Michelson v. U.S case brief 335 U.S.

469 CASE SYNOPSIS: Upon writ of certiorari to review a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, defendant challenged the decision that affirmed defendant's conviction for bribing a federal officer. FACTS: Defendant was convicted of bribing a federal revenue agent. At trial on crossexamination of his character witnesses, the prosecutor asked the witnesses if they had ever heard that defendant was previously arrested for receiving stolen goods. Defendant claimed that this question constituted reversible error. HOLDING: The appellate court affirmed and held that the question was permissible but pointed out that the practice had been severely criticized. ANALYSIS: Upon writ of certiorari, the court affirmed the appellate court decision and thereby rejected the appellate court's invitation to adopt the Illinois rule providing that such questions were improper unless they related to offenses similar to those for which the defendant was on trial. The court held that the cross-examination question was proper because reports of defendant's arrest for receiving stolen goods, if admitted, would tend to weaken defendant's assertion that he was known as an honest and law-abiding citizen. The court found that defendant had no valid complaint at the latitude which existing law allowed to the prosecution to meet by crossexamination an issue voluntarily tendered by the defense. CONCLUSION: The court affirmed a decision of the appellate court affirming defendant's conviction for bribing a federal officer. The court rejected the appellate court's request to adopt a rule limiting character evidence on cross-examination concerning defendant's prior arrests to only those arrests relating to similar offenses to those for which defendant was on trial. Facts. The defendant is on trial for bribing a federal revenue agent. The defendant called character witnesses and volunteered information that he was convicted of an offense twenty years ago. The character witnesses testified that the defendant had a good reputation for honesty and truthfulness. The defense was allowed to cross-examine the witnesses and asked them whether they were familiar with the fact that the defendant had been arrested twenty seven years prior for receiving stolen goods. The court allowed the cross-examination and warned the jury of the limited purpose of such testimony. The defendant argued that he did not bribe the official and that this was a case of entrapment. Issue. Whether a party has the right to cross-examine another parties character witnesses and inquire about past bad acts such as arrests and/or convictions? Held. Arrest without more does not impeach the integrity or impair the credibility of witness and hence only a conviction may be inquired about to undermine the trustworthiness of a witness. Before a character witness is cross-examined as to a prior arrest of the defendant, the prosecution should demonstrate privately to the court that it is not based on unsupported or untrue innuendo. Dissent.

Justice Wiley Rutledge (J. Rutledge) and Justice Frank Murphy (J. Murphy) dissented. Here, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) concluded there are sound reasons basic to our system of criminal justice, which justify initially excluding the Government from showing the defendants bad general character or reputation. Our whole tradition is that a man can be punished by criminal sanctions only for specific acts defined beforehand to be criminal, not for general misconduct or bearing a reputation for such misconduct. Concurrence. Justice Felix Frankfurter (J. Frankfurter) filed a concurring opinion. It is unprofitable for appellate courts to formulate rigid rules for the exclusion of evidence in courts of law that outside them would not be regarded as clearly irrelevant in the determination of issues. Discussion. Generally, the prosecution may not resort in its case in chief to any kind of evidence of defendants evil character, disposition, and reputation to establish probability of his guilt. However, when the defendant puts his reputation in issue, the entire subject is fair game and the prosecution may cross-examine the defendants character witnesses as to the contents and extent of the hearsay on which they base their conclusions. When the defendant elects to initiate a character inquiry commonly called character evidence, the witness may not testify about defendants specific acts or courses of conduct. In this case, the inquiry concerned an arrest twenty-seven years before the trial. Events a generation old are likely to be lived down and dropped from the present thought and talk of the community and to be absent from the knowledge of younger or more recent acquaintances. But, where defendant has put his reputation in issue by the calling of character witnesses, he cannot complain at the latitude which is allowed the prosecution in meeting, by cross-examination the issue thus voluntarily tendered, notwithstanding the difficulty which the jury may experience in comprehending the courts limiting instructions.

United States v. Nixon Facts. A Senate committee was set up to investigate a break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate Hotel. Under public pressure, President Nixon appointed a special prosecutor to investigate whether the White House was involved in the break-in. Upon motion by the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena was issued to President Nixon by the District Court requiring the production of certain tapes and writings between the President and his aids and advisors. President Nixon brought this action to quash the subpoena, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue it because the matter involved an interbranch dispute between a subordinate (the Independent Counsel) and a superior officer (the President). Alternatively, he argued that the subpoena should be quashed because it demanded confidential conversations between a President and his close advisors that would be against public interest to produce. Issue. Does the separation of powers doctrine preclude judicial review of a Presidents claim of executive privilege? Should the subpoena be quashed because it demands confidential conversations between a President and his aids that would be inconsistent with the public interest to produce?

Held. No and No. The District Courts decision is affirmed. The president must produce the tapes. It is the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) responsibility to say what the law is. The basic concept of separation of powers requires, on occasion, for the federal courts to interpret the United States Constitution (Constitution) in a manner at variance with the construction given to it by another branch. Therefore, it is the duty of the Supreme Court to say what the law is with respect to a claim of executive privilege. The Presidents need for complete candor and objectivity from advisors calls for great deference from the courts. But when an asserted privilege depends solely on a broad, undifferentiated, claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, concerns for the fair administration of justice must win out. The allowance of privilege to withhold evidence that is clearly relevant in a criminal trial would vitiate the guarantee of due process and seriously impair the basic function of the courts. United States v. Jackson Facts. About thirty minutes after Defendant, Jackson, was released from prison after serving two bank robbery convictions, he robbed another bank. Jackson had been previously convicted of four armed bank robberies and one armed robbery. He was sentenced to life in prison under a statute which provided that anyone with three previous felony convictions for robbery or burglary (or both) who possesses a firearm shall be imprisoned not less than fifteen years without the possibility of parole. Jackson claimed that while the statute allowed the imposition of any amount of years, it did not authorize a life sentence. Issue. Was the imposition of life in prison on Jackson permissible?