CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

DR. RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

2019-20

FINAL-DRAFT

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

“EFFECTS OF INJUNCTIONS GRANTED ON INSUFFICIENT GROUNDS”

SUBMITTED BY : UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF:

ANUSHKA MR. VIPUL VINOD

ROLL NO : 170101033 ASSISTANT PROFESSOR

DR. RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT _____________________________________________________ 2

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ___________________________________________________ 3

INTRODUCTION____________________________________________________________ 4

OBJECT____________________________________________________________________ 6

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STAY AND INJUNCTION ____________________________ 6

PRINCIPLES ON WHICH TEMPORARY INJUNCTION MAY BE GRANTED ______ 7

SECTION 95 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE _____________________________________ 10

CONCLUSION _____________________________________________________________ 16

BIBLIOGRAPHY ___________________________________________________________ 17

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Though this research project initially came up as just one submission for the end of the semester,
I am very happy to acknowledge that a substantial amount of research has gone into the making
of the same. Here I should acknowledge the guidance extended by Mr. Vipul Vinod, Assistant
Professor of Law at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow without which
this research project wouldn’t have been possible.

I would also like to thank Dr. Madhu Limaye Library, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
University, Lucknow which provided me with the required support both in the form of books and
online databases which has been of immense value to this project. In the course of this project, I
have also reproduced various parts of published and non-published researches which have been
duly cited. I would here also like to thank the authors of the same.

Anushka

Lucknow, March, 2019.

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Agricultural Produce Market Committee v Girdharbhai Ramjibhai Chhaniyara AIR 1997 SC

2674. .......................................................................................................................................... 10
Bank of India v Lakshimani Dass and Ors (2000) 3 SCC 640 ..................................................... 16
Best Sellers Retail India (P) Ltd v Aditya Nirla Nuvo Ltd (2012) 6 SCC 792. ............................. 12
Gujarat Bottling Co Ltd v Coca Cola Co AIR 1995 SC 2372..................................................... 10
ITO v MK Mohd Kunhi AIR 1969 SC 430; see also Polins v Gray (1879) 12 Ch D 438. ............. 8
Mohan Misser and Ors v Surendra Narain Singh and Ors 1914 SCC Online 172 ...................... 20
Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v Kartick Das (1994) 4 SCC 225 ................................................. 13
Mulraj v Murti Reghunathji Maharaj AIR 1967 SC 1386. ............................................................ 9
Narahari Iyer v Vathinatha Iyer (1919) 9 LW 69 (Mad)(DB) ..................................................... 20
Seema Arshad Zaheer & Ors v Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors (2006) 5 Scale
263. ............................................................................................................................................ 12
Transmission Corpn of AP Ltd v Lanco Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd (2006) 1 SCC 540 ................ 8

.Other Authorities

CK Takwani, J, Civil Procedure with Limitation Act, 1963 (7th edn, Eastern Book Company
2016) 343..................................................................................................................................... 5
PP Joshi, ‘LAW OF INJUNCTIONS: Temporary Injunction including Ex-parte Injunction,
Perpetual Injunction and Mandatory Injunction’ (2015)
http://mja.gov.in/Site/Upload/GR/Consolidate%20Workshop%20Paper%20Ratnagiri%20Civil
-15032015.pdf accessed 15 March, 2017. ................................................................................... 6

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INTRODUCTION
An injunction is an equitable remedy in the form of a court order that compels a party to do or
refrain from specific acts. It is a court order which restrains one of the parties to a suit in equity
from doing or permitting others who are under his control to do an act which is unjust to the
other party. An injunction clearly forbids a certain type of conduct. It is a remedy that originated
in the English courts of equity. Like other equitable remedies, it has traditionally been given
when a wrong cannot be effectively remedied by an award of money damages.1

Injunctions are intended to make whole again someone whose rights have been violated.
Nevertheless, while deciding whether to grant an injunction, courts also take into account the
interests of non-parties (that is, the public interest). When deciding whether to give an injunction,
and deciding what its scope should be, courts give special attention to questions of fairness and
good faith. One manifestation of this is that injunctions are subject to equitable defenses, such as
laches and unclean hands. Injunctions are given in many different kinds of cases. They can
prohibit future violations of the law, such as trespass to real property, infringement of a patent
etc.2

Taking in to consideration the duration and the stage, they can be classified in to

1. Temporary Injunctions
2. Perpetual Injunctions

Perpetual injunction restrains a party forever from doing the specified act and can be granted
only on merits at the end of the trial after hearing both parties to the suit.3 Otherwise, an
injunction that requires conduct is called a "mandatory injunction." An injunction that prohibits
conduct is called a "prohibitory injunction.”4 5
Many injunctions are both—that is, they have
both mandatory and prohibitory components, because they require some conduct and forbid
other conduct. When an injunction is given, it can be enforced with equitable enforcement

1
CK Takwani, J, Civil Procedure with Limitation Act, 1963 (7th edn, Eastern Book Company 2016) 343.
2
PP Joshi, ‘LAW OF INJUNCTIONS: Temporary Injunction including Ex-parte Injunction, Perpetual Injunction
and Mandatory Injunction’ (2015)
http://mja.gov.in/Site/Upload/GR/Consolidate%20Workshop%20Paper%20Ratnagiri%20Civil-15032015.pdf
accessed 15 March, 2017.
3
S 37(2) Specific Relief Act, 1963.
4
Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th edn) vol 24, para 901.
5
Food Corporation of India v Sukh Deo Prasad (2009) 5 SCC 665.

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mechanisms such as contempt. It can also be modified or dissolved (upon a proper motion to the
court) if circumstances change in the future. These features of the injunction allow a court
granting one to manage the behaviour of the parties.6

In Indian legal system the law of injunctions is mainly governed by Order XXXIX and section
36 and 42 of the Specific relief Act. Section 94(c) of the Civil Procedure Code also gives
supplemental provision for grant of temporary injunction. It is also settled that there is no bar in
granting injunction or supplementary orders under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code for
compliance of injunction in just cases. The latter provision of inherent powers increases the
scope of civil courts for granting injunctions.

This research paper seeks to analyse the nature of the effects injunctions granted on insufficient
grounds have under § 95 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

6
CK Takwani, J, Civil Procedure with Limitation Act, 1963 (7th edn, Eastern Book Company 2016) 345.

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OBJECT

The primary purpose of granting interim relief is the preservation of property in dispute till legal
rights and conflicting claims of the parties before the court are adjudicated. The court in the
exercise of sound judicial discretion can grant or refuse to grant interim relief. The underlying
object of granting temporary injunction is to preserve status quo at the time of institution of the
proceedings and to prevent any changes in it until the final determination of the suit. It is in the
nature of protective relief granted in favor of a party to prevent future possible injury.7

In other words, the object of making an order regarding interim relief is to evolve a workable
formula to the extent called for by the demands of the situation, keeping in mind the pros and
cons of the matter and striking a delicate balance between two conflicting interests. The Court in
the exercise of sound judicial discretion can grant or refuse to grant interim relief.8

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STAY AND INJUNCTION

There is difference between stay and injunction. “Stay” means stoppage, arrest or suspension of
judicial proceeding, while “injunction” means restraining or preventing a person from
commencing or continuing action. Order of stay is addressed to court while order of injunction is
issued to party. Injunction becomes effective as soon as it is issued whereas stay operates only
when it is communicated to the court to which it is issued.9

7
ITO v MK Mohd Kunhi AIR 1969 SC 430; see also Polins v Gray (1879) 12 Ch D 438.
8
Transmission Corpn of AP Ltd v Lanco Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd (2006) 1 SCC 540.
9
Mulraj v Murti Reghunathji Maharaj AIR 1967 SC 1386.

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PRINCIPLES ON WHICH TEMPORARY INJUNCTION MAY BE GRANTED

It provides that when the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury
to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in suit, the Court may grant a temporary
injunction to restrain such an act or make other order for the purpose of preventing the
dispossession of the plaintiff or for the purpose of preventing the causing of injury to the plaintiff
in relation to any property in dispute.

Temporary injunction is a provisional remedy that is invoked to preserve the subject matter in its
existing condition. Its purpose is to prevent dissolution of the plaintiff's rights. The main reason
for use of a temporary injunction is the need for immediate relief.

In Agricultural Produce Market Committee Case10, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that "a
temporary injunction can be granted only if the person seeking injunction has a concluded right,
capable of being enforced by way of injunction."

The Hon'ble Apex Court through its landmark judgment in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. Case11,
held that the Court needs to follow certain guidelines while considering an application for grant
of temporary injunction, some of which are briefly stated hereunder:

• The applicant seeking relief of temporary injunction shall have to establish a prima facie
case in his favour. For this purpose, the Court will not examine the merits of the case
rather only the basic facts on which it is established that the applicant has a prima facie
case to contest. Thereafter the applicant also has to establish that the allegations /
averments made in the application on which the temporary injunction is sought are
plausible.

• The court will also examine the conduct of the applicant and such conduct needs to be
examined even at the stage where the application for setting aside an order under Order
XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is filed.

10
Agricultural Produce Market Committee v Girdharbhai Ramjibhai Chhaniyara AIR 1997 SC 2674.
11
Gujarat Bottling Co Ltd v Coca Cola Co AIR 1995 SC 2372.

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• The court has to examine the balance of convenience i.e. the balance of comparative loss
caused to the applicant and the respondent in the case of not passing the order.

• The court will first of all will examine what is the extent of loss that would be caused to
the applicant if the order is not passed and also whether it is reparable by monetary
compensation i.e. by payment of cost. Then it will examine the loss suffered by
respondent if the order is passed and thereupon it has to see which loss will be greater
and irreparable. The party who would suffer greater loss would be said to be having
balance of convenience in his favour and accordingly, the court will pass or refuse to pass
the order.

• The court has the power also to ask the party to deposit security for compensation or to
give an undertaking for the payment of the compensation, if ordered.

It is to be understood that relief of temporary injunction cannot be sought for some right which
would arise in future. Similarly, an injunction cannot be obtained to restrain a party from filing a
suit. In Seema Arshad Zaheer Case12, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has indicated the salient
features of prima facie case as under:

"The discretion of the court is exercised to grant a temporary injunction only when the following
requirements are made out by the plaintiff: (i) existence of a prima facie case as pleaded,
necessitating protection of the plaintiff's rights by issue of a temporary injunction; (ii) when the
need for protection of the plaintiff's rights is compared with or weighed against the need for
protection of the defendant's rights or likely infringement of the defendant's rights, the balance of
convenience tilting in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being
caused to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted. In addition, temporary
injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only
when the plaintiff's conduct is free from blame and he approaches the court with clean hands."

12
Seema Arshad Zaheer & Ors v Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors (2006) 5 Scale 263.

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However, in Best Sellers Retail India (P) Ltd. Case13, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that
prima facie case alone is not sufficient to grant injunction and held that:

"Yet, the settled principle of law is that even where prima facie case is in favour of the plaintiff,
the Court will refuse temporary injunction if the injury suffered by the plaintiff on account of
refusal of temporary injunction was not irreparable."

Order XXXIX Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for ex-parte temporary
injunction in the cases of extreme urgency. However, Rule 3 does not stipulate a separate
application for ex-parte injunction rather such an application should be a part of an application
for a bi-parte temporary injunction and in such application an urgency shall be shown by the
applicant so as to warrant the passing of an ex-parte injunction/order. However, such an order
has to be temporary. The essential safeguards in this regard are briefly stated as under:

• The matter should be urgent and overwhelming.

• The other elements for the grant of temporary injunction order as explained in the Gujarat
Bottling case shall be existing.

• The court shall record reasons for the grant of exparte order.

• It is the duty of the applicant to serve a notice to the other party after the order has been
passed and such notice shall be coupled with a copy of the application, the plaint, the
affidavit and any other document which were filed in support of the application. Upon
serving such notice, the applicant shall on the same day of the order or on the next day
file an affidavit of his having served such a notice.

• Under Order XXXIX Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it is a mandate for
the Court that after passing such an ex-parte order, it shall continue with the bi-parte
proceedings and shall dispose of the application within 30 days. However, the said 30
days period is not the upper limit for ex-parte orders i.e. the ex-parte order will not get
automatically vacated upon the lapse of 30 days rather it can further be extended beyond
30 days in extreme cases.

13
Best Sellers Retail India (P) Ltd v Aditya Nirla Nuvo Ltd (2012) 6 SCC 792.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Morgan Stanley Case14, inter alia observed the under mentioned
guidelines for grant of temporary injunction besides others:

• Where irreparable or extremely serious injury will be caused to the applicant, ex-parte
order can be passed;

• The court shall examine the time when the plaintiff got notice of the act complained;

• If the plaintiff has acquiesced to the conduct of the respondent then ex-parte temporary
injunction shall not be passed;

• The applicant shall be acting in utmost good faith; and

• Such an order shall be for a temporary period.

SECTION 95 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

Section 95 of the Civil procedure Code deals with what this research paper deals in principle
with, the “effects of injunctions granted on insufficient grounds.” For a better understanding of
the entire jurisprudence around this particular section, it is inevitable to reproduce the section
below as such.

95. Compensation for obtaining arrest, attachment or injunction on insufficient grounds.

Where, in any suit in which an arrest or attachment has been effected or a temporary injunction
granted under the last preceding section,-

(a) it appears to the Court that such arrest, attachment or injunction was applied for on
insufficient grounds, or

(b) the suit of the plaintiff fails and it appears to the Court that there was no reasonable or
probable grounds for instituting the same,

14
Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v Kartick Das (1994) 4 SCC 225.

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the defendant may apply to the Court, and the Court may, upon such application, award against
the plaintiff by its order such amount,15[not exceeding fifty thousand rupees], as it deems a
reasonable compensation to the defendant for the16 [expense or injury (including injury to
reputation) caused to him];

Provided that a Court shall not award, under this section, an amount exceeding the limits of its
pecuniary jurisdiction.

(2) An order determining any such application shall bar any suit for compensation in respect of
such arrest, attachment or injunction.

It is clear from the plain reading of the above section that in an instance where the court finds
that the injunction has been sought on insufficient grounds or where the suit instituted by the
plaintiff has failed and the court comes to the conclusion that there was no reasonable ground for
instituting the same, the defendant may apply for compensation to be paid to him by the plaintiff
(including compensation for damage to his reputation).

However, the plain text of the section hasn’t meant a plainer jurisprudence. There have been
certain controversies regarding the interpretation of § 95. These contentious points will be dealt
with the help of case law in the succeeding section.

1. S. 95 ONLY PROVIDES FOR AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY.

This point came up before the consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Bank of
India v Lakshimani Dass and Ors.17

FACTS:

. Shital Chandra Das and Karmadhar Das filed Title Suit No. 77/59 in the Court of Subordinate
Judge at Alipore against Madhuri Choudhary, daughter-in-law of the original lessee of a godown
bearing No. 103/ IB Raja Dipendra Street, Calcutta. The sub-tenants Brij Kishore Bhagat, Nawal

15
Subs, by Act No 46 of 1999, section 8 for “not exceeding one thousand rupees” (wef 1 -7-2002).
16
Subs by Act No 104 of 1976, sec 32 for “expense or injury caused to him” (wef 1-2- 1977).

17
Bank of India v Lakshimani Dass and Ors (2000) 3 SCC 640.

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Kishore Bhagat and Durga Devi Bhagat were also impleaded in the said suit as defendants. The
said suit was decreed on September 30,1963 against all the defendants, including Brij Kishore
Bhagat, Nawal Kishore Bhagat and Durga Devi Bhagat. The plaintiffs in that suit levied
execution in Case No. 18/63 in which warrant for delivery of possession of the disputed premises
was issued. In the disputed godown there were racks on which oil seeds were stacked. Inasmuch
as the said oil seeds could not be immediately removed, the plaintiffs therein obtained delivery of
possession of the godown along with oil seeds stacked in several bags. The said oil seeds were
kept in the custody of Sitaram Roy, an officer of the plaintiffs by the process-server of the Court.
Thereafter the Bank of India, defendant No. 1 in the suit, filed an application under Order XXI
Rule 101 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) claiming that the Bank was in possession of the
godown as a pledgee of the goods from an alleged partnership firm, namely, M/s, Bansidhar
Baijnath and Brij Kishore Bhagat, Durga Devi Bhagat and Nawal Kishore Bhagat, who are stated
to be the partners of the said firm, M/s. Bansidhar Baijnath, the firm, also filed an application
under Order XXI Rules 100 and 101, CPC claiming to be in possession of the godown on the
date of the delivery of the possession. These applications were registered as Miscellaneous Case
No. 1/72 and Miscellaneous Case No. 3/72 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Alipore. The
Subordinate Judge, Alipore, granted leave to the Bank to remove the said goods. Defendant No.
1-Bank, however, applied for modification of the order dated June 27, 1972. A revision petition
was filed in the High Court. Before the High Court defendant No. 1 withdrew the petition for
removal of the said goods and the order of the Subordinate Judge passed on June 27, 1972 was
set aside. In view of the indifference by the defendants, the plaintiffs had suffered loss by way of
rent and by not delivering the vacant possession to the Bank by obtaining an order of injunction
wrongfully and by not removing the goods in spite of the offers made by the plaintiffs and
having kept the goods in spite of the offers made by the plaintiffs, the defendants have become
liable to pay compensation. A separate suit was also filed for ascertaining the mesne profits and
in the suit out of which these proceedings arise, the plaintiffs claimed damages for wrongfully
keeping the said alleged oil seeds from January 15, 1972.

2. Defendant No. 1-Bank, contested the suit. On January 14, 1972 at about 4 p.m. an employee of
the Bank was informed through telephone that padlocks were being broken upon and certain
locks were being placed thereon. The agent of the defendant-Bank went to the spot to find that
the padlocks fixed to the godown had been removed and they had been replaced by other locks.

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The name plates of the defendant also had been removed. The agent of the Bank was prevented
from entering into the godown and making Inspection of the pledged goods. A report was also
made to the police station on January 14, 1972.

3. 12 issues were raised by the trial Court. The trial Court dismissed the suit with costs. The
matter was carried in appeal to the Court of the Additional District Judge, Alipore.. The learned
Judge took the view that the plaintiffs could claim damages from the Bank as well as other
defendants for making good the loss sustained by the plaintiffs on account of occupation of their
respective extent of liability. He, therefore, set aside the judgment and decreed the suit and
further made it clear that the assessment of damages had not been made for the purpose and for
that purpose the matter was remanded. The matter was carried in the second appeal in the High
Court. In the High Court the view taken is that no independent title has been found in favour of
M/s. Bansidhar Baijnath and/or its partners, that is, defendants Nos. 2 to 4, in respect of the said
godown by the Courts below and apart from Section 95, CPC the plaintiffs are entitled to bring
an action for recovery of damages for wrongful use and occupation of the godown by the
defendants Nos. 1 to 4.

HELD:

Section 95, CPC provides for a summary remedy to get compensation where a temporary
injunction has been granted if such injunction was applied for on insufficient grounds or there
were no reasonable or probable grounds for instituting the claim for injunction. The defendant in
such a proceeding is simply to present a petition to the court and the court subject to its
pecuniary jurisdiction can give compensation up to Rs. 1,000/-. The remedy under the code is
optional and an injured party can file a regular suit against the applicant for injunction for
compensation if he has not already sought relief under the aforesaid provision. Thus this section
is an alternative remedy in cases of wrongful obtainment of an injunction and it does not in any
way interfere with the principles regulating suits for damages for tort of malicious legal process.

As a general principle where two remedies are available under law one of them should not be
taken as operating in derogation of the other. A regular suit will not be barred by a summary and
a concurrent remedy being also provided therefore, but if a party has elected to pursue one

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remedy he is bound by it and cannot on his failing therein proceed under another provision. A
regular suit for compensation is not barred by the omission to proceed under summary procedure
provided under Section 95, CPC, but if an application is made and disposed of, such disposal
would operate as a bar to regular suit whatever may be the result of the application. There is,
however, a difference between conditions necessary for the maintainability of an application
under Section 95, CPC and those necessary to maintain a suit. The regular suit is based on tort
for abusing the process of Court. Under the law of torts in a suit for compensation for the tort the
plaintiff must not only prove want of reasonable or probable cause of obtaining injunction but
also that the defendant was attracted by malice which is an improper motive.

2. APPEAL TO LIE UNDER § 104, CPC.

This position was adjudged by the Madras high court in the case of Narahari Iyer v Vathinatha
Iyer.18

HELD:

The mere fact that the defendant was in straitened circumstances, had suffered coercive civil and
revenue processes and had previously made an alienation of some property is not proof of the
fact that the defendant was actually about to dispose of his property and is not sufficient to
enable a Court to order an attachment before judgment.

An order under Sect. 95, Civil Procedure Code, refusing compensation for wrongful attachment
before judgment is appealable under Sect. 104 of the Civil Procedure Code.

3. NO SUIT WOULD LIE UNDER § 95, CPC MERELY ON THE SUGGESTION OF MALICE. ALSO,
LIMITATION WOULD RUN FROM THE GRANTING OF THE PERPETUAL INJUNCTION.

This position came up for consideration before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Mohini
Mohan Misser and Ors v Surendra Narain Singh and Ors.19

18
Narahari Iyer v Vathinatha Iyer (1919) 9 LW 69 (Mad)(DB).
19
Mohan Misser and Ors v Surendra Narain Singh and Ors 1914 SCC Online 172.

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HELD:

No suit lies for damages against a Defendant for maliciously and without reasonable and
probable cause obtaining a perpetual injunction which has been subsequently dissolved on
appeal.

A temporary injunction granted in such a suit is ipso facto dissolved by the Court's decree
granting a perpetual injunction.

In a suit for damages in respect of the temporary injunction limitation would therefore run from
the date when the temporary injunction was dissolved by the decree granting perpetual
injunction.

Per Fletcher, J.— An allegation by the Plaintiff that the Defendants were actuated by malice and
that their suit for perpetual injunction ultimately proved unsuccessful when the decree of the
High Court in their favour was set aside by His Majesty in Council was not a sufficient
allegation of want of reasonable and probable cause.

Want of probable cause is not to be inferred because of mere evidence of malice.

Per Richardson, J.—Sec. 95, C.P.C., seems to contemplate the possibility of a suit being brought
to recover compensation in respect of a temporary injunction applied for on insufficient grounds
or in a suit instituted without reasonable or probable cause.

A party is not liable in damages for procuring an erroneous decision.

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CONCLUSION

In light of the aforesaid discussion, it can be clearly concluded that S 95 acts in the form of a
deterrent preventing suits without a just, probable cause or without a reasonable ground from
being instituted and innocent citizens from being harassed. Further, it also acts as a deterrent
against malicious prosecution, the cases of which are far too many these days.

The wording of S 95 has been such that not many contentious points have been raised relating to
its jurisprudence but the case of Bank of India v Lakshimani Dass20 is of much importance and
relevance as it cleared the long standing question of S 95 acting as a bar against the institution of
another suit for malicious prosecution. What is necessary to understand is that while another suit
being instituted against malicious prosecution may or may not be under the realm of civil law, S
95 specifically applies in the realm of civil law.

In an era which is dominated by institution of suits that don’t stand up to the scrutiny of even the
first juristic hearing, such deterring sections gain even more importance. While the issue gets
murkier under criminal law, protection of the rights of the innocent and the fair is as much a
prerogative of the judicial system under civil law as much as it is under criminal law.

Further, S 95 acts as an assurance to anybody wrongfully convicted or unnecessarily harassed

about the protection of his/her/ their rights and as the apostles of justice, it is the prerogative of
the judiciary to continue to protect them.

20
Bank of India v Lakshimani Dass and ors (2000) 3 SCC 640.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS:

• Sarkar, SC, Law of Civil Procedure, vol 1, Butterworths Wadhwa and Co, 2002, Nagpur.
• Takwani, CK, 2016 edn, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow.
• Woodroffe, John, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, 4th edn, Delhi Law House, 2006, Delhi.

WEBSITES

• http://www.inc.com/articles/1999/11/15396.html
• http://www.scconline.com/
• http://www.thecitizen.in/
• https://www.academia.edu/
• http://mja.gov.in/
• http://www.manupatrafast.in/pers/Personalized.aspx

• http://jstor.org/stable/1069096

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