Firep IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION 10 fii o n> AAMES CAPITAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v A-04-CA-614 LY CHARLES EDWARD LINCOLN, Defendant, v. GLENN J. DEADMAN, Third-Party Defendant. § § § § § § § 8 § § § § Before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Quash Plaintiff Aames’ Second Subpoena Duces Tecum and Renewed Motion for Protective Order filed March 3, 2005 (Clerk’s Doc. No. 80) and Plaintiff's Response filed March 8, 2005 (Clerk's Doc. No. 84). ‘The District Court referred the discovery motion to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and Rule 1(c) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Wester District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. 1, DISCUSSION Defendant Charles E. Lincotn seeks to quash Plaintiff’ second subpoena duces tecum to take Defendant's oral deposition on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiffhas refused to “meet-and-confer” as required by Rule 26(f); (2) less than 30-days notice was given for the document subpoena attached to the second deposition notice; and, (3) Plaintiff°s counsel, who is also a third-party defendant, is disqualified to represent Plaintiff. As Plaintiff correctly points out, most of the issues raised by &Defendant in the instant motion have been ruled on by the District Court, See Judge Sparks’ Orders of February 17, 2005 (Clerk’s Doc. Nos. 68 & 69). Absent a showing of good cause, this Court will not re-visit those issues already considered by the District Court. See Westbrook v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 68 F.3d 868, 879 (5" Cir. 1995) (reconsideration of proceedings is generally denied in the absence of “substantial error” or “unusual circumstances”) A. Rule 26(f) Defendant, notwithstanding Judge Sparks’ instructions to the contrary, maintains that any further attempts by Plaintiff to initiate discovery should be barred until a Rule 26(f) conference is held. The Court disagrees. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize federal courts to control and expedite the discovery process and give the trial court broad discretion in managing discovery. See Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.34.291, 305 (5% Cir. 2000); Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 380 (5" Cir. 1996). Further, itis beyond dispute that the district court is vested with inherent power to control its docket and prevent undue delay in the disposition of pending cases, Johnson v. Universal Life Ins. Co, 108 F-R.D. 150, 152 (S.D. Miss. 1985). Therefore, the district court, in its discretion, may order that a Rule 26(f) conference need not occur prior to discovery being sought. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 Advisory Committee’s Notes (2000 Amendment), Moreover, Judge Sparks issued a scheduling order for this case on December 9, 2004, See Clerk's Doc. No. 24. Prior to this date, Lincoln argued that the Court should provide more time before setting a schedule, and raised many of the same arguments he continues to raise at present. See Motion to Extend Deadline and Enlarge Time to File Scheduling Order (Clerk’s Doe. ‘No. 12) (arguing that schedule should not be set until court considers disqualifying opposing counsel). The Court rejected those arguments, and entered its order setting a schedule for this case.Given that the main purpose of a Rule 26(f) conference is to develop a proposed discovery and scheduling plan, a Rule 26(f) conference is no longer necessary in the instant case. B. 30-day notice Under Rule 45, the court must quash a subpoena if it fails to allow reasonable time for compliance. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3(AM(i). Rule 30(b)(5) specifically provides that a request for documents appended to a notice of deposition must be “made in compliance with Rule 34.” FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(5). Rule 34 provides for a 30-day response time. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b). Accordingly, a request for documents served with a deposition (through the vehicle of a subpoena duces tecum) must be served at least 30 days prior to the time for production of the documents. See 8A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2108 (2d ed. 1994). Here, the first Rule 30(b)(5) request was served on February 7, 2005, fora February 16, 2005 deposition. Defendant moved to quash the first subpoena duces tecum for lack of adequate notice. On February 17, 2005, Judge Sparks denied the motion to quash and ordered Defendant “be given ten days notice to comply with either a deposition or providing documents under subpoena.” See Iudge Sparks’ Order (Clerk’s Doc. No. 69). A second Rule 30(b)(5) request was then served on February 18, 2005, for a March 4, 2005 deposition. Defendant failed to appear at this deposition or produce any documents. Thirty days have elapsed since the first Rule 30(b)(5) request was served. Because by now Defendant has been afforded sufficient time for compliance, his objection to not having 30 days to respond to the subpoena is unfounded. C. Conclusion Finally, the Court feels compelled to provide an advisory to Mr. Lincoln. This is the undersigned’s first involvement in this case, Having reviewed the file, it is quite clear that