GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM EMERGENCY SERVICES RESPONSE CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS

PRELIMINARY REPORT

International Association of Fire Fighters 1750 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20006

COVENTRY FIRE DISTRICTS

TOWN OF COVENTRY, RHODE ISLAND

OCTOBER 29, 2013

TABLE OF CONTENTS
________________________________________________________ I Executive Summary.5 II Introduction9 III Fire Department Operations11 IV Staffing and Deployment Analysis.31 V Central Coventry Liquidation - Response Capability Analysis...49 VI Conclusions63 VII Summary...65 VIII Methodology Appendix...67

Executive Summary
This report summarizes the results of a station location, staffing, and emergency vehicle travel time analysis for the Coventry Fire Districts including Central Coventry, Coventry-Anthony, Hopkins Hill, and Western Coventry at the request of IAFF Local 3372. Furthermore, this computer-based analytical study examines predicted travel times and geographic coverage areas for emergency response units deployed from existing fire station locations in the Coventry Fire District response jurisdiction under existing and previous staffing and deployment configurations and predicted travel times and geographic coverage areas for emergency response units pursuant to liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.

National Performance Standards

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) produced NFPA 1710 Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments. NFPA 1710 is the consensus standard for career firefighter deployment, including requirements for fire department arrival time, staffing levels, and fireground responsibilities.1 Key Sections included in the 1710 Standard are: 5.2.3.1 & 5.2.3.1.1 o Fire companies, whose primary functions are to pump and deliver water and perform basic firefighting at fires, including search and rescue shall be staffed with a minimum of four on-duty personnel. 5.2.3.2 and 5.2.3.2.1 o Fire companies whose primary functions are to perform the variety of services associated with Ladder work, such as forcible entry, ventilation, search and rescue, aerial operations for water delivery and rescue, utility control, illumination, overhaul and salvage work shall be staffed with a minimum of four on-duty personnel. 5.2.4.1.1 o The fire departments fire suppression resources shall be deployed to provide for the arrival of an engine company within a 240-second travel time to 90 percent of the incidents. 5.2.4.2.1 o The fire department shall have the capability to deploy an initial full alarm assignment within a 480-second travel time to 90 percent of the incidents.

NFPA 1710, 2010

5.2.4.2.2 o The initial full alarm assignment to a structure fire in a typical 2000 ft2 twostory single-family dwelling without basement and with no exposures shall provide for the following. Assignment Incident command Uninterrupted Water supply Water flow from two handlines Support for hand lines Victim search and rescue team Ventilation team Aerial operator Initial Rapid Intervention Crew (IRIC) Required minimum personnel for full alarm Required Personnel 1 Individual 1 Pump Operator 4 Individuals (2 for each line) 2 Individuals (1 for each line) 2 Individuals 2 Individuals 1 Individual 2 Individuals 14 firefighters & 1 scene commander

Key Findings
The Coventry Fire Districts are not currently in compliance with performance objectives in NFPA Standard 1710. Current non-compliance will be worsened in the event of liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. This lack of compliance with industry standard performance objectives will increase risk for citizens and visitors of Coventry. These findings are based on the following facts. 1) Based on this geographic information system assessment of the areas that are assumed to be covered by CCFD a good measure of CCFD assigned area roads are not currently serviced within safe and effective time frames as illustrated in this report. In fact, for roads that can be identified as the sole responsibility of CCFD to protect, on only a few roads can citizens expect the arrival of 12 or more firefighters pre-flashover, and on no roads can citizens expect the arrival of 15 or more firefighters within 8 minutes, considered to be the standard for safe, effective, and efficient operations at small residential structure fires. Any reduction of CCFD resources, especially on-duty and immediately available firefighters, will dramatically worsen performance. This increases 6

the risk of death or injury due to fire for nearly 50% of all citizens in Coventry as well as significantly increases the risk of significant property loss for approximately half of the housing units across the entire town of Coventry. Liquidation of CCFD resources would clearly open the population, the housing they live in, and the businesses where they work to unprecedented risk of property loss and injury. 2) Fire companies are not uniformly staffed in companies of 4 firefighters. 3) The existing response resources provided by the four fire districts do not provide for the prompt arrival of any apparatus or personnel within 4-minutes of travel time in most areas of the Town. 4) The existing response resources provided by the four fire districts do not provide for the effective assembly of apparatus and personnel at the scene of a small structure fire within 8-minutes in most areas of the Town. 5) Currently twelve is likely the maximum firefighting force that can be assembled within the Town of Coventry within the 8-minute response time parameter, if automatic mutual aid responds. This falls short of NFPA 1710 performance objectives that indicate that fifteen firefighters are needed to initiate safe and effective operations at a fire occurring in a typical 2,000 sq. ft. single family dwelling and twenty-six firefighters are needed to initiate safe and effective operations at a fire occurring in a high hazard occupancy building. In the event of liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District six is likely the maximum firefighting force that can be assembled within the 8-minute response time parameter, and only when automatic mutual aid responds. Without automatic aid response there will be no firefighting or rescue capability in the Central Coventry Fire District post-liquidation, at all. 6) Any further reduction in resources by any of the four fire districts significantly deteriorates response and increases risk to firefighters and the citizens of Coventry.

Introduction
The International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) was contacted by the Central Coventry Fire Fighters, IAFF Local 3372 to perform a Geographic Information System (GIS) analysis of the response capability of the Coventry Fire Districts. Local 3372 requested that the GIS study evaluate the current, previous and liquidation deployment models against both National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) industry standards and Federal Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) regulations. The procedures involved in the evaluation included generating GIS maps and explanations of the results. The steps included in the evaluation are listed below. 1) GIS analysis of planned staffing and deployment configurations. 2) Statistical analysis of fire department response capabilities pre and post personnel and mobile resource deployment changes.

Scope and Objectives

This report provides the results of the emergency response system evaluation and the GIS assessment of the Coventry Fire Districts response capabilies. The report refers both to the current performance of the department and to their staffing and deployment practices. Items specifically covered in this report include the following. Fire District response capabilities and compliance with industry standards Staffing configurations and safe work practices Strengths and weaknesses of the Fire Districts

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Fire Department Operations

The business of providing emergency services has always been labor intensive, and remains so today. Although new technology has improved firefighting equipment and protective gear, and has led to advances in modern medicine, it is the firefighters who still perform the time-critical tasks necessary to contain and extinguish fires, rescue trapped occupants from a burning structure, and provide emergency medical and rescue services. In less than 30 seconds a small flame can burn out of control and become a major fire. During fire growth, the temperature of a fire rises to between 1,000 and 1,200 F. It is generally accepted in the fire service that for a medium growth rate fire2, flashover- the very rapid spreading of the fire due to super heating of room contents and other combustibles- occurs in less than 10 minutes. Allowing time for discovery of the fire, a call to 911, and dispatch of emergency responders, flashover is likely to occur within 8 minutes of firefighter dispatch. It is also worth noting that flashover may occur more quickly depending on newer building construction materials and room contents that act as fuel. At the point of flashover, the odds of survival for unprotected individuals inside the structure are virtually non-existent. The rapid response of an appropriate number of firefighters is therefore essential to initiating effective fire suppression and rescue operations that seek to minimize fire spread and maximize the odds of preserving both life and property. Fire Growth, Flashover, and the Importance of a Rapid Response to a Fire in a Residential Structure: The Incipient Phase The first stage of any fire is the incipient stage. When heat is applied to a combustible material, the heat oxidizes the materials surface into combustible gases. The oxidation process is exothermic, meaning that the oxidation process itself produces heat. The heat from oxidation raises the temperature of surrounding materials, which increases the rate of oxidation and begins a chemical chain reaction of heat release and burning. A fire can progress from the incipient phase immediately or slowly, depending upon the fuel, nearby combustibles, and the availability of oxygen in the surrounding air.

As defined in the Handbook of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers, a fast fire grows exponentially to 1.0 MWin 150 seconds. A medium fire grows exponentially to 1 MWin 300 seconds. A slow fire grows exponentially to 1 MWin 600 seconds. A 1 MWfire can be thought-of as a typical upholstered chair burning at its peak. A large sofa might be 2 to 3 MWs.

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The Free Burning Phase The second stage of fire growth is the free or open burning stage. When the temperature of a fire gets high enough, visible flames can be seen. The visible burning at this stage is still limited to the immediate area of origin. The combustible process continues to release more heat, which heats nearby objects to their ignition temperature, and they begin burning. In a wild-land fire the surrounding growth will ignite and the flames will spread, quickly if wind and dry growth are present. A structure fire is different, because the gaseous products of combustion, most of which are flammable and lighter than air, rise and are contained in the upper levels of the structure. When this occurs, the structure fire is at a critical point: either the fire has insufficient oxygen available to burn and it progresses back to the incipient stage, or it has sufficient oxygen available to move on to the next stage.

FIGURE 1: FIRE GROWTH IN A CONFINED SPACE3 When an object in a room starts to burn (such as the armchair in Figure 1), it burns in much the same way as it would in an open area. After a short period of time, however, confinement begins to influence fire development. The smoke produced by the burning object rises to form a hot gas layer below the ceiling; this layer heats the ceiling and upper walls of the room. Thermal radiation from the hot layer, ceiling, and upper walls begins to heat all objects in the lower part of the room and may augment both the rate of burning of the original object and the rate of flame spread over its surface. At this point, the fire may go out, for example, if the first object completely burns before another begins, or if sufficient oxygen cannot get into the room to keep the object burning. Sometimes, however, the heating of the other combustibles in the room continues to the point where they
3

Image courtesy of University of California at Davis Fire Department

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reach their ignition temperatures more or less simultaneously. If this occurs, flames suddenly sweep across the entire room, involving all combustibles. This transition from the burning of one or two objects to full room involvement is referred to as flashover. 4 Flashover Flashover, when it occurs, is the most significant event during a structure fire. As combustible gases are produced by the two previous stages they are not entirely consumed and are therefore available fuels. These available fuels rise and form a superheated gas layer at the ceiling that continues to increase, until it begins to bank down to the floor, heating all combustible objects regardless of their proximity to the burning object. In a typical structure fire, the gas layer at the ceiling can quickly reach temperatures of 1,500 degrees Fahrenheit. With enough existing oxygen at the floor level, flashover occurs, burning everything in the room at once. The instantaneous eruption into flame generates a tremendous amount of heat, smoke, and pressure. The pressure has enough force to push beyond the room of origin and through doors and windows. Usually at the time of flashover, windows in the room will break, allowing for the entry of fresh air. The introduction of fresh air serves to further fuel the growth of the fire by increasing the fires temperature and spreading the fire beyond the room of origin.

TIMELINE OF A FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO A STRUCTURE FIRE

8 minutes

Unknown Unknown

1 minute elapsed

2 minutes elapsed

3 minutes elapsed

7 minutes elapsed

8 minutes elapsed
Access, Rescue, Ventilate and Suppress

Ignition of Fire

Discovery Notification of Emergency Response System

Dispatch of Emergency Units

Fire Department Turnout

Fire Department Departure

Fire Department Arrival at the Incident Scene FLASHOVER

Overhaul Scene

FIGURE 2: FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TIMELINE

J.R. Mehaffey, Ph.D., Flammability of Building Materials and Fire Growth, Institute for Research in Construction (1987)

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Based on the dynamics of fire behavior in an unprotected structure fire, any decrease in emergency unit response capabilities will correlate directly with an increase in expected life, property, and economic loss. Fire Growth and the Importance of a Rapid Response to Fire in High-Rise/High Hazard Structures: Fires in high-rise buildings pose unique and significant risks to firefighters operating on the fireground and are some of the most difficult fires to control. The logistics of a high-rise firefighting operation must not be underestimated. Even under ideal conditions, successfully fighting a fire requires large numbers of personnel and supplies. Physical demands on firefighters due the buildings sheer size requires regular rotation of personnel out of the fire area for rest and rehabilitation.5 High-rise firefighting operations are considered high-hazard scenarios because of the potential for extremely large fires and the potentially large number of building occupants who may be exposed to the resulting heat and smoke. Fires that are not contained by sprinklers or other fire protection measures may grow to consume large portions of available floor area due to the significant time that it takes for firefighters to reach and suppress the fire, as well as the large quantities of fuel load typical of modern office spaces. Additionally, high-rise buildings may have large floor areas and many floors at or above the fire that need to be searched for possible victims or occupants requiring assistance. Searching the fire floor is typically conducted in high heat and low visibility conditions due to the proximity of the fire. The remaining floors above the fire can take substantial resources and time to fully search. Together, the tasks and hazards typical of the high-rise fireground combine to form a substantial operational challenge typical of the high-hazard class of response scenarios.6 The conclusions of the recently released NIST study on the high-rise fireground can be summarized in three principal parts. First, when responding to a medium growth rate fire, 3person crews ascending to the fire floor confronted an environment where the fire had released 60% more heat energy than the fire encountered by the 6-person crews doing the same work. Unfortunately, larger fires expose firefighters to greater risks and are more challenging to suppress. Second, larger fires produce more risk exposure for building occupants. In general, occupants being rescued by smaller crew sizes and by crews that used the stairs rather than the elevators were exposed to a significantly greater dose of toxins from the fire. While the exact risk exposure for an occupant will depend on the fire growth rate, their proximity to the fire, and the
5

National Fire Protection Association, Warehouse Operations, Fire Protection Handbook, 18th ed. (Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1997) 9-114 6 Averill, J., et. al., NIST Report on High-Rise Fireground Experiments, April 2013.

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floor on which the fire is located, it is clear that on-scene deployment decisions can have a dramatic impact in determining the fate of building occupants. Third, the study confirmed that a properly engineered and operational fire sprinkler system drastically reduces the risk exposure for both the building occupants and the firefighters. While this has been well understood for many years and most new high-rise buildings are constructed with fire sprinkler protection, NFPA estimates that 41 percent of U.S. high-rise office buildings, 45 percent of high-rise hotels, and 54 percent of high-rise apartment buildings are not equipped with sprinklers. Moreover, sprinkler systems fail in about one in 14 fires. Thus, fire departments should be prepared to manage the risks associated with unsprinklered high-rise building fires. Modern warehouses and storage occupancies are also subject to rapidly developing fires of great intensity because complex configurations of storage are conducive to rapid fire spread, presenting numerous obstacles to fire suppression efforts. Additionally, windows with iron shutters- or buildings with no windows at all, hamper a fire departments efforts to gain access to the building. If passageways are impassable, the fire can be reached only by streams operating through windows, and the opening of shutters may be a time-consuming operation.7, 8 The Importance of Adequate Staffing to Conduct Safe and Effective Fire Suppression and Rescue Operations: Staffing deficiencies on primary fire suppression apparatus also negatively affect the ability of the fire department to safely and effectively mitigate emergencies and therefore correlate directly with higher risks and increased losses. Continued fire growth, beyond the time of firefighter on scene arrival is directly linked to the time it takes to initiate fire suppression operations. As indicated in Table 1, responding companies staffed with four firefighters are capable of initiating critical fire ground operational tasks more efficiently than those with crew sizes below industry standards.

7 8

Fire Chiefs Handbook, 4th ed., Advanced Fire Fighting, (Saddle Brook, N.J., 1987) 498. National Fire Protection Association, Warehouse Operations, Fire Protection Handbook, 18th ed. (Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1997) 9-110

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Engine Company Duties

Ladder Company Duties

Fireground Tasks
4 Firefighters 3 Firefighters 2 Firefighters

Advanc % Water e Attack Change on Fire Line

0:03:27 0:03:56 12% Less Efficient 29% Less Efficient 0:08:41 0:09:15

% Chang e

Primar y Search
0:08:47

% Chang e

Ventin g Time
0:04:42

% Change

6% Less Efficient 15% Less Efficient

0:09:10

4% Less Efficient 28% Less Efficient

0:07:01

32% Less Efficient 38% Less Efficient

0:04:53

0:10:16

0:12:16

0:07:36

TABLE 1: IMPACT OF CREW SIZE ON A LOW-HAZARD RESIDENTIAL FIRE9 First-arriving companies staffed with four firefighters are more efficient in all aspects of initial fire suppression and search and rescue operations compared to two-or three-person companies. There is a significant increase in time for all the tasks if a company arrives on scene staffed with only three firefighters compared to four firefighters. According to the NIST Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments, four-person crews are able to complete time critical fireground tasks 5.1 minutes (nearly 25%) faster than three-person crews. The increase in time to task completion corresponds with an increase in risk to both firefighters and trapped occupants. With four-person crews, the effectiveness of first-arriving engine company interior attack operations increases by 12% to 29% efficiency compared to three- and two-person crews respectively. The efficacy of ladder company search and rescue operations also increases by 4% and 28% with four-person crews compared to three and two person crews. Moreover, with a four-person company, because the first-in unit is staffed with a sufficient number of personnel to accomplish its assigned duties, the second-in company does not need to support first-in company operations and is therefore capable of performing critical second-in company duties. Insufficient numbers of emergency response units or inadequate staffing levels on those units exposes civilians and firefighters to increased risk, further drains already limited fire department resources, and stresses the emergency response system by requiring additional apparatus to respond from further distances. Failing to assemble sufficient resources on the scene of a fire in time to stop the spread and extinguish the fire, conduct a search, and rescue any trapped occupants, puts responding firefighters and occupants in a dangerous environment with exponential risk escalation such that it is difficult to catch up and mitigate the event to a positive outcome.
9

Derived from NIST Report on Residential Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al., 2010.

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A prime objective of fire service agencies is to maintain enough strategically located personnel and equipment so that the minimum acceptable response force can reach a reasonable number of fire scenes before flashover is likely.10 Two of the most important elements in limiting fire spread are the quick arrival of sufficient numbers of personnel and equipment to attack and extinguish the fire as close to the point of origin as possible, as well as rescue any trapped occupants and care for the injured. Rapid and aggressive interior attack of structure fires, as close as possible to the point of origin, can reduce human and property losses. Sub-optimal staffing of arriving units may delay such an attack, thus allowing the fire to progress to more dangerous conditions for firefighters and civilians. If the arriving units have adequate resources to handle the situation, then they will fight the fire aggressively and offensively. They will attack the problem head-on and, following department standards, will accomplish their objectives efficiently, effectively, and safely. If they do not have adequate resources to aggressively handle the situation, then they will have to fight the fire in a defensive mode of attack. This mode will continue until enough resources can be massed to then change to an aggressive, offensive attack.11 NFPA 1500 and 1710 both recommend that a minimum acceptable fire company staffing level should be four members responding on or arriving with each engine and each ladder company responding to any type of fire. Recall that at the scene of an emergency, the driver/operator of the engine must remain with the apparatus to operate the pump. Likewise, the driver/operator of the Ladder must remain with the apparatus to safely operate the aerial device. Such activities, which help to ensure the safe and effective delivery of fire suppression and rescue services, leave a crew of only two firefighters from an engine company and two firefighters from a ladder company to support the attack or complete search and rescue activities. As noted previously, due to the demands of fireground activities which reduce the effective firefighting force deploying from each company from four to three, a fire attack initiated by a single fire company is not capable of effecting a safe and effective fire suppression and/or rescue operation in compliance with 2 In/2 Out policies until a second company arrives with sufficient personnel to support the fire attack and/or rescue operation, and to assist the first company in the event of an unexpected emergency. 12 Industry studies have confirmed that four firefighters are capable of performing the rescue of potential victims 80% faster than a crew of three firefighters.13

10

University of California at Davis Fire Department website; site visited June 7, 2004. < http://fire.ucdavis.edu/ucdfire/UCDFDoperations.htm > 11 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, High-Rise Apartment Fire Claims the Life of One Career Fire Fighter (Captain) and Injures Another Career Fire Fighter (Captain) Texas, 13 October 2001 12 A four-person fire company may initiate emergency search and rescue operations at the order of the incident commander if there is a reasonable and immediate threat to life. 13 McManis Associates and John T. OHagan & Associates, Dallas Fire Department Staffing Level Study, (June 1984); pp. 1-2 and II-1 through II-7; Richard C. Morrison, Manning Levels for Engine and Ladder Companies in Small Fire Departments, (1990)

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The Importance of Crew Size to Overall Scene Time: Studies have shown that the more personnel that arrive on Engine and Ladder companies to the scene of a fire, the less time it takes to do all aspects of fire suppression and search and rescue. As units arriving with more firefighters increases, the overall time on scene of the emergency decreases. In other words, the more firefighters available to respond and arrive early to a structure fire, the less time it takes to extinguish the fire and perform search and rescue activities, thus reducing the risk of injury and death to both firefighters and trapped occupants and reducing the economic loss to the property.

TABLE 2: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CREW SIZE AND SCENE TIME 14 As Table 2 shows, units that arrive with only two firefighters on an engine or truck are on the scene of a fire almost 7 minutes longer than units that arrive with four firefighters on each crew. Responding units arriving with only 3 firefighters on an apparatus are on the scene of a fire 5 to 6 minutes longer than units that arrive with four firefighters on each apparatus. In addition to crew size, the time between the arriving crews matters to overall effectiveness and on scene time. In the NIST study on low hazard residential fireground, close stagger was defined as a 1-minute time difference in the arrival of each responding company. Far stagger was defined as a 2minute time difference in the arrival of each responding company.15 16 The results show a consistent pattern of units arriving with four firefighters in a close stagger or far stagger will decrease the overall time at the scene of the emergency compared to units that arrive with two or three firefighters and are more efficient in fire suppression.

14 15

NIST Report of Residential Fireground Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al., 2010 NIST Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al., 2010, pg. 24 16 One minute and two minute arrival stagger times were determined from analysis of deployment data from more than 300 U.S. fire departments responding to a survey from fire department operations conducted by the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the International Association of Firefighters.

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The Importance of a Rapid Response in Initiating Safe and Effective Fire Suppression and Rescue Operations: Any delay in the initiation of fire suppression and rescue operations translates directly into a proportional increase in expected property, life, and economic losses (reference The Relationship between Fire Extension and Fire Loss, Table 4, p. 24). It warrants emphasizing that if a structure has no automatic suppression or detection system, a more advanced fire may exist by the time the fire department is notified of the emergency and is able to respond. Fires of an extended duration weaken structural members, compromising the structural integrity of a building and forcing operations to shift from an offensive to defensive mode.17 As with inadequate staffing this type of operation will continue until enough resources can be amassed to then change to an aggressive, offensive attack. Typical Initial Attack Response Capabilities Assuming Interior Attack and Operations Command Capabilities for Differing Fire Hazard Environments: High-Hazard Environments Type of Occupancy Schools Hospitals Nursing Homes Explosives Plants Refineries High-Rise Buildings Other high life hazard or large fire potential occupancies. Response Capability 4 Engines / Staffed with 5 firefighters 2 Ladder Trucks/ staffed with 5 firefighters (or combination apparatus with equivalent capabilities.) 2 Chief Officers Other Specialized Apparatus as may be needed to cope with the combustible involved. Personnel Resources 30 Firefighters 2 Chief Officers Extra staffing of units first due to high-hazard occupancies is advised.
17

According to the NFPA, its important to realize that every 250 GPM stream applied to the building can add up to one ton per minute to the load the weakened structure is carrying.

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 One or more safety officers Rapid intervention team(s) is also necessary. Medium-Hazard Environments Type of Occupancy Apartments Offices Mercantile and Industrial not normally requiring extensive rescue or fire-fighting forces. Response Capability 3 Engines/ Staffed with 4 or 5 firefighters 1 Ladder Truck/ Staffed with 4 or 5 firefighters (or combination apparatus with equivalent capabilities.) 1 Chief Officer Other Specialized Apparatus as may be needed or available. Personnel 16 20 Firefighters 1 Chief Officer Safety Officer Rapid Intervention Team

Low-Hazard Environment Type of Occupancy One-, two-, or three-family dwellings Scattered Small Business Scattered Small Industrial Occupancies Response Capability 3 Engines/ Staffed with minimum of 4 firefighters 1 Ladder Truck/ staffed with minimum of 4 firefighters (or combination apparatus with equivalent capabilities.) 1 Chief Officer Other Specialized Apparatus as may be needed or available.

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Personnel 16 Firefighters 1 Chief Officer Safety Officer Rapid Intervention Team The Importance of the 8-minute Engine Company Response during Structural Fire Fighting Operations One of the first priorities in a fire is to get water on the fire to extinguish it. When initiating fire attack, a single engine company would not be capable of affecting a safe and effective fire attack or rescue operation in compliance with 2 In/2 Out requirements unless staffed with at least four firefighters. Engine crews with less than four must wait until a second fire suppression company arrives with sufficient personnel to support the fire attack and/or rescue operation and to assist the first crew in the event of an unexpected emergency during interior attack.

One firefighter remains to check for exposures and intervene in the event of a firefighter emergency
Two firefighters initiate interior fire attack and rescue trapped occupants One firefighter must remain at the engine pump to establish and maintain an uninterrupted water supply to firefighters working inside the burning structure

FIGURE 3: ENGINE COMPANY FIREGROUND OPERATIONS WHEN STAFFED WITH FOUR FIREFIGHTERS

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The Importance of the 8-minute Ladder Company Response during Structural Fire Fighting Operations Ladder companies play a vital role on the scene of a structure fire. Ladder crew duties include securing building access, conducting search and victim rescue and conducting ventilation during suppression activities. The importance of being able to ventilate a building efficiently, effectively, and in coordination with interior attack operations is key to supporting fire suppression and search and rescue operations. Once the superheated gases and smoke from the building have been ventilated, firefighters conducting interior fire suppression and rescue operations are able to more clearly locate the seat of the fire and more effectively perform victim search and rescue. The rapid extrication of victims from inside a burning structure is critical to saving lives: the quicker fire victims are removed from the structure, the quicker they can be treated by fire department and medical personnel for smoke inhalation, burns, and other injuries related to fire. Thus, the response of the Ladder in concert with other fire suppression companies assigned to respond to a structure fire is critical to initiating safe and effective fire suppression and rescue operations. Any delay in response translates directly into a proportional increase in risk and the expected loss of life and property. To facilitate the rapid extrication of trapped occupants, NFPA 1710 states that Fire companies whose primary functions are to perform the variety of services associated with Ladder work, such as forcible entry, ventilation, search and rescue, aerial operations for water delivery and rescue, utility control, illumination, overhaul and salvage work shall [also] be staffed with a minimum of four on-duty personnel.18 A crew of four is required to make a safe initial attack on a fire, with a crew of two working inside the burning structure and a backup crew of two standing by to assist should the interior crew become trapped or injured. This is known as OSHAs 2 In / 2 Out policy19. Both the NFPA and OSHA 2 In/2 Out policy require an outside crew to be assembled prior to anyone entering an atmosphere that is immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH). This important safety requirement will have a large impact on availability of firefighters to enter the building when small crews are deployed.

18 19

NFPA 1710, Section 5.2.2.2 and 5.2.2.2.1 The 2 In/2 Out policy is part of paragraph (g)(4) of OSHAs revised respiratory protection standard, 29 CFR 1910.134. This paragraph applies to private sector workers engaged in interior structural fire fighting and to Federal employees covered under Section 19 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. States that have chosen to operate OSHA-approved occupational safety and health state plans are required to extend their jurisdiction to include employees of their state and local governments. These states are required to adopt a standard at least as effective as the Federal standard within six months. OSHAs interpretation on requirements for the number of workers required to be present when conducting operations in atmospheres that are immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) covers the number of persons who must be on the scene before fire fighting personnel may initiate an attack on a structural fire. An interior structural fire (an advanced fire that has spread inside of the building where high temperatures, heat and dense smoke are normally occurring) would present an IDLH atmosphere and therefore, require the use of respirators. In those cases, at least two standby persons, in addition to the minimum of two persons inside needed to fight the fire, must be present before fire fighters may enter the building. Letter to Thomas N. Cooper, Purdue University, from Paula O. White, Director of Federal-State Operations, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration, November 1, 1995.

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No firefighter immediately available to ventilate the structure

Staffing conditions and fireground capabilities when a ladder company is staffed with only three firefighters

Driver/Operator remains at the ladder truck to maneuver the aerial device into position in anticipation of second-in companies; inspection of the premises for fire extension and exposures not accomplished

Two remaining firefighters initiate victim search and rescue operations in conjunction with the suppression crew from an engine.

When staffed with three firefighters, only two ladder company personnel initiate victim search and rescue. Ventilation activities are delayed.

FIGURE 4: LADDER COMPANY OPERATIONS WHEN LADDER TRUCKS DEPLOY WITH ONLY THREE FIREFIGHTERS

The critical difference between staffing ladder companies with three firefighters instead of four is that when staffed with four firefighters, ladder companies are capable of venting the structure and initiating rescue operations more safely and more effectively than ladder companies staffed with less than four firefighters. In the low hazard environment, trucks staffed with four firefighters, in compliance with industry standards, firefighters are 32% more efficient than three-person crews in ventilating the structure and 4% more effective in accomplishing victim search and rescue than three-person crews20.

20

NIST Report on Residential Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al., 2010, Pg 40-41.

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Firefighter #2 left to perform the task of ventilating the structure

Staffing conditions and fireground capabilities when ladder companies are staffed with four firefighters, in compliance with NFPA 1710 company staffing objectives

Driver/Operator remains available to check for exposures and fire extension, and to maneuver the aerial device into position in anticipation of second-in companies

Company Officer and Firefighter #1 initiate victim search and rescue operations

When staffed with four firefighters, the crew is able to initiate search and rescue and begin ventilation as necessary.

FIGURE 5: LADDER COMPANY FIREGROUND OPERATIONS WHEN STAFFED WITH FOUR FIREFIGHTERS When staffed with three firefighters, crews assigned to ventilate a low hazard structure are 32% less effective than 4-person crews. Likewise, 2- person crews are 38% less effective compared to crews with four firefighters. For search and rescue tasks, crews staffed with three firefighters are 4% less efficient at search and rescue compared to four firefighters.21

NUMBER OF FIREFIGHTERS 4 Firefighters 3 Firefighters 2 Firefighters

ROOF VENTILATION 32% less efficient

SEARCH & RESCUE 4% less efficient

38% less efficient 28% less efficient

TABLE 3: LADDER COMPANY EFFICIENCY: 2 FIREFIGHTERS VS. 4 FIREFIGHTERS 22

21 22

NIST Report of Residential Fireground Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al., 2010, pg 40 -41. NIST Report of Residential Fireground Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al., 2010, pg 40-41.

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Initial Full Alarm Assignment Initial Full Alarm Assignment Capability, as outlined in NFPA Standard 1710, recommends that the fire department shall have the capability to deploy an initial full alarm assignment within an 8-minute response time to 90 percent of the incidents [and that the] initial full alarm shall provide for the following: a minimum of one individual dedicated to establishing incident command outside of the hazard area, assisted by an aide; establishment of an uninterrupted water supply, which shall be maintained by an operator who shall ensure uninterrupted water flow application; establishment of attack and backup lines, operated by a minimum of two personnel each to effectively and safely maintain the line; provision of one support person for each attack and backup line to provide hydrant hookup, assist in line lays, utility control, and forcible entry; a minimum of one search and rescue team, consisting of two personnel; a minimum of one ventilation team, consisting of two personnel; and establishment of an Initial Rapid Intervention Crew (IRIC), consisting of a minimum of two properly equipped and trained personnel.23 This breakdown of the expected capabilities of a full alarm assignment, in compliance with NFPA Standard 1710, requires a minimum contingent of fifteen fire suppression personnel, including the Incident Commander (IC) and the ICs aide24, to arrive at the scene of a structure fire within 8 minutes of receiving the alarm.25
15 PERSONNEL REQUIRED 17 if Aerial Device and Supply Pump are in Operation TOTAL ON SCENE: 17 Incident Command Vehicle: 1 Chief Officer Ladder Truck: 1 Officer/3 Fire Fighters Engine: 1 Officer/3 Fire Fighters Engine: 1 Officer/3 Fire Fighters Engine: 1 Officer/3 Fire Fighters

Ventilation Team

Aerial Operator Backup Hose Crew Incident Commander (IC) and IC Aide Attack Hose Crew

FD FD

Supply Pump Operator Attack Pump Operator Victim Search & Rescue Team IRIC Team

FD

FIGURE 6: NFPA 1710 INITIAL FULL ALARM ASSIGNMENT DEPLOYED WITHIN 8 MINUTES
23 24

NFPA 1710, 5.2.3.2.1 and 5.2.3.2.2, (a) (h) NFPA 1710, 5.2.1.2.5 25 It should be noted that a minimum on-scene contingent of fifteen to seventeen fire suppression personnel are required by NFPA Standard 1710 when a second pump and an aerial device are in operation at the incident scene.

25

The ability of adequate fire suppression forces to greatly influence the outcome of a structural fire is undeniable and predictable. Data generated by the NFPA provides empirical proof that a rapid and aggressive interior attack can substantially reduce loss of life and the loss of property associated with structural fires. Each stage of fire extension beyond the room of origin directly increases the rate of civilian deaths, injuries, and property damage. Rate Per 1,000 Fires Fire Extension in Residential Structures: Civilian Civilian Average Property Deaths Injuries Damage 2.07 24.30 $1,505.00 Confined to Room of Origin 18.60 80.44 $12,134.00 Confined to Floor of Origin 27.23 55.37 $21,343.00 Beyond Floor of Origin TABLE 4: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRE EXTENSION AND FIRE LOSS 26 OSHAs 2 In/2 Out Regulation: The 2 In/2 Out policy is part of paragraph (g)(4) of OSHAs revised respiratory protection standard, 29 CFR 1910.134. The focus of this important section is the safety of fire fighters engaged in interior structural firefighting. OSHAs requirements for the number of workers required to be present when conducting operations in atmospheres that are immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) also covers the number of persons who must be on the scene before firefighting personnel may initiate an interior attack on a structural fire. An interior structural fire (an advanced fire that has spread inside of the building where high temperatures, heat and dense smoke are normally occurring) would present an IDLH atmosphere and, therefore, require the use of respirators. In those cases, at least two standby persons, in addition to the minimum of two persons inside needed to fight the fire, must be present before fire fighters may enter the building.27, 28 This requirement is mirrored in NFPA 1500, which states that a rapid intervention team shall consist of at least two members and shall be available for rescue of a member or a team if the need arises. Once a second team is assigned or operating in the hazardous area, the incident shall no longer be considered in the initial stage, and at least one rapid intervention crew shall be required.

26 27

Source: National Fire Protection Association According to NFPA standards relating to fire fighter safety and health, the incident commander may make exceptions to these rules if necessary to save lives. The Standard does not prohibit fire fighters from entering a burning structure to perform rescue operations when there is a reasonable belief that victims may be inside. 28 Paula O. White, letter to Thomas N. Cooper, 1 November 1995 (OSHA)

26

FIGURE 7: OSHA 2 IN/2 OUT ILLUSTRATED Two of the most important elements in limiting fire spread are the quick arrival of sufficient numbers of personnel and equipment to attack and extinguish the fire as close to the point of origin as possible, as well as rescue any trapped occupants and care for the injured. Several existing National Fire Protection Association standards address this time-critical issue. NFPA 1500 states, while members can be assigned and arrive at the scene of an incident in many different ways, it is strongly recommended that interior firefighting operations not be conducted without an adequate number of qualified firefighters operating in companies under the supervision of company officers. It is recommended that a minimum acceptable fire company staffing level should be four members responding on or arriving with each engine and each ladder company responding to any type of fire. NFPA Standard 1710 further recommends that fire companies whose primary functions are to pump and deliver water and perform basic firefighting at fires, including search and rescue shall be staffed with a minimum of four on-duty personnel,29 while fire companies whose primary functions are to perform the variety of services associated with Ladder work, such as forcible entry, ventilation, search and rescue, aerial operations for water delivery and rescue, utility control, illumination, overhaul and salvage work shall [also] be staffed with a minimum of four on-duty personnel.30 For either fire suppression company, NFPA 1710 states that in jurisdictions with tactical hazards, high hazard occupancies, high incident frequencies, geographical restrictions, or

29 30

NFPA 1710, 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.1.1 NFPA 1710, 5.2.2.2 and 5.2.2.2.1

27

other pertinent factors as identified by the authority having jurisdiction, these companies shall be staffed with a minimum of five or six on-duty members.31 There exist a number of incidents in which the failure to follow 2 In/2 Out procedures have contributed to fire fighter casualties. For example, in Lexington, Kentucky, one firefighter died and a second was severely injured following a fire where Kentucky OSHA later cited the firefighters employer for failing to utilize 2 In/2 Out procedures. In a second case, two firefighters died from smoke inhalation after being overcome by toxic fumes while fighting an accidental fire in Philadelphia, PA. Although two additional firefighters were outside the home, both were engaged in support activities (hydrant hook-up and pump operation), and neither was fully accountable for monitoring the interior personnel32. There also exist a number of success stories following the adoption of 2 In/2 Out procedures. In Pittsburgh, PA, the Fire Department implemented an accountability and rescue system following a fatal fire. In one instance, four firefighters who were performing an interior attack on an apartment building fire became disoriented and were trapped in the building. The standby personnel were able to initiate rescue operations promptly and, although the four interior firefighters and two of the rescuers were injured, all survived.33
Only 4 firefighters are capable of initiating effective emergency rescue operations

Two firefighters enter structure and initiate fire suppression and/ or emergency rescue of trapped occupants

One firefighter expected to maintain an uninterrupted water supply to firefighters working inside the burning structure and also remain available for rapid intervention if firefighters inside become trapped.

Two firefighters remain immediately available to monitor operations and rescue trapped firefighters, if necessary

Figure 8: Emergency 2 In/2 Out Operations When Fire Companies are Staffed with 4 Firefighters

31 32

NFPA 1710, 5.2.2.1.2 and 5.2.2.2.2 FACE 98-03: Two Fire Fighters Die of Smoke and Soot Inhalation in Residential Fire Pennsylvania, retrieved from CDC website: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9803.html, site visited 3/5/2013 33 John B. Miles, Jr., letter to J. Curtis Varone, Esq., 29 April 1998 (OSHA)

28

When confronted with occupants trapped in a burning structure and a single fire company is on scene, only a company staffed with four firefighters is able to initiate emergency search and rescue operations in compliance with 2 In/2 Out policies. As indicated in the previous graphic, this requires the complete engagement of every firefighter from the first-in fire company, staffed with four, to participate in the effort, and means that the driver-operator of the apparatus must tend to the pump to ensure the delivery of water to the firefighters performing the initial attack and search and rescue operations and be prepared to make entry with the remaining firefighter should the crew operating inside become trapped. Regardless, when there exists an immediate threat to life, only a company of four firefighters can initiate fire suppression and rescue operations in compliance with the 2 In/2 Out policies, and in a manner that minimizes the threat of personal injury. In crews with fewer than 4 firefighters, the first-in company must wait until the arrival of the second-in unit to initiate safe and effective fire suppression and rescue operations. This condition underlines the importance and desirability of fire companies to be staffed with four firefighters, and stresses the benefit of four-person companies and their ability to save lives without having to wait for the second-in company to arrive.

29

30

Staffing and Deployment Analysis

Staffing and Deployment
The following table specifies the Coventry Fire Districts existing Station locations, apparatus and minimum on-duty staffing: Station Central Coventry - 1 Central Coventry - 3 Central Coventry - 4 Central Coventry - 5 Central Coventry - 7 Coventry-Anthony Station Address 954 Hill Farm Road 2 Station Street 243 Arnold Rd 701 Main Street 2847 Flat River Road 571 Washington Street Apparatus Min. Staffing closed closed 2 2 closed 2 2 4

Engine Ambulance Engine Ambulance Engine Ladder Ambulance Engine Ladder Ambulance Engine Ambulance

Hopkins Hill Station

1 Bestwick Trail

1 career, 1 volunteer 2 career (M-F, 8-4), 2 volunteer

Western Coventry Station

1110 Victory Hwy, Greene, RI

The following table specifies the previous staffing and deployment configuration: Station Central Coventry - 1 Central Coventry - 3 Central Coventry - 4 Central Coventry - 5 Central Coventry - 7 Coventry-Anthony Station Address 954 Hill Farm Road 2 Station Street 243 Arnold Rd 701 Main Street 2847 Flat River Road 571 Washington Street Apparatus Ambulance Ladder Ambulance Engine Engine Engine Engine Ladder Ambulance Engine Ladder Ambulance Min. Staffing 2 2 2 2 2 4

Hopkins Hill Station

1 Bestwick Trail

1 career, 1 volunteer

31

Western Coventry Station

1110 Victory Hwy, Greene, RI

Engine Ambulance

2 career (M-F, 8-4), 2 volunteer

Fire District and Station Location Overview Map

32

The following series of maps indicate estimates of existing response capabilities of the Coventry Fire Districts based on a travel time model. The indicated response capabilities for individual units, and the units designated to respond as part of an alarm assignment, assume that all units and the personnel assigned to staff these units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.34 Understanding the several components of an emergency response is an important part of understanding how to interpret the following series of maps. To follow are some key terms that the reader should understand. Alarm Answering Time is The time interval that begins when the alarm is received at the communication center and ends when the alarm is acknowledged at the communication center.35 Alarm Handling Time is The time interval from the receipt of the alarm at the primary PSAP until the beginning of transmittal of the response information via voice or electronic means to emergency response facilities (ERFs) and emergency response units (ERUs) in the field.36 Alarm Processing Time, also known as Dispatch Time or Call Processing Time, is The time interval from when the alarm is acknowledged at the communication center until response information begins to be transmitted via voice or electronic means to emergency response facilities (ERFs) and emergency response units (ERUs).37 Alarm Transfer Time is The time interval from the receipt of the emergency alarm at the PSAP until the alarm is first received at the communication center.38 Initiating Action/Intervention Time is The time interval from when a unit arrives on the scene to the initiation of emergency mitigation.39 Total Response Time is The time interval from the receipt of the alarm at the primary PSAP to when the first emergency response unit is initiating action or intervening to control the incident.40

34

As previously indicated, dispatch time and turnout time are not considered as part of this analysis, and may add as much as two minutes to overall call-to-arrival time. Actual response speeds may be slower, and the associated travel times greater, with any traffic congestion or any other unpredictable impedances. If any unit is unavailable for any reason, travel times will be greater as more distant apparatus will be required to respond, with potential delays. Impediments to access may add to the delay between the discovery of a fire and implementation of an actual fire attack, and to the delay between the discovery of an individual in medical distress and the initiation of emergency medical care. 35 NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.1 36 NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.2 37 NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.3 38 NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.4 39 NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.5

33

Travel Time is The time interval that begins when a unit is en route to the emergency incident and ends when the unit arrives at the scene.41 Turnout Time is The time interval that begins when the emergency response facilities (ERFs) and emergency response units (ERUs) notification process begins by either an audible alarm or visual annunciation or both and ends at the beginning point of travel time42 Per NFPA 1710, turnout time should not exceed 80 or 60 seconds. 43

It is critical to understand that the response capabilities indicated in the following series of maps reflect travel time only. That is to say, the following series of maps indicate how far an emergency vehicle traveling on the existing road network can travel within 4 and 8 minutes. Dispatch time and turnout time are not considered as part of this analysis, and may add as much as two minutes to overall call-to-arrival time. Actual response speeds may be slower, and the associated travel times greater, with any traffic congestion or any other unpredictable impedances including those impedances listed above. If any unit is unavailable for any reason, travel times will be greater as more distant apparatus will be required to respond, with potential delays. Unavailability of any units critical to a particular emergency response will result in increased risk to firefighter safety. Impediments to access may add to the delay between the discovery of a fire and implementation of an actual fire attack (possibly resulting in increased fire growth), and to the delay between the discovery of an individual in medical distress and the initiation of emergency medical care (possibly resulting in decreased patient survivability). Additionally, when and where use of callback or mutual aid personnel may be applicable, the computer model is unable to accurately portray the response of callback fire fighters responding in private vehicles from their residence or other location to an incident scene. Inasmuch as callback or mutual aid personnel are not available on a regular basis to respond emergency units immediately upon dispatch- and it is impossible to quantify the amount of time it takes for those individuals to respond from their different locations to the station, staff an apparatus, and respond that unit to a given location- the GIS software is also unable to accurately display the predicted response capabilities of apparatus deploying from a fire station when staffed with callback, or mutual aid personnel. As such, the unpredictable response capabilities of units staffed by off-duty personnel responding as callback fire fighters, or those units staffed personnel from neighboring communities as mutual aid personnel, are omitted from this analysis.

40 41

NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.6 NFPA 1710, 3.3.42.7 42 NFPA 1710, 3.3.42.8 43 NFPA 1710, 4.1.2.1(2) 80 seconds for turnout time for fire and special operations response and 60 seconds turnout time for EMS response.

34

Existing Emergency Response Capabilities Coventry Fire Districts

Map 1

Map 1 indicates existing Engine Company 4-minute response capabilities. Currently, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine company to 39.20% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 4 minutes, assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM.

35

Map 2

Map 2 indicates existing Engine Company 4-minute response capabilities. Currently, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine company to 32.31% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 4 minutes, assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.

36

Map 3

Map 3 indicates existing Engine Company 8-minute response capabilities. Currently, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine company to 83.44% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes, assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM.

37

Map 4

Map 4 indicates existing Engine Company 8-minute response capabilities. Currently, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine company to 70.11% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes, assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.

38

MAP 5

Map 5 indicates those areas where the Coventry Fire Districts are currently capable of initiating safe and effective fire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2 Out regulation within 8-minutes. Under these conditions, when District units are responding from assigned stations, it is predicted that the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of initiating fire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2 Out regulations on 69.14% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry in 8 minutes, assuming the units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.

39

Map 6

Map 6 indicates the existing ability of the Coventry Fire Districts to assemble 12 personnel within 8-minutes. Currently, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with at least 12 personnel to 1.7% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes, assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch. Map 6 also indicates 7.09% of roads (indicated in red) lost coverage from previous capabilities (see Map 13, page 44).

40

Previous Emergency Response Capabilities (5 operating Central Coventry stations) Coventry Fire Districts
Map 7

Map 7 indicates previous Engine Company 4-minute response capabilities. With 5 operating Central Coventry Stations, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine company to 47.94% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 4 minutes, assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM.

41

Map 8

Map 8 indicates previous Engine Company 4-minute response capabilities. With 5 operating Central Coventry Stations, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine company to 41.05% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 4 minutes, assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.

42

Map 9

Map 9 indicates previous Engine Company 8-minute response capabilities. With 5 operating Central Coventry Stations, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine company to 86.06% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes, assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM.

43

Map 10

Map 10 indicates previous Engine Company 8-minute response capabilities. With 5 operating Central Coventry Stations, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine company to 72.72% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes, assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.

44

MAP 11

Map 11 indicates those areas where the Coventry Fire Districts were previously capable of initiating safe and effective fire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2 Out regulation within 8-minutes. Under these conditions, when Fire District units are responding from assigned stations, it is predicted that the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of initiating fire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2 Out regulations on 66.59% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes, assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM. .

45

MAP 12

Map 12 indicates those areas where the Coventry Fire Districts were previously capable of initiating safe and effective fire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2 Out regulation within 8-minutes. Under these conditions, when Fire District units are responding from assigned stations, it is predicted that the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of initiating fire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2 Out regulations on 61.56% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes, assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.

46

Map 13

Map 13 indicates the previous ability of the Coventry Fire Districts to assemble 12 personnel within 8-minutes. With 5 operating Central Coventry Stations, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with at least 12 personnel to 8.79% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes, assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.

47

48

Central Coventry Liquidation Response Capability Analysis

Staffing and Deployment
The following table specifies the potential effective liquidation staffing and deployment configuration: Station Central Coventry - 1 Central Coventry - 3 Central Coventry - 4 Central Coventry - 5 Central Coventry - 7 Coventry-Anthony Station Address 954 Hill Farm Road 2 Station Street 243 Arnold Rd 701 Main Street 2847 Flat River Road 571 Washington Street Apparatus Min. Staffing closed closed closed closed closed 4

Hopkins Hill Station

1 Bestwick Trail

Western Coventry Station

1110 Victory Hwy, Greene, RI

Engine Ladder Ambulance Engine Ladder Ambulance Engine Ambulance

1 career, 1 volunteer 2 career (M-F, 8-4), 2 volunteer

The following Geographic Information System (GIS) maps present the results of a response capabilities analysis of the emergency response capabilities of the Coventry Fire Districts pursuant to the liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. Please refer to pages 32 and 33 regarding modeling assumptions made in the following analysis.

49

Post-Liquidation Response Capabilities Coventry Fire Districts

Map 14

Map 14 indicates the anticipated 4-minute Engine Company response capabilities pursuant to the liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry fire Districts would have response capability on 30.08% of all roads within 4 minutes. The ability of the Coventry Fire Districts to respond to 30.08% of all roads within the Town of Coventry within 4 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to a 9.12% decrease in response capabilities from the existing conditions and a 17.86% decrease in response capabilities from the previous conditions, assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM. Table 5 details the comparison of the engine company 4-minute response capabilities under existing and previous conditions and engine company 4-minute response capabilities pursuant to liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. 50

TABLE 5:

COMPARISON OF ENGINE COMPANY 4-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES (M-F, 8AM-4PM) SCENARIO Existing Engine Company 4-minute Response Capabilities (reference Map 1, page 34) Previous Engine Company 4-minute Response Capabilities (reference Map 7, page 40) Post-Liquidation Engine Company 4minute Response Capabilities RESPONSE CAPABILITIES 39.20% of all roads covered within 4 minutes 47.94% of all roads covered within 4 minutes 30.08% of all roads covered within 4 minutes

51

Map 15

Map 15 indicates the anticipated 4-minute Engine Company response capabilities pursuant to the liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry fire Districts would have response capability on 23.19% of all roads within 4 minutes. The ability of the Coventry Fire Districts to respond to 23.19% of all roads within the Town of Coventry within 4 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to a 9.12% decrease in response capabilities from the existing conditions and a 17.86% decrease in response capabilities from the previous conditions, assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch. Table 6 details the comparison of the engine company 4-minute response capabilities under existing and previous conditions and engine company 4-minute response capabilities pursuant to liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.

52

TABLE 6:

COMPARISON OF ENGINE COMPANY 4-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES (24-HOUR) SCENARIO Existing Engine Company 4-minute Response Capabilities (reference Map 2, page 35) Previous Engine Company 4-minute Response Capabilities (reference Map 8, page 41) Post-Liquidation Engine Company 4minute Response Capabilities RESPONSE CAPABILITIES 32.31% of all roads covered within 4 minutes 41.05% of all roads covered within 4 minutes 23.19% of all roads covered within 4 minutes

53

Map 16

Map 16 indicates the anticipated 8-minute Engine Company response capabilities pursuant to the liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry fire Districts would have response capability on 69.32% of all roads within 8 minutes. The ability of the Coventry Fire Districts to respond to 69.32% of all roads within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to a 14.13% decrease in response capabilities from the existing conditions and a 16.75% decrease in response capabilities from the previous conditions, assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM. Table 7 details the comparison of the engine company 8-minute response capabilities under existing and previous conditions and engine company 8-minute response capabilities pursuant to liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.

54

TABLE 7:

COMPARISON OF ENGINE COMPANY 8-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES (M-F, 8AM-4PM) SCENARIO Existing Engine Company 8-minute Response Capabilities (reference Map 3, page 36) Previous Engine Company 8-minute Response Capabilities (reference Map 9, page 42) Post-Liquidation Engine Company 8minute Response Capabilities RESPONSE CAPABILITIES 83.44% of all roads covered within 8 minutes 86.06% of all roads covered within 8 minutes 69.32% of all roads covered within 8 minutes

55

Map 17

Map 17 indicates the anticipated 8-minute Engine Company response capabilities pursuant to the liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry fire Districts would have response capability on 51.86% of all roads within 8 minutes. The ability of the Coventry Fire Districts to respond to 51.86% of all roads within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to an 18.25% decrease in response capabilities from the existing conditions and a 20.86% decrease in response capabilities from the previous conditions, assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch. Table 8 details the comparison of the engine company 8-minute response capabilities under existing and previous conditions and engine company 8-minute response capabilities pursuant to liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.

56

TABLE 8:

COMPARISON OF ENGINE COMPANY 8-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES (24-HOUR) SCENARIO Existing Engine Company 8-minute Response Capabilities (reference Map 4, page 37) Previous Engine Company 8-minute Response Capabilities (reference Map 10, page 43) Post-Liquidation Engine Company 8minute Response Capabilities RESPONSE CAPABILITIES 70.11% of all roads covered within 8 minutes 72.72% of all roads covered within 8 minutes 51.86% of all roads covered within 8 minutes

57

MAP 18

Map 18 indicates the anticipated 8-minute 2 In/2 Out response capabilities pursuant to the liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry Fire Districts would have response capability on 41.24% of all roads within 8 minutes. The Coventry Fire Districts will likely have the capability to respond with at least four firefighters to 41.24% of all roads within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to a 27.90% decrease in response capabilities from the existing conditions and a 25.35% decrease in response capabilities from the previous conditions, assuming all are available to respond immediately upon dispatch. Table 9 details the comparison of 2 In/2 Out 8-minute response capabilities under existing and previous conditions and anticipated 2 In/2 Out 8-minute response capabilities pursuant to liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.

58

TABLE 9:

COMPARISON OF 2 IN/2 OUT, 8-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES (24-HOUR) SCENARIO Existing 2 In/2 Out 8-minute Response Capabilities (reference Map 5, page 38) Previous 2 In/2 Out 8-minute Response Capabilities (reference Map 11, page 44) Post-Liquidation 2 In/2 Out, 8-minute Response Capabilities RESPONSE CAPABILITIES 69.14% of all roads covered within 8 minutes 66.59% of all roads covered within 8 minutes 41.24% of all roads covered within 8 minutes

59

Map 19

Map 19 indicates the anticipated 8-minute ability to assemble 12 personnel pursuant to the liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry fire Districts would have 12 personnel response capability on 0.0% of all roads within 8 minutes. The ability of the Coventry Fire Districts to respond to 0.0% of all roads within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to a 1.70% decrease in response capabilities from the existing conditions and an 8.79% decrease in response capabilities from the previous conditions, assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch. Table 10 details the comparison of the 12 personnel 8-minute response capabilities under existing and previous conditions and 12 personnel 8-minute response capabilities pursuant to liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.

60

TABLE 10:

COMPARISON OF 12 PERSONNEL 8-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES (24-HOUR) SCENARIO RESPONSE CAPABILITIES Existing 12 personnel 8-minute Response 1.70% of all roads covered within 8 minutes Capabilities (reference Map 6, page 39) Previous 12 personnel 8-minute Response 8.79% of all roads covered within 8 minutes Capabilities (reference Map 13, page 46) Post-Liquidation 12 personnel 8-minute 0.0% of all roads covered within 8 minutes Response Capabilities

TABLE 11:

SUMMARY OF THE COVENTRY FIRE DISTRICTS RESPONSE CAPABILITIES AS MODELED CURRENT PREVIOUS LIQUIDATION 4 MIN ENGINE 39.20% 47.94% 30.08% 4 MIN ENGINE 32.31% 41.05% 23.19% 24 HOUR 8 MIN ENGINE 83.44% 86.06% 69.32% 8 MIN ENGINE 70.11% 72.72% 51.86% 24 HOUR 8 MIN 69.14% 66.59% 41.24% 2 IN 2 OUT 8 - MIN 12 FF 1.70% 8.79% 0.0%

61

62

Conclusions
The Coventry Fire Districts are not currently in compliance with performance objectives in NFPA Standard 1710. Current non-compliance will be increased in the event of liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. CCFD assigned area roads are not currently serviced within safe and effective time frames. Citizens on roads that can be identified as the sole responsibility of CCFD to protect are unlikely to receive 12 or more firefighters on scene before flashover occurs, and on no roads can citizens expect the arrival of 15 or more firefighters within 8 minutes, considered to be the standard for safe, effective, and efficient operations at small residential structure fires. Any reduction of CCFD resources, especially on-duty and immediately available firefighters, will dramatically worsen performance. This increases the risk of death or injury due to fire for nearly 50% of all citizens in Coventry as well as significantly increases the risk of significant property loss for approximately half of the housing units across the entire town of Coventry. Liquidation of CCFD resources would clearly open the population, the housing they live in, and the businesses where they work to unprecedented risk of property loss and injury. Fire companies are not uniformly staffed in companies of 4 firefighters. The existing response resources provided by the four fire districts do not provide for the prompt arrival of any apparatus or personnel within 4-minutes of travel time in most areas of the Town. The existing response resources provided by the four fire districts do not provide for the effective assembly of apparatus and personnel at the scene of a small structure fire within 8-minutes in most areas of the Town. Currently twelve is likely the maximum firefighting force that can be assembled within the Town of Coventry within the 8-minute response time parameter, using automatic mutual aid. This falls short of NFPA 1710 performance objectives that indicate that fifteen firefighters are needed to initiate safe and effective operations at a fire occurring in a typical 2,000 sq. ft. single family dwelling and twenty-six firefighters are needed to initiate safe and effective operations at a fire occurring in a high hazard occupancy building. In the event of liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District six is likely the maximum firefighting force that can be assembled within the 8-minute response time parameter, and only if automatic mutual aid continues. Otherwise no firefighting force will be available in the Central Coventry Fire District post-liquidation at all. 63

Any further reduction in resources by any of the four fire districts significantly deteriorates response and increases risk to firefighters and the citizens of Coventry.

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Summary
While it is impossible to predict where most of a jurisdictions fire and medical emergencies will occur, the Coventry Fire Districts should examine where emergencies have typically occurred in the past and make efforts to ensure these areas continue to enjoy the same level of coverage, while adjusting resources and deployment in an effort to achieve complete compliance with NFPA Standard 1710. Areas with accelerated development and population growth will require additional coverage in the future. Any projected increase in emergency response demands should also be considered before changes are implemented, focusing on associated hazard types and planned response assignments. It is generally accepted that a municipality has the right to determine the overall level of fire protection it wants. However, regardless of the level of fire protection chosen by the citizens, neither they nor their elected representatives have the right to jeopardize the safety of the employees providing those services. Citizens pay for protection of life and property through their tax dollars, and they assume that their elected and appointed officials will make informed decisions regarding that protection. Too often, however, that decision-making process has been based solely on budgetary expedience. Irrespective of the resources provided, citizens continue to believe that firefighters are prepared to provide an aggressive interior assault on fires, successfully accomplishing victim rescue, fire control, and property conservation. They do not expect firefighters to take defensive actions- to simply surround and drown a fire- because to do so would be to concede preventable loss of both life and property The ramifications of station closures and staffing reductions, as they pertain to the loss of life and property within a community, are essential when considering modifications to a fire departments deployment configuration. A fire department should be designed to adequately respond to a number of emergencies occurring simultaneously in a manner that aims to minimize the loss of life and the loss of property that the fire department is charged to protect. Any proposed changes in staffing, deployment and station location should be made only after considering the historical location of calls, response times to specific target hazards, compliance with departmental Standard Operating Procedures, existing industry standards, including NFPA 1500 and NFPA Standard 1710, and the citizens expectation of receiving an adequate number of qualified personnel on appropriate apparatus within acceptable time frames to make a difference in their emergency.

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Methodology Appendix
Overview Once the domain of cartographers, computer-assisted drawing technicians, mainframes, and workstations, geographic information systems (GIS) mapping has migrated to the desktop. With ArcMap, a user can create intelligent, dynamic maps, using data from virtually any source and across most popular computing platforms to display information that has a geographic aspect. The ArcMap GIS software, a product of ESRI, Inc., allows desktop users to work simultaneously with maps, database tables, charts, and graphics, and is an effective tool for conducting computerized system analysis and management. GIS is used by government agencies, nonprofit organizations, and businesses to describe and analyze the physical world. Simply put, a GIS combines layers of information about a geographic region to give you a better understanding of that region. Layers of information can be combined depending on the purpose of the study, forming a computer model of a jurisdiction on which many types of analysis can be made. In the public safety sector, and for the purposes of this analysis, GIS software uses geography and computer-generated maps as an interface for integrating and accessing location-based information. For example, the location of fire stations can be layered on a jurisdictions geography including the road network, water features, building footprints, or any other feature that has been digitized and assigned a location. In this manner, GIS allows public safety personnel to effectively plan for emergency response, determine mitigation priorities, analyze historical events, and predict future events. GIS can also be used to provide critical information to emergency responders upon dispatch or while en route to an incident to assist in tactical planning. NFPA 1710 and GIS Analysis While modern science has been well integrated into many areas of emergency response, it has been glaringly absent in the area of fire-rescue organization and deployment. Fire growth and behavior are scientifically measurable, as are the expected outcomes associated with untreated cardiac arrest, and the specific resource requirements to control fires, reduce fire-related injuries, and prevent deaths. Despite these facts, many communities maintain an ad hoc approach firerescue organization and deployment. The Role of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) The mission of the NFPA is to reduce the worldwide burden of fire and other hazards on the quality of life by providing and advocating scientifically-based consensus codes and standards, 67

research, training, and education44, and recommends that all fire departments establish a policy of providing and operating with the highest possible levels of safety and health for all members. The recommendations and analysis contained in this study are guided by NFPA standards for two important reasons. First, NFPA standards provide fire departments with a measure of interoperability. Interoperability enables fire service personnel in the chain of command to speak the same language and conform to the same operational guidelines. NFPA standards provide the fire service with a common language, common definitions, and common requirements that are meant to foster the safe and effective delivery of fire suppression, rescue, EMS, and special services to a given community. Second, NFPA standards are formulated via consensus development. Development of NFPA standards are the result of scientific research, empirical studies, and consensus among technical experts and the organizations they are affiliated with. Combined, these factors legitimate NFPA standards as the yardstick by which fire departments are measured internationally. Examples of some NFPA codes and standards include: NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, is currently used in every U.S. state and adopted statewide in 43 states and addresses minimum building design, construction, operation and maintenance requirements necessary to protect building occupants from danger caused by fire, smoke, and toxic fumes. NFPA 101 is recognized and utilized by numerous federal government agencies, including the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services. NFPA 1404, Standard for Fire Service Respiratory Protection Training, which specifies the minimum requirements for a fire service respiratory protection program (NFPA 1989). This standard concentrates on the training component of a respiratory protection program, including the evolution of respiratory protection training, current equipment, and recent fire experience.45 NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire Department Incident Management System, which provides minimum criteria for emergency incident management. Such incident management systems are intended to provide structure, coordination, and effectiveness during emergency incidents to enhance safety and health of fire department members and other persons involved. NFPA 1971, Standard on Protective Ensemble for Structural Fire Fighting, which specifies minimum requirements for the design, performance, testing, and certification of the elements of
44

NFPA Mission Statement, NFPA Website, < http://www.nfpa.org/categoryList.asp?categoryID=143&URL=About%20NFPA >, site visited 4/9/2013. 45 Reference NFPA 1500 for requirements concerning use of SCBA in fire fighting operations and NFPA 1852 for the selection, care, and maintenance of SCBA, and respiratory breathing air quality content.

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the protective ensemble including coats, trousers, helmets, gloves, footwear, and interface items for protection from the hazards of structural fire fighting operations. NFPA 1981, Standard on Open-Circuit Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for the Fire Service, which specifies minimum requirements for the design, performance, testing, and certification of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) respirators used by the fire service. Requirements are in addition to U.S. OSHA respirator certification under 42 CFR 84. NFPA 1982, Standard on Personal Alert Safety Systems, which specifies minimum requirements for the design, performance, testing, and certification of personal alert safety systems (PASS) that monitor a fire fighter's motion and automatically emit an alarm if a fire fighter becomes incapacitated. On account of their emphasis on safe and effective fire suppression and rescue operations, the two standards that will be referenced most often throughout this analysis are NFPA 1500 and NFPA 1710. NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, specifies (1) the minimum requirements for a fire departments occupational safety and health program, and (2) the safety procedures for members involved in rescue, fire suppression, and related activities. This standard addresses organization, training and education, vehicles, equipment, protective clothing, emergency operations, facilities, medical and physical criteria, and member assistance programs. NFPA 1500 recommends that a minimum acceptable fire company staffing level should be four members responding on or arriving with each engine and each ladder company responding to any type of fire. The purpose of NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, is to specify the minimum criteria addressing the effectiveness and efficiency of the career public fire suppression operations, emergency medical service, and special operations delivery in protecting the public of the jurisdiction and the occupational safety and health of fire department employees.46 The standard recommends fire companies, whose primary functions are to pump and deliver water and perform basic fire fighting at fires, including search and rescue shall be staffed with a minimum of four on-duty personnel.47 Fire companies whose primary functions are to perform the variety of services associated with truck work, such as forcible entry, ventilation, search and rescue, aerial operations for water delivery and rescue, utility control, illumination, overhaul and salvage work shall [also] be staffed with a minimum of four on-duty personnel.48 In jurisdictions with tactical hazards, high hazard occupancies, high incident frequencies, geographical restrictions, or other pertinent

46 47

NFPA 1710, 1.2.1 NFPA 1710, 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.1.1 48 NFPA 1710, 5.2.3.2 and 5.2.3.2.1

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factors as identified by the authority having jurisdiction, these companies shall be staffed with a minimum of five or six on-duty members.49 The NFPA 1710 Standard is important because it applies the documented and proven science of fire behavior and emergency medicine to the basic resource requirements for effective fire and emergency service deployment. Coupled with GIS analysis, this application allows a community to determine if the resources allocated for the different types of fires, emergencies, medical calls and other incidents are sufficient to effectively control the incident and protect lives and property. NFPA 1710 sets forth in concise terms the recommended resource requirements for fires, emergencies and other incidents. The standard requires, and GIS analysis facilitates, the emergency response organization to evaluate its performance and report it to the authority having jurisdiction. The approach embodied by NFPA 1710, and supported by GIS analysis, makes communities and fire fighters safer and responders more effective and enhances efficiency. NFPA 1710 and the Law NFPA standards protect communities against liability. In the United States, by law- specifically, the General Duties clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Act- if Congress fails to pass legislation setting industry safety standards, municipal governments nationwide are mandated to follow standards promulgated by an industry-wide trade group, such as the NFPA. Many NFPA standards have been enacted into law at the federal, state, provincial and local levels. Although jurisdictions having authority are not required to automatically enact a particular NFPA standard, courts frequently rely upon NFPA standards to determine the industry standard for fire protection and safety measures. Judicial reliance on NFPA doctrines is most frequently found in common law negligence claims. To prevail in a common law negligence claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, that the defendant breached this duty of care and that this breach was the cause of the plaintiffs injury. Hence, the NFPA 1710 standard could be found highly relevant to the question of whether a jurisdiction has negligently failed to provide adequate fire or emergency medical protection to an individual harmed in a fire or medical emergency. ArcGIS 10.1 and Network Analyst Geographic Information Systems ArcGISs Network Analyst is an extension, or software tool, that performs calculations on the network data incorporated into a GIS. Networks are interconnected line features, visually represented as roads, rivers, pipelines, or trails. From this data, it is possible to determine the best route between two spots or amongst several points, calculate travel cost in distance or time, find the closest facility to an address, or model service areas.

49

NFPA 1710, 5.2.3.2.2

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The ArcGIS 10.1 software Network Analyst extension uses ESRIs street database built by NAVTEQ, for the United States, which offers the most comprehensive and up-to-date U.S. street and address data available to be used in conjunction with Network Analysis. Travel speed is assigned by the NAVTEQ street database for this analysis. Assigned Road Speeds As stated above, geographic street data in this study originates from the NAVTEQ street file database in conjunction with the ESRI ArcGIS software. NAVTEQ is a global provider of maps, traffic and location data to provide worldwide map data in ESRIs ArcGIS. 50 Information provided in the street database used for this analysis include: up to date speed limits for every road, turn restrictions, one ways designations, intersections and travel impedances. The road database is kept up to date using the latest GPS technology, innovative collection tools and software, and analysts in the field. Checks and balances are used to ensure map data accuracy. 51 Based on the road speeds and the length of the road segment, a GIS user employing the ArcGIS Network Analyst extension is able to calculate the travel time for each line segment in a road network (i.e., the roads in a city, county, or other jurisdiction). The net result is the ArcGIS software is able to calculate response coverages within user designated time intervals (4 and 8 minute intervals are used for this project). Using ArcGIS 10.1 and Network Analyst Geographic Information Systems software as described above, output was generated predicting which roads in the response jurisdiction could be covered by the deployment within two time intervals. Travel time, for the purpose of this analysis, is defined as the time that begins when units are en route to the emergency incident and ends when units arrive at the scene. 52 It should be noted that dispatch time and turnout time for apparatus, staffed with on duty career personnel are not considered as part of this analysis, and may add as much as two minutes to overall call-to-arrival time. Assumptions Several key assumptions must be addressed prior to drawing any conclusions from this analysis: Modeled travel speeds are based on reasonable and prudent road speeds, as defined by the NAVTEQ Street Database. The Coventry Fire Districts response capability findings characterized by travel times throughout this document do not account for the factors listed below. Actual response speeds may be slower, and the associated travel times
50

ESRI, News Release - April 25 2011, < http://www.esri.com/news/releases/11-2qtr/esri-agreement-with-navteqbroadens-access-to-map-data.html >, site visited 6/4/2013. 51 NAVTEQ, Building the NAVTEQ Database, July 19 2011, < Building the NAVTEQ Database (press.navteq.com/download/Building+the+NAVTEQ+Map+Database+July-19-11.pdf ) >, site visited 6/4/2013. 52 NFPA 1710, 3.3.42.7

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greater, with any traffic congestion or any other unpredictable impedances including, but not limited to:

Traffic Incidents: collisions and vehicle breakdowns causing lane blockages and driver
distractions.

Work Zones: construction and maintenance activity that can cause added travel time in
locations and times where congestion is not normally present.

Weather: reduced visibility, road surface problems and uncertain waiting conditions result in
extra travel time and altered trip patterns.

Demand Changes: traffic volume varies from hour-to-hour and day-to-day and this causes
travel time, crowding and congestion patterns to disappear or to significantly worsen for no apparent reason in some locations.

Special Events: an identifiable case of demand changes where the volume and pattern of the
change can frequently be predicted or anticipated.

Traffic Control Devices: poorly timed or inoperable traffic signals, drawbridges, railroad
grade crossing signals or traveler information systems contribute to irregularities in travel time.

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