, it was transmitted to French andBelgian colonial doctors, who included Lomidine intheir standard protocol to treat trypanosomiasis. In1942, Belgian doctors at the Princess Astrid Institute inLeopoldville (now Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) tested its preventative effects. The injectionof a single dose of Lomidine to the entire populationof a village drastically reduced the prevalence andincidence of sleeping sickness in the following months,compared with untreated villages. Lomidine, theyconcluded, was a very effective chemoprophylaxis.From 1945, large-scale trials of Lomidinechemoprophylaxis were run in French EquatorialAfrica, French West Africa, Cameroon, Nigeria, SierraLeone, Angola and Portuguese Guinea. In 1948, theAfrican Conference on Tsetse Flies and Trypanosomiasisproposed a standard protocol and recommendedits implementation in all areas contaminated with
Trypanosoma gambiense
. Lomidine, produced by theFrench rm Specia and by its British subsidiary May &Baker, added its voice to the optimism of the times.Lomidinisation appeared as an antidote to many of the problems faced by colonial medical services in thepostwar years. The liberalisation of colonial regimes,forced by the political mobilisation of colonised peoplesand by international pressures, had an immediate side-effect: populations increasingly avoided mass medicalcampaigns. Unable to respond to that ‘epidemic of indiscipline’ with compulsion and coercion, colonialdoctors had difculties implementing medical surveys.In that context, chemoprophylaxis offered newperspectives. Though it was particularly demanding forpatients and medical teams – the whole of a concernedpopulation had to be given intra-muscular injections– it was also promising: Lomidinisation could bethe last assault against sleeping sickness. Instead of lifelong treatment of trypanosome carriers and costlyscreening campaigns, Lomidinisation was an intenseand ambitious effort. Put simply, eradication wasworth a renewed burst of policing. In Cameroon, forexample, the beginning of Lomidinisation coincidedwith new public health legislation (1948), makingcompulsory the presentation to medical surveys andthe treatment and segregation of contagious subjects.Between 1948 and 1955, Lomidinisation was massivelyapplied in French colonies and Belgian Congo.Mobile teams, composed of local male nurses headedby colonial doctors and assisted by secretaries andpolicemen, were organised on the classic modelof screening–treatment teams. The injection of Lomidine to every healthy subject was added to theother tasks, which included the examination of theblood of the entire population and the treatmentof parasite carriers. The operations had to befurther rationalised and Taylorised, since the intra-muscular Lomidine injection was the ‘bottleneck’in the ‘production line’. A particular emphasis wasput on the injection rate: one every minute was anachievable goal. Campaigns reached remote areas,beneting from the progress of transportation androad infrastructure at that time. Intensity peakedin 1954, with more than 1 million people injectedin French Africa. Results were “prodigious”. Casesbecame rarer and rarer. Infection indexes dropped“vertically”, and ofcial reports celebrated “one of the greatest sanitary victories of our civilisation”.Nevertheless, the success of Lomidinisation appearedfragile from the outset. Lomidinisation proved veryeffective at combating severe epidemics; at the sametime, its efcacy and safety appeared very uncertainwhen considered at the individual scale. Some subjectswho had received Lomidine were found infected thefollowing year. Experts had radical explanations: almostcertainly, they proposed, these subjects had managedto escape from the medical team between theirregistration and their effective injection. Individualindiscipline explained individual failures. On top of this, Lomidine caused worrying side-effects: it inducedhypoglycaemia and hypotension, which caused nauseaand collapse; the injection itself was irritating andcaused pain and oedema; the fact that injections weregiven serially to several hundred people increased therisk of error and contamination, and complicated thesurveillance. But all of these practical problems hardlychallenged the trust in the method: according tocolonial doctors, the cause of most accidents was theindiscipline of Africans, in the form of “lazy nurses”or “malevolent villagers”. Strikingly, British colonialdoctors refused to use Lomidinisation on a large scale.They limited their trials to small communities withintense epidemics, such as mine employees in NorthernNigeria. Classically preferring the ght against tsetseies, British colonial doctors considered Lomidinisationtoo costly and too unpopular, and also dangerous.Moreover, Lomidine prevention had no effect on theepidemics caused by
Trypanosoma rhodesiense
, theparasite causing sleeping sickness in British East Africa.Lomidine’s success as a chemoprophylaxis hadbeen tested at the individual scale only once. Theexperiment, conducted by Belgian doctors inLeopoldville during the War, submitted two Congolesenatives injected with Lomidine to daily bites of tsetse ies. Trypanosomes were found in their bloodonly nine months later, which was taken as a proof of the preventative power of Lomidine. Withoutany control subjects, the trial design was very weak,as British researchers claimed at the time. But thesubsequent success of the community-scale trialsclosed the controversy: the effectiveness of preventativeLomidine was considered to be demonstrated. Fromthis crucial experimentation to the assessment of the efcacy of mass campaigns, the communityremained the only scale on which to evaluate therationale of Lomidinisation. There was one exception:Europeans were systematically excluded fromLomidinisation. It was deemed inefcient and toorisky in their case, notably because it could mask theearly development of the disease and complicate itstreatment. Meanwhile, Africans were compulsorilysubmitted to Lomidinisation, even in the absence of any epidemic menace, for “the health of their race”and for the sake of eradication. The application of Lomidinisation thus relied on – and reactivated –the racialisation of colonial medical thinking.
According to colonial doctors,the cause o most accidentswas the indiscipline o Aricans,in the orm o “lazy nurses”or “malevolent villagers”
Several factors contributed to the abandonment of Lomidinisation during the 1960s: the dismantling of colonial medical services, the disappearance of sleepingsickness in most African countries, and a dramatic seriesof accidents. Contaminated Lomidine injections causedepidemics of gaseous gangrene on several occasionsin Gabon, Cameroon and Chad, affecting morethan 500 people and causing more than 50 deaths. Justied by the absence of recent sleeping sicknesscases and signicance of the quest for eradication, itwas a high price to pay for the affected communities.
Dr Guillaume Lachenal
is a postdoctoral researcherin Arican history at the Centre d’Etudes des Mondes Aricains, CNRS, Paris. His doctoral thesis at theUniversity o Paris 7 dealt with the history o biomedicineand decolonisation in Cameroon. He now works onthe history o colonial and post-colonial medicine in theFrench-Arican world (
E
guillaume.lachenal@ivry.cnrs.r).
Chemoprophylaxis against sleepingsickness in late colonial Arica
Right:
Blood sampling ortrypanosomiasis inCameroon, 1951.
© Inocam
Above:
Microscopistsexamining bloodsamples inCameroon, 1951.
© Inocam
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