Ibn 'Arabi's Flqh: Tbree Cases from tbe Futhut

By Eric Winkel
Is there even any material for a study of Ibn 'Arabi's fiqh (legal discourse/jurisprudence)?
Few people realize that Ibn 'Arabi had a fiqh! And yet a translation of just the extended
fiqh section of the Futht would run over two thousand pages. Yes there is an Akbarian
fiqh: I have chosen here three particular cases he investigates and argues from a fiqh
perspective.
Although Western scholarship on Ibn 'Arabi has focused on the philosophical and mystical
aspect of his thought, situating Ibn 'Arabi in a metaphysical, philosophical context,
especially around his work Fuss al-Hikam and the numerous commentaries and
discourses produced by his brilliant disciples,[1] another aspect of his thought is now
emerging. Chodkiewicz[2] and Addas[3] have charted the growth and influence of the
"akbarian" tradition as it nurtured a more universal and "earthy" approach, exemplified in
Amir 'Abd al-Qadir, for example. Chittick has bridged the "Eastern" Ibn 'Arabi with his
more "Western" dimension through a translation of many short passages from the
Futht.[4, 5] Sells' work has been exploring the various formats traditionally found to be
conducive to the effort of articulating divine truths: poetry, allusion, symbolism, and
metaphor.[6] And finally, Morris' work on "spiritual literalism" has seized the importance
of Ibn 'Arabi's appropriation of traditional forms of the Islamic sciences to "convert" those
practitioners to a higher understanding.[7]
By way of establishing a definition for fiqh here, Ibn 'Arabi seems to treat the fiqh as a
superstructure erected upon the shari'ah, a superstructure of discourse conducted among
the intellectual elites (the 'ulam') of the community. It may be glossed "Islamic legal
discourse".
The central patterns in Ibn 'Arabi's fiqh discourse involve the roots '.b.r. (to cross
over/interpret) and kh.l.f. (differ in opinion). The extended section here covers the "pillars
of Islam", with tahrah (purity) as a prerequisite for the second pillar, salh (prayer). Each
subject has a lengthy poem, which, Ibn 'Arabi explains elsewhere, is not a summary of the
chapter's contents; the poems in effect serve as an "overture", touching the highlights of the
contents and adding a few ideas which will not actually be dealt with in the prose section.
There are also prose overviews. But the main content of the extended section is two
thousand pages of ikhtilf al-'ulam' and min q'il: each issue is introduced with the
statement "the 'ulam' diverge over such and such", and the enumeration of the different
positions and arguments with the ellipsis "min q'il": "among those who argue there is one
who argues for" or more fluidly, "there is a proponent for".
The standard fiqh format is in fact the discussion and analysis of "differences of opinion"
among the 'ulam'. In the days of fiqh vitality, the scholars enjoyed entering the fray with
their own views about the various positions held by previous scholars, with resounding
phrases like "But he is a liar!" and "All of that is falsehood!" in contrast to present-day
fiqh, which wallows in the dead authority of past scholars. Ibn 'Arabi refrains completely
from derogatory statements but does achieve the proper stance of skepticism and
objectivity required of the fuqah' (scholars of the legal discourse) by omitting, almost
always, the name of the particular scholar whose views are being discussed by the
anonymous phrase "there is a proponent that". Surprisingly perhaps, Ibn 'Arabi finds
significance in every position one gets the sneaking suspicion, however, that Ibn 'Arabi
knew more about a particular position than its proponent!
The heart of the discourse is the area of disagreement, or divergence, because it is here that
the revelation's meaning is tested. The fiqh exists in the nexus of revelation and society, the
place where the universal and general revelation becomes applied and actualized in
historical and contextual society. The areas of disagreement are the grist of the scientific
discourse, because there interpretation and hermeneutics are pushed to the extreme in an
effort to understand and apply the revelation. For Ibn 'Arabi, the mandate for fiqh comes
from the Qur'anic passage "Nor should the believers all go forth together: if a contingent
from every expedition remained behind, they could devote themselves to understanding the
religion [li-yatafaqqahu fi'l-dn], and admonish the people when they return to them that
thus they may guard themselves" [9:122].
The other theme is of metaphor, understood in its root meaning of "metaphorein", to bring
something across. '.b.r. gives words such as the Qur'anic admonishment, the 'ibrah, as in
"There is, in their stories, instruction (or admonishment) for those endowed with
understanding [l al-albb]" [12:111, and 3:13, 16:66, 23:21, 24:44, 79:26]. In verb
form, we have "So take warning [a'tabiru] of you endowed with understanding" [59:2].
Only the people who are endowed with discerning the kernel (lubb) of events are likely to
understand the connection linking the superficial reality to the deeper reality, and in effect
the '.b.r. is the link or bridge between one sort of reality (e.g., of events) and another
reality, ontologically prior and more real.
Ibn 'Arabi glosses this concept in this way:
And so I have opened up for you the metaphor [i'tibr] according to the shar'ah,[8] and it
is the passage [jawz] from the form which manifests its property in the sensory domain
[al-hiss] to what is interrelated in your essence, or at the Side of the Real [janb al-haqq],
from among that which indicates [dall] God. This is the figurative meaning of the
metaphor [i'tibr]. It is like "You have crossed over ['.b.r.] the wadi [arroyo] when you
have forded it and traversed it."
For Ibn 'Arabi the "crossing over" does not negate or diminish the reality of the "sensory
side". As Chittick has demonstrated thoroughly, Ibn 'Arabi is opposed to ta'wl
(interpretation) and allegory.[9] We do not find a neo-Platonic or Gnostic denigration of
the body in contrast, Ibn 'Arabi's treatment of the fiqh is true to its bodily and "earthy"
ground. Ibn 'Arabi does not deal in symbols. Water is a metaphor for knowledge, as we
shall see him argue, and the discerning eye will be able to "cross over" from water to
knowledge and back again. This crossing over affirms both sides. As Reinhart showed in
his study of tahrah,[10] ritual is the central means of re-creating the sacred world, and
tahrah as a ritual addresses temporary imbalances (hadath) in order to restore a state of
sacred purity which for Ibn 'Arabi is a state conducive to the intimate conversation with
God, the salh.
Let us take two cases from the issues involving "tayammum" (abluting with clean earth or
sand) and a case concerning woman's 'aurah (imperfection/deficiency). In modern
Islamicist writings, the subject of "tayammum" has received a line here and there, while the
subject of woman's 'aurah has received books upon books, and articles upon articles, and
has launched movement after movement. These writings are a perfect foil for Ibn 'Arabi's
work, as he, in great contrast, treats the revelation as entirely meaningful, content with
letting God "speak for Himself" in assigning priorities and hierarchies and subjects for
reflection.

I
The first case under discussion is introduced by Ibn 'Arabi as follows:
bb [Chapter/Subject]
The 'ulam' of the shar'ah are in accord that tayammum is permitted for the sick and the
traveler, if there is an absence of water. And according to us, "or non-use of water", despite
its presence, for the sick in whom arises a fear that his sickness would increase, or he
would die,[11] on the basis of the arrival of the plain text concerning that.
The purification of tayammum is given by the text "Oh you who believe, when you prepare
for salh, wash your faces, and your hands to the elbows, rub your heads, and your feet to
the ankles. If you are in a state of ritual impurity, wash your entire body. But if you are
sick or journeying, or come from excreting, or you have touched women, and find no
water, take for yourselves [fa-tayammamu] clean sa'd (earth, sand) and rub therewith
your faces and hands. God does not wish to place you in difficulty, but to make you clean"
[5:6]. The first issue the fuqah' must deal with is the nature of tayammum and its
relationship to the more intelligible forms of tahrah. The modern state 'ulam' conceive
of tayammum as a divine emphasis on the importance in Islam of hygiene:
This tayammum is a symbolic demonstration of the importance of the ablution, which is so
vital for both worship and health. When Islam introduced the repeatable ablution, it
brought along with it the best hygienic formula which no other spiritual doctrine or
medical prescription had anticipated.[12]
Ibn 'Arabi accepts the obvious fact that tayammum has nothing to do with cleanliness,
understood as "spotlessness" (nazafah). Nor is it a "symbolic demonstration",[13] some
kind of empty gesture. More sophisticatedly, traditional 'ulam' conceived of tayammum as
a substitute, but this Ibn 'Arabi rejects as well.
Returning to the central text quoted above, Ibn 'Arabi questions the purpose of tahrah (to
make you clean) and the relationship of water to tahrah (if you find no water). Then he
crosses over. (How does he find this bridge? Through disclosure (kashf), although the
crossing over, once discovered, may be articulated.) First, water is knowledge. Knowledge
is the means by which one gains access to the divine. Even when knowledge is lacking, we
must still approach the divine, or, when we do not find water, we must "take for yourselves
clean sand or earth". Second, the earth is tractable and lowly, the lowness where even the
soles of the lowly's shoes tread. "Dust" metaphorically warns us about whence we came.
So, in the absence of water, humility must suffice. The only humble way to approach God
when knowledge is lacking is taqld (following authority), so tayammum crosses over to
taqld, and the entire discussion of tayammum may be linked metaphorically with the issue
of taqld.
There are two routes, then, for attaining a state of purity conducive to the conversation
with one's Lord, knowledge (water) and taqld (tayammum). An unacceptable route, in Ibn
'Arabi's thinking, is qiys, the analogical extension of a known text to cover yet another
issue which the revelation is "silent" about. For Ibn 'Arabi, there is a legitimate qiys, but
only in the sense of extending a command concerning a small issue to include larger
issues; in his example, the command prohibiting saying a word of contempt to one's father
extends to beating him with a stick. Of course the usual method of qiys is to perform
dramatic leaps of logic, which Ibn 'Arabi and his Andalusian near-contemporary Ibn Hazm
both denounced with vigor. The key offense in qiys, for Ibn 'Arabi, is its improper
appropriation of lordship in creating a legal decision because qiys in effect creates a
new text.
When arguing that tayammum is not a substitute, Ibn 'Arabi says that it rather
is based on a derivation of the property concerning this issue from a plain text in the book
or sunnah, inserting the property concerning this issue into a synopsis [mujmal] of that
discourse. It is the fiqh [legal discourse] in the religion [dn]. God said, "(Let a contingent
from every expedition remain behind) to apply themselves [tafaqquh] to the religion (and
admonish the people when they return to them that thus they may learn to guard
themselves [against evil])" [9:122] and we do not need deduction [qiys] for that!
So, when the text seems to pass over something in silence, technically the maskt, the
solution is not in identifying an articulated text (mantq) and performing qiys, but in
examining the entire synopsis of the revelation and "understanding and applying"
(tafaqqah) the religion. (If this was Fazlur Rahman's life-long thesis, then yet another irony
emerges: his dearest thesis found in the sufi thought he wrote off as psycho-sexual
irrationality!) Instead, on the hypothetical case of the lawfulness of beating one's father
with a stick, Ibn 'Arabi explains that
we decide [h.k.m.] with what is mentioned, and it is the word of God: "treat with kindness
your parents" [2:83] and the address is undifferentiated [ajmal], so we extract from this
synopsis [mujmal] the property about everything which is not a "kindness". Beating with a
stick is not one of the kindnesses which has been commanded by the revelation in our
relationships with our parents. So we do not decide [h.k.m.] except with the plain text, and
we do not need qiys.
Tayammum, then, is a tahrah set down by the revelation based on humility, through the
metaphor of earth and dust. The issue before us is whether a sick person may do
tayammum instead of washing with water. For Ibn 'Arabi, the qualifications of people
(sick, female, menstruating, traveling, mature) are bridges. As such, he is not talking about
a sick person, or a woman, but the Sick person, or Woman. He now takes the case, outlined
in the bb above, and explores its inwardness in the wasl (summary).
wasl
Its metaphor in the inwardness is that the "traveler" is a master [shib] of consideration
[nazar] concerning proof. He is a traveler with his reflection [fikr] through way-stations of
his excursions [manzil muqadimat] and along a path of their hierarchies, so that the
property for the issue sought would enter [the path] for him.
In this discussion, Ibn 'Arabi links the "traveling as far as China" theme with "traveling".
The concept of rihlah (journey), especially as traveling in order to gather hadth from
Companions and Successors, also affirms this link. Travelers who do tayammum are
searchers for knowledge who follow someone else's authority, at first. Then they find
knowledge (water!) and gain a state which is pure from the point of view of the shar'ah
and of the intellect the first purity of tayammum was so according to the shar'ah, but not
according to the intellect, while the second (with water) is purity from both points of view.
Specifically, he says that
the master of consideration, even if he believed first through following authority, he [still]
desires to investigate the considerative proofs which he believed in [but] not because of
doubt, [but] in order to achieve for himself knowledge in the proof which he examines
[consideratively, nazar]. And so he emerges from following authority [taqld][14] to
knowledge ['ilm].
But among the "travelers", there is a hierarchy. The travelers who were not content with
tayammum but sought out water vigorously with their own efforts and through applying
their own ideas about how to find this water are below the travelers who based their efforts
on practice. The first group are never quite sure whether the water they eventually found
was produced by their own efforts or is straight from God. The second group are "upon
insight", because their progression to water was through practice ('amal), not consideration
(nazar). He writes,
And it has been mentioned that "The knowledgeable ['ulam'] are the inheritors of the
prophets" and so we call them "'ulam'" and "The prophets did not bequeath dinars
and dirhams, but they bequeathed knowledge" and taking [akhdh] knowledge is through
spiritual struggle [mujhadah] and practices, also, are a journey. So just as the intellect
journeys with its reflective consideration [nazar al-fikri] in the cosmos, the practitioner
journeys with his practice, and they both come together at the end result [natjah]. The
master of practice is greater as he is "upon insight" in what he knows, and doubt does not
enter into him. The master of consideration does not lack doubt entering upon him in his
proof. So the master of practice is first in [deserving] the name "knower" compared to the
master of consideration. And I will give the discourse about what is permitted in the
"journey", and about what is not permitted, in [the chapter on] "the salh of the journeyer"
in this book, if God so wills.
He continues:
The sick is the one to whose primordial nature was not bestowed consideration of proofs;
given what he knows of his unfortunate primordial nature, and its inadequacy in reaching
the intent [maqsd] with consideration [nazar], rather it is obligatory that he be restrained
from consideration and be commanded to follow authority [taqld].
So the "sick" should not attempt to deal with potent waterknowledge. Rather they should
remain with taqldtayammum.

II
In this next case, Ibn 'Arabi examines the sick person who fears that using cold water
would cause harm. He summarizes as follows.
bb
The 'ulam' of the shar'ah diverge concerning the sick who finds water but fears using it.
There is a proponent for permitting tayammum for him, and I argue for it, and he need not
repeat [the salh]. And there is a proponent that he shall not do tayammum with the finding
[wujd] of water, regardless of the sickness and the fear about that. And there is a
proponent with respect to them both that he do tayammum and he repeat the salh when he
finds water. And there is a proponent that he do tayammum, and if he finds water before
the departure of the moment[15] he shall do ablution and repeat [the salh], and if he finds
water after the departure of the moment he need not repeat [the salh].
The key elements which will undergo "cross over" are "sick" and "fear". The "sick", we
have already seen, is "the one to whose inherent nature was not bestowed the [capacity for]
consideration [nazar] [of proofs]". Water is available, but the "sick" fears it. Crossed over,
this means that "proofs of God" are available, but the "sick" is worried about using them.
Ibn 'Arabi says he is "fearful of destruction, and departing from the religion, if he were to
examine [nazar] them [the proofs], on account of his inadequacy".
Soon after I had first seen this passage, I was teaching fiqh methodology to some students
in Malaysia. Some of them, exposed for the first time to the powerful and critical
methodology of the traditional fuqaha' , told me they were fearful, in the face of strong,
rational fiqh thinking, of their hold on the religion. Although I explained that anyone in a
university environment would have to learn to deal with critical thinking, they had
unconsciously been aware of the following observation:
We have seen the majority of them departing from the religion through consideration
[nazar], as their primordial natures were weak and they were presuming themselves to be,
in that, upon correct knowledge, and they are as God said: "(Shall We tell you of those
whose works are lost? Those whose efforts have been wasted in this life, while) they
reckoned that they were doing themselves good by their works" [18:104]. The likes of these
took, if they desired deliverance, the articles of faith ['aq'id] through following authority,
just as they took the properties through following authority; but they should follow the
authority of the people of hadth and no one but them... Upon this [kind of incorrect taqld]
are most of the common people, but they realize not. This is the "sick" who finds water but
fears using it, in regard to the metaphor [i'tibr].
Ibn 'Arabi mentions briefly here a point whose importance is clear in the terse chapter later
on usl al-fiqh (the foundations of Islamic jurisprudence): there, he posits a list of things to
do when in doubt. The first response to doubt is taqw, as God promises to teach the one
who fears him. The second response is taqld, but one must follow the authority of the ahl
al-dhikr (the people of remembrance), which he links to the scholars of hadth. (Ibn
'Arabi's fondness for hadth is amply demonstrated by Morris' article on "Esotericism".)
Under no circumstances does Ibn 'Arabi accept recourse to opinion (ra'y).

III
Finally, let us examine his discourse on woman's 'aurah. The profusion of literature and
discourse surrounding woman's body and 'aurah is astonishing. Quite clearly, woman's
body is the scene of great contestation, and especially so in social and cultural milieus of
modernization and its concomitant economic deprivation. Just one factor mentioned in
Leila Ahmed's[16] careful study of "fundamentalist" thinking on woman, the dramatic
increase of publicly educated young women and the burgeoning surge of unemployed
educated young men, is enough to get a grasp of the societal upheavals which sustain
"fundamentalism". Sachiko Murata's[17] description of fundamentalist desire, not for the
past, but for a super-modern, aggressively masculine society under their domination,[18]
similarly goes far in explaining much of the polemics around woman. The standard
narrative of woes attending woman's liberation (where glosses of the modern Arabic
hurriyah descend rapidly from liberty to licentiousness, wild abandon, and fearful images
of gender anarchy i.e., lack of male dominance!) are almost ludicrous in their modern
form:
First we condone female public exposure; next dating and easy mixing; next, pre-marital
"games"; next, extra-marital relations and open marriages; next, the elevation of open
homosexuality to an acceptable normal status; and next, uni-sex marriages... The result:
broken laws, blood relations torn apart, deep dissatisfaction, a criminal climate, a
disquieting sense of insecurity, fear and mutual mistrust, wide-spread corruption,
irresponsible strikes, uncontrolled inflation, more frequent cases of rape, and the threat of
depression and bankruptcy.[19]
Ibn 'Arabi's discussion of man and woman's 'aurah, unusually, is an argument for a
completely unique, as far as I know, position. Usually, Ibn 'Arabi argues for a position
which others have argued for, adding to its great insights through "crossing over". Even his
position that a woman may lead the salh when men are in the ranks, as bizarre as it
sounds to most Muslims, is found in a handful of eminent scholars. But what has happened
for this case, and which explains why Ibn 'Arabi must be unique in his argument, is that
'aurah has been conflated with covering.
He begins, as usual, with a summary of positions.
There is a proponent that all of her is 'aurah, except the face and the palms,[20] and there
is a proponent for that and additionally that her feet are not 'aurah;[21] there is a proponent
that all of her is 'aurah.[22]
Then, he gives his argument. Assuming that 'aurah is "fitric", or based on our primordial
selves, he naturally turns to a consideration of Adam and Eve. The Qur'an quite clearly
describes God's attention to Adam and Eve's well-being, especially in the verse promising
further guidance. Adam and Eve were not in a "state of sin", requiring later historical
redemption: instead, whatever "lifestyle" they had was by definition "Islamic". This is the
background for Ibn 'Arabi's argument.
As for our school, the 'aurah is not, for the woman, in fact, anything but the two private
parts [sau'ah], as God said, "(When they had tasted of the tree, apparent to them became
their private parts) and they began to sew together the leaves of the garden over them"
[7:22]. It sufficed for Adam and Eve for covering their two private parts, and the two parts
are the two 'aurahs.
But while Adam and Eve fulfilled the primordial injunctions of the dn al-fitrah
(primordial religion), they did not necessarily fulfill prescriptions of later revelations. And
here Ibn 'Arabi finds a distinction.
Even though the woman is commanded with covering, it is our school that yet [she does
not do so] given the fact that it is 'aurah, rather because that is a property set down by the
revelation mentioning the covering. It is not imperative that the thing be covered given its
[supposedly] being 'aurah.
There are numerous hadth concerned with what men, women, children, and elders are
supposed to cover with clothes. Implied in Ibn 'Arabi's argument is that these hadth are the
dictates for covering of the last shar'ah, but that they are not delimitations of 'aurah. Thus,
while a man is enjoined to cover from navel to knees, that area is not necessarily his
'aurah. The importance of this distinction is automatic: it deals with determining the
revelation's intent by asking if there are two different categories concerned with covering,
that is, the covering of 'aurah (which is primordial) and the covering of the body which is
peculiar to this shar'ah (in the way a man having a beard is peculiar to this shar'ah).
But the distinction also has societal importance as well. 'Aurah is not simply a dry abstract
concept: it carries a sense of shame and embarrassment. To label woman's entirety 'aurah,
and even her voice and scent, as some modern groups do, is to erect a massive discourse
around woman, her "place", her proper relegation to very private and shameful realms, and
so on. That such discourses are sponsored with the semblance of fiqh argument makes it all
the more imperative to transform an easily manipulated fossil-like fiqh into a tafaqquk
rhn (spiritual understanding) along the lines revived by Ibn 'Arabi.[23]

1runxlutlon of Tayammum Chupterx
[370/507] Tayammum is the striving [qasd] for clean earth, whether that earth is from
among the [things] called "earth" dust, or sand, or stone, or zarnikh).[24] If any of these
things each of them or their like quits the earth, tayammum is not permitted with what
quits the earth from among those, except dust specifically, on account of an appearance of
a plain text about it and about the earth, whether it quits the earth or does not quit [it].
wasl
Its metaphor in the inwardness: striving for earth is, in respect to its being tractable
[dhallan], the absolute striving for servanthood ['ubudiyyah] absolutely, since
servanthood is humility [dhillah], and service ['ibdah] is part of it, so tahrah of the
servant is rather fulfilling what the servant is obligated with by way of humility and
dependency [on God], and halting upon the formalities of his master and his [master's]
limits, and submitting to his commands. If the "rational consideration [nazar]"[25] quits its
terrestrial being, then one may not do tayammum with that except with dust, since from
dust was created the one of whom we are his offspring [Adam], and what remains thereof,
including poverty and indigence, as the saying of the Arabs, "May the hand of the man be
dusted",[26] and he became poor.
Then, the dust is the lowest of the elements, so the servant halts with his reality in respect
to his configuration, his purification being from every hadath ["temporary ritual impurity"]
expelling him from this station. And this [occasion for tayammum] does not arise except in
the absence of finding [wijdan] water. And water is knowledge, and in knowledge is the
life of the heart, just as in water is the life of the earth. And as it [tayammum] is the state of
the follower of authority [al-muqallad] concerning knowledge of God, and the follower of
authority, according to us, concerning knowledge of God, is the one who follows his
intellect in his rational consideration [nazar] concerning his gnosis in God in respect to his
reflection [fikr], and as, when the one doing tayammum finds water, or an amount
[sufficient] for his use, tayammum is falsified, so, like that, when the revelation produces
some command about divine knowledge, falsified is taqld [following authority] of the
intellect for the sake of his rational consideration about knowledge of God for this issue,
especially when the return to the revelation with the proof of the intellect is not in
accordance with his proof. And so he is a possessor of revelation and intellect
simultaneously, in this issue, so understand that!
wasl
The 'ulam' of the shar'ah are in accord that tayammum is a substitute for the minor
tahrah,[27] but they diverge on the major [tahrah, i.e., ghusl]. But we, we do not argue
about it that it is a substitute for anything, but rather we argue that it is a tahrah set down
by the revelation specified with preconditions given expression by the revelation. It is not
mentioned by the Prophet, may God give him blessings and peace, nor by the exalted
Book, that tayammum is a substitute. There is no difference between tayammum and every
other tahrah set down by the revelation. We rather say "set down by the revelation" since
it is not a tahrah linguistically,[28] and I will give [371/510] the detailed explanation
[tafsl] in the sections [fasl] of this subject [bb], if God so wills.
There is a proponent that this tahrah, meaning the tahrah of dust, is a substitute for the
major [tahrah], and there is a proponent that it is not a substitute for the major [tahrah]
where the linguistic relationship of "minor" and "major" in tahrah is to the general
tahrah of washing the entire body [i.e., ghusl] and to the specific [tahrah] of [washing]
some of the bodily parts in wud'; so the "minor" hadath [temporary ritual impurity] is the
one obligating wud', and the "major" hadath is every hadath obligating washing.
wasl
Every hadath maligning faith obligates washing from it with water, which is the renewer
of faith in knowledge: if he is one of the people of consideration [ahl al-nazar] concerning
intellectual proofs, then he is a believer based on intellectual proof and it is like finding
water, an amount [sufficient] for its use. And if he is not one of the people of consideration
concerning proofs, but is a follower of authority, tahrah is imposed on him, with faith,
from that hadath which removes the faith from him by the [sword] or a good surmise
[hasan al-zann]. He is the one doing tayammum with dust in the loss of water, or an
absence of an amount [sufficient] for the water to be used.
This is according to the school of the one who sees that tayammum is also a substitute for
the major tahrah; they see tayammum for the one in a state of janbah [major ritual
impurity]. As for the school of the one who does not see that tayammum is a substitute for
the major tahrah, he sees that the one in a state of janbah does not do tayammum, like
Ibn Mas'ud and others. He is the one who does not see following authority in [matters of]
faith, no, inevitably for [matters of] gnosis of God, and he does not obligate him whether
it is possible or impossible with considerative proofs. And the majority of the
Mutakallimin [proponents of Kalm] argue for it.
As for its being meaning tayammum a substitute for the minor tahrah, it is that a
hadath maligns for him a designated issue, not faith, in the absence of a plain text from the
book or sunnah or consensus [ijma'], concerning that. And so just as permitted for him is
tayammum concerning this minor tahrah according to "substitute", permitted for him is
deduction [qiys] concerning the property of this issue, on account of the general meaning
['illah al-jmi'ah] between this issue for which there is no property concerning it
articulating it [al-mantq] and the other issue for which there is a property articulated
concerning it by the book, or sunnah, or consensus.
Our school concerning our argument that tayammum is not a substitute but rather a tahrah
set down by the revelation, specified and designated for a specific state; the one who
revealed it [also] revealed the use of water for this specified [act of] worship, and it is God
and his messenger, may God give him blessings and peace, so it is not a substitute. Rather
it is based on a derivation of the property concerning this issue from a plain text in the
book or sunnah, inserting the property concerning this issue into a synopsis [mujmal] of
that discourse. It is the fiqh [legal discourse] in the religion [dn]. God said, "(Let a
contingent from every expedition remain behind) to apply themselves [tafaqqah] to the
religion (and admonish the people when they return to them that thus they may learn to
guard themselves [against evil])" [9:122] and we do not need deduction [qiys] for that!
The similitude of that [qiys] is a man striking his father with a stick, or whatever it may
be. The people of qiys say "There is no plain text, according to us [for this situation]."[29]
But as God said "Say not (to your parents) 'oof' [a sound of contempt], nor repel them, (but
address them in terms of honor)" [17:23], we argue that when it [the revelation] mentioned
the prohibition of saying "oof" and it is a little thing, and beating with a stick is severer
the admonishment [tanbh] from the Law-giver is with the lesser toward the uppermost,
and so there is inevitably something of qiys on it. The "saying of oof" and the striking
with a stick bring together the wrong, so we seek "the striking with a stick" the thing the
text has passed over in silence [al-maskt] in the "saying of oof" the thing the text
articulated [al-mantq].
We argue, we, that we do not have the exercise of governing control [tahakkum] over the
Law-giver concerning anything [even] among the things it is permitted that we be
responsible for,[30] nor do we have the exercise of governing control [with no plain text of
the Law-giver], and especially not in the likes of this. If he will not refer to the articulation
[nutq] of the revelation other than this, we do not impose qiys, and we do not argue for it,
nor do we augment it from "the saying of oof". Rather we decide [h.k.m.] with what is
mentioned, and it is the word of God: "treat with kindness your parents" [2:83] and the
address is undifferentiated [ajmal], so we extract from this synopsis [mujmal] the property
about everything which is not a "kindness". Beating with a stick is not one of the
kindnesses which has been commanded by the revelation in our relationships with our
parents. So we do not decide [h.k.m.] except with the plain text, and we do not need qiys.
The religion is perfect,[31] and adding to it is not permitted, just as subtracting from it is
not permitted. So the one who beats his father with a stick has not treated him kindly, and
the one who does not treat his parents kindly has rejected what God commanded of him,
that he practice [kindness] toward his parents. And the one who opposes the word of his
parents, and does what his parents do not approve of, something which is [nevertheless]
permissible for him to leave off, has in fact been disrespectful to them both. And it has
been established that disrespect to parents is one of the great sins. For this reason we argue
that the tahrah with dust and it is tayammum is not a substitute. Rather it is set down
by the revelation, just as [the command about] water was revealed. And it has a specific
description for [its] practice it is explicated to us that we do not practice it except on the
face and hands. Wud' and ghusl are not like that. It is appropriate that the substitute take
the place of the thing it is substituting for, and this is the taking the place of the thing it is
substituting for in the act. "(God has not made for any man 'two hearts in one body', nor
has He made your wives whom you divorce by repudiating them as 'mothers', nor has He
made your adopted sons your 'sons'. Such is your manner of speaking, but) God says what
is really true and He shows the way" [33:4].
bb
The 'ulam' of the shar'ah are in accord that tayammum is permitted for the sick and the
traveler, if there is an absence of water. And according to us, [tayammum is permitted... if
there is an absence of water] or non-use of water, despite its presence, for the sick in whom
arises a fear that his sickness would increase, or he would die,[32] on the basis of the
arrival of the plain text concerning that.
wasl
Its metaphor in the inwardness is that the "traveler" is a master [shib] of consideration
[nazar] concerning proof. He is a traveler with his reflection [fikr] through way-stations of
his excursions [manzil muqadimat] and along a path of their hierarchies, so that the
property for the issue sought would enter [the path] for him. The sick is the one to whose
primordial nature was not bestowed consideration of proofs; given what he knows of his
unfortunate primordial nature, and its inadequacy in reaching the intent [maqsd] with
consideration [nazar], rather it is obligatory that he be restrained from consideration and be
commanded to follow authority [taqld].
We have already said in what preceded that the follower of authority concerning faith is
like the one doing tayammum with dust, since dust is not for the sake of tahrah meaning
[in the sense of] spotlessness [nazafah] like water is. And yet we call it a purification
according to the shar'ah meaning dust specifically, in contrast [khilf][33] with water,
and I call it [i.e., purification with water] a purification according to the shar'ah and the
intellect. So, the master [372/521] of consideration, even if he believed first through
following authority, he [still] desires to investigate the considerative proofs which he
believed in [but] not because of doubt, [but] in order to achieve for himself knowledge in
the proof which he examines [consideratively, nazar]. And so he emerges from following
authority [taqld][34] to knowledge ['ilm]. Or he practices with the authority he was
following and so is produced for him by that practice knowledge in God, and thus he
differentiates therewith between the real and the false, with a correct insight, not through
following authority about it. It is the disclosed [kashf] knowledge. God said, "Oh you who
believe, if you have taqw of God, He will make for you a criterion" [8:29] it is an entity
of what we said about it "Be in taqw of God, and He will teach you" [2:282] and He
said, "The merciful/who taught the Qur'an/created humankind/taught them the message"
[55:1ff.], and He said, "(So they came across one of Our servants,) on whom We had
bestowed mercy from. Ourselves and to whom We had taught knowledge from Our
presence" [18:65].
And it has been mentioned that "The knowledgeable ['ulam'] are the inheritors of the
prophets" and so we call them "'ulam'" and "The prophets did not bequeath dinars
and dirhams, but they bequeathed knowledge" and taking [akhdh] knowledge is through
spiritual struggle [mujhadah] and practices, also, are a journey. So just as the intellect
journeys with its reflective consideration [nazar al-fikri] in the cosmos, the practitioner
journeys with his practice, and they both come together at the end result [natjah]. The
master of practice is greater as he is "upon insight" in what he knows, and doubt does not
enter into him. The master of consideration does not lack doubt entering upon him in his
proof. So the master of practice is first in [deserving] the name "knower" compared to the
master of consideration. And I will give the discourse about what is permitted in the
"journey", and about what is not permitted, in [the chapter on] "the salh of the journeyer"
in this book, if God so wills.
bb
The 'ulam' of the shar'ah diverge concerning the sick who finds water but fears using it.
There is a proponent for permitting tayammum for him, and I argue for it, and he need not
repeat [the salh]. And there is a proponent that he shall not do tayammum with the finding
[wujd] of water, regardless of the sickness and the fear about that. And there is a
proponent with respect to them both that he do tayammum and he repeat the salh when he
finds water. And there is a proponent that he do tayammum, and if he finds water before
the departure of the moment[35] he shall do ablution and repeat [the salh], and if he finds
water after the departure of the moment he need not repeat [the salh].
wasl
The metaphor of that in the inwardness is that the sick is the one to whose inherent nature
was not bestowed the [capacity for] consideration [nazar] [of proofs] he is sick
chronically, despite the wujd of proofs, but he was fearful of destruction, and departing
from the religion, if he were to examine [nazar] them [the proofs], on account of his
inadequacy. We have seen the majority of them departing from the religion through
consideration [nazar], as their primordial natures were weak and they were presuming
themselves to be, in that, upon correct knowledge, and they are as God said: "(Shall We tell
you of those whose works are lost? Those whose efforts have been wasted in this life,
while) they reckoned that they were doing themselves good by their works" [18:104]. The
likes of these took, if they desired deliverance, the articles of faith ['aq'id] through
following authority, just as they took the properties through following authority; but they
should follow the authority of the people of hadth and no one but them. This following of
authority of the prophetic hadth concerning God is "upon knowledge of God" concerning
it with no allegorical interpretation [ta'wl] through [excessive] designated tanzh
[declaration of incomparability], and no [declaration of] similarities [tashbh]. Upon this
[kind of incorrect taqld] are most of the common people, but they realize not. This is the
"sick" who finds water but fears using it, in regard to the metaphor [i'tibr]...

1runxlutlon of 'Aurab Chupter
[VI: 172] The 'ulam' are in accord that it is obligatory to cover the "shameful part"
('aurah), with no divergence, and absolutely. That is, it is a requirement during salh and
during other times. I will indicate its limit for the man and for the woman.
The metaphor for that in the inwardness is that it is obligatory on every reasoning person to
cover the divine mystery which if disclosed, its disclosure would lead someone neither
knowledgeable nor reasoning to a lack of reverence [ihtiram] for the divine Side, most
mighty, most unapproachable. The reality of 'aurah is "inclination" [mail], and therefore
the one who said it said "Truly Our houses are 'aurah (exposed)" [33:13], that is, the
inclination was to cancel [their promise] after they had volunteered to go on the expedition.
But God called them liars before His messenger, with His words: "Yet they were not 'aurah
(exposed): they intended nothing but to run away" [33:13], meaning with this word [those
who intended nothing but to run away] from what you [Muhammad] had called them to.
And another [meaning of 'aurah] is a'war, a one-eyed man, and indeed his outlook inclines
to a single perspective.
Likewise, it is appropriate that the knowledgeable person cover before the ignorant person
the mysteries of the Real, such as "There is not a secret conversation among three people
but God is the fourth" [58:17], and His words, "We are nearer to him than his jugular
vein" [50:16], and His words, "I become his ear and his eye and his tongue."[36] In fact,
the ignorant person, when he hears that, it leads him to forbidden interpretations [fahm]
[about God], like corporeal indwelling [hull] or delimiting [tahdd]. So it is appropriate
that what God used to gladden the hearts of the 'ulam' be covered up, and He inclines
glorified and exalted be He, praised and sanctified be He in His speeches to things which
necessitate God's sublimity of total self-sufficiency and independence from the world, to
His words on the tongue of His messenger, may God give him blessings and peace, "I was
hungry and you fed Me not, I was sick and you visited Me not, I was thirsty and you gave
Me nothing to drink."[37]
So let the knowledgeable cover up knowledge of a mystery from the ignorant and not add
to what was said by way of explanation [tafsr] by God, just as God covered it [the
mystery] with His words "Truly, when there is someone sick, and if you visit him, you will
find Me there before him."[38] This statement is more difficult than the first one, since God
has given in this explanation [tafsr] to the 'ulam' in God another knowledge about Him
may He be exalted through it! that they did not previously have, and that is that in the
first statement, God made Himself the "sick" and the "hungry" Himself, but in His
explanation, God made Himself the "visitor of the sick", in that He was "there before him",
in that whoever visits a sick person is in fact "there before him". What a difference
between the [second statement and the first statement] where God makes himself the sick
person! Each statement is true, and to every truth there is its reality.
As for the covering which is for that, before the common person, it is that he should say to
him about God's words "you would find Me there before him" that the state of the sick
person is always one of dependency and needing the one who has in his hands the cure
and he is none other than God! The most part of medicine is remembering God and being
patient, in order to repel what has befallen him which is different for healthy people. He
has said [for them] "I am sitting with the one who is remembering Me." This is a correct
perspective, and the common person will be satisfied with it. But the knowledgeable
person will remain with what he knows of that according to his knowledge, and this is the
covering of the "divine inclination" from the sight of the common person...

Notex
1. For the spread of Ibn 'Arabi's teachings, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr's (1972) Sufi Essays
(London); William C. Chittick (1991) "Ibn 'Arabi and His School", World Spirituality
(New York), 49-79; Osman Yahia (1964) Histoire et classification de l'oeuvre d'lbn 'Arabi
(Damascus); Masataka Takeshita's Ibn 'Arabi's Theory of the Perfect Man and its Place in
the History of Islamic Thought; and for an extensive list of all the 'ulam' who have spoken
"for" or "against" Ibn 'Arabi's Fuss, see Osman Yahia and Henry Corbin (1975) Le Texte
des Textes (Teheran and Paris).
2. See Michel Chodkiewicz (1986) Le Sceau des Saints (Paris), his translation and
discussion of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir's "kitb al-mawqif" published in 1982 and entitled
crits spirituels, and an article published in 1991 entitled "The Diffusion of Ibn 'Arabi's
Doctrine", Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society IX: 36-57.
3. See Claude Addas (1989) Ibn 'Arabi, ou la Qute du Soufre Rouge (Paris).
4. William C. Chittick (1989) The Sufi Path of Knowledge (Albany).
5. See also Michel Chodkiewicz, editor (1988) Les Illuminations de La Mecque (Paris).
Contributors included Chittick, Morris, Gril, and Cyrille Chodkiewicz.
6. See Michael Sells (1984) "Ibn 'Arabi's Garden Among the Flames", History of Religions
24, 2:287-315; Sells (1988) "Ibn 'Arabi's Polished Mirror: Perspective Shift and Meaning
Event", Studia Islamica 62:121- 49; and for mystical language in general, his contribution
in Moshe Idel and Bernard McGinn, editors, (1989) Mystical Union and Monotheistic
Faith (New York).
7. James Winston Morris (1990) "Ibn 'Arabi's 'Esotericism': The Problem of Spiritual
Authority", Studia Islamica 71:37-64. The definitive study of Ibn 'Arabi's interpreters is
Morris', published in JAOS numbers 106-7 (1986-7).
8. The Beyazid MS. has "to the extent of your capability in this path may you carry out
what you are responsible for through i'tibar".
9. His views on the Btiniyyah heresy are clear. He writes,
[They] take the [legal] properties of the shar'ah and discharge them in their inwardnesses,
and they left nothing of the properties of the shar'ah for their outwardnesses. They are
called Btiniyyah, and they are, in that, in various schools. Imam Abu Hamid indicated, in
his book [entitled] Kitb al-Mustazhiri refuting them, something of their schools and has
explicated their errors in them. Felicity is with "outward people". They are diametrically
opposite "inward people". But felicity, all felicity, is with the group who combine the
outward and inward; they are "'ulam' in God" and his [legal] properties.
10. A. Kevin Reinhart (1990) "Impurity/No Danger", History of Religions, 1-24.
11. If he should use the cold water and get chilled.
12. Hammadah Ablati (1975) Islam in Focus (Indiana), 57.
13. One sees yet again the irony of Ibn 'Arabi rejecting the allegories and symbolisms so
beloved by modern state fundamentalists, who distort Islam atrociously to make it fit their
perversions; this from Ibn 'Arabi, the sufi they love to hate, opposing their pretence with
literal and strict exegesis.
14. The Beyazid MS. has "until he emerges from the noose of taqld".
15. Time period, for salh.
16. Leila Ahmed (1992) Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern
Debate (New Haven).
17. Sachiko Murata (1992) The Tao of Islam (Albany, NY).
18. "Many Islamic movements in the modern world seem unwilling or unable to grasp the
nuanced appreciation of masculine and feminine provided by the intellectual tradition. In
some cases we see that Muslims have adopted the worst and most negative tendencies of
the modern world as their own... All the problems of the ecological crisis which are the
clear results of a negative masculinity run amuck are being adopted with glee... we see a
headlong rush into a position of power and domination found in technology."
19. Muhammad Abdul-Rauf (1977) The Islamic View of Women and the Family (New
York), 35.
20. For instance, Ibn 'Arabi's contemporary, Imam Nawawi, writes that "The 'aurah of a
free woman is all of her body except the face and palms... and Malik says this... as do al-
Auza'i and Abu Thaur" in his al-Majmu' III:175.
21. Imam Nawawi records that "Abu Hanifah, al-Thauri, and al-Mazni say her foot is not
in fact 'aurah", Majmu' 111:175.
22. Imam Nawawi writes that Ahmad (Ibn Hanbal) says that "All of her body is 'aurah,
except her face alone", and "al-Mawardi and al-Mutawali take from Abu Bakr ibn 'Abd al-
Rahman al-Tabi'i (i.e., from the second generation after the Prophet) that all of her body is
'aurah", Majmu' 111:175.
23. Leila Ahmed understands the failing of non-Islamic feminism: "colonialism's use of
feminism to promote the culture of the colonizers and undermine native culture has ever
since imparted to feminism in non-Western societies the taint of having served as an
instrument of colonial domination, rendering it suspect in Arab eyes... That taint has
undoubtedly hindered the feminist struggle within Muslim societies." This is Murata's
premise too, that "the rigidly 'patriarchal' stress of some contemporary Muslims is to be
softened", but "Muslims will be able to do this as Muslims not as imitation Westerners
only if they look once again at the spiritual and intellectual dimensions of their own
tradition."
24. Yellow and red earth, pigmented by a compound including arsenic.
25. The Beyazid MS. has "earth".
26. The saying is an imprecation which recalls the dusty look of an impoverished person.
27. I.e., wud'
28. Rubbing dust on the face and hands is not an act of cleansing and purification in the
customary usage and linguistic sense of the word.
29. Or "We have no plain text".
30. Exercising governing control, i.e., making decisions that the revelation allows us to
make.
31. Complete.
32. If he should use the cold water and get chilled.
33. Or "divergence".
34. The Beyazid MS. has "until he emerges from the noose of taqld".
35. Time period, for salh.
36. "My servant continues drawing nearer to Me through supererogatory acts until I love
him; and when I love him, I become his ear with which he hears, his eye with which he
sees, his hand with which he grasps, and his foot with which he walks." See William A.
Graham (1977) Divine Word and Prophetic Word in Early Islam (The Hague), 172-4.
37. Graham (1977) 179-80.
38. This hadth quds has been in effect split by Ibn 'Arabi into two columns, the first ("I
was hungry") a confusing mystery, the second ("you would find Me there before him") a
cover-up explanation which placates the confused person. The format of the entire hadth
is "God says on the day of resurrection, 'Oh son of Adam, I was sick and you did not visit
Me.' He says, 'Oh my Lord, how could I visit You, when You are the Lord of all beings?' He
says, 'Did you not know that My servant so-and-so was sick, and you did not visit him? Did
you not know that if you had visited him, you would have found Me with him?' "